10 5 12 0204 60838 Motion For Order To Show Cause 12-31434

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Electronically Filed
Oct 05 2012 09:40 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
Clerk of Supreme Court
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
In Re Matter of:
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
10 Nevada Bar No: 9473
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) Supreme Court No: 60838
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR

COUNSEL AND, POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY
COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLINS SCR 102(4)(d)
PETITION IN CASE 61426
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COMES NOW, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ., and files the above named
document and moves this Court, or the Board, Panel, Bar for the relief requested herein. This filing
is further based upon the papers and pleadings on file herein and in the companion case before the
Nevada Supreme Court in 60838 and 61426.
FACTS
1. Patrick King, Esq., Bar Counsel of the North, and NNDB Chairman J. Thomas Susich
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continue to display an alarming lack of appreciation for due process, basic fairness, and other notions
of fair play and substantial justice...and now seeks to subvert the express ruling of the Nevada
- 1/62 MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
Docket 60838 Document 2012-31434
Supreme Court in its June 7th, 2012 Order by turning the Hearing that has already been set (as
confirmed by the SBN's Laura Peters, in writing) for September 25th, 2012 into a "due process combo
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pack express package" wherein all the various matters set forth in King's Complain shall also be
addressed, despite the Order by the Nevada Supreme Court and the text of SCR 111 very clearly
indicating the "sole purpose" of the hearing will be to determine the punishment for the one criminal
conviction contained in Bar Counsel's SCR 111 petition of May 10, 2012 in 60838 and where an
"immediate hearing" is further required in light of Coughlin's SCR 102(4)(d) Petition filed, and
unopposed by the SBN in 61426.
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2. SBN Clerk of Court of the Laura Peters has assured Coughlin that no service of any SBN v
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Coughlin Complaint has been effected as of this date and that Coughlin is in no danger of defaulting
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for failure to answer any such Complaint. However, Clerk of Court Peters indicated to Coughlin that
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she did not file Coughlin's September 17th, 2012 Motion to Dismiss in light of directions from Bar
Counsel Patrick O. King, Esq., and further, NNDB Chairman, J. Thomas Susich has made similar
indications of the extent to which King is attempting to circumvent procedural rules attendant to these
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matters and cause Coughlin further damages and delay, particularly with regard to the dictates of SCR
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116. The scheduling of the hearing is the domain of the NNDB and is not to be handed of to the
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prosecutor here, Bar Counsel Pat King. Peters, King, and Clark have all admitted that King and
Clark are seeking to circumvent the procedural rules and Order related to the scheduling and holding
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of the hearing in response to the Court's June 7th, 2012 Order in 60838 and with regard to the
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"immediate hearing" required upon Coughlin's August 13th, 2012 Petition in SCR 61426, which Bar
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Counsel has failed to Oppose, and for which, therefore, Coughlin is entitled to the relief he therein
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sought, ie, the dissolution of the temporary suspension of his license to practice law.
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3. By and Order of the Nevada Supreme Court on June 7th, 2012 Coughlin's constitutionally
protected property right, his law license, was temporarily suspended: "Pursuant to SCR 111,
temporary suspension and referral to the appropriate disciplinary board are mandatory when an
attorney has been convicted of a "serious" crime, which includes theft. SCR 111(6)-(8). Accordingly,
pursuant to SCR 111(8), we refer this matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of
a formal hearing before a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent
of the discipline to be imposed. Furthermore, pursuant to SCR 111(7), we hereby temporarily suspend
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attorney Zachary B. Coughlin from the practice of law in Nevada, pending final disposition of the
disciplinary proceedings."
4. In a written communication from SBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters on July 26th, which
was cc'd to Bar Counsel Patrick King, Clerk Peters wrote: " Mr. Coughlin: I have been contacted by
Tom Susich of the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board. I understand that you would like to schedule
a formal hearing in your matter. I have gathered some available dates in September and October let
me know what will work for you: September 25, 26 or 27 October 15, 16, 17, 18, 30 or 31 Thank you,
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Laura Peters". In an written correspondence from Coughlin to Clerk of Court for the SBN Peters:
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"Subject: Hearing... Dear Ms. Peters, Please set the hearing date as soon as possible for any matter
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involving me that has been referred to the bar or the disciplinary panel. thanks Zach Coughlin". The
SBN's Peters responded, in writing, on August 17th, 2012, to Coughlin: "RE: Hearing...Zach: How
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about September 25th, work for you?". Coughlin responded to Peters, in writing, on August 17th,
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2012: "That works thanks" with a copy of Peter's correspondence of August 17th, 2012 setting forth
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the September 25th, 2012 Hearing date. Coughlin wrote to NNDB Chairman J. Thomsas Susich, Esq.
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on September 11th, 2012 indicating, in writing: " The hearing is set for... Hearing date... I look
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forward to our Hearing on September 25th, 2012. Zach Coughlin".

4.1 Upon information and belief, in early May 2011, prior to any SCR 111 Petition or SCR
105 Complaint being filed, Bar Counsel violated SCR Rule 121(5) Confidentiality: "5. Temporary
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suspension under Rule 102(4). In the event that the state bar files a petition with the supreme court for
the temporary suspension of an attorney before a formal complaint is filed in the underlying
disciplinary proceeding, then the matter shall be treated as confidential. If the court grants the
petition, then the matter shall become public upon entry of the order granting the petition. If the
court denies the petition, then the matter shall remain confidential until a formal complaint is
filed or the matter is otherwise concluded."
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5. On September 11th, 2012, in a telephone conversation with Coughlin, SBN Clerk of Court
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confirmed that the hearing previously noticed, set, and schedule for September 25th, 2012 was "still
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scheduled" and "on the calendar". During that conversation, Clerk of Court Peters admitted that
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"there is a hearing set for the 25th (of September), we set that just on the SCR 111 Petition. Now
there is a Complaint and I think that Pat and David want to combine it, I didn't know that at the time
that I set your hearing date." Coughlin then asked Peters "So, the hearing is still set on the
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calendar?". Peters responded "on the calendar it is". Then Peters indicated that "as soon as the
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Hearing was set, they (Pat King and David Clark) said 'oh, wait, wait, we want to combine it with the
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Complaint's Hearing as well, so they filed a Complaint and I served it on you." when I set your
hearing (for September 25th, 2012), I did not know that David (Bar Counsel David Clark) and Pat
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(Pat King) wanted to combine that (hearing on the SCR 111 and SCR 102(4)(d) Petitions in 60838
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and 61426) with a SBN v. Coughlin Complaint the SBN has been threatening to file against
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Coughlin)".
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6. Bar Counsel King has continually referred to Coughlin, as a "former attorney", often when
speaking directly to Coughlin, and has further mentioned to Coughlin that Coughlin has been
"disbarred", while speaking in a mock devastated tone when mentioning the sadness King would
himself feel if Coughlin lost his law license, which echoed the venomous chill in the air when David
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Clark recalled to Coughlin, regretfully about that one time an attorney committed suicide before Clark
got a chance to prosecute him, and that regret, to be clear, was due to missing the chance to prosecute
that attorney prior to the suicide. King is apparently unaware that disbarments were made irrevocable
in Nevada in 2008 or the fact that one is still "an attorney" during a temporary suspension of one's law
license.
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7. Coughlin appeared at the northern officer the State Bar for the calendared, agreed upon,
noticed, and set September 25, 2012 Hearing notice to him and the NNDB's Chairman Susich and
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required by this Court's June 7th, 2012 Order and SCR 111(8). While Coughlin sat waiting in the
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lobby out walked Clerk of Court Peters and Bar Counsel Patrick King, King holding a stack of papers
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then handing them to Clerk Peters, and King whom greeted Coughlin and entere a conversation that
when approximately like this:
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King: Zach.
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Clerk Peters: I am supposed to hand you this Complaint.
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King: Your're served (motioning to Clerk Peters to hand Coughlin the stack of papers). You are
officially served. She's the Court Clerk. You're served.
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Coughlin: Aw.. I think one has to be served by a non-party under SCR 109.
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King: No, you're served ,she's the Clerk of Court, so take it. She's serving you, your are officially
served and so I will issue a default judgment against you if you don't accept it.
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Peters: I mailed it out.

Coughlin: Is my hearing going to be held right now?
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King: First, take this.
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Coughlin: What about my Hearing that's what I'm here for right now.
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King: First, take this.
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Coughlin I think you actually can't serve people when they are showing up for a Hearing.
King yes I can absolutely can,
Coughlin: I have cases that say you can't.
King: I absolutely can things don't go your way because you don't accept responsibility (King grabs
the stack of papers from Peters and attempt to insert them into Coughlin's suit jacket after pulling the
middle button on Coughlin's blazer away from Coughlin's torso, whereupon King gives up on that
approach). I'll drop it at your feet here your served (King bends down and places the stack of papers
on top of Coughlin dress shoes).
Coughlin you are a party though it has to be a non-party that's the law
King: Zach. don't play games!
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Coughlin: It's not a game, Pat, it's the law.

Peters: Zach, please?
Coughlin: Where is my hearing?
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King: Hi Paula where you witness that I'm serving or that rather Laura is serving Zach Coughlin with
the Complaint.
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Paula: Sure? (looking bewildered beyond all measure).
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King Here is this, take it, take it, Zach.

Coughlin: We go to have my hearing today?
King: First order of business is for you to accept the Complaint
Coughlin: For you may be Pat, but you're not the one who hasn't had a law license last four months
over a candy bar so
King are going to take the complaint it's a formal complaint I'm been a default you him him. You can
pretend you didn't get it else is take a default
Coughlin: Pat I filed a motion to dismiss. Seems like you are trying to put Clerk of Court Peters in
kind of a bad spot.
King No, you haven't filed it it's been rejected,
Coughlin: By who, the prosecutor? The prosecutor rejected it, Pat?
King: Listen the Clerk of Court Peters rejected it because it doesn't say what it's dismissing. You are
not even acknowledging that you have been served so take the Complaint and then you can answer it.
You're been served right now
Coughlin: well I guess you're free to argue that, that you a party that is serving me.
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King: No, the Court clerk is serving you. Your at the State Bar office being served with a Complaint
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Coughlin I I've got cases this the you can serve a criminal defendant when they show up to a civil
proceeding
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King: This is State Bar.

Coughlin: Oh, I get it. We're playin' prison rules, huh? Like in that movie The Cable Guy when Jim
Carrey is playing pickup ball and says "Oh, we're playing prison rules" to the guys who just fouled
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him so hard? I guess, we are "playin' 'prison rules'" down here at the State Bar, huh? Are we going to
have my hearing today? Because the Hearing is limited in scope and purpose, right?
King: Zach listen to the Court Clerk.
Coughlin: Okay.
Peters: when you and I talked about the date for September 25 that was a tentative thing I have not
formally notice that I never did
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King: Because you did not answer the complaint because you did not answer the complaint by me
explain Mr. Coughlin the suspension that you receive from the Supreme Court which is their order
safety of a problem with the Supreme Court.
Coughlin I did with the SCR 102(4)(d) Petition? Why didn't you answer that, Pat? Now, I win on
that on default, too?
King: That's the Supreme Court they suspended you pending...pending a disciplinary Complaint
which is what that is (motioning to a stack of papers King had earlier laid at Coughlin's feet).
Coughlin: So this is a new Complaint filing?
King know the suspension is pending the disciplinary action that I bring. I have not filed any
disciplinary action they suspended you pending disciplinary action him this is disciplinary and him
(motioning to the stack of papers on the ground).
Coughlin: SCR 111(8) and the Supreme Court's order said that the hearing is limited to the sole
purpose of determining Mr. Coughlin's punishment for that upon which the SCR 111 Petition was
brought.
King: it does not say that, it says 'pending a disciplinary action by the State Bar'
Coughlin: I am talking about the "hearing before the Disciplinary Panel" under SCR 111(8) and the
Court's June 7th, 2012 Order, that is different than some hearing Under an SCR 105 Complaint. That
the whole import of the language in SCR 111(8), which the Court quotes exactly in its June 7th, 2012
Order for Temporary Suspension of Law License where it reads, "the supreme court shall"..."refer the
matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hearing before a hearing
panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed".
King: Listen to me, I am trying to help you. That Complaint (pointing at the stack of papers on the
ground) is the Complaint that we will have the Hearing on...
Coughlin: We are having a Hearing today, and if we don't, you default, and I get my license back.
King: If you answer that Complaint, then..you will have the right to appear at a Hearing and argue
your case to the Disciplinary Panel. If you do not file a Verified Answer to the Complaint, then we
will move forward, and proceed on a default basis, and the Panel may accept every allegation in the
Complaint as true.
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Coughlin: So you refused to file the Motion to Dismiss I submitted for filing?
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King: What Motion to Dismiss?
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Coughlin: The one Clerk Peters said you told her not to file.
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King: I didn't tell...I don't tell the Court Clerk what to do...
Coughlin: I sent it to you Pat. What Motion to Dismiss?
King: What are you asking to be dismissed? It doesn't say what you are asking to be dismissed. You
can't have it both ways, Zach.
Coughlin: Pat, do you have a case number,? Do you have a case number on that, on that, Pat?
King: Pick it up and read it. Pick it up and read it.
Coughlin: I can wait around her a little while longer for you to get my Hearing going, but at some
point I think I would be justified in assuming you are refusing to proceed with or hold the Hearing
you set and noticed, so...you might want to get Chairman Susich or somebody down here and get this
Hearing, here, happenin', Pat.
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LAW AND LEGAL ARGUMENT

