Ladera v. HodgesG.R. No. 8027-R, September 23, 1952, Vol. 48, No. 12, Official Gazette 5374Reyes, J.B.L.

, J

FACTS: Paz G. Ladera entered into a contract with C.N. Hodges. Hodges promised tosell a lot with an area of 278 square meters to Ladera, subject to certain terms andconditions. The agreement called for a down payment of P 800.00 and monthlyinstallments of P 5.00 each with interest of 1% per month, until P 2,085 is paid in full. Incase of failure of the purchaser to make any monthly payment within 60 days after it felldue, the contract may be considered as rescinded or annulled.Ladera built a house on the lot. Later on, she defaulted in the payment of the agreedmonthly installment. Hodges filed an action for the ejectment of Ladera.The court issued an alias writ of execution and pursuant thereto, the city sheriff leviedupon all rights, interests, and participation over the house of Ladera. At the auction sale,Laderas house was sold to Avelino A. Magno. Manuel P. Villa, later on, purchased thehouse from Magno.Ladera filed an action against Hodges and the judgment sale purchasers. Judgmentwas rendered in favor of Ladera, setting aside the sale for non-compliance with Rule 39,Rules of Court regarding judicial sales of real property. On appeal, Hodges contendsthat the house, being built on a lot owned by another, should be regarded as movable or personal property.

ISSUE: Whether or not Laderas house is an immovable property. HELD: YES. The old Civil Code numerates among the things declared by it asimmovable property the following: lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kindadhered to the soil. The law does not make any distinction whether or not the owner of the lot is the one who built. Also, since the principles of accession regard buildings andconstructions as mere accessories to the land on which it is built, it is logical that saidaccessories should partake the nature of the principal thing

Mindanao Bus Company v. The City Assessor and Treasurer G.R. No. L-17870, September 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 197Labrador, J

FACTS: Petitioner Mindanao Bus Company is a public utility solely engaged intransporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks, over its authorized lines in theIsland of Mindanao, collecting rates approved by the Public Service Commission.Respondent sought to assess the following real properties of the petitioner; (a) HobartElectric Welder Machine, (b) Storm Boring Machine; (c) Lathe machine with motor; (d)Black and Decker Grinder; (e) PEMCO Hydraulic Press; (f) Battery charger (Tungar 1charge machine) and (g) D-Engine Waukesha-MFuel. It was alleged that thesemachineries are sitting on cement or wooden platforms, and that petitioner is the owner of the land where it maintains and operates a garage for its TPU motor trucks, a repair shop, blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with these machineries, which are placedtherein. Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4, 400petitioner's above-mentioned equipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to therespondent Board of Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty.Respondents contend that said equipments, though movable, are immobilized bydestination, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the New Civil Code

Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc.G.R. No. L-58469, May 16, 1983, 122 SCRA 29De Castro, J

FACTS: To obtain financial accommodations from the Makati Leasing and FinanceCorporation, the Wearever Textile discounted and assigned several receivables withthem under a receivable purchase agreement. To secure the collection of receivablesassigned, Wearever Textile executed a chattel mortgage over certain raw materialsinventory, as well as machinery

ISSUE: Whether the equipments in question are immovable or movable properties. HELD: The equipments in question are movable. So that movable equipments to beimmobilized in contemplation of the law, it must first be "essential and principalelements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be"unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established."Thus, the Court distinguished those movable which become immobilized by destinationbecause they are essential and principal elements in the industry from those which maynot be so considered immobilized because they are merely incidental, not essential andprincipal.The tools and equipments in question in this instant case are, by their nature, notessential and principle municipal elements of petitioner's business of transportingpassengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentalsacquired asmovables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Evenwithout such tools and equipments, its business may be carried on, as petitioner hascarried on, without such equipments, before the war. The transportation business couldbe carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another. ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery is real or personal property. HELD: The machinery is a personal property. The Supreme Court explained that if ahouse of strong materials may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which

