G.R. No. 86647 February 5, 1990 REP. VIRGILIO P. ROBLES, petitioner, vs. HON.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ROMEO L. SANTOS, respondents. Virgilio P. Robles for and in his own behalf. Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro & Arcilla Law Offices for private respondent. MEDIALDEA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order assailing the resolutions of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET): 1) dated September 19, 1988 granting herein private respondent's Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest, and 2) dated January 26, 1989, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987. On January 5, 1988, Santos filed an election protest with respondent HRET. He alleged, among others, that the elections in the 1st District of Caloocan City held last May 11, 1987 were characterized by the commission of electoral frauds and irregularities in various forms, on the day of elections, during the counting of votes and during the canvassing of the election returns. He likewise prayed for the recounting of the genuine ballots in all the 320 contested precincts (pp. 16-20, Rollo). On January 14, 1988, petitioner filed his Answer (pp. 22-26, Rollo) to the protest. He alleged as among his affirmative defenses, the lack of residence of protestant and the late filing of his protest. On August 15, 1988, respondent HRET issued an order setting the commencement of the revision of contested ballots on September 1, 1988 and directed protestant Santos to identify 25% of the total contested precincts which he desires to be revised first in accordance with Section 18 of the Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (pp. 76-77, Rollo). On September 7, 1988, the revision of the ballots for 75 precincts, representing the initial 25% of all the contested precincts, was terminated. On September 8, 1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision and on September 12, 1988, Santos filed a Motion to Withdraw Protest on the unrevised precincts (pp. 78-80, Rollo).

No action on Robles' motion to suspend revision and Santos' motion to withdraw protest on unrevised precincts were yet taken by respondent HRET when on September 14,1988, Santos filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest (pp. 81-85, Rollo). On September 19, 1988, Robles opposed Santos' motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest in an Urgent Motion to Cancel Continuation of Revision with Opposition to Motion to Recall Withdrawal (pp. 86-91, Rollo). On the same day, respondent HRET issued a resolution which, among others, granted Santos' urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest. The said resolution states: House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Case No. 43 (Romeo L. Santos vs. Virgilio P. Robles). Three pleadings are submitted for consideration by the Tribunal: (a) Protestee's "Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision," dated September 8, 1988; (b) Protestant's "Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing," dated September 12, 1988; and (c) Protestant's Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest, dated September 14, 1988. Upon the filing of Protestant's Motion to Withdraw Protest, the revision of ballots was stopped and such revision remains suspended until now. In view of such suspension, there is no need to act on Protestee's Motion. The "Motion to Withdraw Protest," has been withdrawn by Protestant's later motion, and therefore need not be acted upon. WHEREFORE, Protestee's "Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision" and Protestant's 'Motion to Withdraw Protest' are NOTED. The 'Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest' is GRANTED. The Secretary of the Tribunal is directed to schedule the resumption of the revision on September 26, 1988 and to send out the necessary notices for this purpose. (p. 84, Rollo). On September 20,1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion and Manifestation praying that his Urgent Motion to Cancel Revision with Opposition to Motion to Recall dated September 19, 1988 be treated as a Motion for Reconsideration of the HRET resolution of September 19, 1988 (pp. 92-94, Rollo). On September 22, 1988, respondent HRET directed Santos to comment on Robles' "Urgent Motion to Cancel Continuation of Revision with Opposition to Motion to Recall Withdrawal" and ordered the suspension of the resumption of revision scheduled for September 26, 1988. On January 26,1989, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal denied Robles' Motion for Reconsideration (pp. 109-111, Rollo). Hence, the instant petition was filed on February 1, 1989 (pp. 1-14, Rollo). On February 2, 1989, We required the respondent to comment within ten (10) days from notice of the petition (p. 118, Rollo). On February 9, 1989, petitioner Robles filed an Urgent Motion Reiterating Prayer for Injunction or Restraining Order (pp. 119-120, Rollo) which We Noted on February 16, 1989. Petitioner's Motion for Leave to File Reply to Comment was

