________________________________________________________________________________________________

The Evolution of Sino-American Cooperation: a Critique of the Past and Suggestions for the Future

4th Year Dissertation Submitted to the Department of International Relations at the University of St Andrews

By

Brook Kohn
Student Matriculation Number: 080007827

December 2011 Dissertation Supervisor: Professor Nicholas Rengger This dissertation is submitted in part requirement for the Degree of M.A. (Honours with International Relations) at the University of St Andrews, Scotland, and is solely the work of the above named candidate.

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

2 4
4 4 6 7

ONE: AMERICAN WORLD ORDER

20th century American world order

US unipolar moment 21st Century decline? American policy towards Japans rise of the 1980s

TWO: CHINAS RISE

Sino-American relations since the Cold War Calculating power transitions Can China lead Asia? Is conflict inevitable? Constructivism Mutually assured (economic) destruction

10
10 13 15 15 16 16 19 21 23 26 27 29 31 32

THREE: SECURITY DILEMMA THEORY

Chinas early post-Cold War fears about Japan Containing China Security dilemma sensibility Levels at which cooperation can be built Global economic reform Nuclear weapons The South China Sea Cyber security

18

FOUR: BUILDING COOPERATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 25

CONCLUSION

33 34

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Evolution of Sino-American Cooperation: a Critique of the Past and Suggestions for the Future

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Abstract: History is comprised of conflicts caused by shifts in power among states. Chinas assent in the 21st century has led some to question the likelihood of conflict with the United States. Utilizing Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheelers security dilemma theory, this dissertation asks how cooperation can be built in such uncertain times. Robert Axelrods work on iterated Prisoners Dilemmas suggests ways for building cooperation and alleviating uncertainties. The US and China can build cooperation on issues with achievable solutions such as global economic reform and nuclear nonproliferation. In working towards these ends, solutions on highly combustible issues like Taiwan may come easier. Reduced uncertainties and cooperation will help to deter conflict between China and America.

Introduction

In November 2011, United States President Barack Obama announced the movement of American marines to Darwin, Australia. Proponents of the move such as John Mearshimer justify and recommend American troop increases in Asia to deter Chinas rise from upsetting the regional balance of power (2010). Obamas troop movement echoes George Kennans policy of containment that Washington followed when it rivaled the Soviet Union during the Cold War (1947). However, as the regional security dilemma escalates, neither China nor America benefit from this move. In times of mutual uncertainty, the path to cooperation and trust is through bilateral and multilateral efforts to solve issues that trouble all in the international community. Historical memories play an important role in cooperation building. Thus it is important to understand the context of American world order from the 20th century to today. Chinas history is equally important. Indeed, it is one characterized by foreign intervention, humiliation and recent prosperity. China first integrated into American world order in 1978 with Deng Xaiopings open door economic policies.

Since then, Chinas participation in the international community has been beneficial for both Beijing and Washington. Nowas it is Chinas century to return to her role as Asias hegemon America can either help guide its rise in a positive-sum game or construct a dangerous zero-sum game characterized by rising tensions on the road to confrontation. Neither Cold War containment policies nor the anti-Japanese economic polices of the 1980s can be recycled. Rather, Washington must make Beijing feel like it has a vested interest in the maintenance of the international system. Power transition theory tells us that when rising states stop feeling satisfied with order, they resort to force. However, security dilemma theory better characterizes todays Sino-American relationship. Furthermore, it offers solutions to increasing escalations by mitigating uncertainties. For example, while power transition theory implies that Washington should give ground on Taiwan to satisfy Beijing, security dilemma theory recommends the two powers work on less politicized issues to establish a precedent of successful cooperation. Indeed, with Taiwan set aside, Beijing and Washington may achieve success on important disagreements. It is recommended that the US and China cooperate on issues such as global economic reform and nuclear nonproliferation in order to build their relationship. Increased communication at summits and bilateral meetings creates an iterated situation whereby both Beijing and Washington realize that it is in their interest to give ground on one issue to gain ground in another. Furthermore, if leaders want to build trust and cooperate they have to think about their actions, even in their day-to-day lives and how statesmen in foreign countries will interpret them. If conflict is to be adverted, Washington must not listen to offensive realists like Mearshimer, but rather scholars with suggestions on cooperation building like Robert Axelrod. A solid understanding of Chinese history, especially their century of humiliation is pivotal in ensuring a peaceful future. In the Sino-American relationship, conflict is the worst-case scenario and should be avoided at all costs.

CHAPTER ONE
20th century American world order With the creation of his Fourteen Points, United States President Woodrow Wilson had great influence over the construction of 20th century American World Order. After WWII, Franklin D. Roosevelt said, more than an end to war, we want an end to the beginnings of all wars, a belief that helped facilitate the United Nations (Williams 2007: 88). In FDRs footsteps, President Harry S Truman believed American power resulted from the exceptional form of its government. In 1945 he said the thing we have learned now and should never forget is this: that a society of self-governing men is more powerful, more enduring, more creative than any other kind of society, however disciplined, however centralized (Truman 1961). Indeed, after WWII, over one third of global economic output came from the US. Such economic power enabled Washington to lead the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 resulting in a new global economic liberalism facilitated by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A year later, the Conference of San Francisco of 1945 established the Charter of the United Nations, which proved more resilient than Wilsons League of Nations. At the core of the American constructed order was an aim to create interdependence. US unipolar moment The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led to a belief that free markets, democracy and international institutions led the path to prosperity (Fukuyama 1993). The French spoke of American hyperpuissance or hyperpower. It was the US unipolar moment. Hegemonic stability theory argues that post-Cold War peace is a result of American hegemony. Charles Kupchan writes, Americas preponderant economic and military might produced a unipolar international structure, which in turn provided a ready foundation for global stability (Kupchan

American World Order

2002). However, history has shown that bids for hegemony have resulted in a counterbalancing coalition of countries that do not want the aggressor leading the international system (Charles V, Philip II, Louis XIV, Napoleon, Hitler). Henry Kissinger adds, hegemonic empires almost automatically elicit universal resistance, which is why all such claimants sooner or later exhausted themselves (Kissinger 2000b). However, the US has seen little universal resistance. Christopher Layne writes scholars and policy makers have invoked hegemonic stability theory, balance of threat theory, and the liberal approach to international relations to support the proposition that the United States can be a successful hegemon (Layne 2004). In support, Robert Gilpin argues that in order to function, the international economic system requires a dominant power to provide liquidity and a global reserve currency, to serve as both a market and lender of last resort and to maintain the rules of the game. The hegemon, Gilpin continues, must provide security and stability for global commerce to flourish (1983). Thus, states interpret the hegemons domination as beneficial, not threatening. Indeed, acting as the worlds policeman, Washington spends more money on defense than any other country, acting to deter any and all belligerency throughout the world (Lebow and Valentino 2011). Stephen Walts balance of threat theory argues that states balance against those that pose the greatest threat to their security (Walt 1996). According to Walt, threats are equated by first, a states total power including economic, population, technology and military; second, the geographical location of a state; third, a states offensive capabilities, and; fourth, whether or not the state acts aggressively or is perceived to act in an offensive manner. In this calculation, the nature of a foreign states domestic political system weighs heavily because one can better calculate its intentions. Kissinger also lends us insight into hegemonic international systems through his writings on legitimacy. When the rules of the game are accepted by the majority of those in the international system then, wars may occur but they will be fought in the name of the existing structure and the peace which follows will be justified as a better expression of the legitimate general consensus, writes Kissinger (2000a). Considering Gilpin, Walt, Layne, and Kissingers theories, some 5

question American leadership today. Is the international community still satisfied with American-led world order? 21st Century American decline? Throughout modern history, there have been many examples of great powers rising and falling. Decline can result from defeat in war such as the Ottoman Empire or Austro-Hungarian Empire experienced after 1918. External states can interfere as Britain did during the 1800s in China. A great power can face issues domestically with unrest and social breakdown as Russia did in 1905 and 1917. Domestic populations also sometimes demand reform at home rather than expansion abroad. Or, as was also the case with the USSR, the costs of competition with a more economically dynamic rival can lead to collapse. Writing in 1989, Paul Kennedy spoke of American imperial overstretch. Decision-makers in Washington must face the awkward and enduring fact that the sum total of the United States global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the countrys power to defend them all simultaneously (Kennedy 1989: 667). While in the above, Gilpin argued that American preeminence reinforces itself by securing the globe, Kennedy disagrees. A very heavy investment in armaments, while bringing greater security in the short term, may so erode the commercial competitiveness of the American economy that the nation will be less secure in the long term, he writes (1989: 689). Indeed, this also leads to decreased economic growth, increased taxes, domestic concerns about government spending, and ultimately a weakened global policeman. While an economic boom and a fiscal surplus characterized the 1990s, the American economy has struggled since 2007. Thus, Kennedy may have been 20 years early in his announcement of American decline. The 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis characterizes todays declinist argument. According to Danny Quah, one can observe a redistribution of economic power, shifting from the Mid Atlantic in the 1980s towards the east today (2011). With newfound economic power comes political power and the ability to have greater influence over the rules of the game. Roger Altman believes that today there is 6

domestic unrest in America because of the perception of a declining economy (2009). The gap between rich and poor is growing and social expenditures are decreasing due to a budget deficit. Furthermore, Altman writes that Americans are experiencing a drastic reduction in net wealth facilitated by declining home equity. Abroad, he continues, Americans will be far less able to supply capital to developing markets and those in trouble. This will greatly reduce Washingtons influence. Therefore, he recommends that rising states such as China should be incentivized to become larger shareholders in the IMF. American economist Barry Eichengreen recounts that British sterling lost its place atop the worlds currencies because London lost its great power status, which was due to homegrown economic problems (2011). Hedge fund manager Jim Chanos argues that the Chinese government is not publishing accurate statistics on its economy and a crisis in Beijing is looming (Chanos and Massar 2011). Besides the fact that the Chinese government does not allow Chanos to short stock shares on the Shanghai market, he also observes many issues with credit and says the property market is hitting the wall, leaving developers unpaid. Local governments, he argues, continue to borrow in order to develop and the central government is loosing control over this phenomenon. People are assuming that half of all new loans in China will go bad so he questions the 9% GDP growth rate. Indeed, China is not immune to what happens in the west. A lot is focused on fixed investment, like construction and infrastructure. However, the above sounds eerily similar to Kennedys thesis. American policy towards Japans rise of the 1980s Twenty-two years ago, Kennedy characterized Japans rise by an artificially deflated currency, cheap exports to the American market, a growing sense of affluence, Japanese innovation and the luxury of not wasting resources on defense. Surveys suggested that Americans in the early 1990s were concerned with relative gains by a rising Japan. In 1990, Robert Reich asked a series of Americans including State Department officials, economists, investment bankers, post-graduate students, and corporate executives which future scenario they preferred: (a) the next decade 7

sees growth at 25 percent for the US and 75 percent for Japan or (b) 10 percent for the US and 10.3 percent for Japan. Naturally, the economists chose option a, but the majority of the other groups choose option b (Reich 1990). This sentiment seems hypocritical because the US built world order based on free trade and comparative advantage. Protectionism caused WWI. Furthermore, many successful American businesses practice Raymond Vernons product cycle theory. Vernon suggests that firms perfect production techniques, then export them to developing countries who produce a cheaper product to sell back in America (Balaam and Dillman 2011: 444). In 1988 Congress passed the Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act in order to curb America's growing trade deficit. Most important about the Act was the Super-30 rule. This provision forced the US trade representative to pick a number of countries that the US traded with which were causing trade deficit. The three countries included were Brazil, India, and Japan. Super-30 specifically targeted trade with Japan in satellites, supercomputers and forest products. Targeting the satellite trade was the most symbolic. The Japanese had yet to develop the technology necessary for high quality satellites, so Japanese firms were willing to buy the technology and give US firms market access. However, the Japanese government did not think along the same lines. Tokyo wanted to help the firms acquire the technology and then protect the domestic market. In this scenario, Washington observed a loss in relative gains even though American firms would have benefited from selling the technology. When Super 30 was announced, therefore, Tokyo was not pleased. Indeed, Vernon said because America and Japans economies are so interdependent this type of threat "makes no more sense than threatening a first strike in nuclear politics" (1989). Indeed, it is apparent that if Japan benefited more than America in trade, US policy makers will respond to regain the upper hand (Mastanduno 1991). A few years after this debacle, the Japanese housing bubble burst and they have experienced economic stagnation ever since. Recently, China overtook Japan as the worlds second largest economy. One must wonder if Washington will create similar policies in order to curb Beijings relative gains.

However, there are important differences when comparing Japan of the 1980/90s and contemporary China. First, Japan was bound by a post-WWII constitution that was heavily influenced by the US. It bound Japan to nonaggression and a military solely for defensive purposes know as the Self Defense Forces (SDF). While China is not bound by such constitutional amendments, Beijing is a member of the United Nations: a security community that pulls militaries together to collectively deter. For example, if China were aggressive in the South China Sea, there would be a response from the international community, not just the regional states. Second, most calculations of power include a population variable. Japanese population was only 123 million by 1991 whereas today, China has 1.3 billion people.

CHAPTER TWO
For a long time, China has felt humiliated. Foreign invasions, poor deals in international treaties and disrespect by the international community facilitated such a feeling. Today, the international communitys lack of historical knowledge of Chinese greatness frustrates China as her coffers overflow with IOUs from the developed world. When the Politburo looks to Chinas neighbors and their past challenges to the international system they become weary of American foreign policies that threaten growth. Washington was able to defeat the Soviet Union in the Cold War because Moscow exhausted its resources on building up its military and lost sight of the conditions on the ground. Beijing will not let Washington exploit the same weakness. In the late 1980s as Japan became the worlds second largest economy, American statesmen retracted agreements on economic cooperation and forced Tokyo to let her currency appreciate, thereby crippling her export based economy. All the while Beijing quietly grew and took notes. Nowas it is Chinas century to return to her role as Asias hegemonAmerica can either help guide its rise in a positive-sum game or construct a dangerous zero-sum game characterized by rising tensions on the road to confrontation. Sino-America relations since the Cold War For China, the 20th century was characterized by early political failures, Japanese subordination, civil war and the rise of Mao Zedong. China joined the allied powers in late WWI to victory and supported Wilsons Fourteen Points. However, at Versailles, German concessions in China were given to Japan, which humiliated China. This sparked the May Fourth Movement and a rift between the Kuomintang (KMT) and communist revolutionaries, which continued until 1949. With his success against the KMT, Mao became Chinas leader in thought and practice. Mao aimed to rekindle a unity in order to keep Western powers out. Again and again he reiterated, Chinas modern revolutionary struggle has for its goal, first and

Chinas Regional Rise

10

foremost, the opposition against the invasion of imperialism (Legro 2008: 177). Indeed, during the Korean War, when UN troops past the 38th parallel, China took the offensive. Mao used the advancement in a call to unity and sent troops. After the armistice, Mao led China with a revolutionist view toward world order as Beijing leaned toward the USSR. In 1971, President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger visited China to restart diplomatic relations. In the process Beijing was admitted to the UN replacing Taipei. During the Cold War, Sino-American cooperation was due to mutual interests, not ideologies. They were united by a common enemythe Soviet Union. Importantly, this controlled the conflict of interests and values in secondary domains such as trade, the Taiwan issue and human rights(Wang 2009). After Mao, Deng Xaioping came to power and with him, an aim to integrate. Thus, his open door policies of 1979 embraced the global economy and led an integrationist view towards world order. Indeed, it was Dengs decision to open up that led to Chinas economic prosperity today. The move has lifted millions out of poverty in China and highlights the benefits of joining the world order. Deng also reigned during the Tiananmen Square incident, which was a breach of core liberal human rights values. President George HW Bush decided that the cost outweighed the benefit of punishing Deng for his abuses. In contrast, the Clinton administration pushed the human rights agenda aggressively on China. This led to an impasse on trade issues and growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. However, Clinton backed down because the rising tensions threatened American businesses. In addition, during Clintons reign, a NATO air campaign in Serbia bombed the Chinese Embassy mistaking it for a Serbian military building. This led to the largest demonstrations since Tiananmen Square in 1989. Protestors threw stones and Molotov cocktails at the US embassy in Beijing, burned the consulate in Chengdu, and wrecked Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonald's restaurants (Shirk 2007). Washington must not incite nationalism in China if they wish to pursue a progressive relationship, as nationalism strengthens the CCP. Following Clinton, President George W Bush took office with the idea that China was a strategic competitor of the US. His Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, reiterated this belief by highlighting Americas role in Chinas unresolved disputes in 11

the South China Sea and with Taiwan. Thus, if China wanted to alter the status quo, America is directly threatened, so cooperation should be conceived at opportune times. Unfortunately, mutual mistrust only increased when a US Navy EP-3 Surveillance Plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet in April 2001. However, President Jiang Zemins policy towards the US was straightforward: enhancing mutual trust, minimizing trouble, developing cooperation and avoiding confrontation (Shirk 2007: 40). In China some saw this as too weak especially because Beijing always focused on not escalating tensions when criticized by Bush. As it changed many relationships, September 11th happened, and Washingtons China centered grand strategy greatly changed. Beijing immediately responded to Washingtons Global War on Terror and seemed to be united once again on a common enemy. At the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shanghai, Bush called China a friend of the United States. In response, China then said the relationship became candid, constructive and cooperative. Bushs wars in Iraq and Afghanistan shifted attention away from China toward the Middle East. In 2001, China joined the WTO adopting its rules and regulations and highlighting the fact that China does not aim to rewrite the rules of the game. Later that year, Zheng Bijian articulated Chinas peaceful rise to the international community (Zheng 2005a). He argued that Beijing learned from the mistakes of Japan, the USSR and Germany in their 20th Century rises to power. Indeed, Chinas rise was made possible by integration in the global economy, so to disturb it, would also disturb Chinas rise. Chinas rise is about modernization, not militarization, he conveyed. In response, US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick concurred that China was not like the Soviet Union during the Cold War because they are not trying to overthrow the international system, rather they are an active member of the international community; a responsible stakeholder (Zoellick 2005). Such status allows more discussion on strategic matters and differentiates China from other authoritarian countries that the US calls rouge states. While it shows Americas recognition of China as a power, it also raises the responsibility and pressure when Washington critiques human rights abuses. In response to Zoellicks words, Zheng published an article on the cover of the Peoples Daily 12

echoing his earlier comments by contrasting China from the Soviet Union and highlighting Chinas rise through globalization. He explained that at the root of Chinas grand strategy was international peace, internal harmony and reconciliation across the Taiwan Strait (Zheng 2005b). Washingtons recognition of Chinas rise leads to important theoretical questions and explanations. How has Washington calculated Chinas power? What can power transition theory say about Chinas rise? With its newfound power, will Beijing aspire for regional or global dominance? Will China remain satisfied with Americas international order or will it act to revise it? Calculating power transitions Jack Levy measures power with a simple equation: population multiplied by GPD/capita multiplied by political capacity (2008). Populations importance derives from its military and economic applications. While China boasts the worlds largest population at 1.3 billion, it is unclear whether the effects of the One Child Policy will prove to be a barrier to prosperity. Salvatore Babones highlights this problem by projecting a major reduction in the workforce in 20 years when the current leaders of growth retire and require care from their children. Because it is culturally taboo not to care for ones aging parents and retirement homes are not acceptable, those entering leadership positions in the workforce will be subjected to caring for their parents (Babones 2011). However, Chinas outstanding economic growth multiplies perceptions of its power. As countries rise, and the global quota of power changes, so too does the balance. A.F.K. Organski argues that when the question of balance is raised, international order faces unstable situations. Stability results, he continues, from one dominate power writing the rules to the game (Tammen 2000). Power transition theory can highlight what affect Chinas rise has on world order. Most importantly, power transition theory argues that war is most likely when a rising challenger is unsatisfied with the hegemons leadership. Both theories show that conflict occurs with poor leadership.

13

However, there must be substantial disdain for an international system to motivate challengers to forcefully change it. Richard Ned Lebow and Benjamin Valentino write, rising powers must feel excluded from the system and denied its rewards to convince itself that military challenges are likely to be met with success (2011: 222). Therefore, one must examine ifand to what extentChina is satisfied or unsatisfied with American world order. Levy argues that the variables to calculate satisfaction include institutional similarity, economic interdependence, and American strategy (Levy 2008: 17). As shown above, by joining institutions built by the US, such as the WTO, China integrated itself into world order. Indeed, China plays an active role in the UN and heavily funds the IMF. Secondly, the US and China share a great economic interdependence. Chinas rising economy owes a lot to American innovation and an open economy to sell its exports. One benefit of a growing middle class in China is increased domestic consumption balances decreased international demand. However, to fully realize this would be costly because factories would need to change their production lines and products to satisfy Chinese consumers. Thirdly, the more that China assimilates to current institutional practices of the international order, the more the US will listen to its grievances in other areas because they then have a larger stake in the systems order. Thus, American strategy towards China should work towards satisfying Beijing. From Levys argument, it seems as though Beijing is satisfied enough with global order, but what about regional order? Power transition theorys shortcomings result from the inability to conceptualize global-regional interactions. China does not want to be a revisionist power, but if it aims to take the Asian region, what affect would this have on the international order? Barry Buzan and Ole Wver argue that regional power shifts will remain regional because regions have more interconnectedness, history, and rivalries (Buzan and Waever 2003). However, because of its commitments, the US is an inescapable foreign power in Asia. 14

Can China lead Asia? Currently, there are three ways of thinking about the future of Chinese foreign policy among its citizens. One is to become more democratic and open as supported by the intellectuals, state owned enterprise executives, business people, and those on the coast. There are those who think Dengs get rich attitude has increased socioeconomic inequality in China, so they should not continue to participate in the international order (this opinion is shared by those more inland, farmers, and some members of the CCP and military who have not benefited from the liberalization). The third school is one that prizes the regional over the global. A return to the Middle Kingdom is the aim and the international order is not as important. Indeed, writing in 1991, Samuel Huntington, arrived at the conclusion that China would be East Asias greatest threat to destabilization. The external expansion of the UK and France, Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States coincided with phases of intense industrialization and economic development (Huntington 1991). China is experiencing such phases today. Is conflict inevitable? Aaron Friedberg offers many theoretical insights into this question. He argues that American liberal optimists see three areas of cooperation to improve Sino-American relations: economic interdependence, institution building and democratization (Friedberg 2005: 12). Thomas Friedman's Dell Theory of Conflict Prevention argues states in the global supply chain such as China will not risk aggression for the sake of removal from the supply chain and economic activity (2005). Furthermore, as economic exchange increases between the US and China, both sides will have interest in the success of the other thus constraining any aggression. Institutions, liberals argue, work to facilitate healthy communication between states thus easing anarchy within the international system. Indeed, institutions enable spaces for trust and cooperation between states that would not exist in bilateral relations. Liberals believe that over time such interactions will bode well for reducing uncertainties. Lastly, liberals attest that democracy promotes peace, participation, and prosperity

15

better than any other political system. Participation reduces the likelihood that statesmen will lead their citizens to war if they must answer to them at the ballot box. However, the ongoing democracy debate in China (with a rising middle class comes increased desire political participation) will continue for the foreseeable future. Constructivism Academias obsession with Chinas rise may be losing sight of structural issues in Chinese banking, politics, and industry. Michael Cox argues that a major reason why scholars got the end of the Cold War wrong was because it was in their interest to maintain the discipline of Soviet Studies and publish work relating to implications of Soviet power, but not critical inquires into its underlying structure (Cox 2009). Furthermore, Wohlforth adds, the debate focused like a laser beam on US decline, even as the Soviet Union was entering the initial stages of its final crisis (1994). Another negative construction equates Chinese prosperity with economic decline in America. As factory workers lose jobs in small town America an easy scapegoat is China, even though they could have lost their jobs to any number of countries that have lower minimum wages. Polls in 2006 suggest that Americans are divided between those who view China in a negative and positive light. The majority believes that it is both good and bad that Chinas economy is catching up with Americas. Seventy-five percent of Americans are concerned about Chinas transition to a military power. Fifty-eight percent do not think China acts responsibly in the world highlighting an American mistrust towards China (Shirk 2007). In response to these and other poll results of American public perception towards China, Beijing has rolled out a strong well-funded public diplomacy campaign working on strengthening its soft power. So far, among other efforts, Beijing has established over 400 Confucius Institutes globally (Zhiqun 2010: 215). Mutually assured (economic) destruction? One of the greatest pressure points on the Sino-American relationship is over the global economy. Arvind Subramanian argues that creditors act like dictators 16

towards debtors (2011). He cites the leverage that the Americans had over the British in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis as evidence. In this endeavor and others, the British economy was incurring great losses and Washington demanded they stop the invasion or lose American financing. London stopped and Harold Macmillan, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer said the Suez attempt was "the last gasp of a declining power." Macmillan also wrote "perhaps in 200 years the United States would know how we felt (Subramanian 2011). However, because the Chinese and American economies are so interdependent, the greatest threat to each other may be in their economic policies. Indeed, as will be observed in the following chapter, security dilemma theory was built around mutually assured destruction with nuclear weapons, but today the US and China can mutually destroy the others economy with protectionist trade policies.

17

CHAPTER THREE
Security dilemmas are dilemmas of firstly interpretation, and secondly response. Both levels produce intense dilemmas for statesmen. At the first level, statesmen must choose between either a positive or negative interpretation of an opponents motives, intentions, and capabilities (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 5). Are a states military developments for offensive or defensive purposes? Does that state aim to change the status quo or reinforce it by protecting themselves against others who want to change it? At the second level, there is a dilemma of a rational response. If the status quo power presumes the challenger acted to upend order, then it will respond by deterring further expansion or by preemptively attacking the expanding power. However, if the status quo power believes the challenger was acting in a positive manner, then it will either do nothing or increase its arms to reassure the challenger that they need not worry about their security. To illustrate, let us examine the expansion of the PLA Navy. The US can interpret this expansion as a step to upend the status quo with offensive purposes. Thus, the US can respond by expanding its fleet in the Pacific to counter that move and deter the Chinese from altering the status quo. Or, the US can respond by confronting the PLA Navy and attacking it: the worst-case scenario. However, if the US interprets Chinese expansion as defensive in nature in order to protect its sea lines of communication from pirates for example, then it can respond in one of two ways. First, it can trust China that its expansion is for defensive purposes and make no response. In this scenario, the US would not expect a response from China but remembers their expansion for the next game. The second path the US can take is to reassure China that the status quo will not change by increasing its arms in the region. If the PLA did aim to maintain the status quo by deterring Taiwan from attempting to gain independence, then they would see Americas increase as supportive of Taiwan. Thus, Beijing would dedicate more resources to expanding

Security Dilemma Theory

18

the PLA Navy creating a security paradox whereby Washington and Beijing constructed an unintended spiral of mutual hostility (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 5). International relations theorists believe the international system is anarchic causing states to feel insecure. Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler offer three schools of thought on insecurity: the fatalist, the mitigator, and the transcender. The fatalist believes there will always be anarchy in international politics and states will always be insecure, thus aggressive. The mitigator argues that insecurity can be reduced through cooperation and diplomacy, but ultimately can never be eliminated. Lastly, the transcender advocates rebuilding global structures towards harmony, peace, and human society, which would nullify security dilemmas. Security dilemmas inventor, John Herz, believed the predicament was simple: kill or perish. Thus, states will always prepare for the worst and arm themselves more and more. In fact, Herz believed there was no escape from this vicious circle (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 22). Indeed, Herzs contemporary regarding this belief is Mearsheimer whose offensive realism predicts states will constantly act offensively to ensure their survival. Let us explore the above theory in practice with a glimpse into the post- Cold War triangular diplomacy with Japan, China, and the United States regarding Taiwan. Chinas early post-Cold War fears about Japan When Japans economy was prospering in the 1980s, China worried that America would reduce security commitments and let Japan funnel its newfound wealth to its military. Thus, Beijing presumed, Japans attitudes on power projection in East Asia would change, a view based on historical memories of Japanese imperialism. The close ties of Taiwans President, Lee Teng-huis with Japan including fluency in Japanese and relationships with Japanese nationalists did not help Chinese fears. Lastly, during the early 1990s, until China surpassed it, Japan had the worlds second largest defense budget. The North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 switched Washingtons focus from economics to security of which Japan was a centerpiece. Thus with the 1995 East Asia Strategy Report or the Nye Report, the US vowed to strengthen its military 19

alliance with Japan by sending more troops and adding bases. In this move, Beijing interpreted America strengthening its ties to Taipei. Afterwards, in 1995, Lee Teng- hui gave a highly politicized speech at his alma mater, Cornell University. Chinese and American statesmen reportedly agreed that the US would not issue Lee with a visa to visit the US. However, trust was shattered when Lee landed on American soil. After this, Beijing presumed a US-Japanese alliance had its eyes set on Taiwan. In order to deter such an advance, China began missile tests off of the Taiwan Strait in July 1995. Clinton responded in March 1996 by dispatching two aircraft carriers into waters near Taiwan. This scenario follows Booth and Wheelers security paradox of unintended hostilities. This also highlights Chinese feelings of encirclement resulting in escalating tensions. Such escalations led to a shift in policy in Tokyo and Washington on Taiwan. Importantly, in the 2000s, Taiwans separatist leader, Chen Shui-bian received no support from the US concerning his aspirations for independence. When US Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage visited Beijing in 2002, he noted that the US does not support Chens policy of independence. In addition, Armitage strengthened ties to China in the Global War on Terror by labeling the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) a terrorist organization. Given ETIMs aspirations for an independent Xinjiang, Armitage made room for cooperation of a symbolic nature. In 2004, President Bush stated that the US opposed Chens independence movement during Taiwan presidential elections. However, Chen was successful in his bid for reelection much to the dismay of Beijing. In response, Beijing passed the anti- Secession Law, declaring that China would use nonpeaceful means against Taiwan if independence were declared. American statesmen may improve their expertise in predicting the future of security dilemmas that involve Taiwan. If they assume that the Chinese will interpret any act concerning Taiwan in a negative instead of positive light, then possible outcomes are reduced. Also, because Booth and Wheeler describe weapons as inherently ambiguous in their politico-strategic meaning, American sales to Taiwan totaling $6.5 billion in 2008 and $5.8 billion in 2011 invite mistrust (Booth

20

and Wheeler 2008: 42). Indeed, Chinese feelings of uncertainty result from regional security alliances among its neighbors. Containing China When China feels surrounded in Asia, Washington replies that its actions are positive in order to reassure its allies. China, still, interprets such moves as threatening and responds by attempting to match them. This is a tough task for Beijing and certainly one that the US has the advantage given its place atop world order. Chinas only official military ally is North Korea, whereas Americas are numerous and continue to grow. During the 2000s, President Bush strengthened Indo-American relations by sending New Delhi nuclear weapons technology. Influencing Chinese thought on this matter, surely must be containment theory that Washington utilized toward the Soviet Union in the Cold War. George Kennans article suggested that the US act to contain the spread of Soviet influence by responding to any move in a tit-for-tat fashion (1947). Today, Kissinger writes, China feels as though they are playing a game of wei qi with the US. In the game, one must strategically avoid encirclement by their opponent. Victory is achieved once one has encircled his opponent, thus securing the board (2011). If the US increases relations with Vietnam or Indonesia, then China will increase relations with Central Asian states in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in order match Washingtons efforts. Indeed, the first joint- military exercise that China held with another country was with Kyrgyzstan in 2002 (Karrar 2009). Furthermore, Chinas relationship with Uzbekistan has changed recently. After 9/11, Tashkent partnered with Washington on its Global War on Terror and received substantial amounts of funding to fight terrorism in exchange for US accesses to bases in Uzbekistan. In 2005, the Uzbek government brutally suppressed a protest in the town of Andijan and faced great criticism from the US. Uzbek president Islam Karimov did not like American efforts to interfere in his governments domestic affairs and subsequently severed counterterrorism ties and requested that the American troops leave Uzbekistan. In their place came the SCO and increased relations with China. Indeed, China sent $600m of aid to develop an 21

oil pipeline to China after the Americans left. Similar cases of financing such states existed in the Cold War and both China and the US must be careful to avoid a repeat of Afghanistan Robert Ross believes Sino-Russian cooperation will be forged in resistance to American power projection in Asia (2004). Indeed, increased cooperation with the SCO may be an example of this prediction. Regional relations may change if Russian allows China to buy the land on their border. In Siberia and the Far East, Chinese farmers and laborers have crept through the Russian border and stimulated economic growth in the area. While more production is welcome in under populated areas of Russia, there is anti-Chinese sentiment that could harm Sino-Russian cooperation. Indeed, Russia also sees Chinas military rise as a threat, as some in Moscow fear they could lose Siberia (Mankoff 2009: 222). In 1990, Hu Shung said the history of modern China is a history of China being looted, invaded, and oppressed (Hu 1990). This nationalistic fervor and victimized view of history makes communication in the region a challenge. Thus, when Beijing strengthens is army and presence in the coastal areas around its border, there is disconnect between the region and Beijing. ASEAN states fear for their sovereignty, but Beijing remembers its place in history and aims to reclaim dominance. However, one must consider Chinas new free trade agreement (FTA) with ASEAN a step towards improved relations. The FTA was first proposed in 2000 and ten years later, ASEAN and China had successfully reduced or eliminated tariffs on 95 percent of all goods. Currently, China is ASEANs largest trading partner (Xinhua 2011) and important industries like tourism have doubled in growth (Sanchita 2011). For example, Vietnam has seen bilateral trade increase substantially from $222 million in 1995 to $3.14 billion in 2006 (Devadason 2010). However, while Vietnamese economic relations improve with China, Hanois security relations increase with the US. In 2003, the first ever port call by an American ship led to a stronger relationship in the 21st century (Stern 2009). One could make the observation that Hanoi is hedging Chinese influence with this move. 22

Security Dilemma Sensibility As these alliances begin to tangle and overlap, statesmen must be weary of constructing or perpetuating unnecessary security dilemmas. WWI teaches us that complex alliance systems are sometimes problematic. American foreign policy experts should be weary of entangling themselves in a complex system of alliances not only in Southeast Asia, but Asia as a whole. Furthermore, with nationalism present in most East and South East Asian countries as well as the US, statesmen must have security dilemma sensibility. Gauging an opponents motivations and understanding their options within a scenario is important to healthy relations. One statesman must understand the others history and context. They must also understand the role that fear might play in their attitudes and behavior, including crucially the role that ones own actions may play in provoking that fear (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 7). Across the East China Sea, during the early 2000s Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi made a point of visiting the Yasukuni Shrine every year of his stint in office. The Yasukuni Shrine commemorates WWII soldiers who lost their lives fighting for the Japanese emperor, including those who committed horrible war crimes in China. Thus, a visit by the Japanese leader does not send positive signals to Beijing and lacks security dilemma sensibility. If leaders want to build trust and cooperate they have to think about their actions, even in their day-to-day lives and how statesmen in foreign countries will interpret them. Kissinger notes the importance of Sun Tzus The Art of War to contemporary Chinese foreign policy. Sun Tzus teachings place a premium on victory through psychological advantage and preach the avoidance of direct conflict (Kissinger 2011). If Kissinger is correct, then Sino-American security dilemmas may not reach the point of preemptive or confrontational attacks. In the past, China faced security dilemmas with Japan and the US concerning Taiwan and all parties successfully mitigated conflict through dialogue. That being said, times have changed as Chinas power has increased in both security and economic sectors. Therefore, American statesmen must be aware of perceptions in Beijing that US alliances with regional players are seen as efforts to constrain Chinas rise. Furthermore, statesmen on both

23

sides must proceed with caution to avoid constructing security dilemmas and peacefully resolving some that were described above. The following chapter will examine ways to build trust and cooperation in efforts to reduce the likelihood of security dilemma paradoxes.

24

CHAPTER FOUR Building Cooperation in Theory and Practice

Booth and Wheeler argue that security dilemmas can be successfully mitigated within international regimes (2008). Goals aiming to eliminate security dilemmas may be too unrealistic, but efforts to alleviate uncertainty and develop cooperation can be achieved. Realist scholars have argued that cooperation is possible in an anarchic system, but it is difficult to achieve, maintain and is more likely with a liberal hegemon. Liberal intuitionalists believe states have common interests and benefit from working together on multilateral issues (Grieco 1993). Later on, the system may experience a snowball effect whereby more and more states enter a cooperative institution forcing other states to enter in fear of being left out of the group. This effect also applies to a bilateral relationship when a solution is jointly discovered on one issue and leads to confidence that cooperation on others is achievable. Robert Axelrod believes cooperation turns a zero sum game into a positive sum one (Axelrod 1984). For example, when states have trade barriers, they fail to maximize the potential of their exports. If one country leads efforts to dismantle such barriers, they risk economic destruction by opening their market to foreign goods before the same policy is reciprocated. Therefore, if they both open their markets they both stand to gain. Regarding the Sino-American relationship, there isin Axelrods wordsan iterated Prisoners Dilemma. That is, because one can assume that the two will enter such games for a long time to come, Beijing and Washington should be clear about their intentions, which encourage cooperation. Furthermore, Axelrod argues that positive tit-for-tat actions result from a mutual understanding that the other will reciprocate. Indeed, the reason that Beijing and Washington may achieve success on issues like nuclear nonproliferation is because Taiwan is set aside. If such pressure is put on the game, then reciprocation may be questioned and one may defect.

25

Players can put pressure on reciprocation if they set dates for future meetings where decisions will be made as Axelrod recommends. Thus when Beijing and Washington set time aside for summits, bilateral meetings, and other conferences, they are following this logic. They need to stick to the plan and not renege on any previously arranged meetings and conclude them with joint statements. The visits should also run smoothly unlike US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visit in 2011, which correlated to the PLAs release of its new stealth fighter jet. While this may highlight the divide and disconnect between Hu and the PLA, it should not be something happening during a high-profile visit. As long as they run smoothly, Beijing and Washington should increase such interactions. The 2011 USChina Defense Consultative Talks are a step in the right direction. As Sino- American agreements grow, so does their interest in the well being of the other, thus increasing the likelihood of reciprocity. Levels at which cooperation can be built As shown by the above, cooperation can be built between statesmen. However, this section will examine the bottom up approach to cooperation building. While statesmen represent their constituencies in foreign policy, the 21st century brings with it the proliferation of communications technologies including: the Internet, telecommunications, and advances in aviation enabling widespread personal interaction between peoples. The future leaders of China and America interact in universities, cosmopolitan cities, and online message boards. Globalization facilitates the exchange of both cultures and there are Chinese and American diaporas in both countries. Therefore, if tensions rise, personal relationships are at risk. Also there is high potential for a rebirth of the peace movement that Booth and Wheeler observe to result from growing anxiety about the increased danger of super-power nuclear war, which they examined in America, and the Soviet bloc during the Cold War (2008: 143). Indeed, activism and civil society is growing in China. In July 2011, two high-speed trains crashed in Zhejiang causing many Chinese to protest the early launch of the trains. In August, Dalian played host to a large protest against a 26

chemical plant that was polluting the citys water supply. Subsequently, the plant was moved to another city. Then, In September, there were protests against a solar manufacturing plant in Haining that was similarly releasing toxins into the local waters supply. Indeed, there is a noticeable increase in activism in China. Social networking websites offer possibilitiesthrough increased communicationto reduce tensions, mistrust, and uncertainty. However, without access to Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, Chinese cannot interact with the outside world as easily as others. If Beijing broke down the great firewall then the two citizenries could communicate more and reduce mistrust. Global economic reform Regarding economics, China and the US have the first and second largest economies in the world. Thus, the global economy hinges on a good relationship between the two. Here, Axelrods theory of cooperation applies well. Economic prosperity is not a zero sum game. After joining the WTO in 2001, Chinas export sector surged dramatically (Dittmer 2010: 215). China became the largest steel producing country in the world and experienced exceptional growth in cement production and aluminum output after joining. This boom drove up the price of raw materials found in such countries as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbors. Indeed, to facilitate this important trade, China supports the Congo with over $9 billion in development aid (Taylor 2011: 75). Since its admission to the WTO, China surpassed the US as the worlds largest consumer of natural resources, excluding oil (Dittmer 2010: 215). Therefore, developing countries that export commodities benefit from Chinese integration into a global economy. However, trade between Beijing and Washing has resulted in, the most imbalanced bilateral economic relationship in human history (Garrett 2010). Indeed, coupled with the global financial crisis of 2008, the two have seen rising tensions in trade. In 2009, the Governor of the Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan advocated for a new global reserve currency that was not issued by one country in particular. Later in 2009, President Obama placed heavy tariffs on Chinese tiers being imported into the US because they had a negative effect on American 27

production and jobs. This was the first act of protectionism under Obama against Chinese goods. In response, China opened a case against American chicken, nylon, and auto part imports before the WTO. This is not the path to cooperation. Indeed, there is a growing protectionist sentiment in the USA from congressmen, factory workers, and consumers who only buy made in USA. In a 2011 congressional hearing, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen said, the American people have also borne the brunt of Chinas mercantile trade policies Jobs and American dollars have flown across the Pacific to China for the past two decades as the American people have suffered high unemployment and a diminished standard of living (US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs 2011). Subsequently, there is pressure from President Obama on Beijing to let the Yuan appreciate. In response, Beijing calls on Washington to stop printing money, which devalues the debt owned by China. However, Beijing and Washington must lead joint solutions to todays economic problems. In 2011 diplomats from the US and China met for the third time to discuss measures to increase trust and cooperation at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Leaders including US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Treasury Timothy Geithner, Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan, and State Councilor Dai Bingguo met to discuss investment policy, financial reform and domestic consumption forecasts. Security issues were also discussed regarding the Asia- Pacific region in order to avoid misunderstandings that can lead to dangerous miscalculations (Clinton 2011). To some, what was not spoken about, including the South China Sea, highlights the lack of substance to such conversations. However, it is important to establish cooperation on simple issues before moving on to matters of controversy. Once the relationship has been built, then sensitive matters can constructively be mitigated. Wang Jisi, an influential Chinese academic writes, Chinas long term interests will require some incremental appreciation of the Yuan, but its desire to increase its exports in the short term will prevent its decision makers from taking quick measures urged by the United States (2011: 75). Indeed, Wang highlights how China learns from the past, especially Washingtons treatment of Japans rise in 28

the 1980s. Only the enhancement of Chinas domestic consumptions and a steady opening of its capital markets will help it shake off these international pressures (75). Can China and America work together to jointly solve the problems associated with the global economy? One such way may be a hybrid of the two development models China and America advocate. In many cases, structural adjustment loans given by the IMF or World Bank have hurt developing countries by liberalizing domestic markets too rapidly. However, Beijings loans allow states to maintain a greater amount of control over their economies, which can lead to corruption. Therefore, if a timeline on such loans was implemented, it may make them more effective. That is, a loan jointly issued by China and America via the IMF would prescribe gradual market liberalization instead of one that shocks the state as advocated by Washington (Klein 2007). Furthermore, increasing Chinese participation in international financial institutions could lead the way in a general increase in stakeholder participation as suggested by Ngaire Woods (2001). Nuclear weapons Since the end of the Cold War, the US and China have worked together toward the common goal of arms control and nonproliferation. China joined the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2002, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 and the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997. The proliferation of such destructive weapons upsets regional order and China does not want a nuclear war on its western border. Indeed, in 1998 when the Indo-Pakistan rivalry intensified up with nuclear tests, Washington and Beijing released the Sino-U.S. Presidential Joint Statement on South Asia condemning the tests. Therefore, they have already shown cooperation on nuclear issues. Successes with India-Pakistan should prove to the US and China that they work well together in helping to reduce nuclear tensions. Gu Guoliang and Steven Miller suggest that this same combined effort can work towards the goal of ending Irans uranium-enrichment program (2009). However, this case contains different variables. Iran does not border China, so there is not a direct threat. Also, in many 29

instances, Beijing undercut American sanctions on Iran to maintain its supply of Iranian oil. In 2004, Sinopec attempted to by 16 Iranian oil fields against Washingtons wishes, highlighting tension between the two over Iran (Zha 2006). Unfortunately, neither Washington nor Beijing can solve the North Korean issue. While China may have more leverage in the discussions than the US because of economic ties, they are also unable to get the Kim regime to yield. In order to control its people and legitimize its power, the Kim family has relied on manipulating other countries to Pyongyang's advantage. Aid transfers go back to the earliest days of the North Korean state. Kim Il-sung was a beneficiary of the Soviet Union and Beijing has sent aid since the Korean War. Even today, as a leader in the Six Party Talks, Beijing recently bought off Kim to come to the negotiating table. In total, since the late 1990s, Kim received more than $6 billion from South Korea, China, Japan and the US in efforts to curb its nuclear weapons program (Byman and Lind 2010). Furthermore, Beijing may not want to deal with the chaos on its border and influx of refugees in the event of regime collapse. The option to wait until the Kim regime is in transition and then dismantle their weapons program is a great opportunity for Sino-American leaders to solve an issue together. On multilateral agreements, there is much to be done. The US does not think China abides by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which prohibits the sale of missile technology, including ballistic, cruise, and those capable of carrying heavy loads to other states. The US does not allow Chinese involvement in drafting the treaty out of security concerns due to the sensitive missile design information (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2004). In 1991, China exported such technology to Pakistan and had plans to do the same with Syria, which resulted in sanctions by the US. Beijing apologized and agreed not to do it again and the US lifted sanctions. Then in 1993, the US accused China again of exporting such missiles to Pakistan and imposed sanctions. This led to a joint statement on missile proliferation whereby China agreed to ban the sale of all such missiles in exchange for America lifting the sanctions. The US believes that throughout the 2000s China has sold such technology to Iran and thus will not allow Beijing to ratify the MTCR. However, there is room for cooperation. In the past, it seems as though Beijing responds when it is 30

given a carrot. Therefore, the US can agree to stop giving India nuclear weapons technology if Beijing stops giving it to Pakistan and Iran. This would be in the interest of the US because it alleviates a brewing issue in the Middle East. This exchange would be seen in Beijing as a success because of the growing Indo-China rivalry and perceptions that Washington is using India to contain China. The US and China should lead the way in ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The US has yet to ratify the treaty, but must. Indeed, it would be a simple cooperative measure to have Beijing and Washington both ratify the treaty at the same time in the near future. Indeed, such moves could lead to cooperation on a larger issue like Americas Ballistic Missile Defense system, which causes great stress in Beijing. South China Sea In the South China Sea, Beijing is taking unilateral measures to drill for oil. As stated above, many of the states involved have strong relations with the US and rely on American security in such waters. Lin Boqiang, a professor at Xiamen University says, "It is always a first-come-first-served game when vying for non-renewable resources in disputed sea areas, as the resources are not infinite (Mucha 2011). However, Secretary of State Clinton says that the US supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion (2010). Furthermore Chinas forceful claim of resources would break the 2002 ASEAN-China Code of Conduct in the South China Sea as well as the UN Conventions on the Law of the Sea. Having just launched their first deepwater rig, Hai Yang Shi You 981, Beijing, is becoming more capable of realizing Lins suggestions. Cooperation building regarding the South China Sea can begin with agreements in the UN rather than naval posturing. First, there should be a reassessment of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the US should ratify the agreement. Beijing and Washington should lead negotiations in the UN about how to make the treaty more applicable to current issues like the South China Sea exclusive economic zones and the Northwest Passage that Canada wants 31

to claim. Indeed, by agreeing that the Northwest Passage is for international navigation, they can then set a precedent for the South China Sea and joint development with ASEAN states. In other words, by settling a manageable dispute between the US and Canada, with Chinese help, cooperation will be built and can snowball into cooperative efforts in the South China Sea. Cyber security Recently, Washington published a report entitled Project 2049 on China's cyber capabilities. Beijing responded that they are just following the precedent set by the US as it has similar if not more advanced capabilities in cyber warfare. China Daily suggests that there are a few ways to build trust and cooperation between the US and China regarding cyber. The US and China stand to gain from catching cyber criminals, so they should collaborate on cases where online acts are illegal in both countries. However, Washington worries that China will use its cyber power to steal information stored online such as military and political secrets or business secrets such as intellectual property and strategy (Segal 2011). Beijing does not like the idea of a cyber hotline to quickly resolve escalating issues because it resembles a similar mechanism that Washington operated with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Furthermore, Washington's report 2049 highlighted a lack of leadership in China's cyber department, so it would be difficult for them to put someone at the other end of the phone. Beijing and Washington could lead efforts to construct an international regime on the law of cyber space resembling UNCLOS. If they could start preliminary discussions on this, it would better relations between the two.

32

 Put simply, China needs the current international order and that order needs China. Wang writes, Chinas continued success in modernizing its economy and lifting its peoples standards of living depends heavily on global stability (Wang 2011: 77). In order to maintain global stability those with high stakes must cooperate. A strategic way of doing so is to cooperate on straightforward issues like nonproliferation or the global economy in hope that agreements on Taiwan may come easier in the future. As timing is an important factor, it makes sense to wait and then tackle such difficult issues when China and the US have stronger relations. Indeed, both Beijing and Washington must remember that cooperation turns a zero sum game into a positive some game in which the whole international community can benefit. Washington must not practice Mearshimers theory on offensive realism. In similar fashion, Beijing should not allow disconnect to grow between a power hungry PLA and the CCP as evident in Gates 2011 visit. Rather, both sides should take advantage of the fruits of the 21st century such as the Internet, increased communications and cheap travel to grow relations among citizenries. When both powers say cooperation is key, actions speak louder than words. Thus, Beijing and Washington must act to advert conflict through cooperation building measures today and well into the future.

