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Highlights of Recent Interviews Concerning Congressional Oversight

Summary

• SSCI/HPSCI are weak vis-a-vis SASC/HASC due to sequential referral of

authorization bills.
• SAC/HAC dominate appropriations; SASC/HASC have limited influence in
appropriations. Contractors lobby SAC/HAC and SASC/HASC - not the
SSCI/HPSCI - for procurement dollars.
• SAC/HAC's defense subcommittees appropriate for both the 1C and DoD and raid
intelligence to fund defense.
• Poor Congressional oversight of 1C strategy and performance on terrorism pre-911.
• Funding the war on terrorism via supplemental diminishes Congressional oversight
because authorization committees have less involvement.

BillDuhnke. SSCI Staff Director

• Sequential referral (by which SASC has final mark-up authority over the intelligence
authorization bills) renders SSCI superfluous to SASC. SASC guards its jurisdiction.
• SSCI has no incentive to cut intelligence funding, as SASC applies SSCI's
intelligence savings to DoD.
• Authorizing committees are weak compared to SAC; SASC perhaps has the strongest
influence of any authorization committee - SSCI is particularly weak due to
sequential referral. Contractors for intelligence procurement lobby SASC and SAC,
not SSCI.
• SAC defense subcommittee raids the intelligence appropriation to fund DoD.
• Funding the war on terrorism via supplemental circumvents SSCI/HPSCI review.

Melvin Dubee, SSCI Deputy Minority Staff Director

• SSCI is only a B Committee.

• SSCI is not involved in supplemental appropriations.
• SSCI does not yet have insight into USDI's role.
• SSCI held hearings on UBL in 1997 and hearings after terrorist attacks.

Pat Murray. HPSCI Staff Director

• HASC gives HPSCI a top-line budget figure for the 1C authorization.

• The goals of oversight are: (1) to provide the best strategic policy guidance to the 1C,
(2) to keep Members informed of strategic/policy decisions that they need to make,
and (3) to ensure that there is political support for 1C activities. Congress needs to
give big-picture direction to the DCI and 1C program managers.
• In conducting oversight, SSCI/HPSCI know only what the 1C wants them to know.
SSCI/HPSCI need to maintain their own networks in the 1C to learn things that the 1C
does not tell them.

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• HPSCI examines how the 1C was functioning mainly via budget hearings. In the end,
all Congress can really do is (1) give money and (2) criticize. The less reactive
agencies are to broad policy guidance, the more Congress must be directive.
• Before 9/11, Congress recognized that CIA was not well positioned for HUMINT and
thus provided CIA with money and billets - but CIA failed to initiate change. The
DO had no way to measure how much money it was spending.
• ' Jurisdictional exclusivity' is critical for improving oversight. SSCI/HPSCI should
have exclusive jurisdiction over JMIP/TIARA because SASC/HASC lack the time to
concentrate on these programs.

Mike Sheehv. Former HPSCI Minority Staff Director

• HPSCI and HASC agreed that HPSCI has full jurisdiction over CIA and shares
jurisdiction with HASC over defense intelligence.
• HPSCI has little power over appropriations. HAC gives its defense subcommittee an
overall budget number, and the subcommittee raids intelligence to fund DoD. HPSCI
did not play in pre-9/11 supplemental.
• Conferences on the intelligence authorization bill include the HPSCI, SSCI, and
SASC. HPSCI generally removes parts of the authorization bill that SASC opposes.
• Most of HPSCI's time is spent on budgets. Regarding oversight, the HPSCI depends
upon what the 1C tells it; HPSCI was content with the IC's actions against al Qaeda
before 9/11 because the 1C did not seem too concerned itself.
• Rep. Goss said that the Executive Branch never requested that Congress increase the
IC's top-line budget figure. Also, the DCI never reallocated funding to correspond to
his assertion that terrorism was a high priority.
• Limited tenure for HPSCI membership prevents the 1C from 'capturing' Members
and makes other Members more receptive to HPSCI Members' recommendations.
• SASC/HASC drove USDI's creation.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Meeting with Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton on Congressional Oversight

February 25,2004
Attendees: Philip Zelikow, Chris Kojm, John Roth, the Vice Chairman's assistant, and
Gordon Lederman
Prepared by: Gordon Lederman

Gordon Lederman provided a brief update on our work concerning Congressional

oversight. The HPSCI and SSCI have collected documents at our request and are holding
them for our review. We have scheduled interviews with SSCI and HPSCI staffers.
Also, we have covered Congressional oversight issues during interviews with Executive
Branch officials and academics.

