INTRO.

TO LAW
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-44717 August 28, 1985

THE CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs. HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as the Incumbent Secretary of Labor, and THE CHARTERED BANK,respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the respondent Secretary, now Minister of Labor which denied the petitioner's claim for holiday pay and its claim for premium and overtime pay differentials. The petitioner claims that the respondent Minister of Labor acted contrary to law and jurisprudence and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and in issuing Policy Instruction No. 9, both referring to holidays with pay. On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in representation of its monthly paid employees/members, instituted a complaint with the Regional Office No. IV, Department of Labor, now Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against private respondent Chartered Bank, for the payment of ten (10) unworked legal holidays, as well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from November 1, 1974. The memorandum for the respondents summarizes the admitted and/or undisputed facts as follows: l. The work force of respondent bank consists of 149 regular employees, all of whom are paid by the month; 2. Under their existing collective bargaining agreement, (Art. VII thereof) said monthly paid employees are paid for overtime work as follows: Section l. The basic work week for all employees excepting security guards who by virtue of the nature of their work are required to be at their posts for 365 days per year, shall be forty (40) hours based on five (5) eight (8) hours days, Monday to Friday. Section 2. Time and a quarter hourly rate shall be paid for authorized work performed in excess of eight (8) hours from Monday through Friday and for any hour of work performed on Saturdays subject to Section 5 hereof.

Section 3. Time and a half hourly rate shall be paid for authorized work performed on Sundays, legal and special holidays. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx Section 5. The provisions of Section I above notwithstanding the BANK may revert to the six (6) days work week, to include Saturday for a four (4) hour day, in the event the Central Bank should require commercial banks to open for business on Saturday. 3. In computing overtime pay and premium pay for work done during regular holidays, the divisor used in arriving at the daily rate of pay is 251 days although formerly the divisor used was 303 days and this was when the respondent bank was still operating on a 6-day work week basis. However, for purposes of computing deductions corresponding to absences without pay the divisor used is 365 days. 4. All regular monthly paid employees of respondent bank are receiving salaries way beyond the statutory or minimum rates and are among the highest paid employees in the banking industry. 5. The salaries of respondent bank's monthly paid employees suffer no deduction for holidays occurring within the month. On the bases of the foregoing facts, both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of the petitioners ordering the respondent bank to pay its monthly paid employees, holiday pay for the ten (10) legal holidays effective November 1, 1974 and to pay premium or overtime pay differentials to all employees who rendered work during said legal holidays. On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the petitioner's claim for lack of merit basing its decision on Section 2, Rule IV, Book Ill of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9, which respectively provide: Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not. POLICY INSTRUCTION NO. 9 TO: All Regional Directors SUBJECT: PAID LEGAL HOLIDAYS The rules implementing PD 850 have clarified the policy in the implementation of the ten (10) paid legal holidays. Before PD 850, the number of working days a year in a firm was considered important in determining entitlement to the benefit. Thus, where an employee was working for at least 313 days, he was considered

definitely already paid. If he was working for less than 313, there was no certainty whether the ten (10) paid legal holidays were already paid to him or not. The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily employees. In the case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit. Under the rules implementing PD 850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the entitlement of monthly paid employees. The new determining rule is this: 'If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays. These new interpretations must be uniformly and consistently upheld. This issuance shall take effect immediately. The issues are presented in the form of the following assignments of errors: First Error Whether or not the Secretary of Labor erred and acted contrary to law in promulgating Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9. Second Error Whether or not the respondent Secretary of Labor abused his discretion and acted contrary to law in applying Sec. 2, Rule IV of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 abovestated to private respondent's monthly-paid employees. Third Error Whether or not the respondent Secretary of Labor, in not giving due credence to the respondent bank's practice of paying its employees base pay of 100% and premium pay of 50% for work done during legal holidays, acted contrary to law and abused his discretion in denying the claim of petitioners for unworked holidays and premium and overtime pay differentials for worked holidays. The petitioner contends that the respondent Minister of Labor gravely abused his discretion in promulgating Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 as guidelines for the implementation of Articles 82 and 94 of the Labor Code and in applying said guidelines to this case. It maintains that while it is true that the respondent Minister has the authority in the performance of his duty to promulgate rules and regulations to implement,

