SISON v.

PEOPLE 250 SCRA 58, November 6, 1995 Facts: On July 27, 1986, in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Despite being denied a permit, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal Monument of the Luneta and started an impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches in between. When the authorities arrived and no permit could be produced, they were told to disperse. One of the leaders, Atty. Oliver Lozano, turned to his group and said Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators , and a commotion ensued. They eventually fled, and later, some of them converged at the Chinese garden of Luneta. Another commotion ensued and the loyalists started attacking persons in yellow, the color of the Coryistas, one of which was Salcedo. He was chased, boxed, kicked and mauled. One Ranulfo Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them, but several accused came forward and resumed mauling Salcedo despite his pleas for mercy. He died upon arrival at the Philippine General Hospital of hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic. Issue: Were the photographs of the incident presented properly given evidentiary weight despite lack of proper identification by their respective photographers? Held: Yes. Photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other

competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witnesses who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.

In this case, the counsel for two of the accused used the same photographs to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. When the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused, no objection was made by the defense, not until Atty. Lazaro interposed at the third hearing a continuing objection to their admissibility. The use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged nonparticipation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representation of the mauling incident was affirmed when some of the accused identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. The absence of two of the accused in the photographs, meanwhile, does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. However, the accused were unequivocally identified by two witnesses. Doctrine: Photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. They can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witnesses who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. ADAMCZUK v. HOLLOWAY 13 A.2d 2 (1940) Facts: The plaintiffs brought an action in trespass against the defendants for personal

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injuries and property damage arising out of a collision between a car owned and operated by plaintiff, Jack Adamczuk, and a car owend by defendant, Morris Cohen, and driven by Elmer Holloway. A photograph was presented as evidence for the plaintiffs, and Adamczuk identified the roads and buildings appearing in the picture, stating that the conditions presented by that picture truly represent the conditions of the crossing at the time of this accident except for the fact of daylight or dark. The photograph was offered in evidence several times, but in each case, no proof could be given as to who took it, or any identity as to the picture, other than the physical view thereon or where the camera was standing, under what conditions it was taken, and whether it was taken with a view to distorting it or not. The court ruled against Adamczuk, commenting that he had two days since adjournment last Friday, to procure the original taker of this photograph and thus establish it in the legal way with the right of cross-examination to defendants counsel of the photographer. Issue: Was the picture presented in evidence properly denied evidentiary weight due to the absence of proof as to its photographer and the conditions under which it was taken? Held: No. The rule is well-settled that a photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to the issue and if verified. It does not have to be verified by the taker. Its verification depends on the competency of the verifying witness and as to that the trial judge must in the first instance decide, subject to reversal for substantial error. The objection that a photograph may be so made as to misrepresent the object is genuinely directed against its testimonial soundness; but it is of no validity. While a photograph can be deliberately so taken as to convey the most false impression of the object, so also can any witness lie in his words. A photograph can falsify just as much and no more than the human being who takes it or verifies it. There is no more reason to exclude it on such ground.

If a witness is familiar with the scene photographed and is competent to testify that the photograph correctly represents it, it should, if relevant, be admitted. Doctrine: A photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to the issue and if verified. It does not have to be verified by the taker. Its verification depends on the competency of the verifying witness and as to that the trial judge must in the first instance decide, subject to reversal for substantial error. STATE v. TATUM 360 P. 2d 754 (1961) Facts: William Tousin of Pasco received monthly welfare checks from the state of Washington. In February, 1960, however, Tousin did not receive his check, which was usually mailed to and left on a window ledge in the hallway of the rooming house where he resided. The check turned out to have been endorsed and cashed at Shermans Food Store in Pasco by someone other than Tousin.

Caroline Pentecost, a employee at the store, testified that the initials appearing on the check were hers, though she could not specifically recall the above-mentioned transaction. According to her, whenever a check was presented to her for payment at the store, she was instructed by the store manager to initial it and then insert it into a Regiscope machine, which is designed to simultaneously photograph, through two separate lenses, both the check and the person facing the machine. Upon discovery of the forgery of the endorsement on the check, the Regiscope film of the transaction was sent to the Regiscope distributor in Portland to be developed. The processed film showed both the check and Ralph Tatum, who lived in the same rooming house as Tousin, with the food store in the background. Both the negative and the print therefrom were admitted in evidence, above Tatums objection.

