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G.R. No. 106401. September 29, 2000.*SECOND DIVISION. SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUEZ-ZARAGOZA, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA MORGAN, respondents. Appeals; Evidence; As a rule, the Supreme Court is bound by the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.-Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his properties among his three children, excepting private respondent, through deeds of sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent because she had become an American citizen and the Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioners admitted Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of the private respondent. These are factual determinations of the Court of Appeals, based on documentary and testimonial evidence. As a rule, we are bound by findings of facts of the Court of Appeals. Succession; Partition; It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Was the partition done during the lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid? We think so. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article 1061: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the dece_______________ * SECOND DIVISION. 310 310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Zaragoza vs. Court of Appeals
dent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. Same; Collation; Parties; Indispensable Parties; Collation cannot be done where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the compulsory heirsthe petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present.Unfortunately, collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.
Land Registration; Land Titles; Title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law, otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost.We now come to the second issue. Private respondent, in submitting her petition for the delivery of inheritance share, was in effect questioning the validity of the deed of sale covering Let 943 in favor of petitioner and consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the latters name. Although the trial court, as an obiter, made a finding of validity of the conveyance of Lot 943 in favor of petitioners, since according to it, private respondent did not question the genuineness of the signature of the deceased, nevertheless, when the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the latter declared the sale to be fictitious because of finding of marked differences in the signature of Flavio in the Deed of Sale vis--vis signatures found in earlier documents. Could this be done? The petition is a collateral attack. It is not allowed by Sec. 48 of the Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, which provides: Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack .A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. We have reiterated this rule in the case of Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, citing the earlier cases of Constantino vs. Espiritu and Co vs. Court of Appeals . In Halili, we held that a certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, 311 VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 311 Zaragoza vs. Court of Appeals
enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Ermitao, Sangco, Manzano and Associates for petitioners. Cirilo T. Ganzon, Jr. and Claro Aligaen for private respondent. QUISUMBING, J.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks (1) the reversal of the decision1CA Records, pp. 49-60. of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 27, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 12587, which affirmed the decision2Id. at 29. of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 14178, except the
dismissal of private respondents claim over lot 943; (2) the dismissal of the complaint filed by private respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo; and (3) the declaration of the deed of sale executed by Flavio Zaragoza covering Lot 943 as valid. The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals and on record are as follows: Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land situated at the Municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Province of Iloilo. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9, 1964, he died without a will and was survived by his four children. On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta ZaragozaMorgan filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against Spouses Florentino and Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of damages. She claims that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and the youngest child of the late Flavio. She fur_______________ 1 CA Records, pp. 49-60. 2 Id. at 29.
312 312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Zaragoza vs. Court of Appeals
ther alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among his four children. The shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while her share, which consists of lots No. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She averred that because of her marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these lots during her fathers lifetime. Petitioners, in their Answer, admitted their affinity with private respondent and the allegations on the properties of their father. They, however, denied knowledge of an alleged distribution by way of deeds of sale to them by their father. They said that lot 871 is still registered in their fathers name, while lot 943 was sold by him to them for a valuable consideration. They denied knowledge of the alleged intention of their father to convey the cited lots to Alberta, much more, the reason for his failure to do
so because she became an American citizen. They denied that there was partitioning of the estate of their father during his lifetime. On November 23, 1983, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action and it failed to implead indispensable parties. The resolution of said Motion was deferred by the lower court until the case was tried on the merits. On October 7, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo promulgated its decision, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the above findings, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudicating Lot 871 in the name of Flavio Zaragoza Cano to plaintiff Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan as appertaining her share in his estate and ordering defendants to vacate its premises and deliver immediately the portion occupied by them to herein plaintiff. Plaintiffs claim against defendants over Lot 943 is dismissed as well as claims for damages interposed against each other.3Rollo, p. 116. _______________ 3 Rollo, p. 116.
313 VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 313 Zaragoza vs. Court of Appeals
In the above decision, the RTC found that Flavio partitioned his properties during his lifetime among his three children by deeds of sales; that the conveyance of Lot 943 to petitioners was part of his plan to distribute his properties among his children during his lifetime; and that he intended Lot 871 to be the share of private respondent.4Id. at 115. Not satisfied with the above decision, both parties interposed an appeal in the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-GR CV No. 12587. On March 27, 1992, respondent court rendered the assailed decision, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, WE reverse the decision appealed from, insofar as defendant-appellants, spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda E. Zaragoza, were adjudged owner of Lot 943. In all other respects, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.5CA Records, p. 59. The appellate court gave weight to the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by private respondent to support its finding that Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance share of private respondent.
Specifically, it noted the admission by petitioner in his letter in 1981 to private respondents counsel, that their father had given them their inheritance.6Id. at 58-59. Further, public respondent found that the alleged sale of lot 943 in favor of petitioner Florentino was fictitious and void. The signature of Don Flavio in the said document was markedly different from his other signatures appearing in other documents he signed from January to February 1957.7Ibid. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution8Id. at 107. dated June 26, 1992. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari,9Rollo, pp. 16-64. with a supplemental petition, raising the following assigned errors: _______________ 4 Id. at 115. 5 CA Records, p. 59. 6 Id. at 58-59. 7 Ibid. 8 Id. at 107. 9 Rollo, pp. 16-64.
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LOTS 871 AND 943 ARE THE INHERITANCE SHARE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE DECEDENT FLAVIO ZARAGOZA HAS NOT EXECUTED ANY WILL NOR ANY DOCUMENT GIVING THESE TWO PROPERTIES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT; B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING AND GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WITNESSES TO THE EFFECT THAT LOTS 871 AND 943 ARE THE INHERITANCE SHARE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS TOLD TO THEM BY FLAVIO ZARAGOZA DESPITE THE FACT THAT THESE TESTIMONIES ARE HEARSAY; C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY FLAVIO ZARAGOZA IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER OVER LOT 943 IS A FORGERY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:
1. THE THEORY THAT THE AFORESAID DEED OF SALE WAS A FORGERY WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE COMPLAINT NOR ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE. 2. THE SAID DEED OF SALE WAS IN A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT. 3. NO WITNESSES WAS EVER PRESENTED TO ASSAIL THE GENUINENESS OF THE SIGNATURE OF FLAVIO ZARAGOZA. 4. THE SAID DEED OF SALE WAS EVEN WITNESSED BY HIS OTHER DAUGHTER GLORIA ZARAGOZA NUEZ AND NOTARIZED BY NOTARY PUBLIC ATTY. EDURESE. D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MODIFYING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WITH RESPECT TO LOT 943 WHEN THE LATTER SUSTAINED THE GENUINENESS OF THE SIGNATURE OF PETITIONERS FATHER FOUND IN EXH. I. E. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL, IGNORING THE FACT THAT IT IS THE LAW ON INTESTATE SUCCESSION, AND THE CORRESPONDING RULES OF COURT ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE THAT IS APPLICABLE ON THIS CASE.10Id. at 17-18. _______________ 10 Id. at 17-18.
In their Supplemental Petition for Review dated October 29, 1992, petitioners additionally raised: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION. II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT LOTS TRANSFERRED INTER VIVOS TO THE OTHER HEIRS SHOULD HAVE BEEN COLLATED TO THE MASS OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO. III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING AS LAWFUL AND VALID ALL THE DISPOSITIONS MADE BY THE DECEASED FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO EXCEPT LOT # 943 DESPITE UTTER LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS FINDING THAT THE SIGNATURE OF THE LATE FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO IN EXH. M-11-A APPEARING IN THE DEED OF SALE DATED FEBRUARY 5, 1957 (EXH. 1, FLORENTINO) WAS A FORGERY.
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-35946 (EXHIBIT 2) COVERING LOT 943 IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER CONCLUSIVELY EVIDENCES THE LATTERS OWNERSHIP THEREOF.11Id at l33. Essentially, we are asked to resolve two issues: (1) whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of his properties, which include Lots 871 and 943, is valid; and (2) whether the validity of the Deed of Sale and consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title over Lot 943 registered in the name of the petitioners, can be a valid subject matter of the entire proceeding for the delivery of inheritance share. On the first issue. It is the main contention of the petitioners that the adjudication of Lots 943 and 871 in favor of private respondent, as her inheritance share, has no legal basis since there is no will nor any document that will support the transfer.
Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his properties among his three children, excepting private respondent, _______________ 11 Id at l33.
through deeds of sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent because she had become an American citizen and the Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioners admitted Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of the private respondent. These are factual determinations of the Court of Appeals, based on documentary and testimonial evidence. As a rule, we are bound by findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.12Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 596, 605-606 (1997). Was the partition done during the lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid? We think so. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this.13NCC, Art. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article 1061: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. Unfortunately, collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos. We now come to the second issue. Private respondent, in submitting her petition for the delivery of inheritance share, was in effect questioning the validity of the deed of sale covering Lot 943 in favor of petitioners and consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the latters name. Although the trial court, as an obiter, made a finding of validity of the conveyance of Lot 943 in _______________ 12 Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 596, 605-606 (1997). 13 NCC, Art. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
favor of petitioners, since according to it, private respondent did not question the genuineness of the signature of the deceased, nevertheless, when the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the latter declared the sale to be fictitious because of finding of marked differences in the signature of Flavio in the Deed of Sale vis--vis signatures found in earlier documents. Could this be done? The petition is a collateral attack. It is not allowed by Sec. 48 of the Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, which provides: Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. We have reiterated this rule in the case of Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations,14257 SCRA 174, 184 (1996). citing the earlier cases of Constantino vs. Espiritu 1545 SCRA 557, 562 (1972). and Co vs. Court of Appeals. 16196 SCRA 705, 711 (1991). In Halili, we held that a certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its
owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. In Constantino, the Court decided that the certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. And in Co, we stated that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. _______________ 14 257 SCRA 174, 184 (1996). 15 45 SCRA 557, 562 (1972). 16 196 SCRA 705, 711 (1991).
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition for review. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 27, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 12587, entitled Alberta Zaragoza Morgan vs. Spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda Enriquez-Zaragoza is VACATED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for delivery of inheritance share in the Regional Trial Court, for failure to implead indispensable parties, is also DISMISSED without prejudice to the institution of the proper proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Petition granted, judgment vacated and set aside. Complaint for delivery of inheritance dismissed. Notes.Collation contemplated under Article 1061 of the Civil Code contemplates properties conveyed inter vivos by the decedent to an heir by way of donation or other gratuitous title. (Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 647 [1997])
A prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the deceased. (Heirs of Ignacio Conti vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 345 [1998]) o0o [Zaragoza vs. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 309(2000)] G.R. No. 137739. March 26, 2001.*FIRST DIVISION. ROBERTO B. TAN, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE BANKING CORP., HELEN LEONTOVICH VDA. DE AGUINALDO and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents. Land Titles; It is well-settled that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.The Court of Appeals (CA), in its decision, correctly denied respondent banks prayer to reinstate its canceled TCTs because to do so would effectively cancel petitioners title on the same lot. It must be noted that petitioners title was regularly issued after the lot covered by the same was sold to him by respondent Aguinaldo. Petitioner relied on the sellers title, which was then free from any claims, liens or encumbrances appearing thereon. As such, petitioners title can only be challenged in a direct action. It is well settled that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Having obtained a valid title over the subject lot, petitioner is entitled to protection against indirect attacks against his title. _______________ * FIRST DIVISION. 293 VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 293 Tan vs. Philippine Banking Corporation
Same; Torrens System; The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.The CAs original ruling on the matter, as stated in its decision, denying respondent banks prayer for reinstatement of its canceled titles without prejudice to the filing of proper action should thus stand. It is more in keeping with the purpose of the adoption of the Torrens system in our country: The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations
and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of the titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Nelson M. Reyes for petitioner. Jose, lyog, Guan & Bool for respondent Philbank. Agustin Sundiam for Helen Leontovich Vda. de Aguinaldo. KAPUNAN, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Roberto Tan (petitioner) seeking to reverse and set aside the resolutions, dated 28 August 1998 and 23 February 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39903. In the said resolutions, the CA directed the Register of Deeds of Marikina to reinstate the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 194096 and 194098 in the name of Philippine
294 294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Tan vs. Philippine Banking Corporation
Banking Corporation (respondent bank) over the same parcel of land already covered by petitioners valid and subsisting TCT No. 296945. The antecedent facts of the case as culled from the decision1Rollo, pp. 70-73. of the CA are as follows: On 29 December 1995, petitioner bought from Helen L. Aguinaldo (respondent Aguinaldo) a parcel of land at the Valley Golf Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal. The lot was then covered by TCT No. 294192 in the name of respondent Aguinaldo. No claims, liens or encumbrances appeared on the said title. After payment of the agreed purchase price, TCT No. 294192 was cancelled and a new one (TCT No. 296945) in the name of petitioner was issued. On 29 February 1996, two (2) months after he bought the property, petitioner was served a copy of the petition for certiorari filed by respondent bank in CA-G.R. SP No. 39903. Said petition stated that petitioner was being sued here as a nominal party as the new registered owner of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 296945. It was only then that petitioner learned that the lot he bought from respondent Aguinaldo was subject of legal dispute between her and respondent bank.
It appears that respondent Aguinaldo and her husband Daniel R. Aguinaldo obtained a loan in the amount of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from respondent bank some time in December 1977. To secure the payment of this obligation, the Aguinaldos executed in favor of respondent bank a real estate mortgage over three parcels of land situated in Antipolo and Cainta, Rizal covered by TCT Nos. 234903, 153844 and 151622. In January of 1985, Daniel Aguinaldo obtained three more loans from respondent PBC totalling over five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00). He died without having paid these loans. Upon maturity of these loans, respondent bank sent a demand letter to respondent Aguinaldo, as administratrix of the estate of her husband. Despite said demand, the loans remained unpaid. Respondent bank thus initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the real estate mortgage. In the public auction sale, the _______________ 1 Rollo, pp. 70-73.
295 VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 295 Tan vs. Philippine Banking Corporation
mortgaged properties were sold to respondent bank as the highest bidder. On 15 February 1990, before the expiration of the redemption period of one year, respondent Aguinaldo filed a complaint for the nullification of the aforesaid foreclosure proceedings, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-1705-A, with Branch 71, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo, Rizal. In said proceedings, the parties (respondent Aguinaldo and respondent bank) entered into a Joint Partial Stipulation of Facts stating, among others, that they agree that the decision to be rendered by this Honorable Court *RTC+ shall be final and unappealable, subject only to the filing within the reglementary period of the usual motion for reconsideration. On 20 April 1995, the trial Court rendered its decision the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: (1) The Notice of Sheriffs Sale dated February 10, 1989, Certificate of Sale dated March 10, 1989, Affidavit of Consolidation executed by the defendant bank, and the deed of sale dated February 1, 1995 executed by the bank in favor of the Terraces Realty & Development Corporation are hereby declared null and void and of no legal force and effect;
(2) The Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to cancel Transfer Certificates of Title No. 194096 and 194008 in the name of the bank and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275504 in the name of Terraces Realty & Development Corporation, and to issue, in lieu thereof, new titles in the name of the plaintiff or her successor-in-interest upon proof by the latter of the payment to be made by them to the bank or by similar proof that such amount is deposited by the plaintiff in trust for the bank. The plaintiff shall pay to the bank or deposit the amount in trust for the bank within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of this decision the amounts as follows: (a) on the promissory note for P176,623.24The amount of P176,623.24 plus the stipulated 12% interest per annum from January 24, 1985 until March 10, 1989; and 12% interest per annum on said amount of P176,623.24 from March 11, 1989 until fully paid. (b) on the promissory note for P380,000.00The amount of P380,000.00 plus 14% interest per annum from January 24, 1985 until
March 10, 1989; and 12% interest per annum on said amount of P380,000.00 from March 11, 1989 until fully paid; and (c) on the promissory note of P31,000.00The amount of P31,000.00 4% interest per annum from January 24, 1985 until March 10, 1989; and 12% interest per annum of said amount of P31,000.00 from March 11, 1989 until fully paid. (3) The claim of plaintiff for damages and attorneys fees is hereby denied. No pronouncement as to costs.2Id., pp. 71-72. Respondent bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision. Pending resolution thereof, respondent bank moved for the inhibition of the presiding judge. The motion for inhibition was granted, thus, the case was re-raffled to Branch 72. The presiding judge thereof subsequently denied respondent banks motion for reconsideration. Respondent bank then filed a notice of appeal but the same was denied on the ground that it (respondent bank) already waived its right to appeal pursuant to the joint stipulation. The decision was declared final and executory. On 6 October 1995, the Clerk of Court of Branch 72 issued a certification that the decision had become final. Upon presentation of the trial courts decision and certification, the Register of Deeds of Marikina canceled respondent banks TCT No. 194096 and 194098 and Terraces Realty & Development
Corporations TCT No. 275504 and issued new titles in lieu thereof, all in the name of respondent Aguihaldo. She subsequently sold the lot covered by one of these titles to petitioner who was then issued TCT No. 296945 therefor. Respondent bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court but the same was denied. It then brought the case to the CA by way of certiorari. In its decision, dated 27 February 1998, the CA substantially granted the reliefs prayed for by respondent bank and directed the trial court to, among others, give due course to respondent banks appeal and elevate the records of the case to the CA for review. The CA, however, denied respondent banks prayer for the reinstatement of its TCTs stating that the _______________ 2 Id., pp. 71-72.
averments as against petitioner are insufficient to make up a cause of action against the latter.3Id., p. 80. Respondent bank thereafter moved for a partial reconsideration of the CA decision insofar as it denied its prayer for the reinstatement of its TCTs. For his part, petitioner filed a motion to cancel notice of lis pendens while respondent Aguinaldo filed a motion for reconsideration. Acting on these motions, the CA issued the assailed resolution of 28 August 1998 the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens dated 23 March 1998 filed by respondent Roberto B. Tan and the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Helen Leontovich Vda. de Aguinaldo dated 23 March 1998 are hereby DENIED, for lack of merit. Petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 20 March 1998 is hereby GRANTED and par. (d) of the dispositive portion of our decision promulgated on 27 February 1998 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows: Directing the Registrar of Deeds to reinstate the cancelled Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 194096 & 194098 in the name of petitioner and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275504 in the name of Terraces Realty & Development Corporation, or issue new ones in the event this is not legally feasible in their favor, pending review of the case on appeal. SO ORDERED.4Id., p. 25.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the appellate court in its resolution of 23 February 1999. Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition assigning the following errors: 1. The Court of Appeals erred and committed serious irregularity in directing the reinstatement of Philbanks cancelled TCT No. 194096 (or the issuance of a new one in its place), in the face of an existing TCT in Roberto Tans name over the same parcel of land, and absent any proper direct action and judgment for reconveyance against him which rescinds or cancels his TCT No. 296945; _______________ 3 Id., p. 80. 4 Id., p. 25.
2. The Court of Appeals erred and acted without jurisdiction in deciding upon the question of whether Philbanks cancelled TCT No. 194096 should be reinstated, or a new title issued in its place, this being within the exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts, and outside the scope of a certiorari proceeding.5Id., pp. 16-17. The Court required respondent bank and respondent Aguinaldo to file their respective Comments. Thereafter, the parties were required to file their respective memoranda. The Court finds the petition meritorious. The first assailed CA resolution (28 August 1998) directing the Register of Deeds of Marikina to reinstate the TCTs of respondent bank had the effect of canceling petitioners title over the same parcel of land. The CA clearly committed reversible error in issuing the aforesaid resolution. Petitioner was not even a party to the action between respondent Aguinaldo and respondent bank in the court a quo. Petitioner was impleaded only in the certiorari case filed by respondent bank in the CA. In fact, the petition filed by respondent CA merely stated that petitioner was being sued as a nominal party in his capacity as the new registered owner of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 296945.6Id., p. 30. Other than this averment, there were no allegations to constitute a cause of action against petitioner. As the CA held in its main decision: Private respondent Roberto Tan has filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, one of which is x x x the petition states no cause of action against Roberto B. Tan. In his submission to support this ground, Tan
claims being a buyer in good faith and for value (P2.5 Million), P2 Million of which came from a loan directly paid by the lender bank to the seller, and the full consideration was fully paid. Under the circumstances obtaining, the prayer under paragraph 3.5 cannot be granted. The aforequoted averments as against private respondent Roberto B. Tan are insufficient to make up a cause of action for the desired relief.7Id., p. 80. _______________ 5 Id., pp. 16-17. 6 Id., p. 30. 7 Id., p. 80.
