HEGEL ON CULTURE AND GLOBALIZATION. By: Karavakou, Vasiliki. Globalization (15359794), Fall2005, Vol.

5 Issue 2, p5-5, 1p; Abstract: Globalization is undoubtedly an important constitutive feature of the modern world. One of the current interdisciplinary assumptions is that globalization necessarily amounts to the loss of cultural identity. A particular culture is usually singled out claiming some sort of cognitive and ethical absolutism. In contrast to this view, there have been other approaches urging us to rethink our conceptions and commitments to culture, but leading to a malign relativism that regards all forms of cultural expression as equally valid. In any case, culture and globalization came to be understood as mutually exclusive or incompatible. If the ideal Hegel suggests through philosophical reasoning helps us to overcome this alleged dilemma, it is interesting to ponder over its future in the current circumstances of globalization. These circumstances stress the need for global communication and recognition among the different, and quite often conflicting, cultural creations. The challenge the Hegelian philosophy of Bildung (culture) has to deal with is to steer a viable theoretical middle way for the values of current Bildung. It has to avoid, on the one hand, the arrogant complacency of those values that claim any kind of absolutism. On the other hand, it has also to avoid a rampant relativism that distributes validity and praises to all forms of cultural expressions in the name of the need to self-expression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]; (AN 20068250) Vnculo persistente a este informe (enlace permanente): http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=2006 8250&lang=es&site=ehost-live Cortar y pegar: <A href="http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN =20068250&lang=es&site=ehost-live">HEGEL ON CULTURE AND GLOBALIZATION.</A> Base de datos: Academic Search Complete

HEGEL ON CULTURE AND GLOBALIZATION Abstract Globalization is undoubtedly an important constitutive feature of the modern world. One of the current interdisciplinary assumptions is that globalization necessarily amounts to the loss of cultural identity. A particular culture is usually singled out claiming some sort of cognitive and ethical absolutism. In contrast to this view, there have been other approaches urging us to rethink our conceptions and commitments to culture, but leading to a malign relativism that regards all forms of cultural expression as equally valid. In any case, culture and

globalization came to be understood as mutually exclusive or incompatible. If the ideal Hegel suggests through philosophical reasoning helps us to overcome this alleged dilemma, it is interesting to ponder over its future in the current circumstances of globalization. These circumstances stress the need for global communication and recognition among the different, and quite often conflicting, cultural creations. The challenge the Hegelian philosophy of Bildung (culture) has to deal with is to steer a viable theoretical middle way for the values of current Bildung. It has to avoid, on the one hand, the arrogant complacency of those values that claim any kind of absolutism. On the other hand, it has also to avoid a rampant relativism that distributes validity and praises to all forms of cultural expressions in the name of the need to self-expression. Key words: culture; globalization; cultural identity; absolutism; relativism Introduction Philosophers may argue endlessly about globalization, but they can all agree that it refers to an increasing interconnectedness and convergence of activities and forms of life among diverse cultures throughout the world. As it has been plausibly suggested, a culture "is no longer a discrete world. It is transformed to accord with a world of ruptured boundaries"( n2). Globalization has attracted the attention of many disciplines. Quite often, unfortunately, it has been reduced to a mere economic logic. But, why does that matter? For a moral and social philosopher who, as Hegel says, likes "to see things with the eye of reason", globalization is important because it affects both selfunderstanding and cultural identity. Following Hegel, we could argue that this ever-increasing tendency reflects the expression of the most profound need of the human mind to understand itself through dialogue and interaction with what is different from oneself, through acts of reciprocal recognition( n3) and never through isolation. This remains a universal and eternal truth about humanity, indifferent to all cultural and historical differentiations.( n4) So this ideal presupposes universality, but it also thrives in culturally and historically specific traditions of ethical thought and practice. In other words, this profound need of humanity should be understood in universalist terms and viewed through cultural and historical lenses. Cultural identity is important for Hegel. In fact, philosophy itself has some important cultural presuppositions. On this basis, Hegel would not be of much help to anyone who insists to understand the process of globalization as necessarily implying homogeneity and the annihilation of all difference. The difficult task Hegel undertook to accomplish was to steer a viable theoretical middle way for the values of modern culture. On the one hand, he had to avoid the arrogant complacency of any set of values that claim a kind of cognitive and moral absolutism. On the other hand, he had also to stand clear from any form of malign relativism that would attribute validity and significance to all forms of cultural

