ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Volume 3 - Issue 2, February 2013

NATO Interoperability and New Capabilities

NATOs strategic objectives over the past several years have been to enhance and better coordinate its operational capabilities to address emerging threats while adhering to the growing fiscal constraints of its members and the need to downsize military budgets. The key goals have been to acquire new capabilities that can maintain NATOs strategic edge while increasing interoperability amongst its members in order to maximize cooperation and efficiency. Essential to achieving these goals is coordinating military and technical specializations between member states that seek to capitalize on each members area of expertise within the Alliance. The rapidly changing international security environment brings added emphasis to NATOs need to ensure that its goals are not jeopardized in the face of emerging threats and financial crisis. Accomplishing these objectives rests heavily on effectively coordinating future NATO campaigns and facilitating better cooperation in acquiring new capabilities that are critical, sustainable, and rapidly deployable.- Jason Wiseman
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 2 F35 Joint Strike Fighter (Photo - A-A Military Aviation News and Media)

Contents:
Implications of Broken Promises on NATOs 2% Rule
Quint Hoekstra examines the consequences of the ongoing inequality between the financial commitments of NATO members and the impact this will have on future operations. He analyzes how NATOs goals of attaining greater interoperability and new capabilities are effected by ongoing budget constraints and that these goals can be jeopardized if defense spending between European nations and the US is not rebalanced.

Engaging Young Thinkers on the Euro-Atlantic Security Debate

The ATA hosted a one-day workshop with Masters Students in Political Science and International Relations on Euro-Atlantic foreign policy and its implications for the Alliance. A group of selected students were engaged in a meaningful debate on the future of Euro-Atlantic security. Together with ATA experts, they outlined a new vision and set of priorities for the Transatlantic community to ensure that NATO remains prepared for future challenges.
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Implications of Broken Promises on NATOs 2% Rule

by Quint Hoekstra NATO utilizes peer-pressure by reporting annually on member states military spending. Using NATOs own definition and report, in 2011 only three members Greece, the United Kingdom, and the United States spent more than two percent of their GDP on their armed forces.3 Nearly three quarters of NATO member states spent between one and two percent. There are two outliers: At the low end is Iceland, which has no armed forces; at the high end is the United States, contributing nearly five percent. As will be explained later, this discrepancy has caused friction between member states. Theory Scholars of international relations have a long history of explaining the difficulty of international cooperation. There are three relevant theories to the NATO case: The prisoners dilemma, which expects no cooperation; Olsons theory, which expects small states to benefit the most; and the hegemonic stability theory, which expects great powers to gain most from cooperation. Each theory will

or decades, NATO member states have pledged to commit at least two percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) to their armed forces. Unfortunately,

this promise has often been broken. In fact, in 2011, only three out of 27 members complied.1 This article investigates the implications of non-compliance with these self-determined rules and opens the debate on whether the old rule should be modified. It consists of five parts: observations on the current size of member states budgets; a theoretical approach to explaining member states behaviour; a short overview of historical developments around this issue; implications for the growing gap between US and European defence spending; and finally, conclusions on how to proceed. This article argues that interoperability programmes should be limited to areas where all parties benefit; that it is in the interest of NATO and its members to lower the spending rule to one-and-a-half percent of GDP; that Europe is likely to focus on security in the greater European area only; and that the US might find itself without its European allies should it get into a conflict in the Far East. Comparing Military Budgets The initial goal of NATO, founded in reaction to the Warsaw Pact, was to contain Soviet aggression and to deter the USSR from invading Europe. In order for the deterrence strategy to be credible, European states had to maintain large standing armies ready to be deployed at a moments notice. The two percent rule functioned as a means to ensure states pulled their weight. European member states meanwhile saw the rule as a way to make sure the US would not abandon them. Contrary to security integration in the EU, NATOs intergovernmental nature prohibits the secretariat from developing an autonomous mechanism to ensure state compliance.2 Furthermore, divergence between member states expenditure calculations have complicated transparency. Therefore, using what little power the NATO secretariat does have,
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In 2011, only three members Greece, the UK, and the USspent more than two percent of their GDP on their armed forces.

