An Ethics of Relationality: Destabilising the Exclusionary Frame of Us vs.

Them

Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) is undoubtedly the most celebrated champion of an ethics of responsibility towards the other. What is often forgotten is what motivated Levinas to criticise and re-found traditional ethics: the desire to unmask and demolish the roots of genocide from within Western society. As one of the few in his family (who were mostly in Lithuania when the war broke out) to survive the Shoah, Levinas critique of Heidegger, who symbolises the Western tradition of ontology, was both political and personal. In his earliest writings on the rise of fascism in Germany, he exposed how the ontological roots of Western culture are exclusionary and potentially genocidal (1934). While exclusion does not inevitably lead to genocide, it is a necessary first step, which as such needs to be stopped before it has the potential to snowball into any form of violence. This is precisely the claim Levinas sought to make when he stated that:
The crime of extermination begins before murders take place, that oppression and economic uprooting already indicate its beginnings, that the laws of Nuremberg already contain the seeds of the horrors of the extermination camps and the final solution. (1994: 27)

Genocide, however one defines it, is the most hideous of crimes against humanity. Regardless of whether one is a victim, a perpetrator, or a bystander (local or global), such crimes destroy the fabric of the world we all share. Nonetheless, it is imperative not to detach genocide from other acts, whether physically or symbolically violent, that if permitted to occur may potentially lead to genocide.

With reference to the Shoah, Levinas identifies several of these potentially genocidal precursors such as domination, fiscal injustice, and legal discrimination, which he claims are rooted in the Western ontological tradition. He presents, in Totality and Infinity (published in 1961), a critical phenomenological account of the Western ontology of the self, and makes a

plea for a social ontology of the other in the form of an ethics of alterity. He unmasks the different forms of violence rooted in ego-logy, the logic of the ego that dominates our thinking and choices, demonstrating how it leads to the reduction of the other to the same as well as forms of prejudice that destroys and denies difference (such as anti-Semitism or Islamophobia). What is most troubling about this claim is that, at least according to the media, politicians and many scholars, this same ontology still permeates society at large. While Levinas entire opus was dedicated to developing an ethics of alterity that goes beyond being, that is the current philosophical and political obsession with the self, it remains very abstract (at a level beyond meta-ethics) and as such only its spirit, or basic principles, are exportable to the realm of applied ethics. While the former is of immense importance for theoretical reflections on genocide, it is the latter that we must consider when seeking to prevent future genocides. It is for this reason that I turn to Judith Butlers Frames of War (Butler), which is clearly inspired by Levinas. She analyses how the post-9/11 wars (both in Iraq and Afghanistan) are being reported, or framed, by the government and the media and more importantly, why. It is in the most popular frame (sadly not only during times of war or emergency) of us vs. them, also known as the friend enemy distinction, that one can identify the ontological roots of genocide. To be clear, I am not arguing that this frame leads to genocide but rather that the ontological roots of genocide can be identified in the type of exclusionary thinking associated with this frame. While this type of us vs. them logic is surprisingly common and is by no means always associated with violence, it is a potential genocidal precursor and as such needs to be nipped in the bud.

A first step towards this goal, which must be completed collectively, is to identify this exclusionary frame and to present an alternative frame. This is precisely the goal of this contribution. I begin by providing an account of this frame connecting it to what I identify as

the ontological roots of genocide. I then present the alternative frame of relationality, which offers both an ethics and an epistemology based on a social-ontology inspired by Levinas and Arendt, as a concrete means to destabilise the us vs. them frame. Relationality, in its theoretical form, frames relations in terms of interdependency and horizontality between coconstituting decentred subjects. Concretely, it asks us to consider our responsibility for others within and without when thinking, judging and acting. The crux of this contribution is dedicated to providing an account of relationality, which I hope can help destabilize the exclusionary us vs. them frame that is potentially genocidal.