granted in the same resolution of February 16,1989. On February 22, 1989, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition (p. 129, Rollo), this time questioning respondent HRET's February 16, 1989 resolution denying petitioner's motion to defer or reset revision until this Court has finally disposed of the instant petition and declaring that a partial determination pursuant to Section 18 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Rules was had with private respondent Santos making a recovery of 267 votes (see Annex "C" of Supplemental Petition, p. 138, Rollo). It is petitioner's main contention in this petition that when private respondent Santos filed the Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing dated September 12, 1988, respondent HRET lost its jurisdiction over the case, hence, when respondent HRET subsequently ordered the revision of the unrevised protested ballots, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the protest, it acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. We do not agree with petitioner. It is noted that upon Santos' filing of his Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts on September 12, 1988, no action thereon was taken by respondent HRET Contrary to petitioner's claim that the motion to withdraw was favorably acted upon, the records show that it was only on September 19, 1988 when respondent HRET resolved said motion together with two other motions. The questioned resolution of September 19, 1988 resolved three (3) motions, namely: a) Protestee's Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision dated September 8, 1988; b) Protestant's Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing dated September 12, 1988; and c) Protestant's "Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest," dated September 14, 1988. The resolution resolved the three (3) motions as follows: xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, Protestee's "Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision" and Protestant's 'Motion to Withdraw Protest' are NOTED. The "Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest" is GRANTED. xxx xxx xxx The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated (Jimenez v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-37933, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 1). We agree with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal when it held: We cannot agree with Protestee's contention that Protestant's "Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts" effectively withdrew the precincts referred to therein from the protest even before the Tribunal has acted thereon. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion

is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired. We hold therefore that this Tribunal retains the power and the authority to grant or deny Protestant's Motion to Withdraw, if only to insure that the Tribunal retains sufficient authority to see to it that the will of the electorate is ascertained. Since Protestant's "Motion to Withdraw Protest on the Unrevised Precincts" had not been acted upon by this Tribunal before it was recalled by the Protestant, it did not have the effect of removing the precincts covered thereby from the protest. If these precincts were not withdrawn from the protest, then the granting of Protestant's "Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest" did not amount to allowing the refiling of protest beyond the reglementary period. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56614, July 28,1987,152 SCRA 378; Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Luna, G.R. No. 61404, March 16,1987,148 SCRA 564). This rule more appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional body has time and again been upheld by Us in many cases. As explained in the case of Lazatin v. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988, thus: The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra ,at 162]. The exercise of the Power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature" [ Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete" [Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission [ Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140]. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. Thus, "judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is (thus) possible only in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or, paraphrasing Morrera, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such a GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.

In the absence of any clear showing of abuse of discretion on the part of respondent tribunal in promulgating the assailed resolutions, a writ of certiorari will not issue. Further, petitioner's objections to the resolutions issued by respondent tribunal center mainly on procedural technicalities, i.e., that the motion to withdraw, in effect, divested the HRET of jurisdiction over the electoral protest. This argument aside from being irrelevant and baseless, overlooks the essence of a public office as a public trust. The right to hold an elective office is rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement to the office. This is the reason why an electoral tribunal has been set up in order that any doubt as to right/mandate to a public office may be fully resolved vis-a-vis the popular/public will. To this end, it is important that the tribunal be allowed to perform its functions as a constitutional body, unhampered by technicalities or procedural play of words. The case of Dimaporo v. Estipona (G.R. No. L-17358, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 282) relied upon by petitioner does not help to bolster his case because the facts attendant therein are different from the case at bar. In the said case, the motion to withdraw was favorably acted upon before the resolution thereon was questioned. As regards petitioner's Supplemental Petition questioning respondent tribunal's resolution denying his motion to defer or reset revision of the remaining seventy-five (75) per cent of the contested precincts, the same has become academic in view of the fact that the revision was resumed on February 20, 1989 and was terminated on March 2, 1989 (Private Respondent's Memorandum, p. 208, Rollo). This fact was not rebutted by petitioner. The allegation of petitioner that he was deprived of due process when respondent tribunal rendered a partial determination pursuant to Section 18 of the HRET rules and found that Santos made a recovery of 267 votes after the revision of the first twenty-five per cent of the contested precincts has likewise, no basis. The partial determination was arrived at only by a simple addition of the votes adjudicated to each party in the revision of which both parties were properly represented. It would not be amiss to state at this point that "an election protest is impressed with public interest in the sense that the public is interested in knowing what happened in the elections" (Dimaporo v. Estipona, supra.), for this reason, private interests must yield to what is for the common good. ACCORDINGLY, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in issuing the assailed resolutions, the instant petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Corts, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur. Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, and Felicano, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991 DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner, vs. REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents. Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner. Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda. Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol. GRIO-AQUIO, J.:p This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House? Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it could be considered by some as "an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their prerogatives. In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all too willing to avoid a political confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like in the sands of the "political question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that 'where the matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.) In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action, especially when private rights are affected came to be recognized. As we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).