The CA, in its decision, correctly denied respondent banks prayer to reinstate its canceled TCTs because to do so would effectively cancel petitioners title on the same lot. It must be noted that petitioners title was regularly issued after the lot covered by the same was sold to him by respondent Aguinaldo. Petitioner relied on the sellers title, which was then free from any claims, liens or encumbrances appearing thereon. As such, petitioners title can only be challenged in a direct action. It is well settled that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.8Carreon vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 78, 89 (1998). Having obtained a valid title over the subject lot, petitioner is entitled to protection against indirect attacks against his title. The CAs original ruling on the matter, as stated in its decision, denying respondent banks prayer for reinstatement of its canceled titles without prejudice to the filing of proper action should thus stand. It is more in keeping with the purpose of the adoption of the Torrens system in our country: The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by
complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of the titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.9Tenio-Obsequio vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 550, 557 (1994). WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolutions, dated 28 August 1998 and 23 February 1999, of the Court of Appeals are _______________ 8 Carreon vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 78, 89 (1998). 9 Tenio-Obsequio vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 550, 557 (1994). 300 300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Tan vs. Philippine Banking Corporation
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Its Decision, dated 27 February 1998, is REINSTATED in toto. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Court of Appeals resolutions of August 28, 1998 and February 23, 1999 reversed and set aside, its judgment of February 27, 1998 reinstated in toto. Notes.The Torrens system of land registration, though indefeasible, should not be used a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of the real property. (Claudel vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 113 [1991]) Under the Torrens system of registration, the Torrens title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree. (Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 208 SCRA 215 [1992]) It is an elementary principle that the owner of land registered under the Torrens system cannot lose it by prescription. (Bishop vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 636 [1992]) The Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land, as it merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567 [1994]) o0o [Tan vs. Philippine Banking Corporation, 355 SCRA 292(2001)]
G.R. No. 128750. January 18, 2001.*SECOND DIVISION. CARQUELO OMANDAM and ROSITO ITOM,1Itom in the petition for review, but Etom in the signature portion of the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, Rollo, p. 20. petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BLAS TRABASAS and AMPARO BONILLA, respondents. Appeals; Well-entrenched is the rule that the Supreme Courts jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, findings of fact below being generally conclusive on the Court.In the first two assigned errors, petitioners apparently question findings of fact by the Court of Appeals while disputing the claim of possession by private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. The appellate court had stated firstly that respondent Trabasas bought the subject land from Sayson who presented herself as the true owner, then secondly, that he bought the land from Lasola also. The first two issues, in our view, raise questions of fact. Wellentrenched is the rule that the Courts jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. Findings of fact below are generally conclusive on the Court. It is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again. There are instances where the Court departs from this rule. However, petitioners did not show that involved here is an exceptional instance. Hence, we need not tarry on the first two assignments. Land Registration; Land Titles; Torrens System; Fraud; The indefea-sibility of a Torrens Title cannot be used as a defense in an action for cancellation of title acquired through fraud.In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 71 (1966), we ruled that a void title may be cancelled. A title over a disposable public land is void if its grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by law. In Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358 (1983), we held that the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title cannot be used as a defense in an action for cancellation of title acquired through fraud. These two cases refer to actions for cancellation of title initiated by the government, through the Solicitor General, after a finding of fraud by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. In Padre vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 446 (1992) we said that in an action for quieting of title, the court may determine incidentally the right to the possession thereof, in order to provide complete relief to the parties. The _______________ * SECOND DIVISION. 1 Itom in the petition for review, but Etom in the signature portion of the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, Rollo, p. 20. 484 484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Omandam vs. Court of Appeals
last case refers to determination of rightful possession in possessory actions. Same; Same; Courts; Administrative Law; Homesteads; Courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Landsonly the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary can review, on appeal, such decree.Notwithstanding the formulation by the petitioners in the third assigned error, the real issue raised in this case involves the trial courts jurisdiction vis--vis administrative agencies. What is the effect of the trial courts decision in a possessory action on the order of Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead application and decision of the DENR on the protest over the homestead patent? Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, gives in its sections 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands primarily and to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of Department of Environment and Natural Resources) ultimately the authority to dispose and manage public lands. In this regard, courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands. Only the DENR Secretary can review, on appeal, such decree. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same.DENRs jurisdiction over public lands does hot negate the authority of courts of justice to resolve questions of possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not settled the respective rights of public land claimants. But once the DENR has decided, particularly with the grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its decision prevails. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Rufino Y. Aloot for petitioners. Jose A. Bersales for private respondent. QUISUMBING, J.: This petition1Rollo, pp. 6-25. for review seeks the reversal of the decision dated October 29, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44442, _______________ 1 Rollo, pp. 6-25.
485 VOL. 349, JANUARY 18, 2001 485 Omandam vs. Court of Appeals
reversing and setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Del Sur, Branch 23, dated November 15, 1996, and the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 21, 1997, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration. On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands in Pagadian City issued in favor of Camilo Lasola Homestead Patent No. IX-6-40 covering Lot No. 8736, with an area of 23,985 sq. m. in Sagrada, Tambulig, Zamboanga del Sur. On April 28, 1978, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22-690 in his name. On April 28, 1983, respondent Bias Trabasas bought the land from a Dolores Sayson who claimed she was the owner of said land. In 1984, Trabasas discovered that petitioners Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom had occupied the land. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987, Omandam protested Lasolas homestead patent before the Bureau of Lands and prayed for cancellation of the OCT. Upon Say sons advice, Trabasas repurchased the land from Lasola, who executed a deed of sale dated September 24, 1987. On August 9, 1989, Trabasas acquired a new transfer certificate of title. On April 16, 1990, spouses Bias Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint against petitioners for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land with the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that they were the true and registered owners of the land and Omandam and Itom should vacate it. Petitioners answered that they purchased the land from one Godofredo Sela who had been in possession for almost twenty years. After the parties were duly heard, the Regional Trial Court issued its decision on November 15, 1993 declaring that neither respondents herein nor their predecessors-ininterest were ever in possession of the land. Citing Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 71 (1966), Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358 (1983) and Padre vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 446 (1992), the trial court disposed: WHEREFORE, finding that the plaintiffs have no equitable right to the possession of the land under litigation, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff
486 486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Omandam vs. Court of Appeals
1) Finding the defendants to have equitable right to the possession of the land in litigation. 2) Ordering the plaintiffs to reconvey the title of the land under litigation in the name of the plaintiffs to the defendants within 30 days from the date this decision becomes final and executory, and upon their failure to so comply, ordering the Clerk of Court to execute in behalf of the plaintiffs the necessary deed
of conveyance over the said land in favor of the defendants which deed would be considered sufficient to authorize the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur, Pagadian City, to cause the cancellation of the Torrens Certificate of Title in the names of the plaintiffs, and in lieu thereof, to issue another in the common names of the defendants. SO ORDERED.2Rollo, p. 42. Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending the appeal, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Region IX dismissed Omandams protest previously filed with the Bureau of Lands.3Executive Order No. 192 providing for the reorganization of the Department of Environment, Energy and Natural Resources, transferred to the regional field offices the line functions and powers of the Bureau of Lands. It said that Omandam failed to prove that Lasola, respondents predecessor-in-interest, committed fraud and misrepresentation in acquiring the patent, hence there is no ground for its revocation and cancellation of its corresponding title. On October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. It decided thus: WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, a new one is hereby issued ordering defendants-appellees to vacate the subject land and surrender it to plaintiff-appellant. Cost against defendants-appellees. SO ORDERED.4Id at 31. _______________ 2 Rollo, p. 42. 3 Executive Order No. 192 providing for the reorganization of the Department of Environment, Energy and Natural Resources, transferred to the regional field offices the line functions and powers of the Bureau of Lands. 4 Id at 31.
The Court of Appeals declared that petitioners collateral attack on the homestead title, to defeat private respondents accion publiciana, was not sanctioned by law; that the patent and title of Camilo
Lasola, private respondents predecessor-in-interest, had already become indefeasible since April 28, 1977; and that petitioners action for reconveyance in the nature of their protest with the Bureau of Lands and counterclaim in their answer to the complaint for recovery of possession, already prescribed. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on February 21, 1997. Hence, this petition for review. Petitioners make the following assignment of errors, alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in: I . . . HOLDING THAT ONE OF THE UNDISPUTED FACTS IS THAT On April 28, 1983, plaintiff bought the subject land from Dolores Sayson who presented herself to be the true owner of the subject land; II . . . HOLDING THAT ANOTHER UNDISPUTED FACT IS THAT . . . sometime in 1984 plaintiff discovered that defendants had entered and had occupied the subject land. Upon instructions of Dolores Sayson, plaintiff approached Camilo Lasola and again bought the subject land, this time from Camilo Lasola; III . . . IGNORING THE FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND CAMILO LASOLA HAD NO EQUITABLE POSSESSION ON THE SUBJECT LAND, WHICH LACK OF EQUITABLE POSSESSION MAKES SOME OF THE RECENT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE.5Id., at 7. In the first two assigned errors, petitioners apparently question findings of fact by the Court of Appeals while disputing the claim of possession by private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. The appellate court had stated firstly that respondent Trabasas bought the subject land from Sayson who presented herself as the true owner, then secondly, that he bought the land from Lasola also. The first two issues, in our view, raise questions of fact. Well-entrenched is the rule that the Courts jurisdiction in a _______________ 5 Id., at 7.
petition for review is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. Findings of fact below are generally conclusive on the Court. It is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again.6Co vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 195, 200 (1995); Gobonseng, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 472 (1995). There are instances where the Court departs from this rule.7Bautista vs.
Mangaldan Rural Bank, Inc., 230 SCRA 16 (1994). However, petitioners did not show that involved here is an exceptional instance. Hence, we need not tarry on the first two assignments. In the third assignment of error, petitioners aver that public respondent erred in ignoring the trial courts finding that private respondents had no equitable possession of the subject land. Again, we are confronted with a question of fact. But petitioners claim the appellate court had disregarded or even contradicted our holdings in the cited cases of Director of Lands, Abanilla, and Padre. In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 71 (1966), we ruled that a void title may be cancelled. A title over a disposable public land is void if its grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by law. In Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358 (1983), we held that the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title cannot be used as a defense in an action for cancellation of title acquired through fraud. These two cases refer to actions for cancellation of title initiated by the government, through the Solicitor General, after a finding of fraud by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. In Padre vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 446 (1992) we said that in an action for quieting of title, the court may determine incidentally the right to the possession thereof, in order to provide complete relief to the parties. The last case refers to determination of rightful possession in possessory actions. Notwithstanding the formulation by the petitioners in the third assigned error, the real issue raised in this case involves the trial courts jurisdiction vis--vis administrative agencies. What is the effect of the trial courts decision in a possessory action on the order of Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead application and decision of the DENR on the protest over the homestead patent? _______________ 6 Co vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 195, 200 (1995); Gobonseng, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 472 (1995). 7 Bautista vs. Mangaldan Rural Bank, Inc., 230 SCRA 16 (1994).
Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, gives in its sections 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands primarily and to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of Department of Environment and Natural Resources) ultimately the authority to dispose and manage public lands.8CA 141, Sec. 3: The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands, who shall act under his immediate control.Sec. 4: Subject to said control,... In this regard, courts have no
jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands.9Maximo vs. Court of First Instance of Capiz, Br. III, 182 SCRA 420, 426 (1990). Only the DENR Secretary can review, on appeal, such decree. It will be recalled that the Bureau of Lands approved Lasolas homestead application on May 21, 1968. No appeal was made therefrom. Nineteen years after, or on July 9, 1987, Omandam filed the protest with the Bureau of Lands. Thereafter, respondents Trabasas and Bonilla instituted the present action in the Regional Trial Court for recovery of possession and/or ownership. As mentioned earlier, the trial court held that petitioners were entitled to a declaration of equitable possession over the area in question. Said trial court then ordered the cancellation of respondents title and the issuance of a new one. In effect, the courts order reversed the award made by the Director of Lands in favor of Lasola. This reversal was in error, for the proper administrative agency, the DENR under CA 141, had prior jurisdiction over the patent on the subject matter, which is the contested homestead area. DENRs jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of courts of justice to resolve questions of possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not set_______________ 8 CA 141, Sec. 3: The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands, who shall act under his immediate control. Sec. 4: Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 9 Maximo vs. Court of First Instance of Capiz, Br. III, 182 SCRA 420, 426 (1990).
tied the respective rights of public land claimants.10Rallon vs. Ruiz, 28 SCRA 331, 339 (1969). But once the DENR has decided, particularly with the grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its decision prevails. In this case, Lasola applied for a homestead patent over the contested area in 1967. His application was granted on May 21, 1968. The Order for the issuance of the patent was issued by the Bureau of Lands on
January 29, 1974 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title was issued by the Register of Deeds on April 28, 1976. From the three latter dates, no appeal was made. It was only on July 9, 1987, i.e., 13 years from the date of the Order directing the issuance of the patent that petitioners protested the homestead grant with the Bureau of Lands. Despite the said lapse of time, the Bureau of Lands gave due course to the protest relying on our ruling in Director vs. Abanilla11124 SCRA 358 (1983). that the doctrine of indefeasibility of title does not apply when the grant is tainted with fraud and misrepresentation. From this date, Lasolas right of possession based on his OCT and eventually that of respondents were put on issue. In their desire to get possession of the property, respondents instituted an action for recovery of possession and/or ownership on April 16, 1990 with the Regional Trial Court. Said court rendered its decision against respondents on November 15, 1993. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending the appeal or on March 23, 1995, the DENR-Region IX dismissed petitioners protest on the ground of absence of fraud and misrepresentation committed by respondents predecessors-in-interest.12Rollo, pp. 110-113. On October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated the decision subject of this petition in favor of respondents. Petitioners then brought the instant case to us. We note that the parties did not manifest as to whether an appeal was made from the decision of the Regional Director of DENR-IX. Further, no mention was ever made in their pleadings regarding the matter. From the said Order of the DENR Regional Director up to the present, five years have lapsed. From this, we can _______________ 10 Rallon vs. Ruiz, 28 SCRA 331, 339 (1969). 11 124 SCRA 358 (1983). 12 Rollo, pp. 110-113.
conclude that no appeal has been made and that the DENR decision dismissing the petitioners protest and upholding respondents right on the contested area has attained finality. By now it appears indubitable that private respondents, spouses Trabasas and Bonilla, have been duly confirmed in their right to possession of Lot No. 8736 as owners thereof. By virtue of the deed of sale executed by OCT holder Camilo Lasola as early as September 24, 1987, in favor of Trabasas, who then secured a transfer certificate of title in his name, private respondents clearly have superior right over
the land claimed by petitioners Omandam and Itom. The appellate court did not err in upholding the right of private respondents, and in ordering the petitioners to vacate and surrender the land to said respondents. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1996, and its resolution dated February 21, 1997, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Petition denied, judgment affirmed. Notes.The Torrens Title issued on the basis of a free patent or homestead patent becomes as indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon the expiration of one year from date of issuance of patent. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 335 [1996]) Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 does not contain any prohibition to convey homestead land but grants the homesteader, his widow or legal heirs a right to repurchase said land within a period of five years in the event that he conveys said land. (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 650 [1999]) A homestead applicant is required by law to occupy and cultivate the land for his own benefit, and not for the benefit of someone else. (Saltiga de Romero vs. Court of Appeals, 319 SCRA 180 [1999]) o0o [Omandam vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 483(2001)] No. L-26324. August 31, 1983.*SECOND DIVISION. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIA ABANILLA and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ISABELA, defendants, MARIA ABANILLA, defendant-appellant. Judgment; The final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals shows that appellant Maria Abanilla committed fraud in securing the free patent at bar.Said decision became final and executory on July 18, 1960. Therefore, it is beyond question that fraud was committed by Maria Abanilla in securing her patent and original certificate of title over a public land, known as Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, situated in Roxas, Isabela. Same; Public Lands; Land Registrations; A Certificate of Title cannot be used as shield to perpetuate fraud.In the light of the above-quoted provisions, defendant-appellant Maria Abanilla cannot use her title as a shield to perpetuate fraud. No amount of legal technicality may serve as a solid foundation for the enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. Fraus et jus numquam cohabitant (Acot, et al. vs. Kempis, et al., supra). Public Lands; A false statement in application for land patent shall ipso facto produce cancellation of title granted.Section 91 of the C.A. No. 141, as amended, expressly provides that any false statement
in the application, which is an essential condition of the patent or title, shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. Same; Same; Land Registration; Doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens Title does not apply to free patent secured through fraud.The doctrine in Heirs of Carle, Sumail, and other cases cited by the appellant regarding the indefeasibility of title issued pursuant to a free patent one year after its issuance does not apply to a grant tainted with fraud and secured through misrepresentation, such as the free patent invoked in this case, since said grant is null and void and of no effect whatsoever. _______________ * SECOND DIVISION. 359 VOL. 124, AUGUST 31, 1983 359 Director of Lands vs. Abanilla
Same; Same; Same; Same.The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title. (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindog, L-15398, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 938 page 38). Same; Same; Same; Prescription; The State is not bound by the period of prescription stated in Sec. 38, Act 496 and may still file action for cancellation of certificate of title even after six years from its issuance.Considering that it is the State that is seeking the cancellation of the title of respondent Isagani Du Timbol, said title has not become indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked against the State. A title founded on fraud may be cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof, through a petition filed in court by the Solicitor General, x x x. Same; Same; Same; Prescription is waived by appellant who submitted herself to an administrative investigation on the existence of fraud in securing her free patent.Even granting that the Director of Lands can no longer question the validity of a torrens title after the lapse of one year from its registration under Section 38 of Act 496, still appellant Maria Abanilla is estopped from claiming that this action has already prescribed. The established facts on the record of the administrative case in the Lands Department involving the same subject matter in this case show that defendant Maria Abanilla even before the grant of the subject patent in her favor had allowed herself to submit to an administrative investigation of this case when she appeared on one occasion in the course thereof and requested for the postponement of the same on the ground that she desired to settle the case amicably. Thereafter, she pursued her alleged right to the patent by exhausting all her administrative remedies in the Lands Department. Appellant Maria Abanilla is now estopped from claiming that this action had
already prescribed, for the simple reason that she can be considered an instrumental party in the delay in the filing of the instant action (p. 26, rec.). APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Br. I. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
360 360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Director of Lands vs. Abanilla
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Adriano Dasalla for defendant-appellant. MAKASIAR, J.: This is a direct appeal to the Supreme Court on a pure question of law from the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, 1st Judicial District, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 1308, ordering the cancellation of Free Patent No. V-2317 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2723 issued in favor of defendant-appellant. Plaintiff-appellee (Director of Lands) in his complaint alleged that defendant-appellant (Maria Abanilla) had, through fraudulent means, secured a free patent and an original certificate of title over a public land, known as Lot No. 5798, Pls 62, situated in Roxas, Isabela; that the said free patent and original certificate of title included portions of land occupied by Esteban Esquivel and Wilson Nuesa; and that the portion occupied by Wilson Nuesa was sold to him by Dominador Cullanan, who also bought the same from defendant-appellant Abanilla herself. Defendant-appellant Abanilla in her answer alleged that her application for a free patent over a parcel of public land, known as Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, and the subsequent issuance of the original certificate of title, were lawful, since the occupancy of Esteban Esquivel of the portion claimed by him of Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, was merely tolerated by her and was never adverse, and Wilson Nuesas occupancy never affected her right over the portion he claims, because the sale made by her to Dominador Cullanan was void ab initio. The trial court entered a judgment, declaring Free Patent No. V-2317 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-2317 null and void; ordering the Director of Lands to cancel said patent and issue another patent in favor of Maria Abanilla, excluding the respective portions of land possessed by Esteban Esquivel and Wilson Nuesa; and ordering Maria Abanilla to surrender to the Register of Deeds
of Isabela Original Certificate of Title No. P-2723, who was thereby ordered to cancel the same (p. 16, CFI rec.).