construe and clarify the Labor Code, such power is limited by provisions of the statute sought to be implemented, construed or clarified. According to the petitioner, the so-called "guidelines" promulgated by the respondent Minister totally contravened and violated the Code by excluding the employees/members of the petitioner from the benefits of the holiday pay, when the Code itself did not provide for their expanding the Code's clear and concise conclusion and notwithstanding the Code's clear and concise phraseology defining those employees who are covered and those who are excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. On the other hand, the private respondent contends that the questioned guidelines did not deprive the petitioner's members of the benefits of holiday pay but merely classified those monthly paid employees whose monthly salary already includes holiday pay and those whose do not, and that the guidelines did not deprive the employees of holiday pay. It states that the question to be clarified is whether or not the monthly salaries of the petitioner's members already includes holiday pay. Thus, the guidelines were promulgated to avoid confusion or misconstruction in the application of Articles 82 and 94 of the Labor Code but not to violate them. Respondent explains that the rationale behind the promulgation of the questioned guidelines is to benefit the daily paid workers who, unlike monthly-paid employees, suffer deductions in their salaries for not working on holidays. Hence, the Holiday Pay Law was enacted precisely to countervail the disparity between daily paid workers and monthly-paid employees. The decision in Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong (132 SCRA 663) resolved a similar issue. Significantly, the petitioner in that case was also a union of bank employees. We ruled that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9, are contrary to the provisions of the Labor Code and, therefore, invalid This Court stated: It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefit. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay. This is flagrant violation of the mandatory directive of Article 4 of the Labor Code, which states that 'All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.' Moreover, it shall always be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which would have the most beneficial effect that its language permits (Orlosky v. Hasken, 155 A. 112) Obviously, the Secretary (Minister) of Labor had exceeded his statutory authority granted by Article 5 of the Labor Code authorizing him to promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. We further ruled: While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by the

courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, as in the instant case, the same must be declared as null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (The Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B. Swisher 1958, p. 36). xxx xxx xxx In view of the foregoing, Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement the Labor Code and Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by the then Secretary of Labor must be declared null and void. Accordinglyl public respondent Deputy Minister of Labor Amado G. Inciong had no basis at all to deny the members of petitioner union their regular holiday pay as directed by the Labor Code. Since the private respondent premises its action on the invalidated rule and policy instruction, it is clear that the employees belonging to the petitioner association are entitled to the payment of ten (10) legal holidays under Articles 82 and 94 of the Labor Code, aside from their monthly salary. They are not among those excluded by law from the benefits of such holiday pay. Presidential Decree No. 850 states who are excluded from the holiday provisions of that law. It states: ART. 82. Coverage. The provision of this Title shall apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings, whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees, field personnel members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations. (Emphasis supplied). The questioned Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and the Secretary's Policy Instruction No. 9 add another excluded group, namely, "employees who are uniformly paid by the month." While the additional exclusion is only in the form of a presumption that all monthly paid employees have already been paid holiday pay, it constitutes a taking away or a deprivation which must be in the law if it is to be valid. An administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires. It is argued that even without the presumption found in the rules and in the policy instruction, the company practice indicates that the monthly salaries of the employees are so computed as to include the holiday pay provided by law. The petitioner contends otherwise. One strong argument in favor of the petitioner's stand is the fact that the Chartered Bank, in computing overtime compensation for its employees, employs a "divisor" of 251 days. The 251 working days divisor is the result of subtracting all Saturdays, Sundays and the ten (10) legal holidays from the total number of calendar days in a year. If the employees are already paid for all non-working days, the divisor should be 365 and not 251.

