Tel-Aviv University The Gershon H. Gordon Faculty of Social Sciences Department of Security Studies M.

A Program

The Ceaseless Conflict in Anatolia : The Kurds of Turkey and the Ethnic Turkish State

This paper was submitted as the thesis for the M.A By: Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak

This study was carried out under the supervision of Prof. Ofra Bengio

November 2009

INDEX

Acknowledgements.3 List of Acronyms.4 Introduction.8 Theoretical Background....10 The Roots of Turkish and Kurdish Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire..20 Kurdish Re-Awakening in the Modern Turkish Republic40 The Birth of Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK)..44 PKK and Other Actors......58 I. Syria.59 II. Iran...62 III. Iraq..64 IV. Other Countries67 Turkish Media The State and the Kurds.69 Legal Political Kurdish Movement...76 Conclusion.88 Bibliography..98 Abstract in Hebrew - ...108

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research project would not have been possible without the support of many people. I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Ofra Bengio, who was abundantly helpful and offered invaluable assistance, support and guidance. Deepest

gratitude to Liran Ofek without whose support and assistance this study would not have been successful. I am grateful to Sara Heide Krulewich for her contribution in the editing of the paper. Special thanks also to my friend, Uri Stossel, for his invaluable assistance during the Security Studies M.A Program in the Tel-Aviv University. I would also like to convey thanks to Israels Ministry of Absorption for providing the financial means. I wish to express my love and gratitude to my wife Roslyn, to my brother Soni, his wife Lisya, and finally to my beloved parents Sara and David for their understanding, support an endless love throughout the duration of my studies. I dedicate this M.A. Thesis to them.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AKP BDP CHP CIA CIS CUP DDKO DEHAP DEP DTP ERNK

Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) Bar ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party) Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican Peoples Party) Central Intelligence Agency Commonwealth of Independent States Commitee of Union and Progress (ttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) Dou Devrimci Kltr Ocaklar (Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Centers) Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic Peoples Party) Demokrasi Partisi (Democracy Party) Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party) Eniya Rzgariya Netewa Kurdistan (National Liberation Front of Kurdistan)

GAP GKK HADEP HEP IDF KCK KDP MHP MT NGO PKK

Gneydou Anadolu Projesi (Southeastern Anatolia Project) Geici Ky Koruculuu (Temporary Village Guards) Halkn Demokrasi Partisi (Peoples Democracy Party) Halkn Emek Partisi (Peoples Labor Party) Israel Defense Forces Koma Civaken Kurdistan (Ruling Commitee of Kurdistan Society) Kurdistan Democratic Party Milliyeti Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party) Milli stihbarat Tekilat (National Intelligence Agency) Non Governmental Organizations Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party)

PLO PUK SHP TGNA TSAD

Palestine Liberation Organization Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Sosyal Demokrat Halk Parti (Social Democrat Peoples Party) Turkish Grant National Assembly (Trkiye Byk Millet Meclisi-TBMM) Trk Sanayici ve adamlar Dernei (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmens Association)

UN USA

United Nations United States of America

INTRODUCTION

Since the Turkish victory over the Byzantine Empire in the Battle of Manzikert of 1071, the Turks and the Kurds have been living together side by side in the same geographical region of Anatolia. In 1299, the Turks founded the Ottoman Empire. In time the Ottomans expanded their borders. Many different ethnic groups and nations became the subjects of the Ottoman Empire. In order to rule easily the Ottomans introduced the Millet System in 1453, which based the concept of citizenship upon the basis of religion. As a consequence of the Ottoman Millet System each recognized religious community enjoyed a high degree of internal autonomy and preservation of their ethnic, linguistic and cultural identities.1 According to the Millet System society was divided into Greek Orthodox Christians, Armenian Christians, Jews and Muslims. As a result, all the Muslim subjects of the Empire including Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Albanians, etc. were bound to the Ottoman Sultan regardless of their ethnic origin. Consequently, religion became the glue of the Ottoman Empire. The ideas of nationalism as associated with the 1789 French Revolution became very popular in all of Europe, especially in the empires which were composed of many nations, such as the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. In order to save the empire from secessionist policies, the Ottoman Empire adopted Pan-Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism respectively. However, neither Pan-Ottomanism nor Pan-Islamism could find a solution to the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. The Greek, Serbian and Albanian secessions from the Ottoman Empire under the formation of a nation-state of their own influenced the Turks in the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turks, also known as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), became the sovereign power in the Ottoman Empire from 1908-1918 as Pan-Ottomanism and
1

Nesim eker, Identity Formation and the Political Power in the late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic, HAOL, No:8 Autumn 2005, p.59

Pan- Islamism had failed to keep the enpire together. The Young Turks were the first Turkish nation-state nationalists. Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, the founder of Modern Turkey, was a member of this organization. The Ottoman Empire was among the defeated belligerents of World War I. Just as the Versailles Treaty was signed with Germany, the last Ottoman government of Sultan Vahdettin reluctantly signed the Sevres Treaty (10th August 1920) with the victorious powers of World War I. Articles 62, 63, and 64 of the Sevres Treaty paved the way towards a local

autonomy for the Kurds, possibly leading to full independence, which would be worked out by a commission composed of British, French and Italian delegates. 2 The treaty envisaged that the future Turkish state would be reduced to a rump that would include only Istanbul and central and northern Anatolia, and with access to very few resources and practically no freedom of action in the economic sphere. 3 With the Treaty of Sevres; Turkeys Armenians, Greeks and Kurds had their own territories. This treaty is the root of paranoia among the Turks that can be summarized by the term of The Sevres Syndrome which will be addressed in the next chapters of this paper. The concept of citizenship changed with the new born secular Turkish Republic. The core emphasis on citizenship was transformed from religion to ethnicity. Mustafa Kemal Atatrks anti-sultanic, secular, Turkish nationalism became the sovereign power in Turkey. Even the name Turkey, derived from the Turkish ethnicity, it symbolized the new glue of citizenship. Even before the establishment of modern Turkey there had been Kurdish unrest that had resulted in a violent revolt. In 1880, the Kurds rebelled against the Ottomans under the leadership of Sheikh Ubeydullah. After the Ubeydullah Uprising was suppressed, and with the proclamation of a secular republic, Kurds found themselves more alienated than ever before.
2

The Treaty of Sevres Articles 62,63,64 http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I,_Articles_1_-_260, 9th July, 2009 3 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2000 p.45

They found no bond to the new secular Turkish republic which based its principles on ethnic origin. As a result of this alienation Kurdish rebellions erupted, such Kogiri (1920), Sheikh Said (1925), Ar/Ararat (1927), Dersim (1937); these revolts will be examined in the following chapters. All of these rebellions were supressed by the Turkish army, and as a result, the Kurdish question and their rights became a taboo subject in Turkey. From the Dersim Revolt of 1937 until the year 1961, the Kurdish national consciousness fell silent. A more libertarian constitution was adopted in Turkey in 1961. This new constitution granted rights and liberties that the Turks had never enjoyed, and allowed the Kurds of Turkey to enter into a period of re-awakening. In the aforementioned period, the Kurdish youth began to discover their Kurdishness. In this new wave of the Kurdish consciousness, the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan Kurdistan Workers Party) was born. The PKK was founded in 1973 by Abdullah calan as a Marxist Leninist Kurdish Movement whose main purpose was to establish an independent Kurdistan in eastern Turkey. The division of the Turkish people to right and left created a chaotic situation which led to violence and triggered the 12th September 1980 coup detat that abrogated the 1961 Constitution. The 1961 Constitution was replaced by the current constitution written in 1982, which took severe measures against the wide rights and liberties enjoyed by the Kurds. The 1982 Constituiton granted extra ordinary jurisdictional powers to the military, and more importantly, constrained the rights and liberties of the people. From 1984 until today, the PKK has been carring out its activities against Turkey. The PKKs activities can be categorized as guerilla warfare and at the same time as terrorism. The reality is that despite its violent actions, the PKK contributed to Turkish politics in terms of breaking the untouchable taboo, like the Kurdish Question, which led the way to political representation of the Kurds in the Turkish parliament.

In order to analyze the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, a theoretical background is needed to address the basic terms and their importance to each party. This paper will follow a chronological order in order to analyze the roots of the conflict and its development making it easier to analyze and reach a concrete conclusion. I chose this topic for several reasons. The first element that attracted my attention is that the Kurds are the largest stateless nationality in the world. Secondly, the geographic arena and the culture of the conflict are very familiar to me since I was born in Istanbul, Turkey and am a native Turkish speaker. The last reason why I chose the Turkish-Kurdish Conflict is to better understand the parties stance through an objective manner. The thesis question of this paper is: Did the Turkish governments try to hinder the Kurdishness to appear n the public sphere, and if yes, what were the Kurdish responses to the mentioned policy? The thesis assumption of this paper is that the Turkish governments did try to hinder the Kurdishness to appear in the public sphere.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND As was stated in the introduction part of this paper, this conflict has two parties: the Turks and the Kurds. The Kurds are a largely Sunni Muslim people with their own language and culture. The Kurdish people mostly inhabit a geographical region called Kurdistan which includes adjacent parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.4 They have their own language with different dialects. The two main dialects are Kurmani and Sorani. According to the

American Central Intelligence Agencys (CIA) factbook, 20% of Turkeys population is of Kurdish origin.5 This means the Kurds constitute a large minority group, while the Turks are the majority in their own republic. As of 1994, approximately 22 million Kurds were living in Kurdistan.6 Even though Kurdistan is the homeland of the Kurdish people, due to wars and economic reasons Kurds began to emigrate to other countries and have created a Kurdish diaspora. Beginning in the 1960s, large Kurdish communities migrated from Turkey due to labor needs and settled in Lebanon, Germany, Western Europe, Libya, Russia, the United States and Australia.7 Although the Kurds of Turkey see themselves as a different ethnic political entity in the Modern Turkish Republic, the Turkish state discourse rejects their claim. The Lausanne Treaty, which founded the Modern Turkish Republic, was signed between the Ankara Turkish Grand National Assemblys representatives and British, French, Italian, Japanese, Greek, Romanian, Bulgarian, Portuguese, Belgian, Russian and Yugoslav representatives on 24th July, 1923. The Treatys articles 37-42 define the minorities and their rights and obligations. Only the non-Muslim Turkish citizens were defined as minorities. According to Turkish political discourse Kurds are first class citizens who shall not seek minority rights. In a BBC
4

Who are the Kurds The Washington Post, August 1999. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/feb99/kurdprofile.htm 9th August, 2009 5 CIA Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html#People 19th April, 2009 6 Amir Hassanpour, The Kurdish Experience, Middle East Report, July-August 1994, p.3 7 Martin Van Bruinessen, Transnational Aspects of the Kurdish Question, Florence, Robert Schumann for Advanced Studies, 2000, p.4

10

interview on 24th March, 1992, Minister of Interior smet Sezgin invoked the Treaty of Lausanne to assert that the Kurds were not a minority but actually first class citizens of the Turkish state.8 In addition to that, in May 1995 President Sleyman Demirel opposed the granting of more rights to the Kurdish citizens of Turkey claiming that if the Kurds were given additional rights this would be equivalent to privileges which would cause other Turkish citizens to become second class citizens.9 Furthermore, Demirel claimed there was a Western conspiracy against Turkey in which Western appeals for Turkey to grant minority rights and open up dialogue with the Kurds could lead to a situation worse than that envisaged by the much despised Treaty of Sevres.10 Since the Kurds in Turkey could not identify themselves with the new definition of citizenship on the base of the ethno-nationalism, they have entered a period of alienation. This phenomenon can readily be seen also in other conflict theaters such as the Basque-Spanish conflict. The conflict derives from the fact that the players define each other in different terms which contribute to the conflict's essence. Therefore it is vital to understand how each party defines itself. Today, one of the vital disagreements between the politically conscious Kurds and Turkey is the political status of the Kurdish citizens. This conflict can be explained in minority-majority terms. A report by the United Nations (UN) sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of the Minorities released in 1985, attempted to define the concept of minority. The report defines minority as a group of citizens of a state

constituting a numerical minority which differs from those of the majority population in terms

Robert Olson, Mark Muller (eds.), Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, Kentucky, Kentucky University Press, 1996, p.175 9 Kemal Kirii and Gareth Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, Abingdon Oxon, Routledge-Curzon, 2004, p. 212 10 Ibid, p. 209

11

of ethnicity, religion or language, whose ultimate goal is to survive and achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law.11 The Kurdish minoritys essence in Turkey is nationalistic and ethno-cultural. The Kurds want to acquire wider civil rights on the basis of ethnic constitutional definitions which will be examined in the following chapters. First we will examine what are the concepts of ethnicity and nationalism. The term ethnos was first used in Ancient Greece. Therefore the Greeks differentiate the others by the term ethnos. Moreover, the English term ethnic derived from the Greek ethnikos which in turn was a translation of the Hebrew goy, meaning nonIsraelite/Gentile/non-Jewish/Pagan. religious code of difference.12 Today the term ethnicity refers to the cultural practices and outlooks of a given community of people that set them apart from the others. Members of ethnic groups see themselves as culturally distinct from other groups in a society and are seen by those other groups to be so in return. The most common characteristics of the ethnic groups are language, history, ancestry, religion and style of dress.13 In his book Majority-Minority Relations, John E. Farley defines the ethnic group as a group of people who are generally recognized by themselves and/or by others as a distinct group with such recognition based on social or cultural characteristics. Most of these characteristics are nationality, language and religion. Hence, ethnicity is a social characteristic that passes from generation to generation. 14 Anthony Smith lists characteristics of an ethnie, Consequently, we see that the term ethnic was a

11 12

Kemal Kirii and Gareth Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p.33 Chris Lorenz, Stefan Berger (eds.), The Contested Nation, Ethnicity, Class, Religion and Gender in National Histories, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p.36 13 Anthony Giddens, Sociology, 4th Edition Polity, 2001, p.246 14 John E. Farley, Majority-Minority Relations, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 2000, p. 8

12

these are: a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with specific territory, and lastly, a sense of solidarity. 15 Walker Conner (1993) uses the term Staatsvolk to illustrate the process by which the dominant ethnic group comes to determine the national essence of the nation-state. Staatsvolk describes a people who are culturally and politically preeminent in a state, even though other groups may well be presented in significant numbers. Connor suggests that by their preeminence, the dominant groups culture and language come to be represented as the core or national culture and language. Minority groups, their cultures and languages, consequently tend to be excluded from national recognition. At the same time, minority groups are also variously encouraged and/or coerced by the dominant ethnie to assimilate to national norms.16 Thomas Hammerberg, the European Councils Human Rights High Commissioner, published a report after visiting Turkey on 28th June 3rd July 2009, which revealed the domination of the Turkish ethnicity in Turkey. According to the report, Turkey glorifies the Turkish ethnicity in the schools by promoting Atatrks famous motto: Happy is the man who says he/she is a Turk. This report states that the motto leads to ethnic discrimination. Hammerberg also added that the minority definition in Turkey must be re-addressed according to todays needs.17 Despite Turkeys insistence that being Turkish is not reflecting an ethnical identity but rather a citizens bond to the state, today in Turkey we can clearly see a staatsvolk Turkish ethnic model. While the Turks are seeing the Kurds as an indispensable element of the Turkish nation, the Kurds see themselves from a different origin.

15 16

Quoted in T.K Oomen (ed.), Citizenship and National Idetity, New Delhi, 2000, p.19 Stephen May, Language and Minority Rights, Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language, New York, Routledge, 2008, p.81 17 Zeynep Lle, Ne Mutlu Trkm Etnik Ayrmclk Hrriyet, 1st October 2009

13

Anthony Smith (1983) notes that even in Europe where, arguably, the ideal of the nation-state is strongest, at the time of his writing there were 73 nations and only 24 states.18 Today, not every nation can enjoy sovereignty in its own territories. The Kurds are one of these unlucky nations. The word nation comes from Latin and, when first coined, clearly conveyed the idea of common blood ties. It was derived from the past participle of the verb nasci meaning to be born.19 Anthony D. Smith, in his book National Identity, defines nation as a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.20 Shared language, religion, culture and a common descent can also be added to Smiths definition of nationalism. Nationalism has three models: the first one is the PrimordialistNon-Modern; the others are the Modern and the Ethno-Symbolic approaches. According to the Primordialist approach the nations did exist even before nationalism. In the Primordialist approach the importance was given to the kinship instead of the state-citizen relation. German nationalism is an example of this approach. The Primordialist approach has six vital characteristics, these are common assumed blood ties, common race, common language, common region, common religion and common custom.21 Accordingly, if a person does not match all of these criteria than he/she would not be considered as part of a primordial thought nation. On the other hand, contrary to the Primordialist, modern nationalism emphasizes the bond between the citizen and the state regardless of the religious and linguistic differences. French nationalism and the Turkish model are a good example of the Modern approach.

18 19

Stephen May, Language and Minority Rights, Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language, p.75 Walker Conner, Ethnonationalism, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994, p.94 20 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1991 p.14 21 Clifford Geertz, Primordial and Civic Ties, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 32-33

14

The Ethno-Symbolic approach regards both approaches as insufficient. It states that ethnic origins are as important as the state-citizen relationship. Smith supports the EthnoSymbolic approach. Joseph Stalin, in his article The Nation, argues that nation is a community of people which is not racial or tribal. He strengthens his point of view by giving examples such as the modern Italian nations formation which was based on the joining of the Romans, Teutons, Etruscans, Greeks, Arabs and so forth. Thus Stalin came to the conclusion that a nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.22 Ziya Gkalp, a Kurd, whose nation definition is similar to that of Stalins and who had a great influence on Atatrk, is regarded as the Father of Turkish nationalisms core theories. Gkalp, in his book Trkln Esaslar (The Priciples of Turkism/Turkishness) first published in 1920, showed the Kemalists the way how to assimilate the minorities with the Turkish identity. According to Gkalp, the concept of race can not be related to the concept of nation. Gkalp emphasized that the components of nationality such as societal and cultural unity can be transferred to the next generations through education. Moreover, Gkalp further defines nation as: nation is not a group of people who came from the same racial roots, geography, or political view, but nation is a group of people who have the same language, religion, shortly, who receives same sort of education . Likewise, he emphasizes the importance of Trkiyecilik, which means Turkish nationalism within the boundaries of Turkey, instead of Turanclk/Kzl Elma (Red Apple), the unity of the whole Turkic world.23 Today, the core concepts for the humankind -- nationalism, religion, ethnicity, minority rights and other concepts -- are used as a tool in order to carry out terrorist activities.
22

Joseph Stalin, The Nation, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 32-33 23 Ziya Gkalp, Trkln Esaslar, Ankara, Elips, 2006, pp.15-27

15

Terrorism is one of the most important instruments of weak players against their powerful opponents in the international arena. In order to understand what terrorism is we should examine its origins. The term "terrorism" was first used in reference to the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution which began 5th September 1793, and ended 28th July 1794. The Terror (French: La Terreur) was a period of violence that led the mass executions of enemies of the revolution. Today, there is still no consensus regarding the definition of terrorism in the world arena. For one state an entity might be a terrorist organization while for the other the same entity might be seen as a freedom fighter. According to the Former Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence (1955-1959), Yehoshafat Harkabi, terrorism is threatening and using violence against innocent people to achieve political goals. 24 With the rise of terrorism any small group might become more and more influential by challenging nation-states through the use of terrorism. Walter Laqueur, in his article Post Modern Terrorism, defines terrorism similar to Harkabi: a substate application of violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society in order to weaken or even overthrow the incumbents and to bring about political change. 25 In November 2004, a United Nations Security Council report described terrorism as any act intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act. Terrorisms goals are to create violence, inflict psychological impact and fear, with an emphasis on a political goal, deliberately targeting civilians and unlawfulness. Another vital instrument of the weak player against its opponent is guerilla warfare. The term guerilla came after Napoleons defeat against the Spanish army.
24

Literally,

Yehoshafat Harkabi, ( Milhama ve Estrategya War and Strategy ), Tel-Aviv, Hadekel Publications, 1990, p.204 25 Walter Laqueur, Post Modern Terrorism, Foreign Affairs, Vol.75 No.5, 1996, p.24

16

guerilla means small war. Spanish people organized belligerent, asymmetrical groups which are known today as guerillas. Clausewitz defines this style as small and popular war of the occupied people against the occupiers.26 According to Gil Merom, guerilla strategy offers the underdog a cheap, efficient and often the only way to remain militarily active in spite of logistical, numerical and material inferiority. It provides the insurgent with a chance for a prolonged struggle by relying on the support of the indigenous population. Conquerors and oppressors who refuse to compromise with the political demands of their weak rivals can nevertheless deal with insurgencies in several ways. They can annihilate the popular base of insurgency, isolate the population from the insurgents or selectively eradicate the insurgents and their leaders.27 Hseyin Pazarc, in his book Uluslararas Hukuk (International Law), states the classical aspects of the guerilla as their struggle for independence, peoples contribution, guerillas targetting on military forces, guerillas involvement in political and societal spheres and more importantly Guerillas Long time war.28 Mao Ze Dongs famous theory of Water and Fish emphasizes the importance of the support of the people in the guerilla war. Ze Dong states: If you withdraw the water, that is to say, the population, fish, guerilla can no longer live; its simple, I know, but in war only the simple things can be achieved.29 Today, the Kurds are trying to reach their interests through two different ways: the first is the violent PKK which exercises terrorism and guerilla warfare at the same time, the second sphere is the non-violent political. The DTP (Democratic Society Party Demoktarik Toplum Partisi) the Kurdish political party, is advocating Kurdish rights in the Turkish Parliament and trying to find a solution to the ongoing conflict.