first be examined and then tested in an analysis of the development of military budgets. The first theory is the prisoners dilemma4 (PD) and is the one most commonly used. In this scenario, each member state is portrayed as a player seeking to maximize relative gains over all others. The situation shows how individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. All states pursue the same strategy: they want all others to cooperate with the regime whilst defecting themselves. Applied to the NATO case, this means that all states want the others to stick to the two percent benchmark whilst spending a lot less themselves. The Pareto-optimum would be if all states chose to cooperate, as this way they would form the best deterrence. PD theorists expect states not to end here but with a more likely scenario called the Pareto-deficient Nash equilibrium. This is the situation where no player has the incentive to defect. In the NATO case, this equilibrium means all states choose to defect and ignore the benchmark. The second relevant theory comes from the late Ameri2

can

social

scientist

Mancur

Using EU membership to incorporate former communist states in Eastern Europe into their sphere of influence, postmaterialist Western Europe had managed to rule out war altogether. They werent keen on getting involved militarily either within Europe or abroad. However, the rest of the world didnt share that vision. The end of hostilities between great powers unfortunately did not mean the end of hostilities
U.S. Naval Ship (Photo: US Department of Defense)

Olson5, who illustrated how the small powers try to exploit the great. A way to do this would be for small European states to defect whilst hoping the US will keep up its own forces for other unrelated strategic interests. Smaller states can also seek to free ride or bandwagon with stronger states. After all, defence spending by the smallest states has no significant effect on the total NATO military force, although it does have an effect on their budgets.

altogether. The Cold War had long overshadowed interstate

A third and final theory is the hegemonic stability theory. 6 It explains the benefit of having a powerful and dominant state to lead the cooperation. The hegemon, in this case the US, can incur transaction costs associated with the defence regime in return for the privileged position of laying down the rules for all others. It can then use its power advantage to coerce unwilling states to comply. Historical development During the Cold War, the US had similar strategic interests to its European counterparts as the hegemon in the NATO alliance. The alliance was united against the Soviet threat, seeking to contain communism and prevent a war on European soil. Smaller European states were safe under the nuclear umbrella of the US, Britain and France. Some, such as the Netherlands, also had (and still have) nuclear weapons stored on their territory.
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disputes and regional tensions, and kept the lid on many lingering conflicts. These now flared up, with the war in the former Yugoslavia serving as a prime example. The US was subsequently charged with a new role: that of global policeman. This required the US to maintain a large and readily deployable military force which had the side benefit of discouraging new powers to challenge it. The result was that Europe, dipping its average under the two percent rule for the first time11, cut its military budgets much more than the US, marking the beginning of a US-European divide. The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq temporarily illustrated to some NATO members the necessity of military spending. Yet the terrorist attacks had complex effects on military spending. NATO data shows that US spending went up from an average of 3.3% of GDP during the second half of the 1990s to 5.4% at its peak in 2010. 12 In Spain, after the Madrid bombings, the opposite happened. The Spanish cut their spending by a quarter from 1.2% to 0.9% in 2011. Interestingly, the London bombings caused no significant change in the United Kingdoms spending. Overall, the European average dropped from 2.5% in the early nineties to 1.6% in 2011.13 From this data it can be said that, generally speaking, the longer ago the terrorist attack, the less pressured European states feel to keep up military spending. This rule does not apply to the US, thus increasing the US-European divide.

This functioned as an insurance policy of American assistance. Military spending was largely similar between members, hovering around three percent of GDP.8 This all changed dramatically after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the USSR as the US took up a new role: that of the sole global superpower. With the main threat now gone, military budgets were slashed around the world. For example, the UKs portion of military spending as a percent of GDP halved between the early 1980s and 2000.9 For the first time in over a century, Western European NATO member states no longer had to live under the looming threat of a land invasion from the East. Some states abolished conscription10 and many reduced the size of their standing armies.
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A contributing factor to the growth of the divide may have been the recent global financial crisis (GFC).14 With governments seeking to remedy large deficits incurred by bank bailouts and a shrinking economy, military budgets have come under pressure once more. Worryingly, Brookings Institution research fellow Clara Marina ODonnell remarks that this happens without consultation with allies. NATO has responded with smart
15

The NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 to oust Colonel Gaddafi served as a wake-up call to NATO members for two reasons. First, it showed that European budget cuts have weakened their operational capabilities. The Asia-oriented US felt that it should only lead from behind in missions with more European than American relevance, leaving Europe to do the job.20 However, military chiefs of staff soon realized Europe was unable to carry out this relatively small mission without US assistance. Not wanting to see the mission fail, eventually the US reluctantly agreed to take up a larger role. What this shows is that by 2011, the US-European divide had grown so large that this inhibited their willingness to cooperate. The second wake-up call is that the divide has severe consequences for NATOs much emphasized interoperability goals. The idea of interoperability is that making national militaries more compatible with each other can yield significant benefits in the battlefield. For example, interoperability involves synchronizing communication systems or installing the same air-to-air refueling systems. In an era with increased threats and shrinking budgets the goal is to be able to do more with less. Not only can NATO use this to improve its

defence strategies where member states seek to cooperate to boost efficiency in an attempt to maintain operational capabilities with reduced budgets. However, results are likely to be modest due to states unwillingness to relinquish sovereignty in the field of security for economic gains.16 The GFC also announced the rise of China as a global player in the security sphere. In 2009, US President Barack Obama responded on this by proclaiming himself the first Pacific President.17 European states have fewer strategic interests in that region, again causing an increase in the US-European divide. Implications of the US-European Divide The US and Europe have long disagreed on whether NATO should stick to the protection of their member states or if it should operate globally.

In an era with increased threats and shrinking budgets the goal is to be able to do more with less.

The US, which favours a global NATO, has kept up their military budgets and now accounts for 41% of the worlds military spending.18 It rightfully views itself as a global actor, able to intervene anywhere in the world. Europe, taking on a more regional focus, favours a more modest role for the military alliance. European countries have much smaller budgets, constraining the scope and breadth of their intervention options. It has no interest in pursuing large scale missions in faraway places. Rather, it seeks to undertake limited missions in the greater European area, such as the current mission in Turkey. The deployment of Patriot missiles to the Syrian border shows that, contrary to Western European public opinion, security in Europe still is not a given and remains a top priority for European states. With limited aspirations, European member states are reluctant to maintain forces to the two percent rule, despite public promises. The American economist and Research Fellow at the U.S. Business and Industry Council Alan Tonelson even goes as far to say that Europe has been breaking these promises for over 50 years.
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operations, but it can also reduce costs by collective bargaining. A crucial way to improve interoperability is to freely exchange information relevant to other allies, allowing them to streamline their adaptation to new systems. In Libya however, the US, leader in military technology, was unwilling to share some of its new cyber capacities with its European counterparts out of fear that Europe would free-ride on its technological achievements. Indeed, the US considered mounting a cyber attack on Libya, but the problem with deploying cyber weapons is that they can only be used once.21 As soon as cyber weapons are exposed, other states have relatively easy access to knowledge on how these systems work and how to build their own protection systems for them. The US chose not to deploy the system out of fear that their unique capabilities would end up in European states for free. Coming back to interoperability, NATO should not overestimate the willingness of its members to exchange information if they feel other militaries gain an unfair advantage out of it. Rather than boosting the overall level of knowledge and capabilities, interopera4

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bility programmes can lead to states seeking to free-ride on each