Santos Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.G.R. No. L11139, April 23, 1958, 103 Phil. 401Concepcion, J

described as an aero dryer stentering range. Upondefault of Wearever Textile, the Makati Leasing petitioned for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to it. When the sheriff failed to enter Wearever Textilespremises to seize the machinery, Makati Leasing applied for a replevin. Wearever Textile contended that it cannot be a subject of replevin or a chattel mortgage because it is a real property as it is attached to the ground by means of bolts and that the onlyway to remove it is to destroy the concrete floor. FACTS: On June 4, 1949, Santos Evangelista instituted a civil case for a sum of money. On the same date, he obtained a writ of attachment, which was levied upon ahouse, built by Rivera on a land situated in Manila and leased to him. In due course, judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who bought the house at public auctionheld in compliance with the writ of execution issued in said case. When Evangelistasought to take possession of the house, Rivera refused to surrender it, upon the groundthat he had leased the property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. and that thelatter is now the true owner of said property. It appears that on May 10, 1952, a definitedeed of sale of the same house had been issued to Alto Surety, as the highest bidder atan auction sale held. Hence, Evangelista instituted an action against Alto Surety andRicardo Rivera, for the purpose of establishing his title over said house, and securingpossession thereof, apart from recovering damages. After due trial, the CFI Manilarendered judgment for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and Alto Surety to deliver thehouse in question to Evangelista and to pay him, jointly and severally, P40.00 a monthfrom October, 1952, until said delivery, plus costs.

ismovable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may notbe likewise treated as such.

ISSUE: Whether or not a house constructed by the lessee of the land on which it isbuilt, should be dealt with, for purposes of attachment, as immovable property or aspersonal property. HELD: The house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personalproperty not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, inLadera vs. Hodges (48 OG 5374), "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil)is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by ausufructuary or lessee. The opinion that the house of Rivera should have been attachedin accordance with subsection (c) of said section 7, as "personal property capable of manual delivery, by taking and safely keeping in his custody", for it declared that"Evangelista could not have validly purchased Ricardo Rivera's house from the sheriff housing project and related commercial/industrial development intended for dispositionto and enjoyment of certain beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly asenabling component to finance the project.

Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006Carpio, J

FACTS: MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Paraaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAAs real estate tax delinquency wasestimated at P624 million. Thus, the City of Paraaque, through its City Treasurer,issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. TheMayor of the City of Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Landsand Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. City of Paraaquecontends that Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the taxexemption privileges of governmentowned and-controlled corporations upon theeffectivity of the Local Government Code. However, MIAA avers that airport lands andbuildings are owned by the State, and thus, exempt from tax.

Serg's Products, Inc vs PCI Leasing and Finance

On 13 February 1998, PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. filed a complaint for sum of money, with an application for a writ of replevin. On 6 March 1998, upon an exparte application of PCI Leasing, judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses. On 24 March 1998, the sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory, seized one machinery with word that the return for the other machineries. On 25 March 1998, petitioners filed a motion for special protective order, invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin. On 6 April 1998, the sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the remaining properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estatetax. HELD: Yes. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers toperform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other governmentinstrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. Unlessthe government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, itremains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but alsocorporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain,police authority and the levying of fees and charges. The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republicof the Philippines. Hence, the subject properties are not subject to tax Issue: Whether the machines are personal or real property? Held: The machinery were essential and principal elements of their chocolatemaking industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become "immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry." The machines are thus, real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code. Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of

He was able to take two more, but was prevented by the workers from taking the rest. On 7 April 1998, they went to the CA via an original action for certiorari. Citing the Agreement of the parties, the appellate court held that the subject machines were personal property, and that they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners; and ruled that the "words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties." It thus affirmed the 18 February 1998 Order, and the 31 March 1998 Resolution of the lower court, and lifted the preliminary injunction issued on 15 June 1998. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on 26 February 1999. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari

estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. Thus, said machines are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure (compare Tumalad v. Vicencio). The holding that the machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal. In the present case, however, there is no showing that any specific third party would be adversely affected.

