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INVESTIGATION REPORT: THE SINKING OF THE KANDI WON, JULY 4, 2012

INVESTIGATED BY THE NASSAU COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT


KATHLEEN M. RICE NASSAU COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY

Investigation Report: The Sinking of the Kandi Won


Overview: On July 4, 2012 at approximately 10:05 p.m. the overloaded Kandi Won boat attempted to return to Huntington Harbor following a fireworks display in Oyster Bay Harbor. There were 27 people on board, including 15 adults and young adults, and 12 children aged 16 and under. The total passenger weight on the boat was approximately 3,519 pounds. A wave apparently struck the vessel at the worst possible angle, causing the boat to rock and then tip over until the Kandi Won lay on its side. Eleven-year-old Harley Treanor, seven-year-old Victoria Gaines, and 12-year-old David Aureliano were trapped in the boat's cabin with David's parents, Deborah and Greg Aureliano. The cabin was dark and filled quickly with water. Mr. and Mrs. Aureliano attempted to hold the children above the water as they struggled to find a way out. They were unable to keep hold of the children. Tragically, the three children drowned. The boat eventually sank to a depth of 65 feet on the floor of the Long Island Sound. This report will document the immediate aftermath and investigation of the events, analyze the existing legal authorities, and make recommendations in an effort to prevent this type of tragedy in the future. A review of the statutes and regulations governing pleasure craft revealed a system of laws that rely heavily on long-standing, informal practices. Some people maintain a cultural belief that pleasure boating is the last bastion of recreation that is free from over-regulation. Unfortunately these views tend toward a sentimental oversimplification of the nature of recreational boating. Governments first role is to ensure public safety, and boaters safety must be balanced with freedom and recreation. Basic safety provisions are necessary to provide freedom for individuals to enjoy the waterways knowing that the other people and vessels around them do not pose a threat. The tragic events of July 4, 2012 should cause a re-examination of the laws, regulations and common boating practices. The nature of this tragedy has raised issues at the federal, state and local levels and these issues are discussed comprehensively in this report. It is imperative that we learn from the capsizing of the Kandi Won and use those lessons to improve boating safety in our communities. Synopsis of Findings: The Kandi Won capsized and sank as a result of being overloaded and apparently encountering a 90 wave. Operation of the boat, including the number of people on board, is ultimately the responsibility of the boat operator and, in this case, the boat owner since he was also onboard. However there was no capacity plate required by federal regulation indicating maximum occupancy weight and distribution. Witnesses recalled that the Kandi Won had previously been operated with a large number of people without incident. The combination of the weight, its distribution and the angle of the incoming wave each 1

contributed to making the capsizing of the Kandi Won inevitable. The responsibility of the boat operator and owner did not rise to the level of criminality under these circumstances. Proposals: 1. Recreational boating safety regulations under federal law should be mandated in the same manner as motor vehicle safety regulations. The current safety standards should be reviewed, expanded to include all sizes of recreational vessels, and the European model of categorizing vessels according to their intended use and geographic location should be explored. 2. 33 CFR 183.21 should be amended to require capacity standards and capacity plates as a basic safety requirement of all vessels, regardless of size or use. 3. The U.S. Coast Guard, law enforcement and rescue agencies must re-open discussions regarding inter-agency dependency and resource allocation. If permissible, U.S. Coast Guard members should be given peace officer status for the issuance of summons and the availability of rescue divers and their response times should be revisited. 4. The New York State Legislature recently passed a bill requiring boating safety certificates for all operators born on or after May 1, 1996. Persons born before the May 1 date are exempt. The bill goes into effect May 1, 2014 and represents a good first step. However lawmakers should work toward endeavor to include all boaters and should amend the provisions relating to children. 5. The Department of Motor Vehicles should be the repository for all licensing/certifications for any type of vehicle or vessel operated in New York State. Licenses and non-driver IDs should be marked accordingly. All convictions, suspensions or revocations should be reflected on the operating record. Although the law currently requires this record, significant effort must be undertaken to improve reporting. 6. New York State should conform its laws relating to operating any type of vehicle or vessel while intoxicated or impaired by drugs; operating while intoxicated or impaired with a child in the car, vessel, snowmobile or ATV, leaving the scene of collisions, etc. 7. Vessels should not only be registered with the Department of Motor Vehicles, they should be required to undergo a safety inspection in a manner and intervals to be determined by the Commissioner of Parks and Recreation. 8. Regulators should convene a work group consisting of boating experts and associations, members of law enforcement and local governments to create a strategic boating safety plan with specific legislative and educational goals. New York State should take the lead on these important public safety issues and become the national model for boating safety.

Detailed Statement of Facts The Capsizing: On July 4, 2012 at approximately 7:00 p.m. the Treanor and Aureliano families gathered at Knutsons Marina at Huntington. The families and a group of friends packed food, soda, beer and wine and boarded Kevin Treanors 34-foot Silverton boat, the "Kandi Won", which was moored at the marina. They intended to travel to Oyster Bay Harbor in the area of Cove Neck to watch a fireworks display. There were 27 occupants on the boat when it left the marina, 12 adults, seven young adults or teenagers ranging from 15 -21 years old, and eight children between seven and 12 years old. The total passenger weight on the boat was approximately 3,520 pounds. Most witnesses interviewed stated it was an "uneventful" trip from the Marina to Oyster Bay Harbor. Guy Denigris, a friend of the boats owner, Kevin Treanor, piloted the boat out of the marina and to the area of the fireworks in Cove Neck. A few witnesses stated the boat had "rocked" or "listed" (leaned or tilted) to varying degrees during the outgoing trip. Specifically Mr. Denigris stated to P.O. Norman McCloy that as he operated the boat he thought the vessel had water in its bilge, or, as an afterthought now, maybe a lot of weight on board because the vessel had been listing (leaning or tilting) back and forth. He indicated in retrospect that at one point between Huntington Harbor and Oyster Bay Harbor the boat listed quite a bit, but the vessel recovered. The Kandi Won anchored among numerous other boats to wait for the fireworks display to start. The boat's occupants ate, conversed and some of the children went swimming. According to records, the fireworks began at 9:20 p.m. and lasted for a half hour. It took approximately 10 minutes to raise the anchor and start to leave the area, along with numerous other boats. The boat was being operated by 50 year-old Sal Aureliano. Mr. Aureliano had taken a boating safety course and had received a boating safety certificate.1 He reports over 500 hours of marine experience prior to the capsizing. The Kandi Won travelled north out of Oyster Bay Harbor. Mr. Aureliano stated that he "was not operating at full speed, probably around half throttle for that vessel, maybe 12-15 knots". He did not know how many passengers were on board. He advised P.O. Norman McCloy at 1:15 a.m. on July 5, 2012 that there were vessels going in his same direction on both his left and right sides. It was very dark and he could not distinguish the type or size of the vessels. He could only see their navigation lights but the boat to his left was slowly overtaking him. Mr. Aureliano stated that just before the Kandi Won capsized, the boat started turning to the right and then leaned hard to the right. He stated that he tried to steer to the left and used the throttles to slow the boat to "idle". The boat just kept leaning further and further until it capsized and then eventually overturned completely. The bridge contained approximately 985 pounds of passenger weight at the time. Mr. Aureliano stated that it was very dark and he could not tell if he had

The New York State Dept. of Parks and Recreation confirmed this.

caught a wave. The first call about the incident was received at approximately 10:06 p.m. As a result, the time of capsizing is estimated to be approximately 10:05 p.m. The boat capsized at the mouth of Cold Spring Harbor at latitude 40, 55.473 north; longitude 073, 30.718 west. Accounts vary about how long it took for the boat to turn completely upside down from its position on its side. Most say the boat turned over very quickly. A U.S. Coast Guard boat was at the scene in approximately five minutes and other law enforcement vessels followed shortly thereafter. Three Oyster Bay Bay Constable boats were on scene and participated in the rescue and recovery. Those boats were staffed by Bay Constables Mike Rich, Carmine Montesano, John Plank and Thomas Dillman. Two civilian boats were also there within a few minutes and picked up passengers. Mitchell Kramer was also on scene with a tow boat from BoatUS. Mr. Kramer provided substantial aid to the operation by securing a line to the bow of the capsized Kandi Won at approximately 10:30 p.m. He later handed off the line to members of the NCPD at about 1:00 a.m. after the boat completely submerged. Mr. Kramer assisted throughout the operation and his tow boat was used as a temporary working platform during the rescue and recovery. The Kandi Won drifted and submerged at approximately 11:30 p.m. Law enforcement personnel did not observe any signs of impairment on either the boat operator, Sal Aureliano or the boat owner, Kevin Treanor. Both men denied consuming any alcohol while on the boat. There was no smell of alcohol emanating from either man, and neither displayed and signs of intoxication. As a precaution both men were administered a preliminary breath test (PBT) at 3:10 a.m. and 3:12 a.m. respectively. Both men registered .00 BAC at those times. Witness Statements: Ray Rivers was travelling in his 24-foot boat with three other people behind Kandi-Won in its wake. Mr. Rivers describes the water as good condition, stating the wakes were not crazy, with no wind but a storm was approaching. Mr. Rivers was gaining on the Kandi Won when it stopped. He cut his power and drifted toward the boat which was on its side with people in the water. Mr. Rivers called the Coast Guard at approximately 10:10 p.m. Mr. Rivers stated that from the time of his arrival it only took the boat one minute to turn completely upside down in the water. Mr. Rivers said that the police were there in five minutes followed by approximately 10 emergency boats. Mr. Rivers opined that the boat had a bad design since he saw three people on one side of a similar boat rock it while docked in Connecticut. He blamed this on the boats flat bottom. An employee of Knutsons Marina had just finished work and was preparing to sail over to Oyster Bay to watch the fireworks with a friend. He stated that Kevin Treanor left about a half hour before the employee. The employee stated he only saw around 10 to 12 people on the boat as it left. He met up with the Kandi Won in Oyster Bay and they tied off together to watch the fireworks. The employee asked Mr. Treano where he got all these people but Mr. Treanor didnt really answer. It was the employees opinion the boat was overloaded so he offered to take some of the people back to Huntington on his boat but once again, he said, Mr. Treanor really didnt answer. Mr. Treanor also kind of signaled to me that they were okay. The employee heard a distress call on the way back to Huntington and saw the flare and the police responding but did not know it was the Kandi Won until the next day. 4