secretariat is attempting to resolve the issue, with Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen repeatedly urging member states to comply with the two percent rule and increase military budgets.25 Europe however, hasnt been receptive to such calls and insists on making its own strategic decisions. Conclusions From this study, there are two discernible conclusions. The first concerns the three theories, while the second concerns NATOs options to resolve the US-European divide and enhance greater interoperability. Regarding the theories, the prisoners dilemma does not apply well to the Cold War scenario, in which the Soviet threat was paramount and was deemed more significant than another state getting a relative gain over an ally. States largely followed the two percent rule. However, with the disappearance of this existential threat, European states started their race to the bottom, per the theorys provisions.
Therefore, the prisoners dilemma theory is applicable only in situations where there is no existential threat. The second theory, that of Olson that the small exploit the great, seems plausible. Indeed, the US has incurred the vast majority of defence costs; however, because the US spends at a rate far above two percent, it seems they may have alternative motives for this. Thus, US defence spending is likely more of the USs own volition rather than exploitation by smaller members. Finally, hegemonic stability theory explains how the US has been successful in leading and shaping NATO, despite failing to coerce European members to spend more. Further investigation is necessary to see whether this was because European states were unable to spend more or were simply unwilling to do so. Moreover, there is a growing rift due to the inability of the US to prevent the US-European divide from overlap-

other, as the cyber example shows. The Libyan intervention and the European military constraints have furthered the Pentagons doubts on European capabilities and intentions further from home. This is particularly important considering the rise of China. Chinas leaders might insist on a peaceful rise, but the security dilemma of the growing Chinese armed forces puts this optimistic vision in doubt. An inherent problem with growing armies is that for outsiders it is unclear if they serve a defensive or offensive purpose. Faced with uncertainty, militaries work based on worst-case scenarios. The US would therefore be tempted to increase its presence in the South China Sea, threatening Chinas dominance there. Making matters worse, NATO members are deeply divided on policy towards China. The US has the capacity to engage China while European members are much more hesitant to engage in such an adventure, leading one to the aforementioned ODonnell to conclude that Europes military strength might become irrelevant.22 The US-European divide on China, as well as on military missions and budgets in general, threatens NATO unity. It comes then as no surprise that the US has long tried to convince Europe to broaden its horizon and increase military spending. In 2011, then US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates even warned NATO that it would have a dim if not dismal future if defence spending crease.
23

didnt summit,

inthe

At last years

Chicago

decline of military budgets was mentioned as one of the most important challenges to NATO.24 Meanwhile, the NATO

US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (Photo: US Department of Deping into different military strategies. fense 5

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There are two considerations for NATO as it determines a course of action to resolve this divide. First, the imbalance of military spending in the Alliance can harm interoperability goals, as states are tempted to free-ride on others. It is therefore recommended to only pursue it in those areas where all parties benefit, rather than a select few. Second, the disagreement concerning the appropriate size of the national armed forces currently undermines NATO unity. Decisions must be made in funding and operations. In terms of funding, the first option is to encourage all

military operations in the area will be conducted without its European allies.

About the author

Quint Hoekstra is Political Science Major with a specialization in International Relations at Leiden University (the Netherlands) and writes about global security issues.

1. Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence (Brussels: NATO, 2012). 2. Jolyon Howorth, Decision-making in members to adhere to the two persecurity and defense policy: Towards supranational inter-governmentalism? Coopcent rule. This generates the money eration and Conflict 2012 : 433-453. NATO can show its strength by ac3. NATO, Data, 2012. for European states to independently Robert Jervis, Realism, Game Theory knowledging and managing the differ- 4. and Cooperation. World Politics 1988 (3): execute operations in the European 317-319 ence of US and European interests. 5. John R. Oneal and Paul F. Diehl, The neighbourhood, leaving the US to Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests, focus on containing China. This outPolitical Research Quarterly 1994 (2): 373396 come is unlikely to occur considering popular European re6. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 7. Kernwapens Tijdlijn [Nuclear weapons timeline], NOS, sistance to large military spending, especially in an age of April 22, 2010, http://nos.nl/artikel/152354-kernwapenstijdlijn.html. austerity. The second option is to maintain the current spend8. Ibid 9. Ibid ing structure. The US will keep spending more than other 10. Christopher Jehn and Zachary Selden. The End of Conscription in Europe? (paper presented at the Western Economic members but in return Europe has to support the US in the Association International Annual Meeting, July 5-8, 2002). NATO, Data, 2012. Far East with what little capacity they have. The difficulty 11. Ibid 12. Ibid here is that sovereign states are unlikely to operate outside of 13. Clara Marina ODonnell, The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATOs Largest Members. Brookings Centheir strategic interest. The third and best option is to lower tre on the United States and Europe (2012), 3. 14. Ibid the currently ignored benchmark to one-and-a-half percent of 15. Jakob Henius and Jacopo Leone McDonald, Smart Defence: A Critical Appraisal (paper presented at the NATO DeGDP. Each member is free and encouraged to stay above it, fence College Forum, Rome, March 2012). 16. Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall, The but this would at least stem the decline of military budgets. White House, last modified November 14, 2009, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentHaving attainable goals makes states considerably more likely barack-obama-suntory-hall. 17. Recent trends in military expenditure, SIPRI, accessed to pursue them. This way, NATO can remain relevant, seFebruary, 20 2013, http://www.sipri.org/research/ armaments/milex/resultoutput/trends. cure peace in the greater European area, and engage in small18. Alan Tonelson, NATO Burdensharing: Promises, promises, Journal of Strategic Studies 2000 (3): 29-58, 52. scale missions globally. 19. Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Tactics in Libya May Be a Model for Other Efforts, The New York Times, August With the end of two ground wars in the Middle East 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/29/world/ africa/29diplo.html?pagewanted=all. 20. Eric Schmitt and Tom Shanker, U.S. Debated Cyberwarfare and a new focus on cyber and drone technology, NATO has in Attack Plan on Libya, New York Times, October 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/world/africa/cyberalready begun to reduce its footprint. Adapting to a change in warfare-against-libya-was-debated-by-us.html?_r=0. 21. ODonnell, Spending Cuts, 2012, 6. military budgets, NATO can show its strength by acknowl22. Thom Shanker, Defense Secretary Warns NATO of Dim Future, New York Times, June 10, 2011, http:// edging and managing the difference of US and European inwww.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/world/europe/11gates.html? _r=0. terests. Europe can be expected to focus primarily on bring23. Lisa Aronsson and Molly ODonnell, Smart Defense and the Future of NATO: Can the Alliance Meet the Challenges of the ing security to the greater European area, while the US is Twenty-First Century? (paper presented at the NATO Chicago Conference, March 28-30, 2012). likely to continue its Asian focus under the pretext that any 24. Why we need to invest in defence, NATO, last modified November 13, 2012, http://nato.int/cps/en/ natolive/ news_91256.htm.
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T
the ATA.

Engaging Young Thinkers on the Euro-Atlantic Security Debate

he ATA hosted a one day workshop with Masters Students in Political Science and International Relations on Euro-Atlantic foreign policy ternational Organization and military alliance, should encourage Member and Partner states to reduce their energy demands; aspire for renewable supplies; and, most importantly, constrain the energy consumption in their militaries. This shall be done by adopting educational and R&D programs that aim to develop new energy-efficient solutions in their militaries. Investment in green military solutions will not only serve Members and Partner states, but the international community as a whole. NATO members are among some of the most advanced countries when it comes to green technology. This puts NATO at a prime position to work with its Science and Technology Organization (STO) to invest in furthering green technology research. Training and Education in the Balkans (by Enitsa Gabrovska) A local qualified workforce is an integral part of the sustainable civilian-military structure necessary for NATO accession. While NATO puts emphasis on military capabilities, a civilian workforce is indispensable for the comprehensive approach towards capacity building that the Alliance strives for. Therefore, NATO should partner with the European Union on this civilian component, which includes strengthening of police structures; the rule of law and law enforcement; civilian administration; and

and its implications for the Atlantic Alliance. A group of selected students were engaged in a meaningful debate on the future of Euro-Atlantic security. Their proposals and priorities for a renewed transatlantic partnership have been discussed with ATA experts and are being presented to NATO officials. These are the students own ideas, developed on the basis of materials (NATO Manuals + NATO history videos) provided beforehand by

NATO members are among some of the most advanced countries when it comes to green technology

This workshop represents an active contribution by the Post-Cold War Generation to the strategic thinking currently in place amongst Allied countries over the future of NATO. Green Military (by Alon Gilboa) In light of the global need to adopt sustainable policies and reduce the use of fossil fuels, NATO, as a leading In-

Two US Marines discussing energy (Photo: PEW Charitable Trusts: Environmental Initiatives) Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 2 7

overall monitoring capabilities.