Frames of War: The Ontological Roots of Genocide In her most recent book Judith Butler analyses and criticizes the media for creating an unspoken distinction between lives that are grievable, and those that are not (and implicitly all of us who support the media by watching it). While we find comfort in justifications such as proximity and fiscal limitations, it is undeniable that a parent dedicates more time and care grieving their childs bruised ego then the death of an unknown child whose face flashes before them on CNN. Saturated by such images and stories of suffering across the globe, we frame the other as one whose death is somehow less grievable, somehow less valuable than ours (or those near to us). While the military may be the only institution most infamous for entering into the human-value calculus , the media has long acknowledged this by means of McLurgs Lawi, but we are all silently complicit. While war, and specifically contemporary wars which are brought into our homes by the media, is perhaps the strongest example of such framing of lives as (non)grievable, it is by no means an anomaly. After the recent tragic bus

Arguably medicine should be included when doctors have limited resources and decide which lives to say, as well as the law since it puts a dollar value on peoples limbs and that can change given what the person doeseven large corporations that refuse to do recalls if the price of the recall is more than the price of a payout to dead victims families as a result of their faulty product. McLurgs Law refers to a deceased British news editor who used the death toll of a disaster to quantify its newsworthiness as being inversely proportional to its distance from a particular location.

crash in which 28 Belgians, 22 children and six adults, were killed the public, the politicians and the media were all in solidarity no expense was to be spared, minutes of silence were observed throughout the country, and everyone was in a form of collective shock. Without denying the tragic nature of this event, why is it that we (Europeans) have failed to give as promised even 0.07% of GDP to help prevent the death of many more people across the globe, why do we not even observe a second of silence for those dying every minute, and most importantly why does the tragic reality of precarity across the globe no longer even shock us?

Butlers exploration of the frames of war, as a supplement rather than a substitution for Levinas phenomenological analysis of Western ontology, provides us with a clear and concrete case in which the other is denied dignity, difference and as such is dehumanised. It is because we accept certain frames, which shape the way we see the world, that help us to silence other frames, frames which might be more ethical, more critical or more onerous. While there are no perfect frames, dualistic, exclusionary and rigid frames are certainly the most problematic. These types of frames permit certain ontologies, such as those Levinas criticises, to dominate our way of thinking, judging and acting and as such create a fertile ground for dehumanisation, which in itself is by no means a monolithic process. The claim Butler makes is that because we have accepted the frame of us vs. them, although in a milder form, we no longer feel the need to grieve the loss of lives across the globe. While this frame may not seem problematic, and is not always problematic, when one reads the literature on genocide and more specifically interviews of perpetrators of genocide, the recurrence of this frame, in different forms and disguises, is undeniable (Kiernan 2009; Totten 2008; Waller 2007; Dallaire 2004). Frames, such as those used overtly during so-called times of emergency and war, enable us to simplify the world, to reduce the other, to silence or at least hush certain

voices within and without. In military and psychological terms, frames all too often play a pivotal role in the process of moral disengagement that leads to the type of dehumanisation that is one of the root causes of genocide. It is for this reason that I claim that such frames, rooted in ontologies of the self, are dangerous and potential precursors to genocide. Moral disengagement is the psychological process of separating oneself from ones conduct, deemed unethical or unacceptable according to ones own standards (McAlister 2001; Aquino et al. 2007). Just as we might spend a lengthy period of time justifying a difficult moral choice, such as whether to put aside money for a family vacation or to give it to a charity, moral disengagement is a difficult mental procedure in which we attempt to convince ourselves that the harm we have done to another, which is contrary to our conscience or intuition, is in fact permissible because of a specific situation, moral exceptions, etc. According to social psychologists, it is the process of disabling the mechanism of selfcondemnation, of silencing our moral intuition or conscience (Fiske 2004). Simply put, it is how we detach ourselves from a particular person(s) or distance ourselves from a particular situation by means of a gradual process of justification, which allows us to turn off an otherwise operational sense of morality. Many first-hand accounts indicate that others can actually observe this process. One mother describes her experience of her son, returning from his first tour in Iraq, as follows: He would get this glazed look over him and wed be in a discussion and his eyes would literally get glassy and he would just disconnect (Phillips 2010: 6). Levinas was critical of any dehumanisation of the other and did not often distinguish between lesser and viler forms (perhaps because this would open the door, even slightly, to a space for justifying minor forms of violence), nonetheless, as Butler elucidates, the greatest danger experienced during times of war which is all too often a cover for genocide are those forms of dehumanisation rooted in a fundamental exclusionary binary logic of us vs. them.