That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case. It is a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to administer justice according to law. ... It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.) In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each received the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga: Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes Difference...................................... 3,300 votes On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short) which is composed of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows: AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Associate Justice Supreme Court ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member Chairman

Associate Justice Supreme Court FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Associate Justice Supreme Court HONORATO Y. AQUINO Congressman 1st District Benguet LDP DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Congressman 1st District Palawan LDP SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Congressman 2nd District Nueva Ecija LDP JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Congressman 1st District Davao del Sur LDP JOSE E. CALINGASAN Congressman 4th District Batangas LDP Member Member Member Member Member Member

ANTONIO H. CERILLES Congressman 2nd District Zamboanga del Sur (formerly GAD, now NP)

Member

After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision in July, 1989. By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the finalization of the decision in the case. The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief," Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self- respect," and to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that they would "abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot 1 Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal. On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991. On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman Camasura by letter 2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions. 3 At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it 'especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite. 4 At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M. Herrera, received the following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of

the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. The letter reads as follows: 13 March 1991 Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills Quezon City Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera: I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House of Representatives during its plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is self-explanatory and copies of which are hereto attached. Thank you. For the Secretary-General (SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations Department (p. 10, Rollo.) Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in writing, of this "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the electoral protest entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no legal impediment to its promulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated. The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal requested re-appreciation of some ballots, the finalization of the decision had to be deferred by at least 4 months.

With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting. Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience vote, for which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of the leader of his party. Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely difficult to continue with membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve it. 8 integrity and credibility as a constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us that the unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is being prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not be hampered in the performance of its constitutional function by factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases before it. In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional representation in the Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should be amended to provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935 Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three (3) of the party having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can dominate the legislative component in the Tribunal. In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Similarly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all such contests involving members of the Senate. In this way, there should be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a decisive role in the resolution of election contests. We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations. There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have been promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy Week recess.

But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated task of the Tribunal well ahead of the completion of the present congressional term. Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship and membership in the Tribunal. xxx xxx xxx At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads: In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills morning from the House of Representatives that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated. The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of the opinion that this development undermines the independence of the Tribunal and derails the orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even date, for their relief from membership in the Tribunal. The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to resign as a member of the Tribunal. The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also manifested a similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.) On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that: ... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all contests relationship to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective political parties but as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to further bolster the independence of the Tribunals, the

term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be relieved from their membership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performs functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE the view that the term of all the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the first instance. Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura should be allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a political and judicial travesty will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave. On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to: 1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;" 2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place of respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; 3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and 4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable. Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to comment 5 on the petition within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing and allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol

or whoever is designated to replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of said Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.) Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition. Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress' being the sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the political parties therein, those who are to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party; 6 that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive with his legislative term, 7 for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified; 8 and that the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP 9 and the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of judicial review. 10 In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET. 11 Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET. 12 The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the HETH as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the House of Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanita nito Camasura as a member of the HRET. 13 Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's) prejudice. 14 Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid." 15 In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol was impleaded as one of the respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives had announced the termination of Congressman Camasura's membership in the HETH several newspapers of general circulation reported that the House of

Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal. 16 Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party? Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides: Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of three members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935 constitutional provision reads as follows: Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest member of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.) Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible for any political party to control the voting in the tribunal. The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa. The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court

although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members. The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature. The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and control them, without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.) To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts. The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature. xxx xxx xxx The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)

The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the following exchanges on the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, attest: MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you. My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction? MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement. MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body.? MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President. MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions? MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body. MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be valid? MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies. MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of government, I would like to know again if the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be applicable to the present bodies we are deciding on, when the Supreme court said that these electoral tribunals are independent from Congress, devoid of partisan

influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress has no power to regulate proceedings of these electoral tribunals. MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a separate branch of government. MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to leave unto themselves the determination of controversies with respect to the election and qualifications of their members, and precisely they have this Committee on Privileges which takes care of this particular controversy. Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule because apparently we have an independent electoral tribunal? MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman will notice that the wordings say: 'The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal of the House and tribunal of the Senate although they are independent. MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are independent from both bodies? MR. AZCUNA. That is correct. MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say that these bodies are independent when we still have six politicians sitting in both tribunals? MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President. MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this in the Committee on the Executive, there was a comment by Chief Justice Concepcion-Commissioner Concepcion-that there seems to be some incongruity in these electoral tribunals, considering that politicians still sit in the tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in the