Sal Aureliano is related to the boat's owner through marriage. Mr. Aureliano was operating the boat when it capsized. In addition to the statement given to P.O. Norman McCloy (above), Mr. Aureliano also gave a statement to assigned NCPD Homicide Detective, David Nystrom at 4:30 a.m. on July 5, 1012. He stated: After the fireworks were done we left along with some other boats. This was about a little after 10 p.m. and I was piloting the boat. People were in the cabin, in the back and some older kids were on the front of the boat...At this time there was a boat on my right and a boat on my left. After the boat passed me on my left I think I hit a wave and a storm was developing and the water got rough. After hitting the wave I tried to control the boat but it went over fast to my right. The boat started to fill fast with water...I didn't drink any alcohol while we were on the boat. Guy Denigris is a friend of the boats owner, Kevin Treanor. He operated the boat on the trip from Huntington to Oyster Bay. He did not know the number of people on board the boat. Mr. Denigris stated that as he drove the boat out of Huntington Harbor and got towards the sound, the boat hit multiple wakes and the boat rocked a little. We got to Cold Spring Harbor around 8:30 and waited till about 9:15 when the fireworks started. It was dark out and the weather was still nice when they left after the fireworks. Mr. Denigris stated everybody was spread out on the boat. After about 15 minutes I felt that the boat was moving back and forth and it caught my attention. I wasnt alarmed but I yelled to Sal Whats going on? I dont remember if he replied. I went up top and Sal seemed to be in control. The boat seemed fine and then the boat went over to the right. The water seemed choppy but I dont recall a big wave or multiple waves when the boat went over. Two-and-a-half weeks after the capsizing, Mr. Denigris stated to P.O. Norman McCloy that as he operated the boat he thought the vessel had water in its bilge or, as an afterthought now, maybe a lot of weight on board because the vessel had been listing (leaning or tilting) back and forth. He indicated in retrospect that at one point between Huntington Harbor and Oyster Bay Harbor the boat listed quite a bit, but the vessel recovered. LuAnn Denigris is the wife of Guy Denigris and a friend of Kevin Treanors. Mrs. Denigis stated that everyone boarded at Knutsons Marina and that the only stop the boat made on the way to Oyster Bay was to empty the bathroom. Mrs. Denigris stated my husband and I felt that the boat didnt seem as stable as in the past and we had gone out on the boat before with plenty of people. She also stated that on the way back, the boat rocked once to the right and my husband, Guy, went up top to Sal to see what was wrong. When Guy got up to the top, the boat went over to the right and everybody got thrown out. Greg Aureliano is David, Rocco and Kimberlys father. Mr. Aureliano stated he did not know how many people were on the boat when they left Knutsons marina. He said they were headed to watch the fireworks in Oyster Bay like we have done for years. He described the trip to Oyster Bay as uneventful. Mr. Aureliano also stated there were boats docked all around them during the fireworks. He stated my wife and I were inside the cabin of the boat with my son, David, Kevins daughter, Harley, and Victoria Gaines. Mr. Aureliano indicated that about 10 minutes into the trip back from Oyster Bay the boat unexpectedly rolled to the right side throwing myself, my wife Deborah, and the three children to the right side of the boat, along with the couch, and other things inside. The boat filled up quickly with water and my wife and I 5

lifted all three children above the water as it rushed in. He stated it was dark and they were trying to find a way out when they lost their grip on the children. Mr. and Mrs. Aureliano were eventually able to get out of the boat. Deborah Aureliano is David, Rocco and Kimberlys mother. She states there were more than 20 boats watching the fireworks in the area where they anchored. When the fireworks display was over, she went below into the cabin with her husband, Greg and her son, David. Mrs. Aureliano stated that as the boat was heading back to Huntington, the boat was rocking because it felt like we hit a wake. The boat rocked and then turned over and was not able to recover. Mrs. Aureliano stated the cabin was filling up with water and she tried to help her son, David and seven year-old, Victoria Gaines. She lost David and Victoria, saw a light and was able to get out from under the boat. Thereafter she swam to a Coast Guard boat where she met up with her husband, Greg and her son, Rocco. Rocco Aureliano (16 years old) is the brother of David (deceased). He stated that the Kandi Won left after the fireworks display at about 9:50 p.m. He stated that a lot of boats [were] leaving at the same time. He had been on the forward bow when the boat capsized and he saw his 10-year-old sister, Kimberly, and his 11-year-old cousin, Julia Aureliano in the water. Rocco also stated I grabbed hold of them and helped them to get onto a speed boat that came over to assist us. I then swam back to the boat that capsized and tried to get into the cabin to save my brother, David, and my second cousin, Harley Treanor. Rocco stated that a Coast Guard boat pulled up to him and Coast Guard officials made him get into the boat with them. Candida Treanor is Kevin Treanors sister-in-law. She stated the weather was fine when they left from the fireworks display. About 10 minutes into the ride back, while I was sitting in the back of the boat on the left side, I felt a thrust which pushed the boat over to the right side. I watched the people on the right side of the boat get pulled into the water, and I think I might have been one of the last people into the water. The boat went over onto its right side and totally capsized within secondsI tried to get into the boat along with Sal, Guy and otherswe knew that Harley and David were inside and we were frantically trying to get to them. Eventually rescue people came and took over Joan Treanor is Kevin Treanors mother. She did not know the number of people who boarded the boat at Knutsons Marina and further stated the boat seemed to be handling the same [as before]. Mrs. Treanor further stated As we were heading back, I was sitting in the right rear corner of the boat. While we were heading out of the bay on the way back, boats were speeding past us causing wakes, which at the time didnt alarm me. Then it seems a big wave hit us, rocking the boat. Water seemed to come into the back by me from the left and then the right and then the boat went over to the right. We all got thrown out of the boat Eric Machado is a friend of the boats owner, Kevin Treanor. He stated the trip to Oyster Bay was uneventful and that he did not know how many people were on the boat. Mr. Machado stated while they were stopped to watch the fireworks, people ate and some people swam. He stated that after about 10 minutes on the way back All of a sudden the boat went over to the right and everybody ended up in the water. Everybody was around me in the water. A lot of boats stopped to help us. 6

Deborah McGovern stated that she was seated in the back of the boat with her boyfriend, Eric Machado, and some other people when they were heading back to Huntington after the fireworks display. [A]ll of a sudden the boat went over to my left side (I was standing at this time facing the rear of the boat). This happened real fast and I found myself in the water[there was] a lot of screaming. Casey Spanier (21 years old) is a friend of Laine Treanor. She and her friends were the last on the boat and were not concerned with the number of people. The young adults and teens rode on the forward bow of the boat. They had been anchored among other boats to watch the fireworks. When it ended, the boats began leaving the harbor. About eight minutes into the trip back to Huntington Harbor, the boat rocked slightly to the right, then left and then back to the right and did not recover. The boat was at 90 to the water and everybody was falling or jumping off the boat. Ms. Spanier described the boat as remaining on its side and then slowly sank and eventually went totally upside down. Sydney Shlakman (16 years old) is a friend of Laine Treanor. He estimated the Kandi Won was carrying approximately 17 people to Oyster Bay for the fireworks. He described the trip there as normal, uneventful. He stated after the fireworks they pulled anchor and about 8 10 minutes later they started back toward Huntington. About 10 minutes into the ride, I saw lightning and the water seemed a little choppy. Other boats were leaving at the same time, but I dont know how many. All of a sudden the boat started to roll slowly to its right. Everybody started to scream and I let go and fell into the water. Mr. Shlakman made it to a boat but knew from the way everybody was reacting I know that someone was still on the boat. Brendan Gellerstein is a friend of Laine Treanor. He described the trip to Oyster Bay as normal. He said it took them about 10 minutes to leave Oyster Bay after the fireworks ended. The boat then travelled about another 10 minutes when the boat went over. Right before the boat went over, the boat was rocking a little more than normal and then it went up and rolled over to the right side. The water when we left seemed more choppy then on the way over Everyone was screaming in the water. Mr. Gellerstein was eventually picked up by another boat. Recovery of the Children: The body of 11-year-old Harley Treanor was recovered underneath the boat at 11:10 p.m. by Atlantic Steamer/Oyster Bay Fire Company firefighter divers Ronald Bagen and Daniel Rivera. The boat was capsized and floating upside down in the water. A second body was observed by the divers but the boat began to sink and the divers were unable to recover the body at that time. Harley Treanor was removed and emergency CPR was performed by Town of Oyster Bay, Bay Constable John Plank. Petty Officer 3rd Class Dillon Palmer of the U.S. Coast Guard assisted transporting Harley Treanor to the Town of Oyster Bay, Roosevelt Park launching ramp which was being used as a staging area. Constable Plank continued CPR throughout the transport. Harly was transported a 1:16 A.M. to Syosset Hospital by East Norwich Fire Department ambulance where she was pronounced dead at 3:46 a.m. NCPD diver Sgt. Andrew Sawula, shield number 527, was on-duty on July 4. NCPD divers P.O. Brian Frey, shield number 2769, P.O. William Gordon, shield number 851, P.O. Gene Drum, shield number 1571 and P.O. 7

Norman McCloy, shield number 301, were called in and responded to the location. The New York City Police Department (NYPD) also dispatched a helicopter with 2 divers who landed at Roosevelt Park in Oyster Bay, NY. Seven members of the Cold Spring Harbor Fire Department divers also responded to the scene but NCPD had re-classified the dive operation at 12:35 a.m. from a rescue to a deep dive recovery because the boat had submerged to a depth of 65 feet. The re-classification required the remaining dives to be conducted by police divers. The body of seven-year-old, Victoria Gaines, was recovered at 1:30 a.m. on July 5, 2012 by NCPD police divers Brian Frey and Gene Drum. The body of 12-year-old David Aureliano, was recovered at 2:12 a.m. by NCPD police divers Brian Frey and William Gordon. Both were recovered from inside the cabin of the boat, which had submerged. Both children were pronounced dead by AMT Joshua Gallub, shield number 70, aboard NCPD vessel, Marine 1 3:48 a.m. and 3:50 a.m. respectively. The boat had drifted .7 nautical miles southeast from the position of its original capsizing. It was approximately mile from the shore. The boat was located at latitude 40, 55.113 north; longitude 073, 29.819 west at a depth of 65 feet. Other Boat Occupants: Passengers were removed from the water. Seventeen passengers were taken by an NCPD vessel and a private boat to the first staging area at the Seawanhaka Yacht Club in Centre Island, NY. Bayville Fire Chief Dennis Kelly provided their large passenger bus and an ambulance to the Seawanhaka location. Six passengers were taken by an Oyster Bay Fire Department vessel and a Town of Oyster Bay Bay Constable boat to the second staging area at Roosevelt Park in Oyster Bay, NY. Four passengers from that location were transported by fire department ambulances to area hospitals. Deborah and Rocco Aureliano were treated for shock at Glen Cove Hospital. Candida Treanor and Guy Denigris were treated for shock at Syosset Hospital Occupants and Their General Locations at the Time of Capsizing: The operator of the boat was Salvatore Aureliano (50 years old). He was located on the bridge. The three children who died were located in the boat's cabin with two adults. The children were 11-year-old Harley Treanor, 12-year-old David Aureliano and seven-year-old Victoria Gaines. Harley is the daughter of the boat's owner. David is the nephew of the boat's operator, Sal Aureliano. Victoria Gaines was not related to any of the parties. Her mother, Lisa, was a friend of the boat's owner. (See the relationship list below.) Cabin Occupants (in addition to the 3 children): Greg Aureliano (45 years old) Deborah Aureliano (45 years old) Forward Bow Occupants: Sydney Shlakman (16 years old) Brendon Gellerstein (18 years old) Caitlyn Kemerson (14 years old) Rocco Aureliano (16 years old) Lainie Treanor (20 years old) 8 Approximately 934 pounds Combined Weight in Location Approximately 632 pounds

Casey Spanier (21 years old) Haily Treanor (15 years old) Aft Cockpit (Back) of Boat: Luann Denigras (47 years old) Deborah McGovern (43 years old) Eric Machado (42 years old) Kevin Treanor (46 years old) - Owner Joan Treanor (74 years old) Candida Treanor (49 years old) Christina Aureliano (12 years old) The Bridge: Madison Treanor (8 years old) Lisa Gaines (45 years old) Salvatore Aureliano (50 years old) - Operator Cathy Aureliano (49 years old) Ryan Gaines (12 years old) Julia Aureliano (11 years old) Guy Denigris (50 years old) Kimberly Aureliano (10 years old) Approximately 988 pounds Approximately 965 pounds

Total weight: Approximately 3,519 pounds Relationship of Occupants (Those not listed below are friends): Candi Treanor (Married to Joe Treanor) Mother of: Haily Treanor Laine Treanor Sister-in-law of-(- Not on boat -) Kevin Treanor (Owner) (ex- wife: Joy) Father of: Harley Treanor Madison Treanor Sal Aureliano (Operator) Married to: Cathy Aureliano Parents of: Julia Aureliano Christina Aureliano Greg Aureliano Married to: Deborah Aureliano Parents of: David Aureliano Rocco Aureliano Kimberly Aureliano