361 VOL. 124, AUGUST 31, 1983 361 Director of Lands vs. Abanilla
This being an appeal on question of law exclusively, We therefore consider as conclusive the following findings of fact made by the trial court: The evidence shows that on April 5, 1949, Maria Abanilla applied for Free Patent over a public land known as Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, situated in Roxas, Isabela; That on March 19, 1952, Esteban Esquivel having discovered that the said Free Patent Application included a portion of land occupied by him since before the early part of 1949, registered his opposition therein and asked the Bureau of Lands to investigate the matter (Exh. G); that on May 12, 1952, Dominador Cullanan also registered his opposition to the said Free Patent Application upon the ground that it included a portion of the land sold to him by Maria Abanilla by virtue of a public document dated April 20, 1950 (Exh. J); that on July 3, 1952, for and in consideration of the sum of P1,000.00, Dominador Cullanan sold the same portion of land to Wilson Nuesa by virtue of a public instrument notarized before the Municipal Judge of Roxas (Exh. K); that pursuant to the protest filed by Esteban Esquivel, the Director of Lands, on March 29, 1952, ordered the investigation of said protest (Exh. E); that by reason of the acquisition of the same land holding of Dominador Cullanan by Wilson Nuesa, the latter intervened in the Administrative Investigation of the land conflict between Esteban Esquivel and Maria Abanilla, as claimant-intervenor (Exh. I); that while the aforesaid administrative case was pending investigation by the Fact Finding Committee composed of representatives of the Bureau of Lands and the Land Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO), Maria Abanilla, on February 11, 1953, secured the issuance of Free Patent No. V-2317 in her name covering the entire Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, with an area of 2.1664 hectares; that by virtue of the said patent, Original Certificate of Title No. P-2723 was issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Isabela on June 16, 1953 (Exh. I); that on June 25, 1953, the Fact Finding Committee heard the administrative case aforesaid and submitted its report on July 31, 1953, sustaining the claim of preferential right of Esteban Esquivel, and that of Claimant-intervenor Wilson Nuesa and recommending the annulment of Patent No. P-2317, as well as the Original Certificate of Title No. P2723 in the name of Maria Abanilla insofar as the portions claimed by them are concerned (Exh. I); that acting upon the said report the Director of Lands rendered a decision holding that Maria Abanilla acted in bad faith and procured the issuance of the aforesaid patent thru misrepresentation and directing that appropriate steps be taken to institute court action for the
voidance and cancellation of Patent No. V-2317 and the issuance of another patent for the correct area adjudicated to her in the said decision, excluding therefrom the portions claimed by Nuesa and Esquivel (Exh. N); that Maria Abanilla filed a motion for reconsideration dated May 5, 1954 (Exh. O); to set aside the aforesaid decision, and on August 30, 1956, the motion for reconsideration was denied by the Director of Lands (Exh. P), that upon the denial of her motion she filed a second motion for reconsideration dated September 28, 1956 (Exh. Q), which was similarly denied by the Director of Lands in his Order dated October 19, 1956 (Exh. R); that on November 19 , 1956, she filed a notice of appeal against the decision of the Director of Lands and asked that the same be reviewed and reversed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Exh. S); that on January 16, 1958, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed the decision of the Director of Lands appealed from and dismissed the appeal; and that on August 27, 1958; the Secretary denied the motion for reconsideration to set aside his confirmatory decision (Exh. U). That on November 5, 1956, Maria Abanilla filed an action with this Court against Esteban Esquivel, Wilson Nuesa and three others for the recovery of possession of the portions of land involved in the administrative case between them in the land department; that after due trial, the Court rendered a decision in favor of the defendants Wilson Nuesa and Esteban Esquivel and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint; that Maria Abanilla brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision appealed from, on June 14, 1960 (Exh. V); that on August 11, 1959, the Director of Lands filed this present case to annul the patent and original certificate of title issued to Maria Abanilla (pp. 13-14, CFI rec.). The case is now before this Court on a pure question of law: Whether the patent and original certificate of title issued by virtue of the said patent can still be cancelled despite the lapse of six (6) years and six (6) months from their issuance. Defendant-appellant now claimed that the lower court erred: [1] in ordering the cancellation of both Free Patent No. V-2317 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2327 of the Register of Deeds of Isabela, both in the name of Maria Abanilla; and [2] in not dismissing the action considering that a period of six (6) years and six (6) months had already elapsed from February 11, 1953 when the land patent was issued, to August 11, 1959
363 VOL. 124, AUGUST 31, 1983 363
Director of Lands vs. Abanilla
when the present action was instituted in the trial court (pp. 48-49, rec.). WE find that the trial court did not commit either of the assigned errors. It should be noted that, pursuant to explicit and repeated averments in the complaint, defendantappellant Maria Abanilla had acted in bad faith, with full knowledge of the factual background of the case, particularly of the public, continuous and adverse possession of Esteban Esquivel at the time she applied for patent over the land in question, and up to the time she secured the issuance of an original certificate of title over the said land. The fact that Maria Abanilla acted fraudulently in securing patent No. V-2317 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2723 was clearly and definitely established in the decision of the Director of Lands (Exh. N), where it was held that Maria Abanilla acted in bad faith and procured the issuance of the aforesaid patent thru misrepresentation and directed that appropriate steps be taken to institute a court action for the voidance and cancellation of Patent No. V-2317 and the issuance of another patent for the correct area adjudicated to her in the said decision, excluding therefrom the portions claimed by Nuesa and Esquivel. Appellant Maria Abanilla even exhausted her administrative remedies by appealing to then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Minister of Natural Resources) *Exh. S+, who affirmed the decision of the Director of Lands *Exh. U+. This Court held in the case of Eusebio vs. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin (L-21519, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 569) that the factual findings of the Director of Lands, approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, are conclusive in the absence of proof of fraud, imposition, error or abuse of discretion. This Court reiterated said principle in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals (L-23591, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 297). In the previous case filed by Abanilla herself against the same claimants Esquivel and Nuesa, decided on June 14, 1960, the Court of Appeals, speaking thru then CA Justice, later
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Conrado V. Sanchez, concurred in by then CA Justices Natividad and Angeles, both of whom were promoted as Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, found:
x x x So that, as the case now stands, the dispute solely is between appellant Maria Abanilla, on the one hand, and appellees Esteban Esquivel and Wilson Nuesa, on the other. On April 5, 1949, appellant Maria Abanilla filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for free patent over Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, aforesaid. On March 19, 1952, appellee Esteban Esquivel registered his opposition to appellants application upon the ground that the same included a portion of landcircumscribed by the letters C, D, G and H of the sketch shown in Exhibit 5which pertained to said appellee. On May 12, 1952, Dominador Cullanan opposed appellants application upon the averment that the same also covered an areadesignated in the sketch set forth in Exhibit 5 by the letters A, B, E and F which was sold to him by the very same applicant Maria Abanilla. In view of the fact that Dominador Cullanan had since conveyed his holding to appellee Wilson Nuesa, the latter intervened in the proceedings. On February 11, 1953, while the protests heretofore mentioned were pending investigation, Free Patent No. V-2317, covering the entire Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, with an area of 2.1664 hectares, was issued in the name of appellant Maria Abanilla. On June 16, 1953, Original Certificate of Title No. P-2723 covering the same land was issued by the Register of Deeds of Isabela to said Maria Abanilla. On June 25, 1953, the fact-finding committee of the Bureau of Lands and the Land Settlement and Development Corporationobviously unaware of the prior issuance of a patent and title over the landopened hearings on the protests of appellee Esquivel, and Cullanan who was substituted by appellee Wilson Nuesa. On March 20, 1954, decision was rendered by the Director of Lands holding that applicant M aria Abanilla was guilty of bad faith and that she procured the free patent over the land thru misrepresentation, and stating that steps would be taken to institute the necessary court action for the cancellation of Patent No. V-2317 and the issuance to Maria Abanilla of another patent for the correct
area adjudged to her in said decision, that is, excluding the portions claimed by Esquivel and Nuesa. On August 30, 1956, the motion for reconsideration filed by appellant Maria Abanilla was denied by the Director of Lands.
On October 19, 1956, appellants second motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. On November 5, 1956, appellant started the present suit. It subsequently develo ped that on November 22, 1956, appellant perfected an appeal from the decision of the Director of Lands aforesaid to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 16, 1958, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed in to to the decision of the Director of Lands. On August 27, 1958, the said Secretary denied appellants motion to reconsider the confirmatory decision. We will take up the case piecemeal. Appellee Esteban Esquivel, as aforesaid, claimed the portion inclosed by corners C, D, G and H in the sketch appearing in Exhibit 5. The evidence shows that he first entered that land in 1949 when the same was still covered with forest. He cleared and levelled the same. Since then, his occupancy was open, continuous and without molestation or interference from anyone, much less from appellant. He introduced improvements thereon, i.e., his house, an annex thereto for restaurant and store purposes, a pumpwell, and a fence around the premises. Appellant claims that this portion of the land, together with a house used as a shed for drying leaf tobacco, was ceded by her in 1952 to Esquivel on a temporary basis as the latter had no place to live in; that one time she sent her son to cut bamboos behind that house but Esquivel objected and claimed that he owned the land and forthwith told appellants son to get out therefrom; and that she requested Esquivel to pay P30.00 for the use of the lot, and P20.00 for the use and occupation of the house. Apart from the fact that the foregoing version runs counter to the decision of the Director of Lands which was confirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the improbability of the same is quite apparent. If appellants claim were true, it is strange that no attempt was ever made by her to promptly oust Esquivel from the land. Indeed, if at any time appellant ever asserted that the portion occupied by Esquivel was part of the land applied for
by her and that she made known this fact to Esquivel, the latter, doubtless, would not have placed valuable improvements thereon. That he did, is indicative of the fact that nobody ever challenged his occupancy thereof.
On the defense of appellee Wilson Nuesa, we find that on April 20, 1950, in consideration of P500.00, appellant Maria Abanilla executed in favor of Dominador Cullanan a deed of sale covering the portion hereinbefore described. In that deed, Exhibit 1, appellant warranted that she was the absolute owner of the portion sold, the same being her share of the conjugal partnership with her late husband Donato Pilar. She never mentioned in that document that said property was part of the public domain which, on April 5, 1949, she previously applied for under a free patent. Of course, in court she tried to avoid the effects of this writing. When confronted with her thumbmark thereon, she stated in varying terms that she Probably executed that document, or that I do not know whether that is my thumbmark, or that I doubt if I impressed my thumbmark. The obvious weakness of this explanation prevents us from accepting the same. Exhibit 1 is a notarial document. A rule so well settled as to require citation of authorities is that which says that oral evidence to overcome a notarial document must be clear, convincing and beyond a mere preponderance. Here, appellants evidenceher sole testimonyis notches below the legal yardstick. Alternatively, appellant states that the deed, Exhibit 1, is null and void because the subject thereof is public land which is beyond the commerce of man. The sale was executed before the order for the issuance of the patent in her favor. The same could, therefore, be treated as a disposition of her rights as a free patent applicant which is sanctioned by law. In pari materia: Gabon, et al. vs. Amboy, et al., CAG.R. No. 20556-R, July 22, 1959. Appellee Wilson Nuesa acquired the rights of Dominador Cullanan to the portion sold to the latter by appellant under the deeds of sale, Exhibits 2 and 4. Neither Dominador Cullanan nor Wilson Nuesa was ever disturbed in their possession of said land. It will be observed, however, that upon examination of the sketch in Exhibit 5, the land acquired from appellant by Cullanan and subsequently sold to Nuesa included the strip of land in the actual possession of Esteban Esquivel. As a result of the investigation of the protests against appellants application, Nuesa recognized the rights of Esquivel to the portion occupied by him. So that no quarrel exists as between Esquivel, on the one hand, and Nuesa, on the other.
We do not believe that appellant has any lawful claim against appellee Wilson Nuesa. The portion of land here involved was sold by appellant herself as her own private property. She cannot now turn back and say that said portion is public land. Here, the matter is exclusively between her and Wilson Nuesa, her vendees successor-in-interest. The government is not involved. As against appellee Wilson Nuesa,
therefore, appellant is in estoppel. Section 68(a), Rule 123, Rules of Court; Article 1431 and 1434, Civil Code; Llacer vs. Muoz de Bustillos, et al., 12 Phil. 328, 334. Furthermore, assuming that the area sold by appellant to Cullanan was public land, the free patent in favor of the former cannot be used as a weapon to oust appellee Wilson NuesaCullanans vendee from that land. In the same way, said free patent did not give appellant protection against the adverse claim of Esquivel. She knew or was charged with knowledge, of Esquivels actual possession of the portion claimed by him. And, the patent in her favor is in fraud of the rights of both Nuesa and Esquivel. Accordingly, she must respect the rights of the two to their respective holdings. It would not help appellant any to say that the Director of Lands was without jurisdiction in sustaining the claims aforesaid. For, said adverse claims were filed long before the patent was issued. As we have heretofore intimated, that patent literally passed thru the backdoor. The following from Acot, et al. vs. Kempis, et al., 55 Off. Gaz., No. 16, pp. 2907, 2912, is illuminating: We start with the premise that appellant acquired the patent and Torrens title through fraud. Appellant clings to the legal fiction of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. But piercing the shard of his paper title, we find that appellant has no equitable right to the possession of the land covered thereby. He cannot use that title as a shield to perpetuate fraud. Our reason is that no amount of legal technicality may serve as a solid foundation for the enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant. WHEREFORE, finding that the decision appealed from is in conformity with the facts and the law, the same is hereby affirmed. Said decision became final and executory on July 18, 1960. Therefore, it is beyond question that fraud was committed by Maria Abanilla in securing her patent and original
certificate of title over a public land, known as Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, situated in Roxas, Isabela. In this regard the controlling provisions of the Public Land Act (Com. Act No. 141, as amended), reads: Sec. 90. Every application filed under the provisions of this Act shall be made under oath and shall set forth:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(g) Whether all or part of the land is occupied or cultivated or improved, and by whom, giving his post office address, and whether the land has been occupied or cultivated or improved by the applicant or his ascendant, the date when the possession and cultivation began, and a description of the improvements made, accompanying satisfactory evidence of the relationship of the applicant with the ascendant, and of the death of the latter and the descendants left by him, in case it is alleged that he occupied and cultivated the land first; or whether there are indications of its having been occupied, cultivated or improved entirely or partially, and if so, in what such indications consist, whether he has made investigations as to when and by whom such improvements were made, and if so, how such investigations were made and what was the result thereof; or whether the land is not occupied, improved or cultivated either entirely or partially, and there are no indications of it having ever been occupied, improved, or cultivated, and in this case, what is the condition of the land (italics supplied). Sec. 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement therein or omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying, the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. x x x (italics supplied). In the light of the above-quoted provisions, defendant-appellant Maria Abanilla cannot use her title as a shield to perpetuate fraud. No amount of legal technicality may serve as a solid foundation for the enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. Fraus et jus numquam cohabitant (Acot, et al. vs. Kempis, et al., supra).
Section 91 of the C.A. No. 141, as amended, expressly provides that any false statement in the application, which is an essential condition of the patent or title, shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. Defendant-appellant clings to the legal fiction of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title. She claimed that the lower court erred in not dismissing the action considering that a period of six years and six months had already elapsed when the present action was instituted, in view of the line of decisions of this Court sustaining the indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued in pursuance of a public land patent.
The doctrine in Heirs of Carle, Sumail, and other cases cited by the appellant regarding the indefeasibility of title issued pursuant to a free patent one year after its issuance does not apply to a grant tainted with fraud and secured through misrepresentation, such as the free patent invoked in this case, since said grant is null and void and of no effect whatsoever. As We held in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindog (L-15398, Dec. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 938): We are in accord with appellants contention that Act 496 is not intended to shield fraud and that registration thereunder merely confirms titler but does not vest any, when there is none, because registration under the Torrens System is not a mode of acquiring ownership. Furthermore, appellant Maria Abanilla cannot pretend that her title has become indefeasible because no petition for review thereof was filed within one year from its issuance, since proceedings for the review of her patent was actually pending before and after the issuance of appellants torrens title. According to the findings of fact of the trial court, the patent of Maria Abanilla was under administrative investigation by the office of the appellee Director of Lands at the time she obtained her torrens title pursuant thereto (Exhs. G, H, and I), and that the decision of the appellee ordering the cancellation of appellants patent on the ground of fraud was rendered on March 20, 1954 (Exh. N), or less than a year from the issuance
of her torrens title on June 16, 1953 (Exh. I). It was also less than a year from the issuance of said torrens title that appellant, on May 5, 1954, filed a motion for the reconsideration of said decision of the Director of Lands (Exh. O), which motion for reconsideration was denied on August 30, 1956 (Exh. P), from which denial appellant Abanilla filed a second motion for reconsideration (Exh. Q), and when said motion for reconsideration was likewise denied (Exh. R), appellant Abanilla even appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Exh. S), who, however, affirmed the decision of the Director of Lands ordering the cancellation of her patent. In the previous action aforecited, between herein appellant Maria Abanilla and the other parties claimants Esteban Esquivel, Magno Velayo, Sotero Nuesa, Wilson Nuesa and Teofilo Nobleza of the same land in question wherein appellant Abanilla sought to use her torrens title as basis to recover portions of said land from the defendants (Maria Abanilla vs. Esteban Esquivel, et al., No. 22660-R, 57 O.G. No. 28, pp. 5104-5108, June 14, 1960), the Court of Appeals, speaking through the Honorable Conrado V. Sanchez, expressly found appellants free patent to have been obtained in fraud of the rights of the other private parties claimants thereto, so that to hold that such patent, which literally
passed through the backdoor, cannot be used as a shield to perpetrate a fraud (Exh. V, p. 39, Folder of Exhibits; p. 73, rec.). In Republic vs. Animas (L-37682, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 499), petitioner Director of Lands sought the review of the order of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, dismissing the complaint instituted by the said Director of Lands, to declare null and void a free patent and the original certificate of title based thereon, which was fraudulently secured. WE hereby quote pertinent portions thereof: The complaint alleges in its paragraph 8 that applicant Isagani Du Timbol was never in possession of the property prior to his filing the application, contrary to the provisions of law that the applicant must have been in possession or cultivation thereof for at least 30 years; x x x.
The above alleged circumstances are indicative of fraud in the filing of the application and obtaining title to the land, and if proven would override respondent Judges order dismissing the case without hearing. The misrepresentations of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land and residing thereon are sufficient grounds to nullify the grant of the patent and title under Section 91 of the Public Land Law, x x x. A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under his name although the property belongs to another. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17696, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 71, 79-80; italics supplied). The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title. (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindog, L-15398, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 938 page 38) *italics supplied+. This Court, in the same case, further held that prescription of action to review a title after the lapse of one year from its issuance under Section 38 of Act 496, cannot be invoked against the State, since under paragraph 4 of Article 1108 of the Civil Code, prescription does not run against the State, and We quote: Considering that it is the State that is seeking the cancellation of the title of respondent Isagani Du Timbol, said title has not become indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked against the State. A
title founded on fraud may be cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof, through a petition filed in court by the Solicitor General, x x x. Even granting that the Director of Lands can no longer question the validity of a torrens title after the lapse of one year from its registration under Section 38 of Act 496, still appellant Maria Abanilla is estopped from claiming that this action has already prescribed. The established facts on the
record of the administrative case in the Lands Department involving the same subject matter in this case show that defendant Maria Abanilla even before the grant of the subject patent in her favor had allowed herself to submit to an administrative investigation of this case when she appeared on one occasion in the course thereof and requested for the postponement of the same on the ground that she desired to settle the case amicably. Thereafter, she pursued her alleged right to the patent by exhausting all heir administrative remedies in the Lands Department. Appellant Maria Abanilla is now estopped from claiming that this action had already prescribed, for the simple reason that she can be considered an instrumental party in the delay in the filing of the instant action (p. 26, rec.). In Cebedo vs. Director of Lands (2 SCRA 25), this Honorable Court held that it is not only the right but the duty of the Director of Lands to conduct investigation to determine whether steps should be taken in the proper court for the annulment of the title or titles theretofore issued, and to file the corresponding court action for the reversion of the properties to the State, if the facts disclosed in the course of the investigation so warrant. It was in pursuance of the above and similar rulings of this Court that the appellee Director of Lands filed the present action for cancellation of Abanillas patent and title over the land in question. WHEREFORE, FINDING THAT THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE FACTS AND THE LAW, THE SAME IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. DOUBLE COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin, JJ., concur. De Castro, J., on sick leave. Abad Santos, J., is on abroad. Decision affirmed.
373 VOL. 124, AUGUST 31, 1983 373 Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. vs. Reyes, Sr.
Notes.A possessor of public lands may choose either the remedy of judicial confirmation of imperfect title or the issuance of a free patent. (Kayaban vs. Republic, 52 SCRA 357.) The institution of cadastral proceedings or, at least, the publication of the notice therein issued, has the effect of suspending the running of the prescriptive period. (Cano vs. De Camacho, 43 SCRA 390.) The Court may review the decision of the Director of Lands only in a direct proceeding therefor and not collaterally. (Firmalo vs. Tutaan, 53 SCRA 505.) The 1973 Constitution reduced to only 24 hectares the maximum area of public land that maybe transferred to any purchaser, patentee or homesteader thereof. (Guiang vs. Kintanar, 106 SCRA 49.) Where the lot on which the guilding sold a retro is constructed is public land the appellants have no right to sell it. (Renaco vs. Ruaya, 110 SCRA 46.) o0o [Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358(1983)] No. L-17696. May 19, 1966. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, BRAULIO COSME and DAMASO A, ACOSTA, respondents. Public lands; Torrens system; One-year period does not apply to cancellation of title based on a patent.Where the action is not for the review of the decree of registration on the ground of fraud, but rather for the cancellation of the patent and certificate of title on the ground that they are void, because the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue the patent, the one-year period provided for in section 38 of Act 496 does not apply. A certificate of title, based on a patent, is still subject to certain restrictions even after the expiration of one year from its issuance (Res. in Nieto vs. Quines, L-14643, Sept. 29, 1962). A title, issued pursuant to a decree of registration, is on a higher level that a title based upon a patent issued by the Director of Lands, Same; Proper party in action to cancel patent and certificate of title.The Government is the proper party to bring an action to cancel a patent and a certificate of title issued in accordance therewith. (Lucas vs. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157). Same; Nature of certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent.A certificate of title pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding as long as the land disposed of is really part of the disposable land of the public domain (Lucas vs. Durian, supra).