A state cannot exclude a person from the practice of law in a manner or for reasons that
contravene the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 105. Due
process requirements; notice and opportunity to be heard
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An attorney is entitled to due process in disciplinary proceedings concerning his or her

conduct.[FN1] Due process in disciplinary proceedings requires that the attorney be given notice of
the proceeding and an opportunity to defend at a hearing, and that the proceeding be essentially fair.
[FN2] Due process requires that, in an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the attorney must be notified
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of clear and specific charges and must be afforded an opportunity to anticipate, prepare, and present a
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defense.[FN3] The precise procedural protections of due process vary, depending upon the
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circumstances, because due process is a flexible concept unrestricted by any bright-line rules.[FN4]
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An attorney is not denied due process where he or she voluntarily leaves the hearing with full
knowledge that the proceedings will continue in his or her absence.[FN5] There is no denial of due
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process where an attorney is served with a complaint and requests for admissions before the bar files
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the complaint in the supreme court where the rules do not require that the complaint be filed before it
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is served.[FN6] In addition, an attorney's due process rights are not violated, even though the attorney
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is not allowed to attend a grievance committee meeting, if the attorney is served with notice of the
bar's charges and is afforded an opportunity in the disciplinary hearing to be heard.[FN7]
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A statute providing for automatic disbarment of an attorney for conviction of an offense involving
moral turpitude does not violate due process if the attorney has notice of the disbarment proceedings,
and is able to present his or her position to the board on professional responsibility and argue that his
or her crimes did not involve moral turpitude.[FN8]
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What is important is that the disciplinary board's recommendations put the attorney on notice of the
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charges he or she must answer to the satisfaction of the court.[FN9] As to the discipline imposed, due
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process requires that an attorney facing discipline be permitted to explain the circumstances of the
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alleged offense and to offer testimony in mitigation of any penalty
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to be imposed.[FN10]
Where the evidence at the hearing discloses misconduct not charged in the original notice, the bar
may move to amend the notice to conform to the proof, but if no such motion is made, the attorney
may be disciplined only for the misconduct alleged in the original notice.[FN11]
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An attorney may be temporarily suspended without a pre-suspension hearing where the risk of
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erroneous deprivation is minimized by provisions allowing the attorney to continue his or her existing
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practice for a specified time and allow for immediate hearing and prompt resolution of the matter.
[FN12]
Due process requires a court to provide notice and opportunity to be heard to an attorney prior
to imposing a lifetime ban on the attorney's pro hac vice status in the court's local division.[FN13]
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Attorney suspended from practice of law was not deprived of due process by state court
disciplinary procedure, as would warrant imposition of different discipline in reciprocal discipline
proceeding, for attorney's ethics violation in misleading lower court in underlying inheritance action
by filing motion to withdraw funds consigned in lower court for client, but failing to disclose that
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client had died and misstating that there were no minors involved, since attorney had full notice and
opportunity to be heard in state court disciplinary proceeding. In re Oliveras Lopez De Victoria, 561
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009).
Attorney was not denied due process at presentment before trial court in disciplinary
proceeding by admission of complainant's testimony at earlier hearing before reviewing committee;
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complainant was unavailable, and attorney had a full and fair opportunity to and in fact did cross
examine complainant at hearing before review committee. Statewide Grievance Committee v.
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Johnson, 108 Conn. App. 74, 946 A.2d 1256 (2008), certification denied, 288 Conn. 915, 954 A.2d
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187 (2008).
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Attorney was properly notified of disciplinary proceeding, and the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to
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proceed, where hearing notification was sent by both regular and certified mail to attorney's last
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address on file with the Clerk of Appellate Courts and both mailings were returned, marked "not
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deliverable as addressed," and same notice was mailed to Colorado address that attorney had listed in
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a responsive pleading in a prior disciplinary action, and that notice was also returned, marked "return
to sender." Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 215. In re Lober, 241 P.3d 81 (Kan. 2010).
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Attorney had no due process right to jury trial in discipline proceeding, even though license to
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practice law was a property right. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. In re Gargano, 460 Mass. 1022, 957
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N.E.2d 235 (2011).
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Supreme Court observes due process in exercising disciplinary jurisdiction over an attorney, but
disciplinary proceedings are not encumbered by technical rules and formal requirements. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14. In re Disciplinary Action against Garcia, 792 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 2010).
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Attorney's conviction for two misdemeanor counts of theft warranted immediate suspension of
attorney's license under disciplinary rule authorizing immediate suspension pending final disposition
of disciplinary proceeding predicated upon conviction for serious crime. In re Disciplinary Action
Against Fisher, 2008 ND 151, 754 N.W.2d 802 (N.D. 2008).
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The standards of due process in an attorney disciplinary proceeding are not equal to those in a
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criminal matter. Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St. 3d 521, 2008-Ohio-91, 880 N.E.2d
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467 (2008). [FN1] The Florida Bar v. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1999). [FN2] Bradley v.
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Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 20 L. Ed. 646, 1871 WL 14737 (1871); Jaen v. Coca-Cola Co., 157 F.R.D. 146,
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31 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 178 (D.P.R. 1994). [FN3] In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marshall, 160
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Wash. 2d 317, 157 P.3d 859 (2007). [FN4] Steinert v. Winn Group, Inc., 440 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir.
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2006). [FN5] Colangelo v. State Bar, 53 Cal. 3d 1255, 283 Cal. Rptr. 181, 812 P.2d 200 (1991).
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[FN6] The Florida Bar v. Daniel, 626 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1993). [FN7] The Florida Bar v. Committe,
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916 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1098, 126 S. Ct. 1890, 164 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2006).
[FN8] In re Krouner, 920 A.2d 1039 (D.C. 2007). [FN9] Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 85 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1985). [FN10] The
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Florida Bar v. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1999). [FN11] Edwards v. State Bar, 52 Cal. 3d 28,
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276 Cal. Rptr. 153, 801 P.2d 396 (1990). [FN12] In re Lamm, 116 N.C. App. 382, 448 S.E.2d 125
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(1994), decision aff'd, 341 N.C. 196, 458 S.E.2d 921 (1995). [FN13] Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399
F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 873, 126 S. Ct. 381, 163 L. Ed. 2d 167 (2005).
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SCR Rule 119. Additional rules of procedure.

1. Record. The record of a hearing shall be made available to the attorney at the attorneys expense
on request made to bar counsel. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 83
S. Ct. 1175, 10 L. Ed. 2d 224, 2 A.L.R.3d 1254 (1963).
2. Time limits not jurisdictional. Except as is otherwise provided in these rules, time is
directoryand not jurisdictional. Time limitations are administrative, not jurisdictional. Failure to
observe directory time intervals may result in contempt of the appropriate disciplinary
board or hearing panel having jurisdiction, but will not justify abatement of any disciplinary
investigation or proceeding.
3. Other rules of procedure. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, the Nevada Rulesof Civil
Procedure and the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure apply in disciplinary cases.
The undersigned (Coughlin) submitted to the Supreme Court of Nevada's electronic filing
system an Opposition to Bar Counsel's petition on or about May 24th, 2012, as an original matter
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given the online system would not allow filings in the case itself (60838). The Clerk's Office
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refused to file, mark as received, or, apparently, in any way make the Justices of this Court away of
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the Opposition. Only after the undersigned reputation has been sullied by news outlets far and wide
(an article appeared in papers in at least three different cities, separated by the vast expanse of our
state) did the Clerk's Office allow Coughlin to file something in an attempt to tell his side of the
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story here and avoid the prejudice that would be done his child custody, foreclosure defense,
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bankruptcy, and other other clients should Coughlin's law license be suspended, even temporarily..
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SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS....NRCP 5(e), Filing With the
Court Defined: The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as required by these rules
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shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court....The clerk shall not refuse to accept for
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filing any paper presented for that purpose solely because it is not presented in proper form
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as required by these rules or any local rules or practices. NRCP 5(e).
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accused of stealing $755,000 candy bars from a client yet he was temporarily suspended and his
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Coughlin is not
suspension has now lasted over four months. Only after the undersigned reputation has been sullied
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by news outlets far and wide (an article appeared in papers in at least three different cities, separated
by the vast expanse of our state) did the Clerk's Office allow Coughlin to file something in an
attempt to tell his side of the story here and avoid the prejudice that would be done his child
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custody, foreclosure defense, bankruptcy, and other other clients should Coughlin's law license be
suspended, even temporarily...
It is the official duty of the clerk of a court to record (Nash v. Campbell County Fiscal
Court, 2011 WL 1620587 (Ky. 2011). [FN2] ) or file all the papers in a cause presented by the
parties, and to indorse the correct date of the filing on them. Estate of Johnson v. Ciarpelli, 71
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A.D.3d 1482, 896 N.Y.S.2d 752 (4th Dep't 2010); In re Simmonds, 271 S.W.3d 874 (Tex. App.
Waco 2008)The duty is purely ministerial (Benson v. District Clerk, 331 S.W.3d 431 (Tex. Crim.
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App. 2011) (writ of habeas corpus) and the clerk may not refuse to perform except on the order
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of the court. Cave v. Elliott, 190 Md. App. 65, 988 A.2d 1 (2010); In re Smith, 270 S.W.3d 783
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(Tex. App. Waco 2008).
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It is important to note that Coughlin has already had a very important attempted filing
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rejected by the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Nevada, and now Bar Counsel Patrick King, Esq. is,
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according to Clerk of Court of the State Bar of Nevada, Laura Peters, telling her not to file somethign
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Coughlin has submitted for filing.
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Further, Coughlin served his SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in SCR 61426 and his SCR111(10)
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Motion to Dissolve Temporary Suspension upon both Bar Counsel for the North, Patrick King and
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Bar Counsel for all of Nevada and the main Southern Office of the SBN, David Clark on August
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13th, 2012, with both consenting to waive any personal service by a non party rule under SCR 109,
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and further, where Clerk of Court Laura Peters signed a "Notice of Receipt" of those documents that
also bore a heading that it was a "Proof of Service". See attached in Exhibit 1. So, the SBN wants to
deem Peters "not a party" sufficient to serve Coughlin with something requiring personal service, but
does not want Peters to be deemed "a party" sufficient that her signature attesting to a "Notice of
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Receipt" effectuates any SCR 102(4)(d) requirement that a "Petition shall be served on Bar
Counsel"? Or, the SBN has just failed to timely respond to Coughlin's August 13th, 2012 SCR
102(4)(d) Petition in 61426 and his SCR 111(10) Motion to Dissolve Temporary Suspension in
60838, both served on the SBN and NNDB Chairman J. Thomas Susich that very day, August 14th,
2012.
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Rule 104(3). State bar counsel....