Sister of--

Sister of--

Daughter-in-law of-- Joan Treanor Mother of adults: Kevin (Boat owner) Joe (**Not on boat) Grandmother of Harley Weather: On July 4, 2012 at 7:18 p.m. the National Weather Service (NWS) issued a forecast for Long Island Sound west of New Haven, Connecticut/Port Jefferson New York. The forecast for that night indicated northwest winds around 5 knots with seas at one foot or less. It also indicated a chance of showers and thunderstorms for the evening. At 9:15 p.m. National Weather Service Doppler radar indicated thunderstorms producing winds around 30 knots. The storm was located 21 nautical miles northwest of Bridgeport, (northern) CT and was travelling southeast at 20 knots. Mariners were warned to expect gusty winds up to 30 knots with locally higher waves and occasional lightning strikes. Boaters were advised to seek safe harbor until the storm passed. At 10:04 p.m. the NWS issued a bulletin and requested immediate broadcast of a special marine warning for the Long Island Sound, west of New Haven, CT/ Port Jefferson, NY. Radar detected a thunderstorm 4 nautical miles northwest of Captain Harbor, CT and moving southeast at 30 knots. The bulletin advised that mariners could expect gusty winds, high waves, dangerous lightning and heavy rains. The storm was forecast to be in the area of Captains Harbor, CT around 10:10 p.m., Hempstead Harbor, NY around 10:20 p.m. and Cold Spring Harbor, NY around 10:25 p.m. Boaters were again advised to seek safe harbor until the storm passes. At 10:13 p.m. NWS radar continued to indicate a thunderstorm producing winds over 35 knots in the area of Captains Harbor, CT moving southeast at 35 m.p.h. The storm was forecast to be 3 miles southwest of Cold Spring Harbor by 10:25 p.m. The same precautions about seeking safe harbor and the effects of the storm remained in effect till 10:30 p.m. Despite these reports, weather does not appear to have played a significant role in this capsizing other than speculation that boaters were hurrying to beat the weather and return to their home docks. At the time of the capsizing the wind was northwest at 7-14 m.p.h., water temperature was 73 and high tide was due at 12:47 a.m. A weather buoy stationed by the University of Connecticut in the general area did not record the weather and wave data. A few of the witnesses indicated their belief that the water was "choppier", or more rough, on the return trip to Huntington. Heavy rains and storm conditions commenced shortly after the capsizing. The wind conditions could play a role in any initial aviation response. Fireworks: On July 4, 2012 there was a fireworks display scheduled for approximately 9:30 p.m. in Oyster Bay Harbor in the area of Cove Neck. The display was hosted by James Dolan who had 10

submersion the engine is likely to have overheated. P.O. McCloy also noted the seacock shut-off handle was missing. (A seacock is a valve in the hull that protects the plumbing pipes from water from outside the vessel and/or permits water to flow into or out of the boat depending on the need. Seacocks can be used to intake salt water for a faucet or to cool an engine or to release water out of the boat, such as for a sink drain or a toilet.) The boats 12 volt batteries were energized. There were two bilge pumps, and the bilge pump in the engine compartment had compromised wiring. The pump functioned properly when attached to intact wires. P.O. McCloy was unable to determine whether the corrosion to the wiring existed before the boat sank or whether the corrosion was the result of the submersion. P.O. McCloy's inspection concluded there was no significant source of water entering the vessel before the boat capsized. It was his opinion that even if only one of the bilge pumps was functioning, it should have been able to control any water in the bilge since there was no significant amount of water entering. There was some pressure crushing and resulting leaks in the fuel tanks which P.O. McCloy attributed to the external pressure created by the sea water as the boat sank and remained submerged. There was no water intrusion from the shower and toilet connections. There were two bilge blowers (essentially two engine fume exhaust fans). P.O. McCloy indicated it could not be determined with certainty if they were functioning pre-submersion. However, he noted that the motors did not appear to be seized. The switches for the steaming lights and the navigation lights were in the on position when the boat was recovered. The navigation lights did not work upon inspection but again, the submersion could have damaged the lights. Life Jackets: Homicide Detective Nystrom reported the recovery of 21 assorted sized life jackets confirmed to be recovered from the boat along with a throwable life ring. There were 16 adult-sized and five youth-sized jackets specifically attributable to the Kandi Won. David Aureliano was recovered wearing one of the youth sized life jackets. There were also numerous life jackets in the vicinity of where the boat capsized. It is impossible to discern how many of these jackets came from the Kandi Won or the other boats who responded to the emergency. Stability Test: Neil Gallagher, B.S., M.S., P.E, Professor of Marine Engineering and Naval Architecture at Webb Institute, performed a stability analysis of the Kandi Won on October 18, 2012 after the boat's recovery.2 He first noted that the hull of the boat had no apparent damage. This indicated the most likely cause of the capsizing was "related to the stability of the vessel". Professor Gallagher did a stability test of the vessel "using a procedure called an "inclining experiment" according to methods normally used by U.S. Coast Guard to demonstrate stability on commercial passenger vessels. This method required the boat to be place in the water and outfitted with test equipment. The center of gravity was determined for the empty vessel as well as its "lightship" weight (empty weight) of 16, 500 pounds.
2

The Stability Analysis is attached hereto.

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Then the center of gravity, "lightship" weight and hull shape were used to examine operating stability with various weights on board such as the weights of passengers, fuel, water, etc. The weights and approximate locations of all persons on board the Kandi Won at the time of the capsizing were required information which was obtained through NCPD interviews. All weights and individual centers of gravity were entered into a computer program that uses the hull shape to determine the stability characteristics. The Kandi Won's stability in flat water conditions (no waves) was substantially impacted by the weights on the boat. The empty boat with no fuel and no passengers was slightly less than 2.5 times more stable than the fully loaded boat. The fully loaded boat indicated that it was capable of righting itself when "heeled" (tilted or leaned) in flat water but the boat received a low "score" in this regard. The empty boat with no passengers or fuel would have had adequate stability to return upright when heeled (tilted or leaned), but the boat as loaded at the time of the incident had marginal stability in flat water. One commonly used numerical indication of stability was reduced by about 60% when the empty boat was loaded as it was at the time of the incident. The stability of the Kandi Won was examined against different size waves encountered from various angles. Waves approaching any vessel at a 90 angle to the centerline of the ship's "keel" (center of the hull) "will impart a significant rolling movement". In the case of the Kandi Won the greatest "heel" angle was caused by these 90 waves. "(I)n particular with a 2-foot wave height...the vessel has insufficient stability to remain upright and has capsized." Gallagher observed: When loaded with the twenty-seven persons...there was low stability in flat water, although enough to remain upright. However, in beam (90) waves of only two feet, the boat had inadequate stability to remain upright and was likely to capsize...(T)his analysis demonstrates from a naval architectural standpoint why it happened. While the exact series of events with regards to whether another boat was passing the Kandi Won, and what steering and throttle movements may have been made that had an influence on the capsize, may not be known with certainty, what this analysis shows is that the capsize was very likely to have occurred given the loading...Once the boat rolled to 75 or 80 degrees, the deck and interior would have flooded, and the predictions of heel angle no longer would apply as flooding and sinking at any angle of heel with the deck edge immersed sinking was inevitable...It can be concluded that the load of 27 passengers, located as they were on July 4th led to the capsizing and sinking of the vessel. Eric Sorensen is the author of "Sorensen's Guide to Powerboats". He was also the founding director of J. D. Power and Associates Marine Practice and is a consultant for the Navy, boat builders and boat owners. Mr. Sorenson did a theoretical or "academic" analysis of the capsizing for "Soundings: Trade Only Today", posted online on July 27, 2012. He indicated that the Kandi Won (Silverton boat) had "little depth below the waterline, and it has a correspondingly high center of gravity, with most of the boat's mass well above the waterline." In addition ..."no matter where you are standing on board, your own body's CG (center of gravity)... will be above the boat's CG." He also stated generally "The lower the boat's center of gravity with all passengers and gear on board, the more stable it will be." As a result, Mr. Sorenson states "A planing convertible such as the Silverton would likely capsize at 60 or 70 degrees of list..." 13

It should be reiterated that Mr. Sorenson's analysis was based on boat specifications (rather than an examination of the Kandi Won) and estimated weights using U.S. Coast Guard averages. In conjunction with naval architects David Gerr, Eric Sponberg and Steve Dalzell, Mr. Sorenson found "with 27 passengers on board ...the resulting calculations appear to satisfy the requirements of the 46 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) stability standards which is surprising." (46 CFR actually applies to commercial boats because there is no such stability standard for recreational boats under 20 feet). He goes on to state "Unfortunately there are no passenger capacity regulations for uninspected boats of this size in the United States, as there are in Europe. But in speaking with other designers and operators of similar planing boats, I find that a sort of bell curve of consensus is that 8 to 12 people is a full load for a boat of this type in sheltered waters. Some went as high as 15 people if half were children...I would allow, at most, 3 of those 8 on the flybridge at any given time..." Mr. Sorenson observes that "the Silverton is by every indication a fine inshore boat. Moderately loaded and judiciously operated, it should offer safe and satisfactory service in coastal waters..." In other words, the seaworthiness of the boat is directly related to its loading and operation. Experts agree that the Kandi Won capsized and sank because it was overloaded and apparently encountered a 90 (beam) wave. The wave was likely the result of a vessel of unknown size passing the Kandi Won on its left. It was dark and the specific wave was not observed by the boat's operator or other occupants of the boat. There was no indication the wave was weatherrelated in spite of the approaching storm. The type and design of the boat did not permit it to "right" itself once it tipped and the "deck edge" immersed. At that point, the capsizing and eventual sinking were inevitable according to Professor Gallagher. Recommendations and Proposals: USCG's National Recreational Boating Safety Program, The European Recreational Craft Standard and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) Both NHTSA and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) have a legislative obligation to issue safety standards and regulations to which manufacturers of both motor vehicles and vessels must conform and certify compliance. Both NHTSA and the USCG rely on self-certification programs. There is a distinction in the federal language used and the resulting responsibility. Whereas the U.S. Secretary of Transportation shall promulgate motor vehicle safety standards (through NHTSA), the U.S. Secretary of the Interior may prescribe regulations for recreational vessels. According to its website the USCG's mission is: To minimize the loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and environmental impact associated with the use of recreational boats, through preventive means, in order to maximize safe use and enjoyment of U.S. Waterways by the public. Its vision is: As an agency of the Federal government and a servant of the public, the U.S. Coast Guard, in its role as the designated National Recreational Boating Safety Coordinator, is 14

a leader in improving the boating experience of the maritime public. We are an organization noted for working in partnership with all stakeholders within the waterways activity spectrum and across all modes of transportation to reach consensus solutions. We measure our success by our customer satisfaction, and our customers' needs help define our workload and priorities. Title 46 of the United States Code, Subtitle II - Vessels and Seamen, Part B, Chapter 43, Recreational Vessels contains USCG's legislative directive. According to the USCG website the Recreational Boating Product Assurance Branch is part of the U.S. Coast Guard's Boating Safety Division, and is responsible for developing and enforcing Federal safety standards, investigating consumer complaints, interpreting Federal standards. This includes, but is not limited to: Inspecting and testing recreational boats for compliance. Investigating consumer complaints involving alleged safety defects and non-compliance with Federal standards. Issuing recalls of recreational boats and associated equipment. Encouraging development of voluntary safety standards for recreational boats by international and national standards organizations. Interpreting Federal standards. Handling requests for exemptions to Federal standards. Assigning Manufacturer Identification Codes (MICs) to boat manufacturers. Publishing the Boating Safety Circular newsletter. USCG safety standards are data-driven. Annual boating fatality and injury data are compiled and reviewed as trends. That data indicates the majority of these incidents occur on recreational boats under 20 feet and as a result recreational vessel safety standards are targeted at these boats to the exclusion of larger vessels. The USCG sets minimum safety standards that boat manufacturers must self-certify as being met. The USCG conducts factory visits/inspections to insure compliance. However, consistent with the data-driven approach, the USCG standards do not currently include stability or capacity standards for recreational vessels over 20 feet. Federal pre-emption law prohibits states from creating their own standards. However, the American Boat and Yacht Council (ABYC) sets voluntary manufacturer standards that "include and expand upon the regulations of the USCG". The site goes further to state "Federal Regulations cover very little when it comes to boat construction. This is where the Standards of the ABYC take over". According to its website the ABYC "was created in 1954 as a non-profit organization to develop safety standards for the design, construction, equipage, repair and maintenance of boats. The mission of ABYC is to improve boating safety and reduce the number of injuries and fatalities. Membership is recommended and rewarded." The National Marine Manufacturers Association (NMMA) is a trade association representing the recreational marine industry. It is another voluntary 15

