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Unity of knowledge versus Kants heteronomy with a reference to the problem of money, nance and real economy relations in a new global nancial architecture
Masudul Alam Choudhury
College of Commerce and Economics, Sultan Qaboos University, Muscat, Sultanate of Oman and Trisakti University, Jakarta, Indonesia
Abstract
Purpose The paper aims to offer a new perspective casting original light on the foundational socio-scientic argumentation premised on the application of the epistemology of unity of knowledge across contrasting shades of reasoning, to the problem of religion, science and society. Kantian epistemological reasoning is questioned within this argumentation. The specic case of money, nance and real economy is treated in the context of the epistemology of unity of knowledge contra Kantian problem of heteronomy. Design/methodology/approach The comparative study of received literature in the history of epistemological thinking is applied to the issue of universality and uniqueness of theory and its application in the learning dynamics between organically complementary relations, called circular causation, to the ethical interdependence between money, nance and the real economy. The goal is to attain social and economic sustainability. Findings A new epistemological outlook in occidental sciences is needed to repair its intrinsic dualism. Kantian thinking is instrumental in this structural aw. Unity of divine knowledge as comprehended by functional ontological formalism in the deepest of scientic terms compromises the universal and unique alternative in everything. This claim has been formalised. Research limitations/implications This is a theoretical exploration. Practical implications Important global implications of the need for a new outlook of unity between monetary, nancial and real economic variables are presented within the contrasting epistemological argumentations. The direction of such money-real economy reform in the light of Islamic economics and nance is pointed out. Originality/value This is an original conceptual paper, whose content argued out in rigorous scientic language of topological mathematics aims at showing the link between the epistemology of unity of knowledge and the world-systems. The same is impossible in the Kantian worldview. Keywords Epistemology, Economics, Finance, Philosophy, Sciences Paper type Research paper

International Journal of Social Economics Vol. 37 No. 10, 2010 pp. 764-778 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0306-8293 DOI 10.1108/03068291011070435

Introduction Neo-liberal economic and social thought has for long now been inuenced by a scientic pursuit of dichotomous realities (Holton, 1992). This approach spells out the assumptions upon which all of economic and social argumentation is based. They are namely,
The usual disclaimer applies.

competition, full-information, perfect foresight, consumer preferences and production menus as datum, and wherewithal, the fundamental axiom of scarcity of resources and economic rationality, and scientic rationalism in all of social inquiry. The end picture of human behavior and the social world depicted by the structure of such assumptions taken up ensemble is that of a world-system competing for scarce resources. This state of affairs denes the landmark of methodological individualism and self-interest (Minogue, 1963). Yet the dichotomous nature of economic distribution and use of resources, and the competition nature of social ordering are neither the perceived nor the desired goals of human well-being. The true condition of sharing of wealth, income and outputs, and the complementing of resources are found to be the accepted modes of the social order. Examples here are co-nancing of projects and the goals of objective economic globalization (Dunning, 2004). The idea of pervasive complementarities between possibilities in the economic and social worlds is a vast one. It has its deep scientic implications. The principle of extensive complementarities invokes agent-agent specic and agent-principal specic codetermination of output and resources. It also implicates organic unication by interaction, integration and evolutionary learning between the underlying variables in the system of analytical equations dening contracts between the variables and their representative agents. This is the idea of strong interaction used by Smith (1992), and is a concept contrary to social Darwinism. The latter concept underlies the neo-liberal assumptions, axioms and dichotomous relations, despite its scientic nicety. Objective In this paper, we will argue that the heritages of the two perspectives of economy and society owe to epistemological origins carried through rational developments. Thus, the neo-liberal differentiated economy and society and the interactively embedded ones by organic complementarities between the variables and agencies of these human domains, arise from their different epistemological origins. In this paper, we will argue that in the history of science and rationalism, and the impact of this felt on the development of neo-liberalism, shares with the Kantian idea of heteronomy. Heteronomy is the problem of failure in synthesizing the relational order of cause and effect. Kants rationalism played a signicant role in the neo-liberal development. We will then go on to an alternative way of explaining the learning paradigm of circular causality embedded in the organic relations between economy, society and ethical possibilities. Our application to such contrasting ideas will be to examine the economy and society unifying linkages in terms of money, nance and the real economy complementarities. Here, the Kantian problem of heteronomy and its alternative in pervasive systemic complementarities as two opposing epistemologies will be examined. Some denitions We dene the social perspective of nancial economy in relation to the endogenous ethical value of the nancial portfolio. Endogenous ethical values are induced into our choices by the text of laws and the resulting nature of selection of the social well-being. The social well-being function is dened as the criterion for estimating the degree of unity of knowledge and its application gained in the study of specic issues and problems in the light of the primal ethical induction arising from an epistemological reference.