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Issue: Were negative and evidence?

the authenticated Regiscope print properly admitted as

Held: Yes. Pentecost testified that the background shown in the photograph was that of the food store and that regiscoping each individual who cashed a check at the store was its standard procedure everytime a check was presented for encashment. Another witness, Phillip Dale, meanwhile, testified as to the Regiscope process. These testimonies amounted to a sufficient authentication to warrant the admission of the negative and the print into evidence. Tatum was not precluded from attempting to prove that the individual portrayed in the Regiscope print was not him, that it was inaccurate in any respect and that he was somewhere else at the time the photograph was taken. However, these arguments go to the weight rather than to the admissibility of said negative and print. The Regiscope films, coupled with the other evidence presented, are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of first degree forgery. Doctrine: The admission and use of demonstrative evidence, including photographs, have for many years been encouraged. Such admission or rejection of photographs as evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Such discretion extends to the sufficiency of identification. As to the required quantum of authentication of a photograph, some witness (not necessarily the photographer) may be able to give some indication as to when, where, and under what circumstances the photograph was taken, and that the photograph accurately portray the subject or subjects illustrated. The photograph need only be sufficiently accurate to be helpful to the court and the jury. PEOPLE v. TANDOY 192 SCRA 98 (1990)

Facts: On May 27, 1986, Makati Police detectives organized a buy-bust operation, whereby Detective Singayan was to pose as the buyer. The target area was a store along Solchuaga St. in Barangay Singkamas, Makati. Detective Singayan stood alone near the store, waiting until three men approached him. One of them, Mario Tandoy, asked Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor? To this, Detective Singayan asnwered yes. Two P5.00 bills, each marked ANU (Anti-Narcotics Unit), were exchanged for two rolls of marijuana. Upon consummation of the deal, the team moved in and arrested Tandoy. The marked money, as well as eight foils of marijuana were confiscated from Tandoy and an information was filed against him. Tandoy was found guilty of violation of R.A. 6425. Hence, he appealed, alleging that the money was actually bet money, and that, under the best evidence rule, the Xerox copy of the marked bills were inadmissible in court. Issue: Does the best evidence rule apply to the marked bills? Held: No. The best evidence rules applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. The marked money is not an ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary evidence, except in five specified instances. In this case, the marked money was presented solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitutionary evidence, such as a Xerox copy, is admissible without need for the accounting of the original. Besides, the presentation at the trial of the buy-bust money was not indispensable to the conviction of Tandoy since the sale of the marijuana had been sufficiently proven by the testimony of the police officers involved in the operation, and the marijuana actually sold had been submitted as evidence

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Doctrine: The best evidence rules applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. AIR FRANCE v. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO, ET AL. G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966 Facts: Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to Rafael Carrascoso, one of 48 Filipino pilgrims bound for Lourdes, a first class round trip airplane ticket for the March 30, 1958, flight from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso travelled in first class. However, at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced him out of his seat in favor of a white man, who, the Manager alleged, had a better right to the seat. Carrascoso refused, telling the Manager that his seat would be taken over [his] dead body. A commotion ensued and many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class. They pacified Carrascoso and prevailed upon him to give up his seat, which Carrascoso reluctantly did. Issue: Do the tickets prove that Carrascoso had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the flight from Saigon to Beirut? Held: Yes. As the trial court and found, the firstclass tickets were marked O.K., which, as Air Frances own witness, Rafael Altonaga, admitted, means that the space in the plane is confirmed. Air France received the corresponding amount as payment of first-class tickets. Testimonial evidence that the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong cannot prevail over written evidence, which belie said testimonies and clearly show that Carrascoso was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever. If, as Air France underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding that seat availability in specific

flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. It will be easy for an airline, aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. The Court has long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language, and that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. In this case, the lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket. Doctrine: As a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language. Spoken word can be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Testimonial evidence cannot prevail over written evidence. PEOPLE v. BIENVENIDO TAN, ET AL. G.R. No. L-14257, July 31, 1959 Facts: Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and her coaccused were charged with the crime of falsification of public documents, in their capacities as public officials and employees, for having made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or merchandise were purchased by Gonzales for distribution to calamity indigents, in such quantities and at such prices, and from such business establishments or persons as written in said public documents. The truth was, no such distributions of such relief and supplies as valued and as supposedly purchased had ever been made. The prosecution presented as evidence a booklet of receipts from the Metro Drug Corporation in Magallanes, Cebu City. Said booklet contained triplicate copies, the original invoices of which were sent to the companys Manila office, the dupicates given to customers, and the triplicates left attached to the booklet. One of the Metro Drugs salesmen who issued a receipt further explained that, in preparing receipts for sales,