The situation is muddled somewhat by the fact that, in computing the employees' absences from work, the respondent bank uses 365 as divisor. Any slight doubts, however, must be resolved in favor of the workers. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice and affording protection to labor (Sections 6 and 9, Article II, Constitution). The Labor Code, as amended, itself provides: ART. 4. Construction in favor of labor. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor. Any remaining doubts which may arise from the conflicting or different divisors used in the computation of overtime pay and employees' absences are resolved by the manner in which work actually rendered on holidays is paid. Thus, whenever monthly paid employees work on a holiday, they are given an additional 100% base pay on top of a premium pay of 50%. If the employees' monthly pay already includes their salaries for holidays, they should be paid only premium pay but not both base pay and premium pay. The contention of the respondent that 100% base pay and 50% premium pay for work actually rendered on holidays is given in addition to monthly salaries only because the collective bargaining agreement so provides is itself an argument in favor of the petitioner stand. It shows that the Collective Bargaining Agreement already contemplated a divisor of 251 days for holiday pay computations before the questioned presumption in the Integrated Rules and the Policy Instruction was formulated. There is furthermore a similarity between overtime pay, which is computed on the basis of 251 working days a year, and holiday pay, which should be similarly treated notwithstanding the public respondents' issuances. In both cases overtime work and holiday work- the employee works when he is supposed to be resting. In the absence of an express provision of the CBA or the law to the contrary, the computation should be similarly handled. We are not unmindful of the fact that the respondent's employees are among the highest paid in the industry. It is not the intent of this Court to impose any undue burdens on an employer which is already doing its best for its personnel. we have to resolve the labor dispute in the light of the parties' own collective bargaining agreement and the benefits given by law to all workers. When the law provides benefits for "employees in all establishments and undertakings, whether for profit or not" and lists specifically the employees not entitled to those benefits, the administrative agency implementing that law cannot exclude certain employees from its coverage simply because they are paid by the month or because they are already highly paid. The remedy lies in a clear redrafting of the collective bargaining agreement with a statement that monthly pay already includes holiday pay or an amendment of the law to that effect but not an administrative rule or a policy instruction. WHEREFORE, the September 7, 1976 order of the public respondent is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 24, 1976 decision of the National Labor Relations Commission which affirmed the October 30, 1975 resolution of the Labor Arbiter but deleted interest payments is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. Makasiar, C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., in the result. Aquino, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-66469 July 29, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO QUIJANO, petitioners, vs. HON. BERNARDO SALAS (In his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Cebu,
Branch VIII), MARIO ABONG, ALFREDO DE LEON, ERIWADWIN MONTEBON, ROMEO DE GUZMAN, & EDUARDO MABUHAY, respondents. Basilio E. Duaban for accused.

CRUZ, J.: Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. 1 As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. 2 Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release; and so he escaped. 3 The respondent judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. 4 But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances. 5 The respondent judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. 6 The order of the trial court is now before us on certiorari and mandamus. 7 The judge erred. He did not see the woods for the trees. He mistakenly allowed himself to be tethered by the literal reading of the rule when he should have viewed it from the broader perspective of its intendment. The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section 19, of the 1973 Constitution, reading in full as follows: Section 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to he informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.

The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. The old case of People v. Avancea 8 required his presence at certain stages of the trial which as a result, had to be discontinued as long as the defendant had not reappeared or remained at large. As his right to be present at these stages was then held not waivable even by his escape, such escape thus operated to the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he had not been recaptured. The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia, Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified. The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the old doctrine when he ruled that trial in absentia of the escapee could not be held because he could not be duly notified under Section 19. He forgets that the fugitive is now deemed to have waived such notice precisely because he has escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. Escape can never be a legal justification. In the past, his escape "rewarded" him by postponing all further proceedings against him and in effect ultimately absolving him of the charge he was facing. Under the present rule, his escape will, legally speaking, operate to Ms disadvantage by preventing him from attending his trial, which will continue even in his absence and most likely result in his conviction. The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will Identify the accused. 9 Under Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law. Trial in absentia was not allowed in Borja v. Mendoza 10 because it was held notwithstanding that the accused had not been previously arraigned. His subsequent conviction was properly set aside. But in the instant case, since all the requisites are present, there is absolutely no reason why the respondent judge should refuse to try the accused, who had already been arraigned at the time he was released on the illegal bail bond. Abong should be prepared to bear the consequences of his escape, including forfeiture of the right to be notified of the subsequent proceedings and of the right to adduce evidence on his behalf and refute the evidence of the prosecution, not to mention a possible or even probable conviction. We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth," which is not really that evanescent or elusive. As judges, we must look beyond and not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover, by our own lights, the reason and the rhyme for its enactment. That we may properly apply it according to its ends, we need and must use not only learning but also vision.

The trial judge is directed to investigate the lawyer who assisted Mario Abong in securing bail from the city court of Cebu on the basis of the withdrawn information for homicide and to report to us the result of his investigation within sixty days. WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated December 22, 1983, denying the motion for the trial in absentia of the accused is set aside. The respondent judge is directed to continue hearing the case against the respondent Mario Abong in absentia as long as he has not reappeared, until it is terminated. No costs. SO ORDERED. Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 5-6. 2 Ibid., P. 6. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid., pp. 6-7; 1973 Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 19. 6 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 7 Ibid., p. 66. 8 32 O. G. 713. 9 Aquino v. Mil. Commission No. 2,63 SCRA 546; People v. The Presiding Judge, 125 SCRA 269. 10 77 SCRA 422.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 70443 September 15, 1986