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The emanation of social choices is from the text of moral laws. Such morally (ethically) induced social choices inuence the formation of human preferences. Therefore, such laws are universally and uniquely acceptable to ethical forms of social behavior everywhere. Within this social implication is the induction of the value-loaded individual preferences. The ethically induced preferences are then collectively aggregated in complex ways to form social preferences, social choices and the social well-being function. The social well-being function is thus an evaluative criterion that is premised on the precept of universality and uniqueness of the epistemology of unity of knowledge in its relation with the unity of the world-system. Within the world-system, we will particularize our focus on nancial portfolio selection. The resulting formalism is an undertaking in analytical ethics. About such analytical ethical methodology, Edel (1970, p. 289) writes (edited):
The EP (existentialist perspective of an ethical theory) of a given ethical theory is its view of the world and its properties, mans nature and condition, insofar as these enters into its understanding of moral processes and moral judgments.

The methodological approach we will suggest in addressing the above-mentioned points in terms of the analytical EP approach is a combination of what Edel prescribes as the analytical approach, causal-explanatory approaches and evaluative approaches. The analytical method in this paper takes the form of theorems. These are presented below in a discursive style. I. Theorem 1: the universal EP is derived and formalised in the functional ontological form in reference to a meta-epistemological foundation Categories of epistemologically derived knowledge The importance here is to note the denition of epistemology, knowledge, and the functional ontological effects of formalised functions. Knowledge essentially means the discerning and differentiating power of Truth over Falsehood. In between these categories is also indeterminateness of knowledge that characterizes murky areas of human experience between Truth and Falsehood. The fact of the matter is that in most worldly matters we have a slight understanding of Truth and Falsehood, if these precepts are rendered to rationalistic thinking. If rationalism is made the determining epistemology of what we humanly perceive as Truth and Falsehood, then such an epistemology has no social convergence in most cases concerning worldly matters. Institutions of law, courts, democracy and cultural acceptances, merely enforce a time-honored socio-cultural development of norms over historical time. But a conscious understanding of facts, and the critical evaluation of possibilities, invokes human consciousness. The epistemological origin of human consciousness in social determination and its continuance cannot be rendered to the whims of variegated rationalistic ideas. Instead, there must be an epistemologically determined commonly acceptable idea for all everywhere. Such is also the principle underlying global ethics (IMF, 1995). Thus, the determination of Truth and Falsehood takes up an epistemological basis of understanding what is meant by the precepts of universality and uniqueness. Thereby, the indeterminate concepts that lie in between humanly best determinations of Truth and Falsehood are subjected to the incidence of knowledge. That is, as the learning based on organic unity of knowledge and the world-system grows, individuals and