membership organization. NMMA certifies vessels by applying the ABYC standards. An NMMA inspector will inspect each model annually to ensure each vessel is compliant with the applicable USCG and ABYC standards for that model year.3 There is no requirement that these voluntary recommendations/standards must be met. It should be noted that the majority of vessel manufacturers participate in one or both of these programs. However, it should also be noted that the USCG, the ABYC and the NMMA do not provide standards for recreational boats over 26 feet. The Kandi Won was 34 feet in length and therefore not subject to the standards. The inspection of the boat also revealed other hazards that could benefit from industry regulation. The sliding cabin door slammed shut and locked when the boat tipped. The cabin furniture, provided with the boat, was unsecured by design. The couch, table, etc. became obvious projectiles as the boat rolled. It seems clear that safety standards would be appropriate to address these circumstances in the same way that seatbelts and head restraints are mandated for cars. By contrast the European Recreational Craft Directive sets essential requirements for the design and construction of recreational craft which it defines as any craft intended for sport or leisure purposes, regardless of the type or the means of propulsion, with a hull length of 2.5m (just over eight feet) to 24m (just over 78 feet), measured according to the appropriate harmonized standards.4 The directive sets regulations and requirements based on four possible design categories: A OCEAN: Designed for extended voyages where conditions may exceed wind force 8 (Beaufort scale) and significant wave heights of 4 m and above but excluding abnormal conditions, and vessels largely self-sufficient. B OFFSHORE: Designed for offshore voyages where conditions up to, and including, wind force 8 and significant wave heights up to, and including, 4 m may be experienced. C INSHORE: Designed for voyages in coastal waters, large bays, estuaries, lakes and rivers where conditions up to, and including, wind force 6 and significant wave heights up to, and including, 2 m may be experienced. D SHELTERED WATERS: Designed for voyages on sheltered coastal waters, small bays, small lakes, rivers and canals when conditions up to, and including, wind force 4 and significant wave heights up to, and including, 0.3 m may be experienced, with occasional waves of 0.5 m maximum height, for example from passing vessels The European directive requires in section 3.6: The manufacturer's maximum recommended load (fuel, water, provisions, miscellaneous equipment and people (in kg)) for which the boat was designed shall be determined

3 See the comparison between USCG requirements and NMMA Certification Requirements available at http://legcon.nmma.org/certification/about/chart.asp 4 See Directorate General for Internal Policies: Design Categories of Watercrafts, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201206/20120615ATT46965/20120615ATT46965EN.pdf.

16

according to the design category, stability and freeboard (section 3.2) and buoyancy and flotation (section 3.3). Section 2.2 requires a "Builder's plate" - Each craft shall carry a permanently affixed plate mounted separately from the boat hull identification number, containing the following information: The manufacturer's name; CE marking (The mandatory conformity marking for products sold in the European Economic Area [EEA]. It is a statement from the manufacturer that the product meets the requirements of the applicable EC directives. In this case, the recreational craft directive.); The boat design category; The manufacturer's maximum recommended load excluding weight of the contents of the fixed tanks when full; and The number of persons recommended by the manufacturer for which the boat was designed to carry when under way. By comparison to the Coast Guard regulations, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has a legislative "mandate" to issue safety standards and regulations. NHTSA's mandate is under Title 49 of the United States Code, Chapter 301, Motor Vehicle Safety. NHTSA is required to issue Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) and Regulations to which manufacturers of motor vehicle and equipment items must conform and certify compliance. Motor vehicle travel is not a luxury and is inextricably intertwined with the daily living of the American people. As a result, NHTSA has implemented a vehicle safety program that has a wider scope than the National Recreational Boating Safety Program conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard. NHTSA's scope is fundamentally more proactive inasmuch as it regulates and causes all types of motor vehicles to be inspected, regardless of which vehicles are overrepresented in fatal and injury crashes. NHTSA provides for an Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC). According to NHTSA, OVSC tests new vehicles and regulated equipment items to applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs), enforces importation and certification regulations, maintains identifying and VIN-deciphering information submitted by motor vehicle and equipment manufacturers, and monitors light and heavy vehicle fuel economy requirements for credits and monetary penalties. OVSC carries out its mission by conducting random compliance testing, and compliance inspections, and by reviewing import data from the Customs and Border Protection Agency, and fuel economy data from the Environmental Protection Agency. According to NHTSA, the FMVSS is also a self-certification program. The NHTSA does not certify that vehicles or items of motor vehicle equipment meet the requirements of various FMVSSs or issue "approval" stickers, labels, certificates, etc. A NHTSA compliance testing 17

program has been in place since 1968. Each year the OVSC randomly selects vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment for compliance testing by independent testing laboratories under contract with the OVSC to verify that the manufacturer's certification is valid. The OVSC compliance testing program is a strong incentive for manufacturers of vehicles and/or items of motor vehicle equipment to institute and maintain a strong quality control/product surveillance program. Recommendation: Title 46 of the U.S. Code, Chapter 43 was specifically enacted as "a direct response to the dramatic increase in the number of recreational boats and the Congressional recognition of the maritime safety problems that recreational boating has imposed upon our more than 25 million miles of waterways." There are more than 12 million boats registered in the United States. It is advisable for the federal officials to re-visit its approach to recreational vessels. Boating safety regulations should be the mandate of the Secretary of the Interior rather than an "option". Data-driven regulations that pre-empt states from enacting stricter safety measures are counterintuitive. It is difficult to justify regulations that do not encompass all recreational boats. Therefore, we recommend that federal officials examine and revamp the federal approach to this fundamental safety issue and consider adopting the European model or a hybrid that includes broad stability, capacity, design and "intended use" considerations. Capacity Standards: Capacity standards have specific relevance to the capsizing of the Kandi Won. There was no "capacity plate" affixed to the Kandi Won indicating the maximum number of persons or weight the vessel was capable of safely carrying. There is no federal requirement that this basic information be posted on the boat simply because it exceeded 20 feet in length. There was consequently no information about the importance of weight distribution on this particular vessel, with its high center of gravity and flat hull, indicating the critical need to limit the number of person on the fly bridge. It seems to be a matter of common sense that this fundamental information ought to be visibly posted where any operator would see it. This is especially true considering the current state of the law that permits persons with no boater safety training or license to pilot this 34-foot vessel. Capacity standards are currently imposed by federal regulation applying capacity standards to boats less than 20 feet.5 46 USCA 4306 specifically pre-empts any state laws with different boating safety or equipment standards. Until 2012, New York had a requirement that capacity standards must be affixed via plate to all vessels under 26 feet (N.Y. Nav. L. 71-c). Recent legislation repealed 71-c to comply with the federal pre-emption. It is one of the only Navigation Law provisions passed by the legislature in the two legislative sessions preceding the sinking of the Kandi Won. [Note: There were 19 Navigation Law bills submitted in the last two sessions ranging from requiring boater safety certificates to requiring VTL license suspensions after a BWI conviction. The repeal of 71-c, the suspension of the boater safety certificate requirement for leased jet skis under certain conditions and the increased penalties for Boating Leaving the Scene (making them consistent with the VTL) are the only items that passed.]
5

See Code of Federal Regulations 33 CFR 183.21, 183.23.

18

We must call upon New York's elected federal representatives to submit a request for an amendment to 33 CFR 183.21: Proposal: The federal regulations must be changed to require capacity plates on all vessels (public and private) as follows: 183.21 Applicability. [Deletion] Added Language This subpart applies to all mechanically propelled vessels [monohull boats less than 20 feet in length], except sailboats, canoes, kayaks, and inflatable boats. As indicated, New York State cannot require these capacity plates due to the federal preemption. However, if the requested federal change were accomplished, enforcement would become the next necessary step. It would be incumbent on NYS to enact and enforce stepped penalties for capacity violations. The Coast Guard, the Police Marine Bureaus and boating experts (such as the Power Squadrons and NASBLA) should be enlisted to assist in the creation of this legislation. Their expertise should be used to determine which capacity violations should result in violations and fines and which should result in misdemeanor charges. It is equally and critically important that education accompany any regulatory/legislative change. Law Enforcement: The waterways surrounding Long Island have overlapping jurisdictional responsibilities among the federal government, New York State, Nassau and Suffolk counties and local authorities. Interagency assistance and coordination is an essential part of providing appropriate law enforcement coverage that addresses deterrence and public safety. This need has been heightened in recent years as resources have become increasingly strained. Nassau County alone covers 225 square miles of Marine District territory and 300 square miles of Law enforcement was geographically and temporally nearby due to the fireworks display coming to an end. The USCG, NCPD and Town of Oyster Bay, Bay Constables all responded to the capsizing within minutes. There was a fast-moving strong storm that passed through the area that may have played a role in the response time of additional emergency service personnel who were not already on the water. The Atlantic Steamer/Oyster Bay Volunteer Fire Department divers received an alarm, acquired their gear, arrived on scene and conducted the first dive at 11:00 p.m. They recovered Harley Treanors body at 11:10 p.m., approximately one hour after the Kandi Won capsized. Just two minutes later during their second dive, the boat began sinking to its ultimate depth of 65 feet and the dive had to be terminated. NCPD divers, the Cold Spring Harbor Volunteer Fire Department divers, and NYPD divers arrived thereafter. This incident exposed a vulnerability on our waterways. Long Island is fortunate to have the services of so many heroic volunteer firefighters and volunteer rescue divers. The nature of their service relies on those divers receiving an emergency call, obtaining the dive equipment, travelling to the water and then boating to the area of the emergency. In spite of every best effort, valuable time is lost in this process. It is not widely known by Long Islanders engaged in casual water sports that the USCG, Nassau County PD and Bay Constable boats are not regularly equipped with rescue dive gear. These 19

entities are prepared to engage in rescue swimming but their dive operations are targeted toward searches and recoveries rather than rescues. Only the NYPD has rescue dive teams on standby with the aviation capability of getting multiple divers and their equipment in the air and to an emergency quickly. The New York State Police have approximately 65 divers but there are no divers stationed on Long Island. The closest dive unit is located in Troop K in Poughkeepsie, NY. Joy Treanor is Harley Treanors mother. She was not on the Kandi Won at the time it capsized. She became aware of the anomaly that law enforcement boats patrolling Long Islands busy waterways did not have dive equipment through this tragedy. It was incomprehensible to her that a USCG boat was on-scene so quickly, accompanied by the Bay Constables and NCPD, but unable to provide diving assistance. Joy Treanor has actively worked with Christopher Briggs, president of the Bay Constable Benevolent Association, to provide the Oyster Bay Bay Constables with Rapid Diver units. The units include air sources for both the rescuer and the victim. Briggs raised the money to purchase a number of units. On May 21, 2013 the Oyster Bay Town Board agreed to accept the equipment for future use. Two units will be deployed to the south shore and two to the north shore. It is advisable that the U.S. Coast Guard, law enforcement and rescue agencies across Long Island re-open the discussion of inter-agency dependency and resource allocation. This discussion should include the reliance on volunteer rescue divers as well as daily patrol coverage and emergency coordination. Consideration should be given to making members of the U.S. Coast Guard peace officers for the purpose of issuing summons rather than simply "boarding officers" capable of doing safety inspections. Licensing and Other Legislation: In July of 2012 there was no licensing or general boating safety certificate requirement in the State of New York other than the narrow requirement for 10 18 year-old boaters and those operating personal watercraft such as jet skis. According to NASBLA (National Association of State Boating Law Administrators), Alabama is the only state that requires a boating license. 47 states have some form of boating safety course (including New York). Most states only require the course for young operators. 27 states do not require an adult to take a boater education course. 14 states specify a born after date for required certification. Four states have an age and horsepower requirement. New Jersey, Connecticut and Florida are the only three states that do not tie certification to a boaters age. FLA does specify a minimum of 10 horsepower however. There were at least nine bills relating to boating before the legislature in the 2013 session. Only one, a boating safety certificate bill, passed both houses and awaits the Governors signature. If enacted, the bill will ultimately require all persons born on or after May 1, 1996 to obtain a boating safety certificate before regularly operating a boat alone. People born on or before April 30, 1996 are "grandfathered" into the provision and are exempt from the requirement. It is an important step toward a comprehensive boater safety legislative scheme. The bill also authorizes 20

