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Wednesday, 11 February 2009

Two Birds with One Stone: Attention from the US; Conciliation from the ROK

MAJ Steve Sin, USA; and Ms. Su Goodwin, CIV

Summary: On 30 Jan, the North Korean Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Fatherland (CPRF) issued a
statement that is will “nullify” 1) “all the agreed points concerning the issue of putting an end to the political and

military confrontation between the north and the south”; and 2) the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression,

Cooperation and Exchange between the North and the South and the points on the military boundary line – the

Northern Limit Line (NLL) – in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) stipulated in its appendix.” In the statement, North Korea

blasted the Republic of Korea (ROK) government and said the hard-line policies of Lee Myung-bak forced it to nullify

the accords. The 30 Jan statement is the second threatening statement North Korea has made this year that

mentioned the NLL. On 17 Jan, a spokesman of the North Korean People's Army (KPA) General Staff issued a

statement announcing that because the Lee Myung-bak government of South Korea has continued to insist on a

hostile policy toward North Korea and it will conduct "all-out confrontation" against the South. Recent series of

rhetoric and threats surrounding the NLL seems to be a set of political maneuvering on the part of North Korea. A

continuing leitmotif of North Korean regional foreign policy is its aim to establish diplomatic relations with the US while

isolating the ROK from the regional diplomatic and security forums. The statements from 17 and 30 Jan served as a

vehicle to maintain the US’ focus in the region and engagement with the North to bring to fruition Kim Jong-il’s deep

seated desire to normalize diplomatic relations with the US. Through the same two statements, the North has

conveyed the ROK administration its mounting displeasure about the current ROK policy on North Korea.

Please direct your questions and comments to MAJ Steve Sin, Chief, USFK J2 OSINT:
DSN – (315) 725-5045, Commercial – +82-2-7915-5045, or Email – CIOCCAOSINT@us.army.mil

Information contained in this document is entirely derived from unclassified, open source, information. This product is based
exclusively on the content and behavior of selected media and has not been coordinated with other US Government components.
This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

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Introduction: On 30 Jan, the North Korean Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of
Fatherland (CPRF) issued a statement that is will “nullify” 1) “all the agreed points concerning
the issue of putting an end to the political and military confrontation between the north and the
south”; and 2) the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Cooperation and Exchange
between the North and the South and the points on the military boundary line – the Northern
Limit Line (NLL) – in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) stipulated in its appendix.” In the statement,
North Korea blasted the Republic of Korea (ROK) government and said the hard-line policies of
Lee Myung-bak forced it to nullify the accords. The CPRF, a body handling inter-Korean affairs
in North Korea, said in the statement that "the group of traitors has already reduced all the
agreements reached between the north and the south in the past to dead documents. … Under
such situation it is self-evident that there is no need for the DPRK to remain bound to those
north-south agreements.” This statement shapely raised tensions between the two Koreas and
raised the possibility of a naval clash in the West Sea. The ROK government expressed “deep
regret” about the statement and encouraged North Korea to agree to a dialogue with the South,
which the North has rejected.

The 30 Jan statement is the second threatening statement North Korea has made this year that
mentioned the NLL.

On 17 Jan, a spokesman of the North Korean People's Army (KPA) General Staff issued a
statement announcing that because the Lee Myung-bak government of South Korea has
continued to insist on a hostile policy toward North Korea and it will conduct "all-out
confrontation" against the South.

Though the North Korean Naval

Command routinely protests movements
by the ROK vessels close to the NLL in
the West Sea (Yellow Sea), it does not
complain as frequently about the ROK
vessels’ movement across the North’s
claimed demarcation line – which is well
south of the NLL.

Indeed, a North Korean military provocation against the South near the NLL (or other actions
that could be perceived as provocative) in the future cannot be ruled out; however, it is more

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likely that these pronouncements are intended to pressure the South to adapt more conciliatory
policies toward the North while garnering attention from the new US administration.

Recent Developments Surrounding North Korea Leading up to the 30 Jan CPRF

Statement:

ƒ Weeks prior to the US inauguration, North Korea offered to send a top diplomat to the
inauguration, which the US rejected on 12 Jan.

ƒ On 13 Jan, a spokesman for the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement
that the US should first normalize relations with North Korea as a precondition for its
denuclearization and that it will hold onto its nuclear weapons as long as the US backs the
ROK with its own atomic arsenal. The statement also demanded that if “the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the issue to be settled only when the DPRK
shows nuclear weapons,” then North Korea must be able to also verify the presence of
nuclear weapons in the ROK as well and that the same rule should be applied to US troops
stationed in the ROK.

ƒ On 15 Jan, the ROK government rejected the North’s demand as “distorted.”

ƒ On 16 Jan, North Korea issued another strong statement directed at the US about retaining
nuclear weapons. The North stated that it will boost its nuclear deterrent and maintain its
nuclear weapons as longs as it remains under a nuclear threat from the US.

ƒ On 17 Jan, North Korea escalated its saber rattling against the ROK with a threatening
statement from the KPA General Staff.