Vice Chairman Hamilton suggested that we talk with the staff director of Rep. Chris
Shays' Government Reform subcommittee. We should also talk with Senator Bob
Graham's staffers and Sen. Shelby's staffers. We are already scheduled to meet with Bill
Duhnke. Philip Zelikow suggested that we talk with Sen. Shelby's staffer who wrote the
Senator's addendum to the Joint Inquiry; Philip Zelikow thought that the staffer had gone
into the Executive Branch.

Vice Chairman Hamilton said that he is unsure how to approach this issue and directed us
to meet with staffers of Senators McCain, Rockefeller, and Harman to ask them for
recommendations for strengthening oversight and what recommendations are actually
feasible. He noted that the Joint Inquiry did not examine Congressional oversight due to
time constraints.

Vice Chairman Hamilton said that we should keep in close contact with Commissioners
Kerrey, Roemer, and Gorton because they have a strong interest in this issue on account
of their experience in Congress. Commissioner Kerrey is extremely interested, Vice
Chairman Hamilton said.

Vice Chairman Hamilton said we should not confine our interviews just to Congress but
should talk with high-level Executive Branch officials. However, talking with such
officials is a delicate matter. We should also talk with the PFIAB. The Intelligence
Community is difficult to oversee because (1) it has a "leave it to us" attitude, and
(2) there is no media exposure. The PFIAB and Congress are the two bodies with a
stand-off perspective on the Intelligence Community, although Vice Chairman Hamilton
noted that the PFIAB is appointed by the President.

Chris Kojm suggested that we need to go beyond Congressional oversight of the

Intelligence Community and examine how Congress as an institution is handling national
security issues after 9/11. He noted that there is a Select Committee on Homeland
Security in the House but no comparable committee in the Senate.

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Vice Chairman Hamilton suggested that we review the historical record of the HPSCI
and SSCI before 9/11, such as what the Intelligence Community did to warn the
committees concerning terrorism and how many hearings on terrorism were held. The
Vice Chairman said that he is not hesitant to criticize Congress because Congress has two
responsibilities to fulfill: legislation and oversight. His personal view is that Congress
failed to do oversight. We should also examine how Congress has done oversight after
9/11. We should generate recommendations for what they should do from now on.

Gordon Lederman asked whether we include the HASC and SASC in our inquiry given
that these committees have resisted increased DCI authorities. Vice Chairman Hamilton
noted that many commissions have recommended increased DCI authorities but that the
HASC and SASC have opposed it. SecDef Rumsfeld's response to the DCI/DoD issue is
to have good personal relations with the DCI - but are good personal relations enough,
Vice Chairman Hamilton asked.

Philip Zelikow commented as follows:

(1) Congressional oversight seems to be 'all trees and no forest,' not engaging
on strategic issues (which concern the Executive Branch) but rather at the
micro-budgetary level or on issues prominent in the media.

(2) We will likely demand that the DCI develop a resource plan for terrorist
intelligence across Intelligence Community, but there must be parallel
Congressional oversight authority: Congress should be aligned so that
the intelligence oversight committees have full authorization authority
over the National Foreign Intelligence Program, and the HASC and SASC
would then oversee only JMIP and TIARA. This alignment, however,
would require declassifying the top line of the intelligence budget.

The Vice Chairman agreed that Congressional oversight gets lost in the trees. However,
the more the recommendations focus on structural reform in Congress, the less feasible
they become. The Vice Chairman suggested that, on the other hand, perhaps the
Commission's role is to tell Congress to get its house in order. He relayed to us
Commissioner Kerrey's recommendation that we start by reviewing the charters of the
intelligence committees.