case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral tribunal Case No. 1, they are supposed to act in accordance with law and justice with complete detachment from an political considerations. That is why I am asking now for the record how we could achieve such detachment when there are six politicians sitting there. MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the opposition, has, with sterling competence, shown independence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think we can also trust that the members of the tribunals will be independent. (pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis supplied.) Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power. The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure. There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed, however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET. The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him for "party disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case. The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the strong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207). Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative

of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice. Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. 86649 July 12, 1990 ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG and KABABAIHAN PARA SA INANG BAYAN, petitioners, vs. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., as speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines; HON. FRANCISCO SUMULONG, as Majority Floor Leader of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines; HON. JOVITO SALONGA, as Ex-Oficio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments; HON. ROQUE R. ABLAN, JR., HON. LORNA L. VERANO-YAP, HON. MIGUEL ROMERO, HON. ANTONIO V. CUENCO, HON. ROGACIANO M. MERCADO, HON. ALAWADIN T. BANDON, JR., HON. JOSE L. CABOCHAN, HON. CARLOS R. IMPERIAL, HON. MA. CLARA L. LOBREGAT, HON. NATALIO M. BELTRAN, JR., HON. CARMELO J. LOCSIN & HON. LUIS C. SINGSON, as Members of the Commission on Appointments for the House of Representatives of the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioners. Panganiban, Benitez, Barinaga & Bautista Law Offices for Lorna L. Verano-Yap. GRIO-AQUINO, J.: The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the House of Representatives of the candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa (LB), Liberal Party (LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA. On August 26, 1987, the House of Representatives, upon nomination by the Majority Floor Leader, Cong. Francisco Sumulong, elected from the Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) out of twelve (12) congressmen to represent the House in the Commission on Appointments. They were: 1. Hon. Miguel Romero LP (Liberal Party) 2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco LB-Panaghiusa 3. Hon. Rogaciano Mercado LB (Lakas ng Bayan) 4. Hon. Raul Daza LP 5. Hon. Alawadin T. Bandon Jr. PDP-Laban 6. Hon. Jose Cabochan PDP-Laban 7. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP 8. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial IND 9. Hon. Ma. Clara L. Lobregat IND 10. Hon Natalio M. Beltran, Jr. LB/Unido/NP 11. Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin PDP-Laban/LB (pp. 115-116, Rollo.)

On September 22, 1987, upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the House elected Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the twelfth member of the Commission on Appointments, representing the Coalesced Minority in the House. A year later, on September 16, 1988, the "Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP, for brevity) was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized. On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal (p. 15, Rollo). Her request was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen, namely, Hon. Lally Laurel-Trinidad, Bonifacio Gillego, Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Gerardo Cabochan, Jose D. Aspiras, Oscar Santos, Eduardo N. Joson, Antonio H. Cerilles and Isacio Pelaez. On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, on motion of the Majority Floor Leader and over the objection of Cong. Raul A. Daza, LP, revised the House majority membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, as follows: 1. Hon. Miguel L. Romero LDP 2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco LDP 3. Hon. Rogaciano M. Mercado LDP 4. Hon. Alawadin T. Bandon, Jr. LDP 5. Hon. Jose L. Cabochan LDP 6. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial LDP 7. Hon. Maria Clara L. Lobregat LDP 8. Hon. Natalio M. Beltran, Jr. LDP 9. Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin LDP 10. Hon. Luis C. Singson LDP 11. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP (p. 122, Rollo.) Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing the House minority. On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (which may be considered as a petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying this Court to declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation because: 1) the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members of the House) is entitled to only nine (9) seats out of the twelve to be filled by the House (p. 29, Rollo);