BRAULIO CONDE, RUFINA CONDE, GERARDO CONDE, CONCHITA C. LUNDANG, and ALFREDO VENTURA,petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. CESAR C. PERALEJO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch LXVI, Third Judicial Region, Capas, Tarlac, and MARCELO GUTIERREZ,respondents. Tomas P. Matic, Jr. for petitioners. Adelaido G. Rivera for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

On January 16, 1984, the petitioners filed an action to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals dated September 23, 1981, which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and ordered the petitioners and/or their successors-in-interest to deliver immediately the ownership and possession of the property in question to the then plaintiff-appellant Marcelo Gutierrez. In their complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, the petitioners alleged that through fraud, Gutierrez was able to make it appear that he was the son of Esteban Gutierrez and Fermina Ramos and as a necessary consequence of such filiation, was the absolute owner by succession of the property in question. On February 27, 1984, the trial court dismissed the petitioners' complaint on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and a writ of injunction before the appellate court. The said court in turn, dismissed the petition and a subsequent motion for reconsideration on the grounds that a Regional Trial Court is without jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals and that only the Supreme Court is empowered to review the judgment of said appellate court. Hence, the petitioners elevated the case before this Court. On August 31, 1984, we issued a resolution dated August 22, 1984, remanding the case to the appellate court for decision on the merits. The resolution reads as follows: The respondent intermediate Appellate Court erred when it declared that the complaint for annulment of judgment in this case should be filed with the Supreme Court. This Court has no original jurisdiction to look into allegations of

fraud upon which the complaint for annulment is based. In January, 1984, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac seeking among other things the annulment of a decision which had already passed, on appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 60139-R. On February 17, 1984, the lower court dismissed the petitioners' complaint for annulment of judgment. The petitioners appealed the dismissal to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court which denied due course to the petition stating that what is sought to be annulled is a decision of the Court of Appeals over which the regional trial court is obviously without jurisdiction. The decision sought to be annulled calls for the turning over of possession to the original respondent of the disputed properties. While the judgment being enforced may have been that of the Court of Appeals, it was actually an appellate judgment rendered on a review of the trial court's decision. Considering that Section 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980B.P. No. 129 gives the Intermediate Appellate Court exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of regional trial courts, the COURT RESOLVED to REMAND this case to the Intermediate Appellate Court for it to hear and decide the action. On January 29, 1985, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction and for lack of merit. In its decision on the issue of jurisdiction, the respondent court ruled that since the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court can be annulled by the Regional Trial Court and a decision of the latter is annullable by the Court of Appeals, then logically the decision of the appellate court should be annullable only by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the appellate court ruled that it is but logical to conclude that it cannot annul its own decision unless there is an express grant under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Finding none, it stated that it must perforce dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. On the merits of the petition, the appellate court ruled that the fraud relied upon by the petitioners is only intrinsic and thus, even on the assumption that it has jurisdiction to decide the case, still the same has no merit. It dismissed the petition. The petitioners elevated this decision to us. On June 5, 1985, we resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition. Notwithstanding proof that a copy of the petition was served on the respondents' counsel on June 24, 1985, no comment has been filed. We decide the petition. We need not emphasize the rule that this Court decides appeals which only involve questions of law and that "it is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to receiving errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court." (Baniqued v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 596, 601; citing Tiongco v. de la Merced, 58 SCRA 89). It was, thus, totally pointless for the Intermediate Appellate Court to delve into the question of whether or not it has jurisdiction to pass upon the merits of the petition which then alleged the perpetration of fraud by one of the parties in the original case, and which thereby called for a review of the factual findings of the court. Furthermore, the fact that this Court already remanded the case to the appellate court for decision on the merits should have prompted the latter to limit its decision only to the merits of the case.