3. A grievance against bar counsel or bar counsels staff shall be investigated at the direction
of the president of the state bar and heard by the board of governors. A decision of the board of
governors against bar counsel may be appealed to the supreme court under the Nevada Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
SCR 105(2):. Commencement of formal proceedings. Formal disciplinary proceedings are
commenced by bar counsel filing a written complaint in the name of the state bar. The complaint
shall be sufficiently clear and specific to inform the attorney of the charges against him or
her and the underlying conduct supporting the charges. A copy of the complaint shall be
served on the attorney and it shall direct that a verified response or answer be served on bar
counsel within 20 days of service; the original shall be filed with bar counsels office. The time to
respond may be extended once by the chair for not more than 20 days for good cause or upon
stipulation of the parties. In the event the attorney fails to plead, the charges shall be deemed
admitted; provided, however, that an attorney who fails to respond within the time provided may
thereafter obtain permission of the appropriate disciplinary board chair to do so, if failure to file is
attributable to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
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The SBN has admitted, via Clerk of Court Laura Peters, that not only has the SBN
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agreed to and already set for hearing the referral to the Board called for in the Nevada Supreme
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Courts June 7th, 2012 Order Temporarily Suspending Coughlins License to Practice Law, but also
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that any SBN v. Coughlin Complaint Bar Counsel Pat King wishes to throw together at the last
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minute in an attempt to skirt the limits of the jurisdiction granted the Board in the Courts June 7th,
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2012 Order, given Kings stated intention to attempt to make a combo-hearing out of the Hearing
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called for in that Order, despite its sole purpose language and the same found in SCR 111(8), in
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addition to the fact that given Coughlins Petition in 61426, under SCR 102(4)(d), requires an
immediate hearing, and that Petition was duly served on August 13th, 2012, both on the Board via
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Chairman Susich and both offices of the SBN, via Clark and King, and Peters personal receipt
thereof, which the SBN has still failed to respond to (much less challenge the reconsideration motion
in 60383, etc. (who is talking about whos competence, again?)...
Further, it is a virtual certainty, given Pat Kings established modes., that any such
Complaint he files, upon it being properly served and not insufficient due to illegibility of the
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photocopies of any exhibits (take it from me given 60302 and 60317, I know...) will be wholly
insufficient in that it will in no way comply with SCR 105(2), and so, as a preemptive measure,
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please be advised that any such Complaint ought take particular care to state who brought what
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grievance, and avoid conclusory assertions about something lacking legal merit or otherwise
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broadly demonstrating incompetence.
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Further, any assertions by the SBN that sending such a Complaint via certified mail,
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especially where a phone call to SBN Clerk of Court Peters on September 14th, 2012 yield her giving
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Coughlin the SBNs word that given the SBNs apparent attempt to serve Coughlin via Certified
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mail some Complaint Pat King apparently followed through on in his promise to thrown together
haphazardly in hopes of defeating any due process accorded the hearing on September 25th, 2012,
would not require a response at least until the SBN receives back as unclaimed some second
attempted certified mailing under SCR 109.
Proceedings instituted a long time after the commission of the act complained of are
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regarded with disfavor. In re Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d 1, 474 P.2d 116 (1970). Bar Counsel is
purportedly, and ever so conveniently seeking delay Coughlins procedural rights to a hearing on the
temporary suspension of his law license (which has already lasted longer than the NNDBs
punishment for an attorney who admitted to misappropriating about 755,000 candy bars, from his
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clients, during the course of his duties as an attorney rather than, allegedly, on a Saturday night at a
Wal-Mart an in no way connected to the practice of law, and under circumstances that indicate the
conviction stemmed from a proceedign wholly devoid of due process, and where the appeal thereto
was improperly dismissed based upon a failure of the RMC to order the transcripts produced within
10 days (the District Court cited to a civil statute in blaming Coughlin for failing ot point to a
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transcript in his Appeal Brief where the RMCs practice of demanding indigent defendants use one
and only one court approved transcriptionist and pay her up front is violative of Nevada law.
Since it is essential that the bar and the public perceive the process of the discipline of an
attorney as fair, orderly, and rational, and implicit in this perception is the timely and efficient
resolution of complaints. In re Grossman, 448 Mass. 151, 859 N.E.2d 423 (2007). A delay in
bringing disciplinary proceedings against an attorney it is to be placed into context as a
mitigating factor to be balanced against a number of aggravating factors. In re Disciplinary
Proceeding Against Boelter, 139 Wash. 2D 81, 985 P.2d 328 (1999).
The purpose of the attorney disciplinary process is not to punish the offender[FN4] but to
protect the public. Attorney Grievance Com'n of Maryland v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 922 A.2d 554 (2007),
reinstatement granted, 2007 WL 2128391 (Md. 2007). The principal reason for attorney discipline is
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to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity and trustworthiness of lawyers in general. In
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re Scanio, 919 A.2d 1137 (D.C. 2007) Attorney discipline is designed to protect the public, the legal
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profession, and the legal system and to deter other attorneys from engaging in unprofessional
conduct. In re Non-Member of State Bar of Arizona, Van Dox, 214 Ariz. 300, 152 P.3d 1183
(2007). Thus, the judgment of a disciplinary proceeding must be fair to the attorney. The
Florida Bar v. Cox, 718 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1998).
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The purpose of the temporary suspension of a lawyer is more than disciplinary; it is also
intended to prompt a response to the board's inquires so the disciplinary action may proceed in a
timely and informed fashion. Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Fields, 790 N.W.2d
791 (Iowa 2010).
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Upon information and belief, in early May 2011, prior to any SCR 111 Petition or SCR 105
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Complaint being filed, Bar Counsel violated SCR Rule 121(5) Confidentiality: "5. Temporary
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suspension under Rule 102(4). In the event that the state bar files a petition with the supreme court
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for the temporary suspension of an attorney before a formal complaint is filed in the underlying
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disciplinary proceeding, then the matter shall be treated as confidential. If the court grants the
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petition, then the matter shall become public upon entry of the order granting the petition. If the court
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denies the petition, then the matter shall remain confidential until a formal complaint is filed or the
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matter is otherwise concluded." In early May 2012 Coughlin received a disturbing phone call from a
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client wherein the exact same information regarding some purported "taking away your right to
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practice in (REDACTED) Court" was mentioned by the client, despite not such deprivation of
Coughlin's right to practice in said (REDACTED) Court ever being mentioned by anyone other than
Bar Counsel Pat King (whom referenced such a non-existent Order to Coughlin and Chief Bar
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Counsel David Clark during an informal three hour meeting Coughlin had with those Bar Counsel in
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Reno on August 13th, 2012, while serving the SCR 102(4)(d) and SCR 111(10) filings by Coughlin).
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King is simply wrong, recklessly and negligently so, and in violation of SCR 111. King needs to
stop behaving like a fall semester freshman high school girl with no self esteem taken by every
letterman walking past her wearing a football jersey to school on a Friday game day, eager to be
accepted by the "in crowd" with the "juice" in Nevada legal circles (and overly willing to be used for
even the most loathsome of chores, like, say a SCR 117 Petition for a Judge whom had Coughlin
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arrested for "criminal summary contempt), and, rather, faithfully uphold the duties of his Office, as
the integrity of the legal profession in this State requires it. No such "Order" was ever entered by the
(REDACTED) Court, and it is obvious that King had improper communications with Coughlin's then
client.
Such an anticipated SBN v Coughlin SCR 105 Complaint, according to King, will be based
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largely upon Coughlin allegedly wearing "pajama bottoms" to the Reno Municipal Court filing
counter one day while inquiring about a parking ticket or some other non-sensensical high school
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jibberish, will contain more of the same reckless and lacking in foundation mentions of "breaking
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into" the former law office and "broken locks" despite the fact that no factual support exists for such
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an allegation, there were no "broken locks" ever mentioned by anyone (and if Hill is willing to make
up finding a "bag of weed and crack pipe" along with describing what Hill's own videos show to be
vitamins as a "large quantity of pills", then you know Richard G. Hill, Esq. would have been all over
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any "broken locks" at the former home law office, yet, there simply were none, not that that would
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stop Pat King or J. Thomas Susich from cobbling together such an allegation in the SCR 117 Petition
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in 60975) along with something about Coughlin being subject to a custodial arrest for "jaywalking"
by the Reno Police Department while Coughlin was filming Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s contractor's crew
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loading up a dump truck with items of personal property then located in Coughlin's former home law
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office (the arrest occurred shortly after Coughlin discovered that Hill's contractor, Phil Stewart, had
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used Coughlin's own distinctive plywood to "secure" or "board up the property" in December 2011,
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for which the landlord was ultimately awarded costs, $1,060 of which were based upon Stewart's
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invoice for "securing the property", which included the cost of plywood, and "fixing a leak in the
basement" despite NRS 118A.460 only allowing costs for "moving, storing, and inventorying" a
tenant's personal property), which Coughlin was unable to remove during the scant 13 hours he was
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afforded to do so by the Reno Justice Court's Order following a Hearing on Coughlin's November
16th, 2011 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien (the Hearing was not set or conducted with the
"10 days" required by NRS 40.253(7)-(8) because Richard G. Hill, Esq. needed to go on a six-week
vacation shortly after Coughlin's November 16th, 2011 filing (in a matter now on appeal in SCR
60331 and 61838, wherein, somehow, a commercial tenant, Coughlin (whom was both running a law
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practice and Coughlin Memory Foam, a foam mattress business from his home, which was
previously utilized for commercial purposes by a drug and alcohol rehabilitation counseling business
and is zone for mixed use purposes) was summarily evicted based upon a No Cause Eviction Notice
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only (ie, the non-payment of rent was neither noticed, pled, nor argued by the landlord) despite the
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clear dictate against the use of summary eviction proceedings against commercial tenants not based
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upon the non-payment of rent (Bench Book stuff) set forth in NRS 40.253. The December 21st,
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2011 Order "Resolving" Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien actually required
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Coughlin to pay the exact same amount of rent for 17 days (November 1 to November 17th, 2011),
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$480 (ie, pro-rated from the $900 per month rental agreement) as Coughlin would have under a "fair
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rental value", for the "full use and occupancy of the premises" despite the fact that Hill somehow
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signed a Criminal Complaint for Trespass Against Coughlin, on November 13th, 2011 despite any
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Summary Eviction Order not being served in accordance with NRS 40.400 (and therefore NRCP 5
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and 6(e) vis a vis the "within 24 hours" of "receipt" of the lockout order, and, therefore, any such
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lockout that had occured being rendered a nullity or pursuant to a void Order) and where the Washoe
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County Sheriff's Office Civil Process Service Supervisor Liz Stuchell has admitted in writing that the
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Affidavit of Service filed November 7th, 2011 by Deputy Machen, attesting to having "personally
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served" the Summary Eviction Order on November 1st, 2011, was, in fact, purportedly merely posted
to the door of Coughlin's former law office while Coughlin was not home, at which point a Soldal v.
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Cook County violating illegal lockout occurred. In a February 7th, 2012 written correspondence to
Coughlin, Stuchell wrote: "Mr. Coughlin, Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that
day was personally served by Deputy Machen by posting a copy of the Order to the residence. The
residence was unoccupied at the time. Liz Stuchell, Supervisor WCSO Civil Section".
NRS 40.253 speaks to service of Lockout Orders: The court may thereupon issue an order directing
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The text of
the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the
order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary Eviction was signed by
October 27th, 2011 (though not mailed to Coughlin until after the November 1, 2011 lockout had
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allegedly already occured). That language is only found in situations inapplicable to the one incident
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that in the summary eviction from Coughlin's former home law office. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and
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NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the only sections of NRS 40 where this within 24 hours language occurs, and
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those situations only apply where, in: 40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1
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or 2 must: ...(b) Advise the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an
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unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
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providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the county to
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remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order and, 40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon
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noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the landlords agent may apply by affidavit of
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complaint for eviction to the justice court of the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile
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home or commercial premises are located or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling,
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apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction over the
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matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the county to
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remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order. The way these summary eviction
proceedings are being carried out in Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates
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Nevada law. There is not basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in
this case. The requirements attendant to serving Summary Eviction Orders and conducting lockouts
are found in NRS 40.253 in two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language are
inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where the Tenant did file
an Affidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen. To require Nevada's tenants to get
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up and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the order (what does that even mean? The use of
terms like rendition, rendered, notice of entry, pronounced, is absent here, and this receipt
of the order language is something rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV
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statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must file a Complaint within 90
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days of receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which follows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in
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imputing receipt of such a letter, when actual receipt is not shown, by applying a constructive
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notice standard that relies upon the days for mailing extension of time for items served in the
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mailing, etc.). In Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the
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record did not reflect when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on
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November 24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced on November 30, 2006,
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based on three days for mailing after excluding Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim
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under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90
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days of receipt of a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome
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Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (granting plaintiff an
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additional three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).... Further, as seen in the Anvui case, there is
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some argument respecting not effecting a lockout for at least 5 days where a lease has not expired by
its terms, as Coughlin's arguably had not.
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However, in his January 20th, 2012 Second Motion for Order to Show Cause, Richard G.
Hill, Esq. did not get all bogged down in legal research and stuff, instead he just pointed out:
"FACTS SHOWING CONTEMPT OF COURT 6. EXHIBIT 1 (the Summary Eviction Lockout
Order) was served on Coughlin on November 1, 2011 by the Washoe County Sheriffs Department
in its customary manner, by posting same on the front door of the property in the manner
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customary for evictions in Washoe County. The locks to the premises were changed at that time,
thereby ejecting and dispossessing Coughlin of possession of the Property." Hill went on to lie again
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in that January 20th, 2012 Motion when he equated his offer to let Coughlin get some of the
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personalty Coughlin was unable to remove, due largely to Hill failing to remove the chain link
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padlock from the backyard gate that Hill had only just installed in time for the 13 hours Coughlin had
to remove his property in exchange for Coughlin waiving his rights to the $700 damage deposit
Coughlin provided upon moving in, where Hill spins it: "12. On Friday, December 23, 2011,
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Coughlin had a crew of helpers, and made progress. Nonetheless, Coughlin failed to remove all of
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his belongings from the Property. Coughlin failed to remove his things despite having been given
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additional time to do so after the time set by the Reno Justice Court in its order of December 21,
2011 (EXHIBIT 2) had expired." Apparently, to Hill, at least one has " failed to remove all of his
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belongings from the Property. Coughlin failed to remove his things despite having been given
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additional time to do so" where Hill threatens to have one arrested for criminal trespass or larceny (of
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their own stuff, arguably) if one is on the property one minute past 5 p.m., unless one waives any
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right to their damage deposit (which neither Hill nor the Landlord eve did return, nor did they
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comply with the requirement that they provide an itemized statement indicating an application
thereof justifying such a failure to return such deposit within 30 days....and Hill does not want to get
into whether his conduct is violative of the FDCPA or whether he is licensed a as debt collector). In
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that Motion, Hill continued on: "13. On December 30, 2011, Coughlin moved this Court for a
temporary restraining order to prevent Merliss from disposing of the items he (Coughlin) had
abandoned on the Property. Coughlin's motion was fully briefed, and the Court entered its order
denying the motion on January 11, 2012. A true and correct copy of this Court's January 11,2012
order is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 3. 14. On Thursday, January 12, 2012, in accordance with
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EXHIBIT 2 and EXHIBIT 3, a licensed contractor hired by Merliss began cleaning up the Property
and disposing of the abandoned items still remaining there. 15. Early that afternoon, while the
contractor was hauling the first of several loads of abandoned property to the transfer station (dump)
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for disposal, Coughlin stopped the contractor in traffic and attempted to prevent him from carrying
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out his task. 16. Specifically, Coughlin stood in front of the contractor's vehicle in an effort to
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prevent him from proceeding to the transfer station. Coughlin threatened to sue the contractor.
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Coughlin climbed up on the contractor's vehicle. Coughlin then called the police and falsely told
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them that the contractor had stolen his possessions, and that the contractor had tried to run him over.
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Coughlin's acts were specifically calculated to prevent the contractor from disposing of the
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abandoned property, and to frustrate and interfere with Merliss' compliance with this Court's January
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11, 2012 order. 17. When Mr. Hill of the undersigned's office was notified of the foregoing, he went
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to the transfer station and presented EXHIBIT 2 and EXHIBIT 3 to the police. The contractor was
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then allowed to proceed. 18. However, before the contractor could return to the River Rock Property,
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Coughlin was there. He had his video camera and was walking up and down the street screaming and
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yelling at the police, the contractor, and Mr. Hill, once Mr. Hill arrived. At the instruction of the
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police, Mr. Hill then obtained a temporary protective order ("TPO") again~t Coughlin from the Reno
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Justice Court. Coughlin ended up being arrested and taken to jail that day as a result of his antics at
the transfer station and the Property."
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The thing is, and Coughlin would sure like to get the 911 tapes (or, more likely, with Hill, any
recordings that may exist of Hill calling somebody in particular he may have had in mind with the
RPD) of calls by Coughlin (and if Wal-Mart can call 911 over a candy bar, or a skater board over an
iPhone he seems to have set down on the concrete ground in downtown Reno, then skaterboarded off
some 100 yards away for sufficiently long period of time to seem to have been pretty much the only
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person not to have heard somebody who picked it up threaten to throw it is in the river if it went
unclaimed can call 911 (and make up a bunch of lies on the spot for the purpose of manipulating the
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police into assuages the skateboarders own negligence vis a vis the iPhone) is it unreasonable for
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Coughlin to call 911 upon happening, totally by chance, to cross paths with Hill's contractor while
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driving, catching site of a huge dump truck full of Coughlin's personal property headed towards the
town dump? Hill admits the Order denying Coughlin's Motion for a TPO (and hey, family heirlooms
are pretty fungible, right? Who needs a TPO for that? And its not like the landlord could just accept
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rent in the meantime, or that the property still remains unrented to this day, some 11 months after the
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lockout, and apparently, some $60,000 worth of attorney's fees paid to Hill for a two bedroom home
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that appraises at around $90,000 currently, if that. And Hill's fantastic legal work ("wrong site
surgery" and all) was surely worth the risk of a wrongful eviction lawsuit (and check out those
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potential damages under Winchell v. Schiff, 124 Nev. 938, 193 P.3d 946 (2008), not that the loss of a
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patent attorney's career could amount to all that much). Regardless, its not all that colorable for Hill
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to allege Coughlin was violating some Order entered on January 11th, 2012 by Coughlin's conduct of
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January 12th, 2012 when NRCP 6(e) provides that 3 days for mailing is to be accorded to account for
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the service of filings, even filings electronically served on registered efilers like Coughlin. Its
similar to Hill wanting a criminal trespass arrest where NRCP 6(e)'s three days for mailing where no
personal service was accomplished (by way of NRS 40.400) and Hill's et al did not even comply with
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the constructive service requirements of mailing the summary eviction lockout order prior to Hill's
breaking into Coughlin's former home law office on November 1st, 2011, with the help of the
WCSO, in violation of Soldal v. Cook County where Coughlin was not accorded the "24 hours"
cushion after Coughlin's "receipt" of the lockout order mentioned in this Court's own packets on the
service of Lockout Orders, which Hill himself attached as a subsequent exhibit recently...It gets
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funnier. The civil division of the Justice Court and the Sheriff's Office think that whole "within 24
hours" language in NRS 40.253 means "within 24 hours" of the Sheriff's "receipt" of the Order from
the Justice Court...While other's think it is "within 24 hours" of the tenant's receipt of the Order from
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the Sheriff...and this Court's official forms and instructions seem to imply that "at least 24 hours"
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from "receipt" of the lockout Order must be accorded to a tenant. Who knows? But, it is not clear,
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as Hill suggests, that the "usual custom and practice of the Washoe County Sheriff's Office" is black
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letter law upon which Bar grievances, custodial criminal trespass arrests, multiple Motion for Order
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To Show Cause, tens of thousands of dollars in attorney's fees sanctions against a pro se appellant,
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etc. are warranted. Somehow the District Court found a way to sanction Coughlin with $40,050
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worth of attorney's fee in that appeal of the summary eviction without holding a single hearing, well,
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other than the Hearing on Hills Order to Show Cause, which was denied when Coughlin destroyed
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Hill's contractor Phil Stewart on cross-examination. (Really, Phil? Really? You could fell "a
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depression" in your 2 ton loaded to capacity dump truck upon Coughlin allegedly "climbing up on
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it", though you indicated you had already "alighted from the vehicle", but, wait, you could see
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Coughlin's head above the tailgate walls in your rear view mirror (which doesn't seem to be there on
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any the many videos of the events of that day. And even if such a mirror where present on Stewart's
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truck, that doesn't really explain how all the personalty stacked up so high in the truck bed (replete
with specialized add-on high stack retaining walls) wouldn't obscure any purported view of
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Coughlin's head high above the area above the specialize hydraulic dump truck's tailgate, confirming
Stewart's mere suspicion that Coughlin climbed on his truck. Coughlin swears under oath he did not
climb on Stewart's truck. Hill needed a little "fact" to spice up his Motion to Show Cause just