ƒ On 19 Jan, the ROK’s unification minister-designate, Hyun In-taek, said he will work more
closely with the US in dealing with North Korea, as he prepared to take over the post amid
the worst inter-Korean relations in a decade. Hyun, a university professor named as the
ROK’s top policymaker on North Korea, sounded tough in line with the ROK President Lee
Myung-bak's hard-line stance toward the North, a departure from his moderate predecessor
who focused on persuading North Korea to engage in talks. Unlike other major North
Korea experts, Hyun prioritizes the ROK's alliance with the US over reconciliation with North
Korea and advocates international consensus as the starting point in dealing with the North.

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ƒ On 21 Jan, the White House stated that the new Barack Obama administration will get rid of
North Korea's nuclear weapons programs "through tough and direct diplomacy." According
to a foreign policy agenda posted on the White House Web site, the administration plans to
"use tough diplomacy – backed by real incentives and real pressures – to prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons and to eliminate fully and verifiably North Korea's nuclear
weapons program." The Web posting came one day after President Obama said in his
inauguration ceremony on 20 Jan that "with old friends and former foes, we will work
tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat."

ƒ On 23 Jan, Xinhua News Agency reported that Kim Jong-il said he wanted a nuclear free
Korean peninsula, declaring his willingness to work with China to push forward the six-party
process. Kim stated, “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is committed to the
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and hopes to live in peace with all other sides. …
We don’t want to see tension emerge in the situation on the peninsula, and we are willing to
strengthen coordination and cooperation with China and push forward the six-party process
without interruption.” The US and the ROK welcomed Kim Jong-il’s reported commitment.

ƒ On 26 Jan, former US President Jimmy Carter said he believes North Korea would be willing
to give up its nuclear weapons for US diplomatic recognition, a peace deal with the ROK and
the US, and if it got new atomic power reactors and free fuel oil. Former President Carter
said in an interview with the Associated Press that "It could be worked out, in my opinion, in
half a day."

ƒ On 27 Jan, the US Secretary of State Clinton said that six-party talks are "essential" to
ending North Korea's nuclear weapons ambitions and that North Korea's nuclear
proliferation should be resolved quickly through direct diplomacy of the US if necessary.

ƒ On 30 Jan, North Korea’s CPRF stated that the North is scrapping all political and military
agreements with the ROK and declared the NLL void. The ROK responded to the North’s
threat with a warning of its own, stating that any attempt by North Korea to violate the NLL
will face firm counteraction.

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North Korean Rhetoric about the NLL from Jan 99 – Jan 09:
For the past 10 years, North
Korea has issued over 200
statements (rhetoric and
threats) regarding the NLL
through diplomatic channels,
KPA delegation stationed at the
Joint Security Area (JSA), as
well as its state and affiliated
media outlets. (See Graph 1)
All of the statements issued
from 1999 – 2008 (202
statements) have been in Graph 1 (Source: Derived from Open Source Center Document Archive)
response to specific past or
upcoming events rather than
precursors of North Korean
contrived events. Almost all of
the statements were in
response to major ROK-US
combined military exercises;
naval clashes between the
North and South Korean navies;
and disputes between the North
and South Korean fishing boats
during the blue crab fishing
seasons. Only North Korean
statements related to NLL that
were not in response to specific
events were issued in 2009 (five
reports – the 17 Jan KPA
General Staff pronouncement
Graph 2 (Source: Derived from Open Source Center Document Archive)
and four reports that referred to
the pronouncement). The 30 Jan CPRF statement seems to be a response to the ROK’s and
the US’ lack of appropriate action to the 17 Jan statement. (See Graph 2)

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Significance of 17 Jan Pronouncement: The KPA General Staff pronouncements have been
used to announce increased states of military readiness in the past, and only two have been
observed in the past 10 years. Both of the KPA pronouncements were issued in response to a
specific event. In Dec 98, a KPA General Staff spokesman’s statement responded to “third
country” media reports about Operation Plan 5027 – what Pyongyang describes as US-ROK
preparations for “northward aggression” – saying although we do not want a war, we also will
not avoid a war.” In Sep 99, KPA General Staff special communiqué delineated the North’s
West Sea military demarcation line (MDL) in response to a deadly Jun 99 North-South naval
clash.

The North has often adopted “postures” to

raise tension, but it is unusual to place the
KPA on an “all-out confrontation posture”.
The reference to this heightened “posture”
presumably correlates with a higher-state of
readiness and it should be noted that this
higher-state of readiness coincides with North
Korea’s annual Winter Training Cycle (WTC)
for its armed forces.

The announcement’s warning that “strong

military countermeasures … will follow” is KPA General Staff spokesman (KCTV, 17 Jan)
more categorical than typical North Korean
military warnings. Of significance is that there is no language indicating the North intends to
start a war. The statement did not threaten the ROK islands immediately south of the NLL, nor
did it have the usual blood and guts tone of the bellicose statements designed to increase
tension across the Peninsula – it focused primarily on the disputed area off the west coast.
This is not a new threat although it is more pointed and explicit.

