De Roy vs Court of Appeals

on November 5, 2010

157 scra 766 Publication of Supreme Court Decisions in the Official Gazette
The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of the private respondents resulting in injuries to private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence. On the last day of the 15 days period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was again denied. The Supreme Court finds that Court of Appeal did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habulayas vs Japzon. Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should not be applied non-publication in the Official Gazette. ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they can be binding. HELD: There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.

Manuel vs People of the Philippines

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005 FACTS: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy. Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaa on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandaleras knowledge of Manuels first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latters defense being that his declaration of single in his marriage contract with Gandalera w as done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTCs decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code. 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law. RULINGS: 1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was

already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner. 2. The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

ESPIRITU VS CIPRIANO Case Digest

ESPIRITU VS CIPRIANO

FACTS: For resolution is the problem of whether RA No. 6126 may be held applicable to the case at bar. For convenience we reproduce the pertinent provisions of law in question: Section 1 no lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which anothers dwelling is located shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed between the lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed 300php a month. Section 6- This At shall take effect upon its approval. Approved June 17, 1970

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 6126 will have retroactive effect at the case at bara

Held: It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar is covered by the aforecited law. We rule, otherwise. Established and undisputed is the fact that the increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January, 1969, while the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals had been effected. Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may. Therefore given retroactive effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction therefore is in order. Article 4 of the civil code ordains that law shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear. Our duty is equally plain. The law being a temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation, it has limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that no lessor of a dwelling unit or land shall during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this act. Hence the provision against the increase in monthly rental was effective only from March 1970 up to March 1971. Outside and beyond that period the law did not by the express mandate

of the Act itself, operate. The said law did not, by express terms, purport to give retroactive effect. We therefore rule that R.A. No. 6126 is not applicable at the case at bar. As the language of the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly says.

Brehm vs Republic Case Digest

Brehm vs Republic

FACTS: Brehm was a non-resident alien of the Philippines. He filed a petition however, to adopt his step-child. He argued that Article 335 of the New Civil Code which prohibits a non-resident alien to adopt was inapplicable because it covers adoption only for the purpose of establishing a relationship of paternity and filiations where none existed, but not where the adopting parents are not total strangers to the child. Petitioners further contended that they could adopt pursuant to Article 332 of the New Civil Code which expressly authorizes the adoption of a step-child by a stepfather.

ISSUE: Whether or not Brehm as a non resident may adopt a child

Held: Article 338 should be construed in connection with Article 335. Article 33G clearly states that "The following cannot adopt ... (4) non-resident aliens." It is therefore mandatory because it contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in negative terms, importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated (50 Am. JUl'. 51). On the other hand, Article 338 provides that "the following may be adopted: (3) step-child by the step-father or step-mother." This provision is merely directory and can only be given operation if the same does not conflict with the mandatory provisions of Article 335, Moreover, it is Article 335 that confers jurisdiction to the court over the case and before Article 338 may or can be availed of, such jurisdiction must first be established. There is no question that petitioner Brehm is a non-resident. By his own testimony, he supplied the conclusive proof of his status, and no amount of reasoning will overcome the same. For this reason he cannot adopt.

GR No. 137873 April 20, 2001 Consunji vs. Court of Appeals FACTS:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence. 2. Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, RULING: 1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the

law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellants negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident. 2. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmens Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have waived theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she wouldve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had.

Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano Case Digest
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano

G.R. No. L-24022 (March 3, 1965)

FACTS:

Private respondent Feliciano, the Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964. It was approved. The President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding date. Petitioners contend that the importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same.

ISSUE:

W/N RA 2207 was repealed by RA 3452.

HELD:

The importation may be illegal on the ground that such importation belong exclusively to private parties, thereby prohibiting any government agency from doing so. RA 2207 provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by the National Economic Council, the President may authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. The two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances. The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the latter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law, hence there was no repeal. GR No. L-30061 (February 27, 1974) People vs. Jabinal FACTS: Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question. The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Courts decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967). ISSUE: Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the courts rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the MAcarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa. RULING: Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable. The appellant was acquitted.