The two organizations

health risks, and transnational threats to security. NATO identified climate change as a challenge to the security of NATO members in 2010; however, it has not taken practical measures to prevent the advancement of climate change, due to a lack of political will. With the past decade being the hottest on record, it is now time for NATO to establish substantive steps to stabilize this increasingly problematic issue. By doing so, it will galvanize other nations around the world to follow NATOs lead in reducing the damage to the environment.

should invest in local capacity, in particular, by developing educational programmes for students to receive higher education in NATO/EU Member countries (for example, American and European universities and academies) on these specific topics. This way, NATO can ensure continuity in the development process, while re-focusing on a much-overlooked gap in its partnership programmes, namely the civilian component. Energy Security/Article 4 (by Alon Gilboa) The temporary cut-offs of Russian gas supply to Europe in 2006 and 2009 illustrated that the unstable flow of energy is a strategic weapon that can affect the lives of millions of citizens in Europe. Therefore, NATO should not only assist in diversifying its members gas supplies and aspire for alternative energies, but also to establish clear security mechanisms that will prevent such incidents from occurring in the future. These mechanisms should firstly emphasize strategic cooperation and open dialogue between NATO and the supplying states. And secondly, threats on energy security, which go under the threshold of violence, should invoke Article 4 of the NATO founding treaty that calls for consultation when the security of the Parties is threatened. Global Warming (by Fouzia Bencheikh) In a 2011 editorial piece in the Huffington Post, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen declared that taking the appropriate steps to combat climate change is not a choice. It is an urgent necessity. However, since 2011, NATO has not taken the practical measures to combat this devastating problem. Blizzards in Northern Europe, drought in the American Midwest, torrential rains in Central Europe and disruptive storms along the eastern coast of the U.S are examples of events that are becoming increasingly intense and are results of climate change. It affects all NATO nations differently and in complex ways; including food shortages,
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NATO should begin the process of planning for instability in key regions caused by climate change

In addition, NATO should begin the process of planning for instability in key regions caused by climate change. The rising of the Arab Spring was in part a result of food

scarcity from the year before. Many have attributed this food scarcity to the droughts in the U.S. and Russia. A lack of resources culminating into instability in regions around the globe will become the new normal. It is imperative that NATO members begin discussions on potential military and political strategies that will lead to an institutional framework to prepare for these events.

The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) rehearses in Croatia 2007 (Photo: NATO) 8

Capacity Building in the Balkans (by Enitsa Gabrovska) In the process of preparing for NATO membership, it is crucial for the countries of the Western Balkans to develop and modernize their military capabilities to conform to NATOs requirements. In achieving this, Member and Partner (MAP) countries might benefit substantially by establishing topic-specific programmes not only with NATO headquarters but within institutionalized channels for cooperation. IndiFlags bearers from 19 nations rehearse their march (Photo: US Department of Defense)