society sharpen their better acquired knowledge of Truth and Falsehood. Thereby, the indeterminate domain between Truth and Falsehood fades away into a clear divide between these categories of knowledge and de-knowledge, respectively. Ultimately therefore, the growth of knowledge premised on the epistemology of unity of knowledge and the world-system, deciphers what is Truth and Falsehood with increasing levels of consciousness. Yet the progress of such learning according to the evolutionary epistemology being non-depreciative, incessant and undiminished, our progress towards the perfect state of acquiring Truth and Falsehood is never perfectly settled in the temporal order of being and becoming. Queries We now categorize the levels of human ight of consciousness towards acquiring increasing deciphering of Truth and Falsehood, and consequently, the disappearance of the indeterminate domain of knowledge-murkiness. Towards understanding the causality between epistemology, knowledge, Truth and Falsehood and the learning towards these in the human realm, we raise the following questions: what is the nature of the fundamental, i.e. meta-epistemology referred to here? What the meaning of knowledge is as derived from the meta-epistemology? What are the derived meanings of Truth, Falsehood and indeterminateness of knowledge as derived from the epistemological core? What are the meanings of universality and uniqueness in reference to the meanings of Truth and Falsehood arising from the meta-epistemological core? Truth and Falsehood The fundamental premise or meta-epistemology is the reference for discerning between Truth and Falsehood on the basis of unity of knowledge as the meta-epistemological core. Thus, the meta-epistemology comprises the text of laws, instruments and social arrangements that together enable unity of knowledge and organic unity in reasoning, artifacts and relations between agencies and variables to prevail in all issues of the world-system. Likewise, the meta-epistemological foundation determines the nature and functions of Falsehood simultaneously with those of Truth. The functional or engineering ontology (Gruber, 1993)[2] of this epistemological origin comprises the mapping of the laws, instruments and social arrangements onto specic problems and issues of our real world-system. The result of this analytical approach rst is the formulation of such a body of information derived from laws, instruments and social arrangements, and organizes them into functional edicts. The second phase is the analytical construction of ways of interrelating the edicts and their representative variables so as to measure organic unity of knowledge between them. Third, such an empirical estimation of the functional ontological forms is done by quantitative and discursive methods. This is where the social well-being function as the objective criterion for the estimation of the degree of unity of knowledge as gained in the analytical system is determined. The method is to simulate the social well-being function across phases of learning in respect of circular causation between the representative variables and reconstructed relations out of normative meta-epistemological directions (expression (1)). Truth then is the state of unity of knowledge as epistemologically established, conjoint with its impact on the unity of the world-system via the medium of the laws,

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instruments and social arrangements that together enable such organic unity of knowledge to take up functional ontological forms invoking logical formalism. Falsehood is differentiation of the artifacts, variables and relations that come about via such laws, instruments and social arrangements. They cause differentiation as opposed to organic unity. Rationalism and social Darwinism are two cases of this state, where they are based on methodological individualism, differentiation by means of conict and competition, or by initial limited afnity but parting eventually into independence and differentiation (Primavesi, 2000). Indeterminate knowledge Indeterminateness is the murky area between Truth and Falsehood due to the fact that knowledge is progressive along evolutionary epistemology towards increasingly perfecting the knowledge of Truth and Falsehood as opposite kinds in the limiting case. The path of evolutionary epistemology creating unity of knowledge in the world-systems, and thus differentiating this from the nature of Falsehood, conveys the meaning of learning by interaction leading to integration (conscious convergence or organic unity), and these two states followed by creative evolution of similar reasoning and individual and social actions and responses that establish causality (expression (1)). Universality The precept of universality is the meta-epistemological, conceptual and methodological state of pervasiveness of the differentiated meanings of Truth and Falsehood. This certainty is to be proven across the broadest range of issues and problems. The knowledge-induced socio-scientic elds in such a case transcend economics, society, science and philosophy. Since the meta-epistemological foundation leads into a functional ontological formulation of relations of organic unity of knowledge and its unication consequences in the world-system, therefore, the epistemology of Truth is contrary to the differentiated methods of Falsehood. Yet the emanating systems in the two cases are empirically viable and conceptually explainable by the logical formalism of the meta-epistemological approach. The metaepistemological foundation thus explains both Truth and Falsehood simultaneously. Contrarily, the epistemologies of Truth and Falsehood by themselves alone cannot explain unity of knowledge and differentiation, simultaneously. In other words, in this separated state of the two categories there is no comparison to evaluate one against the other, morally, ethically and materially. Universality and uniqueness The above-mentioned attributes of knowledge together convey the meaning of uniqueness within universality. The two go together. The super-encompassing knowledge domain that universally and uniquely explains Truth, Falsehood and the indeterminate is the meta-epistemology for comprehending simultaneously what is Truth and Falsehood. The meta-epistemology is the penultimate foundation of knowledge in this sense of its universality. Hence it self-references. Self-referencing is the attribute of universality and uniqueness (Choudhury and Zaman, 2009). Finally, we also note that since meta-epistemology establishes the universality and uniqueness by assigning the denitions of Truth, Falsehood and indeterminateness,

therefore, any complex relationship in each of these domains dened on the basis of this meta-epistemology, with the text of laws, instruments and social arrangements along the learning path of evolutionary interaction and integration, is a representation of unity of knowledge in the world-system. The functional ontology of the generic world-system induced by unity of knowledge brings out such unication consequences.