the Commissioner of Parks and Recreation to "develop a method for approving internet-based boating safety courses". This eventual on-line capability (perhaps with an "in-person', proctored exam) is another important step forward. The more accessible boating safety training becomes, the more likely it is to be extended to all boaters. When New Jersey amended its law to require a boating safety certificate for all operators, there were major implementation problems. Apparently there were not enough courses available to meet the needs of both new and existing boaters. Unfortunately the bill falls short of requiring persons renting boats to have a boating safety certificate while jet skiers (owners or renters) are still required to have a certificate. It seems a little like requiring a driver's license for a motorcycle but not for an automobile. However, as a starting point the bill does require that an explanation of the operation of the rental craft and basic navigational rules are given to the renter before operation. This bill still permits boaters as young as 10 years old to continue to operate power boats alone as long as they have a boating safety certificate. It also continues to have no bottom age limit for allowing a child to operate a boat, without a boater safety certificate, as long as they are accompanied by a person who is 18 years old or older and either has a boating safety certificate or is otherwise exempt. The Town of Huntington's Senior Harbor Master, Harry Acker summed up the reality of this continuing provision during the Public Hearing on boating safety conducted by Senator Carl Marcellino on August 8, 2012 in Oyster Bay. Mr. Acker stated in substance: There's nothing to stop a twoyear-old, with an adult on board, from operating a power boat while pulling a water skier. Finally, the bill states "The commissioner ( of Parks and Recreation) is authorized and directed to establish a system for tracking and replacing boating safety certificates issued by the commissioner. The commissioner is further authorized to require that any other entity approved by the commissioner to provide courses of instruction and award boating safety certificates establish a system for tracking and replacing boating safety certificates so as to enable the replacement of lost or stolen certificates to those who have previously been awarded such certificates." This provision was apparently enacted because the entities authorized to provide boating education and boating safety certificates had widely variant practices and could not always replace a lost certificate. It was suggested during the Oyster Bay hearings that all designations relating to the operation of motor vehicles, boats, jet skis (personal watercraft), all-terrain vehicles (ATV) and/or snowmobiles should be centralized through the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) Operator's Record. A driver's license or non-driver I.D. could reflect whether a person had a boating safety certificate rather than relying on the decentralized certificates provided by individual safety trainers. This would be consistent with the requirement that boats be registered through DMV. Likewise, legislation presented by Senator Charles J. Fuschillo, Assemblyman Harvey Weisenberg and others proposed that New York State conform its laws relating to operating while intoxicated or impaired by drugs, operating while intoxicated or impaired with a child in the car, vessel, or other vehicle, leaving the scene of collisions, etc. There should be parity and consistency among the laws relating to operation of motor vehicles, boats (including sailboats), snowmobiles or (ATVs). All vehicle operating suspensions or revocations, as well as all 21

convictions for summons resulting from the operation of any type of vehicle should be contained in this one record. And a second DWI, BWI or OWI conviction from type of vehicle should be elevated to a felony charge based on a prior conviction from any type of vehicle. A truly comprehensive and integrated approach should be the goal. The legislature should be congratulated for taking the first steps necessary toward implementing a comprehensive boating safety legislative scheme for the State of New York. Perhaps this starting point can be used to continue the discussion among legislators, law enforcement and the many boating associations and experts who know what is needed to accomplish New York's boating safety goals. Registration and Inspection of Vessels: Registration of all vessels is required pursuant to N.Y. VTL 2251, (unless the vessel has a US marine or foreign country document which will serve as a substitute for NY registration). Vessel registration is the responsibility of the Department of Motor Vehicles. Vessel registrations assign a unique number, certificate and sticker to the vessel. The registration is valid for three years and can thereafter be renewed. However vessels should not only be registered with DMV, they should be required to undergo a safety inspection in a manner and intervals to be determined by the Commissioner of Parks and recreation. There is something inherently wrong with a legislative scheme that requires the inspection of a trailer carrying a boat, but not the boat itself. Boating privilege and registration suspensions are supposed to be noted on a separate part of the DMV motor vehicle driving abstract pursuant to both the Navigation Law and the DMV regulations. If a boater does not have a driving abstract, a new client ID would be assigned to the boater exclusively to have a record of the status of the boaters operating privilege. Navigation Law 49-a(3)(b) provides: The court shall report each conviction recorded pursuant to this section to the commissioner of motor vehicles and the commissioner of parks, recreation and historic preservation on forms provided by the department of motor vehicles. Such reports shall include the length of any suspension imposed on the privilege to operate a vessel and any suspension imposed against a vessel registration. The department of motor vehicles shall maintain a record of all convictions and suspensions in order to effectuate the provisions of this section. Per this section, DMV is required to post boating while intoxicated convictions/suspensions and boating refusals (if the Department is informed by the court), on the VESSEL/SNOWMOBILE record which follows the regular driving record on a DMV abstract. Significant efforts should be made to improve reporting of all convictions and suspensions relating to all types of vehicles. DMV may to have statistics on this reporting but anecdotally, experienced prosecutors in this office have never seen this record. While the centralization of these records through DMV is a costly undertaking, it is an essential part of an effective boating safety program. Deterrence relies on enforcement and 22

accountability. There is no real accountability if local convictions are not reported and suspensions or revocations are not enforced. Governor Andrew Cuomo recently announced increased access to DMV data for use in legitimate law enforcement investigations and prosecutions. The use of this data can result in solving criminal enterprises ranging from economic crimes to child abductions to hit and run crashes. The data also has use in terrorism investigations. It is essential for all purposes that the data is accurate and thorough. Title 46 of the U.S. Code provides (in pertinent part); "(c) A State whose recreational boating safety program has been approved by the Secretary is eligible for allocation and distribution of amounts under this chapter to assist that State in developing, carrying out, and financing its program. Matching amounts shall be allocated and distributed among eligible States by the Secretary as provided by section 13104 of this title." As New York State proceeds with creating a comprehensive boating safety program, perhaps the Secretary of the Interior would consider an application to support that program and the computer upgrades essential to its success. Conclusion: The tragedy of the Kandi Won was unspeakable. It was the catalyst for public hearings and legislation. All stakeholders must be open to new common sense regulations to improve boater safety. Federal policymakers should re-examine the role of the federal governments effectiveness in the area of recreational boating safety. New York State must continue to advance the cause of boating safety through comprehensive and consistent legislation. Local governments must review their own procedures during water events to determine whether additional precautions are necessary, just as the Town of Huntington did after the incident on July 4, 2012. The New York State Department of Parks and Recreation is the state's leader in the field of recreational boating, and the Department should consult with boating experts and associations, members of law enforcement and local governments to create a strategic boating safety plan with specific regulatory, legislative and educational goals. New York State should become the national model for boating safety.

23

STABILITY Al'lALYSIS OF THE VESSEL K."NDI WON

0)/
JULY 4
TH ,

2012

1'1
OYSTER BAY, NY

November 25, 2012


Performed For

Nassau County Pollee Department


Neil Gallagher. P.E.

1.0) Introduction On July -tlh , 2012 the 3-t' Silverton powerboat KANDI WO:-': capsized and sank in Oyster Bay Harbor. NY. leading to the deaths of three of the 27 passengers on the vessel. After the sinking. the vessel was raised and no apparent damage to the hull was found, indicating that the most likely cause of the capsize was related to the stability of the vessel. At the request of the Nassau County Police Department (NCPD). a stability analysis was made to detennine the probable cause of the capsize. This report presents the result of the analysis.

2.0) Methodology This analysis follows the methods nonnally used for any commercial passenger vessel required by the US Coast Guard to demonstrate adequate stability. There are n.,.o main components of the analysis: a stability test of the vessel using a procedure called an inclining experiment, and calculations that use the results of the stability test to detennine the floating, or hydrostatic, characteristics. The stability test is done to measure the weight and the position of the center of gravity of the empty .,.esse!. commonly called the "lightship weight and center of gravity". The center of gravity can be considered the average point of all the weight of the vessel and is critical for detennining stability. The second pan of the stability analysis is to use the weight and center of gravity infonnation determined in the stabilit)', lest. along with a hull shape description provided by a lines plan. to examine the stability of the vessel when operating with loads such as passengers. fuel. water. and any other weight element. The weight and center of gravity of each load item is combined with the lightship weight and center of gravity to detennine the total weight and center of gravity of the loaded vessel. The hull shape is then used to determine the equilibrium of weight and buoyancy, and the stability characteristics o[the loaded vessel can be detennined. Traditionally this detennination was made by hand calculations from data taken off the lines plans. In modem times this is done by entering the hull shape into a computer program thaI then perfonns the stability calculations. In the case ofKANOI WON, there was no information available with regards to either the hull shape or the lightship weight Although a popular boat, the builder has gone out of business. Some attempts were made to delennlne the designer (often not an employee of the builder), in order 10 ask for the lines. but they were unsuccessfuL Instead, measurements were made on the boat when it was in the Marine Bureau facility of the NCPD, and used in a CAD program called AutoCad to create a lines plan. In order to determine the lightship weight and center of gravity. a stability test was conducted on the vessel. It was placed in the water at the Marine Bureau facility, outfitted with test equipment and the test was perfonned by the author with assistance from NCPD personnel. In executing

the test, lhe procedures Hamuilly employed by a US Const Guard approved stability analysis were followed to maximum extent possible. The weights and locations of all the persons on board on July 4th were required infonnation. ),""CPD personnel interviewed the passengers after the incident and provided a graphic that showed the weight and approximate location of each person on board. This data was used to determme the actual loading condition at the time of the incident. The computer program used in the analysis is General Hydrostatics, or GHS, created by Creative Systems, Inc .. in Port Townsend. \VA. GHS is one of the most widely used stability programs in the US. and is recognized by the US Coast Guard, among others, for fully approwd stability work on commercial vessels. The lines plan created in AutoCad was entered into GHS to create the computer model used for the analysis. Once the hull shape and weight data were entered into GHS. it was possible to examine the stability of the KANDI WON as it was operating at the time ofIhe incident. The stability in flat water was first examined. followed by Ihe stability in waves.

3.0) Hull Shape and Model: The figures below show the hull shape developed from measurements of the hull and created in GHS:

---------------L--.,
---........

------Figure I: Profile (above) and deck plan (below)


3

Figure 2: Hull sections. isometric (above) and body plan (below). In the model and in all subsequent calculations, the origin point for longirudinal and venical locations was the bottom of the transom at centerline, as this was the most easily accessible point for measurements. Additionally. the baseline extends forward through this point and serves as a reference for drafts and trim. The baseline's angle to the hull happens to be parallel to the floor orthe building at the time the measurements were made. but this line's angle is arbitrary, as long as all dimensions and drafts are consistently made from it in this analysis.
It should be nOled that the hull shape was modeled only up to the deck edge. In this analysis, it was presumed that once the vessel rolled to the point that the deck edge was inuncrsed, the boat would flood, without recovery. This was due to the open nature of the hull, particularly aft of the deckhouse, as well as the open windows at the side of the hOllse. There were additional openings
4

on the hull below the deck edge Ihat would lead 10 nooding under angles of heelless than deck immersion: there were two large port holes left open in the forward cabin. and there are two vents aft for air entrance inlo the engine room. These openings would have caused flooding at large heel angles prior to capsize. but as will be seen below they were probably not significant in the case of a sudden capsize.