According to Bandura, dehumanisation and/or blaming the victim is one of four mechanisms of moral disengagement each of which occurs by turning off one, or more, of the following sanctions: 1) cognitive restructuring of conduct often by means of sanitizing language, 2) displacing or diffusion of responsibility, and 3) disregarding or misrepresenting injurious consequences (1991; 1999). Mechanism of Moral Disengagement (Bandura et al, 1996)
Moral Justfication Palliative Comparison Euphemistic Labeling Minimizing, Ignoring, or Misconstruing The Consequences

Dehumanization Attribution of Blame

Reprehensible Conduct

Detrimental Effects

Victim

Displacement of Responsibility Diffusion of Responsibility

While for Bandura dehumanisation is but one mechanism of moral disengagement, what we refer to as the us vs. them frame (and associate with dehumanisation in a more general Levinasian sense) plays a role in all of these mechanisms. Rather than clearly identifying excluded groups, euphemistically masked frames are used thereby enabling these other mechanisms of sanitisation, misconstruction of consequences, and diffusion of responsibility, etc. According to Moshman, the most common types of euphemisms are those of dangerous beings (the enemy, racial impurity, etc.), non-human (i.e. animals, insects etc.), or non-beings (i.e. garbage, machines, etc.) (2007).What is most common in the military are euphemistic abbreviations, such as PAX for people. These exclusionary frames, regardless of their particular form, are the first step in a process that potentially leads to genocide. Frames create binary modes of thinking; this exclusionary process is then connected to a hierarchy by means of force or power. Following upon this polarisation, the other or them is seen to be different, and lesser in some manner, than us. As a result of this, the other is seen as dangerous, non-

human or not-living enabling the self, or the us, to harm them most often first verbally, often guised in terms of humour, then publically or psychologically, and lastly physically. According to Moshman, the fourth step is the process of self-justification, which is less painful because of the moral disengagement enabled by the frame.
Dichotomization elevates one dimension of identity over others and, within that dimension, sharply distinguishes two categories: us and them. This may lead to (2) dehumanization, in which they come to be seen not just as different from us but as outside the human universe of moral obligation. (3) Destruction may result, accompanied and followed by processes of (4) denial that enable the perpetrators to maintain their moral self-conceptions. (2007)

An us vs. them frame, dichotomisation in the above terms, such as those with which we characterize our interactions with strangers is not necessarily enlaced with power or rigidity. The cause of the second step to dehumanisation and potential destruction (third step) is often to be found in the particular context such as in times of crisis, instability or emergency politics all of which intensify a culture of fear. The question, which needs to be asked, is whether it is possible to prevent this by destabilising these frames.

In line with Hannah Arendts conclusions in her analysis of the Eichmann trial (2006), I do not believe that genocide is the result of a real hatred or an act of a monster (to argue such would be to deny the humanity of the perpetrator) but rather that it is an extreme form, the final step in a longer procedure, of a much more ordinary process one that finds its ontological roots in exclusionary frames. Genocide, and its psychological and physical precursors, is often the tragic combination of 1) instability (political, economic, etc.), 2) fear (violence, war, etc.) and 3) a perceived threat to ones identity. Instability, which is unavoidable in post-foundational societies, is pervasive today and it would be foolish to deny its inevitability or the possibility of an alternative (such as returning to the supposed certainty of the past). Closely related but different in that it is avoidable is the ethos of fear. This fear, often justified as the only possible response to the series of crisis that mark our times