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Theorem 2: self-referencing is congruent with the attributes of universality and uniqueness of the meta-epistemology of unity of knowledge Self-referencing as a scientic methodology that was investigated extensively by Godel (1965) refers to the irreducibility of the penultimate axiom, which is the epistemological core of unity of knowledge, and its differentiating characterization of Falsehood in the area of rationalistic tendencies. Self-referencing cannot take place in rationalism, and hence, in any of its derivatives. Examples of the latter case are neo-liberalism and social Darwinism. This is because the rationalistic origins of these doctrines survive in everlasting and continuous falsication and conjecture, as exemplied by Poppers (1998) conjectural universe. Another example of the same kind of randomness of conicting epistemologies in social inquiry is Marxs over-determination problem (Carchedi, 1991). In this case, a plethora of theoretical constructs arise from competing epistemological origins, just as divergent intellectual contests create competing social scenarios. Marxs Social Model was thus a disequilibrium model of all such conicts between different social agents and ideas. Consequently, labor and capital forever remained opposed to each other in Marxs social and economic study of alienation and surplus value. But because the meta-epistemology explains the universe in the framework of organic unity while at the same it studies the opposite world-system of social differentiation and rationalism, therefore, there is place for self-referencing of each of these sub-systems in this methodology. In other words, according to the self-referencing theorem, the contrasting epistemologies of Truth and Falsehood segregate the texts of laws, instruments and social arrangement oppositely between the categories of Truth and Falsehood. Hence Truth self-references; Falsehood self-references. The indeterminate domain of knowledge is a temporary phenomenon. As knowledge derived from the meta-epistemology advances the differentiated recognition of Truth and Falsehood, the indeterminate event is nally absorbed by either of these two, as the nal determination may be. The deciphering in this continuous learning dynamics is event-specic, that is based on specicity of issues and problems wholly comprising everything in the world-system.

A consequentialist socio-scientic extension of the EP formalism In the resulting socio-scientic system, there is a one-to-one relationship between knowledge formation and its socio-scientic variables that are induced by the knowledge-ows. Likewise, this is true of de-knowledge-ows characterizing Falsehood. Note here that we associate all knowledge-ows with the Truth sub-set of the meta-epistemology. We associate all contrary kinds of knowledge with the Falsehood sub-set of the meta-epistemology and refer to it as de-knowledge. Now by a simple notation we write the formal expression (1):

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V!S u ! xu ! {sets of circular relations ! social evaluation ! recall V!S between {u; xu} ! continue 1 Meta-epistemology world-system social evaluation evolutionary processe

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The bold variable in expression (1) denotes a vector of variables that are complementary to each other as the result of epistemology of unity of knowledge and its unication impact on the artifacts and variables of the problem under study. In economics, and nance, we can denote x(u) by the variables for money (x 1(u)), and real economy (x 2(u)) {u} here denotes the knowledge-ows involving text, instruments and social arrangements that arise from meta-epistemology and establish unity of relations via the circular ows of causal relations between (x 1(u)) and (x 2(u)). The net-worth of the analytical system then is to increase the level of well-being as measured by our earlier mentioned simulated social well-being function, subject to circular causation between the included variables. The circular interrelationships between the variables represent the gained social reconstruction of the system to attain complementarities between the variables. This is the sign of the level of unity of knowledge gained between the variables of the problem under study. But the same set of causal relations, rst, yields estimates of the prevalent forms of relationships in the economy at large. Then the reconstruction of the estimated forms is done and used to implicate the social forms that are guided by the norms of unity of knowledge. If the (x1(u)) and (x2(u)) values are also vectors, then we have extended circular causation interrelations signifying the positivistic picture of such circular causation relations, leading thereafter, to social reconstruction in the light of unity of knowledge. The latter case is justied by the complementarities that are normatively structured between the vector-variables. The example is of x1 as a vector of money and nancial variables, x2 as the vector of real-economy variables, both being induced by the knowledge of organizing the economy along lines of organic unication between the monetary sector, nancial instruments and the real-economy. As knowledge-ows that are derived from the Truth sub-system of the meta-epistemology increase, systemic unication intensies. Likewise, any positive functional transformation dened on the variables is also complemented by the same kind of epistemological effect. The relationships between the variables and their monotonic positive transformations are the functional ontological forms caused by the meta-epistemology denoted by [V ! S] in the string relation (1). Because of the positive monotonic transformation of the uniquely knowledge-induced variables and their transformations, this implies the existence of a learned equilibrium at any phase of learning as signied by the recalling and continuation of evolutionary learning processes in expression (1). In this case, we can derive an extended version of Brouwer and Kakutanis Fixed Point Theorems (Nikaido, 1989) for open spaces of learning behavior in systemic unication of knowledge between the variables and their monotonic positive transformations (Choudhury, 1993). Generalizing the formalism of universality to everything The above-mentioned methodology is consistent and applicable to the broadest category of socio-scientic problems within organically unied domains of relationships. Thus, the precepts of universality and uniqueness in their analytical sense are shown by rst

studying the prevalent differentiated domains, as in neo-liberalism and rationalism. As well as now the same methodology can be used to study the organically unied and interrelated learning domains of pervasive complementarities. Complementary states and forms of the analytical system are equivalent to the participative relations caused by unifying variable-linkages and appropriate rules to attain unity in this particular issue of the examined world-system. This state is also the primal property of Truth. Above all this is the overarching existence of the meta-epistemology. It determines simultaneously Truth (unity of knowledge) and Falsehood (differentiation of knowledge) along there, respectively, differentiated paths of systemic evolution. II. The impossibility of universality and uniqueness in Kantian rationalism implications for ethics and economics Invoking Kant on the question of universality and uniqueness, Carnap (1966) had an incisive critique of Kants divided worlds between noumena and phenomena, and likewise, between a priori and a posteriori, pure reason and practical reason. This is the essential nature of dualism between deductive and inductive reasoning. Carnap referred to it as the problem of lack of synthesis in Kants reasoning for the sciences and philosophy. This problem of dualism contrasts with Imam Ghazzalis Islamic [IMAM] (1997) thought (Marmura, 1997), which was centered on the unied perception of knowledge and the world-system reected in inner and outer realities as an integrated phenomena. The theme is explained by Choudhury (1997) in studying Kants problem of heteronomy. Kant (1949, p. 25) wrote on such a dichotomy of knowledge that inuenced all his socio-scientic thought and penetrated Western scholarship:
This, then, is a question which at least calls for closer examination, and does not permit any off-hand answer: whether there is any knowledge that is thus independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses. Such knowledge is entitled a priori, and is distinguished from the empirical, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience.

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The resulting lack of unity of knowledge between the two kinds of reason causes the impossibility of unifying knowledge between God, whose law is in the abode of a priori reason, and the world that receives the divine law in the a posteriori domain. Thus, there comes about the impossibility of embedding God as the functional unity in all of the Western worldview. This parting reality presents itself as the problem of duality in scientic thinking. In such a Kantian manifestation, the circular causation and continuity methodology of the unity of knowledge that carries unity by the creatively dynamic interrelationships among epistemological, ontological and ontic (evidential) forms could not be realized either in Kantian epistemology or in latter days occidental thinking. Such an impossibility of unifying a priori and a posteriori categories of knowledge becomes the permanent methodological character of occidental thought. Thus, Kants epistemology does not present unity of knowledge encompassing mind and matter. The resulting socio-scientic order that overarches between mind and matter remains devoid of an epistemology of causal linkage between the two in Kant. This is the problem of Kantian heteronomy. This state of incompleteness of Kants epistemology explains Carnaps criticism of Kantian failure in knowledge synthesis.

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The consequence of the pervasive lack of unity of knowledge and the resulting absence of a circular causation and continuity worldview resulted in permanently dichotomizing the methods of deductive knowledge, which marked the epistemological origin of Kants thought from inductive knowledge, which was otherwise Humes (1992). Likewise, the normative and the positive aspects of knowledge remained dichotomized. In the end, by both cause and effect of such relations, religion and science became permanently divorced from each other (Dampier, 1961). Neither religion nor science could bequeath to the socio-scientic world-system a meta-epistemological holism. In conclusion to this section, we note that there neither exists a methodology nor instruments, whereby the epistemological need for unity of knowledge and the world-system can be brought together in Kant and the classics and neo-classics. Yet this problem of unication applies to the special case of social economics and nance in todays volatile world-system where organically unifying relationships have been ruptured between money, nancial and the real economy. This is a topic we will address briey. The idea is extracted from Choudhury (2009a, b). According to the earlier -stated theorem on universality and uniqueness of the episteme of unity of knowledge, unity of the world-systems, and thereby, the differentiation between Truth and Falsehood, unication between money, nance and real economy is rationalized in the following way. In an extensive program of privatization, while being cognitive of markets for the good and productive things of life in exchange and trade, commercial banks come to acquire the power of mobilizing the full thrust of savings into the real economy through the medium of participatory nancial instruments. Such nancial instruments that lubricate the ow of resources through commercial banks into real assets in the market economy must logically liberate reserve accumulation and savings from the unproductive accumulative effect of interest-rate. Contrarily, capital accumulations, non-inationary economic growth and market transformation in the learned choices of the good things of life the Rawlsian primaries (Sen, 1989) while ltering out the socially harmful exchanges (Korten, 1995) are realized by productive returns in the real economy. An example of such a development transformation in an extensively participatory economic and nancial framework is the dynamic basic-needs development regime. Within this regime is also the example of an evolutionary and path-dependent development future, as in Schumpeters creative destruction along the learning processes of the unifying organic relations. Here money, nance and the real economy unite together to share wealth and resources productively between them. Now money acts as a contravention of valuation; participatory nancing instruments as the enabling way to fully mobilize resources through the banking sector; and the real economy is where productivity in the good choices of life appears to attain sustainability of the learning (participatory) system. By the logical argumentation of such socio-economic transformation it becomes necessary to reduce the rate of interest, and thus divert money from reserves and bank savings into spending in the real economy. The real economy with the regulation that is endogenously learned by participation between commercial bank functions, the central bank regulation and supervision, and the real economy social choices, now increasingly move away from the kind of segmentation that is otherwise entrenched in the economy in

the presence of interest rates and the blockage of the ow of resources of money to the real economy through the medium of the productive resource-mobilizing nancial instruments. Over all these relations prevails the need for organically unifying learning between the activities. Kantian world-system with its differentiation between a priori and a posteriori analysis, noumena and phenomena, pure reason and practical reason (Seidel, 1988) reect the condition of separation of the monetary sector from the real economy. The nancial instruments, in the middle of this dichotomy, lose their participatory function due to the holding back of resource mobilization by the rate of nancial interest in bank savings. Indeed, Keynes wondered about the predicament (Ventelou, 2005) with marginal propensity to save as withdrawal from the income multiplier. Figure 1 explains the above problem of Kantian differentiation both in respect of epistemological questions of science and religion, and for the broken links between money, nance and real economy. Kants theoretical constructs, failing to apply to the organic need for methodological synthesis in knowledge and reasoning, deny causality to prevail. Thus, the theorem of universality and uniqueness, which we have earlier formalised, and it falls off in Kantian thought. This formal inference is utterly destructive for modern socio-scientic reasoning. Consequently, the entire domain of the sciences has always viewed an isolated existence of its own, separated from any endogenous theory of morality, ethics and sociality in it. Even when social Darwinism is invoked to explain process in scientic theory (Hull, 1988), competition, conict, methodological individualism and biological differentiation are found to fully color the organic relational domains. Now symbiosis in socio-scientic processes is meant to explain instead, the continuum of endogenously embedded forces of competition, conict, methodological individualism and differentiation (Holton, 1992). The result of Kantian dichotomy and problem of lack of synthesis, that is heteronomy in economics and nance, is resource scarcity. Kantian rationalism is now seen to enhance the other systemic constrictions. Learning cannot be extensively realized, as it should be by its endogenous consequence of sustainability (Primavesi, 2000). Thus, there is the pressing epistemological need to examine, study and