Bustos v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 120784-85, January 24, 2001, 350 SCRA 155Pardo, J

FACTS: Paulino Fajardo died intestate on April 2, 1957. He had four (4) children,namely: Manuela, Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial, all surnamed Fajardo. On September 30, 1964, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Paulino Fajardo.On the same date, Manuela sold her share to Moses G. Mendoza, husband of Beatrizby deed of absolute sale. At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey inMasantol, Pampanga. Later, the cadastre was conducted and the property involved inthe partition case was specified as Lots 280, 283, 284, 1000-A and 1000-B. The shareof Manuela, which was sold to Moses, includes Lot 284 of the Masantol Cadastre andLot 284 was subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B. Trinidad was in physical possessionof the land. She refused to surrender the land to her brother-in-law Moses G. Mendoza,despite several demands.On September 3, 1971, Moses filed with the Court of First Instance, Pampanga acomplaint for partition claiming the one fourth (1/4) share of Manuela which was sold tohim.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be considered a builder in good faith with respectto the improvements he made on the property. HELD: No. The petitioner is a possessor in bad faith. Based on the factual findings fromthis case, it is evident that petitioner knew from the very beginning that there was reallyno sale and that he held respondents property as mere security for the payment of theloan obligation. Therefore, petitioner may claim reimbursement only for necessaryexpenses; however, he is not entitled to reimbursement for any useful expenses whichhe may have incurred.

During the pendency of the case for partition, Trinidad Fajardo died. On December 15, 1984, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Trinidad Fajardo.On February 16, 1987, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son of Trinidad sold Lot 284-B to spousesVenancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray whereby the former sold a 250 square meter portion of the subject lot, together with thetwo-story commercial and residential structure standing thereon. Sometime in May1969, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner for recovery of ownership and possession of the twostory building. However, petitioner filed a salesapplication over the subject property and was issued an OCT. Due to overlapping of title, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title. Judgment was rendered in favor of therespondents. When respondent filed a motion for execution, petitioner opposed, andalleged that he had a right of retention over the property until payment of the value of the improvements he had introduced on the property

Lopez vs Orosa jr and plaza theater

1. Lopez was engaged in business under the name Lopez-Castelo Sawmill. 2. Orosa, who lived in the same province as Lopez, one dayapproached Lopez and invited the latter to make an investment inthe theatre business. 3. Orosa, his family and close friends apparently were forming acorporation named Plaza Theatre. 4. Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest. Nonetheless, therewas an oral agreement between Lopez and Orosa that Lopezwould be supplying the lumber for the construction of the theatre.The terms were the following: one, Orosa would be personallyliable for any account that the said construction would incur; two,payment would be by demand and not by cash on delivery. 5. Pursuant to the agreement, Lopez delivered the lumber for theconstruction. Lopez was only paid one-third of the total cost. 6. The land on which the building has been erected was previously owned by Orosa, which was later on purchased by the corporation. 7. Due to the incessant demands of Lopez, the corporation mortgaged its properties. 8. On an earlier relevant date, the corporation obtained a loan with Luzon Surety Company as surety and in turn, the corporation executed a mortgage over the land and building. In the registration of the land under Act 496, such mortgage wasnt revealed. 9. Also due to the demands of Lopez, Orosa issued a deed of assignment over his shares of stock in the corporation. 10. As there was still an unpaid balance, Lopez filed a case against Orosa and Plaza theatre. He asked that Orosa and Plaza theatre be held liable solidarily for the unpaid balance; and in case defendants failed to pay, the land and building should be sold in public auction with the proceeds to be applied to the balance; or that the shares of stock be sold in public auction. Lopez also had lis pendens be annotated in the OCT.