Philip Zelikow asked about the Vice Chairman's experience in Congress. Vice Chairman
Hamilton responded that Congress brings independence and is an 'outsider looking into'
the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Community is still a closed fraternity,
although less so than in the past. Congress has the ability to make sharp criticisms that
will rarely come out of the Executive Branch themselves, as people in the Executive
Branch depend upon the Executive Branch for their jobs. And Congress ultimately has
the power of the purse. Congress's responsibility in national security is to be very
vigorous in exercising oversight. Oversight should be as serious a Congressional
endeavor as legislation. But in the last several decades, Congress has fallen down. It is a
separation of powers issue - oversight is an institutional responsibility. Obviously, the

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intelligence arena is secret, and Congress does not have the assistance of the press like in
domestic arenas; therefore, Congress has a special responsibility in the intelligence area
to perform oversight. The Vice Chairman suggested that the major changes needed - as
in many other areas - are attitudinal.

The Vice Chairman said that we need to interview a lot of staffers. Regarding Members,
he will follow our recommendation - perhaps five should be interviewed. The interviews
would be led by Commissioners, and the Vice Chairman is happy to assist. Indeed, the
Vice Chairman told Rep. Goss and Senator Graham that he will likely come back to talk
with them. However, he would want to go talk with them armed with specific
recommendations. The Vice Chairman noted that Rep. Goss complains about
declassification issues, although many commissions have studied this issue over the
years. Chris Kojm suggested we talk with Rep. David Dreier and asked about other
Members to speak with about Congressional oversight as a whole (not just intelligence).
The Vice Chairman suggested Reps. Cox and Turner. Chris Kojm suggested that we look
at the question of whether the Select Committee on Homeland Security in the House
ai

II
should be made permanent. The Vice Chairman recently testified on this issue before a
House Rules subcommittee, and we might talk to the chairman of that subcommittee.

Vice Chairman Hamilton also suggested that we interview Members of the HASC and
SASC such as Rep. Duncan Hunter and Rep. Norman Dicks. He said that former Senator
Bill Cohen favors giving up DoD budget authority over the Intelligence Community but
is an exception on this issue.

The Vice Chairman wants to speak with former SecDef Perry and would be glad to do so
by speakerphone from the Vice Chairman's office.

The Vice Chairman said that, when the HPSCI was initially established, the idea was to
appoint very senior Members - Members who were not outside players and who could be
trusted. During the HPSCI's early years, Members had on average 15-20 years'
experience. Today, the Democrats have appointed to the HPSCI a first-term Member!.
The HPSCI and SSCI have become the most popular committees aside from
Appropriations and Ways-and-Means/Finance. Members believe that, by being on these
committees, they become 'players' - the media pursues them, and their colleagues think
they have access to secret information. Congressional leaders would likely say that
Members are clamoring to be appointed to these committees. This desire is a source of
power for the leaders, as they decide who is appointed. However, in the Vice Chairman's
opinion, the rise in the committees' desirability and the decrease in the average
experience of the committees' Members - factors which perhaps were inevitable over the
long term - have led to deterioration in the quality of oversight. Gordon Lederman noted
that at one point the Members of the SSCI were the chairs of other committees, and
requiring the intelligence oversight committees to be composed of the chairs of other
committees might be a good institutional arrangement to increase the level of experience
of the committees' Members.

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The Vice Chairman asked that we stay in close touch with him on our progress, including
via meetings, and also keep Commissioners Roemer, Kerrey, and Gorton informed.

Gordon Lederman said that he would draft a strategy in conjunction with the Front Office
and Kevin Scheid.

Philip Zelikow, Chris Kojm, the Vice Chairman's assistant, and Gordon Lederman left
the meeting. John Roth stayed in order to brief the Vice Chairman on a discrete issue
specific to Team 4's interview with Secretary Snow.

r (o/c

*"

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