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A priori kantian noumena pure reason God

Heteronomy the problem of lack of synthesis Void reality Impossibility Void relation for mapping money and finance in the presence of interest rate and thus the absence of impossible productive relations

A posteriori kantian phenomena practical reason World-system

Money

Real economy productive relations with money, finance and real economy

Figure 1. Socioeconomic effect of the problem of Kantian heteronomy

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implement a new historical perspective based on the endogenous nature of unity of knowledge and of the world-system (Hubner, 1985). A conceptual social-economy result according to the learning methodology of unity of knowledge contra Kantian heteronomy: nancial risk-diversication Every point of choice and decision making according to the meta-epistemology of the learning universe of unity of knowledge embodies a shifting form of the Bayesian probabilistic eld (Hogg and Craig, 1965). In it, perfect convergence to an embedded equilibrium point is never possible. Only approximations exist due to the prevalence of incomplete knowledge in the continuum of knowledge-ows, time and space dimensions (Choudhury, 2009a, b). This is also the implication of the evolutionary xed-point equilibriums occurring in continuum of knowledge, time and space dimensions. As an example we ask: how is risk and uncertainty of nancial occurrence of an event denoted by (u,x(u)), measured in such a case? Let the probability limit (plim) of an event in the random eld of learning by interaction, integration and evolution be denoted by, plim (u,x(u)) (u *,x *(u *)). Let the intrinsic equilibrium of the learning system be denoted by (u * *,x * *(u * *)). Thereby, risk is denoted by the measured variance, Var(y 2 y *). But uncertainty is measured by Var(y 2 y * *) Var(y 2 y *) Var(y * 2 y * * ) Risk an undetermined factor. Here, y ((u,x(u)). The way to diversify the risk and uncertainty is to distribute it over shareholders in the presence of risk and production diversications. If the number of production diversication equals N, for which S shares are held per unit of N (thus product and risk diversications), then the total shares backing risk and uncertainty is S N. The effectiveness of such a joint force of production and risk diversications between shares S and production diversication N results in a positive function of resource mobilization. As explained above, resource mobilization involves monetary transmission into the real economy through nancial instruments that replace interest rates by trade-related ones in the good things of life, and are real assets that are in ownership at the time of valuation. Now consider that f(y) CF/N . S, that is cash-ow CF generated per unit of share capital, N . S. Consequently: Varf y 2 f y* 1=N : S2 VarCF 2 CF** 1=N : S2 VarCF 2 CF* VarCF* 2 CF** 2

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Now as the valuation method learns increasingly with evolutionary u-values, which is also exemplied by S and N increasing but nitely. Consequently, CF ! CF *. Thereby: Varfy 2 fy* ! 1=N : S2 :VarCF* 2 CF** . 0: 3 The result (3) is true no matter how small expression (3) may be under the force of learning in unity of knowledge between the complementing money, nance and real economy interrelations. Effective risk and production diversications have removed the risk but not the undetermined uncertainty. Consequently, there is no pricing of

measured risk, and undetermined uncertainty cannot be priced. Therefore, interest cannot exist on logical and ethical grounds. In such a case, the law of unity of knowledge, bridging up the Kantian heteronomy, as explained in Figure 1, means that fallibility should always be included in nancial possibilities to avoid draconian market and psychological shocks that spread contagion panic across nancial and economic sectors globally. Man is not the ultimate determiner of his destiny. God prevails over mankind with guidance and mercy in the face of errors and residual uncertainty that cannot be avoided. Thus, the benignity of the divine laws in Kants heteronomy is now replaced by the continuity of the divine laws across knowledge, time and space dimensions in continuum. Thereby, the laws of the nancial world in relation to the embedded organic unity between money and real economy is formulated as a new epistemological outlook altogether. Along similar lines writes Soros (1998, p. 4):
Because there is always a divergence between reality and our understanding of it, the gap between the two, which I call the participants bias, is an important element in shaping the course of history. The concept of open society is based on the recognition of our fallibility.