ISSUES: W/N the materialmens lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of the building attaches to said structure alone and doesnt extend to the land on which the building is adhered to? HELD: The contention that the lien executed in favor of the furnisher of materials used for the construction and repair of a building is also extended to land on which the building was constructed is without merit. For while it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could only mean one thingthat a building is by itself an immovable property. Moreover, in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, a building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. Appelant invoked Article 1923 of the Spanish Civil Code, which provides With respect to determinate real property and real rights of the debtor, the following are preferred: xxx Credits for reflection, not entered or recorded, and only with respect to other credits different from those mentioned in four next preceding paragraphs. Close examination of the abovementioned provision reveals that the law gives preference to unregistered refectionary credits only with respect to the real estate upon which the refectionary or work was made. This being so, the inevitable conclusion must be that the lien so created attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of which the obligation was incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the

11. The trial court decided that there was joint liability between defendants and that the materialmans lien was only confined tothe building.

unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction of the building attaches only to said structure and to no other property of the obligors

Julian S. Yap vs. Hon. Santiago O. Taada and Goulds Pumps International (Phil), Inc., G.R. No. L-32917, July 18, 1988

Doctrine: Article 415, par. 3 of the Civil Code considers and immovable property as everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deteriorating the object. The pump does not fit this description. It could be, and was, in fact,separated from Yaps premises without being broken of suffering deterioration. Obviously, the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated that the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners. Facts: The case began in the City Court of Cebu with the filing of Goulds Pumps International (Phil), Inc. of a complaint against Yap and his wife seeking recovery of P1,459.30, representing the balance of the price and installation cost of a water pump in the latters premises. The Court rendered judgment in favor of herein respondent after they presented evidence

Issue: Whether or not the pump and its accessories are immovable property Held: No. The water pump and its accessories are NOT immovable properties. The argument of Yap that the water pump had become immovable property by its being installed in his residence is untenable. Article 415, par. 3 of the Civil Code considers and immovable property as everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deteriorating the object. The pump does not fit this description. It could be, and was, in fact,separated from Yaps premises without being broken of suffering deterioration. Obviously, the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated that the loosening of bolts or

ex-parte due to failure of petitioner Yap to appear before the Court. Petitioner then appealed to the CFI, particularly to the sale of Judge Tanada. For again failure to appear for pre-trial, Yap was declared in default. He filed for a motion for reconsideration which was denied by Judge Tanada. On October 15, 1969, Tanada granted Goulds Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. Yap forthwith filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order. In the meantime, the Sheriff levied on the water pump in question and by notice scheduled the execution sale thereof. But in view of the pendency of Yaps motion, suspension of sale was directed by Judge Tanada. It appears, however, that this was not made known to the Sheriff whocontinued with the auction sale and sold the property to the highest bidder, Goulds. Because of such, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Execution Sale and to Quash Alias Writ of Execution. One of his arguments was that the sale was made without the notice required by Sec. 18, Rule 29 of the New Rules of Court, i.e. notice by publication in case of execution of sale of real property, the pump and its accessories being immovable because attached to the ground with the character of permanency. Such motion was denied by the CFI

dismantling of other fasteners.

Machinery & Engineering Supplies, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. No. L-7057, October 29, 1954

Doctrine: The special civil action of replevin is applicable only to personal property. When the machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former could not be separated from the latter without breaking the material or deterioration of the object, it had become an immovable property under Art. 415(3). Facts: Herein petitioner filed a complaint for replevin in the CFI of Manila against Ipo Limestone Co., and Dr. Antonio Villarama, for the recovery of the machineries and equipments sold and delivered to said defendants at their factory in Barrio Bigti, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The respondent judge issued an order, commanding Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan to seize and take immediate possession of the properties specified in the order. Two deputy sheriffs of Bulacan, Ramon S. Roco(president of Machinery), and a crew of technical men and laborers proceeded to Bigti, for the purpose of carrying the courts order into effect. Leonardo Contreras, Manager of the respondent Company, and Pedro Torres, in charge thereof, met the deputy sheriffs, and Contreras handed to them a letter addressed to Atty. Palad (ex-officio Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan), protesting against the seizure of the properties in question, on the ground that they are not personal properties. Later on, they went to the factory. Rocos attention was called to the fact that the equipments could not possibly be dismantled without causing damages or injuries to the wooden frames attached to them. But Roco insisted in dismantling the equipments on his own responsibility, alleging that the bond was posted for such eventuality, the deputy sheriffs directed that some of the supports thereof be cut. The defendant Company filed an urgent motion for the return of the properties