4.0) Stability Test: The stability test was performcd on October IS th 2012. Sincc the purpose of the test was to determine the lightship weight and center of gra\-ity of the KANDI WO::--J on July 4lh , it was th important that the \"essel was in the same condition as on the 4 before the incident. Some minor damage had occurred as a result of the sinking and raising. including the dislocation of the swim platform. an interior couch and the awning over the flying bridge, but these were replaced prior to the test. Many smaller interior items were damaged, and there was a coating of mud over much of the interior. but nothing of significant weight appeared to be out of position. The vessel had been on blocks for se\'cral months prior to the test. so everything inside had dried out. It was therefore assumed that the vessel was in essentially the same weight condition as on July 4th , with the exception of the fuel tanks. These had fuel in them at the time of the sinking. but lhey were drained prior to the test. Since their location was known the weight of the fuel could be accounted for by calculation. The \veight of the vessel \vas determined by taking freeboard measurements from the deck edge to the waterline with the vessel in its as-inclined condition. From the freebonrds the drafts at the forward and an end were detennined and entered into GHS. GHS sets the hull to those drafts and knowing the hull shape detennines the displacement which equals the weight. in the asinclined condition. By calculation the weight of items onboard during the stability test but not included in Ughtship are deducted (these are primarily the testing equipment and personnel). resulting in the determination of the lightship weight. shown below in Figure 3 as 16.500 lb. This is significantly higher than the stated weight of the Silverton 34 in the product literature, but such discrepancies between acrual and advertised ,"veights are not uncommon. The as-inclined fore and aft location of the center of gravity, normally referred to as the longitudinal center of gravity (LeG) as it is located at the same fore and aft location as the center of buoyancy of the hull determined by GHS. Calculations were then used to correct the asinclined LCG to the lightship LCG. The inclining segment of the stability test resulted in a determination of venical center of gravity (VCG) of the vessel in Ihe as-inclined condition. Briefly. this was accomplished by moving weights to one side in a series of steps. causing the vessel to heel. The resulting heel angle at each step was carefully measured by three instruments: a pendulum, a digital inclinometer with an output to a computer, and digirallevel read manually. The weight movements and angle measurements were repeated to the opposite side. By recording the amount of weight and distance moved each step, the relationship of heeling moment and Ihe heel angle gave the asinclined stability. from which the as-inclined VCG was detennined. By calculation Ihe effect of

the items not part of lightship was accounted for and the resulting weight and location of the lightship center of gravity was found. The results are also shown in Figure 3. The data and calculations from the stability test are included in the Appendix.
LCG ft Fwd 0 As-Inclined 12.63 -1,729 Wls to Deduct: 10.35 LiQhlship 16,518 12.87 , Figure oJ: Stability Test Results
5.0) Passenger Weight

Item:

Weight Ib 18,247

VCG ft ABL 3.90 6.40 3.64

The other major weight element was the passenger weight and center of gra\ity. The approximate weight and location of all 27 passengers was obtained by NePD through interviews with passengers after the incident and provided for this analysis as sketches sho\Vlng weights and locations. The sketches were used with the CAD model to detennine each passenger's weight. vertical and horizontal distance from the origin point at the bottom of the transom. These were entered into a spread sheet, also shown in the Appendix. from which a single value of weight. horizontal and vertical center of gravity was found. These are sbown in Figure 4 below. These values were entered in GHS as a single weight element representing all the passengers at the time of the incident.
Total Passenger Weight

Weight,lb 3,523

lCG, ft 12.22

VCG,ft 8.65

Figure 4: Passenger weIght summary

6.0) Fuel Weight One remaining significant weight element was the fuel in the tanks. There are two tanks, one each P0rl and starboard, located under the deck at the aft end of the boat, and each tank has a capacity or 130 gallons. It was observed that both tanks had crushed and rupmred due to water pressure during the sinking. so there W<lS no way of knowing the acmal amount of fuel in the tanks prior to the capsize. Consequently in the stability annlysis the cases of full, half-full and empty tanks were considered to see how much the fuel weight affected the results. The fuel was entered as weights inlO the GHS model. (This ignores stability corrections for the fuel sloshing in the tank, which would he very small.) The locations were based on observation of the tanks on the vessel and put in the CAD drawing of the hull to detennine the location of the center of gravity of the fuel.

7.0) Stability Calculations - Flat Water With the \veight data entered into GHS. stability wns detennined ror two conditions: in flat water and in waves. The principal measure of stability in nat water is a quantity known as GM. or metacemric height. and it is a measure of the ability of a noating vessel to relum uprighl when heeled by wind or waves. A positive G.Y1 (greater than zero) indicates a \'essel will right itself when heeled, while a negative GM (less than zero) indicates a vessel is in danger of capsizing. (In the Appendix a brief explanation orthe term GM is given.) For KANDI WON the GM in the July 4 th load condition was calculated by GHS and found 10 be as shown below in Figure 5 for the Ihree cases of fuel load:
Fuel Tank load: 100% 50% 0% 16,518 16,518 16,518 lightship weight, lb Passenger weight, lb 3,523 3,523 3,523 1,820 Fuel weight, lb 0 910 I Total Displacement, Ib 21,861 20,951 20,041 1.25 1.31 1.38 GM, It - GM for each fuel tank load. figure): lightship 16,518 0 0 16,518 3.09

The GM \'alues in Figure 5 are quite low for a typical power boat of the style of the Silvenon 34. A major cause of the low GM is the passenger \veight and venical center of gravity, as can be seen by the last column to the right in Figure 5. Ln the lightship case. the weight of the passengers and fuel are removed. and it can be seen thal the GM in the lightship condition is 3.09 ft.
An additional measure of stability is the righting ann curve, \vhich while not discussed in this narrative. is included in the Appendix for thoroughness.

8.0) Stability Calculations -In Waves The stability condition in waves is of great interest in this case. While there were no large natural waves present, interviews of the operator and passengers on the \'esse! indicate thai other boats were in the immediate vicinity ofKANDI WON and travelling in the same direction. The reports are nOI entirely clear, but KANDI WON appears to have encountered significant wakes from those boats. Waves approaching any vessel from directly ahead or astern will cause the vessel to pitch. while waves approaching from directly abeam will impan a significant rolling moment. Waves approaching in benveen the beam and the bow or stem are called quanering wa\'es and cause a combination of pitch and roll. GHS has the ability to examine the resultant stability condition if a wave is encountered from any angle and thus changes the buoyancy supponing the hull. This was used in these calculations to examine the resulting condition with waves of varying size and direction of approach. In these wave calculations. the fuel load was considered to be 50% in each tank for simplicity, as fuel load has a small effect on the results. A 3D-foot wavelength \vas assumed as a typical wake's wavelength.

Figure 6 shows the sUll1malY of the resulting heel angle caused by the vessel encountering waves at 45-degree increments. where zero degrees represents a wave approaching from astern and 180 represents wave approaching from the bow. These results can be thought of as a static case: in other words, if the vessel were positioned on a sloped waterplane. the table shows the resulting angle of heel. This is in contrast to a dynamic case in which the momentum of the rolling vessel is incorporated into the analysis. In this analysis. the static case can be considered the less severe case of response to a wave.

Condition: SO% Fuel, All Passengers Wave length: 30 ft Wave Height, h Approach Angle (from stern), degrees Static heel angle, degress Wave Height, h Static heel angle, degress

1 0 0

1 45 9.3

1 90 46 2 90 167

11 1351 9.3 2 135 20

1 180 0 2 180 0

Approach Angle (from stern), degrees

2 2 45 0 01 20 FIgure 6: Wave analySIS results

As can be seen by examining Figure 6, the waves from abeam. 90 degrees. cause the greatesl heel angle. and in panicular with a wa\'c beight. the resultant angle of heel is 167 degrees. which simply means that the \essel has insufficient stability to remain upright and has capsized.

9.0) Accuracy of Results


In any engineering analysis the results will only be as good as the information and assumptions

used as inputs. In this analysis. a brief discussion of these inputs is in order. Hull shape: as mentioned above, no lines plan was available for detennination of the hull shape. There was inevitably some inaccuracy involved in the measurementS taken with the boal on a concrete surface. However. the measurements were generally accurate to less than one inch. and the difference in buoyancy caused by this amount will nOI significantly change the results. While more accurate methods of measuring the hull surface do exist, they involve a photographic or laser survey to generate a 3dimensional surface model and were prohibitively expensive.

Stability Test - Condition of the wssel: the key infonnation detennined by the stability test was the lightship weight and center of gravity. The boat was ccnainly not in nonnal operating condition during the test since it had gone through a capsize. sinking. spending over a week on the bottom and raising. Although the interior was mud-covered and loose equipment in shambles. the major weight items were in place. One question regarding hull weight is the possibility that water could have emered in core of the hull and increased its weight. However. there was no sign on the exterior of the hull that any cracks or holes had developed, makLng it unlikely that water dJmage had OCCUlTed to the hull. Location of passengers: again a key pan of the analysis. the accuracy of the weight and venical positions of the passengers is thought to be quite good. The infoftnntion provided shows a sketch with the layout and each passenger's weight indicated on the sketch. The only estimate made herein is whether each passenger was seated or standing and the difference in wl1ical center relative to the baseline for either case is not great. The data is probably the best that could be obtained under the circumstances of this incident.

10.0) Conclusions The purpose of this analysis was to examine the stability characteristics of powerboat WON in its load condition on July 4 1b 2012. and to determine what led to the capsize. When loaded with the twenty-seven persons as it was. there was low stability in flat water, although enough to remain upright. However, in beam waves of only two feet. the boat had inadequate stability to remain upright and was likely to capsize. This of course is what happened. bUllhis analysis demonstrates from a naval architectural standpoint why it happened. While the exact series of events with regards to whether another boat was passing the KA.' \Dl WON, and what steering and throttle movements may have been made that had an influence on the capsize, may not be known with cenainty, what this analysis shows is that the capsize was very likely to have occurred given the loading. II should be noted that while Figure 6 above shows a final heel angle of 167 degrees in beam seas, it is merely a notional equilibrium angle. Once the boat rolled to 75 or 80 degrees, the deck and interior would have flooded. and the predictions of heel angle no longer would apply as flooding and sinking at any angle of heel with the deck edge immersed sinking \vas inevitable. While analysis does not include a sensitivity study, such as what would have happened if fewer passengers were onboard, or if they were located lower in the vessel, a brief analysis of the stability with tcn persons, located on the main deck forward and aft, shows that significant heel angles would have occurred but nm led to capsizing. It can be concluded that the load of27 passengers. located as they were on July 4 th led to the capsizing and sinking of the vessel.

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

APPENDIX

APPENDIX
STABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE VESSEL KANDI WON ON

JUL Y 4TH 2012


IN OYSTER BAY. NY

A'

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

APPENDIX

Description ofGM:

Stability is the measure of any vessel's abilit)' to return to an upright condition when it is caused to heel by wind. waves or an)' other disturbance. The following is a brief description of the quantitative measure of stability for a floating vessel. Consider a vessel floating upright. as in Figure Al belo\\'. The point G is the average" poin! of all the weight of the vessel and is called the center of gravity. G is nonnall)' on the centerline. and does not move. once a vessel is loaded. The averagelocation of all the buoyancy, B, known as the center of buoyancy, is also on centerline assuming the hull is symmetric. G thus represents all the weight of the vessel acting down at one point. and B represents the point of all the upward force of water keeping the vessel afloat.

WATERUNE _ _

-+

-i

l-_ c
B

SHIP UPRIGHT, 8 AND G ON CENTER UNE

Figure Al, vessel upright. Now assume the hull has been caused to heel to some angle as in Figure A2. It can be seen that as it heels, the section of the hull below the waterline is no longer symmetric. and B, the 'average" point of buoyancy moves to the low side. as more orthe hull on that side is immersed. Consequently the upward buoyancy force B is acting outboard of the downward gravity force at G, causing the vessel to return upright. This is a condition of positive stability. At any angle of heel, the center of buoyancy B will always be loc.ated somewhere along an are, as shown in Figure A2, and the center of that arc is a poim known as M. the metacenter. As long as the average weight point G is below M. as in Figure A2. the buoyancy force B will always be outboard of the gravity force G causing the vessel to right itself when heeled. However. ifG happens to rise above M, as in Figure A3, any angle of heel will now put the gravity force G outboard of B. In this case, G now acts relative to B to increase, rather than decrease. the angle of heel and this is what leads capsizing. In other words. having G above M is an unstable condition. From Figure A2 it can be secn that the grealer rhe distance G is below M the grealer the righting moment will be. This distance is known as GM. or metacentric height; GM is considered
A-2

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

APPENDIX

positi\e when G is below M and negative ifG is above M. The value ofGM is the fundamental measure of the stability ora floating vessel.

WATERlINE_--,L

+fG

---jL_

G BELOW M. SHIP RETURNS UPRIGHT

Figure A-2. positive GM

WATERlINE_---jL

++

-+_

G ABOVE M. SHIP ROLLS OVER

Figure A-3, negative GM

A-3

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

APPENDIX

Figure A-4, inclining experimem setup. port side.