expression unconditionally. This paper exposes the basic steps of the Hegelian venture and the endogenous strains of tension from which this venture suffers. It also encourages us to ponder over the value of the Hegelian theory for us today, trying not to lose some of its perspicacious conceptions. Bildung as culture Hegel's preoccupation with the notion of Bildung as culture reveals a great number of influences and an enormous complexity due to the interdependence of its dimensions.( n5) In fact, he tried to preserve its former classical and Baroque elements together with the modern progressivist and secularist fragrance of the Enlightenment. The philosophers of the Enlightenment assigned to culture a prominent place. It was probably, as Gadamer rightly said, "the greatest idea of the eighteenth century" (1985,p.10). Bildung came to be associated with Kultur as the complete and harmonious unfolding of one's undeveloped natural talents and capacities. Crucial to this view was the idea that man has a natural tendency to change and develop through a process of a smooth, unilinear perfection. Culture was seen as self-cultivation and self-improvement. Hegel opposed forcefully this idea, because this might lead us to an understanding of culture in quantitative terms. In his criticism of Lessing for making the education of humanity "a constant growth of knowledge", Hegel says characteristically: "one can go in this manner at great length without ever reaching any definite conclusions or making any qualitative pronouncements".( n6) It was Kant who broadened the scope of the concept of culture and exercised the most definitive influence on Hegel. In his essay on the Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolital Purpose, Kant says that the development and further exercise of one's natural abilities is a duty to oneself. Man, as the only creature whose natural capacities are directed towards the use of reason, must make complete use of his capacities in order to reach that stage where his development is up "to that degree which corresponds to nature's original intention" (1980,p.43). In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant associates directly the concept of culture with the idea of the critical self-explication of reason. In fact, the very project of establishing a critical tribunal of reason is for Kant "the full and complete development of human reason" (A851/B879, p.665). Above all, this is an act of culture. The Kantian approach to culture constitutes a deliberate approach to reason and a certain concern for it. It is a concern for its limitations and for the prospect for its completion in a historical process that prepares us for life within a civil community. Hegel shaped his understanding of culture under the weight of the Kantian legacy. Therefore, he incorporated in it the idea of sharing the clustering of cultural values by which we live. With this step he was also able to avoid the strictly individualistic understanding suggested by German romanticism. The Kantian idea of a struggling human reason enabled him to appreciate the significance of a project in which both

individuals and cultures try to come to terms with their internal imperfections and inadequacies. He deviates from the Kantian prescriptions, when he determines to view this struggle not as a predicament of poverty and incorrigible deficiency, but as the richness typical of humanity. The essence of the Kantian view of culture comes down to the idea of our being able to legislate for ourselves spontaneously. At its best, this idea amounts to the exercise of the capacity to self-compulsion and the subsequent triumph of reason over nature. For Hegel, the problem is that because such an ideal of culture presupposes the endorsement of dualism, it is bound to be unrealistic and impossible to live up to for actual, living human beings. That was precisely the challenge to which Hegel had to respond, i.e. how to steer the middle theoretical way between rational universalism and cultural diversity, between rational abstraction and historical relativity. What the Hegelian notion of Bildung allows us to do is "to settle for a second-rate naturally constrained spontaneity" to use John McDowell's phrase (1994,p.96). We are not mere transcendental possibilities or members of the Kingdom of Ends, but living organisms sharing a world of language, custom and social norms. In the Hegelian light, the life of somebody capable of achieving the ideals of a cultured way of life, of moral autonomy and political freedom can be represented as a process of training oneself in mental, emotional and volitional terms by sharing the world's most significant objective dimensions. In the Philosophy of Right, the road to culture is the road to reason and anyone who "travels on that high road" must learn to appreciate the universal significance of Geist and avoid being conspicuous (para.15A, p.230; Werke 7, p.67). The Hegelian understanding of culture involves a process of alienation and confrontation with what is different from us. However, to broaden what has been suggested so far, we must also bear in mind that Hegel thought that this would enable us to be in conformity with the genuine, universal essence of the mind. It was not meant to be just an instruction into world history. Besides, it was primarily thought to be important for self-expression and the achievement of a deeper appreciation of the significance of our own culture. Of course, this process had to follow the prescriptions of the Hegelian dialectic: a pattern of estrangement from an initial state of natural unity and a subsequent reconciliation with it. The basic idea is that we achieve a less inadequate and a more enriched understanding of ourselves, if we learn to confront the "other" and engage in a dialogue with it. No matter how much selective Hegel has been in his focus on various cultures and historical periods, his concern has always been to bring each individual and culture closer to the stock of universal conceptions. His underpinning assumption has always been the sharing of and the communication with other points of view, so that both individuals and cultures learn to appreciate what lies behind the transience of history and is therefore capable of "infinite modifications". We read in the Introduction of his Lectures on the Philosophyof History:

"The cultured man is accustomed to act in the light of universal perspectives and ends" (p.57). The most important part of Hegel's strategy was to create a powerful link between Bildung as a process of self-formation and the world of culture. For the first time the concept of Bildung abandoned the Procrustean bed upon which it was placed for quite some time. The "subjective" (or individual) and the "objective" (or social) were now considered to be the two significant componential elements of a single concept. Most importantly, they both were seen as important for self-understanding and cultural identity as they were linked inextricably with each other. For Hegel, the process of Bildung involves not only the education of mind and character, but it has also a pervasive social and ethical dimension. Hence Bildung in the sense of culture (Kultur) becomes a pervasive impersonal mode of thought. It permeates our lives even without our own awareness and consent. Sittlichkeit (usually translated as ethical life) is the term used by Hegel in order to refer to the worldview of each cultural tradition that exercises upon its members such a determining influence. With this powerful link, Hegel makes it clear that the modern imperative of being cultured should no longer be understood as the free development of personality, but our being in a constant dialogue with the finest values of our and of other cultures. What Hegel entitles Sittlichkeit is meant to be an ethical and cultural order expressing patterns of ideals and beliefs and embraces individuals, practices and institutions. Important about this order are its recognitional structures that provide our judgements with social confirmation and our quests with coherence and intelligibility. It is no realm in heaven or a transcendental standpoint, but the actual, living world of cultural expression and sociopolitical association. There are a number of occasions where Hegel speaks of a cultural tradition as man's "second nature" or "second birth".( n7) By utilizing the Aristotelian notion of second nature, he exposes the myth of selfsufficiency and our need of the "other" for reasons of spiritual survival and not biological maintenance. In getting beyond his naturalness man finds himself already engaged in a cultural world humanly constituted through language, custom and civil association. In the Hegelian system this act of "getting beyond" takes place at two levels. The first level consists of what we nowadays mean as language games, i.e. concepts and meanings shared and commonly used by individuals living and interacting in a certain culture. The second level refers to the involvement of these concepts and meanings in what Ivan Soll has styled as paideutic games, i.e. ethical (or customary), social, economic and strictly political relationships and practices (1972,p.32). Their common feature is that they all constitute structures that afford their members with acknowledging recognition. Moreover, they need to be re-considered or even totally rejected, if they cease to express the emotional and intellectual needs of their participants.

Hegel's portrayal of culture as the reflection of man's rational nature implies a number of things: Firstly, culture constitutes a rationally articulated structure that respects difference, a publicly shared ethical background from which its members cannot fully or really abstract. Secondly, the significance of a certain culture is not understood and appreciated through acts of solitary contemplation, but through its members' active re-constitution of and participation in its practices and institutions. Finally, any attempt to "raise the veil" of culture, is a selfdevastating attempt of a stubborn sceptic to strip off our cultural clothes leaving us with nothing significant. Beyond absolutism and relativism The association of culture with Sittlichkeit endows this process with a social dimension. But culture in Hegelian philosophy has also a historical dimension and it would be wrong not to stress the interconnectedness of these dimensions just because there are many puzzling questions that surround Hegel's trust in "the rational process of world history". In the first instance, the historical dimension must be understood in relation to the dynamic nature that characterises reason. The inner dialectic of reason applies both to individuals and cultures. So, we find again the famous pattern of simple unity -- estrangement -reconciliation. Each historical culture suffers from internal strains and oppositions it needs to overcome. Characteristic examples in the Hegelian texts are the classical Greek culture with its internal strife between the individual and society and the Enlightenment culture with its famous antithesis of reason and faith.( n8) Hegel invites us to assume that each culture overcomes its strains according to an internal plan. It achieves this, when it is fully aware of what it is really capable. A rational culture is a culture that consciously posits its difference within itself and achieves unity with itself and the world. The phases of this process procure an enriched form of self- understanding. Hegel styles this process as the fight against immediacy, or the "strife with the negative" referring basically to the incessant dialectic confrontations in which the human mind, or an entire culture, engages with other subjects or cultures. Although this might seem as a weakness of the way human reason operates, it constitutes the animating virtue of Hegelian Bildung: the incessant need of human spirit to fight immediacy and to be open to and receptive of the cultural space in general. So the incessant negative activity of human reason becomes for Hegel the foundation of history. The temporary satisfaction that disquiets consciousness in the context of the Phenomenology of Spirit is present within the universal scope of human history. In his Reason in History, he writes characteristically: "The forms it produced become the material on which it labours to raise itself up to new forms. It manifests all its powers in every possible way." (p.33, Werke 12, p.21). There are some significant details about the historical dimension of culture. The first is that Hegel believes that this process is conducted in