environmental, economic, political, etc. is by no means the only means to address these problems. The realisation that so many supposed certainties are sinking into an abyss need not lead us to live in fear (one of the major causes for the rise of the far right in Europe today). Yet fear and instability alone do not lead to genocide. The missing element, the key, is the role of identity. In agreement with David Moshman, genocides are perpetrated by individuals acting collectively on behalf of what they perceive to be their own group against what they perceive to be a different group. At the heart of any genocide, in other words, is identity (2007: 116). In our terms, the missing link is that of exclusionary frames, us vs. them. Genocides find their origins in moments when identities are reduced first into a dichotomy, an aporetic either/or, and second when this Manichean dualism is perverted into a dehumanising hierarchical threat of us vs. them.ii To summarise, the claim I wish to make is that identities, which plays a critical role in potentially genocidal situations, that arise from an ontology of the self create exclusionary frames and as such are the first step in a process of moral disengagement that can lead to genocide. These exclusionary frames, and type of thinking they permit, need to be challenged if we are to make the words never again mean anything ever again.

The Ethics of Relationality: Destabilising the Us vs. Them Frame Having clarified the ontological roots of genocide to be the connection between exclusionary identity frames rooted in an ontology of the self (that currently dominates our societies) and genocide, I now wish to consider the options before us. The first option, to reduce all others to
ii

While I appreciate that as a foreigner writing in Belgium I do not have the same sensitivity to its colonial past, even prior to living here the most cited example of such a process was that of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. While the king of Belgium, whose private property this was, did not create the identities of Hutus and Tutsis, he did exploit this previously dynamic ethnic identity frame for his purpose and in so doing created a rigid us vs. them frame that was made official by means of identity cards. In Moshmans terms, this is the process of creating a dichotomy that divided society. By giving one group many material advantages, a clear hierarchy was introduced. While the transformation from dichotomy to dehumanisation was a slow process that took over half a century (just as was the case for Jews in the early 20th century and Muslims in Europe today), it seems in retrospect inevitable. It is in this sense that the colonial past set in motion the exclusionary identity frame upon which hatred, political and economic instability and fear grew that eventually left over 800, 000 dead.

the same, that is to see all others as part of the us, is both problematic and unrealistic; it is also a denial of our lived experiences. Another option, the route Judith Butler takes, is to find a shared ethical ground. She writes,
For Levinas, violence is one temptation that a subject may feel in the encounter with the precarious life of the other that is communicated through the face. This is why the face is at once temptation to kill and an interdiction against killing (2010:172) The meaning of responsibility is bound up with this anxiety that remains open, that does not settle an ambivalence through disavowal, but rather gives rise to a certain ethical practice, itself experimental, that seeks to preserve life better than it destroys it. (2010: 177)

Her claim is that we must recognise that this happens and take responsibility for the fact that we, whether consciously or not, accept that certain lives are valuable and others are insignificant. Inspired by Levinas ethical practice of responsibility, she puts forward the notion of precarity as something shared by all beings as a means to overcome the exclusionary frame of grievable and not grievable. Butler, like Levinas, asks us to take responsibility for having created this frame, and for allowing it to dominate the way we think when relating to others (2010). While I appreciate Butlers suggestion, I believe we must take Arendts warning regarding the importance of addressing political problems in the political arena seriously. While our shared precarity is undeniable, it by no means destabilises the root problem of exclusionary frames. Our precarity is still distinct from their precarity; my precarity, my problem your precarity, your problem. Butler proposes an ethical solution to a political paradox. What follows is my attempt to offer a political response.

As we have shown, the us vs. them frame is potentially dangerous and as such must be destabilised. This highly polarizing binary approach to the world, which is by no means easy to escape, fails to recognize that while inclusion and exclusion will always play a role in human interactions, they are always partial, contingent and as such meant to be challenged and changed. Relationality is a post-foundational response to the destabilizing revelations that come with the end of foundationalism. It is this end that creates a space for uncertainty in