26 27

Yehoshafat Harkabi, ( Milhama ve Estrategya War and Strategy ), p.194 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, New York Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.46 28 Hseyin Pazarc, Uluslararas Hukuk, Ankara, Turhan Kitapevi, 2004, pp. 574-575 29 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, p.38

17

In order to analyze the Turkish-PKK/Kurdish conflict, I prefer to use the Conflict Theory, and as a research method, I chose the Content Analysis method. In short, Content Analysis Method is based on recognized historical sources such as letters, diplomats, official documents, and so on. The content to be researched can be found in speeches, academic articles and newspaper articles. The ultimate goal in this method is to reach general conclusions about the events. Otomar J. Bartos and Paul Wehr define conflict in their book Using Conflict Theory: conflict can originate either in goal incompatibility or in hostility (or in both) and that it involves a unique type of behavior, conflict behavior. Thus conflict is defined as a situation in which actors use conflict behavior against each other to attain incompatible goals and/or to express their hostility.30 Bruce Bonta defines the conflict as incompatable needs, differing demands, contradictory wishes, opposing beliefs or diverging interests which produce interpersonal antagonism and at times, hostile encounters.31 I would define the concept of the conflict as a state of unharmony caused by clashing interests, needs and principles. There must be at least two parties for a conflict to exist. In this case, Turkey and the Kurdish rebel organization, PKK, are the two parties. As will be addressed in the coming sections of the paper, Turkeys roots are relying on ethnic, secular Turkish nationalism. On the other hand, the PKK bases its policies on the recognition and the emphasis of the Kurdish identity in Turkey. Hence these two conflicting interests resulted in a conflict. According to Anatol Rapaport, the conflict has more than one level: dog fight, chess and a debate. To quickly summarize his theory, when the conflicting parties are in the state of dog fight both sides try to annihilate the other completely; while in the chess level, the two sides try to defeat each other. At this level, the parties are not trying to put an end to each
30 31

Otomar J.Bartos and Paul Wehr, Using Conflict Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.13 Christopher Beaudoin and Esther Thorson, Media and Conflict, Spiral of Violence? in Eytan Gilboa (ed.), Conflict and Conflict Resolution in International News, Transnational Publishers, 2002 p. 47

18

others existence. In the last level, debate, the sides try to persuade each other that their cause is true and noble and the others is false. 32 In a conflict, side A might be at a different level than the side B. For instance, in the Turkish-Kurdish/PKK conflict, Turkey is at the chess level while the Kurds/PKK are at the debate level. In November 1991, Turkish journalist Ismet Imset interviewed the PKK leader calan at his headquarters in Lebanon. In the historic interview, calan declared that the PKK is no longer seeking secession from Turkey but rather to gain Kurdish political and constitutional rights and to change Turkeys composition from unitary to the federative system while continuing to live under Turkish sovereignty. The PKK leader insisted that his group is not a terrorist organization and

emphasized that the current conflict was not created by them, but rather by the Turkish denial policies. Turkey, however, was not interested in any form of compromise of the PKK.33

32 33

Anatol Rapoport, The Origins of Violence, London, Transaction Publishers, 1995, pp.510-511 Ismet Imset, PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992), p.376

19

THE ROOTS OF TURKISH AND KURDISH NATIONALISM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

In order to understand the roots of the current Turkish-Kurdish conflict we have to observe and dig into the early roots of the history of these two people, before their interaction. The word Kurdistan was first used in the 12th century by Seljuk Turks as a geographical term.34 Moreover according to Paul White, Seljuk Sultan Sandjar created the Kurdistan province and made the city of Bahar its capital. 35 There are no officially recognized borders in Kurdistan because the Kurds have never had a state. However, Kurdistan is strategically located in the Middle East:36 in southeast and eastern Turkey, northeastern Syria, northern Iraq, western Iran, and smaller parts located in Syria, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Kurds constitute one of the largest stateless nations in the world.37 Approximately 22 million Kurds are living in Kurdistan. With the victory of Seljuks against the Byzantines in the war of Manzikert 1071, the Kurdish principalities became the dominant autonomous actors of southeast and eastern Anatolia. Later, however, with the Seljuk influence the Turkomans became more dominant. In time Kurds regained their autonomy. Later, the East Roman and Seljuk Empires were replaced by the Ottoman and the Safavid Empires who were in rivalry. In 1299, the Turks founded the Ottoman Empire. Through the years, the Ottomans expanded their borders, hence the many different ethnic groups and nations, including the Kurds, became subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The Kurdish principalities were jammed between the Iranian Safavid Empire, which tended to expand its area of influence towards eastern Anatolia, while the Ottoman Empire tended to expand its territories to the east. In

34 35

David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi (A Modern History of the Kurds), Ankara, Doruk, 2004, p. 28 Paul White, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? London, Zed Books, 2000, p.15 36 A.Manafy, The Kurdish Political Struggles in Iran, Iraq and Turkey, Maryland, University Press of America, 2005, p.1 37 Amir Hassanpour, The Kurdish Experience, Middle East Report, July-August 1994, p.3

20

1514, the aldran (Chaldiran) War, which was a milestone in Kurdish history, took place at Chaldiran between the Safavid Shah Ismail and the Ottoman Yavuz Sultan Selim, where the Ottomans defeated their adversary. The resulting boundary established between the two was formalized by the Treaty of Zuhab (Kasr- irin) in 1639, and has persisted into modern times.38 As a result of the war the Kurds were divided between the Ottomans and Safavids. Following the Ottoman victory, Yavuz Sultan Selim sent Kurdish notable dris Bitlisi (Idris of Bitlis), a highborn Kurdish scholar and diplomat who had helped broker important agreements between the Ottoman Empire and the Kurdish Emirates, to Kurdistan. Idris Bitlisi was authorized by the Sultan to grant the former ruling Kurdish families prominent positions in the newly conquered territories of Kurdistan and establish their administrative framework under nominal Ottoman suzerainty.39 In return, the Kurds recognized Yavuz Sultan Selims overlordship, except for one of the principalities. The Kurdish princes retained de facto control of their lands and some even continued to mint their own coins.40 As Western and Kurdish historians have stated, the Kurds enjoyed limited autonomy in the region. However, according to the Turkish historians product, Turkish high school text books describe another story which is not similar to the Kurdish-Western one. According to the school text book discourse, Yavuz Sultan Selim conquered the entire region from the Safavids which then became under absolute Ottoman rule. In this case, the words Kurd, and autonomy are never mentioned. One can suggest therefore that the principalities of the nineteenth century, with their autonomous existence, constituted and defined a political-social space where Kurdishness was constituted.41 In 1876, Sultan Abdulhamit II came to power. The Sultan decided to form the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments as a precaution against the Russians. This policy,
38 39

Michael M. Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, Maryland, Scarecrow Press, 2004, p. 32 bid, p. 27 40 Christopher Houston, Kurdistan Crafting of National Selves, Indiana, Indiana University Pres, 2008, p. 10 41 Mustafa Yeen, The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity, Middle Eastern Studies 32:2 , 1996, pp. 216 - 229

21

however, planted the seeds of Kurdishness. The real reason for Hamidiyes establishment was the disorder in southeast and eastern Anatolia which was being caused by Armenians and some Kurds. Hamidiye was composed of loyal local Sunni Kurdish tribal members.

Generally, the regiment was composed from a homogenous tribe, therefore the loyalty to the regiment was secured. Tribal leaders and other members of the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments were sent to Istanbul Military Academies.42 Soon a struggle between the

Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments tribal members and other tribes started. The name of Hamidiye soon became synonymous with corruption. sponsored Hamidiye was also used against the local Armenians. The state-

Consequently, the The

Armenians formed their own militaristic units, such as Armenikan and Hinchak.

Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments was a complete failure for Istanbul. Kurds became more united with their tribal consciousness and less loyal to Istanbul.43 eventually dissolved by Istanbul. In the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire faced serious inter-connected problems. The conventional administrative, political and economic structure of the empire were being eroded due to the desire of the Ottoman state to become a modern Western state. A prime consequence of these processes was the gradual erosion in national and non-central aspects of Ottoman politics. The Ottomans started a centralization process. As a result of this process the Kurdish principalities were abolished. This new conjuncture meant the termination of the confederative unity of the Kurdish tribes and the rise of sheikhs as the new political leaders.44 Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri is known as the Father of the Kurdish nationalism, or Kurdishness (Krtlk). In order to understand why Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri is The Hamidiye was

considered the Father of the Kurdish nationalism, we must first examine the idea of Kurdish nationalism.
42 43

David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi, pp.97-103 bid, pp.94-103 44 Mustafa Yeen, The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity, pp. 218-219

22

Hakan zolu, in his book Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, based Kurdish nationalism or Kurdishness, on two pillars: Kurdish nationalism refers to an intellectual and political movement that is based on two pillars the belief in a consistent Kurdish identity, which is rooted in an ancient history; and the conviction of an unalienable right for self determination in a historic Kurdish homeland or territory.45 The main reason for the Sheikh Ubeydullah Rebellion was the Treaty of Berlin, signed on 13th July 1878. According to the treaty the Ottoman Empire made promises to the Armenians. Sheikh Ubeydullah, in order to show his dissatisfaction with the treaty, warned Tosun Pasha (Governor of Subdivision of Bakale): What is this I hear, that the Armenians are going to have an independent state in Van, and that the Nestorians are going to hoist the British flag and declare themselves British subjects? I will never permit it, even if I have to arm the women .46 Here I would like to emphasize the Kurdishness of Ubeydullahs revolt by quoting a letter of his to Mr.Cochran, an American missionary in Hakkari, which was written in 1880: The Kurdish nation, consisting of more than 500,000 families, is a people apart. Their religion is different, and their laws and customs are distinct We are also a nation apart. We want our affairs to be in our hands. 47 Although the Ubeydullah rebellion came to an end with Ottoman and Iranian oppression, its impact on Kurdish history is indisputable. As was stated above, for the first time Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri mentioned the idea of a separate Kurdish nation. The Ottomans, however, were using the Millet System, which worked in an efficient way up until the rise of European nationalism, at which point it ceased to be effective.

45

Hakan zolu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, New York, State University of New York Press, 2004, p. 10 46 bid, p.74 47 Ibid, p.75; Ubeydullah to Dr.Cochran, 5th October 1880, Parliamentary Papers (Turkey 1881), 5:47-48

23

As stated above, the Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire--Turks, Kurds etc-was defined as Muslim or Ottoman. Until the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) rise to power, Turks and Kurds were not conscious of their national identity. Their sense of identity was based on the glue: Islam. With the French revolution, however, the ideas of nationalism became influential among the Turks just as it was influential for other millets in the Ottoman Empire. The Greek and Serbian rebellions and their independence from the Ottomans led the Ottomans to adopt a new unifying ideology called Ottomanism. Ottomanism was a collective, territorial, nonreligious, non-ethnic based nationalism. Ottomanism emerged in order to confront the

problems that nationalism was causing in the empire. This new notion was formally announced with a Nationality Law in 1869.48 Ethnic nationalism was strongly felt among the Young Turks. The Young Turks, or CUP, became the sovereign power in the Ottoman Empire after a successful rebellion against Sultan Abdulhamit II which took place in 1908. CUP members were keen on establishing a state on the basis of Turkish nationalism due to the act that Ottomanism could not unite all the subjects nor could it stop the disintegration of the empire as it has it had been designed to do. The founder of Modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, was a member of this organization.49 Ethnic nationalism was also influential among the Kurds who were more passive than the Turks, since ummah (Nation of Islam) and the Ottoman identity were much more vital for them. During the First World War, the Sykes-Picot Agreement was signed secretly by the Allied Forces against the Ottomans in May 1916. The Sykes-Picot Agreement defined the Allied Forces spheres of influence and control in western Asia after the expected downfall of the Ottoman Empire. In November 1917, the Bolsheviks made this secret agreement public.50

48

Paul White, Citizenship Under the Ottomans and Kemalists: How the Kurds were Excluded, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 3, No.1, 1999, p.79 49 Ibid, p.79 50 David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi, p.167

24

On 30th October 1918, with the Mudros Armistice Agreement that put an end to World War I, and following the Wilson Principles, General Sherif Pasha, a Kurd, along with other Kurds, decided to form a national organization to advocate the Kurdish peoples right to establish its own nation-state in Kurdistan. The organization was formally established on 17th December 1918, and was named The Rise of Kurdistan Society (Krdistan Teali Cemiyeti). Sherif Pasha was declared a traitor in stanbul.51 His agreement with the

Armenian representative, Boghos Nubar, was not well acknowledged among all Kurdish subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Kurds had always identified themselves with their religion instead of their ethnic identity. With the rise of CUP, the Turkish national identity was strengthened. Ottoman submission to the Allies was a huge disappointment to the Turks. Mustafa Kemal (Atatrk) who would become the founder of the Modern Turkish Republic, decided to flee Istanbul for Samsun in order to form an independence movement. The Turkish War of Independence had begun on 19th May 1919. Mustafa Kemal was aware of Kurdish nationalist acts throughout the empire. On 23rd May 1919, four days after his arrival in Samsun as inspector of the 9 th Army, Mustafa Kemal (Atatrk) requested a situation report from Ahmet Cevdet, deputy commander of the 13th corps in Diyarbekir (today:Diyarbakr). In his reply dated 27th May 1919, Cevdet detailed the activity of the tribes and of the British in his area and said that the Kurdish Club (The Rise of Kurdistan Society) in Diyarbekir was working for Kurdish independence. On 29th May 1919, Mustafa Kemal asked the General Staff in Istanbul to notify him where exactly the British were promoting the cause of an independent Kurdistan. As an outcome, Mustafa Kemal sent a telegram on 11th June 1919, to a Diyarbekir Kurdish notable, Kasm Cemilpaazade, as a message to all Kurds. In his telegram Kemal stated: the plan to create an independent

51

smail Glda, Krdistan Teali Cemiyet, stanbul, Doz Yaynlar, 1991, pp.12-13

25

Kurdistan had been hatched by the British for the benefit of Armenians. However Kurds and Turks are true brothers and may not be separated. Our existence requires that Kurds, Turks, and all Muslim elements should work together to defend our independence and prevent the partition of the fatherland. Mustafa Kemal went on: I am in favor of granting all manner of rights and privileges in order to ensure the attachment (to the state) and the prosperity and progress of our Kurdish brothers, on condition that the Ottoman state is not split up.52 During the war, Mustafa Kemal placed a strong emphasis on Islamic unity and their brotherhood bods against the Christian alliance. Although he was against the Caliphate, he never spoke against it in order to preserve the unity of the resistance. The Mudros Armistice Agreement was signed on 30th October 1918. This armistice agreement was different from previous armistice agreements which had been signed after World War I. This is because that even though it divided Turkey into pieces between the Allied states, Article 24 also gave jurisdiction to the Allied Forces to occupy eastern Anatolia in case of a chaotic situation. As a result of the Mudros Armistice Agreement, in the spring of 1919, Greece had landed its army in western Anatolia. The Greeks living in the district of Trabzon were hoping for support from the Greek government in order to set up a Greek dominated Pontus state. Furthermore, in eastern Anatolia where the aim was to establish Greater Armenia, the Armenians began to occupy areas vacated by the Ottoman armies. Due to these

circumstances, organizations for local Turkish defence and the preservation of national rights were formed. organizations.53 In order to unite all of these national resistance movements against the Mudros Armistice Agreements conditions and against the occupation forces, Mustafa Kemal presided
52 53

The landing of Greek troops at Izmir accelarated the efforts of these

Andrew Mango, Atatrk and the Kurds, Middle Eastern Studies, 35:4, 1999, pp.5-7 Kemal Kirii, Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p.76

26

over two important Congresses, Erzurum and Sivas. At the Erzurum Congress participants drew up the National Pact (Misak- Milli), which basically established modern Turkeys existing borders. The National Pact showed that Turkey would not accept an independent Kurdistan in southeastern Anatolia.54 The proclamation of the Congress states that the Black Sea and the eastern Anatolian provinces (including the main Kurdish provinces of Diyarbekir, Mamretlaziz, Van and Bitlis) were an inseparable part of the Ottoman community and that all the Islamic elements living in this area are true brothers,55 while at the same time it stressed the loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph.56 In 1920, the National Pact was ratified by the Ottoman Parliament. The ratification granted legitimacy to the borders that the Turkish Independence Movement sought to defend. It is important to note that the only legitimate government for the victorious powers of World War I, was the Ottoman government. The Turkish Independence Movement, led by Mustafa Kemal, acknowledged this pact as a milestone for the unity of Turkey, while Winston Churchill believed that an independent Kurdistan would form a buffer zone between Turkey and the British-controlled northern Iraqi territories.57 On 10th August 1920, the Sevres Treaty was signed. Sevres authenticated the division of the empire and the final settlement of the Eastern Question.58 According to the treaty, western Turkey was to be occupied by Greek forces, southern Turkey was to be occupied first by the Italians, then by the French who would replaced them. Armenian gangs were

operating in the east, while the British surrouded the area of Istanbul, even though this territory was declared an international zone. Kirkuk and Mosul were also placed under British occupation. Only central Anatolia was left as Turkish territory (See Map 1).

54 55

Michael M. Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, p.143 Andrew Mango, Atatrk and the Kurds, p. 8 56 Kemal Kirii, Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p.76 57 bid, pp.69-71 58 bid, pp.67-68

27

The Treaty of Sevres created a syndrome in Turkey, Sevres Syndrome. The Sevres Syndrome describes the suspicion that the Western powers were bent on dismantling Turkey territorially, just as they had tried to do in the abortive Treaty of Sevres in 1920.59 Hasan Cemal, a prominent Turkish journalist in his book Krtler (Kurds), describes the Sevres Syndrome: As an empire in 1913 we controlled a shore in the Adriatic sea, while in 1919 Istanbul, the empires capital was under occupation. This created a trauma. The fear of Sevres passed from generation to generation.60 The Sevres Syndrome is the reason why the new born Turkish state rejected plurality and the expression of the other ethnic identities in the state and emphasized only Turkism.