the light of an ever- growing knowledge of what human consciousness attains gradually. In other words, what spirit knows is important for its ascending the various cultural stages. In a sense, this kind of cognitivism justifies Hegel's going into so much trouble to describe the "pathway" of Bildung. The second is the fact that our realization of our rationality and of the possibility for further self-actualization is something that occurs not from the standpoint of "bare" nature, but from the standpoint of culture. In other words, the historical dimension of culture should not be understood as encouraging some kind of evolutionary speculation about a possible ungebildet (uncultured) stage from which humanity emerged. There may be an ever-growing awareness of freedom as individuals, or indeed whole cultures, accomplish some of their goals in their broader project of self-development. However this does not necessarily translate to a process of incessant improvement. Nor does it mean that man needs this process in order to escape from an alleged state of animal insensibility. In this light, Hegel should be understood to be suggesting that man needs culture in order to understand himself as a spiritual being, a being capable of integrity and freedom. To suggest that culture must be looked at from this historical perspective simply stresses the fact that the achievement of integrity is not instantaneous, but the end of a long inquiry conducted by human spirit and not by a single somehow superior culture. Going through the stages of this inquiry, we realise that "spirit begins from a state of infinite potentiality", as Hegel put it in his Reason in History (p.131/78). This means, as we indicated earlier, that there is no natural condition totally devoid of the operations of reason. It also means that this duality is not the final predicament of the human condition, but a duality created from the standpoint of culture. The process of self-creation takes place partly on the level of individual education and partly it is already an ongoing concern of our culture, or an achievement of our historical heritage. At this stage, we must see history as a prolonged education of both individuality and humanity. Bildung is not only our individual paideutic investigation; it is not just our purposeful self-surrender to the universal demands of Geist. We are already "thrown" into a world of historical change and cultural demands. Culture is available to us as real, living beings with our limited capacities and psychological vulnerabilities. The doctrine of reason in history was designed to integrate reason and nature in their ever- increasing over historic time interaction. Hegel is adamant on this: we no longer have to fight against nature, for our picture of ourselves as crude natural beings has been dismissed. We are natural beings who inhabit a cultural world and this world is our immovable ground. Trying to go beyond this recognisable background will only trap us in a vicious circle of evolutionary speculation. It is that persistent temptation to discover the "mystery" of our existence, or nature, that feeds the arguments of platonism and the lure of "the transcendental". As it has been so