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two carbon copies were used between the three sheets, so that the duplicates and the triplicates were filed out of the use of the carbons in the course of the preparation and signing of the originals. The trial court judge, Hon. Bienvenido Tan, interrupted the proceeding, holding that the triplicates were not admissible unless it was proven that the originals were lost and cannot be produced. Another witness was presented, and he alleged that the former practice of keeping the original white copies no longer prevails as the originals are given to the customers, while only the duplicates are submitted to the Manila office. Issue: Are the triplicates admissible as evidence? of the receipts

Facts: Pedro Salazar filed a suit for the collection of a sum of money against Eustaquio Balistoy. Judgment was rendered in favor of the former, and Balistoy was ordered to pay him P275.92, plus interest. Two rural properties belonging to Balistoy were attached and set for sale at a public auction on May 27, 1908. Before the auction, Bernardo Gregorio requested the deputy sheriff to exclude one of the properties from attachment as he owned said property, having acquired it by purchase from Balistoy in 1905, prior to the filing of the complaint. Gregorio presented to the sheriff a document, at the end of which appears a memorandum stating that Balistoy bought the land referred to from Luis Balistoy and subsequently sold it to Gregorio. Salazar filed a complaint for falsification against Gregorio and Balistoy for having simulated the conveyance of the property in favor of Gregorio in order to avoid its attachment and sale. Salazar further alleged that, though the said memorandum was dated February 1905, it was actually written in April 1908. However, the original document setting forth the memorandum was not presented, and only a copy thereof was produced in court. Issue: Can a person be convicted of falsification of a document without the original of said falsified document? Held: No. The issue in this case is whether the subject memorandum was falsified, having been made to appear to have been written on a date prior to the one when it was actually prepared and simulating the sale to a third party of a land, with the intent to defraud the creditor who, through proper judicial process, solicited and obtained the attachment and sale of said land. Though the sheriff testified to having seen the original of the document wherein the memorandum was written, or at least the original memorandum of the conveyance, the mere exhibition of a copy of an unauthenticated private document cannot legally produce the effect of suspending the sale of said land inasmuch as such copy is not sufficient proof of the right of Gregorio, being a mere copy of a private

Held: Yes. Under the law on evidence, the best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. The admissibility of duplicates or triplicates under this rule has long been settled. When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produced 2 facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signatures being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others. Doctrine: The best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. Carbon copies, however, when made at the same time and on the same machine as the original, are duplicate originals, and have been held to be as much primary evidence as the originals. U.S. v. BERNARDO GREGORIO 17 Phil. 522 (1910)

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document whose legality has not been proven. He was not able to compare the copy of the memorandum with that written on the original document, having only seen the original for a few moments. As the original document setting forth said memorandum was not presented, but merely a copy thereof, and as it could not be ascertained who had the original of said document, nor the exact date when it was written, doubt arises as to whether the original of the document really existed at all and whether the memorandum is an exact copy of that alleged to have been written at the end of said original document. Consequently, Gregorio and Balistoy cannot be convicted of its falsification. Doctrine: In a criminal case for the falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the judges and the courts have before them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited, or falsified, in order that they may find, pursuant to the evidence produced at trial, whether or not the crime of falsification was actually committed; in the absence of the original document, it is improper to conclude, with only a copy of said original in view, that there has been a falsification of a document which was neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a case, even the existence of such original may be doubted. PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PAMPANGA v. HERMOGENES REYES, ET AL. G.R. No. L-35366, August 5, 1931 Facts: The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel against Andres Guevarra, alleging that the latter, with malicious intent, published on page 9 of the July 13, 1930 issue of the weekly paper Ing Magumasid a sqib in verse, of which a Spanish translation was included, intended to impeach the honesty, integrity and reputation of Clemente Dayrit and of Mariano Nepomuceno. The criminal cases were set for a joint trial. As evidence, the fiscal attempted to present copies of the Ing Magumasid issue which

contained the libelous article with the innuendo, another article in the vernacular published in the same weekly, and its translation into Spanish. The trial court held the copies as inadmissible, saying that, inasmuch as the libelous articles were not quoted in the information, said evidence cannot be admitted without amending the information. The court denied the petition to amend the information on the ground that it would impair the rights of Guevarra, holding that the omission of the libelous article in the original was fatal to the prosecution. Issue: Are the copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published the best evidence of the crime of libel? Held: Yes. The general rules regarding admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. The evidence must be relevant, and not hearsay. This being so, the rule of procedure which requires the production of the best evidence, is applicable to the present case. The copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of a published article. Doctrine: The general rules regarding admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. The copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged.

Municipality of Victorias 149scra32 (1987) L31189

v.