There are instances when this Court desires a further review of facts or a detailed analysis and systematic presentation of issues which the appellate court is in a more favored position to accomplish. Standing between the trial courts and the Supreme Court, the appellate court was precisely created to take over much of the work that used to be previously done by this Court. It has been of great help to the Supreme Court in synthesizing facts, issues, and rulings in an orderly and intelligible manner and in Identifying errors which ordinarily might have escaped detection. Statistics will show that the great majority of petitions to review the decisions of the appellate court have been denied due course for lack of merit in minute resolutions. The appellate court has, therefore, freed this Court to better discharge its constitutional duties and perform its most important work which, in the words of Dean Vicente G. Sinco, "is less concerned with the decision of cases that begin and end with the transient rights and obligations of particular individuals but is more intertwined with the direction of national policies, momentous economic and social problems, the delimitation of governmental authority and its impact upon fundamental rights." (Philippine Political Law, 10th Edition, p. 323). It is, therefore, difficult to understand why a Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court should hesitate to help the Supreme Court and to act on an action which it was specifically ordered to hear and decide. If its initial hesitation was due to doubts about the correctness of our action, then it should recall the admonition inTugade v. Court of Appeals (85 SCRA 226, 230-231) that: xxx xxx xxx Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all It could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera (34 SCRA 98): 'The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid. 107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited.) The ensuing paragraphs of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: 'Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions an other courts should take their bearings. (Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila [Br. VI], 23 SCRA 948, 961). The fault of the Intermediate Appellate Court is mitigated by the fact that it still decided the remanded case on the merits. It stated: On February of 1950 an original complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land was filed before the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, which was subsequently amended on March 19, 1951.

On May 20, 1976, after a full blown trial the Regional Trial Court Branch 64 (formerly Court of First Instance) of Tarlac, rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiff Marcelo Gutierrez to pay the defendants the costs of the suit. The dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiff Marcelo Gutierrez to pay the defendants the costs of this suit. He (sic) pronouncement as to damages for want of proof. From the above judgment an appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals. On September 23, 1981, the then Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, this time ordering the ten appellees (now petitioners) to deliver the ownership and possession of the litigated property to then appellant (now respondent Marcelo Gutierrez), which decision became final and executory on December 20, 1982, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision appealed from, not being in accordance with the applicable law and evidence and finding validity in the errors assigned, is hereby reversed and set aside. In lieu thereof, another one is entered ordering defendants-appellees and/or their successors-in-interest to deliver immediately the ownership and possession of the property described under par. 3 of the complaint to herein plaintiff- appellant Marcelo Gutierrez. With costs. On January 16, 1984, an action to annul the judgment of the former Court of Appeals was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Third Judicial Region in Capas, Tarlac. On February 27, 1984, the respondent Court (Regional Trial Court), dismissed the case for annulment of judgment on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals. On March 19, 1984, the motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was denied by the respondent court. Accordingly, a petition for certiorari, mandamus and a writ of injunction was filed before the Intermediate Appellate Court and raffled to the Third Special Cases Division, The court dismissed the petition for lack of merit on the ground that a Regional Trial Court is without jurisdiction to annul a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, this case should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED OUTRIGHT. With costs against the petitioners. On June 14, 1984, the motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was denied by this Court. xxx xxx xxx

Finally, a judgment based on alleged false testimony is not an extrinsic fraud by which an action for annulment of judgment could be grounded. The Supreme Court in Ilacad v. Court of Appeals (supra, p. 302), declared that: xxx xxx xxx ... and speaking of extrinsic fraud, it is that fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant which prevents a party from having his day in court from presenting his case. Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule 'where it is one of the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contests, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party has been prevented from presenting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. The resort to fraud in introducing fabricated evidence is definitely an intrinsic fraud, hence false testimony being a matter of evidence is definitely intrinsic and not extrinsic. Fraud consisting in acting fictitious cause of false testimony is intrinsic (sic) (Francisco v. David, 38 CG 714). Intrinsic fraud takes the form of acts of a party in a litigation during the trial such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case (Libudan v. Palma, [S1, 45 SCRA 17]). Intrinsic fraud is not sufficient to attack a judgment (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). Petitioners stand that extrinsic fraud was employed by the respondents, is bereft of any factual basis, hence, even on the assumption that this court has jurisdiction to decide this issue, still the petitioners cause of action must fail. A careful review of the present petition and of the records of the appellate court on this case shows that even on the assumption that all the facts alleged in the petition are true, the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit because the fraud allegedly perpetrated by the private respondent in AC-G.R. SP No. 03301 is only intrinsic in nature and not extrinsic. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic or collateral where it has prevented a party from having a trial or from presenting an of his case to the court. (Asian Surety and Insurance Co. v. Island Steel, Inc., 118 SCRA 233, 239; citing Amuran v. Aquino, 38 Phil. 29). In the case at bar, the fraud was in the nature of documents allegedly manufactured by Marcelo Gutierrez to make it appear that he was the rightful heir of the disputed property, Hence, the Intermediate Appellate Court is correct in finding the fraud to be intrinsic in nature. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The respondents' counsel, Atty. Adelaido G. Rivera is fined Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for his failure to act on the order to file comment. SO ORDERED. Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur,