Ermita-Malate Hotel Operations vs.

City of Manila Facts: On July 5, 1963 the petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed by Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, who is "the latters president and general manager" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more than P3 million." It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law. Sec. 1: It was a violation of privacy and it was against self-incrimination and that is why it is unconstitutional and void. Sec. 2: classifying rooms and prohibiting persons under 18 to be given any room without the company of parents. On August 3, 1963 an answer was filed regarding the respondent mayor that the petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.

Issue: Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels (increasing license fees, partially restricting the freedom to contract, and restraining the liberty of individuals) is valid and/or constitutional. Held: Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. It was made as there is observed an alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers. The ordinance proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests. The increase in the license fees was intended to discourage establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal and to increase the income of the city government. Further, the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, are being devoted. Furthermore, the right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. State in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.

CHURCHILL VS. RAFFERTY FACTS:

Plaintiffs put up a billboard on private land in Rizal Province "quite a distance from the road and strongly built". Some residents (German and British Consuls) find it offensive. Act # 2339 allows the defendent, the Collector of Internal Revenue, to collect taxes from such property and to remove it when it is offensive to sight. Court of first Instance prohibited the defendant to collect or remove the billboard.

ISSUE:

insane number of suits enjoining the collection of taxes by tax avoiders. The state will not function since taxes are not paid (and judges will become unpaid!). There is, of course, no law nor jurisprudence that says it is not allowed to sue after having paid the tax, and such is the usual course in bringing suits against illegal(?) taxes. Pay it under protest. As to the diminishment of power of the courts, the Philippine courts never had the power to restrain the collection of taxes by injunction. It is said par 2 sec 56 Act 136 confers original jurisdiction upon CFI to hear and determine all civil actions but civil actions at that time had a well-defined meaning. The legislature had already defined the only action previously and that is the payment of the tax under protest then suit. Civil actions like injunction suits are of a special extraordinary character. Section 139 also does not diminish power of the courts because the power is still there if there is no adequate remedy available but sec 140 gives an adequate remedy.

1.May the courts restrain by injunction the collection of taxes?

2.Is Act # 2339 unconstitutional because it deprives property without due process of law in allowing CIR to remove it if it is offensive?

RULE:

1.an injunction is an extraordinary remedy and not to be used if there is an adequate remedy provided by law; here there is an adequate remedy, therefore court may not do so.

2.unsightly advertisements which are offensive to the sight are not dissociated from the general welfare of the public, therefore can be regulated by police power, and act is constitutional.

RATIONALE:

1.Writ of injunction by the courts is an extraordinary preventive remedy. Ordinary (adequate) remedies are in the law itself. Sections 139 and 140 of the Act forbids the use of injunction and provides a remedy for any wrong. _Plaintiffs say that those sections are unconstitutional because by depriving taxpayers remedy, it also deprives them of property without due process of law and it diminishes the power of the courts_. Taxes, whether legal or illegal, cannot be restrained by the courts by injunction. There must be a further showing that there are special circumstances such as irreparable injury, multiplicity of suits or a cloud upon title to real estate will result. Practically, if the courts can do so then there will be an

2.sec 100 of act 2339 gives power to the CIR to remove offensive billboards, signs, signboards after due invstigation. The question becomes is that a reasonable exercise of police power affecting the advertising industry? Police power is reasonable insofar as it properly considers public health, safety, comfort, etc. If nothing can justify a statute, it's void. State may interfere in public interest but not final. Court is final. Police power has been expanding. blahblahblah (consti1). The basic idea of civil polity in US is gov't should interfere with individual effort only to the extent necessary to preserve a healthy social and economic condition of society. State interferes with private property through, taxation, eminent domain and police power. Only under the last are the benefits derived from the maintenance of a healthy economic standard of society and aka damnum absque injuria. Once police power was reserved for common nuisances. Now industry is organized along lines which make it possible for large combinations of capital to profit at the expense of socio-economic progress of the nation by controlling prices and dictating to industrial workers wages and conditions of labor. It has increased the toll on life and affects public health, safety and morals, also general social and economic life of the nation, as such state must necessarily regulate industries. Various industries have regulated and even offensive noises and smells coming from those industries. Those noises and smells though ostensibly regulated for health reason are actually regulated for more aesthetic reasons. What is more aesthetic than sight which the ad industry is wooing us with. Ads cover landscapes etc. The success of billboards lie not upon the use of private property but on channels of travel used by the general public. Billboard that cannot be seen by people are useless. Billboards are legitimate, they are not garbage but can be offensive in certain circumstances. Other courts in US hold the view that police power cannot interfere with private property rights for purely aesthetic purposes. But this court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements which are offensive to the sight are not dissociated from the general welfare of the public.

Magtajas vs Pryce Properties Corp Date: July 20, 1994 Petitioners: Mayor Pablo Magtajas and the City of Cagayan de Oro Respondents: Pryce Properties Corp and Pagcor

Ponente: Cruz

The adoption of the LGC, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause. It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local government units. Morality of Gambling Not Justiciable. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO. Test of Validity. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must not be unreasonable. We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the LGC, LGUs are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. We conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented. Contravention of PD 1896. The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in CDO. Petitioner deny that the ordinance changed the PD, rather the LGC itself changed the PD. It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the

Facts: In 1992, representatives from PPC made representations with the Pagcor on the possibility of setting up a casino in Pryce Plaza Hotel in Cagayan de Oro City. On November 1992, the parties executed a contract of lease involving the ballroom of the hotel which would be converted into a casino. Way back in 1950, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of CDO passed Resolution 2295 prohibiting the establishment of a gambling casino. Resolution 2673, dated October 19, 1992, reiterated this prohibition. On December 7, 1992, Ordinance No. 3353 was enacted prohibiting the issuance of business permits for the operation of a casino. On January 4, 1993, Ordinance 3375-93 was passed prohibiting the operation of casinos. PPC filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against CDO before the CA. It prayed for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Ordinance 3353. Pagcor intervened claiming that Ordinance 4475 was violative of the non-impairment of contracts and EP clauses. The CA declared the ordinances unconstitutional and void.

Issue: WON the Sangguniang Panglungsod has the authority to enact said ordinances

Held:

No

Ratio: Petitioners Contention. CDO, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the LGC. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16. In addition, Section 458 declares that the Sangguniang Panglungsod has the power to approve ordinances and pass resolutions for the efficient and effective city government. The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people.

decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Sec 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos. It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. Moreover, the petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature. In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general. Rationale for the rule that ordinances should not contravene a statute. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional

limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. Relationship between national legislature and local government. This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

U.S. VS. TORIBIO FACTS: Luis Toribio slaughtered for human consumption a Carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer violating Act 1147 o Act 1147, Sec. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon permit secured from the municipal treasurer Act 1147, Sec. 31. No permit to slaughter carabaos shall be granted by the municipal treasurer unless such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes Application of Toribio for a permit was denied since animal was not found to be unfit for agricultural work or draft purposes.

Statute therefore prohibits and penalizes the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption anywhere without the permit provided for in the Act.

2. W/N the statute is unconstitutional Because of the statue the use and enjoyment of the owners over their cattle are in a way impaired therefore it is not a taking but a just restraint of injurious private use of property police power of the State. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious (to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property or to the rights of the community), and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may thing necessary and expedient. Disease threatened the total extinction of carabaos in the Philippines resulting in famine from the insufficiency of work animals to cultivate the fields. o Given these circumstances and conditions, the general welfare necessitated the enactment of the statute To justify the exercise of police power of the state: first, that the interests of those of a particular class require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

It is contended by Toribio that statute is applicable only to slaughter done in a municipal slaughterhouse and that the statute is unconstitutional sine it penalizes the slaughter of carabaos without a permit amounting to a taking by the government of the right of the person over his property amounting to an exercise of eminent domain without just compensation or an undue exercise of police power by the State.

ISSUE:

1. W/N the statute is applicable only to slaughter done in a municipal slaughterhouse

The statute seeks to protect the large cattle of the Philippines from theft and to make easy their recovery by providing an elaborate and compulsory system of branding and registration By limiting the application of the statue to those done only in the municipal slaughterhouse, the purpose of the article is greatly impaired if not totally destroyed since these animals could now be slaughtered for human consumption without need of showing proof of ownership. Statute should be construed so as to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statue was enacted.

HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners, vs. HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents. FACTS: On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which reads: A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL TREASURY. Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the Municipality of Makati.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people.

Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein."

Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds for the implementation thereof.

The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

ISSUE: whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law."

RULING: PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat, this petition is hereby GRANTED and the Commission on Audit's Decision No. 1159 is hereby SET ASIDE.

RUBI V PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO MALCOLM; February 28, 1919

HELD 1. NO. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power in furtherance of the public good which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110 U. S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply * * * "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U. S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances it varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peabody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.) - There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of liberty and does not practise liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will-going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon. Not knowing what true liberty is and not practicing the same rightfully, how can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of law? - But does the Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practice liberty in a rightful way? - To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people should be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense. In dealing with the backward population, like the

FACTS - Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to establish themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appears from the resolution of the provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2,000 acres, on which about three hundred Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. The Manguianes sued out a writ of habeas corpus in this court, alleging that they are deprived of their liberty in violation of law. - The return of the Solicitor-General alleges that on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 signed by the provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, jr.. The laws primary objective is the advancement of the welfare of the non-Christian people of Mindoro. In one of the Whereas clauses, it was stated that the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on. Pursuant to the Governors power s under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake was selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior. Under the resolution of the Provincial Board, any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceeding sixty days in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. The resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

ISSUES 1. WON the Mangyans were deprived of due process when their liberty to choose their homes were limited by the law. 2. WON the Legislature exceeded its authority in enacting the law mandating the forcible transfer of the Mangyanes.

Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience. - The Mangyans will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will-going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon. To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus be left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point of attack by those who doubt, may challenge the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers. - Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law, has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Decision Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

2. NO. Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. - As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which in case of doubt, would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid, is the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gamble vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes: We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior cases. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS COURT OF APPEALS Facts: The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 RA 8042 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law. Peitioner claims that great majority of the duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their operations for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of a law that are unjust and unconstitutional. On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective for a period of only twenty (20) days therefrom. After the petitioners filed their comment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the amendments consisting in the inclusion in the caption thereof eleven (11) other corporations which it alleged were its members and which it represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section 6 subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections 11 and 40 of Rep. Act No. 8042. The respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. 5 According to the respondent, Section 6(g) and (i) discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and, as such, violated the equal protection clause, as well as Article II, Section 12 6 and Article XV, Sections 1 7 and 3(3) of the Constitution. 8 As the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted rights. The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have the right to seek employment abroad. According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers, while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters. According to the respondent, the grant of incentives to service contractors and manning agencies to the exclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters is an invalid classification. Licensed and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property and due process and to the "equality of the person." It is understandable for the law to prohibit illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against licensed and registered recruiters is unconstitutional.

The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution. 9 It was also pointed out that the penalty for officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies who are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitment under Rep. Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment. The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections 8, 9 and 10, paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22, Article III of the Constitution 10 prohibiting ex-post facto laws and bills of attainder. This is because the provisions presume that a licensed and registered recruitment agency is guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage, upon a finding that it committed any of the prohibited acts under the law. Furthermore, officials, employees and their relatives are presumed guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage upon such finding that they committed any of the said prohibited acts. The respondent further argued that the 90-day period in Section 10, paragraph (1) within which a labor arbiter should decide a money claim is relatively short, and could deprive licensed and registered recruiters of their right to due process. The period within which the summons and the complaint would be served on foreign employees and, thereafter, the filing of the answer to the complaint would take more than 90 days. This would thereby shift on local licensed and authorized recruiters the burden of proving the defense of foreign employers. The respondent asserted that the following provisions of the law are unconstitutional: SEC. 9. Venue. A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this Act. In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged, inter alia, that (a) the respondent has no cause of action for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as the rules implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State. In opposition to the respondent's plea for injunctive relief, the petitioners averred that: As earlier shown, the amended petition for declaratory relief is devoid of merit for failure of petitioner to demonstrate convincingly that the assailed law is unconstitutional, apart from the defect and impropriety of the petition.

On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with a four-page decision dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The appellate court, likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said decision.

748). All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This presumption of constitutionality is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoin upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments (Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516 [1991]). In view of petitioner's standing

Issue: The core issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and the writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of only P50,000; and Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it. Held: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the appellate court is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court dated August 21, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by it in the said case on August 24, 1995 are NULLIFIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Ratio: The matter of whether to issue a writ of preliminary injunction or not is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. However, if the court commits grave abuse of its discretion in issuing the said writ amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may be nullified via a writ of certiorari and prohibition. The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. The "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor. Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes does not automatically render them unconstitutional, so the chilling effect that admittedly can result from the very existence of certain laws on the statute books does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying out the important and necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution. One who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond reasonable doubt (Caleon v. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA

The petitioners contend that the respondent has no locus standi. It is a non-stock, non-profit organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the action. Although the respondent filed the petition in the Regional Trial Court in behalf of licensed and registered recruitment agencies, it failed to adduce in evidence a certified copy of its Articles of Incorporation and the resolutions of the said members authorizing it to represent the said agencies in the proceedings. Neither is the suit of the respondent a class suit so as to vest in it a personality to assail Rep. Act No. 8042; the respondent is service-oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports to represent are profit-oriented. The petition is meritorious. The respondent has locus standi to file the petition in the RTC in representation of the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies impleaded in the amended petition. The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. 16 An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents. We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized for the purposes inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth and development of the manpower recruitment industry, both in the local and international levels; providing, creating and exploring employment opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its general membership; enhancing and promoting the general welfare and protection of Filipino workers; and, to act as the representative of any individual, company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein. In view of standing in behalf of unskilled workers However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers. We note that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition. Furthermore, in failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies it claimed to represent, the respondent failed to comply with Section 2 of Rule 63 20 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, since the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies for which the respondent filed the suit are specifically named in the petition, the amended petition is deemed amended to avoid multiplicity of suits.

charged. In view of retroactivity In People v. Diaz, 24 we held that Rep. Act No. 8042 is but an amendment of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is not an ex-post facto law because it is not applied retroactively. The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and registered recruitment agencies would close shop and stop business operations because of the assailed penal provisions of the law. A writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of penal laws cannot be based on such conjectures or speculations. The respondent even failed to adduce any evidence to prove irreparable injury because of the enforcement of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No. 8042. Its fear or apprehension that, because of time constraints, its members would have to defend foreign employees in cases before the Labor Arbiter is based on speculations. Even if true, such inconvenience or difficulty is hardly irreparable injury. Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain employment abroad is one of the primary considerations that led to the enactment of The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at affording greater protection to overseas Filipino workers, it is a significant improvement on existing laws in the recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment. By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans any evidence, the trial court frustrated, albeit temporarily, the prosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed them to continue victimizing hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain employment abroad as overseas workers, and blocked the attainment of the salutary policies 52 embedded in Rep. Act No. 8042. The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction. It is for this reason that the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.

In view of equal protection clause In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract. The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. In view of the VALIDITY of Sec. 6 of RA 8042 The validity of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 which provides that employees of recruitment agencies may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment has been upheld in People v. Chowdury: An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. By its rulings, the Court thereby affirmed the validity of the assailed penal and procedural provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042, including the imposable penalties therefor. Until the Court, by final judgment, declares that the said provisions are unconstitutional, the enforcement of the said provisions cannot be enjoined. Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment agencies and their officers and employees and their relatives employed in government agencies charged with the enforcement of the law for illegal recruitment and imposing life imprisonment for those who commit large scale illegal recruitment is not offensive to the Constitution. The accused may be convicted of illegal recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment only if, after trial, the prosecution is able to prove all the elements of the crime

Ynot vs. IAC G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: (1) notice; (2) hearing; exceptions SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: (1) public interest requires government interference; (2) reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose

bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. Due Process is a Restraint on Police Power The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number. First Requisite of Substantive Due Process: Interests of the Public Generally Require Interference xxx we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.

FACTS: Petitioners 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition for review. ISSUE:

Whether or not the confiscation of the carabaos amounted to arbitrary confiscation of property without due process of law

RULING: Minimum Requirements of Due Process: Notice and Hearing The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword. Exceptions to Notice and Hearing This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example,

Second Requisite of Substantive Due Process: Reasonable Means Necessary for the Accomplishment of Purpose, not Unduly Oppressive Upon Individuals But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat. Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government. EO 626-A is unconstitutional In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused. We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers. To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

BANCO ESPANOL-FILIPINO VS. PALANCA FACTS: This action was instituted by "El Banco Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a mortgage upon property situated in the city of Manila. The mortgage was executed by the original defendant herein, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, as security for a debt owing by him to the bank.

7 years after confirmation of sale, motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of Tanquinyeng, requesting the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto.

Basis of motion: that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

After the execution of this instrument by Tanquinyeng, he returned to China and he there died. The motion was denied. As Tanquinyeng was a nonresident at the time, it was necessary for the bank in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to Tanquinyeng by publication pursuant to sec 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Publication was made in a newspaper of Manila. The court also directed the clerk of court to deposit in the post office a copy of the summons and complaint directed to Tanquinyeng at his last place of residence, the city of Amoy, China pursuant to the same provision.

ISSUES: Assume that the clerk of court failed to mail the papers which he was directed to send to the defendant in Amoy

1) Sec. 399,Code of Civil Procedure: 2) In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is known, the judge must direct a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith deposited by the clerk in the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to the person to be served, at his place of residence

WON the court acquired the necessary jurisdiction to enable it to proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgage. YES WON those proceedings were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law. YES

RATIO:

1. (note: not in Bernas) Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear. "jurisdiction," may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.

The case proceeded in the CFI, and the defendant not having appeared, judgment was taken against him by default. July 3, 1908, decision was rendered in favor of the bank.

It was ordered that the Tnaquinyeng should deliver amount owed to the clerk of the court, and it was declared that in case of failure to satisfy the judgment, the mortgage property should be exposed to public sale. The payment contmeplated in said order was never made.

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.

Court ordered the sale of the property which was bought in by the bank.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal

proceedings wherein the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective.

In a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made is essential.

In this Case: Tanquinyeng is a nonresident and, remaining beyond the range of the personal process of the court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never acquires jurisdiction over the person at all. This, however, is not essential.

To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for: 1) 2) publication personal notice thru mail, if his residence is known

The property itself is the sole thing which is impleaded and is the responsible object which is the subject of the exercise of judicial power. It follows that the jurisdiction of the court is based exclusively on the power which it possesses over the property.

Personal Notice (aka constructive or substituted service) Such notification does not constitute a service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it. This mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known.

The jurisdiction over the property based upon the following: (1) that the property is located within the district; (2) that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage; and (3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into custody, if necessary, and expose it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt.

Given that jurisdiction is exlusively over property, the relief granted by the court must be limited to such as can be enforced against the property itself.

In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.

2. (this is the only issue included in Bernas) Requirement of due process is satisfied if; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. Issue in this case concerns (3).

Assumption in recognizing the effectiveness of a means of notification which may fall short of actual notice is: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

Right to due process has not been infringed.

Opportunity to be heard:

Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

Whether or not due process of law was observed

JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

RULING: On Jurisdiction The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation. The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant. How Jurisdiction is Acquired Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person. Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world. In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings

FACTS: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action. ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action

are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. xxx It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem. On Due Process xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it. It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light

of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary. The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendants last known address constitute denial of due process? The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings. It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The court either has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law has not been infringed.

ANG TIBAY VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS FACTS: A motion for reconsideration was filed by the Sol-Gen in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations on the case of National Labor Union Inc. praying that their labor case be remanded to the CIR for a new trial.

by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. 1. right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. 2. tribunal must consider the evidence presented. 3. have something to support the decision

Petitioner, Ang Tibay has filed an opposition for both the motion for reconsideration of CIR and the motion for a new trial by the National Labor Union.

The National Labor Unions case: they alleged that Toribio Teodoro, who dominated the National Workers Brotherhood of Ang Tibay, made a false claim that there was a shortage of leather soles in ANg Tibay that made it necessary for him to lay off workers, however, claim was unsupported by records of the Bureau of Customs & the accounts of native dealers of leather. Such was just a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, inc., from work. unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

4. evidence must be "substantial." - such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accepts as adequate to support a conclusion." The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence 5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory, such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. 6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. 8.The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. The court observed that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. Therefore, in the interest of justice, a new trial should commence giving the movant the opportunity to present new evidence.

HELD: motion for reconsideration denied, motion for new trial granted. Discussion of the Nature of the CIR to emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. Court of Industrial Relations an administrative court - exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees - has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS V COURT OF APPEALS AND ARIOKASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE MENDOZA; August 31, 1999

Board of Regents decided to withdraw the doctorate degree. Celine requested an audience with the Board of Regents and a reinvestigation which was denied. - Thus this case, a petition for mandamus and a prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction and damages was filed. Trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit while Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the restoration of the degree.

FACTS - Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is an Indian citizen taking her doctoral program in Anthropology at the University of the Philippines. To complete the doctoral program she was required to pass a dissertation and she created one entitled, Tamil influences in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. She defended her dissertation although prior to it Dr. Medina noted some lifted material in the dissertation without proper acknowledgment. She got the nod of four of the five panelist and thus was allowed to graduate because the letter coming from Dean Paz that wanted her to be temporarily struck off the list of candidates for graduation to clear the problems regarding her dissertation did not reach the Board of Regents on time. - Prior to the graduation, Dean Paz told Celine through a letter that she would not be granted academic clearance without Celine substantiating her accusation of Drs. Diokno and Medina maliciously working for the disapproval of her dissertation. Celine answered by saying that the unfavorable attitude was due to some failure to include Dr. Medina in the list of panel members and that Dr. Diokno was guilty of harassment. Dr. Medina answered back and wrote that Celines dissertation contained plagiarized materials and that her doctorate be withdrawn. - An ad-hoc committee was formed to investigate the charges and that the request for the withdrawal of the doctorate degree was asked of the Board of Regents. In the investigation it was found out that in at least 90 instances the dissertation included lifted materials without proper or due acknowledgment. The College Assembly therefore unanimously approved and recommended the withdrawal of the doctorate degree and forwarded it to the University Council. The University Council approved, endorsed, and recommended the withdrawal to the Board of Regents. UP Diliman Chancellor Roman summoned Celine to a meeting and that she should submit her written explanation to the charges against her. The Chancellor informed Celine of the charges and showed a copy of the findings of the investigating committee. A second meeting was done as well as a third one, however Celine did not attend the third meeting alleging that the Board of Regents at that time already had decided her case before she was fully heard. Celine asked for a re-investigation and that the jurisdiction was placed on the student disciplinary tribunal in the case of dishonesty and that the withdrawal of the doctorate degree is not an authorized penalty. - A special committee was create by Chancellor Roman that investigated the case and they came out with the findings through all the documents and an interview of Celine. It was established that at least 22 counts of documented lifting were identified that forms the 90 instances found by the College ad-hoc committee. That Celine admits of being guilt of the allegation of plagiarism. The ISSUES 1. WON the writ of Mandamus is applicable in this situation 2. WON THE withdrawal of the doctoral degree can be done by the University 3. WON there was a denial of due process

HELD 1. No, a writ of Mandamus is not available to restrain an institution of higher learning from the exercise of its academic freedom that is a constitutional right 2. Yes, because Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or s/he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of a law. It could not be invoked against the academic freedom of the school as academic freedom as a Constitutional right (Article XIV Section 5 (2)) gives a wide sphere of authority over the choice of students. This entails as well that it can also determine who would have the distinction of being a graduate of the school. If the University discovers that the honor and distinction was obtained through fraud it has the right to revoke or withdraw such distinction. The actions of the University through the Board of Regents is to protect academic integrity by withdrawing her academic degree that she obtained through fraud. 3. No, Due process was done as there were several investigations done by the school starting from the college to the Board of Regents. She was also invited in the investigation to clear up her name. However, the actual admission and the clear plagiarism of her sources proved that indeed she committed the offense. Her demand for the Student Tribunal to decide her case is untenable, as it is obvious that such case is useless for the penalty it gives is suspension. Celine in not in the ambit of disciplinary powers of the UP anymore.

Taxicab Operators vs. The Board of Transportation Facts: Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience. On 10 October 1977, Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular 77-42 which phases out old and dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the NCR, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981. On 27 January 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT (Case 80-7553), seeking to nullify MC 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. On 16 February 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a Manifestation and Urgent Motion, praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on 20 February 1981. On 28 November 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on 1 January 1982. Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located. On 29 December 1981, the present Petition was instituted.

1. Procedural and Construction: May

Substantive

Due

Process;

Statutory

PD 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers. Leeway was accorded the Board giving it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. 2. Dispensing with a public hearing prior to issuance of Circulars not violative of procedural due process Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is not violative of procedural due process. Previous notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasijudicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. (Central Bank vs. Cloribel and Banco Filipino) 3. Adoption of a reasonable standard; Requirement of due process met It is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation to determine its road-worthiness, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of

reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met. 4. Equal Protection of the Law; Substantial distinction; Rationale of initial implementation in Metro Manila Equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria. The Circular was enforced initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in said metropolis, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use (common knowledge). Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. The implementation of the Circular outside Metro Manila was also envisioned in MC 77-42 as its provision provides that for an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules shall immediately be effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board. Further, the implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City is already being effected, with the BOT in the process of conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities. 4. Rationale behind exercise of police power The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ

3. WON the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its implementation would virtually result in a cessation of its opeartions and eventual closure of business? YES

FACTS: By virtue of R.A No. 5514, philcomsat was granted a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places the grantee may select, station or stations and or associated equipment and international satellite communications. under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and the ground terminals. The satellite service thus provided by petitioner enable international carriers to serve the public with indespensible communications service Under sec. 5 of RA 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service commission. now respondent NTC Pursuant EO 196 petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction and control and regulation of the respondent NTC Respondent NTC ordered the petitoner to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and ncessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates September 9, 1987, pending hearing, petitioner filed with the NTC an application to continue operating and maintaining its facilities including a provisional authority to continue to provide the services and the charges it was then charging September 16, 1988 the petitioner was granted a provisional authority and was valid for 6 months, when the provisional authority expired, it was extended for another 6 months. However the NTC directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of 15% on the authorized rates HELD: 1. a) Fundamental is the rule that delegationof legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed tha manner of the execise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rarte, its act must be both non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise , in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just . However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. b) under Sec. 15 EO 546 and Sec. 16 thereof, Respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonamle feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power.

2. a)The function involved in the rate fixing power of the NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi legislative; thus hearings are necessary and the abscence thereof results in the violation of due process. b)The Centrak Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribal "In so far sa generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that the notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the excercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where public adminitartive body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whoe rights or property may be affected by the action is entitiled to notice and hearing" c)Even if respondents insist that notice of hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and therefore temporary in nature, it is still mot exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing as well as the requirement o reasonableness.

ISSUES: 1. WON EO 546 and EO 196 are unconstitutional on the ground that the same do not fix a standard for the excercise of the power therein conferred? NO 2. WON the questioned order violates Due process because it was issued without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing? YES

d.) it is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order the be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial wheter the same is made upon a complaint, a summary ivestigation, or upon the comissions own motion.

3. a.) What the petitioner has is a grant or privelege granted by the State and may revoke it at will there is no question in that, however such grant cannot be unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the termination of the opeartion of said utility is required by common good. The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public utilities is limited by the consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the utility, or clothed with the general power of management incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership to such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and its patrons. any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringerement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. b.) A cursory persual of the assailed order reveals that the rate reduction is solely and primarily based on the initial evaluation made on the financial statements of petitioner, contrary to respondent NTC's allegation that it has several other sources. Further more, it did not as much as make an attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at the prescribed rates. It just perfunctorily declared that based on the financial statements, there is merit for a rate reduction without any elucidation on what implifications and conclutions were necessariy inferred by it from said staements. Nor did it deign to explain how the data reflected in the financial statements influenced its decision to impose rate reduction. c.) The challenged order, particularly on the rates proprovide therin, being violative of the due process clause is void and should be nullified.