Cartesian Meditations, CM Formal and Transcendental Logic, FTL Logical Investigations, LI Ideas, Id On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal

Time, PITC Experience and Judgment, EJ CM 21, p. 85 FTL, 38 Id1, esp., 10-17 9 The universalization of the correlatively interrelated concepts intuition and object is not an arbitrary conceit but compellingly demanded by the nature of the matters in question. demonstrates that object is always taken as correlate of consciousness, of intuition in the broadest sense 10, various references, including:
Any possible object - logically speaking, "any subject of possible true predications" - has, prior to all predicative thinking, precisely its modes of becoming the object of an objectivating, an intuiting regard which perhaps reaches it in its "personal selfhood," which "seizes upon" it. Seeing an essence is therefore intuition; and if it is seeing in the pregnant sense and not a mere and perhaps vague making present, the seeing is an originarily presentive intuition, seizing upon the essence in its "personal" selfhood. connection between object and objectivating; object defined as the subject of possible (true) predications; includes all objects, even eidetic objects

13-15, 18-9, 20 (primal objectivity, formal essence of any object whatever and to the formal categories pertaining to this essence); 21 essence-form characterized as an empty form, formal ontology provides a formal structure common to all material ontologies, formal ontology the eidetic science of any object whatever, coordinate with pure (i.e., formal not apophantic) logic as mathesis universalis), all truths of formal ontology lead back to a small stock of axioms in formal logic, these give determination to the concept of object as object, of anything whatever, connected to the analytic/synthetic distinction the eidetic science of any object whatsoever eidetische Wissenschaft vom Gegenstande berhaupt 22 further examples: property, relative determination, predicatively formed affair-complex, relationship, identity, equality, aggregate (collection), cardinal number, whole and part, genus and species, and the signification categories of apophantic logic; the propositions that connect any object whatsoever to any signification whatsoever are part of formal ontology; these comprise the categories of formal logic; distinction between categorial concepts and categorial essences

23 categories of formal logic break into syntactical categories and substrate-categories; apophantic-signification-formations follow upon syntactical categories; syntactical categories derive from syntactical forms; syntactical categories include: predicatively formed affair complexes, relationship, condition or quality, unit, plurality, cardinal number, ordered set, ordinal number; reference to categorial intuition in LI2.VI46f.; all categories ultimate refer back to ultimate substrates, objects which no longer contain any of those ontological forms which are mere correlates of the thinking functions (predicating, denying a predicate, relating, connecting, countings, etc.) [predicating: S is p; denying: negation S is not p; relating: S is p; connecting: S is (p and q), (S and p) are q; countings?) 25 syntactic categories obtained from the theory of forms of significations; individuals are the ultimate substrates of all syntactical objectivities; individual properties are individual in a derivate sense insofar as they are only individual by means of belonging to an individual substrate; ultimate terms, ultimate substrates thus, the form of any object whatsoever is correlative to the ultimate terms of assertion 26 distinction between genera and species of formal essences and material essences; example for signification (formal): highest genus: any signification whatsoever intermediate genus: any proposition whatsoever infimae species (i.e., eidetic singularities): each determinate proposition form example for numbers (formal): highest genus: any cardinal number whatever infimae species: two, three, etc. material ontological examples of genera: any physical thing whatever, any sensuous quality, any spatial shape, any mental process whatever eidetic compositions?, materially filled singularities: determinate physical things, sensuous qualities, spatial shapes, and mental processes (the essence of physical thing as embodied in a particular physical thing is an eidetic singularity) distinction between general and species of essences from the ordinary concepts of set and subset (classification) 26: further distinction between the hierarchy of genus and species among genera and species of formal essences and genera and species of material essences what is the connection between formal and material essences? the essence any physical thing whatever (a material essence) is included in the essence of essence (a formal essence); but essence is not the genus for any physical thing whatever the essence physical thing whatever is a materialization of the form of essence (and essence is a formalization of it)

the essence of physical thing whatever is a specialization of the essence of any nature whatever (and the essence of any nature whatever is a generalization of it) generalization and materialization are different kinds of universalization materialization = de-formalization? if so, youre using de-formalization wrongly further example of formal genus and species, formal ontology!: highest genus: any category whatever of formal ontology singularizations: particular categories (including any object whatever, the empty Something (das leere Etwas) (not individual objects or the categories as embodied in individual objects, these are all materializations?) in fact, all the categories of formal ontology must be designated as eidetic singularities that have their summum genus in the essence, any category whatever of formal ontology 27: individuals are subsumed under material eidetic singularities; species of material and formal essences are subordinated to material and formal genera, both! further distinctions in the concept of extension any object whatever subordinate to any category whatever of formal ontology any physical thing whatever subordinate to any nature whatever an individual physical thing subsumed under the material genus any physical thing whatever material genus any physical thing whatever obtained by generalization from individual physical things material genus any nature whatever obtained by generalization from physical things, mental things, etc. any nature whatever a materialization of any object whatever 41 object is defined as anything at all, e.g., as subject a true (categorial, affirmative) statement 52 (form of the world) Id1, p. 119, 135 (connected to mathesis universalis), 144-5, 212 (consciousness of something), 239, 332, 369 LI1 153: Object, State of Affairs, Unity, Plurality, Number, Relation, Connection, etc. 310: framework of an a priori formal ontology LI2: 3: the pure (a priori) theory of objects as such; Whole and Part, Subject and Quality, Individual and Species, Genus and Species, Relation and Collection, Unity, Number, Series, Ordinal Number, Magnitude, etc.

19: Something, One, Object, Quality, Relation, Association, Plurality, Number, Order, Ordinal Number, Whole, Part, Magnitude, etc. 277ff.: Being is no real predicate, discussion of Being PITC, p. 199