Same; Right of awardee to possession of the land.Prior to the issuance of a patent and its registration, the Government retains the title to the land. The award thereof, however, confers on the awardee the right 16 take possession of the land so that he can comply with the requirements prescribed by law before said patent can be issued in his favor. (Visayan Realty, Inc. vs. Meer, 96 Phil. 515). Being protected by law, under which it cannot be taken away without due process (Balboa, vs. Farrales, 51 Phil 498), said right has the effect of withdrawing the land of the public domain that is ''dispos72 72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
able by the Director of Lands under the provisions of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act 141). (People vs. Lapasaran, 100 Phil. 40; Diaz vs. Macalinao, 102 Phil. 999). PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Ernesto D. Llaguno for petitioner. Teofilo A. Leonin for respondents. CONCEPCION, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari, taken by the Director of Lands, from an amended decision of the Court of Appeals reversing a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela in his favor. The facts are set forth in said amended decision from which we quote: On November 19, 1926 a sales application was filed with the Bureau of Lands by Benito Tolentino for a tract of public agricultural land with an area of 5hectares, situated in Barrio Callang, Municipality of Gamu, Province of Isabela. In accordance with the application, which was given number 8706, the land was advertised for sale to the highest bidder and on February 15, 1928 was duly awarded to the applicant pursuant to the provisions of Chapter V of the Public Land Act. The survey of the said land was undertaken in 1928, as a result of which it was divided into two lots identified as Nos. 8091 and 3605 of Public Land Subdivision (Pls) 62. On January 19, 1950, Tolentino having complied with the legal requirements as to actual occupancy, cultivation and improvement of the area applied for as well as the payment of the purchase price, the Director of Lands signed the corresponding order for the issuance of a patent in his favor. Upon investigation, however, the applicant discovered that a portion of the land covered by his application with an area of 2.3506 hectares, specifically that portion identified as Lot No. 8091 Pls-62, had been applied for as a homestead by the herein defendant Braulio Cosme on March 22, 1949 and that Home-
stead Patent No. V-19 had been issued to him by the Bureau of Lands on the following August 19, pursuant to which he obtained Original Certificate of Title No. P-880 from the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province. of Isabela on November 10, 1949. The homestead settlement application had been filed with the now defunct National Land Settlement Administration pursuant to Executive Proclamation No. 610 promulgated in 1940, under which certain areas of public agri-
73 VOL. 17, MAY 19, 1966 73 Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
cultural land in Isabela were reserved for settlement purposes, and it was upon recommendation of that of fice that the patent was issued by the Director of Lands. Upon protest by Benito Tolentino filed with the Bureau of Lands, an investigation was conducted by the District Land Officer for Isabela, and when it was verified that the land covered by the homestead patent was embraced within the area awarded to Tolentino in 1928, the Director of Lands filed the present action on November 27, 1953, for the cancellation of the homestead patent and the original certificate of title issued to the defendant Braulio Cosme. On November 7, 1957, after the said defendant filed his answer, an answer in intervention was, with prior leave of court, interposed by Damaso A. Acosta, alleging that on June 27, 1957, he purchased Lot No. 8091 from the defendant for the sum of P1,000 and asking that as purchaser for value and in good faith he be declared the lawful owner thereof. He also filed a cross-claim against Braulio Cosme for the return of the purchase price in the event of cancellation of the latters title. After trial the court a quo rendered judgment as follows: FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby enters judgment: (a) ordering the Director of Lands to cancel Patent No. V-19 granted in favor of Braulio Cosme; (b) ordering the Register of Deeds of Isabela to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. P-880 in the name of Braulio Cosme, as well as the owners duplicate copy (Exh. I'); and (c) ordering the reversion of the land covered by the said patent to the public domain. Conformably with this decision, defendant Braulio Cosme is hereby ordered to pay to the intervenor Damaso Acosta the sum of P1,000, the consideration of the same (Exh. [I]-Intervenor). Without special pronouncement as to costs. The case is now before us on appeal by the defendant and by the intervenor. Their principal contention is that after the certificate of title was issued on November 10, 1949 by virtue of Homestead Patent No. V-19 the land in question came under the operation of the Land Registration Act as provided in Section 122 thereof, and that upon the expiration of one year from the date of its issuance, the said title became incontrovertible. The contention does not meet the issue which is decisive of this case. The
present action is not one for review of the decree of title on the ground of fraud, which should be filed within a period of one year under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, but rather for the cancellation of the patent and certificate of title of the defendant on the ground that they are an absolute nullity, because the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue them at all. The decision of the Court of First Instance was af firm-
74 74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
ed in the original decision of the Court of Appeals, but, on motion for reconsideration filed by Braulio Cosme and Damaso A. Acosta, said Court, citing Lucas vs. Durian, L-7886 (September 23, 1957) and Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, L-12485 (July 31, 1959), granted the reconsideration prayed for and reversed the decision of the court of first instance, as well as dismissed the complaint herein, without pronouncement as to costs. Sections 38 and 122 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), upon which appellees rely, read: SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree or confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description To all whom it may concern. Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments. or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certification of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal hereinbefore provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree, Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or any equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed .,,to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other incumbrancer for value, (As amended by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630.) (Italics supplied,)
SEC. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands x x x are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become regis-
tered lands.It shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the province where the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds and conveyances, whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and an owners duplicate certificate issued to the grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the grantees and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the lands, and in all cases under this Act registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. The fees for registration shall be paid by the grantee. After due registration and issue of the certificate and owners duplicate, such land shall be registered land for all purposes under this Act. (Italics ours.) Inasmuch as, after due registration of the patent to a public land and issue of the certificate and owners duplicate, such land shallin the language of said Section 122be registered land for all purposes under the Land Registration Act, and, pursuant to Section 38, a certificate of title is incontrovertible upon expiration of one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest, appellees maintain that the present action is untenable, it having been commenced on December 27, 1953, or more than one (1) year from August 19, 1949, when a patent was issued to Cosme, and from November 10, 1949, the date of issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P860 in his favor. The provision of Section 38 to the effect that a decree or certificate of title shall be incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year after entry of the decree should be construed, however, in conjunction with the sentence immediately preceding the same, pursuant to which a decree of registration shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees, subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land x x x by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent court x x x a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree. x x x. (Italics ours.) In other words, the aforementioned incontrovertibility simply means that the person deprived of the land by said decree may no longer seek a review thereof, upon the ground that it had been obtained by fraud. No such review is, however, sought in the case at bar. Moreover, the same has been brought by the Director of Lands, not by Tolentino or the person deprived of the land. As correctly stated in the original as well as the amended decision of the Court of Appeals: x x x The present action is not one for review of the decree of title on the ground of fraud, which should be filed within a period of one year under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, but rather for the cancellation of the patent and certificate of title of the defendant on the ground that they are an absolute nullity because the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue them at all. Indeed, petitioner-appellants aforementioned claim of lack of jurisdiction and absolute nullity are predicated upon the incontestable fact: (a) that since February 15, 1928, when the land covered by the sales patent was awarded to Tolentino by the Director of Lands, the latter had lost jurisdiction to dispose of subdivision Lot No. 8091, without previous cancellation of the rights thus acquired by Tolentino, and (b) the authority to issue a homestead patent in favor of Cosme was avowedly derived from Executive Proclamation No. 610, dated August 29, 1940, and, although within the territorial limits of the area thereby reserved for settlement purposes, said Lot No. 8091 was not subject to the operation of said proclamation, since the same expressly excluded therefrom those lands which are subject to private rights. Then, again, the provision to the effect that after due registration of the patent to a public land and the issuance of the certificate and owners duplicate, such land shall be registered land for all purposes, under the Land Registration Act, should not be understood in its literal sense, but must be construed in relation to the other provisions of said Act and the spirit and purpose of the Public Land Act, under which patents are issued.
Thus, in a resolution dated September 29, 1962, granting the motion for reconsideration in the case of Arturo Nieto vs. Bartolome Quines and Miguel P. Pio, L-14643, which involved a conflict between a certificate of title issued in pursuance of a decision, in cadastral proceedings, in favor of Maria Tolentino, which had become final and executory on a given date, and another certificate of title, issued, on the same date, to Bartolome Quines, based on a homestead patent in his favor, this Court reversing its former decision in said case, promulgated on January 22, 1961, expressed itself as follows: Under Act 926 which is the law governing this case, the Director of Lands, upon receipt of a homestead application, shall summarily determine whether the land described is prima facie subject to homestead settlement, and should he find nothing to the contrary, the applicant shall be permitted to enter the land specified (Sec. 2), In not less than five nor more than eight years from the date of the filing of the application, final proof of residence and cultivation may be made by the applicant (Sec. 2), of which, the public shall be notified, and any person may contest the same on any of the grounds enumerated in the law (Sec. 3). Should the applicant successfully prove that he has complied with all the requirements of the law, a patent, under the name of the Government, shall be issued to him (the applicant), upon payment of the necessary fee (Sec. 3). The procedure initiated by the applicant and acted upon by the grantor (the Government), is purely administrative.1De los Reyes vs. Razon, 38 Phil. 480. As this Court observed: x x x while provision is made for notice to the public of the intention of the homesteader t o apply for a patent upon final proof of occupation and cultivation of the land, and for the hearing of objections to the application upon various grounds, including the contention that the land in question was not unoccupied at the time of filing the application, the statute nowhere undertakes to declare that the decision of the Director upon such contest shall be conclusive, or that the failure of the real owner to contest the application shall have the effect of forfeiting his title by making the directors decision as to the public character of the land final and conclusively. (De los Reyes vs. Razon, supra.)2Italics ours. Upon the other hand, the proceedings under the Cadastral Act, at the initiative of the Government (Sec. 4, Act 2259), are judicial. Process is served by publication upon all persons _______________ 1 De los Reyes vs. Razon, 38 Phil. 480. 2 Italics ours.
who may have interest on the land, including the Government, to appear and prove or oppose the claims of ownership that may be filed therein (Secs. 8 and 9). The action is one in rem and any decision rendered therein by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world, (Sec. 11) including the Government. The decision of the cadastral court, recognizing Maria Florentinos right of ownership over the land was rendered on August 16, 1930. There being no charge, much less proof, of irregularity of the cadastral proceedings, the Government, on which said decision of the cadastral court is also binding and which is supposed to have knowledge thereof, had actually no more right to convey by homestead grant on August 29, 1930, said parcel of land to appellee Quines. The fact that the decision of the cadastral court became final only on September 25, 1930, after the patent was issued, does not alter the situation that when such patent was obtained, there was already a court adjudication in favor of Maria Florentino, binding upon the Government itself, predecessor-in-interest of Quines. Furthermore, a certificate of title based on a patent, even after the expiration of one year from the issuance thereof, is still subject to certain conditions and restrictions.3Secs. 118, 119, 121, 122, Com. Act 141; Sec. 35, Act 926; Campaero vs. Coloma, L-11908, Jan. 30, 1960. As a matter of fact, in appropriate cases and after prior administrative investigations by the Director of Lands, proper actions may be instituted by said official which may lead to the cancellation of the patent and the title, and the consequent reversion of the land to the Government.4Secs. 123 and 124, Com. Act 141; Rellin vs. Cabigas, L-15926, Oct. 31, 1960. On the other hand, a certificate of title issued pursuant to Act 2259, after the lapse of one (1) year, becomes incontrovertible.5Sec. 11, Act 926, in connection with Sec. 38, Act 496. The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that, while with the due registration and issuance of a certificate of title over a land acquired pursuant to the Public Land Law, said property becomes registered in contemplation of Act 496,6Sec. 122, Act 406, in view of its nature and manner of acquisition, such certificate of title, when in conflict with one 06tained on the same date through judicial proceedings, must give way to the latter."7Italics ours. Thus, a certificate of title issued pursuant to a decree of registration and a certificate of title issued in conformity therewith are on a higher level than a certifi_______________ 3 Secs. 118, 119, 121, 122, Com. Act 141; Sec. 35, Act 926; Campaero vs. Coloma, L-11908, Jan. 30, 1960. 4 Secs. 123 and 124, Com. Act 141; Rellin vs. Cabigas, L-15926, Oct. 31, 1960. 5 Sec. 11, Act 926, in connection with Sec. 38, Act 496. 6 Sec. 122, Act 406, 7 Italics ours.
cate of title based upon a patent Issued by the Director of Lands. The amended decision of the Court of Appeals in the case at bar, eventually sustaining the contention of herein respondents-appellees, is based upon Lucas vs. Durian,8L-7856, September 23, 1957. and Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle.9L-12485, July 31, 1959. The first case involved a controversy between: (1) Simeon Lucas, whose claim was predicated upon a homestead-application approved by the Director of Lands in 1933; (2) Jose Basilio, the successor in interest of another applicant (Mariano Bautista), who had allegedly possessed the lot in question since 1923; and (3) Juan I. Durian, who relied upon the homestead application of one Ricardo Deloso (whose rights were transferred to Durian), approved by the Director of Lands in 1938. Durian got the corresponding certificate of title, after obtaining a patent in 1949 and the registration thereof in the office of the register of deeds. Alleging that the Director of Lands had ordered the issuance of a patent in his favor in 1947, Lucas filed in 1953 an action against Durian for the annulment of his aforementioned certificate of title. In disposing of the case, We used the following language: x x x a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the patent to a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really a part of the disposable land of the public domain (El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga, 60 Phil. 22; Ramoso vs. Obligado, 70 Phil. 86 and others), and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance thereof, x x x a certif icate of title, be it original or a duplicate, may only be ordered cancelled under special circumstances, and one of them is when the title is void. And a title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for the registration of a land in his name although he knows that the property belongs to another (Broce vs. Apurado, 26 Phil. 581; Angelo vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 838); if title is issued for a land already covered by a prior Torrens Title; when it covers land reserved for military, naval, or civil public purposes, when it covers a land which has not been brought under registration proceedings, and in the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with ________________ 8 L-7856, September 23, 1957. 9 L-12485, July 31, 1959.
80
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
the conditions imposed by law (Noblejas Land Titles and Deeds, pp. 111113). It could be gleaned from the foregoing enumerations that the only instance when a certificate of title covering a tract of land, formerly- a part of the patrimonial property of the State, could be cancelled, is for failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law, and in which case the proper party to bring the action would be the Government to which the property would revert (Italics ours.) Unlike said case, however, which had been brought by Lucas, the case at bar was instituted by the very Government which, according to the decision in the Lucas case, is the proper party to bring an action to cancel a patent and a certif icate of title issued in accordance therewith, Moreover, a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding, said decision declares, as long as the land disposed of is really part of the disposable land of the public domain. When Cosme filed his homestead application on March 22, 1949, Lot No. 8091 was no longer part of the disposable land of the public domain, for, after advertising it for sale to the highest bidder, the Director of Lands had awarded it to Tolentino on February 15, 1928. Although prior to the issuance of a patent and its registration, the government retains the title to the land, said award conferred upon Tolentino the right to take possession of the land so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by the law, before said patent could be issued in his favor.10Visayan Realty vs. Meer, 96 Phil. 515. Being protected by law, under which. it cannot be taken away without due process,11Balboa vs, Farrales, 51 Phil. 498. said right had the effect of withdrawing the lands or the public domain that were disposable by the Director of Lands under the provision of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141) ,12People vs. Lapasaran, 100 Phil. 40; Diaz vs. Macalinao, 55 Off. Gaz. 1021. and it was so held in the original decision of the Court of Appeals in this case. Upon the other- hand, the case of Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, supra, was based upon that of Lucas vs. Durian, supra, and, hence, its force as precedent is similarly limited to lands of the public domain ________________ 10 Visayan Realty vs. Meer, 96 Phil. 515. 11 Balboa vs, Farrales, 51 Phil. 498. 12 People vs. Lapasaran, 100 Phil. 40; Diaz vs. Macalinao, 55 Off. Gaz. 1021.
81 VOL. 17, MAY 19, 1966 81
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
which are disposable by the Director of Lands. As a consequence, neither case is controlling on the issue before us, since Lot No. 8091 was no longer disposable by said officer when he entertained the application for homestead filed by Cosme on March 22, 1949, or over 21 years after the land had been awarded to Tolentino on February 15, 1928, as the highest bidder at the auction sale thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the decision in Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle and the resolution in the subsequent case of Nieto vs. Quines, holding that a certificate of title based upon a homestead patent is not identical in all respects, insofar as its effects are concerned, as a certificate of title issued pursuant to a decree of registration in cadastral proceedings, was penned by the same member of this Court, and that, should there be any conflict between both, the intent to modify pro tanto the rule applied in the Carle case is to be assumed. It is only fair to note that the Court of Appeals could not have taken into consideration our aforementioned resolution in Nieto vs. Quines, the amended decision of said Court in the case at bar having been rendered prior to the promulgation of said resolution. At any rate, intervenor-appellee Acosta can not claim the status of an innocent purchaser for value, he having purchased Lot No. 8091 from Cosme on June 27, 1957, or over three years and a half after the commencement of this action, of which he must be deemed, therefore, to be aware, either actually or constructively. Wherefore, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela affirmed, with costs against respondents-appellees Braulio Cosme and Damaso A. Acosta. It is so ordered. Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Justices Bautista Angelo, J.B.L. Reyes, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, J.P. Bengzon, Zaldivar and Sanchez, concur. Mr. Justice Makalintal took no part. Decision reversed.
82 82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Hernando vs. Francisco, et al.
NOTES Right of awardee of public land before issuance of patent.In connection with the right of a purchaser of public land after he was given the award but before the patent is issued, it is relevant to cite the rule in the sale of friar lands that the purchaser has an equitable title to the land before the issuance of the
patent (Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806; Lorenzo vs. Nicolas, 91 Phil. 686; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L18833, Aug. 14, 1965; Pugeda vs. Trias, L-16925, March 31, 1962). An analogous rule obtains in the case of mining claims prior to the effectivity of the Constitution. After a locator had complied with all the requisites for the issuance of a patent, he acquired the beneficial ownership of the claim (Gold Creek Mining Corporation vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259; Salacot Mining Company vs. Abadilla, 67 Phil. 110; Ramos vs. Gibbon, 67 Phil. 371). [Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 17 SCRA 71(1966)] G.R. Nos. 84902-03. October 2, 1992.*THIRD DIVISION. AGRIPINO PADRE, FAUSTA PADRE, SILVINA PADRE, and OCTAVIO PADRE; AND SABAS PAA and ROSARIO PAA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ALFREDO P. DE VERA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch XX, JULIANA PACLEB PAREL and FRANCISCO PAREL, respondents. Remedial Law; Jurisdiction; After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. To buttress the idea that respondent Court erred in converting the action below from quieting of title into one for plenaria de posession and in resolving the conflicting claims of the parties, petitioners submit that it is only the Director of Lands, and not the courts, that can resolve the confluence ________________ and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws promulgated by the Civil Service Commission on 27 December 1991. * THIRD DIVISION. 447 VOL. 214, OCTOBER 2, 1992 447 Padre vs. Court of Appeals
of rights over the subject lots (p. 4, Memorandum for Petitioners; p. 71, Rollo). This subtle experiment of impugning the jurisdiction or competencia of the original and appellate courts after adverse repercussions are experienced has time and again been repudiated, thus: . . . after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court . . . Same; Same; The authority given to the Lands Department over the disposition of public lands does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory action, the public character of the land notwithstanding.Then, too, concerning the contention that it is the Director of Lands and not the
court which should have ruled on the matter of prior possession, this Court has, as early as 1967 in Molina vs. de Bacud (19 SCRA 956), ruled that: . . . the authority given to the Lands Department over the disposition of public lands does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions, the public character of the land notwithstanding. This is such an action and the fact that on her complaint respondent claimed the lands in ownership did not change the nature of her action. The allegation of ownership should be regarded as a mere surplusage. (pp. 959-960) Same; Same; The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public lands is limited to the determination of who has the actual physical possession or occupation of the land in question or the better right of possession.. . . The administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the Director of Lands primarily, and ultimately, to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of public lands. The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public lands is limited to the determination of who has the actual physical possession or occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry cases, before Municipal Courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion publiciana, in cases before Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts.) Same; Same; Same; In order to afford complete relief to the parties, the court may determine incidentally the ownership, or the status of the legal title to the property or the right to the possession thereof.Neither are We persuaded into accepting petitioners contention that the appellate Court seriously erred in converting the action from quieting of title into accion publiciana, because in order to afford 448 448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Padre vs. Court of Appeals
complete relief to the parties, the court may determine incidentally the ownership, or the status of the legal title to the property, or the right to the possession thereof. PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Platon A. Baysa for petitioners. Ernesto S. Somera for private respondents. MELO, J.:
Assailed in the petition for certiorari before Us is the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in Civil Cases No. 08658 and 08659 penned by Justice Celso L. Magsino, concurred in by then Presiding Justice Oscar R. Victoriano and Justice Luis L. Victor, and which set aside the appealed judgment, thus: 1. Declaring the defendants-appellees entitled to the possession of the parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of both complaints (Civil Cases Nos. 2954-V and 2964-V); 2. Ordering the plaintiff-appellants to vacate the aforesaid parcels of land and restore its possession to the defendants-appellees; 3. Dismissing the claim for damages of the plaintiffs against defendants as well as the claim of damages of the latter against the former in both complaints. Without pronouncement as to costs. (pp. 12-13, Decision; pp. 26-27, Rollo.) Inasmuch as the parties herein do not dispute the factual antecedents of the suits for quieting of title as formulated by respondent Court, We hereby adopt said findings which We quote verbatim hereunder: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch XX, in Civil Cases Nos. 2954-V and 2964-V, the dispositive portion of which, reads as follows: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
449 VOL. 214, OCTOBER 2, 1992 449 Padre vs. Court of Appeals
A). Dismissing the complaint in Civil Cases Nos. 2954 and 2964; B). Declaring the defendants as the absolute owners and are now entitled to the possession of the land in suit described in page 1 above (paragraph 2 in both complaints); C). Dismissing the claim for damages of the plaintiffs against the defendants, and likewise dismissing the claim for damages of the latter against the former in both complaints; and D). Without pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED.