enough, and "Coughlin climbed up on the truck" was "just the ticket", and Stewart did not mind
going along for the ride, so long as... And none of the many videos from that day actually show any
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of the Yosemite Sam cartoon villian type behavior Hill attributes to Coughlin in his wonderfully
imaginative Motion for Order to Show Cause and or Application for Order of Protection concerning
the events involved in the jaywalking custodial arrest Hill had Coughlin subjected to on January
12th, 2012.
Much like Hill's contractor, Phil Stewart, flat out lying in an affidavit when he swore
Coughlin "climbed up on" his truck, Hill similarly lied in an affidavit about Coughlin, apparently
while "engraged" making "physical contact" with Hill. On Page 2 of Hill's Affidavit attach to his
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Motion for Order to Show Cause, January 20th, 2012, Hills attests: "5. On Friday, December 23,
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2011, we unlocked the house at 9:00 a.m. as ordered. We overlooked the chain on the back gate.
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There was nobody at the house when we were there. At approximately noon, my staff informed me
that an enraged Mr. Coughlin had called the office screaming that he could not get in the back yard.
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When I finished the meeting I was in, I immediately went over and unlocked the back gate. Coughlin
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had a small crew. He charged at me and made physical contact. He was enraged. We left. When we
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returned at 5:00 p.m., Mr. Coughlin was screaming and yelling obscenities. He drove off in a small U
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-Haul. His crew remained. We walked the property with them. The inside .ground floor was mostly
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cleared of all but a big TV. The basement had been cleared somewhat, but there was still a lot of
"junk. " We could not access the attic. We went outside. I told Coughlin's crew they could remove
anything and everything outside, if they would only try to rehang the gate that Mr. Coughlin had
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taken off the hinges before we could get over to unlock it. I told them I would lock the gates in the
morning.
That is really interesting. Compare the above to the following excerpt from page 3 of Hills
January 3rd, 2012 Opposition in CV11-03628, the appeal of the summary eviction Order: "12. While
at the property to remove the padlock, Coughlin, on more than one occasion, screamed profanities at
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Merliss' counsel, and, at one point, charged Mr. Hill and attempted to physically intimidate him.
At least the audio of this incident was captured on tape. 13. Nevertheless, at 5:00 p.m. on Friday,
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December 23,2011, counsel granted Coughlin and his agents additional, unfettered, and
13
unlimited access to the outside of the property to remove any remaining items." Whereas in his
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January 20th, 2012 sworn Declaration Hill goes so far as to indicate Coughlin "made physical
contact" (which is a damn lie anyways), in Hill's then associate Casey Baker, Esq.'s NRCP 11 signed
January 3rd, 2012 Opposition, HIll's associate Baker will only go so far as to say that Coughlin, "at
18
one point, charged Mr. Hill and attempted to physically intimidate him." Baker was standing directly
19
next to Hill during the interacation wherin Hill swore, under penalty of perjury, that Couglhin "made
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physical contact" with Hill). Sounds like Casey Baker, Esq. was not quite willing to "spice up" the
story line as Hill himself was. Casey probably did not have enough reason to sign on to the lies
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about Coughlin "climbing on" the contractor's truck. In Hill's Application for a Protection Order
24
against Coughlin Hill slips up and claims that Coughlin was "climbing on the contractor's truck,
25
picking through the contents" back at Couglin's former home law after the interaction at the "transfer
26
station" (town dump), whereas Hill's contractor indicated in his Affidavit that the alleged "climbing"
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on his truck occurred at the "transfer station". However, both Hill and his contractor, Phil Stewart
indicate that the Reno Police Department "requested" that Hill filed a Protection Order Application
against Coughlin. If that is true, its improper. The RPD can provide individuals information about
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seeking one, but when the RPD goes a step further and starts urging individuals to file protection
order applications, or, as has recently been the case with RPD Officer Alan Weaver and Sargent
Oliver Miller, whom, upon information and belief, urged Northwind's apartment maintenance man
Milan Krebs to sign a fraudulent criminal complaint against Coughlin for "disturbing the peace" on
July 3rd, 2011, and again urged Superior Mini Storage's Matt Grant to sign a similar baseless
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"disturbing the peace" criminal Complaint against Coughlin on approximately September 21st, 2012
then there is more than a little indication that the RPD is out of control and attempting to incite
members of the public to sign fraudulent criminal complaints based upon a retaliatory animus by the
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RPD towards Coughlin. Officer Weaver and Sargent Dye showed up to an unnoticed July 5th, 2012
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bail hearing for Coughlin, presided over by Judge Linda Gardner's brother RMC Judge William
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Gardner (whom received Coughlin's timely Notice of Appeal of the criminal trespass conviction,
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under NRS 189.010, yet failed to forward it on to the District Court, which somewhat recently
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dismissed Coughlin's appeal in that matter, wherein Sargent Dye and Officer Weaver testified under
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oath, with City Attorney Jill Drake singing backup, the the effectd that, despite bail only being valid
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based upon one reason in Nevada (to secure the defendant's attendance at trial) the "public health and
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safety" dictated increasing the cash required to bail out Couglin TENFOLD, from a bondable $1,415
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to a CASH ONLY $3,000. Consequently, upon Judge Gardner so impermissibly raising Coughlin's
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bail, alleging a "public health and safety" rationale for so doing, Couglin was forced to spend 18 days
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in jail, wherein the opportunity to timely contest the $40,050 attorney fees award to Richard Hill
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incident to the summary eviction appeal ran, all while Coughlin was denied any opportunity to access
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justice or file documents from jail, and where Coughlin sustained signficant damages, financial and
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otherwise, and where the jail refused to transport Coughlin to a hearing on a landlord tenant matter
wherein he was a named party. The extent to which local law enforcement is willing to play "kick
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the can" with an attorney, particularly where Bar Counsel Pat King is so willing to join the chorus, is
troubling, and indicates the judiciary need issue a clarion call out to announce the extent to which
such misconduct can not, and will not, be tolerated. Such a retaliatory animus towards Coughlin by
the RPD is likely due to his September 7th, 2011 Complaint with respect to a wrongful, retaliatory,
and fraudulent arrest by RPD Officer Nicholas Duralde, which was accompanied by extortionate
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threats by RPD Officer Ron Rosa that if Coughlin didn't cooperate they would "call the Nevada Bar
and let them know how you cooperated with our investigation. How's that runnin' for ya?" While
Duralde testified that he did not hear or recall Rosa's coercive threats to Coughlin just prior to the
13
arrest, the fact that Duralde echoed those threats by saying "Now, I can arrest you for larceny. Now,
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I can do a search incident to arrest. How's that?" tends to undermine Duralde's contention that "he
15
doesn't recall" hearing anything like what Officer Rosa was capture on tape saying to Coughlin just
16
prior to the arrest. Upon making a Fourth Amendment violating arrest completely lacking in
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probable cause, and smugly "joking" to Coughlin about the "benefits" associated with charging
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Coughlin with a "felony", (at the time of the August 20th, 2011 arrest, the felony larceny amount
20
limit was $250 and above) compared to a misdemeanor (under some half baked "grand larceny" of an
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allegedly lost or mislaid or abandoned three year old iPhone 3G that the alleged victim testified was
22
only then worth "about $80-100" on eBay or Craigslist), ie, search incident to custodial arrest
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possible where probable cause lacking to arrest, or even reasonable suspicion missing to do a pat
25
down, where alleged crime occured outside officer's presence, after 7 p.m., and no citizens arrest
26
immediately effectuated, particularly where Coughlin himself made a 911 call prior to Officer's
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arriving and where video from minutes prior to officer arriving reveal Coughlin suggesting the 8-12
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hostile late teens to early twenties skater boarders relax, stay peaceful, refrain from assaulting and
battering Couglin, and wait for the police arrive so a lawful, peaceful resolution could be attained
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(with Coughlin even cautioning the youths about a then recent tragic death occurring not far from
that location).
Further Hill just flat out lies in his January 3rd, 2012 Opposition to Amended Motion for
Emergency Restraining Order. Well, he did tell the truth when he wrote, on page 3: "11. On Friday,
December 23,2011, counsel for Merliss neglected to remove the padlock to the back gate of the
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property." That is true, he did do that, and it did prevent Coughlin from removing all his property
during the scant 13 hours Coughlin had to move it. But, when Hill swears, on page 3, that:
12
"Coughlin's access to the house itself was never hindered.:" he is just "sippin' drank" or something,
13
as, obviously failing to remove a lock on a gate gonna tend to have that effect, now...and when Hill
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swears: " 13. Nevertheless, at 5:00 p.m. on Friday, December 23,2011, counsel granted Coughlin and
his agents additional, unfettered, and unlimited access to the outside of the property to remove any
remaining items. The only condition placed on that access was that Coughlin's helpers agreed to
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replace the gate on its hinges as best they could. Coughlin and his agents failed to remove the
19
remainder of Coughin's property from the yard that night, and failed to put the gate back on the
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hinges." Coughlin was never made aware of any such "offer" by Hill, and, even if he had been, hey,
it's the "outside of the property", Rich, people generally put their valuables inside, you know?
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Then the HIll prevarication and obfuscation express kicks into overdrive, when, in his
January 3rd, 2012 Opposition he continues on: "C. Coughlin is Not Entitled to A Stay Coughlin
claims to have deposited $250 with the justice's court pursuant to NRS 40.385, although he has not
provided any proof in support of his claim. Attached hereto as EXHIBIT 10 is a true and correct
copy of the justice's court's docket as of December 19, 2011. That docket shows that Coughlin paid a
filing fee for his appeal on December 12, 2011, in the amount of $216.00." Well, actually, Judge
Sferrazza waived the Justice Court's $24.00 filing fee, and the $216.00 represents the District Court's
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filing fee, and its not really clear whether that date is when the check was cashed by the District
Court, or whether the Justice Court held on to the check for quit4e awhile before shipping it along
with the ROA to the District Court, etc., etc. Hill continues: "It is entirely unclear from the following
entries of that docket whether or when Coughlin ever paid an additional $250.00 under NRS 40.385."
That might, technically be true, Rich, to the extent that you wrote it on January 3rd, 2012, and are
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sneakily indicating that you are looking at an old docket from the Justice Court from December 19th,
2012, even though Coughlin made a big deal to you and the Justice Court, in writing, that he was
depositing the $250.00 supersedeas bond mentioned in NRS 40.385, on December 22nd, 2011, a fact
13
which Hill himself mentions in his own filings...So, kind of a lack of candor to the tribunal there to
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make all this argument based upon some old docket and the extent to which it fails to reveal or
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"make clear" matters to which Hill had ready written notice of via his own e-Flex account and
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service of filings upon him connected thereto, in addition to Coughlin's faxes, emails, and there
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might have even been a service of a Notice of Posting Supersedeas Bond (need to check on that
19
more), etc. in connection with the depositing on December 22nd 2012, the $250 required for a stay
20
during appeal of a summary eviction in NRS 40.385. And, actually, Hill slipped up a bit there, in
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light of the following: And, actually, Hill, in his January 20th, 2012 filing, admitted that Coughlin
22
sent him that December 22nd, 2011 email notifying him of the posting of the $250 supersedeas bond
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seeking a stay, when he admits, on page 3: "11. Pursuant to EXHIBIT 2, Coughlin was provided
25
access to the Property on Thursday, December 22, 2011. That day, Coughlin sent an email to the
26
undersigned and Judge Sferrazza, in which he essentially announced that he was entitled to a
27
stay, and to return to and continue in possession of the Property. Judge Sferrazza quickly
28
responded by email, and reminded Mr. Coughlin that the stay had been denied." Found in
Exhibit 1 is the December 22nd email to Hill's Office that alerts them to the posting of $250 ,
specified as a "supersedeas bond", with a citation to NRS 40.385:
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Hill's January 3rd, 2012 Opposition continues, on page 8: "Even if Coughlin eventually paid
some amount toward an appeal bond, it was not in time to stay the eviction during this appeal. To do
that, a proper motion must be made and granted, and the bond posted, prior to the lockout. The
lockout here occurred on November 1, 2011. By the time Coughlin managed to find that statute and
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pay any money to the court, he had been locked out of the property for six weeks. As such, any
request for a stay was, and is, moot. At this point, Coughlin does not have any rights in either the real
12
or personal". Oddly, Anvui saw a stay granted after a lockout was conducted, and Hill (RPC 3.1
13
"meritorious contention" issues) cites to no legal authority for his contention that "to stay the eviction
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during this appeal...a proper motion must be made and granted, and the bond posed, prior to the
lockout." Citation? None.
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Despite Hill's strange approach of not actually indicating that his office did not get an
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December 22nd, 2011 email notifying them of the posting of $250 for a supersedeas bond seeking a
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stay under NRS 118A.385 (but rather, Hill focuses on what one cannot glean from looking at a dated
docket...), Hill's Office was made aware of such matters, in writing, in the following December 22nd
email to Hill's Offiee: "...Further, this is all moot at this point as I have filed a Supersedeas Bond of
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$250, and according to NRS 40.385, I automatically get a stay of eviction and am entitled to
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return to the property and continue in possession. The statute sets the Supersedeas Bond
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(which yields a stay) at $250 if rent is under $1000, unless the Court wishes to rule that I am a
commercial tenant. However, if the court does rule that I am a commercial tenant, the No
Cause Eviction Notice in this case, under NRS 40.253 makes a Summary Eviction Proceeding
impermissible, as Summary Eviction Proceedings are not allowed against commercial tenants
where only a No Cause Eviction Notice is filed. Its one or the other, but Mr. Hill and Baker
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cannot have it both ways. Further, the Courts Order of December 21, 2011 is just that, and
Order, its not an agreement, its not a settlement, etc, etc. and the audio record clearly reflects
that. NRS 40.385 Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who retains possession of
premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to NRS
40.253: 1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of execution may be obtained
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by filing with the trial court a bond in the amount of $250 to cover the expected costs on
appeal. In an action concerning a lease of commercial property or any other property for which
the monthly rent exceeds $1,000, the court may, upon its own motion or that of a party, and upon a
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showing of good cause, order an additional bond to be posted to cover the expected costs on appeal.
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A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction of the appellate court and irrevocably appoints the
15
clerk of that court as the surety's agent upon whom papers affecting the surety's liability upon the
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bond may be served. Liability of a surety may be enforced, or the bond may be released, on motion
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in the appellate court without independent action. 2. A tenant who retains possession of the premises
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that are the subject of the appeal during the pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in
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the amount provided in the underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes
21
due. If the tenant fails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new proceedings for a summary
22
eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin,
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Esq.".
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Oh, and Hill and Stewart admit to this in a video. Richard Hill's contractor, for some strange
26
reason, removed a ladder Coughlin owns from the property, preventing Coughlin's access to the attic
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upon his being allowed that scant 13 hours to remove his property (and the attic had been renovated
to allow for storage of a considerable amount of property. If Coughlin was Hill he would have called
the RPD to report the "larceny" of his ladder by Hill, in a RICO thing with his contractor. But Hill
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escaped prosecution that time, over they whole ladder deal. It never was made clear why the
contractor removed the ladder from the property, other than, perhaps, like the applying of a lock to
the backyard gate, make it even more unlikely that Coughlin would be able to remove all he needed
to, especially given the limited funds for moving vehicles and hired help, in the scant 13 hours
allowed under the December 21st, 2012 Order.
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Things have just gotten too ridiculous where an attorney's license gets placed in jeopardy for
saying "Wow" in court (or King threatens to buttress an SCR 105 Complaint upon such scandalous
12
behavior while the RPD can violate the Fourth Amendment while making threatening, coercive
13
statements and smugly, menacingly joking to an arrestee (whom dared ask if the officer actually had
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reasonable suspicion to conduct such an evasive Terry Stop style weapons check pat down on one
whom himself called 911 to report an attack by skater youths, while holding his Pekingness and
bicycle, which the skaters were trying to rob the attorney of when they weren't "jokingly" making
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sudden attempts to reach into the attorney's pockets) about overcharging an arrest to get around the
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dictates against conducting a custodial arrest and search incident thereto for some ill supported petty
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larceny of an iPhone, allegedly occuring after 7 pm, outside the officer's presence, based upon some
"lost, mislaid, or abandoned" property fact pattern worthy of a law school final exam where someone
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finds an iPhone on the ground in downtown Reno, offers it up to the denizens of a downtown skate
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plaze shortly before midnight on a Saturday, then threatens to "throw it in the river" if someone does
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not claim it immediately, which eventually leads to an attorney being attacked by a group of youthful
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skateboards making up every lie they can think of to prevent any inference that said iPhone was
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abandoned and or rescued from waste or destruction or that assaulting and battering one who does
not immediately turn over an iPhone to a hostile, violent group of 8 to 12 late teens early twenties
skaterboards yelling things like "give us the phone faggot". Further, in Nevada, a larcenous intent
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must exist at the time one takes possession of lost or mislaid property. "A taking with the intention
of returning the property, or a taking without the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his
property, will not amount to larceny, even though the perpetrator, after gaining possession of the
property, formed that intent. State v. Clifford, 14 Nev. 72, 33 Am.Rep. 526; State v. Ward, 19 Nev.
297, 10 P. 133; Robinson v. Goldfield Merger Mines Co." Harvey v. State, 78 Nev. 417, 422-23, 375
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P.2d 225, 227-28 (1962) [78 Nev. 417, Page 420] , 46 Nev. 291, 213 P. 103. The requirement that the
original taking and the felonious intent coexist in point of time was properly mentioned in the written
instructions given in the instant case. Moreover, we recognize that the question of whether the
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property was originally taken with such intent is one of fact, the determination of which is to be
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made from a consideration of all the circumstances preceding, attending and following the taking of
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the property. State v. Cudney, 47 Nev. 224, 218 P. 736.
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There has already been testimony in such a pending criminal matter against an attorney the
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the attorney did not attempt to furtively or immediately flee the scene where he was allegedly free
19
handed such an iPhone, and where the Witness Statements conveniently left out the whole bit about
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the man holding the phone up and threatening to "throw it in the river" (an an admission by several
hostile witnesses that that did occur was caught on videotape) and, not only that, but actually lied an
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indicated these witnesses "personally eye witnessed" the attorney just walk up and "grab" the iPhone
24
off the ground, etc. Oh, also, the whole arrest was caught on tape too, as were the moments prior
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thereto, and the alleged victims are clearly shown lying to 911 operators about someone "socking a
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minor" to engender a more rapid and urgent police response. Never mind that the alleged "socking"
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was actually flinching went an 18 year old, along 8-12 of his hostile and aggressive friends
attempting to rob the attorney of his bicycle and or dog, made a "joking" and sudden movement
intended to make the attorney think the 18 year old was "reaching in" the attorney's pockets...Add to
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that the fact that they Officer announced to the attorney within seconds of arriving on seen that he
was going to conduct a search incident to arrest, and only later made up a bunch of pretextual
rationale to support conducting a Terry Stop pat down, then a search incident to arrest, while alleging
the attorney's question as to, whether the officer had a sufficient basis to conduct such a pat down or
search incident to arrest, without anything more to support a larceny probable cause analysis than an
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allegation that one possessed an iPhone that was purportedly left on the ground, whereupon that
person called 911 upon being attacked by a group of 8-12 immediately after failing to instantly
adhere to their threatening demands to consent to a search on one's pockets, accompanied by a touch
13
of assault and battery to boot, and some hate speech. Such is not supportable, particularly where
14
merely pending for denying one due process required under the law, and particularly SCR 102(4)(d)
15
and SCR 111(8) and SCR 111(10).
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The fact that the criminal trespass custodial arrest occurred at a time when Coughlin still had
18
not received back the $2,275 "rent escrow" the Reno Justice Court forced Coughlin to deposit with
19
the RJC in that very summary eviction proceeding/"Trial" (all while Coughlin was, at least according
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to Hill, supposed to hire movers and rent a U-Haul and otherwise have sufficient funds to conduct a
large scale move of a home law office after having just gone from zero to expert on landlord tenant
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law litigating a "Trial" for a law office tenant in a matters of days...). Coughlin made such a deposit
24
or $2,275 "rent escrow" with the RJC on October 17th, 2011 (after the October 13th, 2011 summary
25
eviction hearing in Rev2011-001708 wherein the RJC Judge ruled that Coughlin "had established a
26
material issue of fact" as to retaliation and habitability (and perhaps discrimination, that is not clear)
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and set a "Trial" (but only if Coughlin deposited $2,275 in a "rent escrow" account with the RJC by
October 17th, 2011) for October 25th, 2011 (despite a "Trial" under JCRCP 109 requiring 20 days to
respond to a Complaint, under NRS 40.251, ie, a plenary unlawful detainer action with all the
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attendant due process trimmings). Further, the Summary Eviction Order stemming from the October
25th, 2011 "Trial" (it was noticed as a "Trial" in writing by the Court, referred to as a Trial by the
Court) and the accompanying criminal trespass conviction stemming therefrom are likely void do to
the fact that Coughlin filed, on October 18th, 2011 a Notice of Appeal (on a form that, by the way,
indicated McLaughlin's exposure for any attorney's fee award would be limited to $15.00, much less
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the $40,050 ultimately entered against Coughlin in an attorney's fee sanction in CV11-03628 by
Judge Patrick Flanagan. That Notice of Appeal form was provided to Coughlin by a Clerk of the
RJC in response to a specific request by Coughlin for the form to appeal the Order stemming from
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his October 13th, 2011 summary eviction proceeding, and the forms on the RJC web site at the time,
14
under a heading of "Notice of Appeal" linked to that same form, and did not in any way specify such
15
form to only apply to appeals of small claims actions). Coughlin's filing of a Notice of Appeal of
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that October 13th, 2011 Order following the summary eviction proceeding, under Mack v. Mack-
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Manley, divested any jurisdiction of the RJC to hold such a "Trial" on October 25th, 2011, and any
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such "Trial" was void for lack of jurisdiction anyway, NRCP 60(b)(4) in light of the dictates of NRS
20
40.253(6) ("shall make no further Order" upon the Justice Court finding tenant had established a
21
genuine issue of material fact, which Judge Sferrazza indicated Coughlin had in his Order following
22
the October 13th, 2011 summary eviction proceeding, and again, on the record, during the October
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25th, 2011 Trial, Judge Sferrazza again stated that he set the matter for "Trial" upon his making a
25
"finding that Coughlin established a genuine issue of material fact", which, under Anvui, and NRS
26
40.253(6), prevented Judge Sferrazza from making any further order, and the lack of a corollary to
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Las Vegas Justice Court Rule 44 in the RJC, along with the dictates against unwritten/not approved
28
by the Nevada Supreme Court and counter to express statutory mandates in NRS 118A and NRS 40
"house rules" set forth in JCRCP 83 should have prevented forcing Coughlin to make any "rent
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escrow" deposit of $2,275 right in the middle (actually after it should have ended) of a summary
eviction proceeding.
JCRCP RULE83.RULES BY JUSTICE COURTS
Each justice or justice court in a township with more than one justice, by
action of a majority of the justices thereof, may from time to time make and
amend the rules governing its practices not inconsistent with these rules.
Copies of rules and amendments so made by any justice court shall upon
their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court, but shall not
become effective until after approval by the Supreme Court and
publication. In all cases not provided for by these rules the justice
courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with
these rules.
Further, any "Trial" in that summary eviction matter, and therefore any
criminal trespass arrest based upon any failure to properly adhere to some
improperly served Lockout Order stemming therefrom, is also void in light
of the noncompliance with JCRCP 109: SETTING OF TRIAL IN
ACTIONS
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"(a)In no case shall a trial on the merits be set less than 20 calendar
days after service of summons and complaint."
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To continue the temporary suspension of Coughlin's constitutionally protected
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(under the Fourteenth Amendment, a law license is a "property right") law license
based upon conjecture, hearsay, Pat King's "innocent" mistakes about "facts" and
various orders so terribly subject to being found void under NRCP 60(b)(4), etc. and a
criminal trespass conviction similarly suspect, particularly where Coughlin's filings
Further, Judge Sferrazza admitted that the RJC did not have a rule for forcing
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Coughlin to make such a "rent escrow" deposit at the time such was ordered on
October 13th, 2011 in the summary eviction proceeding. And even if the RJC did
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have such a rule speaking to "deposits" with the RJC, JCRRT Rule 2 makes clear that
such a rule does not apply to "landlord tenant matters":
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JCRRT Rule 2. Application of Rules. Except as otherwise provided by

statue, these rules apply to all civil proceedings filed in Reno Township
except small claims and landlord tenant matters.
Oh, and Hill still managed to get Coughlin subject to the November 13th, 2011 custodial
arrest (ie custodial have someone with color of law make you strip naked and spread your buttocks
search incident to arrest, and even apparently allow a complete copying and, some times "erasing" of
one's smart phone, separate micro sd data card, or laptop pursuant to such a "search incident to
10
arrest"...like what occurred on February 27th, 2012 incident to the traffic citation trial before RMC
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Judge Nash Holmes (whom told Coughlin she would have him arrested if he said Richard G. Hill's
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name one more time) in 11 TR 26800 2I stemming from the three traffic citations RPD Sargent John
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Tarter called in a different RPD Officer to issue Coughlin incident to Coughlin being told to leave
15
Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s law office where Coughlin had gone (upon being released from jail on
16
November 15th, 2011) to retrieve his keys, wallet, state issued identification and client's files from
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Hill, whom refused to provide such items to Coughlin, upon Coughlin being bailed of jail after
spending three days there in connection with the criminal trespass arrest connected to the criminal
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Complaint signed by Richard G. Hill, Esq. At that February 27th, 2012 traffic citation Trial in RMC
21
11 TR 26800 (and not even some juicy reckless driving thing, just a plain old "failure to come to a
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complete stop at a stop sign/California Roll/Boulevard Stop traffic ticket"), Coughlin was sentenced
to five days jail, denied a stay (despite being a practicing attorney with actual clients depending upon
him) by RMC Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes seconds after Coughlin testified that RPD Sargent Tarter
26
"lied" during his testimony concerning what Coughlin's purported to be a retaliatory issuance of
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multiple traffic citations incident to Coughlin repeating to Tarter what may have been a sarcastic
28
repose to Coughlin by RPD Officer Chris Carter during the criminal trespass arrest from Coughlin's
former home law office just days prior, when Coughlin queried Carter if he, too, was on Hill's
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payroll. In Judge Nash Holmes written February 28th, 2012 Order Finding Defendant in Contempt
of Court and Imposing Sanctions (a five day immediate trip to jail, and a failure to release Coughlin
after the fourth day despite the RMC accepting and failing to return $100 Coughlin's mother
deposited with the RMC upon an agreement being made to so release Coughlin at the end of the
fourth day...which was not adhered to), Judge Nash Holmes somehow found it fair to impose the
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following upon a pro se indigent criminal defendant (much in line with the RMC's prerecorded
arraignment videos which basically attempt to scare any and all out of even darign to represent
themselves before the RMC, especially where Keith Loomis, Esq. and the boys down there provide
13
such a ready lubricant to the, uh, justice the RMC dispenses: "The court had the defendant sworn at
14
the beginning of the trial, stating that the court has found that most self-represented defendants tend
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to testify a great deal as they cross- examine opposing witnesses, so the defendant would be under
16
oath from the start, too. exhibits were marked or admitted." That practice apparently is read to
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provide support for some contention that Coughlin violated some RPC while appearing as a pro se
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criminal defendant in a traffic citation Trial, where Coughlin's smart phone and micro sd card were
20
searched incident to his arrest for "summary contempt committed in the Court's presence" and
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"booked into evidence" where they stayed for some 37 days, and where returned to Coughlin with all
22
the data erased, but not before lots of contradictory statements were made by the Sheriff's Office, the
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City of Reno Marshal's, the RMC, the Washoe County District Attorney's Office, and the Washoe
25
County Detention Facility regarding the chain of custody of that smart phone and data card, whether
26
it was removed from the evidence room at the jail and transported back to the RMC on February
27
28th, 2012, whether a micro sd card was even included in the property so inventoried then booked
28
into evidence, and whether that micro sd card was released to an associate of Coughlin or kept with
the smart phone for those 37 days. Curiously, in Judge Nash Holmes March 30th, 2012 Order
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Releasing Property, that Order indicates: "IT IS ORDERED that the Washoe County Sheriffs Office
shall release to the Defendant, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, three items taken from him on
February 27, 2012 at Washoe County Regional Detention Facility during his booking for
incarceration pursuant to the imposition of a 5-day jail sentence for Contempt of Court in the above-
entitled case, to wit: one Samsung Cell Phone; one T-Mobile Cell Phone; and one Braun Electric
Razor, as identified in Case Number WC 12-1805 and referred to under Control # C-47951."
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That's the thing, though. There were four items, not three. Marshal Harley, whom made sure
12
he was the one doing the lookin' through of the pockets and pattin' down of the body and all that, he
13
made a big deal about how the micro sd card was not in the smart phone. Actually, Marshal Harley
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pretty much rendered an Order convicting Coughlin of this and that in conjunction with his
conducting the search incident to arrest of Coughlin. The fourth was a micro sd card, capable of
holding an entire libraries worth of books on it in digital format. While the smart phone was
18
returned, with the micro sd data card inserted into it, it was not found that way during the "search
19
incident to arrest". The micro sd card was not inserted into the phone. Such a micro sd card can be
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inserted into a flash drive adapter, into a digital camera, into a lot of things, not necessarily one's
smart phone. And the Washoe County Regional Detntion Facility did not return the phone
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immediately in compliaince with the Order, but rather indicated that the Washoe County District
24
Attorney Office had to give permission and or get to possess the materials first, with "Maddy" of the
25
WCSO indicating Coughlin need contact Mary Kandaras of the WCDA's Office.
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Eventually, after 37 days, the smart phone and micro sd card were returned to Coughlin with
all the date therein erased, but not before Judge Nash Holmes entered an Order accusing Coughlin,
vaguely, of lying (not getting all that specific though with respect to just what it was Coughlin was
apparently "lying" about, but some reference was made to rules related to the media and court
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proceedings...and then a laundry list copy and pasted from teh RPC of all the purported violations of
various RPC's that Coughlin was found to have committed "by clear and convincing
evidence"...including such vague and entirely devoid of any explication or factual rulings that
Coughlin was guilty of demonstrating a "lack of fairness to opposing counsel" or "prolonging
proceedings", etc...Coughlin did report to City Attorney Allison Ormaas during a brief plea
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bargaining session immediately before the Trial that RPD Officer Carter made a statement (perhaps
said sarcastically while arresting an attorney for criminal trespass where the RPD refused to issue a
citation or identify themselves as law enforcement prior storming in Coughlin's former law office's
13
"basement", where a stay is mandated under NRS 118A.380, where one's rent is less than $1,000 and
14
damages awarded are nil, for no more than a $250 deposit, at a time when Coughlin had yet to be
15
returned the $2,275 impermissible "rent escrow" deposit forced upon him in a summary eviction) that
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"Richard Hill pays me a lot of money so I arrest who he says to arrest and do what he says to do"
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upon Coughlin asking Carter if he, too, was on Richard G. Hill's payroll. It appears that at some
19
point, perhaps while they were whispering in each other's ears (as Coughlin noted on the record
20
during the Trial in 11 TR 26800) during the Trial that Marshal and City Attorney Ormaas were
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afraid Coughlin may have some evidence of Ormaas's admitting to Coughlin that she was in no way
22
going to following up on an statements by an RPD Officer that may tend to present and admission of
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accepting some improper benefit in exchange for committing official misconduct under color of law,
25
or otherwise document such information. The RMC's Marshal Harley seemed to be upset about the
26
possibility that Coughlin may have some evidence of Harley purporting to personally serve Coughlin
27
the Order to Show Cause in CV11-03628 (and Machen's Affidavit of Service filed March 8th, 2012
28
indicates Machen "personally served" Coughlin, which not the case, as apparently Machen did not
want to wait around for a few minutes for Coughlin's bargaining session with City Attorney Ormaas
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to end, which means Machen was cutting a corner, which is something courts and local law
enforcement punish ordinary citizens for every day in Washoe County. When Marshal Harley began
to realize Coughlin's questions to him were revealing some questionable issue (so, you don't know
whoat WCSO Deputy handed you this Order to Show Cause? You have no idea? You didn't
recognize him at all? Did he "personally serve" me it, or did you, Marshal Harley? Why is this even
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being personally served? And why while I am attending court on a totally unrelated matter? Is that
proper? Is that somewhat hostile and done in an attempt to embarass Coughlin at the courthouse? Is
that appropriate?
Is there even a rule requiring such an "Order to Show Cause" be personally
13
served"? Have not found one yet...Especially where Coughlin was a registerd efiler at the time, and
14
therefore, likely had already been deemed served. Where the subsequent Affidavit of Service thefore
15
indicated it was actually the same WCSO Deputy Machen having "personally served" such Notice on
16
Coughlin, along with some impromptu questioning of Harley as to whether such service was being
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done bas To the extent City of Reno Marshal Harley barged in to that bargaining session purporting
19
to personally serve Coughlin Notice of a Hearing and or Order to Show Cause in connection with
20
Hill's Motion for Order to Show Cause in the appeal of the summary eviction matter (which resulted
21
in a quadruple jeopardy cocktail courtesy of Hill, based largely upon the same acts which resulted in
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Coughlin being arrested for "jaywalking", and Hill getting a TPO, and Bar Counsel Pat King making
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a federal case of Hill's January 13th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin submitted to the SBN, wherein
25
Hill leads off with an allegation that Coughlin was "ghostwriting for" someone for whom Coughlin
26
was listed as attorney of record. Huh? Then Hill went to "comply with his RPC 8.3 obligation" by
27
reporting the conviction underpinning the current temporary suspension (something Coughlin
28
himself reported in compliance with SCR 111 prior to any knowledge of Hill's having done so, not
that Bar Counsel bothered to mention that in its SCR 111 Petition, something this Court made note of
a lack thereof in its June 7th, 2012 Order).
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Incidentally, RPD Sargent Monica Lopez admitted during a videotaped interview that neither
she nor her fellow office, Carter, identified themselves as law enforcement while calling to Coughlin
at the basement door prior to the landlord opening it, nor requested or warned Coughlin to leave the
property prior to arresting him from criminal trespass from Coughlin's former home law office on
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November 13th, 2011...despite Hill testifying under oath that they did so identify themselves prior to
the landlord opening the "basement" door and that the RPD Officer did issue a warning to leave to
12
Coughlin or otherwise provide Coughlin a chance to heed such a warning prior to effecting a
13
custodial arrest. What makes that even more troubling is the fact that Hill provided the City of Reno
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prosecutors video of pretty much all events other than the "knock and identify themselves" as law
enforcement Hill purports the RPD did (even where RPD Sargent Lopez indicates neither she nor
Officer Carter did so identify themselves prior to the basement door being opened by the landlord).
18
Amongst the videos that Hill filmed on November 13th, 2011 that Hill did manage to provide to City
19
of Reno prosecutors was a video of Coughlin asking Officer Carter and Sargent Tarter, prior to the
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point of arrest, why, if they felt he was trespassing, they wouldn't simply issue a citation in lieu of
making a custodial arrest. Hill's own video establishes that Hill's testimony during the criminal
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trespass matter is extremely problematic respecting whether the RPD identified themselves prior to
24
the landlord opening the door and whether the RPD issued Coughlina warning to leave and
25
opportunity to heed it prior to effecting a custodial criminal trespass arrest. Hill had Coughlin
26
arrested for criminal trespass, even where Coughlin had to pay for "storage" the same amount, $480
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as the Lease Agreement required for "full rental value for full use and occupancy of the premises"
for 17 days of "storage" of Coughlin's personal property, and even where NRS 108.475 and NRS
40.760 indicate a summary eviction is required where one is "using a storage facility as a residence"
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(if that was the case, which has not been established), not a criminal trespass arrest, particularly
where RPD Officer Chris Carter, in violating Soldal v. Cook County, expounded to Coughlin upon
his learned views on "service" of eviction orders like some modern day Friedenthal. Then there is
the fact that Coughlin's former home law office was robbed of approximately $8,000 worth of
personalty on December 12th, 2011 (during the six week wait for a Hearing on Coughlin's Motion to
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Contest Personal Property Lien, again, because, according to Hill, the RJC was going to postpone
setting any such hearing until Hill's six week vacation was over, despite the statutory dictate that
such a hearing be set within 10 days of Coughlin's November 16th, 2011 filing of a Motion to
13
Contest Personal Proeprty Lien). The December 21st, 2011 Order on Coughlin's Motion to Contest
14
Personal Property Lien required Coughlin to rush into his former home law office, and take in the
15
specter of it having been torn asunder and robber, with a chortling Richard G. Hill, Esq. standing on
16
filming the occasion, and quickly throw together an "inventory of anything lost, stolen or damaged",
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then hop over to Kinko's or some wi-fi and email the RJC with such an inventory, copying Hill in the
19
process. Even though the statutes in Nevada are amongst the harshest towards tenants compared to
20
the other 49 states, the RJC, Washoe County Sheriff's Office, Reno Police Department, and landlords
21
like Dr. Matthew Joel Merliss, MD (a Chico, Ca. based neurosurgeon whom graduated from Beverly
22
Hills HS) and their attorney (or, their unauthorized practice of law committing "eviction consulting
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and process service" company, like Nevada Court Services) really go the extra mile in making
25
Nevada a very dangerous, and perhaps, lethal, place to be a tenant. Oh, and the Judge finding
26
Coughlin guilty of the Reno Municipal Code's version of criminal trespass, RMC Judge William
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Garnder, found support for the "when on property with an intent to vex and annoy" the owner of a
28
property version of criminal trespass where the Judge and prosecution also maintained that Coughlin
was "secretly" going on the property (apparently Coughlin was haunting the subconscious of the
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property owner where the prosecution did not have support for the "failed to leave after being warned
to do so" version of criminal trespass in RMC 8.10.010 is also the brother of the Family Court Judge
Linda Gardner whose April 2009 Order for Sanctions of Coughlin incident to Coughlin's service for
legal aid organizations Washoe Legal Services as a domestic violence attorney was cited as the "sole
reason" for Washoe Legal Service firing Coughlin, and which formed the basis for Coughlin's
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Petition for Writ of Mandamus challenging said Order for Sanctions in 54844 and whom admitted,
on the record, in the case flowing from Coughlin's criminal trespass arrest, in RMC 11 CR 26405,
that he "passed along" to his fellow RMC Judge Nash Holmes "his own sister's" over three years old
13
Order for Sanctions ($1,000 attorney's fee award personally payable by Coughlin under NRS 7.085
14
despite Coughlin's citing to an ALR article demonstrating the position he maintained to be the
15
majority viewpoint in Amercian jurisprudence, ie, no setting off "duty" such as alimony for
16
unsecured third party credit card debt where other spouse is sole signatory. A far flung doctrine of
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the necessaries threat by various unsecured debt holders, where none of the debts are likely large
19
enough to engender much litigation, hardly makes vexatious a failure to agree to John Springgate's
20
proposed marital settlement agreement
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. RMC Judge William Gardner refused to recuse himself from Coughlin's criminal trespass trial
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despite acknowleding that he was aware that his passing on his sister's 2009 Order for Sanctions to
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Judge Nash Holmes had resulted in a grievance being filed with the SBN, based upon his sister's
25
Order for Sanctions, upon Judge Nash Holmes forwarding said Order onto the SBN. Bar Counsel
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King issued that "grievance" based upon Judge Linda Gardner's 2009 Order for Sanctions its own
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case number, yet has continued to refuse to specify how that case came to be, who filed the grievance
based upon that Order, or in any other way indicated that such grievance came to be other than an
immaculate conception of sorts.
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Speaking of RMC Judge Nash Holme's submission of grievances and complaints to the SBN
immediately after Coughlin, unsuccessfully sought to invoke his right to appeal the "criminal
summary contempt" Order Judge Nash Holmes rendered on February 27th, 2011 in the Trial for a
traffic citation, in Coughlin's March 7th, 2012 filing in 11 TR 26800 of a Notice of Appeal (which
despite the dictates of NRS 189.010, .020, .030, and .060 and ATTY GEN. OPINION NO. 79-4
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Criminal Appeals From Municipal CourtNRS 189.010 and 189.020 (1979). The RMC has
continued to fail to transmit Coughlin's appeal of the criminal summary contempt Order to the
District Court. Further, Coughlin's own Washoe County Public Defender Biray Dogan, Esq.
Then, Mr. King alleged he would point towards some pending criminal investigation as a
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basis for a Compliant. Tell that to the indicted on federal compaign violation charges attorney's the
SBN is not commenting on.
Somehow, the District Court managed to find it equitable to sanction Coughlin $40,050 in
attorney's fees in the appeal of that summary eviction matter, and the judge making that ruling was
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previously a member of the same law firm as Coughlin, yet refused to recuse himself from the
21
matter. Bar Counsel King has also previously threatened (while attempting to coerce Coughlin's
22
assent to some snake potion SCR 117 deal when King is not busy attempting to fabricate a SCR 105
23
"informal meeting" with Coughlin out of a purported offer by King to actually let Coughlin even
24
view (not copy though) or "see the materials submitted along with the grievances", despite the fact
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that King stormed away from the Bar's Northern Office conference room seconds into Coughlin
reviewing such materials, along with all such materials being stuffed back into their box, upon it
becoming clear that Coughlin wished to view the materials prior to being interrogated by King other
otherwise have King deem the occasion an "informal meeting" under SCR 105). King seeks to
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prolong a temporary suspension incident to a thoroughly defrocked "candy bar petty larceny"
conviction (and the dismissal of the appeal was based upon an impermissible applciation of NRS
189.030 and NRS 4.410(2) wherein a civil statue speaking to paying up front for a transcript was
applied to justify dismissal a criminal appellant's appeal (a growing in Nevada's courts as seen in a
similar case included in Exhibit 1) as a justification for placing a temporary suspension on Coughlin
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throughout a lengthy potential SBN v Coughlin Complaint proceeding (that will be, according to
King, based upon pending criminal charges, Coughlin wearing "pajama pants" to a Municipal Court
filing counter while checking on a traffic ticket, some alleged video of someone swearing in a police
13
officer's presence, a non-existent/CGI-ish "Order" by a (REDACTED) Court Judge that only exists in
14
the mind of Pat King (who is known for being rather sloppy and lazy like that, you know, when it
15
comes to due process and people's way of making a living, and constitutionally protected property
16
rights, while bringing his dog to work to hang out in the Bar's Northern Office's lobby, a Great Dane,
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which, admittedly, is a magnificently regal animal, though it was not in the December 2012 Animal
Law issue like Coughlin's Pekingnese Jackson Pawluck). "Patty Ice" knows Coughlin loves him.
However, it is inappropriate for King to seek to prolong Coughlin's temporary suspension so
unreasonably, where, especially, King has maintained he intends to seek a "combo-hearing" that will
largely be based upon a Complaint that alleges Coughlin has pending criminal charges: Where the
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only relevant factual allegation contained in Disciplinary Board's affidavit, filed in support of its
25
petition for attorney's temporary suspension from the practice of law, was that a criminal indictment
26
had been filed against the attorney, this sole allegation, without more, was insufficient to justify
27
summary suspension and the immediate imposition of temporary restrictions. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rules
28
102, subd. 4(a), 111, subd. 1. Matter of Monteiro, 1984, 684 P.2d 506, 100 Nev. 440. Coughlin has
not been indicted on federal election law/campaign contribution violations. The charges Coughlin
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does currently face say a lot more about the prosecutors than they do about Coughlin, and the fact
that a June 7th, 2012 email from Coughlin to a prosecutor was followed four hours later by a
suspension of this Court, signed by three Justices, one of whom has previously recused himself from
Coughlin's case appeal of the dismissal of Coughlin's wrongful termination lawsuit against Washoe
Legal Services, 60302 (and granted, the Justice referenced has longstanding ties to and altruistic
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interactions with legal aid entities throughout the state...) provides a further reason for this Court to
consider, en banc, Coughlin's various requests to have the temporary suspension of his law license
dissolved (Coughlin filed a Motion for Resconsideation of the Temporary Suspension on June 11th,
13
2012 in light of the Nevada Supreme Court's failure to file Coughlin's May 24th, 2012 attempt at
14
filing an Opposition to the SCR 111 Petition in 60838, in violation of NRCP 5(e), and a August 13th,
15
2012 SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in 61426, in addition to a SCR 111(10) Motion to Dissolve the
16
Temporary Suspension of the same date in 60838.
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As to the reasonableness of allowing Bar Counsel's attempt to subvert procedural SCR's