CA,

VDA. DE CORPUS v. BRABANGCO 59 O.G. 8262 (1963) Facts: Tiburcia Brabangco is the declared owner of two parcels of land at Bugang, Alimodia, Iloilo, which the surviving widow and children of German Corpus alleged were sold by the former to Corpus in 1925 for P450, of which P300 was paid right upon the execution of the deed of sale in due form, as witnessed by Pablo and Bonifacio

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Villareal and acknowledged by Tiburcia before the Notary Public, Jose Tirador. The balance was also alleged to have been paid by Corpus to Tiburcia, as evidenced by a receipt. Corpus heirs claim that Corpus had been in possession of said lands from 1925 until his death. Six months after Corpus death, however, the defendants, with the aid and protection of policemen, entered the property, cut down and carried away 1,000 bamboos as well as 2 and sacks of corn. Tiburcia denied having sold the land, alleging that she simply accommodated and allowed the Corpuses to build their evacuation cottage when Japanese forces occupied the Philippines. Corpus heirs could not produce the deed of sale, however, which had allegedly been lost during the war. The trial court ruled in favor of the heirs and upheld the sale. Issue: Were the heirs of Corpus able to establish the contents of the deed of sale despite the absence of the original document? Held: Yes. As the heirs alleged, the original deed of sale signed by Tiburcia was lost during the war. Corpus heirs made efforts to trace the whereabouts of Notary Public Jose Tirador to get a copy of the deed, but the latters children said that their parents were already dead and that their house in which their father had kept his documents had burned down. The existence of the deed, however, was convincingly proven not only by the testimony of Corpus widow, and by the environmental facts disclosed by the evidence, but also by the disinterested testimony of Pablo Ableza, a municipal counselor who served as one of the witnesses in the execution of the sale. After proper proof of the due execution and delivery of the instrument, and its loss or destruction, oral evidence may be given of its contents by any person who signed the document or read it.

contents of a lost instrument; it is sufficient that the contents are stated in substance. Witnesses cannot be expected to recite the content word for word. It is enough if intelligent witnesses have read the paper and can state substantially its contents and import with reasonable accuracy. Doctrine: After proper proof of the due execution and delivery of a written instrument, and its loss or destruction, oral evidence may be given of its contents by any person who signed the document or read it. COMPAIA MARITIMA v. ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION, ET AL. G.R. Nos. L-28999, May 24, 1977 Facts: On August 11, 1952, the Compaia Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written contract whereby the union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring work for Compaia Maritimas vessels at Iligan City. The contract was to be effective for one month. The company could revoke the contract before its expiration if the union failed to render proper service, and it could be renewed by agreement of the parties. The company would also not be liable for the payment of the services of the union for the loading, unloading and delivery of cargoes, which should be paid for by the owners and consignees of the cargoes. The shippers and consignees paid the union only for the arrastre work (handling and hauling of cargo on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ships tackle), but refused to pay for the stevedoring service (handling of the cargo in the holds of the vessel or between the ships tackle and the holds of the vessel). They claimed that the shipowner was the one obligated to pay for the stevedoring service because the bill of lading provided that the unloading of the cargo was at the shipowners expense. However, the company refused to pay for the stevedoring service on the basis of the contract. As the union workers were in dire need of work, the contract was not terminated, and was verbally renewed upon its expiration.

It is not necessary that the witness should be able to testify with verbal accuracy as to the

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The union requested recognition as the exclusive bargaining unit, but was denied. Hence, the union filed with the CIR a petition for certification. The company terminated the contract and entered into a new stevedoring contract with Iligan Stevedoring Association. The union filed an Unfair Labor Practice suit and picketed the wharf to prevent the Iligan Stevedoring from performing the arrastre and stevedoring work. The company then sued the union, and the trial court awarded in favor of the company actual damages and other damages based on auditors reports showing alleged losses sustained by the company due to the acts of the union members. The union assailed the admissibility of said reports, alleging that they were hearsay evidence. Issue: Were the auditors reports admissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like? Held: No. The exception to the best evidence rule, which states that when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole, the original writings need not be produced, cannot be applied in this case. The voluminous character of the records on which the accountants reports were based was not duly established. Moreover, in order for said rule to be applied, the records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the correctness of the summary may be tested on cross-examination. The general rule is that an audit made by or the testimony of a private auditor is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like. The company failed to show the difficulty or impossiblity of producing the records in court and their examination and analysis as evidence by the court. Doctrine: The general rule is that an audit made by or the testimony of a private auditor is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like, unless it is proved that there would be difficulty