Overall, the North made no commitment to do anything within any time frame throughout the
statement. It also did not lay out any specific requirements on the part of the ROK to take
action, or a set of actions, in order to defuse the threat.

It seems North Korea issued the 17 Jan pronouncement fully anticipating that the ROK
government will continue its hard-line North Korean policies and largely ignore the North’s

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bluster while putting its military on a higher alert status, which will then allow the North to claim
that “the ROK government has failed to respond to Pyongyang’s warnings.”

Another significant aspect of the 17 Jan statement is that it explicitly said it was aimed at both
the internal and external audiences. This year’s New Year’s Joint Editorial hinted that North
Korea is concerned about discipline issues in the KPA. I may be that the North Korean
leadership sees tension with the ROK as a way to help focus its armed forces and instill
discipline.

30 Jan CPRF Statement –

For the US: Weeks prior to the US inauguration, North Korea offered to send a top diplomat to
the inauguration, which the US rejected on 12 Jan. Four days after the rejection (16 Jan),
North Korea issued a strong statement directed at the US about retaining nuclear weapons.
The next day (17 Jan), it escalated its saber rattling with a threatening statement against the
Republic of Korea (ROK). The sequence of these statements suggests they may be reactions
to the diplomatic snub. The quick publications of the statements against the US and the ROK –
which the North sees as the proxy of the US – may also signify North Korea had these in
preparation in the event of rejection (which implies it had a separate set of statements ready had
the US accepted what the North considered a gesture of conciliation).

Between 21 and 27 Jan, the US stated, via multiple channels, that it is willing to work within the
Six-Party framework, as well as through direct diplomacy with North Korea, to verify and
eliminate fully North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

On 23 Jan, Kim Jong-il stated, “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is committed to the
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and hopes to live in peace with all other sides. … We
don’t want to see tension emerge in the situation on the peninsula, and we are willing to
strengthen coordination and cooperation with China and push forward the six-party process
without interruption.”

Given that North Korea has been attempting to maintain itself at the top of the new US
administration’s international agenda for some time, the 30 Jan CPRF statement appears to be
in part political positioning designed to convey to the new US administration, in strongest terms,
that while North Korea will conduct negotiations with the US, it still is a force to be reckoned with.

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For the ROK: Since the election and inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration in the
South, North Korea’s rhetoric and threat against the ROK have increased significantly when
compared to the previous two ROK administrations. The inter-Korean relation is at its coolest
in over ten years. The North claims the Lee government is the root cause of this chilled
relationship.

For the past two ROK administrations, North Korea has enjoyed a conciliatory relationship with
the ROK under the Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae-jung, and later the Peace and Prosperity Policy
of Roh Moo-hyun, The ROK government under the Kim and Roh administrations was sensitive
to the North’s threats and demands, and reacted appropriately – in North’s view – to much of its
demands.

With the launching of the Lee administration, the relationship between the two Koreas became
frosty quickly. Unlike the previous two ROK administrations, the Lee administration has
chosen to take a tough stance against the North, insisting the relationship between the two
Koreas must be based on “reciprocity and North Korea’s willingness to disarm its nuclear
arsenal.”

In response, North Korea has been consistently releasing rhetoric and threats against the ROK
government through diplomatic channels, KPA delegation stationed at the Joint Security Area
(JSA), as well as its state and affiliated media outlets. The frequency and belligerent tone of
the North Korean rhetoric and threats have increased throughout 2008, culminating with the 24
Nov 08 announcement of five “punitive” measures (which was implemented on 01 Dec 08) as a
retaliation to the ROK’s “anti-republic” and “anti-unification” policies.

In the face of the North’s increasingly belligerent and frequent rhetoric and threats, the ROK
government has not wavered and adheres to its hard-line policy. As expected, the ROK
government largely ignored the 17 Jan KPA pronouncement as just another series of
provocative sound-bites.

The 30 Jan CPRF statement appears to be, among other purposes, a response to the lack of
ROK reaction to the 17 Jan KPA statement, designed to elevate the pressure on the ROK to
induce a change in the South’s North Korea policy.

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Conclusion and Assessment: The use of a highly authoritative statement on 17 Jan and the
issuance of the highly provocative statement on 30 Jan certainly are intended to underscore the
gravity with which North Korea views the current inter-Korean and international political situation.

Recent series of rhetoric and threats surrounding the NLL seems to be a set of political
maneuvering on the part of North Korea. A continuing leitmotif of North Korean regional
foreign policy is its aim to establish diplomatic relations with the US while isolating the ROK from
the regional diplomatic and security forums. The statements from 17 and 30 Jan served as a
vehicle to maintain the US’ focus in the region and engagement with the North to bring to fruition
Kim Jong-il’s deep seated desire to normalize diplomatic relations with the US. Through the
same two statements, the North has conveyed the ROK administration its mounting displeasure
about the current ROK policy on North Korea.

Politically, North Korea has more to lose than gain if there is a military clash between the North
and the South (along the NLL or anywhere else on the Korean Peninsula); however, the
possibility of provocation (real or perceived) and/or miscalculation induced clash certainly does
exist if the current trend of elevated tensions between the two Koreas continues.

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