The factual antecedents show that plaintiffs in both cases seek to quiet title to two (2) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of their respective complaint, both situated at Taleb, Bantay, Ilocos Sur, covered by Tax Declaration No. 18719 and Tax Declaration No. 20879-C, respectively. After summarizing the testimonies of the witnesses as well as the documentary exhibits presented by both parties in the two cases (Civil Case Nos. 2954 and 2964), the lower court made its findings of facts and conclusion, to wit: x x x xxx xxx
Let us consider the plaintiffs evidence of ownership in Civil Case No. 2954. The land was originally owned by Jose Padre until a time when he gave the land to Fausta Padre (there is no document showing transfer) and the latter declared the land for taxation purposes in her name. On December 2, 1966 she sold a portion of the land to Avelino Paranada married to Vicente Viernes. His father, the late Jose Padre, had been in possession of the same up to the time it was given to her. She is also in possession of the disputed property until the years 1973, 1974 and 1975 when Juliana Pacleb Parel began to cut down trees on the land. The plaintiffs contended that they are in possession of the land but filed this case upon the advise of a PC soldier when he went to the PC Headquarters. Let us consider the evidence of the plaintiffs ownership in Civil Case No. 2964. The land was originally owned by Calixto Paa when he gave the land to the plaintiffs Sabas Paa (there is no evidence showing the transfer of ownership) and the latter declared the land for taxation purposes in his name. He paid the realty estate taxes due the land to evidence his possession. The complaint was filed because Juliana Pacleb Parel cut down some trees on the portion of the land in question. Let us now consider the defendants evidence of ownership in both civil cases. The disputed parcel of land was formerly
450 450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Padre vs. Court of Appeals
owned by the late Silvestre Paa who sold it to Blas Pacleb (there is no deed of transfer or conveyance). Some of the adjoining lots were the properties of Bartola Pero, the deceased grandmother of Juliana Parel, one of the defendants and a portion of it was the land of Roman Pacleb (no document of ownership), the predecessors-in-interest of the defendant Juliana Pacleb Parel. During the cadastral survey, the said parcels of land were consolidated into one parcel of land under one Tax Declaration but with different Lot numbers. Plaintiffs tried to assert their ownership when defendants cut down trees and tried to bulldoze the land subject of controversy sometime in 1968.
The parties marked in evidence tax declarations, tax declarations in the names of Fausta Padre and Sabas Paa in Civil Case No. 2954. The plaintiffs also marked in evidence tax receipts and certification showing payment of taxes from the office of the Municipal Treasurer of Bantay, Ilocos Sur, as well as the document showing disposition of a portion of the land by plaintiff Fausta Padre. The defendants in both cases marked in evidence, the sketch plan showing the whole tract of land of the late Roman Pacleb, Bartola Pero and Blas Pacleb. They also marked in evidence the tax declarations in the names of Roman Pacleb, Juliana Pacleb Parel, Bartola Pero, Santos Pacleb, Lorenzo Pacleb and Blas Pacleb. Both parties in Civil Cases Nos. 2954 and 2964 also marked in evidence their respective tax receipts showing that they paid the real estate taxes on the land in dispute. And also certifications from the office of the municipal treasurer showing payment of realty taxes. Tax declarations and tax receipts are mere indicias of the claim of ownership and possession. By themselves they are insufficient to prove ownership and possession in concept of owner (Alzate, et al. vs. Cidro, et al., CA No. 40963-R, April 14, 1970). The parties admitted the identity of the land in dispute that the land is identified as Lots Nos. 10219, 10214, 10213 and 10212, of the Bantay Cadastre and that it is the same land being applied for a free patent title under application No. I-3-8988 by Fausta Padre and No. I-3-8989 by Sabas Paa. The defendants in both Civil Cases Nos. 2954 and 2964 are in actual possession of the land in dispute. Being in actual possession under claim of ownership, it is presumed that defendants are the owners (Art. 433, New Civil Code). Plaintiffs assert the affirmative issue that they are the owners and not the defendants. The related rule is that because as plaintiffs, they dispute the presumption of ownership of the defendants, they
have the burden of proof of rebutting that presumption. The plaintiffs have the duty of proving their own affirmative allegations. One who asserts, and not one who denies, must prove. The Court finds that plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 2954 and 2964 have not come forward with sufficient evidence to discharge such duty. Plaintiffs evidence in both cases is far from what is considered sufficient. After carefully considering the evidence adduced by the parties in Civil Cases Nos. 2954 and 2964, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have not established their cause of preponderance of evidence. The Court finds defendants to have been in possession under claim of ownership, publicly, continuously, and uninterruptedly and long before that, the land was in the possession of their grandfather, grandmother and father, under similar circumstances.
The Court denies, however, the claims of defendants for damages, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. The plaintiffs have the right to litigate and it is not sound public policy to punish a party by making him pay damages, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation for having exercised their right erroneously. And adverse decision does not mean that plaintiffs are in bad faith in filing the complaint and that their complaint is entirely unfounded. In this appeal the appellants raise several errors of the lower court, as follows: I. IN FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS (APPELLEES BELOW) ARE IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION. II. IN FINDING THAT THE DISPUTED LAND (FORMERLY OWNED BY SILVESTRE PAA [sic] WAS SOLD TO BLAS PACLEB (PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF HEREIN APPELLEES), DESPITE THE LACK/ABSENCE OF ANY DOCUMENT INDICATE (SIC) SUCH PURCHASE. III. IN FINDING THAT THE DISPUTED LAND CLAIMED BY APPELLEES AS DECLARED IN TAX DECLARATION NO. 20148-C WERE OWNED BY APPELLEES WHEN IN FACT SUCH TAX DECLARATION IS IN THE NAME OF JAMES PORTE, MARIE ANN PORTE, NAPOLEON PORTE AND ROSEMARIE PORTE, WHICH IS LOCATED AT CABUSLIGAN, BANTAY, ILOCOS SUR AND NOT AT TALEB, BANTAY, ILOCOS SUR AS SHOWN BY A CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR. IV. IN FINDING THAT THE LAND BEING CLAIMED
BY APPELLEES IS LOCATED AT TALEB, BANTAY, ILOCOS SUR, WHEN IN TRUTH THE LAND IS LOCATED AT MAGBAUGAN TALEB, ILOCOS SUR, WHICH IS ONE AND ONE HALF (1 1/2) KILOMETERS DISTANCE FROM TALEB PROPER, BANTAY. V. IN DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT APPELLANTS HAVE FILED TAX DECLARATIONS AND PAID TAXES ON THE LAND SINCE 1952 (JOSE PADRE) UP TO THE PRESENT (FAUSTA PADRE); AND SINCE 1949 (SABAS PAA) UP TO THE PRESENT (ROSARIO PAA) WHILE CONSIDERING THAT APPELLEES UNDER TAX DECLARATION NO. 20148-C ARE OWNERS THEREOF ALTHOUGH SAID TAX DECLARATION IS IN THE NAME OF OTHERS (JAMES PORTE, ET AL.). VI. IN NOT CONSIDERING OR IN DISREGARDING THE REBUTTAL TESTIMONIES OF LYDIA MADRIAGA AND CLETO PAA WHO UNEQUIVOCABLY TESTIFIED THAT APPELLANTS HAVE BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE
DISPUTED LAND FROM THE (SIC) IMMEMORIAL WHILE APPELLEES DID NOT PRESENT CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF THE SO-CALLED POSSESSION. VII. IN NOT CONSIDERING AS AN ACT OF OWNERSHIP AND DOMINION, THE SALE OF A PORTION OF THE DISPUTED LAND BY JOSE PADRE TO JUANA AND SEVERINO PARANADA. (pp. 1-6, Decision; pp. 15-20, Rollo.) Before respondent Court discussed the merits of the appeal, two major propositions, anchored on doctrinal rules, were impressed upon plaintiffs-appellants below in that the authority of the Director of Lands over the disposition of public lands does not necessarily rule out the competencia of the regular courts over possessory actions (Molina vs. de Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, 959; cited at p. 8, Decision; p. 22, Rollo) and that the Regional Trial Court has the power to ascertain who has prior possession of public lands (Espejo vs. Malate, 120 SCRA 269, 278, among other pertinent cases cited at p. 8, Decision; p. 22, Rollo). Seemingly, these jurisprudential axioms were utilized by respondent Court in considering the complaints for quieting of title instituted at the court of origin as accion publiciana where the query to be resolved deals with the issue of who between the parties has a prior or better right of possession independently of title.
The aspect of possession, the first issue raised in the appellate court by herein petitioners, was resolved on the basis of the greater probative value given by respondent Court to the documentary evidence adduced by defendants-appellees whose tax declaration over the disputed property dates back to 1921 as affirmed on the witness stand by Sixto Corpus. The conclusion was thus reached that defendantsappellees, private respondents herein, were ahead in occupying the realty in the light of the testimony of Agrifino Padre that his father was in possession of the land only in 1923, and the statement of Emigdio Paranada that Sabas Paa started his possession of the property only in 1936. Now, on the question of whether the court of original jurisdiction properly appreciated the validity of the sale from Silvestre Paet to Blas Pacleb, even if there was no document to support such purchase, respondent Court observed that such a defect has no legal bearing on the case at bar which is not for the enforcement of a contract of sale, apart from the fact that the statute of frauds is inapplicable to consummated contracts. Petitioners third and fourth ascriptions which focused on the identity of the subject lots, likewise did not merit consideration by the Court of Appeals on account of the admission of both parties in this respect that the litigants are referring to the same property.
Respondent Court did not find it necessary to respond to the fifth and sixth assigned errors because of the initial perception in regard to the superior weight of herein private respondents evidence of prior possession. Dissatisfied with the pronouncements of respondent Court, the instant petition was resorted to, but We find the same to be devoid of intrinsic worth. To buttress the idea that respondent Court erred in converting the action below from quieting of title into one for plenaria de posession and in resolving the conflicting claims of the parties, petitioners submit that it is only the Director of Lands, and not the courts, that can resolve the confluence of rights over the subject lots (p. 4, Memorandum for Petitioners; p. 71, Rollo). This subtle experiment of impugning the jurisdiction or compe-tencia of the original and appellate courts after adverse repercussions are experienced has time and again been repudiated,
thus: . . . after voluntarily submitting a cause and ecountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the losser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court . . . (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 36.) Then, too, concerning the contention that it is the Director of Lands and not the court which should have ruled on the matter of prior possession, this Court has, as early as 1967 in Molina vs. de Bacud (19 SCRA 956), ruled that: . . . the authority given to the Lands Department over the disposition of public lands does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions, the public character of the land notwithstanding. This is such an action and the fact that on her complaint respondent claimed the lands in ownership did not change the nature of her action. The allegation of ownership should be regarded as a mere surplusage. (pp. 959-960) This was recently clarified in National Development Company vs. Hervilla (151 SCRA 520) and in Guerrero vs. Amores (159 SCRA 374) that: . . . the administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the Director of Lands primarily, and ultimately, to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public
lands or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of public lands. The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public lands is limited to the determination of who has the actual physical possession or occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry cases, before Municipal Courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion publiciana, in cases before Courts of First Instance now Regional Trial Courts.) (pp. 526-527) Against these judicial pronouncements, petitioners can offer no concrete and contrary sentiments other than their cold protestations that respondent Court overstepped its authority. It follows, therefore, that the Court of Appeals correctly ordered petitioners eviction from the premises in view of the factual finding that herein private respondents have the better right of
possession. Neither are We persuaded into accepting petitioners contention that the appellate Court seriously erred in converting the action from quieting of title into accion publiciana, because in order to afford complete relief to the parties, the court may determine incidentally the ownership, or the status of the legal title to the property, or the right to the possession thereof (Gore vs. Dickinson, 98 Ala. 363, 11 So. 743, cited by Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1990 Reprinting, Volume 2, p. 145). On the second point raised by petitioners as to whether respondent Court erred in rejecting the belated submission of proof intended to show that the lands claimed by respondents herein are distinct from those involved in the litigation, this, too, can hardly give rise to a cause for concern which would result in giving relief to petitioners inasmuch as the theoretical proposition put forward overlooks the previous admission in judicio of the parties herein that they were referring to the same pieces of property (p. 4, Decision; p. 18, Rollo; Article 1439, New Civil Code; Section 4, Rule 129; Section 2(a), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence; Roosevelt vs. Smith, 40 N.Y.S. 381, 17 Misc. 323; Brooks vs. Sessoms, 171 S.E. 222, 223, Ga. App. 554; Little Fay Oil Co. vs. Stanley, 90 Ore. 265, 217 p. 377, 378; cited in Compendium on Evidence, by Sibal and Salazar, Jr., p. 19). Moreover, We deem it improper for petitioners to blame their former lawyer for failing to present evidence to prove that the parcels of land claimed by respondents are different from those concerned in this case, because precisely of the previous admission of petitioners as to the identity of the lands, there was no needas in fact it would have been improperto submit contrary proof. Respondent Court thus merely adhered to the proscription under adjective law that the court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered (Section 34, Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence; De Castro vs. Court of Ap-peals, et al., 75 Phil. 824; cited in Remedial Law Compendium, by Regalado, Volume 2, 1988 edition, p. 547). WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, without special pronouncement as to costs.
456 456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Int'l. Container Terminal Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr., J., On leave. Bidin, J., In the results. Petition dismissed; decision affirmed. Note.A party who voluntarily participate in the trial cannot later on raise the issue of the courts lack of jurisdiction (Maersk-Tabacalera Shipping Agency (Filipinas) Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 646). o0o [Padre vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 446(1992)] No. L-77541. November 29, 1988.*THIRD DIVISION. HEIRS OF GREGORIO TENGCO, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE and VICTORIA ALIWALAS and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Public Lands; Land Title; Rule is well-settled that an original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a judicial proceeding. Petitioners theory is not supported by the jurisprudence on the matter. The rule is well-settled that an original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part of the disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent. A homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title.
Same; Same; Same; Contention of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies already rejected by the Court in earlier decisions.The contention of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, on the theory that the case should have been brought before the Director of Lands, had already been rejected by the Court in earlier decisions. Thus, while the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do so only so long as the land remains part of the public domain and continues to be under his exclusive control; but ________________ * THIRD DIVISION. 199 VOL. 168, NOVEMBER 29, 1988 199 Heirs of Gregorio Tengco vs. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas
once the patent is registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be a part of public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. Same; Same; Same; Dr. Aliwalas title to the property having become incontrovertible such may no longer be collaterally attached.But, as correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, Dr. Aliwalas title to the property having become incontrovertible, such may no longer be collaterally attacked. If indeed there had been any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor General would be the proper remedy. Same; Same; Prescription; Title acquired through a homestead patent registered under the Land Registration Act is imprescriptible.Finally, petitioners contend that private respondents have lost their title to the property through laches and prescription. They assert that private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have never actually possessed the property while petitioners and their predecessor-in-interest have been in actual, open, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property since 1918. But as stated above, title acquired through a homestead patent registered under the Land Registration Act is imprescriptible. Thus, prescription cannot operate against the registered owner. PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Jorge A. Pascua for petitioners. Perpetuo C. Travino for private respondents. Daniel C. Florida collaborating counsel for private respondents.
CORTS, J.: The instant case stemmed from an action to quiet title instituted by the late Victoria L. Vda. de Aliwalas against the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco, the Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. The facts as found by the Court of First Instance of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch VI, in Civil Case No. 4308, are as follows:
200 200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Heirs of Gregorio Tengco vs. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas
The evidence adduced by the parties in this case shows that Lot No. 3563 of the Arayat Cadastre was originally a part of the public domain and it was so declared on October 12, 1933 (Exh. A -2). Thereafter, Dr. Jose Aliwalas applied with the Bureau of Lands for the issuance of a homestead patent covering this lot. On December 12, 1936, the Director of Lands granted this application and issued in favor of Jose Aliwalas Homestead Patent No. 38588 (Exh. E). This patent was duly registered in the Register of Deeds of Pampanga on April 8, 1937 after the corresponding fees thereon were paid (Exhs. D-5 and D-6). On the same day, the Register of Deeds of Pampanga issued OCT No. 159 (Exh. D) in the name of Jose Aliwalas. From that time on, Dr. Aliwalas did the corresponding land taxes thereon (Exh. I, I-1 to I-25) after having declared the land for taxes (sic) purposes in his name (Exh. F G and H). As owner of this property, Jose Aliwalas, thru his overseer Espiridion Manaul, had this parcel fenced and vegetables were planted in some portions thereof. Other portions were dedicated initially to cattle raising until the last war broke out. After the war, palay was planted on some portions of this land, by the tenants of Jose Aliwalas who gave the owners share to him, thru his caretaker and overseer Espiridion Manaul. Other seasonal crops were also planted on the land as well as ipil-ipil trees for firewood purposes. There were also planted mango trees which ultimately bore fruit which were harvested by the caretaker of Aliwalas in this property and who delivered them to Jose Aliwalas until he died in 1962 when the administration and management was assumed by Jose Aliwalas, Jr., a son of Dr. Aliwalas. When the properties left by Dr. Jose Aliwalas were petitioned among his surviving heirs, the lot in question was alloted in favor of the plaintiff Victoria L. Vda. de Aliwalas as indicated in the amended project of partition (Exh. B) executed by her and her nine children, one of whom is Jose Aliwalas, Jr. After this amemded project of partition was approved (Exh. C) and registered with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, OCT No. 52526-R (Exh. A) was issued in the name of the plaintiff on November
14, 1966 (Exh. A-1). Thereafter, the tax declaration pertaining to this parcel of land was also transferred to her name (Exhs. O, P and A). She also paid the real estate taxes thereon (Exhs. N, N-1 to N-14, Exhs. R-1 to R-53). On the other hand, the evidence further show that on October 31, 1973, the defendant Ponciano Tengco in representation of the defendants Heirs of Gregorio Tengco filed an application with the Bureau of Lands, thru its District Land Office here in San Fernando, Pampanga. Among other things, he alleged in his application that this
201 VOL. 168, NOVEMBER 29, 1988 201 Heirs of Gregorio Tengco vs. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas
parcel of land had been occupied and cultivated originally and continuously thereafter by Gregorio Tengco. After being given due course, this application was approved by the Director of Lands who issued Free Patent No. 557692 covering this lot on February 5, 1974 (Exh. 3 Tengco; Exh. 6 Dir. of Lands). This free patent issued in favor of the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco was predicated on the assumption that the lot still formed part of the public domain and on the findings of the Public Land Inspector Romeo Buenaventura who conducted an investigation thereon and who also reported that the land in question was possessed and occupied by the applicant, Heirs of Gregorio Tengco (Exh. 2-Tengco and Exh. 5Dir. of Lands ) who had planted different kinds of trees on the land aside from rice and corn. The defendants Heirs of Gregorio Tengco also adduced evidence tending to show that their late grandfather Gregorio Tengco had occupied this parcel of land exclusively years before the last (sic) and after he died in 1934, his children succeeded him in its possession and enjoying the fruits from the different trees planted thereon, and that the possession of Gregorio Tengco and his successors-ininterest have not been disturbed by anyone including the Aliwalas family. On rebuttal, the plaintiff adduced evidence showing that the pre-war records of the Bureau of Lands pertaining to public land applications were burned during the war as indicated in the certification issued by the Chief of the Records Management Division of the Bureau of Lands. This is to explain why the Bureau has no more record pertaining to the Homestead Patent issued in favor of Jose Aliwalas in 1936 which gave rise to the issuance of OCT No. 159 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga on April 8, 1937. The certification also attests that what is now found in the files of the Bureau of Lands is Free Patent V557692 issued on February 5, 1974 in favor of the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco pertaining to Lot No. 3563. (Rollo, pp. 18-20.] On the basis of the evidence, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Declaring the herein plaintiff Victoria Vda. de Aliwalas as the true owner of Lot No. 3563 of Arayat Cadastre embraced in TCT No. 52526-R of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga in her name; 2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cancel TCT Nos. 132263-R, 132264-R and 132349-R in the name of Cipriano
Tengco, Ponciano Tengco, et al., and Eugenia Tengco, respectively, covering portions of this Lot No. 3563; 3. Ordering the herein defendants-Heirs of Gregorio Tengco to vacate the land in question and to pay the amount of P5,000.00 a year to the plaintiff beginning from the year 1974 until the land is vacated by them and turned over to the plaintiff; and 4. Ordering the defendants-Heirs of Gregorio Tengco to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus costs. *Rollo, p. 17-18.] Dissatisfied with the trial courts judgment, the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 69706. The appellate court, adopting the trial courts findings of fact, affirmed the latters judgment *Rollo, pp. 17-24.] Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied [Rollo, pp. 25-26.] Hence, the instant petition. Private respondents filed a comment to the petition, to which petitioners replied. On September 16, 1987, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda. After the petitioner filed a reply to private respondents memorandum, the case was deemed submitted for decision. In their petition the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco have ascribed several errors to the Court of Appeals, which involved mixed questions of fact and law [Rollo, p. 4.] But, as stated in their memorandum, the issues may be limited to the following: (a) Whether or not the court of origin and/or, subsequently, the respondent Honorable Court of Appeals, had jurisdiction to take cognizance of, and pass upon, the instant case; (b) Whether or not the claim or contention of the private respondents will hold true and prosper before a proper forum; and
(c) Whether or not the private respondents, assuming for the sake of argument, that they have proprietary rights on and to the land in question, have not long lost such rights by laches and/or prescription. [Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 6.] 1. Petitioners contend that the trial court (and, consequently, the Court of Appeals) had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and pass upon the instant case as private respondents have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. They point out that
203 VOL. 168, NOVEMBER 29, 1988 203 Heirs of Gregorio Tengco vs. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas
instead of bringing her case to the Bureau of Lands, Victoria Vda. de Aliwalas went directly to the court. On the other hand, private respondents argue that since a homestead patent and an original certificate of title had already been issued to their predecessor-in-interest, the land had ceased to be part of the public domain and, hence, the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction over the controversy. Private respondents add that since an original certificate of title had been issued pursuant to the homestead patent, their title to the property had become conclusive, absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible. In rebuttal, petitioner contend that private respondents title had not acquired said qualities as it was derived from a homestead patent. Petitioners advanced the view that only titles based upon a judicial declaration can be vested with the attributes of conclusiveness, indefeasibility and imprescriptibility. Petitioners theory is not supported by the jurisprudence on the matter. The rule is well-settled that an original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part of the disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent. [Republic v. Heirs of Carle, 105 Phil. 1227 (1959); Ingaran v. Ramelo, 107 Phil. 498 (1960); Lopez v. Padilla, G.R. No. L-27559, May 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 44.] A homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title. [Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558 (1982); El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17 (1934); Duran v. Oliva, 113 Phil. 144 (1961); Pajomayo v. Manipon, G.R. No. L-33676, June 30, 1971, 39 SCRA 676.] The contention of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, on the theory that the case should have been brought before the Director of Lands, had already been rejected by the Court in earlier decisions. Thus, while the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do so only so long
as the land remains part of the public domain and continues to be under his exclusive control; but once the patent
is registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be a part of public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction [Sumail v. Judge of Court of First Instance, 96 Phil. 946 (1955); Republic v. Heirs of Carle, supra.] 2. Anent the second issue, petitioners contend that petition-ers title to the property was defective for the following reasons: (a) Dr. Jose Aliwalas was not qualified to be a home-steader being a rich landed person; and (b) private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have never been in actual or physical possession of the property, unlike petitioners and their predecessor-in-interest who have been in continuous and open possession of the property since 1918. Thus, petitioners rely on a report prepared by a certain Librado B. Luna, hearing officer of the Bureau of Lands, attesting to such facts [Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 13.] But, as correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, Dr. Aliwalas title to the property having become incontrovertible, such may no longer be collaterally attacked. If indeed there had been any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor General would be the proper remedy [Sec. 101, C.A. No. 141; Director of Lands v. Jugado, G.R. No. L14702, May 21, 1961, 2 SCRA 32; Lopez v. Padilla, supra.] 3. Finally, petitioners contend that private respondent have lost their title to the property through laches and prescription. They assert that private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have never actually possessed the property while petitioners and their predecessor-in-interest have been in actual, open, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property since 1918. But as stated above, title acquired through a homestead patent registered under the Land Registration Act is imprescriptible. Thus, prescription cannot operate against the registered owner. Moreover, as found by the Court of Appeals: . . . The allegation of defendants-appellants (petitioners herein) that plaintiff-appellee (Victoria L. Vda. de Aliwalas) and her predecessor-in-interest slept on their rights for over 40 years, since 1936
205
VOL. 168, NOVEMBER 29, 1988 205 Heirs of Gregorio Tengco vs. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas
when the patent was issued to Aliwalas is untenable. It has been established that Jose Aliwalas through his overseer Espiridion Manaul planted the subject land to vegetables and raised cattle therein until the last war broke out. After the war, the land was planted with palay, seasonal crops, ipil-ipil trees and mango trees. When Jose Aliwalas died in 1962, the administration and management of the farm was assumed by his son, Jose Aliwalas, Jr. Upon the partition of the properties left by the late Jose Aliwalas, the subject property was allotted to and registered in the name of plaintiff-appellee. It was in 1974 when the defendants-Heirs of Gregorio Tengco wrested possession of the subject land from plaintiffappellees caretaker and deprived her of its produce. On October 14, 1976, the plaintiff filed her second amended complaint. The foregoing facts show that plaintiff-appellee and her predeccessor-in-interest occupied, possessed and exercised rights of ownership over the subject land prior to the filing of the instant suit. . . . [Rollo, pp. 23-24.] The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the appellate courts findings, in the absence of a clear showing that the facts have been misapprehended. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69706 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur. Petition denied, decision affirmed. Notes.Action to recover possession of registered land does not prescribe. (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Cleofas, 92 SCRA 389). One cannot acquire title to registered land by prescription. (Javier vs. Concepcion, Jr., 94 SCRA 212). o0o [Heirs of Gregorio Tengco vs. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas, 168 SCRA 198(1988)] [No. L-12485. July 31, 1959] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ETC., petitioner and appellant vs. HEIRS OF CIRIACO CARLE, ETC., ET AL., respondents and appellees.