Map 1: Map of Turkey according to Sevres Treaty

61

Article 62 of the Sevres Treaty states that a commission would prepare a new plan for Kurdish autonomy in the Kurdish populated areas. Article 63 states that the Turkish

59 60

William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, p. 225 Hasan Cemal, Krtler, p.337 61 Map of Turkey according to Treaty of Sevres, http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versa/vmap7.gif 6th September 2009

28

government would accept the commissions decisions. Lastly, Article 64 emphasized that the autonomous Kurds may ask for the right of independence from the League of Nations, and if the Council of the League of Nations would concur, Turkey must abandon her claims to the region.62 The minorities of Turkey became a third party after the Mudros and Sevres Treaties. The legal basis for the minorities political rights was derived from the Wilson Principles of 8th January 1918. According to United States of Americas (USA) President Woodrow

Wilson, the 12th principle states that the Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity for autonomous development. Wilson added that the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.63 Kurdish nationalists base their demands on the Sevres Peace

Treaty and Wilson Principles. As was mentioned before, under the Mudros Armistice Agreement, Article 24 granted opportunities for Allied Forces to occupy the east. In order to put an end to the chaotic situation which had been created by Mustafa Kemal, the stanbul government decided to send British Army Major Noel to the east. Noels intention was to defy the Turkish policy of Pan-Islamic propaganda and to put a stop to the Turkish policy of turning the Kurds against the Allied Forces. J.B. Hohler, a former British political advisor, once said that I am afraid that he will be a Kurdish Colonel Lawrence. 64 Noel sent a telegram to stanbul about his mission in the east. Due to his telegram, the Kurdish state issue was seriously debated in the peace conference where the Armenians
62

The Treaty of Sevres Articles 62,63,64 http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I,_Articles_1_-_260, 9th July 2009 63 Wilson Pinciples, 12th Principle http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson%27s_Fourteen_Points 18th August 2009 64 David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi p184

29

were represented by Boghos Nubar and the Kurds by General Sherif Pasha. 65 n the telegram, Major Noel noted that Ali Galip, Governor of Elaz Province, produced a decree from the Sultan ordering him to raise a force of Kurdish cavalry against Mustafa Kemal in Sivas. A day later, Major Noel commented that Ali Galip had to disperse the Kurdish tribal gathering as the idea of marching to Sivas was too risky. Later, Noel and his colleagues who had helped him, had to leave Turkey. Mustafa Kemal made maximum use of the Ali Galip plot to discredit the stanbul Government, even though the plot failed to reach its goals.66 Seyit Abdulkadir, president of the Rise of Kurdistan Society, sent Baytar Nuri to the region in order to organize the infrastructure of the Kogiri Revolt which took place in 1920. Kogiri rebels asked the Ankara government to put the Sevres Treaty in force in order to establish a Kurdish state on Diyarbekir, Van, Bitlis and Dersim provinces. In a memorandum sent to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), the rebels asked for the autonomy of Kurdistan and the replacement of the Turkish governors by Kurdish ones. Their

memorandum was not accepted. In the above mentioned provinces, TGNA declared martial law and crushed the revolt.67 Despite the Kogiri revolt Mustafa Kemal was still considering granting autonomy to the Kurds in the framework of local government throughout the country. Mustafa Kemal was against drawing new borders for Kurds. He said, If we wished to draw a border in the name of Kurdishness it would be necessary to destroy Turkishness and Turkey.68 On 1st March 1922, in the TGNA, Mustafa Kemal said, The people of Turkey is a social entity united in a race, religion and a culture, imbued with mutual respect and a sense of sacrifice and sharing

65 66

David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi pp.184-186 Andrew Mango, Atatrk and the Kurds p.10 67 smet Bozda, Krt syanlar, stanbul, Truva Yaynlar, 2004, pp.19-21 68 Dou Perinek, Kurtulu Savanda Krt Politikas, stanbul, Kaynak Yaynlar, 1999, p.357

30

the same destiny and interests. Nevertheless, the expression People of Turkey, rather than Turkish people is significant (See Figure 1, page 35).69 After the decisive Turkish victory over the Greeks, the Lausanne Peace Treaty was signed by the former occupiers and Turkey. The treaty had set the borders of the Turkish national state, while all the promises to Kurds made by the Allies were neglected in this agreement due to the Turkish victory in the War of Independence. The Lausanne Agreement defines the minorities in Turkey as simply non-Muslim citizens of the republic. Therefore, Kurds, Lazs, Circassians and other non-mentioned

Muslim citizens of the Turkish republic are not considered minorities. In the Minority Rights Section of the Lausanne Treaty, Article 39 is indirectly related to the Kurds. It states that every citizen of Turkey in every sphere is allowed to use any language, while emphasizing that Turkish is the sole official language.70 This article specifically de-legitimizes the former law which had banned the Kurdish language. The Treaty of Lausanne failed to recognize ethnically based minorities. As Lord Curzon noted: The Turkish delegation insisted that these minorities (Kurds, Circassians and Arabs) required no protection and were quite satisfied with their lot under Turkish rule.71 In one stroke, the Kurdish people lost their right to exist as a recognizable and distinct people and were incorporated into the Turkish nation by virtue of their Muslim heritage.72 In October 1923, a republic was formally declared, with Mustafa Kemal Atatrk as its president and smet nn as its prime minister. The caliphate separated from the Sultanate since November 1922 - was abolished on 3rd March 1924, and Abdul Mejid, the last caliph, was sent into exile. These changes were embodied in a new constitution enacted on 20th April 1924. In 1926, Turkey abondoned the old Islamic based civil and penal codes in favor
69 70

Andrew Mango, Atatrk and the Kurds, p. 12 Lausanne Treaty, Articles 37-42 http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne 12th July 2009 71 Robert Olson, Mark Muller (eds.) Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, Kentucky, Kentucky University Pres, 1996, p.175 72 bid, p.175

31

of secular codes based on the ones of Switzerland and Italy. The compulsory change from the Arabic letters to the Latin script, and the withdrawal of the declaration of Islam as the religion of the state73 shook the relationship between the Turks and the Kurds. As was already mentioned, Kurds were bound in unity with Turks merely because of the glue that held them together: Islam. The new state policies being implemented were intolereable for the Kurds.74 The Turkish language as the sole official language, the Turkish states ignorance of the Kurdish language, and the abolishment of the sultanic rule and the caliphate are just a few examples of such policies. The use of other languages in public was banned and a campaign was inaugurated under the motto Citizen, speak Turkish (Vatanda Trke Konu). The chief target of this policy were the Jews who spoke Ladino instead of Turkish in their daily lives. In addition to the Jews, the non-Turkish Muslims such as Kurds, Arabs and Circassians felt the impact of the campaign.75 Kemalists (the secular and Turkish nationalistic political trend members) thought to unify all elements under the umbrella of secular, nationalist Turkism. With the 1921 Constituition, the definition of citizenship transformed from religion to ethnicity. Mustafa Kemal Atatrks anti-sultanic, secular, Turkish nationalist view became the dominant view in the name of the Republic of Turkey. The name of the new republic, Turkey, which came from the word Turk, symbolized the new glue of citizenship. As was indicated in the theoretical part of this paper, Ziya Gkalp, the Father of Turkish nationalisms core theories, was very influencial. Gkalp, in his book Trkln Esaslar (The Principles of Turkism), published in 1920, showed Kemalists how to assimilate the minorities with the Turkish identity.

73 74

William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, pp.56-57 Kemal Kirii, Garreth Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, pp.91-103 75 Nesim eker, Identity Formation and Politcal Power in Ottoman Empire and in Early Turkish Republic,p.66

32

Today, there are many different ethnicities living within Turkeys borders as Turkish citizens, the most prominent groups are Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Lazs, Albanians, Jews, Greeks, and Armenians. Despite the fact that all of these ethnicities compose the Republic of Turkey, etymologically the name Turkey is derived from the Turkish ethnicity. This fact automatically determines the citizens of Turkish ethnic origin as the dominant and primary staatvolk ethnie of Turkey. Kemalism had three different definitions of the Turkish nation. The first of these was territorial. This was embodied in the Turkish constitution of 1924, which registered all inhabitants of Turkey as Turks. It promised to accommodate the Kurds, the Armenians and all others as equal citizens of the republic. The second definition, less inclusive than the first, was religious. Due to the legacy of the Millet system, the Kemalists saw all Muslims in Turkey as Turks. The third and least inclusive definition was ethno-religious, the ethnicTurks (See Figure 1).76

Figure 1: Zones of Turkishness77

76

Soner aaptay, Reconfiguring the Turkish Nation in the 1930s, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.8, No.2 Summer 2002, pp.75-76 77 bid, p.76

33

From the earliest days of the Turkish Republic, Atatrks conception of ethnicnationalist, secular citizenship of unitary state -Kemalism has made Turkishness synonymous with the Turkish nation-state. The idea was propagated by the Kemalist

magazine, Kadro, that there was only one race in Turkey, the Turks, and one language, Turkish. This process popularized slogans, such as One party, one nation and one leader (Bir parti, bir ulus, tek lider), The only friends of Turks are Turks (Trkn Trkten baka dostu yoktur) and as a last example One Turk is worth all the world (Bir Trk dnyaya bedeldir).78 It was not until March 1992, that the former President Demirel openly announced that he recognized the reality of a Kurdish ethnic presence in Turkey.79 Previously, the Kurds were not acknowledged by the Turkish administrations as a different ethnic group nor a minority. Kurds were seen as Mountain Turks who had forgotten their native language.80 Article 2 of Turkeys current 1982 Constitution states that: the Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular, and social state governed by the rule of law, bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice respecting human rights, loyal to the nationalism of Atatrk (Atatrk Milliyetilii) and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble.81 According to Necmi Yzbaolu and Blent Tanr, the term Nationalism of Atatrk is a synonym for Turkish nationalism. Yzbaolu and Tanr state in their book that, the nationalism of Atatrk is based on several principles: Turkishness openness to Atatrks reforms and principles, the states inseparableness, and the interpretation of the term Turk on the basis of citizenship and not on ethnicity, policy of seeking peace, citizens bound to the state, secularism and sovereignty.
82

Hence Turkish nationalism / nationalism of

78

Paul White, Citizenship under the Ottomans and Kemalists: How the Kurds were Excluded, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 3 No.1, 1999, p.82 79 Kemal Kirii, Gareth Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, p.113 80 John Bulloch, Harvey Morris, No Friends but the Mountains, New York, Oxford University Press,1992, p.168 81 eref Gzbyk, T.C 1982 Anayasas (1982 Turkish Constitution) Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi Yaynlar, 2005, Article 2 82 Blent Tanr, Necmi Yzbaolu, 1982 Anayasasna Gre Trk Anayasa Hukuku, stanbul, Beta, 2004, p.66

34

Atatrk

was based on the Modernist Approach of nationalism in which the common

denominator is not race, religion, language and ethnicity but the will of living together.83 According to Article 66 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution, everyone who is bound to the Turkish Republic in terms of citizenship is defined as a Turk.84 This definition includes Muslims, Jews, Greeks, Armenians, Circassians, Lazs, Albanians, and of course, the Kurds. Furthermore, on 20 th July 1971, the Turkish Constitutional Courts decision 1971/3, 1971/1, and from 8th May 1980, decision numbers 1979/1, 1980/1, set precedential decrees on Atatrks nationalism, stating that Turkish nationalism can not be based on racial ideologies, different ethnic origins, religions and languages, and that these can not be considered as separative factors for the states unity. 85 However, in the case of Turkey, the most prominent difference of the Kurds is the fact that they have a different language. The Republic of Turkey prefers to regard the Kurds on equal footing as fellow citizens of the republic who are not separate from the Republic. The Kurds regard themselves as a political, stateless nation and ask for further democratic rights, if not independence. Modern Turkey was ready to absorb and assimilate all other ethnic groups into one big Turkish group. As Mustafa Kemal Atatrk said, Happy is the man who says he/she is a Turk (Ne mutlu Trkm diyene). Turkishness/Turkism became the only identity for all citizens of the republic regardless of religion and ethnic origin. After the Ubeydullah uprising was suppressed, and with the proclamation of the secular republic, Kurds found themselves more alienated than ever before. The extension of the central governments external authority into Kurdish lands, accompanied by the new and unfamiliar economic and technological processes of modern civilization, roused Kurdish resistance and increased the vehemence of Kurdish nationalism.
83 84

Blent Tanr, Necmi Yzbaolu, 1982 Anayasasna Gre Trk Anayasa Hukuku, stanbul, Beta, 2004, p.67 eref Gzbyk, T.C 1982 Anayasas (1982 Turkish Constitution) Article 66 85 Trial Records Abdullah calan 31st May 1999 25th November 1999, mral Island, Mudanya , Turkey

35

The aggressiveness of nascent Turkish, Persian and Arab nationalism gave rise to new grievances and apprehensions, for besides wounding Kurdish national pride, they threatened the Kurdish national identity with extinction. 86 In the post-victory period there were no Kurdish separatists left in stanbul. However we do see that in 1923 a new organization in the name of Azadi formed in Erzurum. Azadi members were composed of the former officers of the Turkish Army and the Hamidiye Regiments. In 1924, Azadi organized its first meeting in which Sheikh Said was also present. Due to Sheikh Saids pressure, two important decisions were taken. The first decision was that a revolt would be organized against the Ankara govenment for the sake of Kurdishness and Islam, and the second decision was that the revolt had to be supported by external powers such as France and Britain.87 Sheikh Said used Turkeys secular process reforms and its emphasis on the Turkishness as an excuse to start his rebellion in 1925.88 The explicit goal of the revolt was to establish an independent Kurdistan which would be based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the secular Turkey that had just abolished the caliphate. Unfortunately for the Kurds, Sheikh Said could rally only the Zaza speaking Kurds. Alevi Kurds fought on the side of the Turkish government due to their belief that they would be better off in a secular Turkey than in a Sunni Kurdistan led by a Naqshibandi sheikh.89 The rebellion started in the village of Piran when the Turkish gendarmerie tried to arrest five outlaws who were under the protection of the Sheikh, leading to the death of the gendarmeries. This was the largest and most important Kurdish rebellion, until the emergence of the PKK. The Turkish army crushed the rebellion, imprisoning many. As punishment,

86

Wadie Jwadieh, Kurdish National Movement and Its Origins and Development, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 2006, pp.292-293 87 Yaar Kalafat, Bir Ayaklanmann Anatomisi eyh Sait, Ankara, Avrasya Stratejik Aratrmalar Merkezi (ASAM)Yaynlar, 2003, pp.107-111 88 Mustafa Yeen, The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity, 1996, p.221 89 Michael M. Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, p.179

36

Sheikh Said and other leaders of the rebellion were hanged by the Independence Courts of the Turkish State.90 Even after the Sheikh Said rebellion, Kurds continued their disobediance against the Turks. In 1927, a new Kurdish nationalist organization, Khoybun, was established in Lebanon. Just as Azadi played a crucial role in the Sheikh Said rebellion, Khoybun played a crucial role in the Mount Ararat (Ar Da) Revolt. Khoybun sought to establish a strong Kurdish national liberation front with a trained fighting force that would not depend on the traditional tribal leaders.91 In order to organize a trained force that would not rely on the traditional tribal leaders, Khoybun appointed hsan Nuri Bey, a former staff major in the Turkish army. By 1928, a miniature Kurdish state had been created at Ar Da. Turkish authorities surprisingly adopted a conciliation policy. The governor of Beyazt began to negotiate with the rebels. Ihsan Nuri turned down every offer down due to his belief that the Turkish delegation had completely ignored Kurdish national aspirations. As an outcome of the failed negotiations the Turkish army launched an attack which crushed the revolt.92 As a means of oppressing these transgressions, the Turkish parliament legislated law number 1850. According to this law, there will be no investigations concerning the violence against the Kurdish civil population which may have been carried out by the security forces during the clashes.93 In those days, assimilation of the Kurds was seen as an absolute solution for the ongoing Kurdish revolts. A new 2510 numbered re-settlement law passed on 13th June 1934. The first article of this law stated that the Ministry of Interior is assigned the power to correct

90

Robert Olson, The Emmergence of the Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion 1880- 1925, University of Texas Press, 1989, pp. 107-128 91 Michael M. Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, p.99 92 Wadie Jwadieh, Kurdish National Movement and Its Origins and Development, pp.211-215 93 David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi,p.285

37

the distribution and locating of the population in Turkey in accordance with membership of the Turkish culture. 94 According to the law, Turkey was divided into three regions. The first region was Turkish-cultured peoples populated areas, the second region was for the people who do not belong to the Turkish culture but who were seen as a potential for assimilation, and lastly the third region was the Kurdish majority region that had to be evacuated totally for sanitary, material, cultural, political and strategic reasons. Places like Ar, Sason, Tunceli (Dersim), Zeylan (Van), Kars, Diyarbekir (Diyarbakr), Bitlis, Bingl, Mu were among the cities to be evacuated.95 This law made possible to annihilate the Kurdish tribal system. Every village and town whose mother tongue was not Turkish was to be evacuated.96 Assimilation policies such as the Resettlement Law, forced the resettlement of the dangerous Kurdish tribes/leaders/people to the western part of the country in order to disconnect them from the region, resulted in further Kurdish self-consciousness. Turkeys assimilation policies were becoming more evident for the Kurds. The city of Dersim was an important center of Kurdish insubordination. The Kurds were greatly affected by the 1937 Resettlement Law that the Turkish government initiated. Kurds of Dersim decided to send a delegation with a letter of protest to the Turkish Military Governor Abdullah Alpdoan in order to express the peoples opposition to the law. According to Kurdish sources, the Turkish governor arrested the emissaries bearing the letter of protest and executed them. In retalliation, the Kurds attacked a convoy of police cars and kidknapped the policemen. This act marked the beginning of the Dersim Revolt.97

94 95

Soner aaptay, Reconfiguring the Turkish Nation in the 1930s, p.72 smail Beiki, Krtlerin Mecburi skan, Ankara, Yurt Kitap, 1991, p.111 96 David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi, pp.286-287 97 Wadie Jwadieh, Kurdish National Movement and Its Origins and Development, p.215

38

General Alpdoan declared martial law in Dersim. There was an extremely tight military censorship, Dersim became a restricted area where travel was prohibited and the flow of news was strictly controlled. In this confrontation the Turkish army used modern armaments including air crafts. Sayyid Riza, together with a number of leaders and their families surrendered to the Turkish army after two years of ceaseless fighting. Sayyid Riza and the rest of the leaders were tried and hanged. The Kurds have charged that the Turks resorted to the most inhuman methods to punish the rebels both during and after the rebellion which was completely suppressed in 1938.98 After the suppression of the Dersim rebellion, Celal Bayar, Turkish Minister of Interior of the time, was reported to have declared in the TGNA that the Kurdish problem no longer existed...99 It is also noteworthy that Dersims name was Turkified and changed to Tunceli. The Dersim rebellion was the last tribal rebellion against the Turkish Republic.

98 99

Wadie Jwadieh, Kurdish National Movement and Its Origins and Development, p.216 bid, p.216

39

KURDISH REAWAKENING IN THE MODERN TURKISH REPUBLIC

The affects of the Dersim oppression were felt by the Kurds until the 1960s. The year 1961 marked a new constitution in Turkey. The 1961 Constitution granted rights and liberties that the Turks today do not even enjoy under the current 1982 Constitution. In this period, Kurdish youth began to discover Kurdishness. It was during this new wave of Kurdish Consciousness that the PKK began to sprout. Kurdish Radio broadcasts had begun in Cairo and Yerevan at this time. Kurdish intellectual Musa Anter, began to publish leri Yurt in 1959, the first Kurdish publication since the Dersim Rebellion. The Menderes government eventually banned leri Yurt and jailed 50 Kurdish intellectuals to be executed. They were accused of being communists. Due to the fact that one of the intellectuals was killed during his custody, the case was named as the 49ers. Forty-nine prisoners were set free during the military coup detat in 1960. Despite the fact that the coup detat set free the 49ers, the aghas (Kurdish tribal leaders) were arrested and sent to the camps in Sivas. This event would come to be known as the Exile of the Aghas.100 In the introduction to Sherif Firats book Eastern Provinces and the history of Varto, coup detat President Grsel advocated for the non-existence of the Kurdish nationality. Grsel claimed that the Kurds are the racial brothers of the Turks and good citizens of the Turkish Republic. A new era for the Kurds began when the Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Centers (Dou Devrimci Kltr Ocaklar (DDKO)) were founded in 1969. The DDKOs were

organized by urban Kurds in response to provocative anti-Kurdish articles that inflamed the

100

A.Osman lmez, Trkiye Siyasetinde DEP Depremi, Doruk Publications Ankara, 1995, pp.38-45

40

Kurdish public opinion. 101 The word East (Dou) in DDKOs name symbolized Kurdistan.102 The DDKOs were the first legal Kurdish organization in Turkey. The DDKO centers created a network within all the Kurdish towns as a place for evolution in understanding the Kurdish problem. It was no longer an issue of regional under-development, but rather a national (later a colonial) problem.103 In tken, the journal of the extreme right wing Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyeti Hareket Partisi MHP), an anonymous article was published. The article stated that the Kurds were a backward people, devoid of history and culture, who wanted to cut Turkey into pieces. The author suggested that the Kurds must get out of Turkey since Turkey was only for the Turks. As an outcome, the Kurds organized a furious protest. Kurds demanded that the Ankara government punish the author and ban the magazine, since Section 12 of the Turkish constituiton proclaimed the equality of all citizens irrespective of any distinction, but the government did nothing. Instead of condemning the article, Turkish President Cevdet Sunay stated: Those who are not Turks may go away from Turkey, 104 which came as a complete shock to the Kurds. Consequently, many protests took place in cities. In the DDKOs monthly bulletin, the main issues were about the economic problems of eastern Turkey, the oppression of the Kurdish villagers by (Kurdish) landlords and tribal leaders, and the brutal and violent behavior of the Turkish army units in Kurdish villages.
105