plausibly put: "Mere ignorance about how human culture might have come on the scene in the first place is hardly a plausible starting point for an argument that initiation into it must actualise an extra-natural potential in human beings.".( n9) There is no doubt that Hegel cherished full trust in the rationality of history. In his eyes it is impossible to escape from our culture. On the contrary, we do have a chance to selfrealization, only if we see ourselves as parts of this world. Hegel's conclusion must read something like this: we can only come to terms with our nature and we can only realise our potentialities, if we recognise the significance of being initiated into a certain historical tradition of ethical thought and practice. We have left last the most important idea, namely the idea that history itself is a rational process through which mankind progresses towards freedom, or freedom is the goal of history. According to Hegel, this view appears to be a presupposition only from the historical standpoint. Therefore, it cannot achieve an adequate degree of a comprehensive understanding of the history of mankind. We may assume that this is because the historian will be absorbed in the empirical particularity of historical events losing the connecting principle that explains or justifies them. From the speculative standpoint, however, it is possible (according to Hegel) to understand that human history in its entirety obeys a rational principle. This dimension introduces the idea that world-history is not at the mercy of contingency, but is instead governed by an "ultimate design". We are given sufficient warning that this design does not assume the rationality of a singular self-conscious subject. So, any attempt to hypostatize Geist is rejected from the beginning. But of course, this makes room for a diverse range of interpretations. For Hegel, it is "a divine and absolute reason" (ibid.) which reveals itself through activity, in the products of its self-transformative activity. On the level of world history, this reason manifests itself in a bewildering diversity of cultural traditions. World history, Hegel says, is "a vast spectacle of events and actions, of infinitely varied constellations of nations, states and individuals" (ibid., p.31). So, reason is both universal and historically specific. This idea makes Hegel's project particularly interesting, though it creates difficulties for the compatibility of these two aspects. First of all, that this "vast spectacle of events and actions" is itself a process governed by an "original" reason is, according to Hegel, a proposition we must assume. The proposition finds its proof in history, as the latter exhibits the relation of this "original" and universal design of reason to the world. On the one hand, this highlights the universal significance and necessity of the theory. In other words, this is not an optional process, but the result of our being creatures that actualize themselves in this particular way. In this light, we cannot relativize the significance and indeed the content of our values and ideals, since the only ultimate purpose of the entire process is the self-expression of universal reason. But on the other hand,

this universality imposes upon human culture a certain kind of formalism that conflicts with Hegel's firm adherence to the notion of second nature. Hegel firmly believed that we respond to the imperative of culture because we are prompted by our nature to do so. Our nature, however, is not the "bare" nature of vulgar naturalism. Hegel himself has shown that human nature is second nature. Therefore, we respond to the demands of culture precisely because we find ourselves in a world shaped by cultural demands. In this light, we should employ some kind of contextual explanation and justification of our ideals and values. The necessity and significance of our cultural values are not answerable to some kind of a purer or universal reason. Or, are they? It may be useful, at this point, to raise the following question: if culturally dependent conceptions of reason are definitive of one's self-identity, why do we need such a universal standard of Bildung in the first place? To respond to this question, we must deal with the necessity of this process. Although necessity is one of the central concepts in his works, Hegel has never articulated or defended clearly this concept, particularly in relation to his views on culture. Unquestionably, there is an inner dialectic in the activity of spirit that presses it forward to what Hegel understands to be genuine self-completion. On this basis, the kind of necessity involved in this process should not be understood in terms of formal necessity or deductive certainty, but in terms of the immanent purposiveness of human nature to realize an all comprehensive plan. We take the notion of purposiveness to explain the "traffic" that develops between the Aristotelian concepts of "potentiality" (dunamis) and "actuality" (energeia), as Hegel himself admits. On the background of this suggestion, we may read Hegel's position as follows: what characterises human nature is the immanent dialectical movement of thought which necessarily entails a transition to new and more educated or complete forms of consciousness. Human life is described as an activity with an inner purpose: the realization of our rational nature as the kind of beings we are. This idea is expressed in the Philosophy of Right: "The spirit is always one and single and should dwell in me. I am entitled to the union of my potential and my actual being." (para.66A, p.241/p.144). From the earliest stage, the purpose of human consciousness is always to gain knowledge of its own rationality. Similarly, what drives an entire culture forward is the determination to overcome its internal contradictions and achieve thereby its aims and ideals. This strategy may not undermine the developmental character of Bildung as culture. It does encourage, however, questions about the internal consistency of Hegel's theory. On the one hand, the dialectic should be consonant with the universal purposive plan according to which the world of culture unfolds. But can we avoid formalism on this basis? One should not forget that in the Preface of the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel condemns what he styles as "a boring show of diversity" (para.15, p.8/p.21) which fails to be integrated with a monotonous and empty formalism (para.16, p.9/pp.21-