Issue: Whether or not the machineries and equipments were personal properties and, therefore, could be seized by replevin. Held: No. The special civil action known as replevin, governed by the Rules of Court, is applicable only to personal property. When the sheriff repaired to the premises of respondent company, the machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former could not be separated from the latter without breaking the material or deterioration of the object. Hence, in order to remove said outfit, it became necessary, not only to unbolt the same, but, also, to cut some of its wooden supports. Moreover, said machinery and equipment were intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry carried on said immovable and tended directly to meet the needs of the said industry. For these reasons, they were already immovable property pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 415 of the Civil Code. Mr. Ramon Roco, insisted on the dismantling of at his own responsibility, stating that, precisely, that is the reason why plaintiff posted a bond. In this manner, petitioner clearly assumed the corresponding risks. It is well settled that, when restitution of what has been ordered, the goods in question shall be returned in substantially the same condition as when taken. It follows that petitioner must also do everything necessary to the reinstallation of said property in conformity with its original condition.

seized by the deputy sheriffs. On the same day, the trial court issued an order, directing the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan to return the machineries to the place where they were installed. The deputy sheriffs returned the properties seized, by depositing them along the road, near the quarry, of the defendant Company, at Bigti, without the benefit of inventory and without re-installing them in their former position and replacing the destroyed posts, which rendered their use impracticable. The trial court ordered Roco to furnish the Provincial Sheriff with the necessary funds, technical men, laborers, equipments and materials. Roco raised the issue to the CA; a writ of preliminary injunction was issued but the CA subsequently dismissed for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration was denied.

Salvador H. Laurel vs. Ramon Garcia, et. Al. G. R. No. 92013. July 25, 1990.

Doctrine: A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such. Facts: The subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956, the other lots being the Nampeidai Property (site of Philippine Embassy Chancery), the Kobe Commercial Property (Commercial lot used as warehouse and parking lot of consulate staff), and the Kobe Residential Property (a vacant residential lot). The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II. *The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be payable in 20 years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments *The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule and listed under the heading Government Sector, through Reparations Contract 300 dated 27 June 1958. The Roponggi property consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on 22 July 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time. *During the incumbency of President Aquino, a proposal was made by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J.

Issues: Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government? Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property? Held: No. The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through reparation agreements. They were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property was specifically designated under the agreement to house the Philippine embassy. It is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. The respondents have failed to do so. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and payment, in application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as the juridical person but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation. The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service doesnt automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such

Valdez, to lease the subject property to Kajima Corporation, a Japanese firm, in exchange of the construction of 2 buildings in Roppongi, 1 building in Nampeidai, and the renovation of the Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The Government did not act favorably to said proposal, but instead, on 11 August 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition or utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe though AO-3, and AO 3-A to 3-D. On 25 July 1987, the President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first Whereas clause. Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. *Two petitions for prohibition were filed seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 sq. m. of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan scheduled on 21 February 1990; the temporary restaining order of which was granted by the court on 20 February 1990. In G.R. No. 92047, a writ of mandamus was prayed for to compel the respondents to fully disclose to the public the basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi property inspite of strong public opposition and to explain the proceedings which effectively prevent the participation of Filipino citizens and entities in the bidding process

Benjamin Rabuco, et. al. vs. Hon. Antonio Villegas G.R. No. L-24661. February 28, 1974

Doctrine: When a property is owned by a political subdivision in its public and governmental capacity, the Congress has absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due process and without just compensation Facts: In the early morning of April 19, 1970, a large fire of undetermined origin gutted the Malate area including the lot on which petitioners had built their homes and dwellings. Respondents city officials then took over the lot and kept petitioners from reconstructing or repairing their burned dwellings. At petitioners instance, the Court issued on June 17, 1970 a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents city officials from performing any act constituting an interference in or disturbance of herein petitioners possession of Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610, of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila as safeguarded them under the Courts subsisting preliminary injunction of August 17, 1965 pursuant to RA 3120.