2) the members representing the political parties, or coalitions thereof, must be nominated by their respective political parties or coalitions; 3) the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by the respondents as representative of the minority was clearly invalid (p. 31, Rollo); and 4) that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan as Minority member in the Commission because he was neither nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or parties in the House (p. 31, Rollo). Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the Commission on Appointments as a representative of the Minority because she has the support of nine (9) other congressmen and congresswomen of the Minority (p. 31, Rollo). In their collective Comment, the respondents House of Representatives, the Speaker, the Majority Floor Leader, the members of the Commission on Appointments including Congressman Roque R. Ablan, but excluding Congresswoman Lorna Verano-Yap (who filed a separate Comment), alleged: (1) that the legality of the reorganization of the Commission on Appointments is a political question, hence, outside the jurisdiction of this Court to decide, and (2) that in any case, the reorganization was "strictly in consonance with Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution" i.e., on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties, considering the majority coalition "as a form of a political party" (pp. 115, 118, Rollo). They further alleged that as of March 3, 1989, 160 members of the House (including 26 former Liberals) had expressly renounced in writing their respective political party affiliations and formally affiliated with the LDP leaving only 15 Liberals in the House (p. 119, Rollo).itc-asl After its petition for registration as a political party was granted on August 28, 1989 by the First Division of the COMELEC) and affirmed on November 23, 1989 by the COMELEC en banc, the LDP become the new Majority in the House. They finally argued that as KAIBA is part of the Coalesced Majority which supports the administration of President Corazon C. Aquino, not of the minority, petitioner is bound by the choice of the Coalesced Majority of the members who would sit in the Commission on Appointments. Representative Lorna Verano-Yap, in her comment alleged that the petitioner has no better light than those already selected, to be chosen as a member of the Commission on Appointments because: (1) the Constitution was not violated in electing Yap and eleven (11) other House members to the Commission on Appointments; (2) respondent Yap is a rightful incumbent; and (3) petitioner's claim to a seat on the Commission on Appointments is without legal and factual basis (pp. 217-218, Rollo). The Commission on Appointments took a neutral stand on the petition as the issues involved may touch on the validity of its organization and the legality of the entitlement of the LDP or the LP to representation, which are raised in the case of Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, then pending before this Court (pp. 195-198, Rollo). The issue here is whether the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.) After deliberating on the petition and the comments of the respondents, we hold that the petition should be dismissed, not because it raises a political question, which it does not, but because the revision of the House representation in the Commission on Appointments is based on proportional representation of the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The "political question" issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989, where this Court ruled that "the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution" is justiciable, and, "even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government." The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein." The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumably a member also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen. The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's election to the Commission are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman VeranoYap.

There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the Commission on Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority is unassailable. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. Sarmiento, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993 TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD), petitioners, vs. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAADA, respondents. NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention. Ricardo G. Nepomuceno for petitioners. Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for respondents. RESOLUTION CAMPOS, JR., J.: In motions separately filed by respondent Senator Wigberto E. Taada on October 27, 1992 and respondents Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto Romulo on October 30, 1992, said respondents moved for a reconsideration of our decision dated October 20, 1992, on the following grounds: Senator Taada alleges that: 1) The decision was premised on an erroneous appreciation of relevant factual precedents; 2) The decision ignored the reality of the multi-party system recognized both by the letter and spirit of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions; 3) It is mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the Commission on Appointments; 4) The Senate did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it elected respondent Taada to the Commission on Appointments. In their Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification, Senators Gonzales and Romulo allege: 1) That the decision is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in the two cases of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. 1 and Daza vs. Singson. 2 2) It is mandatory to have twelve (12) members of the Commission of Appointments to enable it to function as a constitutional body. 3) The Tolentino Compromise Formula was adopted by the Senate and accepted by all political parties and must govern the selection of respondent Senators to the Commission on Appointments.

4) The election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the multi-party system which contemplates a realignment of political parties to remove fractional membership of any party in the Commission. On December 16, 1992, the petitioner-in intervention Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed its separate Comments to the Motions of respondents Senators while the petitioners filed on January 7, 1993 their separate Comments on the Motion of the respondents. Considering the grounds set forth in the Motions of the respondents and in the light of the reasons/arguments submitted in refutation thereof, We deny both Motions for Reconsideration on the following grounds: 1) The decision is based on a simple interpretation and application of Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution and We quote pertinent portions thereof. It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate is as follows: LDP 7.5 LP-PDP-LABAN .5 NPC 2.5 LAKAS-NUCD 1.5 It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application than as above. The problem is what to do with the fraction of . 5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is a clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC. xxx xxx xxx We find the respondent's claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that twelve senators shall be elected on