based upon pending criminal cases, the RJC docket in RCR2011-063341 is incorrect in that it fails to
detail the extent to which DDA Zach Young violated NRS 178.405 by filing, with a file stamp time
of 2:55 pm an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Appear as Co-Counsel despite the fact that DDA
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Young and Coughlin's public defender Biray Dogan, in RCR2012-065630 met in a clandestine status
24
conference on February 27th, 2012 at 1:30 pm, despite the fact that on February 24th, 2012 (and the
25
files documents this as well) that very MSC was continued until March 29th, 2012 in light of a
26
scheduling conflict attendant to the fact that Coughlin had a traffic citation trial involving Coughlin
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in the RMC on that very day, February 27th, 2012 in 11 TR 26800 set for 1:00 pm. Bar Counsel
King has threatened to file a SBN v Coughlin SCR 105 Complaint based upon a filing by Coughlin
incident to the defense of a "misuse of 911 or emergency services", a charge that presents DDA
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Young with the difficult tasks of prosecuting one for (and some guessing is required here as DDA
Young is taken to not specifying much of anything in the information in his Complaints) calling 911
to report fear of the police and or a failure by a 911 operator to accord such an allegation any
legitimacy...which explains why DDA Young seeks to conspire with Coughlin's public defender
Dogan to amend such a charge to a "resisting arrest" simple misdemeanor, down from a gross, and
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thereby leverage the threat of a conviction of a crime that actually, upon a conviction, would invoke
a SCR 111(6) "serious offense) Petition by Bar Counsel) criminal matter that has been pending since
Coughlin was subject to a custodial arrest on January 14th, 2012 at his then shared residence with
13
two individuals from whom he rented a room, and against which he was ultimately awarded Orders
14
of Protection in FV12-00187 and FV12-00188. The same RPD Sargent, Paul Sifre, who ordered a
15
trainee, Officer Leedy, to effect a custodial arrest of Coughlin on January 12th, 2012 at Coughlin's
16
former law office ordered Coughlin arrested again less than 48 hours later for the "misuse of
17
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emergency services" incident to Coughlin calling 911 to report the sudden disappearance of his dog,
19
in the context of weeks of attacks by his two former housmates (slashed tires, furniture thrown in the
20
street, death threats, being chased up the stairs by a man with a 10 inch butcher knife yelling threats,
21
having hot coffee thrown on him, interference with his mail, etc., etc.), and despite the fact that NRS
22
33.018 does define "domestic violence" to include violence against one's pets or animals. Sargent
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Sifre indicated to Coughlin upon bringing 7 other RPD Officers to "respond" to Coughlin 911 call
25
upon the violent roomates making menacing statements and gestures in response to the
26
disappearance of Coughlin's dog, that it was merely a "matter for animal control" and that Sifre was
27
arresting Coughlin because "you keep placing yourself in situations where you are a victim", and
28
despite that statement being captured on tape, DDA Zach Young continues to prosecute that case.
DDA Young and Coughlin's public defender did seek to prevent Coughlin from becoming aware of
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their attempts to "reduce" that gross misdemeanor to one that would invoke an SCR 111(6) "serious
crime" Petition by Bar Counsel if a conviction is procured, as just because a charge is conveniently
reduced to "resisting arrest", and therefore a "lesser offense" (gross misdemeanor versus
misdemeanor) does not mean the impact on one's life would be less, especially in light of SCR 111.
Dogan failed to apprise Coughlin of DDA Young attempt to so amend the Complaint in that Matter
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in his July 31st, 2012 filing in RCR2012-065630, despite Coughlin previously demanding notice of
any and all filings by either side. Sandwiched between the two arrests in 48 hours by RPD Sargent
Sifre, was an intervening pull over by the same RPD Officer whom wrongfully arrested Coughlin on
13
August 20th, 2011 in RCR2011-063341, Nicholas Duralde, along with 5 other cops assisting Duralde
14
in notifying Coughlin that his license plate was suddenly missing, shortly after Coughlin was
15
released from jail, on January 13th, 2012, incident to a "jaywalking" arrest. Coughlin attempted to
16
submit a written complaint to the RPD regarding the retaliatory, coercive, pretextual conduct by RPD
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Officer's Duralde and Ron Rosa, which the RPD rejected on September 7th, 2011)(and unless the
19
Ninth Circuit has a jewel somewhere that was missed, no matter how backwards and ignorant an
20
arrest is, how pretextual or baseless, even for "jaywalking", the police can copy, view, and search
21
one's laptop or smart phone (even a practicing attorney advocating on a client's behalf who gets
22
arrested for summary contempt committed in a the presence of a Judge: Some courts have relied on
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the Supreme Courts holdings in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and United States
25
v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) to hold that officers can search arrestees cell phones incident to
26
arrest, concluding that they are part of the arrestees person. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501
27
(Cal. 2011); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Young, 278 F.
28
Appx. 242 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Kan. 2007).15
Robinson and Edwards, decided nearly 30 years ago, should be read narrowly in light of the more
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recent holdings in Chadwick and Gant. Searches of the person are distinguishable from searches of
electronic data stored in devices carried by the person, making Chadwick and Gant more directly
applicable).
Judge Nash Holmes has admitted in writing to communications with those involved in that
clandestine, unnoticed, violating of attorney client privilege, February 27th, 2012 MSC in RCR2012-
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065630 involving Dogan and DDA Young. However, that did not, apparently, despite the dictates of
NRS 178.405, stop Judge Nash Holmes from continuing on with the traffic citation Trial minutes later
12
in 11 TR 26800, wherein she sentenced Coughlin's to 5 days in jail, and denied a stay to Coughlin
13
despite his then representing client's as a lawyer in time sensitive matters, finding Coughlin's guilty of
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"summary criminal contempt" (which Coughlin had to report to the United States Patent and
Trademark Office and State Bar of Nevada as a SCR 111 criminal conviction). Curiously, the Order
for Competency Evaluation was signed by Judge Clifton, but the RJC's file and docket therein
18
indicate that Judge Schroeder presided over the 2/27/12 1:30 pm Status Conference, despite the fact
19
that the files indicates such a conference was reset, on 2/24/12 to 3/29/12 (RJC Judge Schroeder
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stated to Coughlin at the January 31st, 2012 Hearing on Extending the Stalking and Harassment
Protection Order Richard G. Hill, Esq received within 40 minutes of filing it, on January 12th, 2012,
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"do you want to go to jail" upon Coughlin attempting to broach the subject of whether, perhaps, Hill
24
was abusing the TPO process to aid in preventing opposing counsel from collectin evidence in
25
support of a damages analysis incident to a wrongful eviction lawsuit, particularly one of a "wrong
26
site surgery" variety for Hill's neurosurgeon client, in that Hill utilized a summary eviction
27
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proceeding against a commercial tenant not based upon the non payment of rent...ie, a "wrong site
surgery" to make an analogy Hill's neurosurgeon client might easily grasp.
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As to the purported "summary criminal contempt" Order by Judge Nash Holmes, it is not clear
there is such a "misdemeanor crime" in Nevada. That February 28th, 2012 Order read: "The court
finds that the defendant's actions were intentional and done in utter disregard and contempt for the
court, and in the presence of the court, for purposes of disrupting and delaying the proceedings and
dishonoring the rule of law and this court, and constitute the misdemeanor of criminal contempt, a
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violation of RS 22.0 I O. Good cause appearing therefore, the following sanctions are imposed: IT IS
ORDERED, pursuant to NRS 22.100, that the defendant be incarcerated at the Washoe County
12
Regional Detention Facility for the term of five (5) days, fro m the time he was taken into custody on
13
this court's order on February 27, 2012, and that sentence shall not be reduced for any reason...."
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NRS 22.010 Acts or omissions constituting contempts. The following acts or