Issue: Whether RA 3120 is unconstitutional as it infringes the right to due process. Held: No. The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 on the strength of the established doctrine that the subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled in the name of the municipal corporation) and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots by sale on installment basis to bona fide occupants by Congressional authorization and disposition does not constitute infringements of the due process clause or the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution but operates simply as a manifestation of the legislatures right of control and power to deal with State property

Levy D. Macasiano vs. Honorable Roberto C. Diokno G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992

Doctrine: Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress Facts: On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon, pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1979, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions.. On June 20, 1990, the municipal council of Paraaque issued a resolution authorizing Paraaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Paraaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets. On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation

Issue: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid. Held: No. The ordinance or resolution authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for a flea market is invalid. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality has the authority to pass the disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance.

of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to respondent Palanyag.

Republic vs CA 281 scra vs 639

Morato has filed for patent over a parcel of land, of which was granted under the condition that he would not encumber it for a period of 5 years from issuance of patent. It was then found out that he mortgaged and leased the lots. The government sought for the revocation of the patent issued. The trial court and appellate court decided in favor of the respondents. DOCTRINE: The grantees title of ownership of patented land to be perfected should comply with the requirements of the law one of which is to keep the property for herself and her family within the prescribed period of five (5) years. If the requirements are not complied with, the

Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congested with people, houses and traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license and allow the establishment of a flea market along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets in Baclaran would not help in solving the problem of congestion. Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down by toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community. Every local government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety and convenience, maintain peace and order, and promote the general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective, the local government should refrain from acting towards that which might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare Foreshore lands have been defined to be that part of the land which is between the high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. This is the strip of land that lies between the high and low watermarks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. Foreshore lands may not anymore be the subject of issuance of free patents. Under property of public ownership or dominion are foreshore lands, as provided for in the Civil Code. It is to be noted that when the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property

State may take action for reversion of the land to the public domain. When the seawater moves toward the estate of an owner, the invaded property becomes foreshore land and becomes part of the public domain. Citing the case of Government vs. Cabangis, the land under the Torrens system which becomes part of the foreshore land reverts to the public domain and the title is annulled. Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs Zamboanga City 22 SCRA 1334 Doctrine: In the case of state properties, properties for public service are of public dominion; this is not so in the case of provinces, cities, etc., said properties for public service are patrimonial since they are not for public use. Facts: Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the said Act also provided that Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General. The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province.

became foreshore land and passed to the realm of public domain.

Issue: Whether all the properties concerned are patrimonial properties. Held: There are two conflicting applicable laws in the case at bar. Applying the New Civil Code, if the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. Under the said law, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase public works for public service for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free

It appears that in 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog. Subsequently, Republic Act 286 was approved. creating the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province. Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. The Auditor General, apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. The Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-owner proindiviso) of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.

and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category. On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc. Under the aforementioned law, Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites a total of 24 lots since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress. The records do not disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the former Province of Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been erected even before 1936 when Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power to authorize construction of buildings such as those in the case at bar at their own expense, 14 it can be assumed that said buildings were erected by the National Government, using national funds. Hence, Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it did with the lots in question.

