Consider this example, a critique or sharpening of utilitarianism, easily delivered in text.

The basic idea of utilitarianism is that whatever makes the most people happy is what is right to do, that is the good of the many outweigh the good of the few. That sounds pretty reasonable, doesn't it? As you can imagine, this could be pushed even further back. How do you know how far back to push it? I tell students to consider the amount of space that they have, how likely their audience is to accept their warrant and backing, and other rhetorical concerns. The final step in the Toulim Model is to consider possible counter-arguments to your claim and offer a rebuttal of those claims. This is essentially where you ask the students to take other perspectives and explanations into account. In the little argument above, a counter-argument could be "Abortion destroys a fetus. A fetus is not a human life. Therefore, abortion is not murder. Therefore, abortion is not wrong." Often in responding to students' writing, I will simply ask them, "What would you say to someone who denies xyz . . . would they accept your argument?" I won't provide an example rebuttal, but I am sure you can imagine some.
One of the favourite strategies of the Buddhists was to show that the entities admitted by the Naiyyika-s cannot be properly defined, and they tried to establish this by pointing out defects in such definitions proposed in the Nyya texts. Another strategy was to point out that the Nyya doctrines were beset with logical difficulties like self-dependence, mutual dependence, infinite regress, etc. The Buddhists also tried to show that in many cases what was regarded as a single or unitary entity by the Naiyyika-s could not be so, since each of them harboured mutually incompatible properties. The adherents of the Nyya school were hard-pressed to find out some way for answering such criticisms, and this more or less compelled them to find out some techniques for formulating precise and immaculate definitions; and also for answering the dialectical arguments of the Buddhists. In some cases, minor modifications in the earlier doctrines were also made, though the basic doctrines and the commitment to realism and pluralism were not compromised in any way.

Then next step is critical, and one I have found requires more instruction and attention. Why does this reason support the claim? How does this evidence warrant the claims you are making? You say some X are Y, and you point to Z as the reason why you think some X are Y. You have to demonstrate just how Z connects to X and Y to warrant your claim. The warrant is usually some sort of argument in itself, but often you have to push students to make this explicit. Consider this ethical argument below:

AmitaNavya-Nyya logic, writes Sibajiban Bhattacharya, is mainly a logic of cognitions.4 A piece of

cognition has at least three elementsviesya (qualificandum), prakra or viesana (qualifier), and samsarga or the qualification relation between them. If, for example, ones cognitive content is a-R-b, i.e., b is located in a by the relation R, then says the Naiyyika, one is directly aware of a, b, and R where a and b are things in the real world and not mere representations of things and the relation R actually obtains between a and b. So a cognitive content a-R-b is true if and only if b is located in a by the relation R. So, when one cognizes a man with a stick, the man is the qualificandum, the stick is the qualifier and the relation between the man and the stick, in this case, is contact or samyoga. This piece of cognition will be true (pram) if and only if the man being perceived has contact with a stick. It is, therefore, obvious that the Navya-Naiyyika-s are in favour of giving a de re reading of a cognitive content. This situation, when viewed in terms of locus-located relation is: b is located in a or a superstratum (dheya) of a in the relation R in a-R-b, and a is the locus or the substratum (dhra) of b in the relation R in a-R-b. Generally speaking, according to Navya-Nyya, the basic combination which expresses a cognitive content is a locus-locatee combination of the form a has f-ness / (there is) f-ness in a (the lotus has redness/ (there is) redness in lotus, which is expressed in ordinary language as the lotus is red. ). In a perspicuous account of a cognitive content, the Navya-Naiyyika would like to make explicit the connection between the lotus and its colour in consonance with their own categorical framework.

FROM AmitaNavya Nyaya Logic

Prabal Kumar Sen Professor of Philosophy University of Calcutta Kolkata 700 027 pksen_cu@rediffmail.com Amita Chatterjee Professor of Philosophy Jadavpur University Kolkata 700 032 amita_ju@yahoo.com

and
Should you have any questions I would be most happy to help. I can be contacted via e-mail at chagankhulan@comcast.net Via USPS - send to; Karen Summerfelt-Hume, 3607 Young Road, Millers, MD 21102-2353 Currently I have a website under construction which can be viewed at: http://www.freewebs.com/chagankhulan . Sain Morilaa, Chagan Khulan Khatun, Clan White Wing Copyright October, 2007, Karen M. Summerfelt-Hume

& J. Brown on Critical Thinking