22). He insists on this critique because of the "monochromatic formalism" that ensues from any approach that imposes an external governing principle on all the instances of the teleological unfolding. This prompts us to assume that it was his belief in the immanence of the unfolding that made him distinguish the kind of universality he advocated from the vacuous formalism that he attacked in the Phenomenology. It would be wrong to contend that Hegelian formalism amounts to the Kantian persistence in the transcendental perspective. This would be a misunderstanding not only of Hegel's intentions, but also of the premises he uses as his starting point. The Kantian program struggles with the duality it has itself created. In the absence of a notion of secondnature, it insists to bargain the autonomy of reason at the expense of nature. The distinctions it draws have painful consequences on morality and culture. In contrast with this picture of humanity, the Hegelian project starts from a totally different conviction, that humanity achieves integrity when it has become fully conscious of what it is. This project may use descriptions of different examples of what we mean by actualization of human nature. We may recall, here, Hegel's saying that: "Descriptions of human nature are meant to apply to all men, past and present. The general pattern is capable of infinite modifications, but, however much it may vary, it nevertheless remains essentially the same".( n10) Hegel might defend himself by saying that we would totally miss the point of the process, had we believed that the general pattern amounts to the cultural variations of human expression. What remains same, Hegel would go on, is the purpose that guides all these diverse activities. Of course, the purpose to be realized is essentially the same with the beginning of the entire process. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, he says: "The result is the same as the beginning, only because the beginning is the process." (para.22, p.12/p.26) and in the Reason in History, he rephrases the same view by saying that "the ultimate end is the intention which underlies the world" (p.46/p.29). What is added in the final stage is the element of full knowledge of what we were capable from the very beginning. On the other hand, the standpoint point from which we embark on our expressive activities is the cultural standpoint of second nature. Actually, it is our self-discovery in the world of culture that enables us to undertake any project at all. Why do we need, then, the idea of such a universal reason, if second nature does most of the work? Although he endorses some form of relativism, Hegel must surely have thought that we do need a conception of rational universality in order to avoid excessive relativism and historicism. But there are several pressing questions that need to be addressed. For example, should we accept any modification or change in our cultural space unconditionally as part of the paideutic inquiry of Bildung? Could the idea that all cultural differences reflect an underlying universal pattern, constitute a good and reliable guide for the assessment of morally demanding situations?

Could we accept all cultural expressions indiscriminately, under the pretext that they all betray this hidden purposiveness? Hegel's aspiration to establish his theory as universally binding is understandable. But, if fighting abstraction and redressing ethical contextualism was of equal importance to him, he should be at least less vague while referring to the immanent teleology of reason as the driving force of Bildung. A frequent defence of Hegel assumes that any similar criticism attacks the internal consistency of this theory. The defence would go on by suggesting that we should drop all interpretations of Weltgeist as a "metaphysical entity directing history from the supersensible shadows". We may instead argue that Hegel's aim was to conceptualise development, or that the development of reason in history should be understood in terms of a logical spiritual development. Quite logically then, the defending position would go on contending that this original and universal plan of internal unfolding evinces necessity for all cultures including our own. It has been suggested that it was the concrete historical situation of Hegel's time that called for such an a priori conception of history.( n11) Before one hastens to reject the theory and argue that we do not need such a conception, since our own situation has changed dramatically, we should respond to the following question. Do we need some purer, immutable canons of rationality, which are rigidly pre-determined and codified to operate in purposive terms and to which our conceptions of ourselves and of the world are necessarily answerable? If yes, then Hegel would be right in maintaining that his theory is a good candidate that explains and describes universally necessary and significant things about humanity. For Hegel, this would also explain why, whilst we commit ourselves to the cultural standpoint, we are able to avoid "vulgar" relativism with the help of the concept of a universal truth and morality that goes "beyond the loud voices of history". Today, new questions arise about a number of cultural, moral and political issues. In addition, several candidates emerge claiming a better worldview, a better understanding of the problems, a better stock of values and ideals in order to confront the arising difficulties. Each of the candidates is culturally dependent. This means, according to Hegel, that we need the conception of a universally valid and necessary standard in order to assess these questions. This does not imply the elimination of cultural diversity, but it does imply that all the culturally diverse standpoints are ultimately answerable to this conception. Concluding remarks Hegel has repeatedly asserted that cultural identity is essentially determined by difference. Any culture defines itself in relation or even in opposition to other cultures. History shows, even in our enlightened days, that these relations are not always relations of equality. There may be a case where a culture exercises its authority over other cultures due to mere imperialistic interests. But it may also be the case that a culture presents itself as dominant on the basis of its contesting the legitimacy