When Abdullah calan, the founder of the PKK, was in stanbul in 1970, he took part in DDKO activities and established connections with other students. The DDKO blended Marxism and Kurdish nationalism to mobilize the youth in the name of social justice and

101

Paul White, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey London, Zed Books, 2000, p.129 102 Martin Van Bruinessen, The Kurds in Turkey, Merip Reports, February 1984, p.8 103 Paul White, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey p.134 104 bid, pp.132-133 105 Martin Van Bruinessen, The Kurds in Turkey, p.8

41

identity.106 The DDKOs were later destroyed when all their leaders were arrested during the 1971 military coup. For the first time in the Turkish history, the Constitution of 1961 made possible the establishment of a socialist party. With time, the Turkish Labor Party became the legal basis for the Kurds.107 However, in 1970, Turkish Labor Party members, sitting in their fourth congress, made a public statement that put an end to the partys being. The partys statement caused an earthquake in the Turkish political arena. The Labor Party emphasized that there are Kurdish people in eastern Turkey who are confronting the fascist policies of assimilation, suppression and violence in their daily lives.108 DDKO members were very active in the Turkish Labor Party. They openly advocated for the Kurdish thesis. More importantly, the division between the Turkish left and the Kurdish left occured only after the DDKOs emergence. In April 1978, a violent event occured in Malatya and in Mara, where the ultra nationalist, Sunni, rightist Turkish Bozkurt group launched an attack against the Kurdish, Alevi, leftists. As a result, 109 people were killed, 176 people were severly wounded, and 500 shops were destroyed. A State of emergency was declared in the Kurdistan provinces. Unfortunately the violence did not end, which led to the 12th September 1980 military coup detat. Events such as the rise of Communism, the division of the Turkish people as right and left, and the chaotic situation of violence all resulted in 12th September 1980 coup detat which abrogated the 1961 Constitution. It was replaced by the current 1982 Constitution which took severe measures against all Turkish citizens by constraining the rights and

106

M.Hakan Yavuz, Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.7 No:3, Autmn 2001, p.10 107 Chris Kutschera, Mad Dreams of Independence, The Kurds of Turkey and the PKK, Middle East Report No:189, The Kurdish Experience, Jul-Aug, 1994, p.13 108 David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi, p.542

42

liberties. In addition to that, 1982 Constitution granted extra ordinary jurisdiction to the military. Another crucial factor in the newly reawakened nationalist Kurdish culture is the Newroz holiday. The Newroz holiday, was first celebrated by Persians between eighth-tenth centuries before their conversion to Islam. It is believed that Newroz is the day that the God created humanbeings and the universe. Moreover, as it is written in Sherefname, written by Sherefhan of Bitlis, Newroz is the day that the Kurdish nation was born. 109 Newroz was first adopted by the Iraqi Kurds in the 1950s. At the same time, Kurdish student unions in Europe began organizing Newroz parties. The Kurdish youth in Europe became more aware of their Kurdish national identity. During the 1980s, the Newroz parties also began to be celebrated among Turkeys Kurds. In time Newroz became politicized. The organized Newroz parties by the PKK distinguished themselves especially in the first years by calling its supporters to a violent struggle for liberation against the Oppressive Turkish State.110 With the rise of the PKK and the Kurdish identity in Turkey, the Kurds of Turkey adopted Newroz as their national holiday. Furthermore, as a holiday it signifies the unity to all the Kurds around the world.

109 110

Hrriyet, 21st March 1998 Martin Van Bruinessen, Transnational Aspects of the Kurdish Question, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence 2000

43

THE BIRTH OF PARTIYA KARKEREN KURDISTAN PKK

In 1973, Abdullah calan along with a group of his friends, decided to form Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) (Kurdistan Workers Party) in ubuk, Ankara. The organizations main ideology was Marxist-Leninist and sought the independence of the Kurdish people. In the criminal charges brought against Abdullah calan in mral Island, it is implied that the PKKs aim was to establish an independent Marxist-Leninist Kurdistan on the parts of the Turkish terrirtories where the Kurdish population is the majority. According to the PKK, this part of Turkey is under Turkish colonial rule.111 In its charter, the PKK defines its purpose as promoting the Kurdish nations unity, promoting Kurdish nations self-democratic administration, providing a democratic solution to the Kurdish Question, influencing the sovereign states in Kurdistan by causing democratization, and providing freedom to women by removal of the feudal society structure.112 According to calan, Turkey could manage its sovereignty over the region by using the feudal lords as collaborators.113 In the beginning, the most important objectives of the PKK were showing the local population Turkeys inability to challenge with itself, destruction of tribal system, abolishing female slavery, and lastly, to establish an independent Kurdistan from Turkey. 114 The PKK formed its structure based on trilogy; these were the Party, the Front and the Army. The Party was responsible for decision making and to force other bodies to carry out the decisions; the Front was responsible for propaganda and providing logistics for the Army;

111

Trial Records Abdullah calan, Preamble, 31st May 1999 25th November 1999, mral Island, Mudanya , Turkey 112 PKK Charter Article 3 113 Ismet Imset, PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992) pp.13-18 114 Nihat Ali zcan, PKK,tarihi ideolojisi ve Yntemi, pp.63- 78

44

the Army had the responsibility to operate against the specified targets and to liberate all the territories it could.115 Nihat Ali zcan in his book, PKK (Krdistan i Partisi) Tarihi, deolojisi ve Yntemi, indicated that the PKK based its struggles theoretical basis on Maos Revolution in China.116 The PKK developed a strategy of confrontation against Turkey, which it called Peoples Long Time War. It defines the confrontation in three phases, just as Mao Ze Dong. These are strategic defense, in which the PKK would try to defend itself and to mobilize the Kurds with guerilla methods against the state. The second phase is the strategic balance, in which the PKK and the Turkish army would be equivalent to each other, where the guerilla methods would be replaced with modern army methods. The last step is the strategic assault, its purpose is to mobilize the masses, capture the cities, and create liberated regions through conventional warfare. 117 Since the 1980 the military coup detat in Turkey, the PKKs leadership was based in Syria, receiving training from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and even fought against Israel in the First Lebanon War together with the PLO.118 In 1983, official Turkish oppresion on the Kurdish language began. The 2932 Numbered Law prohibited speaking, writing, broadcasting, and educating in the Kurdish language. The law remained in effect until 1991. In 1984, a new era began in Turkey. The PKK launched its violent campaign against civilians and Turkish security forces in Eruh, located in southeast Turkey. There is disagreement between the parties on the definition of the PKKs status. While the PKK calls its fighters as guerillas, the Turkish Republic refers to them as secessionist terrorists.

115 116

Nihat Ali zcan, PKK,tarihi ideolojisi ve Yntemi, pp.69-180 bid, pp. 73-74 117 bid, pp. 63- 78 118 Cem Ersever, Krtler PKK ve Abdullah calan, Istanbul, Milenyum Yaynlar, 2007 pp.70- 76

45

In its party program of 1978, the PKK states the necessity of ending the Turkish rule over colonized Kurdistan and the need to establish an independent Kurdish state with the support of the Kurdish proletariat.119 Secession can be defined as a kind of collective action whereby a group (whether officially recognized as a legitimate political subunit or not) attempts to become independent from the state that presently claims jurisdiction over it, in doing so, seeks to remove part of a territory from the existing state.120 Article 3 of the Turkish constitution strictly states that the state of Turkey is inseparable with its territories and people. Furthermore, Article 4 of the constitution prohibits any amendment to Article 3.121 Article 1 of Turkeys Anti-Terror Law defines terrorism as separatist violence against States unity and towards her citizens.122 In 2005, the PKK was classified as a terrorist organization by the United States of America.123 Civilians, state officials, and teachers were the main target of the organization. The PKK regarded the teachers as the brainwashers of the colonial Turkish regime, while the Turkish Armed Forces carried out operations against the PKK. During Prime Minister zals government, Turkey and Iraq under Saddam Hussein, reached a Hot Pursuit agreement that gave Turkey the right to chase the PKK members in the Iraqi territory following their escape from Turkey.124 In 1989, Turkish Chief of Staff General Necip Torumtay for the first time defined the PKK as an enemy, and not as a gang of bandits that the local police could take care of. General Torumtay emphasized that new professional anti-terror elite forces should be formed

119 120

PKK Party Program, November 1978 A.Buchanan, Secession: the Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sunter to Lithuania and Quebec, Boulder CO: Westview, 1991, p.75 121 eref Gzbyk, T.C 1982 Anayasas (1982 Turkish Constitution) Article 3-4 122 Terrle Mcadele Kanunu (Anti-Terror Law), Article 1 http://www.hukuki.net/kanun/3713.15.text.asp 18th August 2009 123 United States of Americas Foreign Terrorist Organizations List Washington - USA 2005 http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm 18th August 2009 124 Kemal Kirii Woodraw Garret, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, pp. 126- 133

46

and deployed to the region. Informally, General Torumtay became the ultimate sovereign of the Kurdish populated regions despite civilian government presence. General Torumtay also suggested the extension of military service period in order to fight terrorism more efficiently. This new strategy of forming small elite forces and forming an army which would be suitable in guerilla fighting was called Special Warfare.125 The special warfare was strengthened by the Turkish governments ban on the use of the Kurdish language in October 1983. It wasnt until 1991 that Kurdish became legal again.126 As a precaution against the PKK, the Turkish government reissued the Village Law and formed temporary Village Guards (Geici Ky Koruculuu - GKK) in April 1985. The GKK system was initiated to protect rural villages against terror attacks. The GKK system was introduced to 22 provinces in 1985. The GKK, in essence, resembled the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments127 which were designed to fight against the Russians. GKK members were recruited from loyal Kurdish tribes. The state provides the GKK members a salary and health insurance. In the campaign against the PKK, the GKKs intimate knowledge of local terrain, ability to speak local Kurdish dialects, and familiarity with local groups and individuals have proven invaluable to the Gendermarie and Armed Forces. As of 2005, it was estimated that a total of 58,511 GKK were employed by the state. General Osman Pamukolu, who directed military operations in Hakkari province between 1993-1995, described the problems of the GKK as something they were scared that PKK militants were going to take revenge on them one day. Indeed, the GKK members became the main targets of the PKK. The European Comission in a recent report on Turkeys progress towards EU accession, has described the

125 126

Ismet Imset, PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992), pp.254-257 David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi p.562-565 127 Ismet Imset, PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992) pp.141-150

47

GKK system as one of the major outstanding obstacles for Turkeys accession to the European Union.128 DespiteGKKs inefficiency, this corrupted entity still survives. Throughout its struggle, the PKK adopted a policy of attrition against Turkey by all means necessary. The PKK established Peoples Courts in the Kurdish populated regions. According to Ismet Imset, the locals began to solve their problems in the PKKs Peoples Courts instead of the legal Turkish courts. In this context, it can be said that the PKK has shook Turkeys state reputation in the region.129 As a result, Turkey had to take some precautions in order to restore her political and militaristic control over the problematic Kurdish populated areas. In 12th April 1991, the TGNA legislated Law Number 3713, or the Anti-Terror Law. Article 1 of the Anti-Terror Law defines terrorism as frightening or threatening civilians, acting against the principles of the Republic, seperatism and shaking the states authority.130 The Anti-Terror Law strengthened the hand of the state against the press. Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terror Law state that terrorist organizations propaganda could lead to imprisonment and a fine.131 Beginning in 1997, the Kurdish populated areas suffered severly from Turkish Martial Law. According to Article 120 of the Turkish Constitution, Turkey had a right to declare martial law in the Kurdish populated regions due to the PKKs violence and weakening the Turkeys authority. 132 Unfortunately during the period of martial law and the state of emergency, all Kurds were seen as potential terrorists by the Turks. It is important to emphasize that the Martial Law and the state of emergency granted extra-jurisdictional powers to the local Turkish governors.

128

Emrullah Uslu, Village Guards on the Frontline of the Turkeys War on Terrorism, Terrorism Focus, The Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 5, Issue: 35, 1st October 2008, 129 Ismet Imset, PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992) p.337 130 Terrle Mcadele Kanunu (Anti-Terror Law) , Article 1 http://www.hukuki.net/kanun/3713.15.text.asp 18th August 2009 131 bid, Article 7-8 132 eref Gzbyk, T.C 1982 Anayasas (1982 Turkish Constitution) Article 120

48

Evacuation of suspected villages was one of the extra-jurisdictional powers of local the Turkish governors. As described by Mao's view on guerilla war, the Turks were trying to withdraw the water from the fish. Beginning in 1988, Turkey adopted the policy of

evacuating villages. These villages were seen by the Turkish administration as the logistic and infrastructure base for terrorism. Hence these villages were evacuated of the civilians and were then set on fire in order to not leave a useful base for the PKK.133 As a result of these evacuations rural emigration to the urban areas were accelerated dramatically. 134 According to Ismet Imset in 1992, 295 villages were evacuated by Turkish forces.135 The Village Evacuation Policy is based on strategic reasons. According to the Turkish officials during the Gulf War these villages were evacuated due to the fact that 1- their geographical position was not suitable for an efficient defense; 2- The villages provided logistics to the terrorists; 3- the refusal of villagers to participate in the GKK; and 4- Selfevacuation took place among the villages out of fear from PKK or Turkish retaliation. 136 The PKK adopted the Marxist ideology. The sine qua non concept of the Marxism is a classless society, hence the PKK declared war against the local feudal tribal lords, aghas. In 1980, the PKKs first assasination attempt was doomed to fail. One of the most influencial feudal family of Bucak was targetted.137 As a result of the failed assasination attempt, a war has started among the local tribes and the classless PKK. In November 1991, a respected Turkish journalist on the Kurdish issue, Ismet Imset, interviewed the PKK leader calan at his headquarters in Lebanon. This interview was a milestone in the PKK-Turkish conflict. For the first time, the PKK leader was emphasizing that the PKK was no longer interested in creating an independent Kurdistan, but rather in

133

smet mset, PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992), Ankara, Turkish Daily News Yaynlar, 1993, pp.155-157 134 Turkey and the Kurds, Strategic Comments, 3:3, April 1997, p.1 135 Ismet Imset, PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992) p.155 136 bid, p.156 137 bid, pp.69-71

49

Kurdish political and human rights inside Turkey. His statements were acknowledged by the Turkish army as a sign of weakness. The last opportunity to solve the problems without bloody methods were missed. The PKK and the Turkish Armed Forces began a cycle of violence against each other.138 Since its first violent attack in 1984 until the year 1999, 9818 Turkish citizens, including civilians, soldiers, policemen and GKK members have been killed by the PKK, while 16,362 citizens have been wounded.139 Another important statistic can be acquired from Hasan Cemals book Krtler. According to it, from 1984 to 1996, 4922 unarmed Turkish civilians and 4102 security forces (including soldiers, police, and GKK) have been killed by the PKK. During the exchanges of fire, the PKK has suffered heavy casualities of 12,871.140 As mentioned before, the PKK regards itself as a guerilla organization/national liberation movement. By calling itself a guerilla, the PKK provides herself legitimacy. The original meaning of a guerilla is one who tries to liberate his homeland from foreign invaders. As a reflection of the PKKs self-definition and as Ismet Imset also states in his book, the PKK wants to emphasize that the territory it is fighting for --Northern Kurdistan/ Southeastern Turkey-- is under Turkish colonial occupation141 and needs to be liberated. The need to liberate a territory from another entity automatically brings about aninevitable conflict. In his historic interview in November 1991, calan was asked by Ismet Imset while in Bekaa Valley, if he is against the PKKs actions against civilians. calan replied that the field commanders sometimes act according to their own consideration. Such was the case regarding Hogir, a field commander. calan added that we cant say that in a time of war there wont be any casualities of women and children but we do not accept and acknowledge

138 139

Ismet Imset, PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992), pp.359- 404 Trial Records Abdullah calan 31st May 1999 25th November 1999, mral Island, Mudanya , Turkey 140 Hasan Cemal, Krtler, stanbul, Doan Kitap, 2007, 18th edition, p.286 141 Ismet Imset , PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992) , p.27

50

it as our systematic tactic.142 Despite calans condemnation of children and women casualities, the PKK continues to carry out many terrorist activities against civilians in Turkey in general, and eastern Turkey in particular. The most noticeable ones are the Pnarck Village Massacre and the Mavi ar Massacre. Pnarck Village Massacre took place on 20th June 1987, where 30 innocent unarmed civilians, including 16 children between the ages of 215, were killed. Istanbuls Mavi ar Shopping Center was targetted by the PKK on 13th March 1999, as a result of a molotov cocktail attack, 13 people were killed. Besides the fact that PKKs terrorist violent actions against the innocent Turkish citizens took place, the Kurds of Turkey are also confronting a difficult situation in their daily lives. Newroz 1990, 1991 and 1992 were typical examples of these confrontations. As already discussed, the Newroz holiday is an indispensible element of the Kurdish culture. The PKK used and continue to use the Newroz celebrations in Turkey for its cause since the beginning of the 1990s. The 1990 and 1991 Newrozes, saw Turkish security forces on a hunt for the PKK. The most important, and certanly the bloodiest, Newroz was in 1992. On 15th March 1992, gendarmerie forces were deployed to the region; on 18th March 1992, the Turkish army began to deploy its troops to Syrian frontier. In Abdullah calans trial, the Turkish court made statements regarding Newroz 1992, that the PKK wanted to use Newroz as a trigger for the revolt, which would have justified its actions.143 The Former Turkish Chief of Staff Doan Gre, in an interview with journalist Fikret Bila, (later published in the book Komutanlar Cephesi), states that the real intention of the PKK was becoming the center of attention by claiming that the Turks are preparing for a Kurdish genocide.144 The City of rnaks Kurdish deputy, Orhan Doan, and Mayor of

142 143

Ismet Imset, PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992), p.384 The Criminal Charge of the State Security Courts Republican Attorneyship, Trial of Abdullah calan, p.35 144 Milliyet, 7th March 1992

51

Cizre, Haim Haimi, claimed before Newroz, that the Turkish state is preparing for a massacre project.145 In response to the Turkish threats, the PKK distributed declarations stating that the Kurdish people should dig trenches, stock food, and fight till to the end. 2000e Doru and Yeni lke interviewed the PKK leader calan. In the interview, calan emphasized that the revolt is the second step for their cause, furthermore he claimed that the Turkish state was trying to escalate the violence against the Kurds in order to suppress a pre-mature rebellion and to crush the Kurdish cause. Ragp Duran, a Turkish journalist and witness to the Newroz 1992 celebrations explains that the Turkish press just reflected what the Minister of Interior Ismet Sezgin and state of emergency governor nal Erkan had wanted. Duran stated that, the Turkish media showed the people of Cizre as the aggressors but in reality the Turkish security forces attacked and opened fire on them.146 The Turkish press point of view was based on the states harmony and unity. Since 1990-1991, the Turkish press was under immense pressure from special squads who charged the press as Traitor Press or PKK Servant Press. As a result of this pressure, journalists became the target of the security forces during a chaotic collision area. During the 1992 Newroz celebrations, Izzet Kezer, Sabahs journalist, was killed.147 Ismet Imset emphasizes that the Turkish media and the head of the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MT - Milli stihbarat Tekilat) expressed serious warnings that the PKK will use Newroz 1992 as an excuse to rebel against the Turkish republic. Confirming this, the PKK published two declarations before Newroz reporting that there will be an insurgence in which the GKK of the Turkish state will be killed. Imset describes the 21st March 1992: everything started in an harmony until the security forces wanted to check people to see if they were armed or not, some of the people
145 146

Ragp Duran, Nevruz 1992 Gneydou Notlar, Ankara ,SD Yaynlar, 1993, pp.27-29 bid , pp. 27-29 147 bid pp.27-29

52

tried not to be checked. The security forces opened fire on them.148 According to Fikret Bilas book, Komutanlar Cephesi, PKK militants were hiding and shooting at security forces, while protecting themselves with Kurdish women and children. 149 On 22nd March 1992, many people gathered in Nusaybin to protest the security forces actions on 21st March. Once again the Turkish security forces opened fire on these people and journalist Izzet Kezer was killed. 150 Ercan Karaka, a leftist parliament member of the Social Democrat Peoples Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halk Parti SHP) of Erdal nn, prepared a report on the Kurdish issue. Karaka included the events of Newroz 1992 in his report and stated that the Newroz incident was shown by the press to the Turkish public only through one point of view. Moreover, Karaka stated that many women were taken into custody and more importantly many of them commited suicide while in custody.151 At the end of nearly 38 hours of a ceaseless exchange of fire, 52 people were killed in rnak Center, 10 in Cizre, 14 in Mardin and Nusaybin, 3 in the city of Batman, 3 in Hakkari, and one policeman was lynched in his home. 152 On 22nd March 23rd March the newspaper headlines read: It is not holiday it is a rebellion; PKK raided rnak; PKK raided rnak, our heroic army liberated the city, now Cizres liberation is on the way. Tercmans Fahir Armaolu, stated in his column that in order to confront terror less democracy is required.153 Former Prime Minister Sleyman Demirels statement regarding Newroz 1992 was: They made the holiday bloody, but they failed to rebel in a total wa y.154 From 1992 until 1999, the conflict inside Turkey entered a