vidual NATO Members and their respective military structures can be a valuable source of soft power in the process of developing military capabilities in the West Balkan countries. This can best be achieved through informationsharing platforms, joint capacity-building projects, bestpractice learning, and assistance on a bilateral level. These partnerships allow for a more bottom-up approach in capacity development within the individual aspirant states. Partnerships Across the Globe (by Fouzia Bencheikh) The days of clearly identifying your enemy are long gone. NATO members now face threats from terrorist groups and cells from around the world. It is of strategic importance to institutionalize bilateral relations between NATO and countries that have contributed to missions and exemplify NATOs core values. The idea of formalizing bilateral relationships between NATO and non-member countries is not a new one; however, NATO has not put forth measures to diversify its partnership programs or provided partners with the tailor made partnership they wish. Countries like Australia and New Zealand have contributed a significant amount of troops and resources to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Additionally, Japan has donated more then 50 million dollars in 2012 to the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration
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Program (APRP). These countries have shown a dedication to the NATO mission in Afghanistan; however, NATO has not taken the steps to formalize bilateral partnerships after the end of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. NATO should begin discussions to invite nations outside of the Western Hemisphere into the Partnerships for Peace program. This regional forum would have political consultations on significant security threats in that region and would put forth practical steps to combat such threats. Therefore, as NATO evolves in the 21st century, it should diversity its partnerships for the sake of maintaining global security. NATO/EU Common Security Strategy (by Dario Sabbioni) European Union foreign policy has always determined divisions among Member States when they were dealing with thorny issues. Since the very beginning of the European Political Community (1970) the force of the main transatlantic ally was an excuse for most of the countries to refuse to have a common strategy and common policies. The early forums in which foreign policy was debated were not very structured ones and suffered from a weak focus on how the discussed relevant issues should evolve. When the EU began to have a stronger voice in international affairs (i.e. after Maastricht and the establishment of the second pillar, CFSP) it became clear that the previous status quo would be reformed.
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Today, there is a new starting point for reflection on EU issues and transatlantic security integration. The roles of NATO and the EU have been colliding over the last several years, as the cases of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrate when the EU took over a previously established NATO mission. In the most important strategic theatres for military and civilian operations of the last ten years (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan) cooperation between the two actors has been a key factor in fostering future partnerships. On the institutional level, an EU cell has been established in the NATO SHAPE HQ in Brussels in March 2006 and on the other hand, a NATO Permanent Liaison Team has been working side by side with EU officials in the EU Military Staff. A truly new security environment can be created with a simple move that nevertheless requires a very high political consensus. The creation of a common NATO-EU strategy upon which to create a shared view of what security means in terms of capabilities and knowledge is necessary. This Joint Strategy between NATO and the EU would make it possible to tackle the same problems that plague both institutions more effectively, namely: instability of the MENA region, post-conflict resolution and democracy building measures in Afghanistan, improving global energy security and creating an international cyber security strategy. The review of the European Security Strategy which is expected this year, and the always higher number of Strategies by NATO, could be combined in a joint paper aimed at speaking with the same voice in the international arena. Establishing a high-level panel whose task should be dealing with the reflection of common security policies will increase the responsibility of ambassadors and representatives, with the focus being on cooperation rather than allocating scarce goods amongst themselves. Mediterranean and Middle East Partnerships/ Youth Inclusion (by Tobey Metzger) In 1994 NATO initiated the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) comprised of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, MauriAtlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 2

tania, Morocco and Tunisia in order to promote cooperation and ensure regional security and stability. Its tools include information sharing; funding through the Trust Fund mechanism; and joint responses to terrorism (PAPT) at the governmental and civil level. This initiative was followed in 2004 by the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) which extended a similar type of dialogue to the Gulf region, namely to Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. However, while improving joint training operations and raising contributions by some MENA partners to NATO operations (e.g. Qatar and the UAE provision of air assets in NATOs intervention in Libya), the main objective of better mutual understanding a problem which the EUs Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is also facing has not been achieved. This is to a large extent owed to the ongoing ArabIsraeli conflict and accusations of double-standards in Western democracy promotion after having prominently supported North African and Middle Eastern authoritarian leaders in repressing their populations over the past decades. It is therefore seen as crucial by the workshop participants to work around political restrictions at the governmental levels which have oftentimes led to the calling off of joint discussions or summits. Instead it is seen as necessary to encourage dialogue among the civil society and especially the youth to ensure that the negative rhetoric towards NATO and its Member States is met by a realistic perspective on NATO missions and objectives. We therefore suggest setting up a comprehensive forum for dialogue including young people from NATO and MENA countries who will then be able to further promote a realistic image of NATO into its respective national communities. Furthermore, the outcome of these workshops which may be conducted to some extent via online communications could be generating suggestions on improving the partnership from the eyes of the youth. Collective Cyber Defense (by Tobias Metzger) Since the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia and the use of
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cyber attacks in the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, cyber threats have emerged as a new potential domain of warfare next to land, sea, air and space. Since then, multiple actors, including online activists or hacktivists, have used the internet for means of disturbance, propaganda, espionage as well as acts of destruction as seen in the 2010 Stuxnet attack destroying centrifuges in Iranian nuclear facilities. According to internet security provider Symantec, more than 5 billion cyber attacks were blocked in 2011 alone. The main difficulties in countering any of these intrusions are on the one hand the difficulty of definite attribution (although news reports have been suggested that some of the recent acts of cyber espionage have been conducted from Chinese computers) and the unclear legality of the cyber domain. Whereas the Geneva Convention clearly outlines the jus in bello the techniques allowed to be used in warfare a similar cyber Geneva Convention is far from existent. Media and political attention has increased and cyber security and defense have been on the agenda of all NATO Summits since 2004 in Istanbul. In addition, the European Union has recently presented its own European Cyber Security Strategy highlighting the need for enhanced cooperation with the civil society and the private sector. During the workshop discussions three areas of activity in cyber defense have emerged: Information sharing: NATO needs to work closely with the EU, the Member States and the private sector to ensure an effective division of labor each focusing on its core competencies. This means that NATO and the EU should develop joint approaches for intelligence sharing in order to create a truly comprehensive approach across the private and public sectors. The difficulties lie in generating enough political will to ensure sufficient transparency in every Member State since the overall security of the internet is determined by its weakest link.