omissions shall be deemed contempts: 1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent
behavior toward the judge while the judge is holding court, or engaged in judicial
duties at chambers, or toward masters or arbitrators while sitting on a reference or
arbitration, or other judicial proceeding. 2. A breach of the peace, boisterous conduct
or violent disturbance in the presence of the court, or in its immediate vicinity,
tending to interrupt the due course of the trial or other judicial proceeding. 3.
Disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, order, rule or process issued by the
court or judge at chambers. 4. Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to
be sworn or answer as a witness. 5. Rescuing any person or property in the custody
of an officer by virtue of an order or process of such court or judge at chambers. 6.
Disobedience of the order or direction of the court made pending the trial of an
action, in speaking to or in the presence of a juror concerning an action in which the
juror has been impaneled to determine, or in any manner approaching or interfering
with such juror with the intent to influence the verdict. 7. Abusing the process or
proceedings of the court or falsely pretending to act under the authority of an order
or process of the court.
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In Judge Nash Holmes February 28th, 2012 Order Finding Defendant in Contempt of Court
and Imposing Sanctions, the Order reads: "9) defendant's lying to the court in response to direct
questions posed by the court with regard to his recording the proceedings". No evidentiary support or
other allegation have been made by Judge Nash Holmes to support that finding. Further, that Order
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seems to take an overly narrow view of what is permissible subject for cross-examining a police
officer, and at one point, Judge Nash Holmes stated, on the record, that she does not "care about
retaliation, or bribery, or corrutpion" or words substantially similar to that effect, and the Order itself
suggests Judge Nash Holmes finds those subject wholly irrelevant to a criminal prosecution,
regardless of the vast body of case law devoted to retaliatory arrests, witness bias, materials not
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offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather the witness's state of mind, etc., etc. That
Order included the following: "defendant's repeatedly injecting allegations of bribery, perjury, and
police retaliation into the matter after the court instructed him not to, and directed him to limit himself
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to i sues pertaining to the facts of the "Boulevard Stop;" 5) defendant's repeatedly trying to insert
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"Richard Hill" into his questions and statements when such person was not relevant to the
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proceedings and the defendant had been ordered to stop discussing that...defendant's continually
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accusing the court of denying him the right or ability to ask questions...defendant' s failing and
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refusing to properly examine the witness, despite numerous admonitions by the court to stop
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repeating questions, misstating answers, injecting irrelevant material, arguing with the witness and
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mischaracterizing the testimony. During that proceeding Judge Nash Holmes asked Coughlin "Are
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you recording this proceeding?". Coughlin prefaced his answer with an assertion that he a a
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Constitutional Right now to be coerced into answering such sua sponte interrogation, but answered
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truthfully that he was not recording the proceeding at the time that question was posed to him by
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Judge Nash Holmes, though, to be sure, the RMC was recording the proceeding, it is a part of the
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public record, and Coughlin surely now has no means of confirming what exactly may have been on
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his smart phone or micro sd data card given both were returned to him damaged and with all the data
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previously therein erased, though likely not before his privacy had been raped by various local law
enforcement entitites perusing the contents therein under some "search incident to arrest" approach.
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In a letter/complaint/grievance to the SBN from the RMC's Judge Nash Holmes, dated March
12th, 2012, it is written: "We are setting that case for trial and attempting to serve him at the most
recent address we have (1422 E. 9th St. #2 Reno NY 89512), although I heard today he may be living
in his vehicle somewhere....It is my understanding that Reno Justice Court also has a matter pending
on this attorney. My Judicial Assistant was contacted by the Washoe Public Defender in February...
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and they stated that they represent him in a Gross Misdemeanor matter in RJC...You will have the full
cooperation of myself, the other judges, and the staff of Reno Municipal Court in your pursuit of this
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matter. Mr. Coughlin has positioned himself as a vexatious litigant in our court, antagonizing the
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staff and even our pro temp judges on the most simple traffic and misdemeanor matters. I do think
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this is a case of some urgency, and I apologize for taking two days to get this package to you; our
IT person was ill and could not make the copies of the audios of Mr. Coughlin's hearings until today,
and I felt it was important that the audios be included in the materials to be considered by the State
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Bar. On February 27, 2012, Mr. Coughlin told me he was actively practicing law and had
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appointments with clients. I do not know if that was true, but if so, he could be causing serious harm
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to the practice of law in Northern Nevada and could be jeopardizing someone's freedom or property
interests...." Such concern for Coughlin's client's "freedom or property interests" did not result in
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Judge Nash Holmes according any real consideration to issuing a stay of any sort to Coughlin prior to
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the immediate and unfathomably unexpected summary 5 day jail sentence incident to a traffic citation
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Trial over a California Roll/Boulevard Stop. Why, in a letter date February 14th, 2012, when
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Coughlin was still living at his fromer E. 9th St. address, Judge Nash Holmes would have "heard he
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(Coughlin) may be living in his vehicle somewhere" is curious, though not at all out of line with
Coughlin's past experience with the some individuals at the RMC and the City of Reno Marshals.
Coughlin has no idea what "pro tem" Judges he ever had any interactions with at the RMC of an
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import whatsoever. The passage wherein Judge Nash Holmes apologizes for "taking two days to get
this package to you" implies a previous communication with the SBN, though hopefully not the sort
of attempts to drum up complaints where none should reasonably issue like that see with the RPD's
Office Weaver and Sargent Miller, or in the apparent exorting Richard Hill by the RPD to file a
protection order against Coughlin. Further, Judge Nash Holmes went on to issue what are likely void
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"double jeopardy" violating Orders subsequent to Coughlin filing a notice of appeal on March 8th,
2012 of the Contempt finding. It is improtant to note, the February 28th, 2012 Order Finding
Defendant in Contempt and Imposing Sanctions, which purports to issue a conviction for
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"misdemeanor criminal contempt" was never received by Coughlin, despite it purportedly being
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mailed to Coughlin's former home law office address at a time that the RMC had Coughlin's then E.
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9th St. address, and despite Coughlin having a change of address on file with the USPS at that time
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(though there were issues with getting the USPS to process or recognize that incident to the domestic
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violence against Coughlin on E.9 9th St.). Regardless, Coughlin only ever first even saw the
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February 28th, 2012 Contempt Order, and probably even then did not realize it purported to issue
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"misdemeanor criminal contempt" conviction (Coughlin still has some confusion as to the distinction
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between criminal and civil contempt and a reading of the NRS 22.010 cited does little to alleviate that
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confusion, though Coughlin has gathered various ALRs and AmJurs on the appealability of summary
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contempt findings and does not belive Judge Nash Holmes Order is sufficiently specific under the
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Houston decision (Judge Pomeranz, handcuffs, etc). Further, Bar Counsel King has gone on to
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threaten Coughlin extensively with the use of sections of subsequenttly issued Orders by Judge Nash
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Holmes that purport to make findings "by clear and convicing" evidence of various violations of
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RPCs for conduct that Judge Nash Holmes already entered an Order on February 28th, 2012. That is
double jeopardy and or law of the case, and not a proper basis for delaying the hearing required under
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SCR 111(8), etc. The SBN and King can have it if they want it with Coughlin, but they ought to
have to do it in compliance with the rules, period, rather than have King get down on all fours an
surreptiously crawl behind a standing Coughlin's knees, only to have whoever give Coughlin a swift
push to the torso, causing him to topple over backwards. And the SBN should be prevented from
doing its bit where it shows Coughlin a flower, prompts him to smell it, then manipulates some
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apparatus built into what is actually a phony flower that sprays water in Coughlin's face. And then
there is the cans of mixed nuts the SBN gave Coughlin that actually contained projectile confetti sorts
of material.
Hill applied for a TPO against Coughlin on January 12th, 2012 when Hill noticed Coughlin
peacefully filming from the public sidewalk at Coughlin's former home law office Hill's crew
throwing into a dump truck the property that Coughlin was unable to remove in the scant 13 hours
accorded him in the Order "Resolving" Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property line, on
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December 24th, 2011, especially where Hill placed a chain link and padlock on the backyard gate to
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Coughlin's former home law office, making removing many, many items unfeasible. Hill failed to
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remove the chain link padlock until only a couple hours remained to move a great deal of property,
and said padlock was only placed on that back yard gate in the one or two days immediately prior to
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the time allowed to remove property....Further, despite billing Coughlin some $1,060 for "securing
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the property" (one would think paying $460 under NRS 118A.460 for "storage" of personalty might
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include "securing" it, but no, it would not...and Hill's contractor saved on expenses incident to such
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"securing" by using Coughlin's own plywood to board up the back porch. Speaking of the extent to
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which Judge Nash Holmes continued on to conduct the Trial in 11 TR 26800 despite the 2/29/12
Order for Competency Evaluation signed by Judge Clifton and file stamped 1:31 pm, despite the
statutory dictate that "the other departments" "shall suspend any other proceedings relating to the
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defendant until to defendant is determined to be competent", found in NRS 178.405, DDA Young
himself violated NRS 178.405 in that his 2/29/12 Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Appear as Cocounsel bares a file stamp of 2:55 pm. Please correct the docket in this regard, as well as revising it to
reflect all of Coughlin's filings, which were all file stamped, yet are not indicated on the docket,
especially the Notice of Appearance Coughlin filed, while Coughlin was still a licensed attorney, in
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addition to any Substitutions of Counsel Coughlin filed so very long ago (no matter what DDA
Young tries to argue about how "untimely" Coughlin's attempts to be rid of the public defenders
obstructive presence are).
Additionally, there is a clear retaliatory animus evince by both Dogan and DDA Young's
participation in the Feburary 27th, 2011 "clandestine" Status Conference where Coughlin's filing of
February 17th, 2011 in that same case RCR20120-065630 That February 14th, 2012 filing by
Coughlin in RCR2012-065630 was attached by Pat King and or J. Thomas Susich in the SCR 117
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Petition in 60975 (and King has repeatedly threatened to attach it to or reference it in the SCR 105
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Complaint he keeps hyping in an ill advised attempt to get Coughlin to sign up for a SCR 117 trip)
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and referenced by Judge Nash Holmes in her various Orders and written complaint to the SBN when
she cites Coughlin with "quoting lyrics to rock songs" in a filing was critical of Dogan's work as a
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public defender for Coughlin, especially where Dogan was attorney of record and failed to appear for
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a hearing...Never mind that the only lyrics to any songs that were quoted by Coughlin in any filings
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so far was the quotation to a rap song in the February 17th, 2012 filing in the case that Dogan
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represented Coughlin on in Reno Justice Court, RCR2012-065630, wherein an Order for
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Competency Evaluation was entered at 1:31 pm on February 29th, 2012, whereupon, shortly
afterwards, Judge Nash Holmes continued on to hold the traffic citation Trial from which the
"summary criminal contempt" charge underpinning most of Bar Counsel King's SCR 117 Petition
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and from which most of King's threats of a SBN v Coughlin Complaint seem to rely (to the extent
such a Complaint would rely on anything other than King's typical legal drivel, which continually
fails to cite to any legal authority whatsoever and evinces the work of a man entirely unfamiliar with
Lexis, Westlaw, AmJur., ALR, Proof of Facts, or any other bastion of actual lawyering. The lyric
Coughlin quoted in that February 17th, 2012 filing (which was necessitated by the fact that Dogan
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failed to appear for a court date on February 13th, 2012 for which he and Coughlin had, when they
met in person and spoke for over an hour about the case on or about February 7th, 2012 agreed
Dogan would appear on Coughlin's behalf and that Dogan was already "attorney of record" in the
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matter and assigned to the case) was quoted merely as a commentary on the spiritual choices one is
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faced with various local power brokers and their agents are behaving like goons: "Okay, your a goon,
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what's a goon to a goblin?". Hardly a rationale for pulling some lawyers ticket, Mr. King. Nor for
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submitting a complaint questioning a lawyers competency to the SBN.
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SCR Rule 111(8). Attorneys convicted of crimes.