or impossibility in producing the records in court and the examination and analysis thereof. VILLA REY TRANSIT v. FERRER 25 SCRA 845 (1968) Facts: Jose Villarama, the operator of the Villa Rey Transit bus company pursuant to certificates of public convenience (CPC) granted to him by the Public Service Commission, sold two of the CPCs to the Pangasinan Transportation Company (Pantranco), with the condition that Villarama shall not, for 10 years, apply for any TPU service identical or competing with the buyer. Three months later, the Villa Rey Transit Inc. (VRTI) was formed, with Villaramas wife and relatives as stockholders and incorporators. VRTI bought 5 CPCs from Valentin Fernando, two of which was levied pursuant to a writ of execution in favor of Eusebio Ferrer, a creditor of Fernando. The CPCs were sold at auction, of which Ferrer was the highest bidder. Ferrer then sold the CPCs to Pantranco. VRTI filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriffs sale in favor of Ferrer and the subsequent sale of the CPCs to Pantranco. Pantranco, on its part, alleged that Jose Villarama and VRTI were one and the same; hence, the noncompetition clause in the abovementioned deed of sale executed by Villarama is also binding to VRTI. As evidence, Pantranco presented photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchers, the admissibility of which was assailed by Villarama on the ground that the best evidence were the originals themselves. Issue: Were the photostatic copies of the ledger entries and vouchers of VRTI sufficient to prove Pantrancos allegations, and thereby are admissible as evidence? Held: Yes. The photostatic copies of the ledger entries and vouchers showing that Villarama had co-mingled his personal funds and transactions with those made in the name of VRTI are very illuminating evidence. The requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the adverse party are: a) the adverse partys possession of the original; b) reasonable notice to the adverse party to

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produce the same; c) satisfactory proof of its existence; and d) the failure or refusal of the adverse party to produce the original in court. Villarama himself admitted the previous existence of the files of VRTI. He said that the originals were missing and that VRTI was no longer in possession of the same. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence o show that the original is in the actual possession of the adversary. It is enough that circumstances show that the writing is in his possession or under his control. It is also not required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument, upon notice to produce it, admit having it in his possession. The party seeking its production may introduce a copy thereof as in the case of loss because among the exceptions to the best evidence rule is when the original has been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced in court. The original of the vourchers in this case must be deemed to have been lost, thus, secondary evidence are admissible. MICHAEL & CO. v. ENRIQUEZ 33 Phil. 87 (1915) Facts: Adriano Enriquez allegedly executed a sale with a right to repurchase in favor of E. Michael and E. Michael & Co., a sociedad en comandita, of which Michael & Co. claims to be the successor, by virtue of an instrument duly executed and delivered by said companies to Enriquez, transferring property, business and assets of every kind, including the subject land in this litigation. Michael & Co. alleged that the time of repurchase had expired; hence, the title to the property had become absolute, and that Michael & Co. is now the owner of the land. Seeking to prove the execution of the sale and the conveyance of the title to the land, Michael & Co. alleged that the instrument executed and delivered to Enriquez was lost, thereby rendering secondary evidence as to its contents admissible as evidence. However, the trial court denied the admissibility of such secondary evidence.

Issue: Is secondary evidence admissible in this case? Held: No. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, an original writing must be produced and proved, except as otherwise provided in this Act. If it has been lost, proof of the loss must first be made before evidence can be given of its contents. Upon such proofs being made, together with proof of the due execution of the writing, its contents may be proved by a copy or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document or by the recollection of a witness. The writing itself must be produced, unless it has been lost or destroyed, in which case, it must be shown by the party seeking the admission of secondary evidence that 1) the document was duly executed and delivered, where delivery is necessary; 2) it had been lost or destroyed. Such due execution and delivery may be established the person/s who executed the document, by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and who saw it executed and delivered, or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the instruments have previously confessed the execution thereof. The loss or destruction of the instrument, meanwhile, may be proved by any person aware of the fact, or by anyone who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document was kept, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation sufficient to satisfy the Court that the document was indeed lost. If it appears that the document is in fact in existence, the proof of loss or destruction will fail and secondary evidence will be inadmissible. Doctrine: An original writing must be produced and proved, except as otherwise provided in this Act. If it has been lost, proof of the loss must first be made before evidence can be given of its contents. Upon such proofs being made, together with proof of the due execution of the writing, its contents may be proved by a copy or by a recital

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of its contents in some authentic document or by the recollection of a witness. Doctrine: The requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the adverse party are: a) the adverse partys possession of the original; b) reasonable notice to the adverse party to produce the same; c) satisfactory proof of its existence; and d) the failure or refusal of the adverse party to produce the original in court. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence o show that the original is in the actual possession of the adversary. Neither is it required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument, upon notice to produce it, admit having it in his possession.

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