148 149

Ismet Imset, PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992), pp.348 Fikret Bila, Komutanlar Cephesi, p.55 150 Ismet Imset, PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992), pp.347-350 151 Ercan Karaka, Sosyal Demokrasi Asndan Krt Sorunu, Istanbul, Trkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasal Aratrmalar Vakf, 1992 pp.70-71 152 Hrriyet, 21st March 1998 153 Faik Bulut, Trk Basnnda Krtler, Evrensel, 2005, pp.117-118 154 Hrriyet, 21st March 1998

53

constant period of violence, in which Turkish extra-territorial operations took place as well. In this period neither Turkey nor the PKK achieved much. The capture of PKK leader calan in 1999 was a significant milestone in the conflict. calan had attempted to escape to European countries such as Greece, Russia, Italy before he was handed over to Turkish Intelligence MIT in Nairobi, Kenya. He was returned to Turkey and sentenced to death by the State Security Courts, but the judgement was ammended by parliament and changed to life imprisonment. Today, calan is still imprisoned in mral Island, located in the middle of the Marmara Sea. He is the only inmate there with thousands of guards.155 With the capture of calan, PKKs attacks decreased drastically until 2007. Despite the drastic decrease of the PKKs raids, on 7th October 2007, PKK militants launched a raid against the Turkish armed forces patrolling in Gabar, rnak Province, where 11 Turkish soldiers were killed. Harsh comments were made by the Prime Minister, the head of Parliament, and by the MHP leader Devlet Baheli. Devlet Baheli stated that Turkey should strike hard and use its natural right of hot pursuit against the terrorists even without permission of the USA.156 The terror acts caused indignation through out Turkey, and many demonstrations took place from the western to the eastern provinces, such as in rnak, Mersin, Tarsus, Elaz, Istanbul, Izmir, Tokat, Adana, Kastamonu, Sakarya, Bolu, Tekirda. Symbols used in these demonstrations included the Turkish flags, banners stating All of us Martyrs, Martyrs dont die, the homeland is inseparable. NGOs in Turkey started to raise money for the army foundation, while Yaar Bykant, the former Turkish Chief of Staff, asked people to help the army by giving to the army foundation Mehmetik, a synonym of the Turkish soldier.157

155 156

Oktay Pirim, Sha rtl, PKKnn 20 Yllk yks, pp.79-98 Hrriyet, 7th October 2007 157 Hrriyet, 11th October 2007

54

On 22nd October 2007, the second PKK raid was launched against the Turkish Armed Forces in Hakkari Dalca where 12 Turkish soldiers were killed and 8 were captured by the PKK as hostages. Later, with the help of the DTP these soldiers were set free and returned to Turkey where they faced a military trial. One of the hostage soldiers, Ramazan Yce a Turkish soldier of a Kurdish origin, was under the suspicion of treason. Following the raid, the Turkish Television Commission issued a declaration that all news which might endanger the security forces motivation would be prohibited from 23rd October until 25th October.158 After the second PKK raid, the unrest in Turkey has grown. According to Hrriyet, 4,500 people volunteered to be soldiers in the army recruitment offices. More remarkable, 350 women volunteered to became soldier.159 Another popular response came from Beikta Sports Clubs spectators during the Champions League game against the English Liverpool. During the game spectators chanted The martyrs are immortal, the homeland is inseparable.160 On 24th October, massive demonstrations, under the influence of the Turkish media took place once again throughout Turkey following the drastic increase of Turkish flag sales in Hakkari, Adana, Kocaeli (where calans and Bushs puppets were burned), zmir, anakkale, Gaziantep, Giresun, Erzurum, Edirne, Sakarya, Gmhane, Krehir, Bolu, Ankara and Zonguldak. Unfortunately though, these demonstrations and the rise of nationalism have led to some racist acts against innocent Kurdish citizens. Many rightist lkc (Ideal) groups of MHP, the radical rightist party in Turkey, attacked Kurdish civilians in Istanbul, Balkesir, Izmir, Elaz and even in Holland and Germany. Moreover, the DTP offices in Istanbul, Iskenderun, Manisa, anakkale, Van, Antalya and Ankara were attacked by stones, bombs

158 159

Turkish Human Rights Foundation Report, 24th October 2007 Hrriyet, 23rd October 2007 160 Hrriyet, 24th October 2007

55

and molotov cocktails. 161 According to Fatih ekirge of Hrriyet, DTPs head Ahmet Trk, was threatened in his home by a Turkish nationalist who identified himself at first as a Kurd.162 The Kurds of Turkey and the DTP held two meetings in an attempt to answer the proTurkish demonstrations. The first meeting named Edi Bese (Enough in Kurdish), took place in the city of Batman; the second was called A Call for a Life of Honor, and took place in Diyarbakr. Thousands of demonstrators shouted pro-PKK slogans and clashed with police. Today the PKK through the DTP and through its local activists possess a lot of support from Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin. From 1984 until today, the PKK have carried out its violent activities against Turkey. Although in the beginning the PKK sought to establish an independent Kurdistan in the majority Kurdish areas in the eastern provinces of Turkey, now the organization seeks for a federation within the Turkish boundaries. In the shadow of the Sevres Syndrome, and with the rise of the PKK, the Turkish government feared that the Turkish unitary state would face separatism on the basis of ethnic nationalism and regionalism. This fear has dominated Turkish policies towards the Kurds and the PKK. In order to confront the PKK, none of the former Turkish governments, except for President Turgut zal, have initiated a democratic Kurdish initiative. As Paul White states in his book Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers?, zal began to make overtures to the Kurdish minority in 1991. zal announced the legalization of spoken Kurdish and offered amnesty to all Turkish Kurdish guerillas, including Abdullah calan.163 Unlike the previous governments that had oppressed Kurdish culture in Turkey as a means of confronting terrorism, the current Justice and Development Partys (Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi-AKP) democratic Kurdish initiative eases the conditions of the Kurds and is trying to break the previously untouchable taboos. It should be noted that Turkey has a right
161 162

Turkish Human Rights Foundation Report, 6th - 26th October 2007 Fatih ekirge, Hrriyet 19th November 2007 163 Paul White, Primitive Rebels or Revoultionary Modernizers, p.162

56

to defend her unity and her legitimate borders which are recognized by the international law. However, while preserving her unity and borders Turkey should be respectful to minorities of different ethnic origin. It is vital to designate that the PKK is still commited to physical confrontation, while still contributing to Turkish politics by breaking the untouchable taboo: The Kurdish Question, which led the way towards political Kurdish representation in the Turkish Parliament.

57

PKK AND OTHER ACTORS

Especially after the 1980 coup detat that took place in Turkey, the PKK had to search for safe havens to carry on its survival and activities. The PKK concentrated its infrastructure in neighboring countries such as Syria, Iraq, Iran as well as non-neighboring countries. By getting financial and logistical support from these countries, the PKK has been able to accelarate its extra-territorial, violent raids against Turkey which resulted in high civilian casualities. In retalliation, Turkish Armed Forces carried out its own extra-territorial military operations against the organization but failed to put an end not only to the organizations physical existence in neighboring countries, but also the organizations political influence over the Kurds of Turkey. The countries hosted the PKK and used it as a card to threaten Turkeys stability for their own interests. Many times Turkey and its neighbors have had political confrontations as well as a brinkmanship situation had occured. The following section will analyze the PKKs activities and the results on the conflict with Turkey, state by state.

58

I. SYRIA

The Alexandretta (Hatay) problem is a well known disagreement between Turkey and Syria. The Franklin Bouillon Pact, signed in 20th October 1921, between the government of France and the TGNA, had an important effect on the Alexandretta problem. William Hale states in his book, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774 2000, that as part of the Franklin Bouillon Pact, Turkey has accepted the attachment of one of its provinces to Syria as long as it is subject to protection of their cultural rights and administrative autonomy.164 The pact also formalized the de-facto recognition by France of the TGNA, rather than the government of the Ottoman Sultan, as the sovereign power in Turkey. This arrangement was confirmed with the Lausanne Treaty. In September 1936, French and Syrian Nationalists initialled a treaty which granted independence to Syria in 1939. After which, Turkey launched a campaign to incorporate Alexandretta into Turkey. The September elections held in the province resulted in favor of Turkey. The Republic of Hatay was declared on 23rd June 1939, Turkey and France with the consent of Republic of Hatay, signed the legal concession of Alexandretta to Turkey. 165 Eyal Zieser in Turkey and Syria Between Confrontation and Cooperation, described the Arab population of Alexandretta became refugees.166 The core problems between Syria and Turkey are the fact that Turkey is not Arab, is pro-Western, NATO member, supported the United States in the Cold War, and has relations with Israel. Syria, on the other hand, is pan-Arab, pro-Soviet, anti-Western, and were claiming

164 165

William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, p. 67 bid, p.67 166 Eyal Zieser, ( Turkey and Syria Between Confrontation and Cooperation) in Hebrew, Michael Winter , Miri Shefer (ed.) in ' : (Turkey: The Ottoman Past, and the Republican Present) in Hebrew, Moshe Dayan Center, Tel-Aviv University, A.R.T Publications, Tel-Aviv, 2007, pp.303-315

59

Alexandretta territory from Turkey. In 1961, Syria withdrew from the United Arab Republic and relations between the two countries became more normal.167 Turkeys South Eastern Anatolia Project (Gneydou Anadolu Projesi - GAP), which came to the scene in 1980,168 became another trouble spot between the two countries. GAPs main goal was irrigation in the poorest region of Turkeys Kurdish populated south eastern Anatolia, and to create job vacancies. From the Turkish point of view, the GAP policy would lower the support of the population on the PKK and more importantly create a water control mechanism against Syria. With the GAP Turkey can close the taps whenever it likes. Consequently, Turkey started to use the water as a weapon against Syria. William Hale demonstrates how water can be used as a weapon: In 1987, Turkey and Syria agreed on a basis of settlement in which Turkey would grant Syria 500 cubic meters of water per second from the Euphrates, in return Turkey demanded an end to Syrias aid to the PKK. In 1989, Prime Minister Turgut zal threatened Syria by cutting off the water supply to Syria due to the fact she was violating the basis of the 1987 settlement. Moreover, Turkey refused to sign the Law of Non-Navigational Use of International Water Courses in order to ensure its deterrence ability of the Euphrates against Syria.169 This law strictly prohibits using water supplies as a weapon or blackmail instrument against another state.170 As a means of defense against Turkeys Euphrates card, Syria wanted to use the Kurdish card. In August 1979, Syria began to host Abdullah calan and his militants. The Turkish army had mostly eliminated the PKK cells in northern Iraq by this time. In order to weaken the PKK Turkey had to bring an end to the Syrian PKK.

167 168

William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, pp. 302-307 GAPs History http://www.gap.gov.tr/gap.php?sayfa=Turkish/Ggbilgi/gtarihce.html 13th October 2009 169 bid, p.303 170 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses 1997, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf , 13th October 2009

60

Syrians provided calan and his PKK comrades, safe havens in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. There, the PLO and the Democratic Front terrorist cells have been training PKK members against a possible confrontation with the Turkish Armed Forces. In September 1998, Turkey threatened Syria stating that hosting Abdullah calan in its territory is a Casus Belli. That month, the Turkish-Syrian border witnessed a high Turkish military build up. The Turkish Commander of the Armed Forces, Atilla Ate, and Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Ylmaz, threatened to punish Syria in military terms if their demands were not met.171 Thanks to Iranian and Egyptian diplomatic efforts a war between the two was averted. As Robert Olson states in his book Turkeys Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel and Russia 1991-2000, Damascus had to expel Abdullah calan from its territories due to serious Turkish brinkmanship which combined in an entente with Israel. After the expulsion of calan, Syrian President Hafiz Assad died 10th June 2000. In order to normalize relations, Turkey was represented by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer at his funeral. After the funeral, PKK official Cemil Bayk asked to reoperate in Syrian territories. His demand was refused by the Syrian administration and seen as a good intentioned move in Ankara. Today the relations of the two countries are improving at a fast pace.

171

Oktay Pirim, Sha rtl, PKKnn 20 Yllk yks, pp.79-98

61

II. IRAN

The heart of the problem between Iran and Turkey is the Iranian Revolution of 1979. As a new born Islamic state, Iran wanted, and still wants, to export her regime to other states. Due to its representation of the anti-Iranian regime profile Turkey became the main target of Iran. Turkey indeed constitutes the anti-thesis of the Iranian radical Islamic regime. Despite this, Turkey has kept her relations with Iran for pragmatic political and economical reasons. Following the Islamic Revolution, Iran cut its ties with Israel. During the First Lebanon War in 1982, the PLO trained PKK militants fought together with PLO against Israel Defense Forces (IDF). After the war, the PKK militants situation was grave in Lebanon. Iran asked Turkeys permission to pass through Turkey into Syria and then into Lebanon in order to deliver humanitarian aid. The humanitarian aid planes from the Iranians didnt return to Iran empty. These planes carried PKK militants to Iran safely through the Turkish air corridor. The militants which were brought from Lebanon were later placed in camps in Iranian territory which were established along the Turkish-Iranian border.172 These militants eventually carried out extra-territorial violent raids against Turkey. According to the PKKs documents, the organization had formed her relations with Iran in 1984. In 1985, an agreement was signed between Iran and the PKK. According to this agreement, the PKK had five obligations in order to receive Iranian support. These were to inform Iran about Turkeys political situation, not to operate in Eastern Kurdistan (Iranian territories), to declare hostility to Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party, not carry out attacks against Turkey within the 50 km border region, and lastly, to target United States missions in Turkey.173 As a result of this agreement, Iran became the safe haven for the PKK militants.

172 173

Nihat Ali zcan, PKK,tarihi ideolojisi ve Yntemi, p. 229 bid, p.232

62

Subsquently, tensions between the two countries grew over the PKK factor, and due to ultra-Islamist terrorism in Turkey. In 1993, pro-secularist journalist Uur Mumcu was killed. On 4th February 1993, Interior Minister smet Sezgin, stated that, some people who were trained in Iran had been arrested for killing Mumcu.174 In November 1993, Turkey and Iran signed a security protocol. According to the protocol, Iran had to put an end to the PKKs activities from Iran towards Turkey, including the PKKs militants passage to Armenia and Iraq, while Turkey had to suppress Mujahiddin-i Halq attacks against Iran.175 In 2008, Turkish Chief of Staff lker Babu announced a new partnership between Turkey and Iran against the PKK. mit zda, who maintains close ties with the military, argues that Turkey and Iran grew closer because the USA ignored Turkeys vital interests in Northern Iraq. The PKK is an important factor in determining the future Turkish-Iranian relations are concerned. Iran would not provide full support to Turkey to end the PKK problem permanently because the PKK problem is the only issue that keeps Iran alive in the minds of Turkey, which allows Iran to be a vital asset to Turkey.176

174 175

William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, pp. 312-316 bid, p.314 176 Emrullah Uslu, Can Turkeys Anti-terrorism cooperation with Iran lead to a strategic partnership? Terrorism Focus, The Jamestown Foundation, Volume 5, Issue:24, 24th June 2008

63

III. IRAQ According to the prominent Dutch researcher Martin Van Bruinessen, the Kurdish population in Iraq in 1992 was 3,900,000. The population is located in the northern region of the Iraqi territory. 177 During the 1990s, there were three dominant Kurdish groups in northern Iraq; these were the PKK, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Mesut Barzani and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani. Turks were suspicious that Western powers were attempting to create an independent Kurdish state in Iraq. Encouragment of any Kurdish ambition to independent statehood would have been quite contrary to the Turkish interests.178 18th August 1992, was a milestone for Turkish PKK confrontation. The PKK launched its siege of rnak. PKKs purpose was to control the city of rnak and create a liberated region from Turkish troops. The PKK carried out its attacks with 1000-1500 militants in rnak. A real war had begun. By the end, Turkish Armed Forces controlled the city.179 During zals presidential period, Turkey and Iraq signed a Hot Pursuit Agreement that gave Turkey the right to chase the PKK members into Iraqi territory as well following to their escape from Turkey. 180 As a direct consequence of this siege, in October 1992, with her right to hot pursuit, Turkey launched an extra-territorial military operation in northern Iraq against the PKK with 50,000 soldiers. The aftermath of this operation was a victory for the Turkish side. The PKKs leader called for a ceasefire. Although the PKKs declaration of a ceasefire, Turkey continued its military operations, which led to the PKK response of the killing of 33 unarmed Turkish soldiers and two civilians in May 1993.181

177 178

Martin Van Bruinessen, Kurdistan zerine Yazlar, stanbul, letiim Yaynlar, 2005, pp.7-123 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, p. 307 179 Fikret Bila, Komutanlar Cephesi, p. 57-59 180 Kemal Kirii Woodraw Garret, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, pp. 126- 133 181 A.Osman lmez, Trk Siyasetinde DEP Depremi, p.249

64

By 1994, a struggle for power and territory began between KDP and PUK. While this Kurdish disunity was an obstacle for the Kurdish State, it allowed for the PKK to extend its presence.182 Turkey did not recognize calan as an authority and ignored his call for a ceasefire. In March 1995, northern Iraq witnessed a second massive Turkish extra-territorial operation, Steel-1, with 35,000 soldiers. This operation had a characteristic of strategic surprise due to the fact that it has been carried out during the winter with the commando forces. However, the PKK did not cease to exist. In December 1996, the PKK launched a raid against the Turkish border guard station of Siyahkaya. 183 In May 1997, Minister of Defense Turan Kayan, stated that the Turkish Armed Forces have entered northern Iraq due to KDP Leader Mesut Barzanis demand. With 50,000

soldiers, Turkey started its Hammer Operation.184 Later that same year, Turkey launched Operation of Dawn with 25,000 soldiers and 150 tanks and Peshmerga assistance. This operation was different from the rest of the Turkish operations. At the end of the operation Turkey decided to deploy some troops to the northern Iraq,185 even after the Turkish operation ended. However the mentioned Turkish military operations had failed to put an end to PKKis activities. As a consequence of the Gabar and Dalca Raids by the PKK against the Turkish army, the last Turkish extra-territorial offensive military operation, The Sun, took place in 21st 29th February 2008. This operation was launched due to the PKKs raid on the Turkish forces which were patrolling in the Gabar Mountains in Turkey. 10,000 Turkish soldiers participated in Opearation Sun.186

182 183

William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, p.308 Fikret Bila, Komutanlar Cephesi, pp.142-183 184 bid p. 184 185 bid pp. 188-192 186 Hrriyet, 23rd February 2008 http://arama.Hrriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=8294454 28th May 2008

65

Turkish General Chief of Staff Yaar Bykant emphasized in Fikret Bilas Komutanlar Cephesi (Commanders Frontier) that these operations still wont put an end to the PKKs existence,187 but Turkey would be successful in damaging the PKKs militaristic abilities due to her new strategy. According to Lieutenant General Altay Tokat, the Turkish Armed Forces did succede because the army switched its method to assymethric warfare, established special elite forces, used high technology night vision devices, purchased new attack helicopters, trained regular soldiers as commandos and most importantly, didnt withdraw from the operation territory after the operation was completed which made it difficult for PKK militants to return to Turkey.188

187 188

Fikret Bila, Komutanlar Cephesi, pp. 228-229 bid pp.192-194

66

IV. OTHER COUNTRIES

The PKK continued its activities through out the world.