our lives, the same uncertainty that often leads to fear and the desire for an exclusionary frame, which is easily found in binary identities such as us vs. them. Concretely, relationality asks us to engage in dialogue with ourselves, in order to address our own internal differences, and others, in order to understand each other and specifically our unique and different perspectives on the world. The aim of engagement which often takes the form of an agonistic disagreement is to create shared political ground. This by no means suggests that communication has consensus as its telos. By contrast, the goal if there is any is to be able to understand, even when we disagree, the justifications of other perspectives, disagreements in fact aid in understanding more than agreements. It is by means of a process of communication that one develops shared standards based on a more complex and closer understanding of others. While this standard is dynamic, continuously open to change, and contingent upon the particular persons engaged in communication, it nonetheless provides partial ground for judgment an inter-subjective standard, rather than a purely subjective or objective one. Rather than take reality to be objective or completely subjective, relationality grounds reality in a form of decentred intersubjectivism, which arises between people. While there are few guarantees, relationality does act as social safety net. The less certain one feels, the more likely one will act out of fear and it is all too often that these reactions, more instinctual than reflective, lead to violence. While relationality cannot promise the type of stability once supposedly guaranteed by foundationalism, it can promote stronger bonds between people.

Despite the fact that there is no causal link between awareness and responsibility, the former often weighs heavily on us and at least makes us aware of the call to responsibility. As we become more aware, and begin to acknowledge, how interdependent we are and the reality that all we have is each other, an increased sense of responsibility for the other may arise.

Relational ethics asks us to reflect and consider our current estimation of the value of autonomy and individualism. In addition it asks us to consider how these are often related to egoism and the denial of our interdependence. By making us question the notion of the self as an autonomous and absolute independent being, relationality prevents us from creating an illusionary (albeit comforting) distance barrier the self and other. It is also by means of this post-modern decentring of the self in which the notion of autonomy is deconstructed, that relationality differs significantly from ethical approaches such as care-ethics which likewise place a strong emphasis on the relation to the other. It is this fictional border-like wall that allows us to deny our fundamental relationality to alterity and opens the door to a denial of responsibility for the other (Levinas 1980; 1997). While this calls for a rather difficult reflection upon our narrative identity, it forces us to question the grounds upon which we fear the other; it equally creates a space, from within, for difference.iii By minimizing the distance, one that is often framed in terms of us vs. them thinking, and promoting a type of thinking that allows us to better understand ourselves and with those whom we interact, we are better able to make judgements and avoid actions of the type that result from either ignorance, or fear, of the other (which are often violent in nature).

At an epistemological level, relationality helps to make us understand that the relationship to the other is constitutive of both the shared world and ourselves. Critically, this allows one to recognise that all our beliefs, judgments, and actions are a product of relationality. Thus, rather than justifying ones actions based on a fixed norm that itself has no foundation, one is forced to turn to the other(s) and to engage in a reflective dialogue. It is by means of communication, both in terms of contradiction and verification,that a shared although by no means one of absolute consensus standards can be developed between people. Learning to
iii

Recognizing that difference is fundamental to the self is equivalent to Arendts recognition of plurality as a social ontology that leads to her identification of plurality as the condition of the political rather than its enemy/threat/menace.

judge from such an intersubjective perspective means being open to have ones thoughts questioned and to reconsidering ones judgments. Likewise it makes one partially responsible for the actions of others as these are also produced in relation to oneself. While this rather tangled web of relations certainly makes it difficult to extricate oneself from any situation, not only is it a more accurate depiction of our relational reality, it may also make it much more difficult to treat another as someone foreign or strangeiv in a dehumanizing sense. Likewise it becomes almost impossible to say, I am not responsible. While this may seem daunting, such a realisation is greatly supported by the reality that one is never alone (although this does by no means prevent one from feeling this way). By accepting this reality, one is also refusing the fear that feeds on loneliness and alienation. Ideally, relationality will help us to recognise that its not all that tragic that all we have is each other. On the contrary, this might be its unique post-foundational selling point. Instead of searching for certainty from either above or below, relationality seeks it by means of horizontal transcendence.