1228 1228 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic of the Philippines, etc. vs. The Heirs of C. Carle, etc., et al.
1. PUBLIC LANDS; CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ISSUED PURSUANT TO A HOMESTEAD PATENT; IRREVOCABLE AFTER ONE YEAR.A certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really a part of the disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance thereof (Lucas vs. Durian, L-7886 September 23, 1957). 2. ID.; HOMESTEAD PATENT; RlGHT OF REVIEW BY DlRECTOR OF LANDS.While the right to review homestead patents pertains to the Director of Lands, he can do so only as long as the land remains a part of the public domain and continues to be under his exclusive and executive control. But once the patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction (Sumail vs. Judge, CFI, et al., 96 Phil., 946). 3. ID.; ID.; PATENT ISSUED THROUGH FRAUD OR MISTAKE; REMEDY OF THE INJURED PARTY.If a patent has been issued, allegedly through fraud or mistake and had been registered, the remedy of the party who had been injured by the fraudulent registration is an action for reconveyance (Roco vs. Gimeda, 94 Phil., 1011; 55 Off. Gaz., [37] 7922). APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro. Ramos, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Asst. Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres, Solicitor Crispin V. Bautista and Ernesto D. Llaguo for appellant. Augusto L. Valencia, for appellee. BARRERA, J.: Ciriaco Carle filed a homestead application over a parcel of land located in Pola, Oriental Mindoro (H. A. No. 154223-E 72825), which was approved on August 30, 1930. Applicant Carle having died in 1942, Homestead Patent No. 71852 corresponding to said application was issued to his heirs on April 26, 1944, which patent was
1229 VOL 105, JULY 31, 1959 1229 Republic of the Philippines, etc. vs. The Heirs of C. Carle, etc., et al.
duly transmitted to and recorded by the Register of Deeds of said province pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496. On May 11, 1946, the corresponding certificate of title (O. C. T. No. 4648) was duly issued in favor of the said heirs. Seven years later, or on August 31, 1953, passing upon the opposition of a certain Meynardo Ilagan to the issuance of Patent No. 71852 in the name of the heirs of Ciriaco Carle, the Director of Lands declared the said patent inoperative in so far as it covers a certain portion designated therein as area A-2 and adjudged the same in favor of the oppositor, holder of another homestead application, for the reason that the inclusion of the aforementioned area in the patent was erroneous. On appeal by the heirs, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed the order of the Director of Lands. Thereafter or on December 2, 1955, the Director of Lands filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, which was later amended, praying that Homestead Patent No. 71852 be declared null and void, and that the respondents, Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, be ordered to surrender the patent and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto to the Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds of Mindoro, respectively, for cancellation (Civil Case No. R650). Respondent moved to dismiss the petition, claiming that as more than one year from the issuance of the certificate of title had already elapsed, petitioner's cause of action was already barred by prescription. Considering the aforesaid motion and the opposition thereto filed by the petitioner, the Court a quo in its order of March 2, 1957, dismissed the petition on the ground that said action was filed beyond the period of limitation provided for by law. The Director of Lands thereupon instituted the instant appeal. There is no controversy as to the fact that on May 11, 1946, the homestead patent in favor of the appellees heirs of Ciriaco Carle was duly registered in the Office of the
1230 1230 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic of the Philippines, etc. vs. The Heirs of C. Carle, etc., et al.
Register of Deeds of Mindoro and the corresponding certificate of title issued to them, and that the order of the Director of Lands cancelling a part of the homestead patent upon which the aforesaid certificate of title was based was handed down on August 31, 1953, or after the lapse of more than 7 years. Appellant, however, maintains that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act providing for the prescriptive period of one year within which to assail the correctness or validity of a certificate of title is not controlling in the case at bar. It is claimed that a homestead patent differs from a decree of registration obtained in an ordinary registration proceeding in many fundamental ways, thus depriving the former of that indefeasible nature ordinarily characteristic of the latter.
The flaw in this contention is that appellant compares a homestead patent and a decree of registration. But what is involved in the instant case is the indefeasibility of the certificate of title issued after the homestead patent has been duly registered pursuant to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496). As to this, the law is clear: "After due registration and issue of the certificate and owner's duplicate, such land shall be registered land for all purposes under this Act." (Sec. 122.) Consequently, the land automatically comes under the operation of Sec. 38 of the same Act and subject to all the safeguards therein provided. And this, too, is the constant doctrine land down by this Court in a long line of adjudicated cases. Where a land was granted by the Government to a private individual as a homesteader under the provisions of Act No. 926, and the corresponding patent was registered and the certificate of title issued to the 'grantee, said land is considered registered within the meaning of the Land Registration Act. The title to the land thus granted and registered may no longer be the subject of any inquiry, decision, or judgment in a cadastral proceeding. (Manalo vs Lucban, et al., 48 Phil., 973).
1231 VOL. 105, JULY 31, 1959 1231 Republic of the Philippines, etc. vs. The Heirs of C. Carle, etc., et al.
Once a homestead patent, issued according to the Public Land Act, is registered in conformity with the provisions of Section 122 of Act No. 496, it becomes irrevocable and enjoys the same privileges as Torrens titles issued under the latter Act (El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga, 60 Phil., 17). Under Section 122 of Act 496, when any public lands in the Philippines are alienated, granted or conveyed to persons or public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of said Act and shall become registered lands (Sumail vs. Judge, Court of First Instance of Cotabato, et al., 96 Phil., 946). A public land patent when registered in the corresponding register of deeds office, is a veritable torrens title (Dagdag vs. Nepomuceno, supra, p. 216); becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title (Ramoso vs. Obligado, 70 Phil., 86). True it may be, as appellant alleges, that neither e Public Land Act (Com. Act 141) nor the Land Registration Law provides for the period within which the certificate of title to a public land grant may be questioned, but this does not necessarily sustain appellant's contention that such action may be brought within 10 years (Art. 1144, new Civil Code), because this point has already been determined by this Tribunal when we held that:
A certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really a part of the disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance thereof (Lucas vs. Durian, G. R. No. L-7886, promulgated September 23, 1957). But appellant contends that as he is the official who exercises the power to dispose public lands, it necessarily follows that the right to review a patent pertains to him. In support of his stand, he cites Section 91 of Commonwealth Act 141. This view is correct but only as long as the land remains a part of the public domain and still continues to be under his exclusive and executive control. But once the patent is registered and the corresponding
1232 1232 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Reyes vs. Berenguer
certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction (Sumail vs. Judge, Court of First Instance, et al., supra). The parties, however, are not without any remedy in law. As we have suggested: If patent has already been issued, allegedly through fraud or mistake and had been registered, the remedy of the party who had been injured by the fraudulent registration is an action for reconveyance (Roco vs. Gemida, 94 Phil., 1011; 55 Off. Gaz., [37] 7922) Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without costs. It is so ordered. Pars, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcin, and Endencia, JJ., concur. Order affirmed. [Republic of the Philippines, etc. vs. The Heirs of C. Carle, etc., et al., 105 Phil. 1227(1959)] [No. L-10471. March 30, 1960] INOCENCIA INGARAN, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs. FEDERICO RAMELO, ET AL., defendants and appellees. 1. PUBLIC LANDS; HOMESTEAD PATENTS; DECISION OF DIRECTOR OF LANDS; WHEN FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE.The decision rendered by the Director of Lands when approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources is final and conclusive upon all questions of fact concerning homesteads which fall within his scope and authority, in the absence of a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition or mistake other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence. 2. ID.; ID.; WHEN APPLICANT ACQUIRES VESTED RIGHT OVER HOMESTEAD.An applicant may be said to have acquired a vested right over the homestead only when his application has been perfected by the presentation of the final proof and its approval by the Director of Lands. 3. ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ISSUED ON THE STRENGTH OF A PATENT INDEFEASIBLE ONE YEAR AFTER ISSUANCE.An original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance thereof. 4. ID.; ID.; ANNULMENT AND CANCELLATION; ROLE OF THE STATE.The annulment and cancellation of a homestead patent and the consequent reversion of the property to the state, are matters between the state and the grantee or his heirs, and until the government has taken steps to annul the grant and assert title to the homestead, the rights of the homesteader stand and must be recognized in the court of law. APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Isabela. Quinto, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Domingo B. Maddumba for appellants. Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres for appellee Director of Lands. Toms L. Ramos for the other appellees.
499 VOL. 107, MARCH 30, 1960 499 Ingaran, et al. vs. Ramelo, et al.
GUTIRREZ DAVID, J.: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for the cancellation of a homestead patent.
Plaintiffs first filed their complaint in the court below on February 20, 1953 against the defendant Federico Ramelo. The complaint was subsequently amended on December 17, 1953 to include the Director of Lands as party defendant. On July 20, 1954, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, including, this time, Felix Guiang as party defendant. Said complaint alleges that in 1936 Prudencio Bumanglag, plaintiffs' predecessor in interest, filed a homestead application for a tract of land in Echague, Isabela, which was given due course by the defendant Director of Lands who acknowledged receipt thereof; that Bumanglag and his family entered the land and cultivated "a greater portion" thereof; that having worked the land for sometime, he intended to submit final proof of his right to a patent, but the war broke out; that after Bumanglag's death, his heirs, herein plaintiffs, continued possession of the land applied for; that on October 26, 1945, plaintiff Inocencia Ingaran filed a new homestead application for the same tract of land; that in 1946 defendant Ramelo entered the land through force and deceit, whereupon plaintiff Ingaran complained to the local District Land Officer who wrote a letter dated September 14, 1946 to said Ramelo advising him to desist from his occupation of the land because Homestead Application No. 217124 of Prudencio Bumanglag was still subsisting; that Ramelo refused to vacate the land; that on October 11, 1947 the District Land Officer rendered a decision rejecting Bumanglag's homestead application (as renewed by plaintiff Inocencia Ingaran, his widow) and gave due course to defendant Ramelo's application for the same land; that while plaintiff's appeal to the Bureau of Lands f rom said decision was still pending, the Director
500 500 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Ingaran, et al. vs. Ramelo, et al.
of Lands on October 18, 1949 ordered the issuance of Homestead Patent No. V-3650 in the name of Ramelo on the strength of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-1004 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Isabela in the name of said Federico Ramelo; that plaintiffs' subsequent appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was of no avail because a patent had already been issued to Ramelo; that plaintiffs had acquired a "vested right" over the land in litigation; that Ramelo's title and patent were secured through "fraud, deceit, misrepresentation * * * and by mistake, collusion, with grave abuse of discretion" of the land officials; and that the land in question was sold to defendant Felix Guiang by defendant Ramelo within the prohibited period of 5 years provided in the Public Land Laws. By way of relief, plaintiffs pray, among other things, that the various decisions and orders of the District Land Officer of Isabela, the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be declared null and void; that defendant Ramelo's patent and certificate of title to the land in question be cancelled; and that the land be restored to them, with damages against defendants Ramelo and Guiang. The defendant Federico Ramelo opposed the filing of the second amended complaint and moved to dismiss the same on the grounds that it did not state a cause of action against him and that it was
"evidently an attempt by plaintiffs to have the court interfere with the purely administrative and jurisdictional functions of the Executive Department of the Government as exercised by the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources." The court, however, without acting on the motion to dismiss, overruled defendant Ramelo's opposition and admitted the second amended complaint. In their separate answers, the defendants set up affirmative defenses which constitute grounds for a motion to dismiss, to wit: that the homestead controversy between
the defendant Federico Ramelo and Prudencio Bumanglag, represented by his widow, herein plaintiff Inocencia Ingaran, had long been settled in favor of the former in a decision rendered by the District Land Officer, which was subsequently affirmed by the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; that plaintiffs' complaint states no cause of action; and that plaintiffs have no personality to assail the validity of the homestead patent and certificate of title issued to defendant Ramelo. At the instance of the defendants, a preliminary hearing was had, pursuant to section 5 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, on the special and affirmative defenses set up by the said defendants. Thereafter, on June 30, 1955, the court below issued an order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint "with prejudice". Plaintiffs in due time filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same having been denied, they appealed directly to this Court. The appeal is without merit. It is not disputed that in a decision rendered by the District Land Officer at Ilagan, Isabela, on October 11, 1947, the homestead application of herein plaintiffs' predecessor in interest Prudencio Bumanglag for the land in question was rejected and the application of defendant Federico Ramelo for the same tract of land was given due course. That decision was rendered after the District Land Officer, upon investigation of the conflict between the homesteaders, found that Federico Ramelo had since 1939 continuously occupied and cultivated the land, ultimately converting the entire area into a productive ricefield, without having been molested by Bumanglag or by his widow; that said Bumanglag and his widow cleared only a very insignificant portion thereof; and that the last time the said spouses saw the land was in 1940, thereby practically abandoning the same. (See Annex A, Answer of the defendant Director of Lands.) The above decision of the District Land Officer was confirmed by
502 502 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Ingaran, et al. vs. Ramelo, et al.
the Director of Lands in his order of November 29, 1949. (Annex B, Id.) Not satisfied, Inocencia Ingaran, representing her deceased husband Prudencio Bumanglag, filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. (Annex C, Id.) On appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, that official in his decision dated November 29, 1950 affirmed the decision of the District Land Officer and the orders of the Director of Lands. (Annex D, Id.) Inocencia Ingaran then filed a motion for a reinvestigation of the case, but the motion was denied. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Secretary on September 7, 1951. (Annexes E and F, Id.) The authenticity of the above documents annexes A to F of the answer of the defendant Director of Lands has not been assailed in the proceedings below. As a matter of fact, the parties agreed, that they be considered for the purpose of resolving the grounds for the motion to dismiss pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answers of the defendants. In the circumstances, we see no valid reason why they should not be taken into account by the court. Plaintiffs, in effect, seek a judicial review of the administrative decision above mentioned. Obviously, plaintiffs' action must fail. It is well settled that the decision rendered by the Director of Lands when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is final and conclusive upon all questions of fact concerning homesteads which fall within his scope and authority, in the absence of a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of a fraud, imposition or mistake other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence. (Julian vs. Apostol, 52 Phil., 422; Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil., 440; De Guzman vs. De Guzman, et al., 104 Phil., 24, 56 Off. Gaz., [4] 753.). Plaintiffs claim that they had acquired a "vested right" over the land in question and that defendant Ramelo's
patent and title thereto were secured through fraud and deceit and "by mistake, collusion, with grave abuse of discretion" of the lands officials. We find the claim to be unfounded. An applicant may be said to have acquired a vested right over the homestead only when his application has been perfected by the presentation of the final proof and its approval by the Director of Lands. (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil., 498; Republic of the Phil. vs. Diamon, et al., 97 Phil., 838.) In the present case, plaintiffs merely alleged in their complaint that an "intention to make final proof was submitted to the proper authorities." No such final proof appears to have actually been presented to show compliance with the requirements of the law as to warrant the issuance of a patent. Indeed, the homestead application of Prudencio Bumanglag, as renewed by plaintiff Inocencia Ingaran, had not even been approved. As to plaintiffs' allegation of fraud or mistake, it will be observed that the complaint does not state the circumstances constituting the fraud or mistake as required by section 12 of Rule 15. In this connection, it should be stated that plaintiff Inocencia Ingaran in her appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in the administrative case involving the homestead in question, raised for the first time the question of "fraud" by alleging that there was no investigation conducted in the case and that "if ever * * * (she) affixed her thumbmark on the alleged report or minutes of investigation, it was done thru fraud, misrepresentation and deceit." The Secretary, however, expressly found that an investigation was duly conducted and that Inocencia Ingaran even signed the portion of the minutes of the investigation containing her testimonies. We also note that, as stated in plaintiffs' complaint, Homestead Patent No. V-3650 was issued to defendant Ramelo as far back as October 18, 1949 on the strength of which an original certificate of title was thereafter
504 504 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Blaquera, etc., vs. Vda. de Aldaba and Court of Appeals
issued in his name. That certificate of title partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding and became indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance thereof. (See Lucas vs. Durian, et al., G. R. No. L-7886, September 23, 1957.) The present complaint having been filed more than 3 years after the issuance of the homestead patent to defendant Ramelo, it is apparent that the lower court no longer had jurisdiction to entertain it. Finally, the annulment and cancellation of a homestead patent, as prayed for by plaintiffs, and the consequent reversion of the property to the state, are matters between the state and the grantee or his heirs, and until the government has taken steps to annul the grant and assert title to the homestead, the rights of the homesteader stand and must be recognized in the court of law. (Eugenio, et al. vs. Perdido et ,al., 97 Phil., 41).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against plaintiffs-appellants. Pars, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcin, Reyes, J. B. L., and Barrera, JJ,, concur. Order affirmed. [Ingaran, et al. vs. Ramelo, et al., 107 Phil. 498(1960)] BERNABE LOPEZ (M.S.A. VI-1-35), MRS.GLORIA D. RAMA, assisted by her husband FORTUNATO RAMA (M.S.A. VINEW), MELECIO CABIDO (M.S.A. NO. VI4-167), SOTERO UBAL (M.S.A, NO. VI-1-2-10), MRS.EBUSA VDA. DB BORJA (M.S.A. VI-l-NEW), Joss ARQUIZAL (R.P.A. NEW), LEOPOLDO URAL (M.S.A. VIl-NEW), BIENVENIDQ GENSIS (M.S.A. VI-l-NEW), ANGEL ALEONAR (R.P.A. NEW), MACARIO DE LOS REYES (R.P.A. NEW), DALMACIO DE LOS REYES (R.P.A. NEW), JULIAN ABING (.R.P.A. NEW), FELIPE BANDE (R.P.A. NEW), A NTONIO SABLE (R.P.A, NEW), ENRIQU E
45 VOL. 45, MAY 18, 1972 45 Lopez vs. Padilla
BASCON (R.P.A. NEW), J. PABALAYA (R.P.A. NEW), ROSARIO EDAO (R.P.A. NEW), PEDRO PICON (R.P.A. NEW), APOLONIO V ILLAMALA (R.P.A. NEW), JUANITA GASIONG (R.P.A. NEW), GREGORIA DICHOSO (R.P.-A. NEW), RODULFO BACANTI (R.P.A. NEW), TEODORO T ABOGON (R.P.A. NEW), CARLOS B ACULI (R.P.A. NEW), CRISANTO B ACULI (R.P.A. NEW), BIBIANO CALMA (R.P.A. NEW), NICASIO PANSACALA.JR., (R.-P.A. NEW), PONCIANO YNTONG (R.P.A. NEW), RESTITUTA CABUCAL (R.P.A. NEW), ANITA MARIQUIT (R.-P.A. NEW), LUCIANO C ABARRON (R.P.A. NEW), GREGORIO CANCANO (R.P.A. NEW), BENEDICTO ALPHABITE (R.P.A. NEW), ESTRELLA PETALCORIN (R.P,-A. NEW), plaintiffs-appellants, vs. EMILIO & ALBERTO both surnamed PADILLA as heirs of the late JUAN PADILLA;the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Bureau of Lands, Manila; and EDGAR WOOLBRIGHT, defendants-appellees. Homesteads; Patent deemed issued upon promulgation of order for its issuance.-In ordinary registration proceedings involving private lands, courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree, only when application for review is filed by the party aggrieved, within one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. Applied to homesteads the decree of registration corresponds to the promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent and not the actual issue of the patent. Same; Reversion; Who may institute action for reversion.Section 101 of the Public Land Act vests only in the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead the authority to institute the action on behalf of the Republic for cancellation of defendants title and for reversion of the homestead to the Government.