Libya was among the

countries in which the PKK operated. The PKK could easily infiltrate into Libya due to Qaddafis anti-Turkish stance. While there, the organization raised huge amounts of money from Turkish construction workers of Kurdish origin.189 Saudi Arabia was another country that PKK used for fund raising. PKK members infiltrated into Saudi Arabia during the Hajj seasons. Once again, Turkish workers of Kurdish origin provided 4,100,000 Saudi Riyals to the PKK cause.190 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (former Soviet Socialist Republics), was another important element in the PKKs development. Soviets provided aid to the PKK through Bulgaria and Syria. CIS countries created a source of weapons for the PKK. Besides the militaristic angle, the PKK was able to keep alive a propaganda side of the conflict directed against the CIS. Kurdistan Repport was first published in Moscow and Botan

Magazine was published in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and in Krasnada. Moreover, PKK members formed good relations with CIS representatives of Poland, Hungary, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. During the Cold War, PKK tried every oppotunity to emphasize its solidarity with Marxism and Soviet Russia and exploit Turkeys alliance in NATO with the United States and the West.191 Europe, however, was the most important fund raising and propaganda arena for the PKK as far as World sympathy and support is concerned. The PKK made Europe its political center. The Serxwebun (Independence) magazine was published in 1981, as a tool for the PKK propaganda in Europe.192

189 190

Nihat Ali zcan, PKK,tarihi ideolojisi ve Yntemi, pp. 276-277 bid, pp. 277-278 191 bid, pp. 278-288 192 bid, pp. 288-289

67

The PKK branch, frontier Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan (ERNK National Liberation Front of Kurdistan) raised money and recruited young Kurds for the PKK cause in 1980s. The PKK formed a new Law of Conscription in 1987. According to the new law, every Kurdish family had to send their young children to train to become guerillas for the PKK. As a result thousands of Kurds were recruited to the PKK.193 This was the start of PKK operations in UK, France, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, Greece and throughout Europe.

193

Ismet Imse , PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992) pp.188-189

68

TURKISH MEDIA THE STATE AND THE KURDS

In todays world, the media is one of the most important instruments for all political and non-politic groups. In order to justify their causes almost every party in the world uses the power of the media. The medias main objective is to supply the necessary information to the targeted group of people. Today the media is dispensed into many fields such as the press, radio, television and more importantly the internet. Today, with the rise of the internet technology, most of the respected newspapers are available online and can be reached free of charge with just a click. This factor has made the print media more influencial. Anthony Giddens in his book Sociology, specified the most important social functions of the media. These functions are information, correlation, continuity, entertainment and most important, mobilization. With these functions media provides us information, helps us to understand the information, supports the social norms, expresses the dominant culture, recognizes the new social developments, reduces the social tension by entertaining people, supports in times of war, and encourages economy, work and religion.194 Through a Marxist point of view, powerful groups are able to control the society by controlling the economy, politics and the ideology of the people. Hence the dominant ideas in the society are the ideas of the dominant group. Consequently this dominant group uses the media in order to justify its position. 195 Ideology is a crucial element when we are talking about the media. Ideology refers to the influence of ideas on peoples beliefs and actions. 196 As a result, through ideology the dominant group is able to control the whole society. The Frankfurt School sees the mediaaudience relation like the relationship between drugs and a patient. Hypodermic Model and
194 195

Anthony Giddens, Sociology, p.599 Andrew Heywood , Political Theory , 2nd Edition ,1999 Macmillan Press, p.128 196 Anthony Giddens Sociology, p.605

69

"Narcotization" are also accepted terms to describe the situation addressed by the Frankfurt School. According to this theory, the audience passively and directly accepts the information without criticism.197 In the case of Turkey, the Turkish army and nationalist discourse are dominating the Turkish media in order to mobilize the masses an gain support for their attitude. The Turkish media is totally biased in favor of the Turkish state. Simon Cottle in his book Mediatized Conflict, gives us a brilliant example of the language of the reports which supports the nation-state. He differentiates between the sides as We and They. According to the reporting language, in the we section the terms: reporting guidelines, press briefings, elimination, neutralisation, first strike, professional, lion hearts, cautious, confident, are used; on the they section: ensorship, propaganda, killing, brainwashed, paper tigers, coward, desperate.198 Since the beginning of the Kurdish revolts, the Turkish media has payed close attention not to use the words Kurd, Kurdistan, Kurdish revolt, Kurdish movement. The Turkish press regarded the Kurdish issue as a threat to the non-divisible Turkish unitary state. During the 1920s, the Islamic elements of the Turkish Republic were Turks, Kurds, Circassians, and Lazs. In 1924, when the Kemalists described the nation just under the Turkish ethnicity, the Turkish press ignored the Kurdish ethnicitys existence. During the Kurdish revolts, when the press was allowed to report, the terms feudals and bigots were used instead of the Kurds. Moreover, after the suppression of the revolts the words Kurds and Kurdistan were used to crush the concept of Kurdistan and make it a synoym to defeat in order to create deterrence.199 The generalization policy of Turkishness is emphasized today and also during the first days of the republic and the Kurdish revolts. A famous journalist, Yunus Nadi in 13th July
197 198

Anthony Giddens, Sociology, pp.608-609 Simon Cottle, Mediatized Conflict, Open University Press 2006, p.81 199 Faik Bulut, Trk Basnnda Krtler, pp.110- 114

70

1930 in Cumhuriyet, stated that there was no Kurdish revolt, but rather it is the revolt of the bigots, illiterate masses. Nadi also stressed that there is only one component in the republic which is the Turkishness, and rejected the term Kurd.200 On 22nd June 1937, the Ulus went one step further, claiming that all ethnographic evidences showed that the Kurds, in reality, are Turks, and because of their radical religious demands the Kurds received a different identity.201 Due to this denial policy, the official Turkish and privately owned media never referred to Kurds as Kurds, but rather as brigands or separatists. A significant segment of the Turkish political body still holds this view.202 Throughout the 1990s, the situation remained the same. In a press conference, the governor of the state of emergency province, Hayri Kozakolu, called upon the Turkish press to support the state against the PKK in the same way that the press supports the Turkish national soccer team against foreign national soccer teams.203 The Turkish media also implemented a humiliation policy towards the Kurds. During 1930s many times in the Cumhuriyet and Akam newspapers, the media accused the Kurds of being primitive, barbaric, moreover, this attributes were compared to the positive Turkish attributes and the sheikhs were accused of being falsifiers.204 The Kurdish language and its dialects were also an important topic in the Turkish media. Hrriyets Oktay Eki claimed that the Kurds settled in northern Iraq and southern Turkey spoke different dialects of the Kurdish language, furthermore, he emphasized that the only common language among the Kurds who lived in Turkey is only the Turkish language.205 Hence, Eki downgraded the importance of the Kurdish language for the Kurds. The reality is

200 201

Faik Bulut, Trk Basnnda Krtler, pp.110-111 bid, p.112 202 Henri J. Barkey, Turkeys Kurdish Dilemma, Survival Global Politics and Strategy, 35:4, p.55 203 Faik Bulut, Trk Basnnda Krtler, p.115 204 bid, pp. 124-125 205 Hrriyet, 23rd April 1992

71

that the Kurds of northern Iraq and the Kurds of Armenia are studying in Kurdish language, this fact proves that Kurdish is not a downgraded language and can also be used in science. In addition to this, the fact that Kurdish is understood among the Kurds even if they come from different geographical regions. The Kurdish language was understood by these people even before the establishment of radio stations in eastern Turkey; most of the Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin were listening to Armenias radio stations which were already broadcasting in Kurdish for two hours a day. Censorship is another frequent and vital phenomenon in the Turkish Media. Here we will analyze the censorship from 1925 until today. The famous Sheikh Said Revolt was published in the newspapers only after 10 days. In the most popular newspaper of the time Cumhuriyet, the revolts of 1926-1929 on the 1st Ar (Ararat), Rekotan and Sason were not on the agenda. In 1930, the Ar (Ararat) Revolt was heard in the press only after a month, the 1937 Dersim revolt was heard after a month and a half after receiving the permission of the state.206 During the 1990s, one may think that less censorship was enforced due to the modernizing acts taken by Turkey and the rest of the world. Unfortunately this was not the reality. The New York Times Istanbul Bureau Chief Stephen Kinzer, was taken into custody in 2nd March 1997 in Batman, accused of espionage in favor of the PKK. In an interview with Milliyet on 11th April 1997, Kinzer emphasized that the topics of Armed Forces, Atatrk, Kurdish identity, the situation in southeast Anatolia are taboos for the Turkish media. 207 Metin Mnir who was the general editor of the Gne said that, In ankaya (Presidents Residence) we were told what was really happening in southeast Anatolia, later we have received some demands about the medias unity against the Kurdish separatists, we
206 207

Faik Bulut, Trk Basnnda Krtler, pp.108-117 Milliyet, 11th April 1997

72

accepted those demands. 208 According to Mnir these demands were that the press should not write about the PKK or about the states methods of confronting the terrorist threat such as human rights violations, massacres, oppressions, persecutions and finally the evacuation of the villages.209 Another frequent factor in Turkey is the close bond between the army and the media. Throughout Turkish history, we can clearly observe that whenever the army is in a need of a support, the Turkish media provided it. Our first example is the Ar Revolt of 1930. Cumhuriyet on 27th July 1930, supported the army in a bold manner. The Turkish soldiers were named as heroes, their actions were shown as supernatural. Another example, again from Cumhuriyet of June 1937, reporting on the Dersim Revolt, is of the first woman pilot of the Turkish armed forces Sabiha Gken. She was described as the Turkish Amazon who fights together with 25,000 soldiers.210 In the 1990s, the scene was the same. Todays most read Hrriyet published an article on 25th January 1992, referring to the newly trained policemen Rambos against the PKK, Sabah (Today the second largest newspaper in Turkey): We are in the death squads camp, 3,000 soldiers have received special training. Gnaydn on 16th January 1992: A volunteer army against the PKK, they are trained as real death machines. In 1995, during Operation Steel, the Tansu iller government backed the media members who supported the operations raison detre. Besides that, Hrriyet started a public campaign to support the troops called Mehmetikle Elele (Together with the Turkish Soldier.) Whoever thought or criticised the army in the Turkish media was regarded as a traitor. 211

208 209

2000e Doru 15th April 1990 bid 210 Faik Bulut, Trk Basnnda Krtler, pp.183-184 211 Bayram Ayaz, Trk Basn, Trkiyede Insan Haklar ve Krt Sorunu rneinde, Istanbul ,Belge Yaynlar, 1997 pp. 142-143

73

In order to counter Turkish propaganda that was being carried out by the Turkish media towards the region, the PKK launched a counter-attack in this field and in 1995 MEDTV was established in London and in Brusells. It had an electrifying effect on Kurds inside Turkey, exciting their sense of national solidarity. In April 1999, MED-TVs license was withdrawn when it was found guilty of inciting violence. However, three months later a new service MEDIA-TV was announced.212 MEDIA-TV was replaced by the ROJ TV, which is broadcasting from Denmark. ROJ TV can be watched today via internet and sattelites. As response to the PKKs ROJ TV, at last the Turkish government launched a new 24 hour Kurdish language television station. TRT-6 began its broadcasts on 1st January 2009, accompanied by prepared messages from President Gl and Prime Minister Erdoan. Gl expressed his hopes that the new television station would further solidify the unity and fraternity of the people, while Erdoan declared, This is a step which will strengthen our democracy. Well known Kurdish singer Rojin commented, The station is an important step for peace. The station features news, films, soap operas, and talk shows dubbed in Kurdish as well as video clips by Kurdish artists.213 Writing for the pro-AKP daily Todays Zaman, columnist Ihsan Da describes the importance of the TRT-6 as given the way Kurdish has been treated by the Turkish state over the decades, the establishment of a Kurdish TV channel by the state is a true revolution.214 Despite this historic event, the DTP and the PKK leaders do not seem to be delighted by the TRT-6 reforms. Emine Ayna, DTPs co-chairman, called the TRT-6 an illegal channel according to the current constitution due to the fact that the letters W,X,Q are not included in the Turkish Alphabet and thus their official usage is prohibited. She went on: How will they

212 213

David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, New York I.B Tauris, 2004, p 459 David Romano, Turkey Addresses PKK Challenge with Kurdish Language Reforms, Terrorism Focus, The Jamestown Foundation, Vol:6 Issue:1, 15th January 2009 214 Ibid

74

write and read Newroz if w,q,x are prohibited. The rights which are not given arbitrarily on the legal basis are not rights, you can not fool the Kurds in this way. 215 Another important critic came from the PKKs Mustafa Karasu, a member of the executive Ruling Commitee of Kurdistan Society (Koma Civaken Kurdistan-KCK) of the PKK. He called TRT-6 the new instrument of the Turkish state to carry on the assimilation policy. Karasu emphasized that, TRT-6s agenda is not the agenda of the Kurdish people, it is not related with the Kurdish people, I do accept that the broadcast language is Kurdish but its main purpose is to integrate the Kurds to the Turkish state.216 Another interesting point was made by a Netherlands based journalist specializing in Turkology and Kurdish issues; Wladimir Van Wigenburg. He argues that the Ankara government established the TRT-6 to strengthen the divisions between the Kurmani and Zaza speakers. The current TRT-6 broadcasts are in Kurmani. There are plans to broadcasts in Zaza and Sorani too. Zaza nationalists have already emphasized that they want a Zaza channel and not a Kurdish Kurmani channel.217

215

David Romano, Turkey Addresses PKK Challenge with Kurdish Language Reforms, Terrorism Focus, The Jamestown Foundation, Vol:6 Issue:1, 15th January 2009 216 zgr Gndem, TRT-6 Asimilasyonu rtme aracdr, 8th March 2009 217 Wladimir Van Wigenburg, Is Ankara Promoting Zaza Nationalism to divide the Kurds?,Terrorism Focus, The Jamestown Foundation, Vol:6 Issue:3, 8th January 2009

75

LEGAL POLITICAL KURDISH MOVEMENT

During the period of Turkish President Turgut zal, the GKK system was established, and on 9th April 1990, zal approved Decree 413 (later revised to Decree 424) which granted the regional governor in southeast Anatolia extraordinary powers. Some of the powers of the regional governor were the ability to censor the press, exile people who present a danger to law and order, suspend trade union rights, and more.218 Despite these harsh decisions which were taken by President zal, his initiative on the Kurdish question was a milestone in the conflicts history. Before zal, Mehmet Ali Eren, SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party) member of parliament, made a landmark speech demanding that parliament to overcome the taboo. Eren stated that the taboo of the modern Turkey is the Kurdish problem. Eren went on to say that the Kurdish problem should be dealt with in all its facets, realistic solutions should be proposed and a detailed debate is necessary.219 In 1988, the courts overruled the decisions of October 1983, allowing the use of Kurdish names which had been prohibited by law number 1587.220 In April 1988, Mehmet Ali Eren proposed an amendment to outlaw the ban on the Kurdish language.221 In September 1989 and in April 1990, zal hinted a change in his Kurdish Policy. In a meeting with Turkish Industrialists and Bussinessmens Association (TSAD) he stated: the government engaged in a quest for a serious model for solving the Kurdish Problem in a manner that goes beyond police measures.222 As a sign of serious change, in 1991 zal approved the annulment on the ban upon the usage of the Kurdish language which had been

218

Michael M. Gunter, The Changing Kurdish Problem in Turkey, Conflict Studies 270, Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism RISCT, May 1994, p.4 219 Martin Van Bruinessen, Between Guerilla War and Political Murder: The Workers Party of Kurdistan, Middle East Report No/153 Islam and the State, July-August 1988, p.45 220 David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi, p. 563 221 Martin Van Bruinessen, Between Guerilla War and Political Murder: The Workers Party of Kurdistan," p.45 222 Michael M. Gunter, The Changing Kurdish Problem in Turkey, p.4

76

prohibited in October 1983 under the law 2932.223 The use of the Kurdish language was limited. Using the Kurdish language in official agencies, publishing or teaching would still be considered a crime. The following year, zal suggested 60 or 90 minute programs in Kurdish language in the GAP (Southeastern Anatolia Project) TV Network.224 As was previously mentioned in the section Kurdish Awakening in the Modern Turkish Republic, the Kurds established the Eastern Revolutionary Culture Households. (DDKO). The most important obstacle for the Kurdish consciousness is undoubtfully Islam. Leftist self-conscious DDKO members were very active in the Turkish Labor Party. They openly advocated for the Kurdish question. DDKOs can be acknowledged as a trampoline for Kurdish intellectuals active in Turkish politics. In the fall of 1989, Kurdish members of the SHP had been expelled from the SHP due to their attendance at the Paris Kurdish Conference. This conference was perceived in Turkey as a pro-PKK gathering against Turkish national interests. This event created a split in the SHP; the more Turkish leftists and the 11 SHP members of Kurdish origin formed the HEP (Halkn Emek Partisi - Peoples Labor Party) in the spring 1990. The partys founding congress could not be held in time, therefore in order to participate in the elections, HEP members decided to form an alliance with their ex-party mates. HEP candidates entered the SHP list.225 In its first year the HEP was very aware of the limits of tolerated speech in parliament. HEP members avoided red-flag words such as Kurdistan. They framed the HEP as the party of the whole of Turkey and not only for certain a people or region. The distinction between the HEP and the PKK was clear. The HEP stated its purposes on the framework of solving the Kurdish problem through peaceful and democratic methods in line with Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the

223 224

David McDowall, Modern Krt Tarihi p.562 Michael M. Gunter, The Changing Kurdish Problem in Turkey, p.5 225 A.Osman lmez, Trk Siyasetinde DEP Depremi, pp.73-100

77

statutes of Helsinki Final Document.226 The rise in attacks on Kurdish party members during the 1990-1991 period triggered violence between the police and civilians in the southeast Turkey. Vedat Aydn, city of Diyarbakirs HEP Chairman, was taken from his home by a group of people who presented themselves to him as policemen, after few days Aydns dead body was found in the city of Elaz. Aydns funeral took place amidst a violent environment between the protestors and the police, resulted in 14 civilians dead.227 Mysterious killings of civilian Kurdish leaders by right wing government hit squads took place. In Total, 225 assasinations took place. To this day many Kurds believe that the killings were carried out by a group associated with the Islamic Turkish Hizbullah (Party of God) in order to protect the unity of the Muslim Turkish state. PKKs Godless Communist identity was a casus belli for the Turkish Hizbullah. Consequently, many people claim that the state did nothing to stop the Turkish Hizbullah in its Holy War against the PKK. It may even be said that the government was indirectly involved. Despite the accusations, the government rejects every involvement with the Turkish Hizbullah.228 In 1991, younger, more radical, and less experienced Kurdish deputies entered the political arena. New HEP members formed informal contacts with PKK. PKK flags, banners, symbols and pictures of calan began to appear in HEP meetings and demonstrations. As policy, HEP as a party rejected condemning the PKKs actions against the state.229 In the Summer 1991 the Public Prosecutor Nusret Demiral started the investigation process against the HEP. Finally on 14th July 1993 the Constitutional Court closed the party. HEP deputies managed to keep their parliamentary seats by forming DEP (Democracy Party) prior to HEPs closure.
226

Nicole F. Watts, Allies and Enemies: Pro-Kurdish Parties in Turkish Politics, 1990-1994, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.31, No:4, November 1999, p.636 227 A.Osman lmez, Trk Siyasetinde DEP Depremi, pp.126-135 228 Michael M. Gunter , The Changing Kurdish Problem in Turkey, p.10 229 Nicole F. Watts, Allies and Enemies: Pro-Kurdish Parties in Turkish Politics, pp.637-638

78

On 6th December 1991, the oath ceremony took place in the TGNA, where SHP listed Kurdish DEP members of parliament among other Turkish members of parliament to swear in. Members of parliament of Kurdish origin emphasized that they were reading the oath text solely due to the fact that it is a constitutional obligation and not because they believe in it. Moreover, at the end of the oath they added the I read the oath text for the brotherhood of the Turks and the Kurds in Kurdish. This event lead to the imprisonment of parliament members of Kurdish origin, Orhan Doan, Srr Sakk, Mahmut Alnak, Hatip Dicle, Leyla Zana and Ahmet Trk.230 On 14th November 1993, Prime Minister iller stated to Hrriyet that, We are out of tolerance against the PKK in parliament, Ill vote for lifting the immunities of some DEP members.231 Whereas the Head of the DEP, Hatip Dicle, emphasized the PKKs role in the potential peace process. While another DEP member Mahmut Kln stated that the PKK is a political party. These statements were sufficient for the Constitutional Court to ban the newly found DEP. DEP was banned by the Constitutional Court and their members of parliament were sentenced to jail. In July 1994, HADEP (Halkn Demokrasi Partisi Peoples Democracy Party) was established. Although HADEP, just as its predecessors had gained 50% of the votes in the southeast, it did not reach the national threshold of 10%. In the spring 1999, the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah calan, the arrests of thousands of pro-Kurdish activists, and a nationwide bombing campaign by militant Kurdish groups placed an additional strain on HADEPs efforts to remain moderate.232 HADEP would be replaced by Demokratik Halk Partisi (DEHAP Democratic Peoples Party); and in 2004, DEHAP was replaced by the current Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP Democratic Society Party).