the basis of proportional representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation. The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. No party can claim more than what is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the Commission on Appointments and more power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its rightful membership in the Commission. 3 The membership of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada in the Commission on Appointments for the year alluded to by respondents is not disputed. The questioned decision however refers to the former Senator's Membership in the Commission during his first election as Senator in 1953-1954. 4 In the following years the composition of the Commission on Appointments showed varying membership from the Nacionalista Party and Liberal Party, not discounting the various coalitions of the rival groups within their own ranks. During this period, his membership in the Commission was acquiesced to by the other members of the Senate, including the Nationalista Party which had a fractional vote. His membership in the Commission was never contested nor disputed by any party nor member of the Senate so that the question of whether his sitting as member of the Commission was constitutionality valid or not never reached the Court. The older Taada's membership in the Commission on Appointments cannot thus be considered by respondent Senator Taada as a precedent sufficient to overrule the clear mandate of Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution. It is a matter of record that in the political ventures of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada, he had his Citizens Party coalesce with the Nationalista Party and got himself elected as Senator under the banner of the latter party. His election to the Commission was principally due to the alliance of his Citizens Party with the Nationalista Party and not because he was elected thereto on the strength of his being the lone representative of the Citizens' Party. 5 Senator Taada was included in the Nationalista Party ticket in 1953 until he parted ways temporarily with the same before the end of 1955. In 1959 he ran as a guest candidate of the Nationalista Party for a term of 6 years and again got re-elected in 1965 for another 6-year term under the Nationalista Party. The NationalistaCitizens Party coalition of 12 Senators in the Senate from 1965-1967 gave the coalition 6 members in the Commission on Appointments, including the late Senator Lorenzo Taada. As early as those years, the Senate recognized the rule on proportional representation in the Commission by resorting to a coalition of political parties in order to resolve and avoid fractional membership in the Commission. This practice was

repeated in 1968-1970 where the lone elected Senator of the Citizens Party was nominated and elected to the Commission on Appointments as the Senator to complete a whole number in the proportional representation to the Commission, with the late Senator Taada becoming the 16th Senator of the Coalition, enabling it to put 8 members in the Commission. Likewise, in 1970, the late Senator Taada filled up the 18th membership of the Coalition to become the 9th member representing the Coalition in the Commission. The election of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada to the Commission on Appointments does not reflect any practice or tradition in the Senate which can be considered as a precedent in the interpretation of the constitutional provision on proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments. No practice or tradition, established by a mere tolerance, can, without judicial acquiescence, ripen into a doctrine of practical construction of the fundamental law. In the absence of judicial confirmation of the constitutionality of the challenged legislative practice the repeated erroneous legislative interpretation of a constitutional provision, does not vest power on the legislature. 6 2) We take note of an erroneous reference in our decision to the listing of the party affiliation of the Senators based on the result of the election on May 11, 1992, giving the LDP only 15 members and including Senator Teofisto Guingona as a member of the Lakas-NUCDP. Respondents, however, accepted the fact that for purposes of determining the proportional representatives of each political party to the Commission on Appointments, the basis thereof is the actual number of members of each political party at the time of election of the members of the Commission on Appointments in the Senate. 7 In fact, respondents affirmed that the affiliation of Senator Guingona with the Lakas-NUCDP upheld the doctrine enunciated in Daza vs. Singson, 8 recognizing changes in alignments of membership in the Commission based on changing political alignments at the time of the organization of the Commission on Appointments. The issue therefore has no significance as an argument to set aside our decision. 3) Senator Taada was actually nominated by the LP because the house rules require that the party must make the nomination. In fact he nominated himself as representative of the LPLDP-LABAN. It was the Majority Leader, an LDP Senator, (Senator Romulo) who presented the motion to elect respondent Senator Taada (along with the Senators belonging to the other Minority parties NPC and LAKAS-NUCD) as part of his function or duty to present for election and votation those previously nominated by the various political parties. In nominating the twelve (12) Senators to the membership in the Commission on Appointments, Senator Romulo moved: Mr. President, pursuant to the Motion just approved, I have the honor to submit for election to the Commission on Appointments the 12 Senators to compose its membership : Senators Angara, Herrera, Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Romulo for the LDP; Senators Tolentino and Osmea for NPC; Senator Rasul, for Lakas-NUCD; and Senator Taada for LP-PDP, Mr. President. 9 4) This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution providing for a multi-party system, entitlement to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments requires a minimum membership in each house. 10 The statement of this Court in Daza vs. Singson 11 to the effect that "under the Constitutional provision on membership of