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We briey note that in accordance with the Kantian implications on heteronomy of Figure 1 regarding money, nance and real economy complementarities and circular causality, there is no mechanism that can make the system of production and risk diversications learn adaptively into unity of knowledge. The Kantian implication of heteronomy in this case is that although the a priori knowledge has its moral imperative, it remains causally disjoint from a posteriori reason and law. Hence the moral law, the instruments and social arrangements to bring about circular causation linkages between the a priori and the a posteriori domains remain disjoint. No particular substantive theory of avoidance of interest and its replacement by participatory nancing instruments can be devised in the theory of money, nance and real economy circular causal and complementary linkages. In the end, we note that neither of expression (2) or (3) for production and risk diversications in the money, nance and real economy complementary linkages can be explained by the application of Kantian heteronomy in this case. Such a social-economy case cannot be analyzed over the knowledge, time and space dimensions. The analysis reduces to the space-time dimensions alone, with knowledge being left exogenous and epistemologically imperfect in its state of heteronomy. Conclusion In conclusion, this paper has explained that the overarching meta-epistemology of a theory of everything (Barrow, 1991) needs to answer the question of continuity in the knowledge, time and space dimensions. This approach to the epistemological inquiry must be able to decipher uniquely and universally the meanings of Truth and Falsehood. It must combine the a priori with the a posteriori reasoning by learning processes across continuums of analytical and ontic formalisms in terms of complementary circular causation between the variables and their underlying edicts. Such relations comprise the functional ontological formalism that is necessary for explaining total reality, and not be limited to particular ones or separable ones (Maxwell, 1962).

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The quest for the overarching meta-epistemology, which we have formalised in this article, when applied to the state of the economy today, brings out certain structural problems of economic theory. According to the new meta-epistemology, the endogenous ethical and learning dynamics of economic theory suggests that the dichotomies between ethics and economics, between microeconomics and macroeconomics, and indeed, between religion and science were mistaken. But so also the microeconomic foundation of macroeconomics is equally awed. Within this eld of intellectual inquiry economic paradigms such as rational expectations hypothesis and general equilibrium welfare economics are in problem. The central problem in all these areas is the overly neoclassical or aggregate Keynesian or monetarist leaning. Neoclassical economic theory as a deductive reasoning has poor inductive power. Keynesianism (Dasgupta, 1987) and monetarism (Friedman, 1953) are based on inductive reasoning, and are thereby, removed from the ethical moorings of deductive reasoning. Thus, the two kinds of reasoning cannot connect by circular causality. This kind of methodology is of the Kantian genre reecting heteronomy. Such a differentiation between deductive and inductive reasoning, between the a priori and a posteriori reasoning has also invaded pure scientic theories. The differentiation between relativity and quantum mechanics is the prominent evidence of the breach (Penrose, 1989). Likewise, in Poppers (1998) kind of conjectures and scientic refutations, the silence on unity of knowledge between forms, entities and their relations has caused loss of directions in the purpose of science. Husserl (1970) laments on such a state of moral emptiness in the pure physical sciences. Godels (Smullyan, 1992) rejection of self-referencing according to the theorem of incompleteness of the arithmetical system, which was a rejection of the claim of the nality of mathematical machinery given by Russell and Whitehead (1910-1913) in their Principia Mathematica, is great. But it is subject to questioning. Godels denial of self-referencing leaves out the theme of unity of knowledge in the possibilities of the socio-scientic universality and uniqueness by the self-referencing theorems (Choudhury and Zaman, 2009). Conclusively therefore, the occidental socio-scientic epistemology is bereft of the overarching meta-epistemology of unity of knowledge and its impact on the organically unied world-system. Prevalent theories and their empirical and institutional pursuits cannot therefore succeed in analyzing and reconstructing the economic, nancial and social worlds into a cohesively relational unity for the common human future. Sustainability of learning in such a system, remaining devoid of the overarching organic unity of relations, is denied.

Notes 1. Functional ontology is a formal concept of existence of factual relations (Gruber, 1993). Such analytical relations are formalized on the basis of the meta-epistemology and are rendered amenable to estimation empirically. Thereafter the normative implications of social reconstruction and social continuance follow by changes in the estimated forms implying development of pertinent strategies, policies and rules. 2. As noted earlier in[1], engineering or functional ontology is the analytical way of establishing existence and causation towards existence of real artifacts and logical categories. The analytical system so generated is known as logical formalism.

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