"8.Referral to disciplinary board. Upon receipt of a petition filed under
subsection 4 of this rule, demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted of a
serious crime, the supreme court shall, in addition to suspending the attorney in
accordance with the provisions of subsection 7 of this rule, refer the matter to
the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hearing
before a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the
extent of the discipline to be imposed..."
SCR Rule 102(2). Types of discipline:
Misconduct is grounds for: "2. Suspension by the supreme court. A suspension of
6 months or less shall not require proof of rehabilitation; a suspension of more
than 6 months shall require proof of rehabilitation to be demonstrated in a
reinstatement proceeding under Rule 116...."
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Given that the Board and the SBN are and have effectively denied Coughlin a timely hearing
called for by the Court's Order and SCR 111(8), and now have failed to provide an "immediate
hearing" pursuant to Coughlin's filed and served SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in case number 61426.
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SCR Rule 116. Reinstatement: "1. Order of supreme court required. An

attorney suspended as discipline for more than 6 months may not resume
practice unless reinstated by order of the supreme court. 2.Procedure for
reinstatement. Petitions for reinstatement by a suspended attorney shall be
filed with bar counsel's office, which shall promptly refer the petition to the
chair of the appropriate disciplinary board. The chair shall promptly refer the
petition to a hearing panel, which shall, within 60 days after referral, conduct
a hearing. ...
4. Tender of costs in advance. Petitions for reinstatement under this rule
shall be accompanied by an advance cost deposit of $1,000 to cover
anticipated costs of the reinstatement proceeding."
The 60 days mentioned above only further highlights the potential for a contempt finding
where the SBN and Board have failed to schedule a hearing for this matter despite Coughlin filing an
Opposition to the SCR 111 Petition, or at least submitting an Opposition as early as May 24th, 2012,
and eventually getting the Court to file something in that vein on June 10th, 2012, which has remain
unchallenged by Bar Counsel. Bar Counsel appears rather busy with other things, and any such
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overburdened condition will only be exacerbated by a protracted involvement with Coughlin, who
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can rake it a little if anyone hasn't noticed yet. King's close and prolonged involvement with Richard
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G. Hill, Esq. (the were opposing counsel on one of the biggest cases of either of their careers, the
March 2012 reported decision in Milsner v Carstarphen)
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CONCLUSION
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Please dissolve the temporary suspension of Coughlin's law license and require the SBN to
remit whatever compensation to Coughlin this Court feels is just, and or, in the alternative, require the
SBN and NNDB or Panel to immediately set for Hearing (very soon) a Hearing limited to the dictates
set forth in SCR 111(8) and this Court's June 7th, 2012 Order, ie, determining the punishment for the
candy bar issue, which arguably has been more than served already given the four months length of
the suspension and other peripheral matters.
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AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
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The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social security
number of any person.
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Declaration: I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to NRS 53.045 that,

to the best of my knowledge, the information contained herein is true and
correct.
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Respectfully submitted this: October 2nd, 2012,
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/s/ Zach Coughlin, signed electronically
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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PO BOX 3961
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Reno, NV 89505
Pro Per Attorney
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Proof of Service:
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On this date, I, Zach Coughlin electronically served a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to all registered electronic filers or those otherwise consenting to electronic service in a
waiver of the application of NRCP as set forth in SCR 109, and to those whom are not I placed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document in the USPS mail on this date and or complied with all
service requirements set forth in SCR 109:
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Patrick O. King, Esq. Assistant Bar Counsel

9456 Double R. Blvd Suite B
Reno, NV 89521
David A Clark, Esq., Bar Counsel
State Bar of Nevada
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Address: 600 East Charleston Blvd.
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Las Vegas , NV 89104
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Phone Number: 702-382-2200
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Fax number: 702-385-2878

J. Thomas Susich, Esq., Chairman NNDB
Nevada Employment Security Division
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Address: 1675 E. Prater Way, Suite 103
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Sparks , NV 89434
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Phone Number: 775-284-9533
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Fax number: 775-284-9513
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Dated this October 2nd, 2012
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/s/ Zach Coughlin

Zach Coughlin
Pro Per Attorney
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10 5 12 0204 60838 Motion For Order To Show Cause 12-31434

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10 5 12 0204 60838 Motion For Order To Show Cause 12-31434

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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR

unopposed by the SBN in 61426.

forward to our Hearing on September 25th, 2012. Zach Coughlin".

filed or the matter is otherwise concluded."

Clerk Peters: I am supposed to hand you this Complaint.

Peters: I mailed it out.

King: First, take this.

King: First, take this.

Coughlin: I have cases that say you can't.

King: Zach. don't play games!

Coughlin: It's not a game, Pat, it's the law.

Paula: Sure? (looking bewildered beyond all measure).

King Here is this, take it, take it, Zach.

King: This is State Bar.

King: What Motion to Dismiss?

Coughlin: I sent it to you Pat. What Motion to Dismiss?

King: Pick it up and read it. Pick it up and read it.

LAW AND LEGAL ARGUMENT

An attorney is entitled to due process in disciplinary proceedings concerning his or her

bar's charges and is afforded an opportunity in the disciplinary hearing to be heard.[FN7]

or her crimes did not involve moral turpitude.[FN8]

alleged offense and to offer testimony in mitigation of any penalty

N.E.2d 235 (2011).

Against Fisher, 2008 ND 151, 754 N.W.2d 802 (N.D. 2008).

SCR Rule 119. Additional rules of procedure.

as required by these rules or any local rules or practices. NRCP 5(e).

(Tex. App. Waco 2008).

Coughlin has submitted for filing.

Rule 104(3). State bar counsel....

broadly demonstrating incompetence.

Florida Bar v. Cox, 718 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1998).

791 (Iowa 2010).

its terms, as Coughlin's arguably had not.

"FACTS SHOWING CONTEMPT OF COURT 6. EXHIBIT 1 (the Summary Eviction Lockout

the transfer station and the Property."

specified as a "supersedeas bond", with a citation to NRS 40.385:

allowed under the December 21st, 2012 Order.

the property. State v. Cudney, 47 Nev. 224, 218 P. 736.

and SCR 111(8) and SCR 111(10).

To continue the temporary suspension of Coughlin's constitutionally protected

such a rule does not apply to "landlord tenant matters":

JCRRT Rule 2. Application of Rules. Except as otherwise provided by

Coughlin was guilty of demonstrating a "lack of fairness to opposing counsel" or "prolonging

Is there even a rule requiring such an "Order to Show Cause" be personally

a lack thereof in its June 7th, 2012 Order).

proposed marital settlement agreement

immaculate conception of sorts.

Temporary Suspension of the same date in 60838.

As to the reasonableness of allowing Bar Counsel's attempt to subvert procedural SCR's

surgery" to make an analogy Hill's neurosurgeon client might easily grasp.

NRS 22.010 Acts or omissions constituting contempts. The following acts or

represented Coughlin on in Reno Justice Court, RCR2012-065630, wherein an Order for

submitting a complaint questioning a lawyers competency to the SBN.

SCR Rule 111(8). Attorneys convicted of crimes.

SCR Rule 116. Reinstatement: "1. Order of supreme court required. An

the suspension and other peripheral matters.

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

number of any person.

Declaration: I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to NRS 53.045 that,

Respectfully submitted this: October 2nd, 2012,