of some of the beliefs or practices of another culture, precisely because it attaches great importance to the stock of universal conceptions to which we referred earlier. For example, criticism and rejection of children's exploitation and human slavery does not simply serve as a helping hand to somebody's concealed imperialism. Unfortunately, we have to admit that quite often this is used as a useful pretext. But even in the case of the use as a pretext, the criticism of that practice makes sense because it appeals to a deeply engraved belief that all human beings have intrinsic value and the inalienable rights to self-determination and freedom. Hegel was clear on this: Otherness should be confronted and acknowledged. It should not be denied. The relationships cultures form with each other aim precisely at self-vindication and not at the eclipse of cultural identity. But we would be blind and nave, to say the least, to believe that we should grant, in the name of cultural identity, our approval to a culture that violates the most important requirements of human rationality and moral autonomy. In other words, we should assert the ethical primacy and autonomy of each culture without denying however the possibility of appealing to certain universal ideas and impulses of modern moral and socio-political thought. In the Philosophy of Right Hegel is exceptionally clear. It is the pre-existing customs of a culture that condition the laws of that culture. But, although a law may have arisen from cultural practices, it may still be unjust and irrational (para.3). For example, the attribution of several rights to certain minorities may go against the customary practices of a community. But these rights should be attributed to them on the basis that they are human (para.270). When a culture discerns the importance of this distinction, it constitutes a reflective culture. It must be obvious now that a culture is reflective, when it establishes relations of dialogue and interaction with other cultures. In recent years, philosophers such as Rawls, Held and Habermas have been addressing the normative implications of globalisation in an attempt to suggest some solutions to problems such as the absence of justice or the loss of democracy. Unfortunately, we do not see often an acknowledgement of the fact that it was Hegel more than Kant who created the conceptual framework allowing for both ethical contextualism and rational universality. Unless we consider that such a synthesis is viable and operative even in our own predicament, it will be enormously difficult to respond to the growing overlapping or transboundary problems with success without yielding to cultural fatalism or concealed imperialism. Globalization is undoubtedly an important constitutive feature of the modern world. Rephrasing one of Hegel's lines from the Philosophy of Right, we could say that globalization is "the judgement of the world" (para.340, Encyclopaedia III, para.548). What the Hegelian theory of cultural development and world history showed, is that globalization does not necessarily prefigure the end of cultural identity. It certainly creates new challenges the

significance of which we should not overlook. Today, we should reconsider, perhaps with greater concern than ever before, our commitments about cultural identity and cultural diversity on a global level. Hegel's theory has also shown that no belief or practice develops ex nixilo. But just because it is part of a culture, this does not endow the belief or the practice with immunity from thorough examination and forceful criticism. Acknowledgements I would like to thank conference participants of the 17 th International Conference on the "Philosophy of Culture and Globalization", held at Pythagoreion (Samos) in Greece, August 2005 for their valuable suggestions and criticism. The usual disclaimer applies. Footnotes (n2.) D.Held & A.McGrew, "Globalisation", Entry for the Oxford Companion to Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press. ( n3) We refer here to the theory of reciprocal or intersubjective recognition, as Hegel formulates it in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Mind. Hegel's emphasis on the process that affords separate, self-determined conscious subjects with acknowledging recognition and self-vindication enables him to depart from the Cartesian and Kantian tradition of the solitary knowing subject and opt for the social or intersubjective standpoint of Geist. A detailed analysis of this theory cannot be offered here for obvious reasons. For a discussion of this theory see Pinkard (1994), Williams (1992) and Karavakou (1998,2004). (n4.) Hegel, G.W.F., Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction: Reason In History, p.44. (n5.) Bildung is one of the central, thematic concepts of Hegel's philosophy. It is a complex concept with a long history. It certainly betrays an educational ideal, but it also has an important social dimension. No English word constitutes a successful translation. Therefore, we have chosen to use the original German term. Here, we can only convey some of the most important aspects of the Hegelian use. For a more detailed discussion of the history of the concept of Bildung as well as of Hegel's own multi-dimensional use in a number of his works see my Reason and Nature in Hegel's Theory of Bildung (1998). (n6.) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction: Reason in History, p.126, Werke 12, p.74. (n7.) Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (II, p.279, Werke 17, p.146), Philosophy of Right (para.151, pp.108-109, Werke 7, p.301) and Reason in History (p.97/57). (n8.) In the Phenomenology of Spirit, there is an entire section entitled "Self-alienated Spirit. Culture". In this case, Hegel describes a fragmented and incoherent culture suffering from universal perversion of meanings and values. Hegel's point is that any similar culture that glorifies the arbitrary whim of individual expression fails to afford its

