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On Reason
The dialectic of pure reason is viewed by Kant as an illustration, even a proof. A proof that the
illusion inherent in the dialectic of pure reason necessarily eliminates any pretension of reason’s
constitutive nature, but establishes it as an important regulative device, for apprehending the
world. The contradictions entailed within the four antinomies (Ak. 339) brand pure reason as
virtually irrelevant but also as essentially a hindrance to the task of understanding nature. A
'contradiction' in this context, I hope it is unnecessary to state, is the phenomena by which two
contradictory statements are each considered deductively true.
For Kant, pure reason is epitomized by the dialectic as, at least, "irrelevant" in the sense that it
holds virtually no application to the world of experience. Furthermore, pure reason is, at most,
viewed as a hindrance because it leads the metaphysician to think she is ascertaining a valuable
insight into the world of things as they are in themselves. In Kant's view we necessarily do not
have access to the world of noumena only their appearances as they are apprehended by our
senses. Thus, the world we see is the world of appearances not the world of things in themselves.
The metaphysicians first mistake is in the assumption that what they have devised by means of
pure reason apprehends the noumenal world. The mistake is in the application of what are
considered the things in themselves to the deduction of pure reason instead of that which they are
correctly considered -- merely appearances.
For one result at least is unavoidable. As it is quite impossible to prevent this conflict of reason
with itself [the dialectic] -- so long as the objects of the sensible world are taken for things in
themselves and not for mere appearances, which they are in fact (Ak. 347)--
That pure reason so readily reveals itself through contradiction and conflict is illustrative of its
fortuitous nature. Perhaps this is even a hint of the regulative nature of reason. When we have
isolated the contradictions from nature from the world (as Kant has here) it becomes clear that
reason contradicts itself merely because its concepts are not properly grounded. These concepts
are thought to come from the world but clearly if the world in itself is considered the source then
the world in itself will be explained by reason. What we have is not the world in itself explained,
but contradictions of an immense nature. Should we then apprehend nature as fertile with
insoluble problems? Nay, says Kant we must take responsibility for the creation of these
concepts that have resulted in insoluble problems and realize the mistake is not that of nature but
one of reason. If we are to learn the lesson of our ways we must realize the true nature of pure
reason herein outlined -- faulty concepts lead to contradictions. Since, Kant contends it is a
mistake to believe we have knowledge of the things in themselves it is a mistake to believe our
concepts are noumenal. It is also a mistake to believe we can understand nature with the concepts
we have so incorrectly drawn far from any relevant application of experiences (Ak. 349). Reason
must necessarily be able to resolve all of its own conflicts it must be able to account for its own
nature and formal structure -- if reason it be. We cannot claim that the world has misled us, that
nature drew us along the garden path. We must account for what should be the fundamental
perspicuity of our own rational methods (Ak. 349). In Kant's conceptualization of reason and the
world the only way we can properly view reason is to be aware that the objects we juggle with
reason are concepts, phantasms of reason.
But if we entirely quit nature or, in pursuing its combinations, exceed all possible experience,
and so enter the realm of mere ideas, we cannot then say that the object is inconceivable and that
the nature of things proposes to us insoluble problems. For we are not then concerned with
nature or with given objects at all, but with mere concepts which have their origin solely in our
reason, and with mere beings of thought; and all the problems that arise from our concepts of
them must be solved, because of course reason can and must give a full account of its own
procedure (Ak. 349)
Kant holds up an example of the true use of reason as a mediative tool of the understanding. As
such, we are capable of deducing the a priori synthetic principle of the understanding because
we have not sunk to the destructive discourse of objects as things in themselves. Kant does not
seem to fear that his own deductions from pure reason are suspect. Perhaps this is because he
carefully remains within the realm of possible experience. This quagmire of contradiction is
avoided by Kant in his deduction of a priori cognition through avoidance of objects which are
mere appearance.
Therefore in one way only can my intuition anticipate the actuality of the object, and be a
cognition a priori, viz., if my intuition contains nothing but the form of sensibility, which in me
as subject precedes all the actual impression through which I am affected by objects (his
emphasis (Ak. 282)).
Thus, Kant asserts, the problem of how pure mathematics is possible is solved through appeal to
no objects except "those of the senses" (Ak. 283). Objects of which we can only know the
appearances, the qualities as our senses receive them, are problematic objects for the derivation
of pure reason -- they are mere appearances. All that these 'apparent' objects may derive is
'apparent' connection to the world. This 'apparent reason' then begets the dialectic of reason,
nothing but declarations which contradict our rational sensibilities. The dialectic of pure reason
is thus only resolved in the Kantian view in the recognition of the separation of the world of
reason from the world of experience. That which goes well beyond the empirical realm could not
possibly be represented with fidelity to our experiences. The dialectic is not just Kant's proof
from reductio ad absurdum this is the true nature of pure reason revealed as a tool beyond price.
Revealed as an invaluable tool because by its very nature it implicates itself when it is used
improperly. That is, when it is used to deduce the thing in itself from things merely apparent.
The limits of reason in natural science, and mathematics too, are demarcated by this (now often
spoken concatenation) the dialectic. Even mathematics is limited by the world of appearances.
But, Kant wants to claim, neither of these fields suffers from its separation with metaphysics.
And metaphysics itself can benefit from both the realization of the boundary defined by these
transcendental ideas and the boundary itself as a revelation of the lack of completeness of our
investigations within the world (Ak. 353). A world of objects that we cannot comprehend but
only follow the direction that their appearances portend.
It seems that Kant almost subverts his own early ideas of the intelligible world with the later one
(above) in his book on morals. For, if the seduction to apply concepts of reason as if they are
themselves applicable to the noumena is a task of meaninglessness then what has Kant done here
with Freedom?
Through this last section in this book (on Morals..) Kant seems to have informed us about the
nature of ourselves as denizens in this intelligible world. If we dwell in the world of noumena are
we not then noumenal ourselves? Of course we are, noumena is thought to be the source of all
appearances. The self which is our subjective seat of consciousness is itself opaque to us. We
cannot perceive the self in its true nature anymore than the other objects of the apparent world.
Kant's solution to the problem of his circularity of thought is intelligible. And his use of the
intelligible world as a means of deriving freedom is also intelligible. What he has done does not
directly contradict any previous part of his works as known to me. Kant deduced that our reason
allows us residence in a world of noumena, then therefore allowing for the deduction of freedom.
A deduction of the self same freedom which he feared was only a machination of circularity. I
agree with Kant, the problem has been resolved. As rational beings we truly appear to be our
own cause in a world of appearances and through this the cause of the objects of our world. I
cannot conceive that such a world would not contain the conceptualization of freedom which
Kant has here determined. That this conceptualization of the intelligible world is intelligible must
now be anothers task to determine. For I have herein dealt with this concept and rendered it
intelligible to myself the question is whether or not others find my dissertation intelligible.