Figure A-5, inclining experiment setup, stbd side.

Digital Levels"""',c--J

Pendulum

Weights

Figure A-6, inclining experiment: weights moved, reading pendulum & level indicators on steps.
A-4

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

APPENDIX

Figure A-7, pendulum and oil damper.

Fig. A-S. digital levels.

Figure A-9. measuring freeboards.

A-S

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

APPENDIX

!
l

m m
m m

./
,

./
m/

m m

./
./
I"

._dF

Figure A-IO: inclining experiment plot of rangents

Freeboards

Meas

LOClllon'

, ",
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

;"

0.'d' " eb 118 ths


2 2

sdFbd

Hull

Deck

Bulwk

Draft

'"
Bow 394" FWd Port 50 50
59 53 50.25 50.25 59.00 5350 57.50 51.00 5225 47.38 43-25

De

HI

;"
6657

;"
0000 0.000

'"
...

'"
16.320 16.320 16320 12.500 18000 15250 12 10

Dist fr 0

Draft

'"39'
293
203 10'

6657
71.50 71.50 69.60 69.60 66.82

931n FWd

Poo

203 In Fwd

Pon

57 51
52
47

0
2 3 2

0.000

16.320 15.250 15.350 17.008 17.375

;"

0000
Ave'"

slope=- -000398 Intercept: 17.0511


Draft at boW'" [)faft at stem:

0000 0000
Ave;

t8
15350
14

15.483 17.375 1.290 1.448

1Q4ln FWd

Port

Sib' Tran5(lm,O"
Pon

6682
58.75

0000 0000
Ave'"

o ,an. at stem, n. '"

Draft 011 bow,ft '"

19445 1

43

39

39.

0000
Ave'"

15 500
1 17 375

1 Freeboll(d measured from underslde 01 rub ral 2. Hull depth measurements made Ie baseline localed at transom lowest pOint, see

scaled & lines.dwg"

Figure AI I: inclining experiment freeboards and drafts,


A6

STABILITY ANALYStS KANDI-WON

APPENDIX

1l5.-.a

MOO

&9.60

1:&.
,

..

,..

.--,,-"
.

INCLINING FREEBOARDS & DRAnS

..

..

1& / ,.... ,.,..'"" "'"

v V

,."

Figure A12: inclining experiment frceboards and drafts plot.

WEIGHT and DISPLACEMENT STATUS Baseline draft: 1.448 @ Origin Trim: Fwd 0.28 deg., Heel: zero Part-----------------------------Wei;ht(LB}----LCG-----TOG----VCG WEIGET 18,247 12.64t 0.00 0.00 SpGr------Displ(LB}----LCB-----TCB-----VCB------RefHt HULL 1.021 18,247 12.63t 0.00 0.79 -1.45
Righting A... ...s: 0.00 0.00 Distances in FBET.------------------------------------------------------------

Baseline Draft Baseline Draft

@ @

0.00 1.448 32.87a .. 1.290 HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIES Trim: Fwd 0.16/32.88, No Heel, VCG - 0.00

LCF Displacement Buoyancy-ctr. Weight/ Moment/ Draft----Weight(LB)----LCB-----VCB-----Inch-----LCF---In trim----GML-----GMT 1.507 18,247 12.63f 0.79 1236 12.35f 2074.06 44.8 6.26 Distances in FEET.-------specific Gravity" 1.022.-----------Moment in Ft-LB. Trim is per 32.BSFt Draft is from Baseline.
HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIES Trim: Fwd 0.1E/32.S8, No Heel

Origin Displacement Center of Buoyancy Depth----Weight(LB}----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----W?A-----LCF------BHL-----aHT I.H8 18,247 12.63f 0.00 0.79 233 12.35f 44.0 5.47 in FEET.-------Specific Gravity" 1.022.--------------------------

Figure A-I3: GHS Output for inclining experiment., as-inclined.

A7

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WDN

APPENDIX

--. . "
"'-

."

...
AS-INCUNED CONDmON

Figure A-14: inclining experiment, location of items to deduct.

WEIGHTS TO OEOUCT

,
.. .-.00 lIFoO
Flllm Cl. I Mom

, , ,

0..:

",;)!II' C'UM Nc 2

. "-

'. r.M

"GJ

-'-

Figure A-IS: inclining experiment, weighl and center of deducted items.


NCPO Stability Test 10i18f2012

:'"
>

"

.B: .. , ,-, "'

" " - '" ,

...,
u, u,
;

S'I5lO

IILOCfI

, "
"

" " ,. ." " .00 "


:Jll

...
"

,
,,"'IiL

.,.,
,

. ,w,

'.)Sl n Aat

, , "

,,. ,

liGHTSHIP WSGHT AND CENTERS

As. INCUNED D1SR..ACEMENT


Slope of Targent

curve

182/17 III (GHS Clutp.)tj 2.3217/1E-Q5 111HD usu'lO

Pen<lJk.m 1&2

AslncIlned As--Incllne<! As-Inclined As-Inclined As-Inclined

GM " 1/(OSptacemernlope) Lee .. 8M " KB" KG "

2Jon
1263 ft FVv'O Transom (OJ 541 f1

079 I'l

I:em

'No
to

"' -,,..,.,.,, w:.s Dedl.a


Cer(1!l"

Log'"'of ' Gravity

, ,

18247 172'S ,

lCG
ftFwdO

l-uorn
11-10

VCG

''''
V-Mom

".,
1035

'AEL

230'60
-17901

'"

20_
1287 ft Fwd 0

'''' ''''

71 155 11061

'-b

6O,IEO 3&1 nABL

Figure A-16. calculation of lightship weight and center of gravity.


A-S

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

APPENDIX

.. c.

E
'

" . l

r' ; ..

. .

KANOI WON

PASSENGER
WEIGHTS AND

--I-LocAnoNS ON

m,

--tc Sased on
NCPO Numbers boxes

JULY 4TH, 2012

21'
_ _ ..
,...........

--Hwith passengers by

r- J
,

..... _

,,,

_3

In

,
\
FORE DECK

are - t l spreadsheel --+-lin

passengerslD

calculatIOns

FLYING

BRJDGELl1Li<--'l."",,',,_f_ . (SS)

'i2

51>
15

1.1:-.
VO (!15

LAFT DECK

Figure A-17, stability analysis, location of passengers (I).


A-9

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

APPENDIX

\.

\.

\. \.

\ \ \

Ifc):\

23

........
ICABIN

Figure A-18, stability analysis, location of passengers (2).


A-l0

>93.9----------------353.7

I
I I I
251.1

I
I

323. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
131.7

v;

" " "

o "

I
99.'
2
,5 PASS PASS
AS I

"
--0I-

, "
34.616.5-

10,1 8,9

9.50
2.50-,

PASS
16 18

76.0 117.4

I
27
25, P2ASS 23,

R
24 26
81.5 78.6

" o " X

23.5

7. 97.9

73.3

41.4

'v
112.5
127.3

""
PASSENGER LOCATIONS
Figure A-19, Passenger location diagram.

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

APPENDIX

NCfO IrlYestigation

Pusenser Loutions
NePO Fa_. Pf'rFu Pass, No Wf'ight Long'l InfwdO' Long'l Ft [WoO 29.50 29.50 29.50 26.92 20.92
20.92

9/V./12

leng'1

Trans

Trans

Vo"
Cede Ht'
In A8L

Ib

Mom

, ,
2

90
84 120 220
155

'"

"<, 2655
2478

Ft P(.1I5f-)

Mom

2 0 0 2 -2

"<b180

atlV ok l

...

FtABL

.
7.11 7.11 7.11

Von Mom
fl-Ib

m
73.3

" 12.0
12.0 12.0 16.0 1'1.0 14.0 14.0

,
5

'" '"
323

"'0
5922 3242

10
11

, 1''
129
55

251 251 251

....
0 0
2S8 -280

2693

20.92

2928
2145 523

100 195
56 175

132 132

1LOO
11.00

,
e

.1.5 "5 .1.5


117.4 117.4 117.4 117.4 117.4 117.4 117.4 117.4 41.4

770

597 853 1705

""

II' II'

._SO

-2 2 0 -2
4

""
0
-110 -224

"'-0 "'-0
36.0 36.0

12 13 14

110
117

15
16

180
140 210
115

100 100 100 100

.50 8.33
8.33 8.33 8.33 6.75 6.75 6.75 2.92 4.33 2.92 1.42 10.58
9.42

532
1458

917
975

'SO
0
-234

"0
30.0 30.0 36.0 30.0 30,0 30.0

13.78 a7B 12.78 12.78 13.78 12.28


12.28

" " '_96

123<
1027 1114 1378

2688 703

716
2412 1351 1437 2301

1500

17 18 19

20
21 22

" "
25 26

200 65 115 120 106 190 165


91
3523 Ib

" "

"

1'1'

."
no
282

,
2 0

-no

81

52 3S

135
17(1 1122 7S3 1552 1746

'"

e
4

560 420 0 0 -260


-460

'"

4
4

17 127
113

-<ao
530 950 -130
182

'"

27
Pus WI'

98 127 98

8.17 10.58 8.17 Pass LCG:

5 5 5 -2

41.4 41.4 41.4 41.441.4 41.4

12.78 5.95 5.95 5.95

.13
1250 684

"'-0
30.0

7_'-5
5.95 5.78 5.78 5.95 5.95

"'-0 "'-,0

""

'43
43038 12.22 ft Fwd 0

-2

'" '" '"

'"

30" 30" 30.0


"_0 "'-_0

'"'' '" 780 '1' '"


'7'
1131

5,95

','-5
6.78

1229
617 3<"77

Pass VCG:

8.65 tt ABL

Assumptions: 1.lol18's & Vf'rtic3l klcJtiorlS from CAD model Yeg above deck tJ.. on each's weight ilJld on locatiOll, whethef assumed seated or standing

Figure A-lO, passenger weight and cenler of gravity calculation.

A-12

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

APPENDIX

WEIGHT and DISPLACEMENT STATUS Baseline draft: 1.945 @ Origin Trlm: Aft 0.53/32.88, Heel: zero Part------------------------------Weight(LBj----LCG-----TCG-----VCG LIGHT SHIP 16.518 12.87t 0.00 3.64 PASSENGERS 3,523 12.22f 0.00 8.65 Fuel Tank Port 910 2.04f 3.00p 2.02 Fuel Tank stbd 910 2.04f 3.00s 2.02 Total Weiqht--------> 21,861 11.86f 0.00 4.31 SpGr------Displ(L3j----LCB-----TCB-----VCB------RetHt HULL 1.025 21,861 lI.81f 0.00 0.93 -1.95 Riqhtinq Ar!llS: 0.00 0.00 Distances in FEEr.------------------------------------------------------------

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIES Trim: Aft 0.53/32.88, No Heel, VCG. 4.31


LCF Buoyancy-etr. Weight/ Ho.ent! Dratt----Weiqht(LBj----LCB----VC9-----Inch-----LCF---In trim----GML-----GHT 1.146 21,861 1l.Blf 0.93 1242 12.31f 1841.90 33.3 1.25 Distances in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.-----------Homent in Ft-LS. Trim is per 32.BBFt Draft is from Baseline.

Figure A-21. GM with 100010 load in fuel tanks.


WEIGHT and DISPLACEMENT STATUS Baseline draft: 1.727 @ Ori;in Trim: Aft 0.11/32.88, Ileel: zero Part------------------------------Weiqht{LB)----LCG-----TCG-----VCG LIGHT SHIP 16,51B 12.87f 0.00 3.64 PASSENGERS 3,523 12.22f 0.00 8.65 Fuel Tank Port 455 2.04t 3.00p 2.02 Fuel Tank Stbd 455 2.04f 3.005 2.02 Total Weiqht--------> 20,951 l2.29t 0.00 4.41 SpGr------Displ(LB)----Lca-----TCB-----VCB------RefHt HULL 1.025 20,946 l2.28f 0.00 0.89 -1.73 Riqhting Arms: 0.00 0.00 Distances in FEET.-----------------------------------------------------------HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIES Trim: Aft 0.11/32.B8, No Heel, VCG - 4.41 LCF Displacement Buoyancy-Ctc. Weight/ Moment! Draftw---WeiqhtlLE)----LCB-----VCB-----Inch-----LCF---In tric----GML-----GMT 1.6B4 20,94.6 12.28f 0.89 1246 12.37f 187B.82 35.4 1.31 Distances in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.-----------Moment in Ft-LB. Trio i3 per 32.B8Ft Draft is froe Ba5eline.