Conclusion

33

Bibliography
Altman, Roger (2009). The Great Crash, Foreign Affairs, (88)1. Axelrod, Robert (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation, New York, Basic Books. Balaam, David and Dillman, Bradford (2011). Introduction to International Political Economy 5th eds. London, Pearson Education. Babones, Salvatore (2011). The Middling Kingdom: The Hype and the Reality of Chinas Rise Foreign Affairs, September/October. Buzan, Barry, and Waever, Ole (2003) Regions and Powers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Booth, Ken and Wheeler, Nicholas J (2008). The Security Dilemma, Basingstoke, Palgrave. Byman, Daniel and Lind, Jennifer (2010) Pyongyangs Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea International Security, Vol. 35, No. 1 Chanos, Jim and Massar, Carol (2011). Chanos on China Street Smart, Bloomberg Television, 20 September 2011 http://www.bloomberg.com/video/75796888/ Clinton, Hillary Rodham (2010). Remarks by Secretary Clinton, Hanoi, 23 July 2010. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm Clinton, Hillary Rodham (2011) Joint Closing Remarks for the Strategic and Economic Dialogue 10 May 2011 Cox, Michael (2009). Why did We Get the End of the Cold War Wrong? the British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 11. Devadason, Evelyn S (2010). ASEANChina Trade Flows: moving forward with ACFTA Journal of Contemporary China, 19(66). Dittmer, Lowell (2010). Chinas Rise, Global Identity, and the Developing World in Dittmer, Lowell and Yu, George T. eds. China the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic, London, Lynne Rienner, Eichengreen, Barry (2011). Exorbitant Privilege, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Friedberg, Aaron L (2005). The Future of United StatesChina Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable? International Security, 30(2). 34

 Friedman, Thomas (2005). The World is Flat: the Globalized World in the Twenty- First Century, London: Allen Lane. Fukuyama, Francis (1993). The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Avon Books. Garrett, Geoffery (2010). G2 in G20: China, the United States and the World after the Global Financial Crisis Global Policy 1(1). Grieco, Joseph M (1993). Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: the Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory in Baldwin, David eds, Neorealism and Neoliberalism: the Contemporary Debate New York, Columbia University Press. Gu Guoliang, and Miller, Steven E (2009). Arms control and the spread of nuclear weapons in Rosecrance, Richard and Gu Guoliang, eds, Power and Restraint: A Shared Vision for the US-China Relationship, New York, Public Affairs. Hu Shen (1998). Writing in Renmin ribao, October 17, 1990 quoted in Foot, Rosemary, China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes of Thought Asian Survey, 38(5). Huntington, Samuel P (1991). America's changing strategic interests, Survival, 33:1. Jacobs, Andrew (2011). Arms Sale Draws Angry, but Familiar, Reaction New York Times 22 September 2011. Kagan, Robert (2008). The Return of History and the End of Dreams, London: Atlantic. Karrar, Hasan (2009). The New Silk Road Diplomacy: Chinas Central Asian Foreign Policy since the Cold War, Vancouver, UBC Press,. Kissinger, Henry (2000a). A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22 London, Phoenix. Kissinger, Henry (2000b). The Long Shadow of Vietnam Newsweek, 1 May 2000. Kissinger, Henry (2011). On China, Toronto: Allen Lane. Kennan, George F. (X) (1947). The Sources of Soviet Conduct Foreign Affairs July 1947. Kennedy, Paul (1989). The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, London: Fontana. Klein, Naimoi (2007). The Shock Doctrine, London: Penguin. 35

 Kupchan, Charles A (2002). Hollow Hegemony or Stable Multipolarity in Ikenberry, G. John, eds. America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power London, Cornell University Press. Layne, Christopher (2004). The War on Terrorism and the Balance of Power: the Paradoxes of American Hegemony in Paul, TV et al, Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, Stanford, Stanford University Press. Lebow, Richard Ned and Valentino, Benjamin (2011). Lost in Transition: A Critical Analysis of Power Transition Theory in Booth, Ken eds. Realism and World Politics New York, Routledge. Legro, Jeffery W (2008). Purpose Transitions: Chinas Rise and the American Response, in Ross, Robert and Feng, Zhu eds. Chinas Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics, London, Cornell University Press. Levy, Jack S. (2008). Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China in Ross, Robert and Feng, Zhu eds. Chinas Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Mankoff, Jeffery (2009). Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, Plymouth, Rowman & Littlefield. Mastanduno, Michael (1991), Do Relative Gains Matter? Americas Response to Japanese Industrial Policy International Security 16(1). Mearsheimer, John J (2010). The Gathering Storm: Chinas Challenge to US Power in Asia the Chinese Journal of International Politics Vol 3. "Missile Technology Control Regime." (2004). Nuclear Threat Initiative. 19 Feb. 2004. http://www.nti.org/db/china/mtcrorg.htm Mucha, Thomas (2011). Oil Drilling: China Goes Deep Global Post 24 May 2011. Quah, Danny (2011). The Shifting Global Balance of Power China.org.cn. 18 April 2011 http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2011-04/18/content_22386768.htm Reich, Robert (1993), Do We Want US to Be Rich or Japan Poor? Wall Street Journal, 18 June 1990 in Baldwin, David eds, Neorealism and Neoliberalism: the Contemporary Debate New York, Columbia University Press. Ross, Robert (2004). Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia in in Paul, TV et al, Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, Stanford, Stanford University Press. 36

 Sanchita, Basu Das (2011), For Firmer ASEAN-China Ties China Daily, 23 August 2011. Segal, Adam (2011). First Steps in U.S.-China Cyber Cooperation? Asia Unbound: a Council on Foreign Relations Blog 29 November 2011. Shirk, Susan (2007). China: Fragile Superpower, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Stern, Lewis (2009). U.S.-Vietnam Defense Relations: Deepening Ties, Adding Relevance, Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, no 246. Subramanian, Arvind (2011). The Inevitable Superpower: Why Chinas Dominance Is a Sure Thing Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011 Tammen et al (2000). Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century, New York, Chatham House Publishers of Seven Bridges Press.

Taylor, Ian (2011). The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), London, Routledge, Trivedi, Sahiba (2011), Space: the final frontier of Sino-US rivalry? Open Democracy, 16th June 2011. Truman, Harry S (1961). Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S Truman, 1945, Washington DC, 1961. US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs (2011). Ileana Ros- Lethinen Assessing Chinas Behavior and its Impact on US Interests 19 January 2011. Vernon, Raymond (1989). "On Glass Houses and Japan-Bashing," New York Times, 21 June 1989. Walt, Stephen (1996). Revolution and War, London: Cornell University Press. Wang Jianwei (2009). Building a New conceptual Framework for US-China Relations in Yufan, Hao, Wei, CX George, and Dittmer, Lowell, Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization and the Next World Power, Lexington, University Press of Kentucky. Wang Jisi (2011). Chinas Search for a Grand Strategy Foreign Affairs, 90(2). Williams, Andrew (2007). Failed Imagination? The Anglo-American New World Order from Wilson to Bush second ed. Manchester, Manchester University Press. 37

 White, Donald W (1987). The Nature of World Power in American History: An Evaluation at the End of World War II Diplomatic History (11)3. Wohlforth, William C (1994). Realism and the End of the Cold War, International Security, 19(3). Woods, Ngaire (2001). Making the IMF and the World Bank more accountable, International Affairs 77(1). Xinhua (2011). ASEAN expects China to boost businesses in the region Xinhua News Agency, 8 June 2011. Zha Daojiong (2006). China's energy security: Domestic and international issues Survival, (48)1. Zheng Bijian (2005a). China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005 Zheng Bijian (2005b). Way that communist Party of China Takes in 21st Century Peoples Daily, November 22, 2005. Zhiqun Zhu (2010). Chinas New Diplomacy: rationale, Strategies and Significance, Surrey: Ashgate. Zoellick, Robert B (2005). Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, 21 September 2005.

38