Legislation and the question of attribution: NATO should encourage the political and judiciary processes necessary to shape a future legislation going beyond the Tallinn Manual on Cyber Warfare which is intended as a mere expression of opinions. The difficulty will be to create a framework of rules which are flexible enough to cope with the quickly evolving and somewhat unpredictable technology. This process will also have to define whether technical changes are going to be necessary in order to ensure future attribution to clearly identify perpetrators with all of the implications for issues of loss of anonymity and privacy. Pooling and sharing: The current budgetary situation has led, within NATO as well as within the EU, to new strategies of smart defense (NATO) or pooling and sharing (EDA). All stages of cyber defense from R&D to cyber investigations need to be clearly aligned across the institutions overcoming the jealousy and competition occasionally visible in previous high level discussions.

About the author

Fouzia Bencheikh is an LLM candidate at the University of Kent, Brussels School of International Studies in Brussels, Belgium. Alon Gilboa is a graduate student of Political Science and International Relations at Leiden University, The Netherlands. Tobias Metzger is a graduate student of International Conflict and Security at the University of Kent, Brussels School of International Studies (BSIS) in Brussels, Belgium. Enitsa Gabrovska is currently pursuing an MSc degree in Political Science with specialization in International Relations at Leiden University, The Netherlands. Dario Sabbioni is currently a Political Strategy and Communication Masters student at the Brussels School of International Studies of the University of Kent.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 2

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ATA Programs
From 14-15 March, the Armenian Atlantic Association together with its youth branch Armenian Youth Atlantic Association will host a youth conference The Black Sea Region: Bringing Future Decision Makers Together in the Changing World. From 4-6 April, the Estonian Atlantic Treaty Association (EATA) will host a NATO-EU Roundtable in Tallinn to discuss various topics related to the work and cooperation of NATO and the EU. This event will bring together 60 students in order to increase the knowledge of young people in foreign and security policy to discuss the working principles of NATO. Visit www.globsec.org/globsec2013/ to learn more about the Slovak Atlantic Commissions upcoming Globsec Conference on 18-20 April. Dont miss the opportunity to apply for the Young Leaders Forum and join one of the leading security and foreign policy forums in the world. Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valuable contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch. We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues of importance to the NATO Alliance. For details of how to submit your work please see our website. Further enquiries can also be directed to the ATA Secretariat at the address listed below. Editor: Jason Wiseman Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and remain the sole property of those sources. Unless otherwise stated, all images are the property of NATO.

Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Association. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic Voices is written by young professionals and researchers. The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international nongovernmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom, Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37 countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially include to the successor generation in our work. Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the publics knowledge and understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform. In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:

the establishment of new and competitive programs on international security issues.

the development of research initiatives and security-related events for its members.

the expansion of ATAs international network of experts to countries in Northern Africa and Asia. The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy

activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives. These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with NATO.

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.