Land registration; Courts; Lack of authority to cancel homestead patent and to annul Torrens title; Torrens title not suscep* tible to collateral attack.The Torrens title issued to defendants in.pursuance of the homestead patent is no longer susceptible to collateral attack through the present action filed by plaintiffs, who as mere applicants of revocable lease permits or miscellaneous applications of what is now concededly titled property of private ownership, have no personality or legal interest in the first place to institute the action, nor to question the sale of the homestead allegedly within the five-year prohibitory period of section 118 of the Public Land Act.
46 46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Lopez vs. Padilla
DIRECT APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Canonoy, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Eleno Andales for plaintiffs-appellants. Gaudioso C. Villagonzalo, Filemon B. Barria and I. V. Binamira for defendants-appellees. TEEHANKEE, J.: Direct appeal on questions of law from the orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiffs complaint for cancellation of title and injunction with prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as filed on June 10, 1966, made the following allegations, as restated by them in their brief: That the late Juan Padilla, the predecessor in interest of defendants Emilio Padilla and Alberto Padilla, was the applicant of a public land under Homestead Application No. V-6992 filed with the Bureau of Lands on February 28, 1939 (par. 2, complaint; p. 2, record on appeal); that on December 27, 1965, the heirs of the said Juan Padilla were issued Original Certificate of Title No. 183 which was transcribed in the Registration Book of the Province of Cebu pursuant to the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 on January 7, 1966, covering Lot Nos. 3986-A, 3986-C, and 3986-F described therein (par. 3, complaint; pp. 3-4, record on appeal); That sometime in the year 1958, the plaintiffs began reclaiming the area covered by the waters across the shores of Mambaling, Cebu City, and as soon as the same became tenantable, they constructed their dwellings thereon and consequently, they filed with the Bureau of Lands applications to lease the areas reclaimed and occupied by them for which they religiously paid the yearly rentals due thereon (par. 4, complaint; p. 4, record on appeal); that some of them also filed with the Bureau of Lands, miscellaneous
sales applications under Republic Act No. 730 considering the long period of time within which plaintiffs were occupying the land in question in good faith, openly continuously, publicly, notoriously and uninterruptedly, which individual applications are indicated therein (par. 4, supra);
That the said Juan Padilla and later on his heirs, defendants Padillas, succeeded in obtaining the approval of the Director of Lands of their homestead application without excluding therefrom the foreshore and marshy lands as well as the areas reclaimed and occupied by the plaintiffs and covered by plaintiffs applications to the great and irreparable damage of said plaintiffs (par. 5, complaint; p. 6, record on appeal); that the approval by the Director of Lands of the homestead application aforesaid and the subsequent proceedings leading to the issuance of the homestead patent in defendants favor were done without the knowledge of herein plaintiffs and without consulting the records of the District Land Office in the province and city of Cebu, thru fraud and misrepresentation of the defendants Padillas (par. 6, complaint; p. 6, record on appeal); that the late Juan Padilla and later his heirs, the defendants Padillas, pretended to the Bureau of Lands, Manila, that their Homestead Application No. V6992 entirely covered an area of land which they alone occupied and cultivated, the truth of the matter being that more than half of the area applied by them for homestead was foreshore, marshy, and covered by the sea, and a portion of which was reclaimed and occupied by herein plaintiffs long before the issuance of the patent and title in defendants favor (par. 7, complaint; p. 6, record on appeal); That subsequent to the issuance of the patent and title aforesaid through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, defendants Padillas sold the land to defendant Edgar Woolbright in open violation of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 456, as admitted by Edgar Woolbright himself in his letter dated May 20, 1966 to the District Land Officer, Land District No. VI-I, Bureau of Lands, Cebu City (par. 8, complaint; pp. 6-8, record on appeal); That the defendants Padillas wrote the plaintiffs demanding that the latter vacate the premises reclaimed and occupied by the said plaintiffs because said defendants would bulldoze, level or fill up the same in order to construct improvements thereon; that defendant Edgar Woolbright has purchased some of the houses within the portion reclaimed and occupied by said plaintiffs with the evident intent of destroying them and bulldozing the houses and/or the lot for the purpose of constructing improvements thereon (par. 9, complaint; p. 8, record on appeal); That notwithstanding the clear and lawful rights of plaintiffs over their respective lots as assigned and allocated to them by the Bureau of Lands through its regional office in Cebu City, Philippines, defendants
conspiring and working together threatened and are still threatening to occupy the premises in question and forcibly oust plaintiffs from their humble homes,
hereby compelling plaintiffs to retain the professional services of undersigned counsel in the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees (par. 10, complaint; p. 8, record on appeal); that due to the refusal of defendants to see the side of the plaintiffs, they suffered damages to the tune of P50.000.00 by way of actual and moral damages (par. 11, complaint; p. 9, record on appeal) ; and that plaintiffs will suffer great and irreparable loss and injury in the event defendants Padillas and Woolbright will proceed to destroy the houses of plaintiffs and/or bulldoze, level or fill up the areas reclaimed and occupied by them, and iri order to obviate the same, plaintiffs pray for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining defendants Padillas and Woolbright or their representatives and all persons acting under their orders from entering into the lands reclaimed and occupied by plaintiffs, from destroying and/or bulldozing plaintiffs houses, and bulldozing, leveling, or filling up the areas aforesaid, while this case is still pending (par. 12, complaint; p. 9, record on appeal).1 Plaintiffs accordingly prayed of the lower court to render judgment 1. Declaring Homestead Patent No. 112448 issued in favor of defendants Emilio Padilla and Alberto Padilla and its corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. 183 as procured thru actual fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, hence null and void, and in flagrant violation of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 456; 2. Ordering the Director of Lands to exclude from the coverage of Homestead Application No. V -6992 the areas which are strictly foreshore and marshy lands as well as those portions which are still under the sea; 3. Ordering the Director of Lands to exclude from the coverage as Homestead Application No. V-6992 of defendants Padillas that area reclaimed and presently occupied by plaintiffs as well as ordering said officer to approve the lease and miscellaneous sales applications of plaintiffs excluding only those portions which may be needed by the City of Cebu, which sales and lease applications had been given due course by the Bureau of Lands and are still pending action by the same to date; 4. While this case is pending, a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be issued enjoining defendants Padillas and Woolbright from _______________
1 Plaintiffs-Appellants brief, pp. 57-61; italics supplied.
(a) Entering into the areas reclaimed and presently occupied by plaintiffs; (b) Destroying and/or bulldozing plaintiffs houses; (c) Bulldozing, leveling or filling up the areas reclaimed and occupied by plaintiffs; (d) Such act or acts prejudicial to plaintiffs in their occupation and use of the areas reclaimed and occupied by them; 5. Making permanent the preliminary mandatory injunction that may be issued by this Honorable Court; 6. Sentencing defendants to pay jointly and severally to plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and the further sum of P50,000.00 as actual and moral damages; 7. Granting such other reliefs and remedies as may be deemed just, proper and equitable in the premises.2Idem, pp. 61-62. Private defendants, in due course filed their answer of June 16, 1966, disclaiming any intention to bulldoze or destroy plaintiffs houses and averring that they have spent money to help those who realized that they were squatting on the land and accordingly removed their houses. They further set up special defenses in their answer based on the records of the subject property in the Bureau of Lands, as follows: 13. That Juan Padilla in life, applied for a homestead patent, over Lot 3986, Cebu Cadastre, sometime in 1939. He then took possession of the land, and made improvements thereon,-planted coconut trees, filled up low places, constructed a small salt bed on the fringes bordering the sea. 14. The landing American liberation forces made use of the homestead beach; U.S. tanks, heavy equipment, and trucks passed thru the homestead, and destroyed the coconut trees, salt beds, and dikes bordering the sea. After liberation, Juan Padilla and his sons Emilio and Alberto renewed building the dikes, and introduced improvements to comply with the requirements of the homestead law. 15. In 1947 Juan Padilla died; the Heirs Emilio and Alberto Padilla were substituted applicants. They carried on the
_______________ 2 Idem, pp. 61-62.
work, and pushed thru the Homestead application. In 1948, long before any of the plaintiffs-squatters complainant herein even ever knew of the homestead, the same, was, after due investigation by the Bureau of Lands, duly approved; and in December 1952, all the requirements of law having been satisfactorily met, the Director of Lands issued the decree for the issuance of Patent. 16. There being delay in the issuance of patent, the Heirs of Juan Padilla, filed Civil Case No. 4041 entitled Heirs of Juan Padilla vs. Director of Lands, for Mandamus, and the Court of First Instance, thru then Presiding Judge Hon. Edmundo S. Piccio decided on November 11, 1955 in favor of the Padillas, and the Director of Lands was ordered to issue the patent. 17. The intervention by the City of Cebu, in the Mandamus Civil Case No. 4041 having been dismissed as without merit, said Cebu City filed a separate civil suit for alleged recovery of title and damages, in Civil Case No. 4877 in 1955. This held up the issuance of the patent,until December 27, 1965, when said case was decided by the Supreme Court on appeal; affirming the issuance of patent3The case referred to is L-20393 decided January 30, 1965 and entitled City of Cebu, plaintiff-appellant vs. Emilio Padilla, et al., defendants-appellee. (13 SCRA 147). The decision recounts that the Padillas petition for mandamus again... and pursuant thereto Original Certificate _______________ 3 The case referred to is L-20393 decided January 30, 1965 and entitled City of Cebu, plaintiff-appellant vs. Emilio Padilla, et al., defendants-appellee. (13 SCRA 147). The decision recounts that the Padillas petition for mandamus against the Director of Lands to compel him to issue the homestead patent over Lot 3986 in favor of the Padillas as ordered on December 16. 1952, was granted by the Cebu CFI in Civil Case No. R-4041 and that the Director of Lands later withdrew his proposed appeal therefrom. The City of Cebu thereafter filed sometime in 1956 its complaint in the Cebu CFI questioning anew the homestead granted the Padillas and to declare null and void the mandamus writ issued by the Cebu court in favor of the Padillas The Padillas motion for dismissal of the-citys complaint for lack of cause of action was granted by the lower court. Thereafter, on appeal, a motion for confirmation of agreement was submitted by the parties and approved by this Court in its judgment as follows:
We observe that in 1954, the City of Cebu, per Resolutions Nos. 806 and 119 of the municipal board, requested the President of the Philippines to reserve the lot in question for its exclusive use. The records do not show, however, any action taken thereon by the President. It is not hard to see why Lot No. 3986 was not reserved for the City of Cebu as requested by said resolutions: Lot 3986 was be-
of Title No. 183, was issued by the Director of Lands, in favor of the Heirs of Juan Padilla. 18. Answering defendants hereby allege that the decree for the issuance of patent issued in December 1952 has long since become final, that Original Certificate of Title No. 183, issued by virtue thereof, and pursuant to the final judgment by the Hon. Supreme Court is valid, legal, final and indefeasible. 19. Answering defendants aver that prior to the approval of the Homestead application in 1948, the Homestead site, Lot 3986 had already been segregated from the lands of the public domain and especially upon the decree of the issuance of patent in 1952, the same was being held and possessed as a private property by the Heirs of Juan Padilla who had vested equitable title thereto, and as such not any portion thereof is subject to any Application for Revocable Permit; RPA or Miscellaneous sale, as all the plaintiffs now pretend to claim to have made such applications in 1958 and thereafter. 20. That assuming but not admitting that any such RPA or Miscellaneous Sale Applications were ever filed in 1958 or thereafter, for any portion of the Homestead, Lot 3986 O.C.T. No. 183, the same must have been either rejected, unacted or if accepted such acceptance must necessarily be illegal, null and void, for the Bureau of Lands or any of its Officers and employees has no right to sell or lease privately owned estates.4Rec. on Appeal, pp. 17-20; italics supplied. Private defendants further filed under date of June 28, 1966 a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that since ________________ ing claimed by the Padillas. The confirmation of the agreement between the City of Cebu and the Padillas will pave the way for the reservation by the Chief Executive of the three sites within Lot 3986 to be segregated from the Padillas homestead. WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is set aside and the Motion for Confirmation of Agreement is hereby granted. Judgment is rendered approving the agreement of the parties, in consonance with which the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources are ordered to
exclude the sites for the proposed city abattoir, extension of Salvador Street and channelization of the Kina-lumsan River from the homestead patent that may be issued to Emilio and Alberto Padilla for Lot No. 3986. The acquisition and/or exclusive use by the City of Cebu of the portions so excluded is subject to the compliance of the provisions of law. No costs. So ordered. 4 Rec. on Appeal, pp. 17-20; italics supplied.
plaintiffs admit in their complaint that (a) they are, as they have been, since 1958, occupying the lots described in the complaint; (b) that the areas occupied are within the homestead grant of which the defendant Heirs of Juan Padilla were issued Original Certificate of Title pursuant to a valid decree, affirmed by the Hon. Supreme Court, now final and indefeasible; (c) that plaintiffs have never filed any opposition against the issuance of the patent, and that in open court, they manifested thru counsel they have not instituted any proceedings against the Land authorities, so therefore have not exhausted the administrative remedies, a requisite sine qua non prior to instituting a civil action as required by law, the complaint should be dismissed since plaintiffs not only are improper parties but have no cause of action against defendants, and the lower court is without jurisdiction over the subject matter. After hearing plaintiffs opposition, the lower court presided by Judge (now appellate justice) Mateo Canonoy, issued his order of July 13, 1966 dismissing the complaint with costs against petitioners. The lower court after citing the applicable legal principles, ruled that The fact that the plaintiffs herein allege that they have pending MSA applications over portions of the land in question with the Bureau of Lands, negates any claim on their part that they own the said portions as their private property. So, even if they succeed in annulling the title of the respondents to the property in question, they do not thereby become the owners of the same. Hence, they have no interest iin the land in question which would entitle them to invoke the protection of the Court. Again, even if this action were to be considered as one for the reversion of the homestead to the government, it is the Solicitor General or his representative and not the plaintiffs herein who have the personality to file the action. Plaintiffs filed their motion for reconsideration insisting that they had the right under section 38 of Act 496 within the one-year period therein provided to declare null and void the homestead patent and Original Certificate of Title issued in pursuance thereof on December 7, 1965on the ground that the same were obtained through fraud and de-
ceit. The lower court denied reconsideration per its order of August 3, 1966, wherein it ruled that defendants torrens title was no longer susceptible to collateral attack through plaintiffs action and again stressed plaintiffs lack of personality or legal interest to assail defendants title, thus: It is a rule in this jurisdiction that once a public land has been brought under the Land Registration Act, the Torrens title issued thereto is indefeasible. It is entitled to the same regard as one issued in a judicial proceeding. The Torrens title is not susceptible to collateral attack. The decree (or order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent in the case of a homestead) may be reviewed under Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act by filing the appropriate petition within one year from the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent. Or an appeal may be taken to the appellate court within the reglementary period from the decision of the Court; and in the case of the homestead, the administrative remedies may be pursued. These are the methods of direct attack. In the case at bar, this Court sitting as a court of general jurisdiction has no power to annul the Torrens title issued to the defendant, Woolbright, and others, because this is an ordinary civil action and it is a collateral attack. During the discussion of the main motion to dismiss the complaint and the motion for reconsideration, what is manifest is that the .various plaintiffs have filed Miscellaneous Applications covering various portions of the lots in question. It is not shown that the applications have already been approved. It is more consistent with the fact and law to state that the Director of Lands would abstain from acting on the applications in view of the existence of Torrens title to the land in question, for he is presumed to know that the property is no longer public land, but private property; hence the Bureau of Lands would have no jurisdiction over the same. Hence, this appeal from the lower courts dismissal order. Plaintiffs-appellants themselves formulate the fundamental issues raised by them, as follows: (1) Whether or not the case at bar falls within the scope of the provisions of Section 38 of Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. (2) Whether or not the plaintiffs are the proper parties to bring the action.
54 54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lopez vs. Padilla
(3) Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Cebu has jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action as well as the power to cancel the patent and title issued to the defendants on the ground of fraud. 1. On appellants first issue, the lower court correctly held that in ordinary registration proceedings involving private lands, courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree, only when application for review is filed by the party aggrieved within one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. Applied to homesteads the decree of registration corresponds to the promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent and not the actual issue of the patent. (Tinio vs. Frances, 21 O.G. 6205; Balboa vs. Ferales, 51 Phil. 498; Recido, et al., vs. Refaso, et al., G.R. No. L-16641, prom. June 24, 1965).5Reported in 14 SCRA 443. The facts of record, including this Courts own decision of January 30, 1965 in City of Cebu vs. Padilla,6Supra, fn. 4. show that the order for the issuance of the patent for the 53,000 square meter homestead lot in question in favor of the Padillas was issued by the Director of Lands on December 16, 1952, which was upheld by this Court even as against the adverse claim and opposition of the City of Cebu in said case; the sale to defendant Woolbright was made on June 2, 1966; and the present action was filed on June 10, 1966. The lower court accordingly held correctly that the period within which to file the action for review of the title and to annul the sale to Woolbright has already expired, on the strength of the ruling of Recido,7Supra, fn. 5 and cases cited, per Bengzon, C.J. In this case, the Court upheld the sale of the homestead in 1948 before the actual issuance of the patent in 1949, as the order for its issuance was promulgated since 7 years ago by the Director of Lands. See... that the patent is deemed issued upon promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance thereof. ________________ 5 Reported in 14 SCRA 443. 6 Supra, fn. 4. 7 Supra, fn. 5 and cases cited, per Bengzon, C.J. In this case, the Court upheld the sale of the homestead in 1948 before the actual issuance of the patent in 1949, as the order for its issuance was promulgated since 7 years ago by the Director of Lands. See also Beniga vs. Bugas, 35 SCRA 111 (Sept. 29, 1970), per Reyes, J.
2. On appellants second issue, the lower court likewise correctly ruled that plaintiffs could not properly institute the action for cancellation of defendants homestead patent No. 112148 and original certificate of title No. 183 issued in pursuance thereof, since the land clearly had ceased to be public land and private ownership thereof had vested in favor of defendants Padillas and their transferee Woolbright. Granting arguendo plaintiffs allegations of fraud and deceit against defendants and their alleged preferential right under Republic Act 730 to purchase the portions of the homestead lot occupied by them in 1958which they insist should be deemed conceded for purposes of the motion to dismiss filed by defendants-appelleessection 101 of the Public Land Act vests only in the Solicitor Genneral or the officer acting in his stead the authority to institute the action on behalf of the Republic for cancellation of defendants title and for reversion of the homestead to the Government.8See Sumail vs. Judge of CFI Cotabato, 96 Phil 946 (Apr. 30, 1955). This Court has recognized as exceptions cases where plaintiffclaimant has sought direct reconveyance from defendant of public land unlawfully and in breach of trust titled by defendant, on the principle of enforcement of a constructive trust, but such principle is in no way applicable or invoked in the case at bar.9See Agcanas vs. Nagum, 32 SCRA 298 (Mar. 30, 1970). 3. Appellants third issue insisting that the lower court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and authority to cancel defendants homestead patent and torrens title, must necessarily fail. As succinctly held by the lower court, the torrens title issued to defendants in pursuance of the homestead patent is no longer susceptible to collateral attack through the present action filed by plaintiffs, who as mere applicants of revocable lease permits or miscellaneous applications of what is now concededly titled property of private ownership, have no personality or legal interest in the first place to institute the action, nor to question the sale of the homestead allegedly within the five-year prohibitory period of section 118 of the Public Land Act. Since there is no showing that their applications have been _______________ 8 See Sumail vs. Judge of CFI Cotabato, 96 Phil 946 (Apr. 30, 1955). 9 See Agcanas vs. Nagum, 32 SCRA 298 (Mar. 30, 1970).