A social ontology that views human relationality, a horizontal dynamic web-like multidimensional interconnectedness, is in fact a counter-balance to the contingency of our reality. While aware of its own limits and contingency, it claims that the self and other are coconstitutive by means of a fundamental relationship of interdependency. Relationality, in this sense, thus means not only that the self and the other are co-constitutive, but also that the relationship between the self and other is the basis of social reality and existence. What is critical is that relationality is not rooted in what is shared or common (it is not a tribal form of connectedness), but rather it arises precisely because of the differences between, and within, us. This seemingly subtle distinction is critical to relationality. As a social ontology it is

iv

The Stranger is close to us, insofar as we feel between him and ourselves common features of a national, social, occupational, or generally human, nature. He is far from us, insofar as these common features extend beyond him or us, and connect us only because they connect a great many people. Georg Simmel The Stranger 1908.

rooted in plurality, which arises from alterity rather than similarity. In addition to the important ethical and political implications of this difference, it is also what distinguishes relationality from many consensus-oriented theories. Aligning itself with alterity, relationality values difference, debate, and non-violent conflict.

Concretely what this entails is the realisation that the subject is the product of society. More specifically this entails that the subject is formed by discourse which itself arises from within relationality. While this notion of a decentred and deconstructed self is as difficult to grasp and reconcile, as is the impossibility of absolute foundations, the two are in fact linked. The notion of an autonomous centred independent subject was itself, as Foucault demonstrated in Les Mots et les choses, a form of illusory foundation for the past few centuries (1966). Nonetheless, the end of the subject need not mean the end of meaningful existence or the end of ethics. On the contrary, as thinkers such as Levinas have shown, the death of metaphysics may create space in the world for the birth of a new type of ethics (1961; 1974). Levinas develops an ethics of alterity that arises from the self yet called by the other. This call awakens responsibility in the receiver, as the ethical subject does not exist prior to this relationship with the other. Being summoned by the other constitutes the self. It is in terms of this fundamental co-constitutionality that relationality is a social ontology. Yet, in addition, this co-constituted relationship between self and other is the basis of the human realm. What is critical is that relationality promotes a type of solidarity that is best described as radical tolerance? Rather than solidarity rooted in similarity, like that of tribes or families, relationality seeks to develop a solidarity rooted in alterity, that is radical tolerance of difference an extreme anti-thesis to the paradoxical notion of zero-tolerance. It is this difference, and our recognition of its ontological basis, that is the basis of relationality and the solidarity it seeks to promote rather than any shared basis. Relationality is strengthened by an

interdependence, which arises from difference. Unlike Habermas, who defines the goal of this public discourse to be consensus-oriented, relationality is much closer to the idea of empowerment, or power in Arendts model of the political, Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keep together (1972: 143). Concretely, what this entails is that power can only arise between people; an individual does not possess power. In terms of relationality, it is an ideal basis from which power can arise and also creates an affective feeling of empowerment shared by all those engaged in a collective action which in addition to awareness helps strengthen ones sense of responsibility for the other. While relationality is a passive interdependence, it is also the perfect springboard for a more active form of empowerment a transformation which calls for a particular action to arise from a relational awareness. It is in this change from passive to active that relationality is also transformed into a form of solidarity with both ethical and political import in terms of taking responsibility for the other and the world.

Conclusions As Viktor Frankl so aptly described after his experiences in Auschwitz, lifes meaning is found in the act of making a choice even when there seems to be no choice, one can still choose ones attitude towards this sombre reality (1946). Post-foundationalism, and the notion of relationality, is precisely such a choice. While it is completely understandable that we would rather cling to the supposed certainties of foundationalism, this option is no longer open to us in the 21st century (although this claim is by no means true across the globe). The other alternative, an anti-foundational one, is all too often a turn to nihilism and a denial of our shared responsibility for the world. Post-foundationalism offers a third alternative, which has yet to be tested. The rise and return of strong foundational claims, whether financial, religious or political, is itself proof of our continued need for such ground.