230 231

A.Osman lmez, Trk Siyasetinde DEP Depremi, pp.160-168 Hrriyet, 11th November 1993. 232 Nicole F. Watts, Allies and Enemies: Pro-Kurdish Parties in Turkish Politics pp.649-650

79

The DTP is the only party in Turkey that bases its political agenda on the Kurdish question and comes out in favor of the Kurds. The DTP advocates greater democratization and expression of ideas in Turkish political life on the Kurdish Question. In 25th June 2006 DTP had its first official congress. The DTPs program can be differentiated easily from the other Turkish parties programs. The partys main goal is to force the state accept the political Kurdish identity. The DTP emphasizes the following policies: the importance of mentioning Kurdish political identity in the Turkish Constituiton, leaving behind militaristic methods in order to end the conflict, freedom of education in the Kurdish language, broadcasts in Kurdish, a general pardon for everyone who was involved in violent clashes, abolishment of the GKK system, returning to the evacuated villages, and economic promotions for the region. The DTPs ultimate goal is to define Turkishness as the upper-identity as opposed to the sole identity by the law and the constitution.233 In addition, de-centralization and regionalism are vital elements of the DTP which creates a strong opposition in Turkey originating from the Syndrome of Sevres. On 9th November 2007, DTP published its Political Stance Document in Hrriyet. According to the document, the DTP accused the Turkish Republic of assimilating the different ethnic groups by generalizing everybody under the Turkish identity. Moreover, the DTP emphasized that the ethnic based Turkish national concept is unacceptable. Instead of the term Turkish people DTP suggests the people of Turkey (Trkiyeli). This term refers to a terriroty instead of an ethnicity. According to the Public Stance Document, the DTP states that it is not supporting secession policies but rather greater democratization policies that might lead to regionalism which would permit regional symbols and the use of regional languages.234
233 234

DTP Party Program, http://www.dtp.org.tr/?sf=icerik&icerikid=226, 4th June 2008 Hrriyet, DTP Political Stance Document, 9 November 2007

80

On 24th August 2006, lker Babu, the Land Forces Commander of the Turkish Army and the current Chief of Staff stated that, PKK is a terrorist, separatist and an ethnic nationalist organization. Today their goal is to establish a nation-state. Their efforts for constituitional definition of the ethnic identity will lead to the destruction of the Turkish unitary state in the favor of a Kurdish unitary state.235 General Babu points to the DTPs political aims as being the same as the PKKs. It can be understood precisely that General Babus statement reflects the Armys view about the DTP, that it is merely the continuation of the PKK in the TGNA. In order to support this view, I would like to quote Sayg ztrks article concerning the Turkish army and terror issues which was published in Hrriyet on 5th October 2008. According to ztrk, Turkish General Staff requested the Turkish government to expand its jurisdiction on the counter-terrorism issues. The General Staff called to carry out necessary operations as soon as possible against the political party, local administrations, labor unions, foundations and clubs, which are affiliated with the PKK. 236 In 2007, the DTP participated in the Turkish General Elections. In order to enter parliament, DTP candidates declared themselves as independent in order to overcome the 10% national threshold. Once a candidate is declared independent he/she is immune from the national threshold. Hence, 20 members of DTP entered parliament as independent and reunified there under the umbrella of DTP. The attacks against the PKK and the DTP reached its peak when Turkey returned to deal with the enemy within. Nurettin Demirta, the young head of the DTP, was accused of not fulfilling his military service on account of fake medical reports. He fulfilled his compulsory army service in the city of Karabk while he was sharing the partys head with Emine Ayna.237

235 236

Fikret Bila, Komutanlar Cephesi, p.295 Sayg ztrk, Genelkurmay Yetki Arttrm stiyor, Hrriyet, 5th October 2008 237 Gareth Jenkins, Turkey Trumpets Attack on PKK, Turns to Enemy Within, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol.4, Issue 234, 18th December 2007

81

The partys prominent policy on Kurds, pro-PKK slogans during its meetings and demonstrations, and DTP members statements on the Kurdish issue caused a political lynching campaign against it. Devlet Baheli and his MHP accused the DTP as being the continuation of the PKK terrorists who are in the mountains. 238 Public Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalnkaya first appealed to the court for the DTPs closure on 16th November 2007, arguing that it had become a center of activities aimed at damaging the independence of the state and the indivisible integrity of its territory and nation.239 The indictment called for 221 members of the DTP, including eight sitting members of the Turkish parliament to be banned for five years from membership in a political party. 240 Upon the Constitutional Courts demand to dismantle the DTP for its 141 acts of violating Turkish Law, a public meeting was held by the DTP on 25th November 2007. At this meeting, Selahattin Demirta a member of the DTP called upon the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoan, to assist them, claiming that the DTP is under constant bombardment of the press, Prime Minister, the courts, and the other opposition parties. Demirta emphasized that there was a Lynch campaign against the DTP.241 On 9th May 2008, 42 Kurdish politicians with links to DTP formally applied to the Turkish Interior Ministry to found the Peace and Democracy Party (Bar ve Demokrasi Partisi BDP). The BDP is ready to serve as a successor to the DTP if it is eventually banned.242 The DTP is regarded by its opponents and many of its supporters as being sympathetic to the violent PKK.243 Another link can easily be seen between the PKK leader and the DTP. calans lawyer, Mehmet Bayraktar, was the head of the DTPs zmir Headquarters.
238 239

Baheli: DTP Kandilin Ankara ubesi, Hrriyet, 20th November 2007 Gareth Jenkins, DTP Presents Final Defense in Closure Case, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol.5, Issue 177, 16th August 2008 240 bid 241 Hrriyet, 25th November 2007 242 Gareth Jenkins, DTP Presents Final Defense in Closure Case, Eurasia Daily Monitor 243 bid

82

Bayraktar was arrested on 23rd March 2008. He was accused of being a member of the PKK, publishing its propaganda, providing assistance to the PKK, and inciting people to rebel. 244 The PKKs current de-facto leader Murat Karaylan, in his 19th April 2009 statement, called upon the Kurdish citizens of Turkey to support the DTP. Karaylan defined the DTP as the only legitimate democratic platform for raising the voice of Kurdish politics in Turkey. 245 Kamuran Yksek, the vice chairman of the DTP, stated that They ask us to comdemn the PKK, we wont do this, we are ready to pay the price. If theyll close our party the Kurds will desert their struggle on the legal basis and will turn to the other option.246 Aysel Tuluk, DTP co-chairman and member of parliament, in an interview with CNN Trks Cneyt zdemir was asked if the DTP is getting its orders from the PKK or not. Tuluks response prove the link between the PKK and the DTP: This should be clear that our main supporters are also PKK supporters. Of course these people can influence our policies. You should not see the PKK as composed of 5000-7000 fighters but rather you should see the PKK as a political entity in Turkey.247 In May 2008, the European Parliament adopted a report on Turkey. According to the report, the European Parliament demanded that the DTP put a wall between the party and the PKK. In the same report, the PKKs actions were condemned and solidarity with Turkey against the PKK was emphasized. Moreover, the European Parliament asked for the disarmament of the PKK.248 According to the pro-Kurdish zgr Gndem, DTPs most important service to the Kurdish people is its opposition to the extra-territorial military operations carried out against

244 245

calann Avukat tutukland, Hrriyet, 23rd March 2008 Sefa Mutlu, PKKda Yeni Almlar, ASAM, Gnlk Deerlendirmeler, 30th April 2009 246 DTP krsden Krte konuacak, Milliyet, 11th September 2008 247 PKKdan emir mi alyorsunuz ? Vatan, 26th May 2009 248 Erhan Akdemir, Avrupa Parlamentosu Trkiye Raporuun Deerlendirilmesi,Gnlk Deerlendirmeler, ASAM, 23rd May 2008

83

the PKK. The DTP was the only party that voted against it. The operations bill was accepted by 509 votes and opposed by only 19.249 Another vital service carried out by the DTP is asserting the use of the Kurdish language. DTP Chairman Ahmet Trk on 24th February 2009, stated that The prime minister is speaking Kurdish in TRT-6s opening ceremony. In fact all people should speak freely in their native language. There should be no problem speaking Kurdish under the roof of parliament. Thus today I will speak Kurdish in our party session in parliament.250 When Trk began to speak in Kurdish the state owned TRT-3 TV channel, which broadcasts parliamentary sessions live, stopped broadcasting and issued this statement: The Turkish Constitution and the Law on Political Parties only allow speaking Turkish in the political party meetings. Speaking any other language is not permitted. Here we have to stop broadcasting.251 Article 66 of the Turkish Constituition of 1982, states that every person who is bound to the Turkish Republic on the basis of citizenship is Turkish.252 According to the PKK DTP point of view, this definition is based on the Turkish ethnicity and is far from identifying that of the Kurdish. Emine Ayna, co-chairman of the DTP and a member of parliament, on 29th May 2008, commented on the Turkish nations composition: Of course one homeland and one flag but how can you talk about one nation as far as Kurds, Turks, Arabs, Greeks and Armenians are living together. The Kurdish language and culture is suffering from oppression. 253 Ayna went on to ask for constitutional recognition for the Kurdish identity. On 10th June 2008, Ayna proposed to change the name of the Turkish nation to the Nation of

249 250

8 Aylk Mecliste Krt Muhalefeti Fark, zgr Gndem, 10th April 2008 David Romano, Turkey Addresses PKK Challenge with Kurdish Language Reforms, Terrorism Focus, The Jamestown Foundation Vol.6 Issue.1, 15th January 2009 251 Emrullah Uslu, Turkeys Kurdish Question: Irony within Irony, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol.6, Issue, 37 25th February 2009 252 eref Gzbyk, T.C 1982 Anayasas (1982 Turkish Constitution) Article 66 253 DTPli Ayna: Yanl Hesap Diyarbakrdan Dner, Milliyet, 29th May 2008

84

Turkey which would refer to a territorial concept rather than ethnicity. 254 As a former Kurdish member of the Turkish parliament and more importantly as the grandson of the Kurdish revolt leader Sheik Said, Abdlmelik Frats statement clarified that the Kurds and the PKK are strongly pushing for inclusion of the Kurdish identity into the constitution. Moreover, Frat underlined the importance of education in the Kurdish language and invigoration of the jurisdictional powers of the localy dominated administrations which will lead to decentralization.255 According to Fikret Bilas Komutanlar Cephesi, today the Generals of the Turkish army are accepting the Kurdish reality, however Generals want the Kurds to identify themselves with the Turkish nation while learning, speaking, publishing in their own Kurdish language. Generals are strictly against any act that might change the Turkish secular unitary nation-states essence. 256 According to the Turkish Statistics Institutes census of 2009, Turkeys population constitutes 70,586,256 people. Unfortunately, the census does not show the ethnic diversity, rather it shows statistics about the urban, rural settlements, age, gender differences, and the foreigners who are living in Turkey.257 Due to the Turkish policy of not emphasizing the official minorities population as a separate entity, we rely on graphs from 1990. In 1990, there were 7,046,000 Kurds, which constituted the 12.60% of the population of Turkey. As Servet Mutlu, a Turkish researcher, states the ethnically Kurdish component of the population has increased from 3.132 million in 1965, to 7.046 million in 1990. The Kurdish element of the total population has increased considerably from 9.98% in 1965, to 12.60% in 1990.258 In addition to this, according to an article in Vatan on 22nd December 2008, the Konda Institute
254 255

DTP: 86 yllk halksz cumhuriyet artk tkanmtr,Milliyet, 10th June 2008 Mine enocakl, Trk-Krt 5 Milyon ift var nasl ayrlalm, eyh Saitin torunu Abdlmelik Frat Vatana konutu, Vatan, 18th May 2009 256 Fikret Bila, Komutanlar Cephesi , p.321 257 Turkish Statistics Institution , Census Statistics http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?tb_id=39&ust_id=11 8th November 2009 258 Servet Mutlu, Ethnic Kurds in Turkey : A Demographic Study, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.28, No:4, November 1996, p.532

85

conducted a poll in order to find out the population of the citizens of Kurdish origin. Twentysix sub regions, 41 cities, 328 towns, 1188 neighbourhoods, 6482 people have participated in this survey. The surveys results showed that 13.40% of Turkey is formed by the Kurds,259 while the CIA Factbook claims 20% of Turkey is of Kurdish origin.260 On 8th March 2008, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan stated in a speech at Denizli on World Womens Day, that couples should have at least three children in order to preserve the stability of Turkeys young population.261 From a Kurdish point of view, Erdoans formulation of three children is the only way to put an end to the Kurdish demographical threat and to preserve the Turkish majority against the Kurds. On 2nd November 2008, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoan visited the eastern province of Hakkari. The Turkish press reported that at least 3000 DTP supporters gathered on the streets of Hakkari shouting Murderer Erdoan ! In response, Erdoan slammed the DTP by charging them with helping terrorists. Terror and democracy can not coexist. (DTP) deputies backed by terrorism are in parliament. Erdoan went on: What have we said? We have said one nation, one flag, one motherland and one state, they are opposed to this. Those who oppose this should leave.262 A prominent Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand, argues in his column in the mainstream Milliyet, that the PKK wants the DTP to be shut down by the Turkish Constituitonal Court. With the DTPs closure, the PKK would be able to show Turkeys citizens of Kurdish origin that the elected Kurdish members of parliament can be thrown out of parliament due to Ankaras intolerance of Kurdish political existence inside the parliament.

259 260

Trkiyede ne kadar Krt var? Vatan, 22nd December 2008 CIA Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html#People 19th April 2009 261 Milliyet http://www.milliyet.com.tr/default.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=503059 8th March 2008 262 Emrullah Uslu, AKP unable to decide on its Kurdish policy, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 5 Isse 211 4th November 2008

86

Not only this, but Ankara is not keen on investing in the region. Consequently, the PKK wants to prove that only way is the armed conflict.263 The vast majority of the Turkish intellectuals think like Mehmet Ali Birand. One hundred Turkish intellectuals signed a letter sent to the Turkish President Abdullah Gl. In the letter, the intellectuals emphasized that the closure of the DTP will create a further crisis in democracy and, more importantly, the closure will not assist in reaching peace. The intellectuals added that the only way to solve this conflict will be the creation of an environment in which both conflicting parties could express their point of view. 264 Today, in spite of the harsh protests and very strong oppositions, the DTP is still an active Kurdish party in the parliament.

263 264

Mehmet Ali Birand, PKK kara kara dnmeye balad, Milliyet, 29th May 2008 Belma Akura, Aydnlardan Gle Mektup, Milliyet, 18th February 2008

87

CONCLUSION

After our long journey from Ottoman times up until 2009, we clearly saw that the Turkish governments did try to hinder the appearance of Kurdishness in the political and the sociological sphere. Beginning with Sheikh Ubeydullah, the Kurds rebelled against their Turkish masters when their local jurisdictions were taken away from them due to the strong Turkish centralization and Turkification policy. As stated before, the most important element for the Kurds in their association with the Ottomans was Islam. The rise of Turkish nationalism, increasing secularism, centralization and pressure on the Kurdish language by Vatanda Trke Konu (Citizen Talk Turkish) campaign, all led the Kurds to feel more alienated from the secular ethnic-based Turkey. It must also be noted that for years Turkey adopted a denial policy regarding the Kurds by claiming that the Kurds were really Mountain Turks. From the suppressed Dersim Revolt until the 1960s, the Kurdish resistance severly deteriorated. With the rise of Communism and the establishment of the DDKO, the Kurds entered to a reawakening period where their national consciousness began to be shaped. The DDKO resulted in political consciousness for Kurdish youth. The mentioned youth, today, is shaping the current Kurdish policy in Turkey. Kurds became active in Turkish politics by establishing their own ethnic based political parties. It should also be noted that despite the fact that the PKK constituted a threat to Turkey, it also has contributed to Turkish politics by keeping the Kurdish question alive since 1984. Despite what the former Turkish Chief of Staff General Yaar Bykant says, there is no power in the world that has the ability to take Turkey back to the days of Sevres Treaty.265

265

Fikret Bila, Komutanlar Cephesi , p.306

88

It is essential to remember that the Sevres Syndrome is still a vital factor in the conflict and one which must be kept in consideration. Bykant sees the PKK problem not in the framework of the Kurdish problem but in the framework of terrorism. Bykant argues that the PKK is using human rights and minority rights as a shield against Turkeys war on terrorism. The Turkish army emphasizes that the PKK is not the official representative of the Kurdish people therefore the conflict can not be seen as the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. Bykant and other Turkish army members consider the PKK as a terrorist entity. On the other hand, the PKK became unsuccessful militaristically against the Turkish army since it could not move from strategic defense to strategic balance and then on to strategic assault due to the Turkish armys territorial sovereignty doctrine. The extraterritorial military operations weakened the PKK while strengthening the Kurdish political partys stance among the Kurds of Turkey. In a 1991 interview with the Turkish journalist smet mset, calan himself declared the change in his strategy from independent Kurdistan to the democratic republic.266 According to Turkish journalist Fikret Bila, by democratic republic calan means two nations based Turkey, which would rely on a power-sharing model in order to reach a solution. calan also aims to convert Iraq, Iran and Syria into two nationed states. By doing so, he hopes to unite all Kurds into a supreme, supranational political organization. If successful, the Kurds would be sovereign in these four states.267 The political events and the PKKs actions forced Turkey to recognize the reality of the Kurdish people. During the 1980s the state discourse was based on No people of Kurdish

266 267

Ismet Imset, PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992) pp.359-388 Fikret Bila, Komutanlar Cephesi, p.314

89

origin in Turkey, but by 1992, with the decision of the National Security Council, President Demirel publicly acknowledged the Kurdish Reality.268 Despite all the moves forward, the topic still remains a taboo in Turkey, even though today the political environment is much freer than it was ten years ago. For instance, the Turkish state owned channel TRT began to broadcast in Kurdish under the name of TRT-6. Columnist hsan Da of Yeni afak argued in Todays Zaman that It will be impossible to argue that the Turkish state is an ethnically homogenous nation-state. We will in time, discover post nation-state political models of coexistence within a recognized multiethnic social community.269 Although the PKK is keeping the Kurdish question alive, and while the DTP is an active player in interior Turkish politics, in my opinion there will be no negotiations between the PKK and Turkey, as suggested by the PKKs current de facto leader, Murat Karaylan, in an interview with the well known Turkish journalist Hasan Cemal. In addition to that, as PKKs imprisoned leader Abdullah calans declared from his prison cell, Turkeys demand of the PKKs disarmament will never take place as long as the Kurdish demand of constitutional recognition is not provided.270 The demands of both parties are sine qua non for themselves. It should be noted that the PKK has made some compromises, like giving up the idea of an independent Kurdistan and focusing on Kurdish civil political rights in Turkey. However, while Turkey is making progress on the Kurdish question reforms, the Turkish army still insists on solving the problem in a militaristic manner despite the Kurdish DTPs non-violent presence in the Turkish political arena. Turkey has never accepted, and to my mind will never accept, the PKK or the DTP as the representative of the whole Kurdish population in Turkey. In my opinion Turkey will not

268 269

Fikret Bila, Komutalar Cephesi, pp.314-316 David Romano, Turkey Addresses PKK Phallenge with the Kurdish Language Reforms, Terrorism Focus, The Jamestown Foundation, Vol.6 Issue 1, 15th January 2009 270 zgr Gndem, calan: Diyalog olmadan silahl gler tasfiye edilemez, 18th March 2009

90

negotiate with PKK. Turkey is still very far from granting the Kurds political rights on the basis of their ethnic origin, as the DTP and the PKK desire. On the other hand, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoans speech on 15th August 2005, was a revolutionary one. Erdoan stated, There are ethnic elements. There are Kurds, Lazs, Circassians, Georgians, Albanians, Turks. All of these are sub identities, we also have an upper identity which is being the citizen of Turkey.
271

Therefore while Erdoan

again included all citizens of Turkey in the ship of Turkey, he allowed his ethnically nonTurkish citizens to identify themselves as they themselves wished. With this speech the huge gap between ex-Turkish denial policies towards non-Turks, and the current recognition policy of the different sub identities can be seen. However the opposition parties secularist Kemalist Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi CHP), and the Nationalist MHP do not share the same idea as Erdoan and have criticized him harshly.272 It is my opinion that further democratization and multi-culturalism in Turkeys national unity borders is the only feasible and applicable solution to the conflict. There is a widespread acknowledgement outside Turkey that further democratization in the country is required. In March 1993, calan proposed talks with Turkey by giving up the idea of independent Kurdistan and living in the recognized borders of Turkey on the condition that the PKK could participate in the Turkish political arena and in order to achieve Kurdish rights under the support of the constitution. 273 In November 1994, the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) released a report. The DeConcini Report recommended that all non-violent political parties should be allowed to participate in political life, restriction on freedom of expression should be lifted, the Anti-Terror Law should be abolished, the GKK should be

271 272

Kimlik tartmasn Erdoan balatt, Radikal, 15th April 2009 bid 273 Michael M. Gunter, The Changing Kurdish Problem in Turkey Conflict Studies 270, Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism RISCT, p.17

91

dismantled and all restrictions on Kurdish linguistic and cultural expression should be lifted, including in the schools. However many Turks are skeptical about Senator DeConcini because of his links with Kurdish radicals. 274 Under the new amendments that took place in Turkey, if a political party were closed the individual members would not automatically lose their parliamentary immunities, a crucial factor for the Kurdish member of parliaments. Still today the ethnic based political parties are not legalized. Between 1991 and 1995, the court had closed down nine parties, seven of these because of their pro-Kurdish policies. 275 Until recently, denial of the Kurdish identity was Turkeys basic response to the Kurdish issue. In effect the state pretended that the Kurds were Turks of a different sort, who had to be assimilated into the cultural mainstream.276 The Kurdish reality is still not recognized by the Turkish constitution. Murat Karaylan the PKKs de-facto leader, in an interview with Hasan Cemal in Kandil Mountains PKK headquarters, stated that, first of all the guns have to be silent, both sides should not attack each other. He went on, for 25 years the Turkish Armed Forces tried to put an end to the conflict with violent methods, they should see that they can not finish the PKK with militaristic methods. I am not talking about disarmament, the first step should be dialogue. According to Karaylan, the guns should remain silent, then a dialogue process must take place. Karaylan points to mral (The prison island where Abdullah calan is being held, referring to Abdullah calan) as the first address of the dialogue. He continued, If mral will not be accepted then Turkey can speak with us, if this option is not acceptable then Turkey can speak with the elected will (DTP) and lastly if it is again not acceptable then a comission of wise men should be established.277 In the same interview Karaylan mentioned a list of demands from the Ankara administration. Some of these demands are:

274 275

Kemal Kirii, Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, pp.199-203 bid, pp 199-200 276 Henri J.Barkey, Turkeys Kurdish Dilemma, p.55 277 Hasan Cemal, Karaylan: Bar umudumuz var, Milliyet, 5th May 2009

92

The Erdoan government should not hand the Kurdish problem over to the military.