the Commission on Appointments, the members thereof are NOT limited to the majority and minority parties therein but extends to all the political parties represented in each house of Congress", does not and should not be construed to mean that all political parties, irrespective of numerical representation in the Senate, are entitled by Constitutional fiat to at least one representation in the Commission. The Supreme Court in the subsequent case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. 12 made this clear where it ruled that proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments requires a minimum membership of a party in each house. The mere presence of one Senator belonging to a political party does not ipso facto entitle such a party to membership in the Commission on Appointments. 5) We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 Senators be elected to the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The overriding directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the Commission on Appointments and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations like the case at bar. Section 18 provides, in part, as follows: There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate as ex-officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and . . . , elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation . . . . The respondent's contention that the use of the word "shall" in Section 18 indicating the composition of the Commission on Appointments makes the election of the Senators mandatory, omitting that part of Section 18 which provides that ( they shall be) elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation. This interpretation finds support in the case of Taada vs. Cuenco, 13 where this Court held that the constitutional provision makes mandatory the election of the specified number of Senators to the Commission on Appointments but also ruled that they should be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties. In case of conflict in interpretation, the latter mandate requiring proportional representation must prevail. Such interpretation is the only correct and rational interpretation which the court can adopt in consonance with its solemn duty to uphold the Constitution and give effect the meaning intended by its framers to every clause and word thereof. The Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve Senators and twelve Representatives in order that the Commission may function. Article VI, Section 18 which deals with the Commission on Appointments, provides that "the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the members", and in Section 19 of the same Article, it is provided that the Commission "shall meet only while Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it". In implementing these provisions, the Rules of the Commission on Appointments provide that the presence of at least thirteen (13) members is necessary to constitute a quorum, "Provided however, that at least four (4) of the members constituting the quorum should come from either house". 14 Even if the composition of the Commission is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum,

which is less than the full complement fixed by the Constitution. And the Commission can validly perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto. Even if respondent Senator Taada is excluded from the Commission on Appointments for violation of the rule on proportional representation, the party he represents still has representation in the Commission in the presence of house members from the LPLDP-LABAN such as Congressman Juan Ponce Enrile. Respondents ask for a clarification of our statement which suggested a practical solution to break the impasse in the membership of the Senate in the Commission on Appointments, which we quote: . . . On the other hand, there is nothing to stop any of the political parties from forming a coalition with another political party in order to fill up the two vacancies resulting from this decision. 15 The statement is merely a suggestion but not an exclusive solution. It is not part of the disposition of the case. It does not contemplate a realignment of political parties, as otherwise this Court would have explicitly said so. What we intimated is merely this: That those entitled to fractional memberships may join their half-memberships to form a full membership and together nominate one from their coalition to the Commission on Appointments. For example, the NPC and the LAKAS-NUCD may join their half-memberships and jointly nominate one of their own Senators to the Commission. In the same way the LDP and the LP-PDP-LABAN may nominate Senator Wigberto Taada to fill up the other slot to complete the membership to twelve. But the latter, as a coalition, may not insist in electing both Senator Taada and Senator Romulo to fill up two slots because this is certainly a violation of the rule on proportional representation. Who decides the question of proportionality? The power to choose who among them will sit as members of the Commission on Appointments belongs to the Senate. The number of senators is fixed by the Constitution to twelve, but the numbers of senators to be chosen must comply with the rule on proportional representation. The question of who interprets what is meant by proportional representation has been a settled rule that it belongs to this Court. The acceptance by the Senate of Senator Tolentino's formula to settle temporarily the impasse concerning the membership in the Commission on Appointments by leaving the final decision to the Supreme Court is a Senate recognition that the determination of proportional representation under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution is a function of this Court. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by Constitutional mandate to decide. The framers of our Constitution, in borrowing from constitutions of other states, thought it wise to vest in the Supreme Court the role in final arbiter in cases of conflicts in the interpretation of the fundamental law. In this role, the Court serves as a check on the unbridled use of power by the legislative majority to silence the minority. Democracy may breed but it will not sanction tyranny by force of numbers. The election of respondents Senators Taada and Romulo is a clear disregard of the constitutional provision and when done over the objections of their colleagues in the Senate, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. We quote from our decision:

. . . The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Taada as members of the Commission on Appointments by the LDP Majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP Majority by sheer force of superiority in numbers during the Senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical strength, knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of authority granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly found to exist. 16 For lack of merit, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED with FINALITY. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.