While relationality only offers a contingent ground, this offer does destabilise the alternative frame that I have argued is a potential precursor to genocide. Relationality seeks to embrace the contingency of post-foundationalism by means of a horizontal social ontology of interdependence rooted in alterity. The proof of this relational social ontology is everywhere to be seen ... in our networked, intertwined networks of social relations as well as within our own internal struggles with the difference that define (if this is possible) who we are both to others and ourselves. Relationality offers no absolute guarantees, it does however promote an ethics of non-violence, dialogue, solidarity, respect for alterity and the unicity of every human being, as well as a critique of binary thinking, exclusion, egoism and the dehumanisation of the other, the result of an us vs. them genocidal frame hidden in the roots of Western ontology. By refusing a simple us-them frame, relationality seeks to destabilise the ontology of the same that pervades our view on the world and the other.

Bibliography Althusser, Louis (2008). On Ideology. London: Verso. Arendt, Hannah (2006). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Penguin Classics. Arendt, Hannah 2005 Responsibility and Judgment. New York: Schocken Books. Arendt, Hannah (1998). The Human Condition. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press. Arendt, Hannah, and Jerome Kohn (2006). Between Past and Future. Penguin Classics. Arendt, Hannah, and Jerome Kohn (1994). Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Press. Aquino, K., A. Reed, S. Thau & D. Freeman (2007). A Grotesque and Dark Beauty: How Moral Identity and Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement Influences Cognitive and Emotional Reactions to War in Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43, 385392. Bandura, A. (1991) How people do bad things: turning off moral controls Stanford University News Service. Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Personality and Social Psychology Review. [Special Issue on Evil and Violence], 3, 193-209. Bandura, A. (2002). Selective moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Journal of Moral Education, 312, 101-119 Bandura, A, C. Barbaranelli, G. Caprara, and C. Pastorelli, (1996), Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Braidotti, Rosi (1999). Sexual difference theory in A Companion to Feminist Philosophy. Alison M Jaggar and Iris Marion Young (eds). London: Blackwell Publishing. Butler, Judith (2010). Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? London: Verso. Castano, E., & Giner-Sorolla, R. 2006. Not quite human: Infra-humanization as a response to collective responsibility for intergroup killing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 804-818. Dallaire, R. ( 2004). Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. Da Capo Press. Derrida, Jacques (2001). On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. New York: Routledge.

Detert, J.R., L.K. Trevio & V.L. Sweitzer 2008. Moral Disengagement in Ethical Decision Making: A Study of Antecedents and Outcomes. Journal of Applied Psychology 932, 374-391. Fiske, S. 2004 Social Beings: A core motives approach to social psychology. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Foucault, Michel (1990). Les Mots Et Les Choses Une Archaeologie Des Sciences Humaines. Paris: French & European Publications Inc. Furedi, Frank (2006). Culture of Fear Revisited. Continuum. Furedi, Frank (2005). Politics of Fear. Continuum. Grossman, D. 1996. On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. New York: Black Bay Books. Heartfield, James (2002). The Death of the Subject Explained. Sheffield: Hallam UP. Honig, Bonnie (2003). Democracy and the Foreigner. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kiernan, B. (2009). Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur. Yale University Press. Levinas, Emmanuel (1997). Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Levinas, Emmanuel (1980). Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Amsterdam: Springer. Levinas, Emmanuel (1998). Otherwise Than Being: Or Beyond Essence. Duquesne University Press. Levinas, Emmanuel (1994). Nine Talmudic Readings. Illinois: Indiana University Press. Maalouf, A. (2011). In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong. Arcade Publishing. McAlister, A.L. 2001. Moral Disengagement: Measurement and Modification. Journal of Peace Research 38, 87-99. Marchart, Oliver (2007). Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Moshman, David (2007). 'Us and Them: Identity and Genocide', Identity, 7: 2, 115 135 Nancy, Jean-Luc (2000). Being Singular Plural. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Phillips, J.E.S. (2010). None of Us Were Like This Before: American Soldiers and Torture, Verso.

Schmitt, Carl (1996). The Concept of the Political. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press. Slim, H. (2007) Killing Civilians: Method, Madness and Morality in War. London: Hurst & Company. Sontag, S. (2004). Regarding the Pain of Others. Picador. Totten, S., Parsons, W.S. (Eds.) (2008). Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts. Routledge. Waller, J.E. (2007). Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing. Oxford University Press, USA.