The state should respect the PKK so that it can remove its weapons. The Ankara government should consider the plight of Abdullah calan and the 4000 PKK members in the prison.

A new social contract needs to be established. The government should have empathy towards the PKK. We extend our hand to shake Turkeys hand for peace. The other side should not leave our hands empty. 278

After the interview with Milliyets Hasan Cemal, Karaylan was interviewed by the Times. There he proposed Turkey accept the British-Scotish model of sovereignty.279 Abdullah calan from his prison cell sent a message to the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoan via his lawyers. calan wrote, Mr. Prime Minister you have all necessary jurisdictional powers to solve this problem; you can bring this conflict to an end with your decisive role.280 calan went on: Tolerance, compromise, and trust would be crucial for a multicultural society. In the name of multi-culturalism, Kurdish institutes should be opened in Turkish universities. On the other hand, traditional dominance of the Turkish ethnic group (staatvolk) would pose a serious obstacle. Granting specific minority rights could initiate creation of a multi-cultural society. The security conscious Turkish government will not accept multi-culturalism while the PKK continues its attacks. The success of multiculturalism is totally dependent on the conflicts solution through non-violent means.281

278

Emrullah Uslu, Ankara Considering PKKs Proposals on Dialogue, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol.6, Issue 88, 7th May 2009 279 PKK sko Modeli istiyor! Vatan, 26th May 2009 280 Abdullah calan, calandan Erdoana: Bu sorunu zebilirsiniz, zgr Gndem, 29th May 2009 281 Kemal Kirii, Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey. pp.203-205

93

Lewis A. Coser, in his book Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict, states that, The parties to the conflict may be willing to cease the battle when they recognize that their aims can not be attained or that they can be attained only at a price that they are not willing to pay, or, more generally, when they conclude that the continuation of the conflict is less attractive than the making of peace.282 On 13 th May 2009, Abdullah calan for the first time stated his plans to release a "roadmap" to end the decades-old ethnic Kurdish insurgency in the southeast Turkey. On 28th August 2009, calan in his weekly meeting with his lawyers in mral Prison Island, declared the main features of the roadmap: democratic mentality, democratic debate, democratic implementation, democratic politics, democratic freedom, and finally and most vital, a democratic constituition.283 In the same weekly meeting, calan emphasized the importance of a non-assimilation policy that should be implemented by the Turkish government and more importantly declared, Turkey and Kurdistan are common homelands.284 According to Emrullah Uslu, the reason calan and the DTP propose "roadmaps" in order to address the Kurdish issue is because violence no longer serves the PKK's interests. Since 11 th September 2001, a number of geopolitical developments have forced the PKK to change its approach: International pressure on the PKK to renounce violence. Turkey's developing economic and security relationship with the Kurds of northern Iraq. The democratizing effect of Turkey's application for membership in the European Union.

282 283

Lewis A. Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict, New York, The Free Press, 1967, p.50 Abdullah calan, Ortak Vatan Trkiye ve Krdistandr, zgr Gndem, 28th August 2009 284 bid

94

 Kurdish and Turkish exhaustion and frustration with the continuing civil war. 285

calan bases his roadmap on the 1921 Constitution. The 1921 Constitution stipulated Turkish provinces were to have full autonomy in local affairs. Article 11 of the 1921 Constitution defines "province" as an autonomous institution. It states that those powers exclusive to the state include domestic and foreign policy, judicial issues, military affairs, international economic relations, and inter-provincial issues. Provincial parliaments were to have autonomous powers in the fields of education, health, economy, agriculture, development and social issues. A prominent researcher on Turkish constitutions, Blent Tanr, emphasized that the 1921 Constituiton includes the principle of the state of Turkey but not the Turkish state which might be interpreted to mean the ethnic based nation-state. Tanr added that the term state of Turkey in the 1921 Constituition refers to territorial, geographic nationalism instead of ethnic nationalism like the term Turkish State suggests.286 Using the 1921 Constitution as precedent, the DTP argues that the 1921 document is the most democratic of all of the country's constitutions and reflects the party's advocacy of a single state and a single flag but also its objection to a single language and a single ethnicity. Like Karaylan, calan's roadmap also contains fundamental points that are crucial to a settlement: 1) The definition of citizenship should be amended. 2) Kurdish-language instruction and education should be accepted and codified in the constitution. 3) The ceasefire should continue and unconditional amnesty should be announced. 4) Intellectuals should take the initiative during the transformation period.

285

Emrullah Uslu, Imprisoned PKK Leader Abdullah calan Preparing a Roadmap to Peace in Turkeys Ethnic-Kurdish Insurgency, Terrorism Monitor, Vol.7 Issue 24, 6th August 2009 286 Kemal Gzler, 1921 Tekilat- Esasiye Kanunu www.anayasa.gen.tr.1921ay.htm 8th October 2009

95

5) All obstacles to the freedom of conducting politics should be lifted. Everyone should be allowed to participate in the political sphere. 6) The isolation inflicted on Abdullah calan should be lifted. 7) Local authorities should be empowered. Democratically-based local autonomy should be accepted. 8) A Truth Commission should be created to research all events in the TurkishKurdish struggle, especially any murders committed in its pursuit. 9) The GKK system should be abolished. 10) The land distribution system should be reformed.287 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan revealed that the government has launched a comprehensive plan to address the Kurdish question. We have launched an initiative, whether you call it the Kurdish problem or the southeast problem, or as some recently named it, the Kurdish initiative.288 In the following days, Interior Minister Beir Atalay gave a press conference to outline the government's Kurdish initiative. In the conference Atalay stated that the way to a solution is through democratization. We want to take this step together with all segments of society. For this reason, we would like to see every segment being constructive regarding this and have it contribute to a solution.289 AKP deputies appeared for the first time in six years on ROJ TV and stated that all political actors [including calan] should be considered if they positively contribute to the peace process. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu, however, has declared and

emphasized, The Kurdish issue will be solved in Ankara, not in mral.290 The principles of the unitary state, centralization, the definition of Turkish ethnicbased citizenship, and non-recognition of the Kurdish nation under the current 1982
287 288

Nevzat iek, calann 10 art, Sabah, 24th July2009 Emrullah Uslu, Imprisoned PKK Leader Abdullah calan Preparing a Roadmap to Peace in Turkeys Ethnic-Kurdish Insurgency, Terrorism Monitor, Vol.7 Issue 24, 6th August 2009 289 bid 290 Ibid

96

Constitution will remain as the core problems of this conflict. The DTP and PKKs demands can be implemented only by real, radical constitutional amendments which we may see on the horizon in the near future. We will see if the continuation of the conflict is more or less attractive than the making of peace.

97

BIBLIOGRAPHY

DOCUMENTS

1921 Turkish Constitution 1982 Turkish Constitution CIA Factbook DTP Party Program GAPs History PKK Charter PKK Party Program, November 1978 The Criminal Charge of the State Security Courts Republican Attorneyship Treaty of Lausanne, 24th July 1924 Treaty of Sevres 10th August 1920 Trial Records of Abdullah calan 31st May 1999 25th November 1999, mral Island, Mudanya Turkey Turkish Anti-Terror Law, 12th April 1991 Turkish Human Rights Foundation Report 24th Ocotber 2007 Turkish Statistics Institution, Census Statistics 2009 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1997 United States of Americas Foreign Terrorist Organizations List Washington, USA 2005 Wilson Pinciples 8th January 1918

98

BOOKS

Ayaz, Bayram, Trk Basn, Trkiyede Insan Haklar ve Krt Sorunu rneinde, Istanbul, Belge Yaynlar, 1997 Bartos, Otomar J, Paul Wehr, Using Conflict Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002 Beaudoin, Chistpopher, Esther Thorson in Eytan Gilboa (ed.) Media and Conflict, Spiral of Violence? Conflict and Conflict Resolution in International News Transnational Publishers, 2002 Beiki, smail, Krtlerin Mecburi skan, Ankara, Yurt Kitap, 1991 Bila, Fikret, Komutanlar Cephesi, stanbul, Detay, 2007 Bozda, smet, Krt syanlar, stanbul, Truva Yaynlar, 2004 Buchanan, A., Secession: the Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sunter to Lithuania and Quebec, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1991 Bulloch, John, Harvey Morris, No Friends but the Mountains, New York, Oxford University Press, 1992 Bulut, Faik, Trk Basnnda Krtler, Istanbul, Evrensel, 2005 Cemal, Hasan, Krtler, 18th edition, stanbul, Doan Kitap, 2007 Conner, Walker, Ethnonationalism, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994 Cottle, Simon, Mediatized Conflict, Open University Press, 2006 Duran Ragp, Nevruz 1992 Gneydou Notlar, Ankara, SD Yaynlar, 1993 Ersever, Cem, Krtler PKK ve Abdullah calan, Milenyum, 2007 Farley, John E., Majority-Minority Relations, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 2000 Issue 177, 16th September 2008

99

 Geertz, Clifford in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.) Nationalism, Primordial and Civic Ties, New York, Oxford University Pres, 1994 Giddens, Anthony, Sociology 4th Edition, Polity, 2001 Gkalp, Ziya, Trkln Esaslar, Ankara, Elips, 2006 Glda, smail, Krdistan Teali Cemiyeti ,stanbul, Doz, 1991 Gunter, Michael M., Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, Maryland, Scarecrow Press, 2004 Hale, William, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, Frank Cass, London, England 2000 Harkabi, Yehoshafat ( Milhama ve Estrategya - War and Strategy), Tel-Aviv, Hadekel Publications, 1990 Heywood, Andrew, Political Theory, 2nd Edition, Macmillan Press, 1999 Houston, Christopher, Kurdistan Crafting of National Selves, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 2008 mset, smet, PKK Ayrlk iddetin 20 Yl (1973-1992), Ankara, Turkish Daily News Yaynlar, 1993 Jwadieh, Wadie, Kurdish National Movement and Its Origins and Development, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 2006 Kalafat, Yaar, Bir Ayaklanmann Anatomisi eyh Sait, Ankara, Avrasya Stratejik Aratrmalar Merkezi (ASAM)Yaynlar, 2003 Karaka, Ercan, Sosyal Demokrasi Asndan Krt Sorunu, stanbul, Trkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasal Aratrmalar Vakf, 1992 Kirii Kemal, Winrow Gareth, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, Abingdon Oxon, Routledge-Curzon, 2004

100

 Lewis, A. Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict, New York, The Free Press, 1967 Lorenz, Chris, Stefan Berger (eds.) The Contested Nation, Ethnicity, Class, Religion and Gender in National Histories, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008 Manafy, A., The Kurdish Political Struggles in Iran, Iraq and Turkey, Maryland, University Press of America, 2005 May, Stephen, Language and Minority Rights, Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language, New York, 2008 McDowall, David, Modern Krt Tarihi, Ankara, Doruk Publications 2004 Merom, Gil, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, Cambridge University Press, New York 2003 Olson, Robert, Mark Muller (eds.) Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, Kentucky, Kentucky University Press, 1996 Oomen, T.K (ed.) Citizenship and National Idetity, New Delhi,2000 lmez, A.Osman, Trkiye Siyasetinde DEP Depremi, Doruk Publications Ankara 1995 zcan, Nihat Ali, PKK, Tarihi Ideolojisi ve Yntemi, Ankara, ASAM, 1999 zolu, Hakan, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, New York, State University of New York Press, 2004 Pazarc, Hseyin, Uluslararas Hukuk, Ankara, Turhan Kitapevi, 2004 Perinek, Dou, Kurtulu Savanda Krt Politikas, stanbul, Kaynak Yaynlar, 1999 Pirim, Oktay, Sha rtl, PKKnn 20 Yllk yks, Boyut, 2000 Rapoport, Anatol, The Origins of Violence, London, Transaction Publishers, 1995 Smith, Anthony D., National Identity, Harmondsworth, Middlesex Penguin, 1991

101

 Stalin, Joseph, The Nation in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.) Nationalism, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994 Tanr, Blent, Necmi Yzbaolu, 1982 Anayasasna Gre Trk Anayasa

Hukuku, stanbul, Beta, 2004 Van Bruinessen, Martin, Kurdistan zerine Yazlar, stanbul, letiim Yaynlar, 2005 White, Paul, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? London, Zed Books, 2000 Zieser, Eyal, ( Turkey and Syria Between Confrontation and Cooperation) in Hebrew, Michael Winter, Miri Shefer (eds.) in ' : (Turkey: The Ottoman Past, and the

Republican Present) in Hebrew, Moshe Dayan Center, Tel-Aviv University, A.R.T Publications, Tel-Aviv 2007

102

ARTICLES Akura, Belma, Aydnlardan Gle Mektup, Milliyet, 18th February 2008 Akdemir Erhan, Avrupa Parlamentosu Trkiye Raporuun Deerlendirilmesi, Gnlk Deerlendirmeler, ASAM, 23rd May 2008 Barkey, Henri J., Turkeys Kurdish Dilemma Survival Global Politics and Strategy, 35:4, 1993 Birand, Mehmet Ali, PKK kara Kara Dnmeye Balad, Milliyet, 29th May2008 Cemal, Hasan, Karaylan: Bar Umudumuz Var, Milliyet, 5th May 2009 aaptay, Soner, Reconfiguring the Turkish Nation in the 1930s, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.8, No.2, Summer 2002 ekirge, Fatih, Eve Gelen Yabanc Tehdit Etmi, Hrriyet, 19th November 2007 iek Nevzat, calann 10 art, Sabah , 24th July 2009 Gunter, Michael M., The Changing Kurdish Problem in Turkey, Conflict Studies 270, Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism RISCT May 1994 Hassanpour, Amir, The Kurdish Experience, Middle East Report July-August 1994 Jenkins, Gareth, DTP Presents Final Defense in Closure Case, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 5, Issue 17, 16th September 2008 Jenkins, Gareth, Turkey Trumpets Attack on PKK, Turns to Enemy Within, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 4, Issue 234, 18th December 2007 Kutschera, Chris, Mad Dreams of Independence, The Kurds of Turkey and the PKK, Middle East Report, No:189, The Kurdish Experience, July-August 1994 Laqueur, Walter, Post Modern Terrorism, Foreign Affairs, Vol.75 No. 5, 1996

103

 Lle Zeynep , Ne Mutlu Trkm etnik ayrmclk, Hrriyet, 1st October 2009 Mango, Andrew, Atatrk and the Kurds, Middle Eastern Studies, 35:4, 1999 Mutlu, Sefa, PKKda Yeni Almlar, Gnlk Deerlendirmeler, ASAM 30th April 2009 Mutlu, Servet, Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: a Demographic Study, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.28, No: 4, November 1996 calan, Abdullah, calandan Erdoana: Bu sorunu zebilirsiniz, zgr Gndem Gazetesi, 29th May 2009 ztrk, Sayg, Genelkurmay Yetki Arttrm stiyor, Hrriyet Gazetesi, 5th October 2008 Romano, David, Turkey Addresses PKK Challenge with Kurdish Language Reforms, Terrorism Focus, The Jamestown Foundation Vol: 6 Issue: 1, 15th January 2009 eker, Nesim, Identity Formation and the Political Power in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic, HAOL, No:8, Autmn 2005 enocakl, Mine, Trk-Krt 5 Milyon ift var nasl ayrlalm, eyh Saitin torunu Abdlmelik Frat Vatana konutu, Vatan Gazetesi, 18th May 2009 Turkey and the Kurds, Strategic Comments, 3:3, April 1997 Uslu, Emrullah, Village Guards on the Frontline of the Turkeys War on Terrorism, Terrorism Focus, , Vol. 5, Issue: 35, 1st October 2008 Uslu, Emrullah, AKP Unable to Decide on its Kurdish Policy, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 5 Issue 211, 4th November 2008 Uslu, Emrullah, Ankara Considering PKKs Proposals on Dialogue, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol.6, Issue 88, 7th May 2009

104

 Uslu, Emrullah, Can Turkeys Anti-Terrorism Cooperation with Iran Lead to a Strategic Partnership? Terrorism Focus, The Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 5 Issue 24, June 24 2008, Uslu, Emrullah, Imprisoned PKK Leader Abdullah calan Preparing a Roadmap to Peace in Turkeys Ethnic-Kurdish Insurgency, Terrorism Monitor, Vol.7 Issue. 24, 6th August 2009 Uslu, Emrullah, Turkeys Kurdish Question: Irony within Irony, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol.6, Issue37, 25th February 2009 Van Bruinessen, Martin, Transnational Aspects of the Kurdish Question, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence 2000 Van Bruinessen, Martin, Between Guerilla War and Political Murder: The Workers Party of Kurdistan, Middle East Report, No/153 Islam and the State July-August 1988 Van Bruinessen, Martin, The Kurds in Turkey, Merip Reports, February 1984 Van Wigenburg, Wladimir, Is Ankara Promoting Zaza Nationalism to Divide the Kurds? Terrorism Focus, The Jamestown Foundation, Vol:6 Issue:3, 8th January 2009 Watts, Nicole F., Allies and Enemies: Pro-Kurdish Parties in Turkish Politics, 1990-1994, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.31, No:4, November 1999 White, Paul, Citizenship Under the Ottomans and Kemalists: How the Kurds Were Excluded, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 3, No.1, 1999 Who are the Kurds, The Washington Post, 9th August 2009 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/feb99/kurdprofile.htm

105

 Yavuz, M.Hakan, Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.7, No:3, Autmn 2001 Yeen, Mustafa, The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity, Middle Eastern Studies, 32:2, 1996

106

NEWSPAPERS

2000e Doru ASAM Gnlk Deerlendirmeler Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation Hrriyet Milliyet zgr Gndem Radikal Sabah Terrorism Focus, The Jamestown Foundation The Washington Post Vatan

107

,1071 1514- ' , , ' . , ' . - . . , ' . "" - . ,19- , , . 1918 , . ' ' . , KURDISTAN TEALI CEMIYETI . 1920 , ., , , . : " ", " " . , . . . , - . 1937 .

108

 - .60 , ) DDKO - ( , . ) PKK- ( , 1984 . PKK- . 1999 ' , ,- MIT , - . . , . DTP- , . PKK- , DTP- : , - . . - .

109

 ''

'' '' . -

'

: . '

2009

110