Figure A-22, GM with 50% load in fuel tanks.

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANOI-WON

APPENDIX

WEIGHT and DISPLACEMENT STATUS Baseline draft: 1.510 @ Oriq1n Trin: Fwd 0.30/32.88, Heel: zero Part------------------------------Weiqht(LBl----LCG-----TCG-----VCG LIGHT SHIP 16,518 12.87f 0.00 3.64 PASSENGERS 3,523 12.22f 0.00 8.65 Total Weight--------> 20,041 12.76f 0.00 4.52 HULL Riqht1nq 1.025 20,041 12.79f 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 -1.51

in FEET.------------------------------------------------------------

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIES Trim: Fwd 0.30/32.88, No Heel, VCG - 4.52 LCF Buoyancy-etr. Weightl Draft----Weiqht(LB)----LCB-----VCB-----Inch-----LCF---In trim----GHL-----GHT 1.624 20,041 12.79t 0.86 1252 12.46f 1920.44 37.8 1.38 Distances in FEET.-------Spec1f1c Gravity - 1.025.----------Moment 1n Ft-LB. Trim is per 32.B8Ft Draft from Baseline.

Figure

GM with 0% load in fuel tanks.

STATUS draft: 1.269 @ Origin Tric: Fwd 0.32/32.88, Heel: zero Part------------------------------Weiqht(LE1----LCG-----TCG-----VOG LIGHT SHIP 16,518 12.87! 0.00 3.64 rotal Weight--------> 16,518 12.87f a.ao 3.64 HULL 1.025 16,518 12.90f 0.00 0.72 -1.27

WElGET and

Righting Arms: 0.00 0.00 Distances in FEET.----------------------------------------------------------

HYDROSTATIC PROPBRTIES Tric: Fwd 0.32/32.88, No Heel, VCG - 3.64 LCF Displaceaent Buoyancy-ctr. Weiqhtl Momentl

1.386 16,518 12.90f 0.72 1233 12.30f 1893.11 45.2 3.09 Distances in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.-----------Homent in Ft-LB. Trim per 32.88Ft Draft is from Baseline.

Figure A24. OM of lightship (no passengers or fuel).

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

APPENDIX

FIGURE A-25: STABILITY ANALYSIS ON IFT WAVE. WAVE ENCOUNTER ANGLES FROM 0 DEG (ASTERN) TO 180 (AHEAD).
WEIGh"! and DISPLACE."!!Nl' STATUS draft: 1.727 @ Oriqin Tria: Mt 0.11/32.88, Heel: zero Part-----------------------------Weight(LB)----LCG-----TCG-----VOG LIGHT SHIP 16,518 12.87f 0.00 3.64 PASSENGERS 3,523 12.22f 0.00 8.65 Fuel Tank Port 455 2.0H 3.00p 2.02 Fuel Tank Stbd 455 2.0H 3.00s 2.02 Total Weight--------> 20,951 12.29f 0.00 4.41 SpGr----+-Displ(LBI----LCB-----TC3-----VCB------RefHt HULL 1.025 20.951 12.28f 0.00 0.89 -1. 73 Rightinq Arms: 0.00 0.00 Distance" in FBT.-----------------------------------------------------------HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIES Trim: Aft 0.11/32.88, No Heel, VCG - 4.41 LCF Displaceunt Buoyancy-etr. Weight/ Moment/ Draft----Weiqht(LBl----LCB-----VCB-----Inch-----LCF---In tria----GHL-----GMT 1.684 20,951 12.28! 0.89 1246 12.37f 1878.86 35.4 1.30 Distances in FEEf.-------Specific Gravity in Ft-LB. Trim is per 32.88Ft Draft is from Baseline. WAVE Wave type: SINUSOID Phase of crest relative to oriqin: 90.0 deqrees (7.50 Ft) Wave length: 30.00 Ft Crest-to-trough height: 1.00 Ft PROPERTIES Trim: Aft 1.52/32.88, No Heel Origin Displacement Center of Buoyancy Depth----weight{LB)----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----WPA-----LCF------BML-----BMT 2.316 20,952 12.1Jf 0.00 0.91 233 12.27f 38.1 4.84 Distances in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.----------+--------------Wave in effect.

WAVE DESCRfPTlON Wave type: SINUSOfD Phase of crest relative to origin: 190.0 degrees (15.83 Ft) Wave length: 30.00 Ft height: 1.00 Ft Angle of encounter: 45 degrees (starboard quarterinq sea)

A-IS

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WDN

APPENDIX

FIGURE A-25 (CONTINUED): STABILITY ANALYSIS ON I-FT IVA YE. IVA YE ENCOUNTER ANGLES FROM 0 DEG (ASTERN) TO 180 (AHEAD).
HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIES Aft 1.82/32.ea, Heel: Stbd 9.35 deg. Origin Center of Buoyancy Depth----Weiqht{LBj----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----WPA-----LCF------BHL-----3K! 2.242 20,950 12.09f 0.94 230 12.03f 36.1 4.86 Distances in FEET.-------specitic Gravity 1.025.-------------------------Wave in errect.

WAVE DESCRIPTION Wave type: SINUSOID of relative to origin: 90.0 (7.50 Ft) Wave length: 30.00 Ft crest-to-trough height: 1.00 Ft Angle of encounter: 90 HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIES Trim: Fwd 0.38/32.88, Heel: Port 46.42 deg. Origin Center of Buoyancy Depth----Weiqht(LBI----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----W?A-----LCF------BML-----3KT 0.432 20,950 12.33f 2.70p 1.84 230 13.27t 37.4 4.71 in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.-------------------------Wave in et(ect.

WAVE DESCRIPTION Wave type: SINUSOID Phage of relative to origin: 170.0 (14.17 Ft) Wave length: 30.00 Ft cre9t-to-trough height: 1.00 Ft Angle of encounter: 135 bow sea) HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIES Trim: Aft 1.82/32.8e, Heel: Port 9.35 deg. origin center of Buoyancy Depth----Weight(LBI----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----WPA-----LCF------BML-----BH! 2.242 20,952 12.10f 0.57p 0.94 230 12.03t 36.1 4.86 Distances in FEET.-------Specitic Gravity - 1.025.-------------------------Wave in effect.

A-16

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

APPENDIX

FIGURE A-2j (CO, TI 'UED): STABILITY ANALYSIS ON I-FT WAVE. WAVE ENCOUNTER ANGLES FROM 0 DEG (ASTER.\l) TO 180 (AHEAD).

WAVE DESCRIPTION Wave type: SINUSOID Phase of crest relative to origin: 90.0 degrees (7.50 Ftl Wave length: 30.00 Ft Crest-to-trough heiqht: 1.00 Ft Angle of encounter:-180 degrees (head seal
HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIES 1.29/32.88, No Heel Origin Center of Buoyancy Depth----Weiqht(LBI----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----W?A-----LCF------8M1-----3HT 1.134 20,947 12.43f 0.00 0.91 236 12.53f 40.6 4.83 Distances in ?EET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.-------------------------Wave in effect.

A-17

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

APPENDIX

FIGURE A-26, STABILITY ANALYSIS ON 2-FT WAVE. WAVE ENCOUNTER ANGLES FROM 0 DEG (ASTERN) TO 180 (AIIEAD).
WEIGHT and DISPLACEMENT STATUS Baseline draft: 1.727 @Origin Trim: Aft 0.11/32.88, Heel: zero Part------------------------------WeightILB)----LQG-----TCG-----VCG LIGHT SHIP 16,518 12.87f 0.00 3.64 PASSENGERS 3,523 12.22f 0.00 8.65 Fuel Tank Port 455 2.04f 3.0Op 2.02 Fuel Tank Stbd 455 2.04f 2.02 Total weiqht--------> 20,951 12.29f 0.00 4.41 SpGr------Displ(LB)----LCB-----TCB-----VCB------RefHt HULL 1.025 20,950 12.2Bf 0.00 0.89 -1.73 Righting Arms: 0.00 0.00 Distances in FEET.-----------------------------------------------------------HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIES Tria: Aft 0.11/32.88, No Heel, VCG - 4.41
LCF Buoyancy-ctr. Weightl Momentl Draft----Weiqht(LB)----LCB-----VCB-----Inch-----LCF---In trim----GML-----GHT 1.684 20,950 12.26f 0.69 1246 12.37f 1678.65 35.4 1.30 Distances in FEET.-------specitic Gravity 1.025.-----------Moment in Ft-LB. Trim is per 32.8SFt Draft is from Baseline.

WAVE DESCRIPTION Wave type: SINUSOID Phase of crest relative to origin: 90.0 degrees (7.50 Ftl Wave length: 30.00 F"t Crest-to-trough height: 2.00 Ft HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIES Trim: Aft 2.69/32.68, No Heel origin Displacement Center af Buoyancy Depth----Weiqht(LBj----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----WPA-----LCF------BKL-----BMT 2.eBl 20,949 11.99t 0.00 0.96 232 12.19f 37.e 4.87 Distances in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.-------------------------Wave in etrect.

WAVE DESCRIPTION Wave type: SINUSOID Phase of crest relative to origin: 190.0 degrees (15.63 Ft) Wave length: 30.00 Ft crest-to-trough height: 2.00 Ft Angle of encounter: 45 degrees (starboard quartering sea)

A-IS

STABiliTY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

APPENDIX

FIGURE A-26 (CONTINUED): STABILITY ANALYSIS ON 2-FT WAVE. WAVE ENCOUNTER A GLES FROM 0 DEG (ASTERN) TO 180 (AHEAD).
HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIES Trim: Aft 3.14/32.88, Heel: Stbd 19.91 deq. Origin Center of Buoyancy Depth----weight(LB)----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----WPA-----LCF------BML-----BM! 2.145 20,958 1l.89f l.07 219 12.00t 32.8 4.36 in FEET.-------Specific Gravity Wave in effect.

1.025.--------------------------

WAVE DESCRIPTION Wave type: SINUSOID Phase ot relative to origin: 90.0 degrees (7.50 ?t) Wave lenqth: 30.00 Ft crest-co-trouqh height: 2.00 Ft Angle of encounter: 90 degrees beam HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIES Trim: Aft 2.58/32.88, Heel: Stbd 161.06 deg. Origin Center of Buoyancy Depth----Weight{LB)----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----WPA-----LCF------BML-----BMT -3.646 20,951 12.23f 0.17s 5.17 311 14.74f 69.7 9.04 in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.-------------------------Wave in effect.

WAVE DESCRIPTION Wave type: SINUSOID of cre3t relative to origin: 110.0 degree3 (14.17 Ft) Wave length: 30.00 Ft Crest-to-trough height: 2.00 Ft Angle of encounter: 135 degrees (starboard bow sea) HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIES Tria: Aft 3.14/32.88, Heel: Port 19.96 deg. Origin Di3placement center of Buoyancy Depth----Weight(LB)----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----WPA-----LCF------BML-----BMT 2.745 20,952 lI.89f 1.21p 1.07 219 It.99f 32.8 4.36 Distances in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.-------------------------Wave in effect.

A-19

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

APPENDIX

FIGURE A-26 (CONTINUED): STABILITY ANALYSIS ON 2-FT WAVE. WAVE ENCOUNTER ANGLES FROM 0 DEG (ASTERN) TO 180 (AHEAD).
WAVE Wave type: SINUSOID Phase of crest relative to origin: 90.0 degrees (7.50 Ft) Wave length: 30.00 Ft Crest-to-trough height: 2.00 Ft Angle of encounter:-180 (head sea) HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIES Trim: Fwd 2.66/32.88, No Heel Origin Displacement Center of Buoyancy

0.552 20,944 12.S7f 0.00 0.96 237 12.82f 41.9 4.73 Distances in FEET.-------specific Gravity - 1.025.------------------------Wave in effect.

A-20

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