But even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute mere accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and so, they follow the nature of said lands, i.e., public. Moreover, said buildings, though located in the city, will not be for the exclusive use and benefit of city residents for they could be availed of also by the provincial residents. The province then and its successors-in-interest are not really deprived of the benefits thereof. But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly, governmental purposes. The fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature. On the other hand, that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no significance since registration cannot convert public property to private. In fine, the Court ordered herein defendant Zamboanga City to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter. Secondly, the defendants were ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of plaintiffs 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant City, in the manner

originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

Chavez v Public Estate Authority GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002

Facts: On November 20, 1973, the government through the Commissioner of Public Highways signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land. On April 25, 1995 the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to develop the Freedom Islands. This JVA was entered into through negotiation without public bidding. The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. Among the conclusion are: that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands, the certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and the JVA itself is illegal. On December 5, 1997, President Ramos created a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA. The Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions of the Senate Committees. On April 27, 1998, Petitioner as taxpayer filed the instant petition for mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit. Ratio Decidendi: The petitioner has standing to bring the taxpayers suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. This duties are particularly in answer of the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern, and of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. Furthermore, the court considered that the petition raised matters of transcendental importance tot eh public. The mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right. Also, ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities if the issues raise are of paramount public interest and if they immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the people. The amended JVA does not make the issue moot and academic since this compels the court to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimony. The content of the amended JVA seeks to transfer title and ownership of reclaimed lands to a single corporation. The court does not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to

Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA. Furthermore, petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domains as blatant violation of Sec 3, Art XII of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Petitioner assert that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billion of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.

Villarico vs sarmiento

Facts: Villarico here is an owner of a lot that is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue highway by a strip of land belonging to thegovernment. Vivencio Sarmiento had a building constructed on a portion of the saidgovernment land and a part thereof was occupied by Andoks LitsonCorp. In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, Villaricoacquired a portion of the same area owned by thegovernment He then filed an accion publiciana alleging that respondents(Vivencio) on the government land closed his right of way tothe Ninoy Aquino Avenue and encroached on a portion of hislot

formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public. The instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. The instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is purely legal or constitutional question. The right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement as required by the constitution. The Supreme Court granted the petition. PEA and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are permanently enjoined from implementing the amended JVA which is hereby declared null and void ab initio Ratio: No. It is not disputed in this case that the alleged right of way to the lot belongs to the state or property of public dominion. o It is intended for public use meaning that it is not confined toprivileged individuals but is open to the indefinite public.Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built isfor the use of the people as passageway hence, it is a property for public dominion. Public dominion property is outside the commerce of man and hence, it cannot be: - Alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matterof contracts - Acquired by prescription against the state - Cannot be the subject of attachment

and execution - Be burdened by any voluntary easement It cannot be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favorof the petitioner and petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself andhe cannot claim any right of possession over it.

103882, 105276

FACTS: On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project. Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land. Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term foreshore land than that in the definition provided by the dictionary. RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was

ISSUE: I. Whether or not the term foreshore land includes the submerged area. II. Whether or not foreshore land and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man. HELD: The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term foreshore land includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to: The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New International Dictionary) The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the

affirmed by the CA with modifications.

exclusion of submerged areas from the term foreshore lands. It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void

chavez vs nha 16452

FACTS: On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc. On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161 approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state. As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the importance of private sectors as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others. The same MO also established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution

ISSUES: Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands considered as alienable and outside the commerce of man Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public domain Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information

and evaluation of the plan, respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA). Notices of public bidding to become NHAs venture partner for SMDRP were published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process. Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI. Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties. To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite. Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the project. The original 3,500

related to the SMDRP Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position HELD: 1. Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. This does not mean that it shall be responsible for all. The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project are approval by the President (which were provided for by MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA (which were seen as a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or entity under contract of PEA or by the National Government Agency (NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279). 2. Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project. ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine President. 3. The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President Ramos. 4. Despite not having an explicit

units of temporary housing were decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119hectare land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project. Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33. On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI.

declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be disposed to qualified beneficiaries. Furthermore, these lands have already been necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under the BOT law. 5. Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem appropriate. 6. There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to become its joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project. It was noted that notices were published in national newspapers. The bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards Committee on May 18, 1992. 7. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In addition, when the lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by which it has the power to sell the same to any qualified person. 8. This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to information on matters of public concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution. 9. When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by virtue of MOA between RBI and NHA. The properties and rights in

question after the passage of around 10 years from the start of the projects implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned. The petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said project, but did not do so. The moment to challenge has passed.