members with self-recognition. Consequently its members, like those of the decadent 18 th century France, are bound to assimilate such an alienated environment and perpetuate its contradictions in their language and activities. Hegel's message is that any culture that procures confusion and inversion and thrives on fragmentation, it is an uncertain, disorientated and self-estranged culture. Apparently, as far as Hegel is concerned, this happened precisely because the Enlightenment culture universalized its own principles and never engaged in a dialogue with other cultures. Hence the strife with "the negative" is necessary, but it is a strife that needs to be resolved and the dialogue with other cultures is a valuable antidote against such a predicament. (n9.) McDowell, J. (1994), pp.123-124. (n10.) Reason in History, p.44. (n11.) Houlgate, St. (1991,1993). References Gadamer, H.G. (1985). Truth and Method, London, Shed & Ward. Hegel: Werke in zwanzig Bnden: Theorie Werkausgabe. Michel, K.M & Moldenhauer, E. (eds.) (1970), Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag. Cited by volume. Standard English translations are normally cited. In some cases, German pagination follows English pagination. Phnomenologie des Geistes, Werke 3, 1979. Cited by volume and page number. Translated as Phenomenology of Spirit by A.V.Miller (1977), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cited by paragraph and page number. Grundlinien des Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7. Cited by volume and paragraph number. Translated as Hegel's Philosophy of Right by T.M.Knox (1967), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cited by paragraph and page number. Additions are indicated by an "A". Enzyklopdie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III, Werke 10. Cited by volume, paragraph and page number. Translated as Hegel's Philosophy of Mind by W.Wallace & A.V.Miller (1971), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cited by paragraph and page. Additions are indicated by an "A". Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke 12. Cited by volume and page number. Translated as The Philosophy of History by J.Sibree (1956), New York: Dover. Cited by page number. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History; Introduction: Reason in History, translated from the German edition of J.Hoffmeister by H.B.Nisbet (1975) with an introduction by D.Forbes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cited by page number. Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Religion, Werke 16-17. Cited by volume and page number. Translated as Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion by E.B.Speirs & J.B.Sanderson (1895,) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, reprinted 1968, 3 vols. Cited by page number. Habermas, J. (2001). The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press.

Held, D. (1995). Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Stanford, Stanford University Press. Houlgate, S. (1991). Freedom, Truth and History: An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Houlgate, S. (1993). "World History as the Progress of Consciousness: An Interpretation of Hegel's Philosophy of History", in G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments, ed. R.Stern, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, vol.3. Kant, I. (1989). Critique of Pure Reason, N.K.Smith (transl.), London: Macmillan Press, 2nd ed. Kant, I. (1980). Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss, translated by H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Karavakou, V. (1998). Reason and Nature in Hegel's Theory of Bildung, Unpuplished PhD Thesis, University of London, London. Karavakou V. (2002). Hegel's Theory of Individual Freedom, Athens: Gutenberg Publications. Karavakou, V. (2004). "Friendship and Recognition in Aristotle and Hegel", Philosophical Inquiry, vol. 25, pp.42-52. McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and World, Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press. Pinkard, T. (1994). Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rawls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press. Soll, I. (1972). "Hegel as a Philosopher of Education", Educational Theory, vol.22, pp.26-33. Williams, R.R. (1992). Recognition, Fichte and Hegel on the Other, Albany: SUNY Press. ~~~~~~~~ By Vasiliki Karavakou, Dr., Department of International and European Studies University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece Address for correspondence Dr. Vasiliki Karavakou 17 Palaiologou Street, Panorama, 55236 Thessaloniki Greece; Tel: 0030 2310 347441, e-mail: vkm@uom.gr Copyright of Globalization (15359794) is the property of Globalization and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. La informacin de los vnculos que ver ms arriba proporciona un vnculo persistente a la bsqueda que solicit.