56 56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Unal vs. People
approved by the Director of Lands, who could not be expected to do so knowing that he has since 1952 decreed the issuance of a patent therefor and the property has long ceased to be of the public domain,
the lower court correctly ruled itself to be bereft of authority to grant the relief sought by plaintiffsappellants on the basis of their lack of a valid cause of action. ACCORDINGLY, finding no error in the lower courts appealed orders dismissing the complaint, the same are hereby affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs. Reyes, J.B.L,, Actg. C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., concur. Concepcion, C.J., is on official leave. Castro, J., took no part. Orders affirmed. Notes.a) Effect of registration of patent and issuance of certificate of title,Once the patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. (Director of Lands vs. Jugado, 2 SCRA 32). b) Reversion of public lands.Section 101 of the Public Land Act, which provides that actions for reversion of lands to the State shall be instituted by the Solicitor General, may be invoked only when title has already vested in the individual. (Francisco vs. Rodriguez, 6 SCRA 443). ______________ [Lopez vs. Padilla, 45 SCRA 44(1972)] {No. 17043. June 22, 1922] FLORENTINO PAMINTUAN, petitioner, vs. Honorable PRIMITIVO SAN AGUSTIN, Auxiliary Judge of the Second Judicial District, the SHERIFF OF PAMPANGA, NicoMEDES ESPINOSA, ROSA ESPINOSA, EUSEBIA ESPINOSA,, and FRANCISCA DAVID, respondents. 1. REGISTRATION OF LAND; JURISDICTION OF COURT IN CADASTRAL CASES.In a cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. 2. ID. ; ID.The jurisdiction of the court in cadastral cases over lands already registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands. ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Cavanna, Aboitiz & Agan for petitioner. Felix Bautista for respondents. OSTRAND, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari, requiring the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance to certify to this court the record in land registration case No.
559 VOL. 43, JUNE 22, 1922 559 Pamintuan vs. San Agustin
11732, and as much of the record of cadastral case No. 132, as pertains to lot No. 625, of the cadaster of Mabalacat, Province of Pampanga. The petitioner further prays that upon said records being so certified, all proceedings had in said cadastral case in relation to said lot No. 625, be declared null and void. By order of this court dated November 30, 1920, a preliminary injunction was issued, directing the respondents to return the possession of the land in question to the petitioner and under another order dated August 29, 1921, the records mentioned were certified to this court. An examination of the records before us shows that in land registration case No. 11732, and under the date of April 19, 1917, the aforesaid lot No. 625 was decreed in favor of Florentino Pamintuan, the petitioner herein, by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, and that certificate of title No. 540 covering said lot was thereupon issued to him in June, 1918. In the meantime cadastral case No. 132 was instituted. This case embraced the district in which the lot in question was situated and the lot was given its cadastral number in the proceedings and was marked on the plans as land in regard to which registration proceedings were pending under Act No. 496. Florentino Pamintuan inadvertently failed to claim the lot at the trial of the cadastral case, and the Court of First Instance in a decision dated April 29, 1919, awarded it to the respondents Nicomedes, Maria Mercedes, Rosa, and Eusebia Espinosa, and ordered the cancellation of certificate of title No. 540. The persons to whom the land had been adjudged subsequently conveyed their interest to the respondent Francisca David, in favor of whom the Court of First Instance issued a writ of possession, placing her in possession of the land. The possession was restored to the petitioner by virtue of the preliminary injunction issued by this court on November 30, 1920. It may be noted that no final decree has as yet been issued in the cadastral case in regard to the lot.
560 560 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Pamintuan vs. San Agustin
Florentino Pamintuan knew nothing about the adjudication of the land in favor of the Espinosas until the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga required him to surrender his certificate of title for cancellation. He then presented a motion to the Court of First Instance, asking that the decision of the court in regard to the lot in the cadastral case be set aside and that the writ of possession issued by virtue of said decision be recalled. This motion was denied by the court on November 16, 1920. We are of the opinion that the court below exceeded its jurisdiction in undertaking to decree in a cadastral case land already decreed in another land registration case. Cadastral proceedings are authorized and regulated by Act No. 2259. The scope and purpose of this Act is expressed in its title: "An Act providing certain special proceedings for the settlement and adjudication of land titles." What is understood by "settlement and adjudication" is very clearly indicated in section 11 of the Act, which reads as follows: "SEC. 11. The trial of the case may occur at any convenient place within the province in which the lands are situated or at such other place as the court, for reasons stated in writing and filed with the record of the case, may designate, and shall be conducted in the same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of Land Registration, and shall be governed by the same rules. Orders of default and confession shall also be entered in the same manner as in ordinary cases in the same court and shall have the same effect. All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees awarded in favor of the persons entitled to the lands or the various parts thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the basis for original certificates of title in favor of said persons, which shall have the same effect as certificates of title granted on application for registration of land under the Land Registration Act, and except as herein otherwise provided
561 VOL. 43, JUNE 22, 1922 561 Pamintuan vs. San Agustin
all of the provisions of said Land Registration Act, as now amended, and as it hereafter may be amended, shall be applicable to proceedings under this Act, and to the titles and certificates of title granted or issued hereunder." As will be seen the "settlement and adjudication" of a land title under the Cadastral Act is exactly that provided for in the Land Registration Act, No. 496, i. e., a proceeding culminating in the issuance of a final decree and a Torrens certificate of title in favor of the owner of the land. The title to the land is therefore fully as well settled and adjudicated, within the meaning of. the Cadastral Act, by a final decree in an ordinary land registration case as it would be by a similar decree in a cadastral cas$ and, obviously, it cannot have been the intention of the Legislature to provide a special
proceeding for the settlement and adjudication of titles already settled and adjudicated. It is, .indeed, more than doubtful if the Legislature would have the power to enact such a provision had it so desired; the landholder who possesses a settled and adjudicated title to his land cannot be deprived of that title through another settlement and adjudication of a similar character. The intention of the Legislature to exclude land already registered from the operation of the Cadastral Act is further indicated by the provision of section 18 of the Act to the effect that, no apportionment of any part of the costs and expenses of cadastral proceedings can be made against such lands. We hold that in cadastral cases the jurisdiction of the court over lands already registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title. The petition is granted, and the proceedings in the court below in regard to lot No. 625 of the cadaster of Mabalacat
562 562 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Di Siock Jian vs. Sy Lioc Suy
are declared null and void, with the costs against the respondents Nicomedes Espinosa, Maria Mercedes Espinosa, Rosa Espinosa, Eusebia Espinosa, and Francisca David, jointly and severally. So ordered. Araullo, C. J., Malcolm, Avancea, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur. [No. 37434. April 5, 1934] EL HOGAR FILIPINO, Mutual Building and Loan Association, plaintiff and appellant, vs. SEVERINO OLVIGA ET AL., defendants and appellees. 1. EVIDENCE; EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF A PUBLIC DOCUMENT CONTAINING A CONTRACT OF PURCHASE AND SALE.The biased and interested testimony of the grantor and the vague and uncertain testimony 18 18 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga
of his son are insufficient to overcome a public instrument embodying a contract of purchase and sale drawn up with all the formalities prescribed by law. To hold otherwise would be to establish a very dangerous doctrine which would throw wide open the doors to fraud. 2. HOMESTEAD PATENTJ REGISTRATION ACCORDING TO ACT NO. 496.Once a homestead patent, issued according to the Public Land Act, is registered in conformity with the provisions of section 122 of Act No. 496, it becomes irrevocable and enjoys the same privileges as Torrens titles issued under the latter Act. (Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 850; Manalo vs. Lukban and Liwanag, 48 Phil., 973.) 3. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION IN A CADASTRAL PROCEEDING.When a homestead patent is registered in accordance with section 122 of Act No. 496 and a certificate of title issued in conformity therewith, the land thus registered cannot again be the subject of registration in a cadastral proceeding without the consent of the owner, and the title issued in the latter proceeding in violation of this principle is null and void and should be cancelled. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. Enage, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Antonio Sanz for appellant. Argosino & Antipala for appellees. IMPERIAL, J.: The plaintiff, a mutual building and loan association, brought this action to recover from the defendants the title to and possession of a parcel of land, with the improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Esperanza, of the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, and more particularly described in transfer certificates of title Nos. 5261 and 5617, both of which were issued by the register of deeds of the said province. In the same action, the plaintiff likewise seeks to recover from the said defendants damages in the sum of P2,000 plus whatever other amount proven at tfee trial as value of the fruits illegally received by them.
19 VOL. 60, APRIL 5, 1934 19 El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga
After trial, the court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff. It appealed.
The case was submitted by the parties upon a stipulation of facts quoted hereinbelow, in addition to other evidence: "The parties agree on the following facts: "1. That the plaintiff is a mutual building and loan association duly incorporated in accordance with the laws of the Philippine Islands. "2. They agree as to the identity of the land in question. "3. That the land in question formerly had original certificate of title No. 477 (Homestead Patent No. 2973) issued by the Governor-General on July 7, 1921, and registered in the registry of deeds of Tayabas on October 3, 1921, in favor of the spouses Timoteo Olviga and Rafaela Iglesia. "4. That certificate of title No. 477 was cancelled by transfer certificate of title No. 2505 issued on August 3, 1928, in favor of Genaro T. Tabien. "5. That on August 4, 1928, the land in question was mortgaged by said Genaro T. Tabien to El Hogar Filipino for the sum of P5,600, and said mortgage was registered in the registry of deeds of Tayabas and noted on the said transfer certificate of title No. 2505. "6. That pursuant to the mortgage contract and Act No. 3135, the land in question was extrajudicially sold at public auction and adjudicated to the plaintiff entity El Hogar Filipino, as the highest bidder, for the sum of P6,232.30. "7. That on April 18, 1931, this court declared El Hogar Filipino, upon its petition, as the absolute owner of the land in question and ordered the cancellation of transfer certificate of title No. 2505, and the issuance in the name of said El Hogar Filipino of another certificate, which is transfer certificate of title No. 5261 of the registry of deeds of Tayabas. "8. That the land in question is the same land now known as lot No. 3912 of Cadastral Record No. 54 of the Cadastre of Lopez, with its original certificate of title No. 30174 in
20 20 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga
the name of the spouses Timoteo Olviga and Rafaela Iglesia, issued on June 27, 1930, and registered on July 26, 1930, in the registry of deeds of Tayabas.
"9. That on March 30, 1929, said parcel of land was sold by Timoteo Olviga, his wife, Rafaela Iglesia, and their children to the defendant spouses Bonifacio Perez and Irinea Oiviga. "10. That upon petition of the spouses Bonifacio Perez and Irinea Olviga, and pursuant to the court's order dated March 24, 1931, in lot No. 3912, Cadastral Record No. 54, the said original certificate of title No. 30174 was cancelled and a new one, transfer certificate of title No. 5617, was issued in favor of the said defendant spouses Bonifacio Perez and Irinea Olviga. "11. That the defendant spouses Bonifacio Perez and Irinea Olviga have been in actual possession of the land in question since March 30, 1929. "12. That during the period between March 29, 1930, and this date, November 6, 1931, the defendant spouses Bonifacio Perez and Irinea Olviga harvested from the said land fruits valued at P400, and from this date, November 6, 1931, the said land will yield fruits at the average rate of P45 every three months. "Therefore, both parties respectfully pray the court to admit this stipulation of facts." The gist of the plaintiff's three assignments of error may be stated as follows: that the court erred in not declaring the plaintiff to be the owner of the land in question, entitled to the immediate possession thereof and to the value of the fruits illegally received by the defendants, which value is determined in paragraph 12 of the stipulation of facts. The appealed judgment is based on two grounds, to wit: (1) That the deed of sale alleged to have been executed by Timoteo Olviga in favor of Genaro T. Tabien is false and fictitious and (2) that transfer certificate of title No. 5261, which was issued in favor of the plaintiff, cannot prevail
over transfer certificate of title No. 5617 issued in the name of the defendant spouses Bonifacio Perez and Irinea Olviga. A careful examination of the evidence presented at the trial convinces this court that the said deed of sale is not fictitious but genuine. Only Timoteo Olviga and his son Severino testified in support of its falsity. The former's testimony is contained in an affidavit prepared ex parte, which was admitted by the court merely because it was not objected to upon presentation. Its admission under such circumstances did not in the least give it a greater evidentiary value than it should have under the well recognized rules of evidence. In said affidavit Timoteo asserted that he did not sign the deed of sale in question, that the
signature thereon is not his, and that he was not even informed of the contents thereof. His son Severino confined himself to testifying that the signature in his father's name appearing on the said instrument is not his father's because it does not look like his real signature. A brief analysis of such evidence will show how insufficient it is to overcome or detract from the evidentiary force of the public instrument relating to the transfer made by Timoteo in favor of Genaro T. Tabien. It should be borne in mind that said public instrument was signed in the presence of two instrumental witnesses and appears to have been ratified by Timoteo before a notary public. If the biased and interested testimony of a grantor and the vague and uncertain testimony of his son are deemed sufficient to overcome a public instrument drawn up with all the formalities prescribed by the law then there will have been established a very dangerous doctrine which would throw wide open the doors to fraud. The trial court, following the doctrine on the effects of the registration of a homestead patent laid down in the cases of Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby (31 Phil, 590), and De los Reyes vs. Razon (38 Phil., 480), held that the titles obtained by Genaro T. Tabien and the plaintiff should not
prevail over those subsequently obtained by the spouses Timoteo Olviga and Rafaela Iglesia and by the spouses Bonifacio Perez and Irinea Olviga on the ground that the latter titles were issued in a cadastral proceeding while the former, in a proceeding for the registration of a homestead, in accordance with section 122 of Act No. 496. In arriving at said conclusion of law the court undoubtedly disregarded the circumstance that the doctrines laid down in the above cited decisions have been abandoned by this court after a further study of the provisions of said section 122, as may be seen in the decisions subsequently rendered in the cases of Aquino vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil., 850), and Manalo vs. Lukban and Liwanag (48 Phil., 973). In the first case the court said: "The proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final. (Act No. 496, secs. 35, 38, and 45, as amended; Act No. 926, secs. 59 and 63, as amended; Escueta vs. Director of Lands [1910], 16 Phil., 482; Grey Alba-vs. De la Cruz [1910], 17 Phil., 49; Roxas vs. Enriquez [1914], 29 Phil., 31; Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby [1915], 31 Phil., 591.)"
And in the second case, the court said: "Where a land was granted by the Government to a private individual as homesteader under the provisions of Act No. 926, and the corresponding patent was registered and issued to the grantee, said land is considered registered within the meaning of the Land Registration Act, No. 496. (Sec. 122, Act No. 496.) "The title to the land thus granted and registered may no longer be the subject of any inquiry, decision, or judgment in a cadastral proceeding. But a partition may be made in said proceeding, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2259."
23 VOL. 60, APEIL 5, 1934 23 El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga
Therefore it follows that inasmuch as the titles in favor of Tabien and the plaintiff have been issued in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 496, the same have all the characteristics of an irrevocable Torrens title, and since Tabien's title is prior to that issued in the name of the spouses Bonifacio Perez and Irinea Olviga, the latter title should not prevail over the former. The case presents another legal aspect. Nobody questions the fact that the property in question was originally a public land which was granted to Timoteo Olviga and his wife as a homestead. Later the title obtained by them under the Public Land Act was registered under the Torrens System by virtue of the provisions of section 122 of Act No. 496. Thenceforth the land became subject to the provisions of the latter Act and the title issued thereunder became irrevocable. When the Olviga spouses appeared in the cadastral proceedings and applied for the cancellation of their title and the issuance of a new one to them, which was so done, the court which took cognizance of the cadastral proceedings must have known that the land already had an old title and that Genaro T. Tabien appeared in the records of the registry of deeds as the registered owner thereof. In such case it was in duty bound not to order the issuance of a new certificate of title in favor of the Olviga spouses on the ground that they had already ceased to be the registered owners of the same. The court, however, ordered the cancellation of the old title of the said Olviga spouses and the issuance to them of a new certificate of title which was later replaced by the transfer certificate of title issued in the name of the defendant spouses Bonifacio Perez and Irinea Olviga. The irregularity thus committed is due to no other cause than the failure of the 01viga spouses to inform the court, which took cognizance of the cadastral proceedings, that they had already obtained Torrens title to the said land and that in the records of the registry of deeds Genaro T. Tabien appeared as the
registered owner thereaf and the plaintiff as the mortgagee. There is no question that the plaintiff is a mortgagee in good faith and for value and if that is true there is no valid reason in law for not considering it as the absolute owner of the land in question inasmuch as in enforcing its right, it foreclosed the mortgage constituted thereon in its favor and acquired the said property at public auction, and later succeeded in obtaining the issuance to it of transfer certificate of title No. 5261. As regards the indemnity for damages and the value of the fruits which the defendant spouses Bonifacio Perez and Irinea Olviga have been receiving, this court is of the opinion that the evidence does not sufficiently show that said spouses are possessors in bad faith inasmuch as there is no sufficient proof that they were aware of the fact that Timoteo Olviga and his wife had no title to transfer the property, nor is there sufficient indication that there was collusion between the said parties. For this reason this court holds that there is no legal justification for ordering said defendant spouses to pay to the plaintiff the value of the fruits in question. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, by declaring the plaintiff as the absolute owner of the land in question and ordering the spouses Bonifacio Perez and Irinea Olviga to deliver the possession and enjoyment of the same to the said plaintiff, with the costs of both instances against the said Perez spouses. The register of deeds of Tayabas shall cancel de oficio original certificate of title No. 30171 and transfer certificate of title No. 5617. So ordered. Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, and Goddard, JJ., concur. STREET, J., dissenting: In view of the finding that the deed under which the plaintiff claims in this case was forged, I am of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed. Negligence should not be imputed to Olviga from the fact that he placed his owner's duplicate certificate in the hands of Juan Tabien, for that
act was done for a legitimate purpose and no negligence existed. DIAZ, J., dissenting: It is with regret that I have to dissent from the majority opinion. Timoteo Olviga's affidavit and the testimony of his son Severino are not the only evidence on the falsity of the deed of sale by means of which Juan T. Tabien and his brother Genaro T. Tabien, on August 3, 1928, obtained the issuance of transfer certificate of title No. 2505 in favor of Genaro; but so are Juan T. Tabien's two letters to Timoteo Olviga, dated July 1, 1928, and March 23, 1929, respectively. Between Timoteo Olviga and Juan T. Tabien, there never existed any relation of principal and agent. In order to induce Timoteo Olviga to deliver to him Olviga's certificate of title No. 477, Juan T. Tabien resorted to the trick of informing Olviga that the latter's son-in-law named Bonifacio Perez was under arrest, that he (Perez) had to file a bond in order to be set at liberty, and that it was necessary for said Olviga to deliver to said Tabien his certificate of title and become one of Perez's bondsmen. This fact appears in Juan T. Tabien's aforesaid letter dated July 1, 1928. Thus induced, Timoteo Olviga, who, by the way, is illiterate and furthermore an old man seventy-seven years of age, delivered the certificate of title required of him by Juan T. Tabien who, after obtaining possession of the same, with the aid of his brother Genaro T. Tabien, forged the aforesaid deed of sale in favor of Genaro, making it appear therein that the same had been executed and signed by Timoteo Olviga, who never did so in fact, thus pitilessly abusing the old man's good faith. When Timoteo Olviga asked Juan T. Tabien to return his certificate of title, the latter wrote him the letter dated March 21, 1929, promising to return the said certificate as soon as possible, although he knew positively that such thing was impossible because he did not have it in his possession, nor could he again have possession of the same on the ground that it had been cancelled upon the issuance of
transfer certificate of title No. 2505 in favor of Genaro T. Tabien by the register of deeds of Tayabas. With the aid of the said forged deed and the exhibition of Timoteo 01viga's certificate of title, the two Tabien brothers succeeded in inducing the said register of deeds to act as he did, and with the new certificate of title issued by the said official to Genaro T. Tabien, the two likewise succeeded in inducing the herein appellant to buy with pacto de retro from Genaro the land covered by the said certificate. Upon the facts just stated, I am of the opinion that the doctrine laid down by this court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Fabie (35 Phil., 144), is not applicable to the case at bar on the ground that the facts of that case are not similar to those of the instant case. In the case of De la Cruz vs. Fabie, Vedasto Velasquez really acted as Gregoria Hernandez's attorney in fact to sell or otherwise encumber the land in question,
while in this case it cannot be said that there has existed the same relation of agent or attorney in fact and principal between Juan T. Tabien and Timoteo Olviga. The above cited case was decided adversely to Gregoria Hernandez because it was held that said woman was negligent while in this case the same cannot be said as regards Timoteo Olviga for, in the first place, if Olviga acceded to Juan T. Tabien's request for the delivery to him of the former's certificate of title, it was simply because Olviga was made to believe that such delivery was only for the purpose of qualifying him as one of the bondsmen of his son-in-law Bonifacio Perez; in the second place, said Juan T. Tabien was never authorized by Olviga to sell the latter's land or obtain from anybody any loan secured by said property, and in the third place, Olviga did not fail to require Tabien to return his document. Such acts do not constitute negligence. On the other hand, the same section 55 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3322, contains a clause which protects Timoteo Olviga, providing as follows: "That after the transcription of the decree of registration on the original ap-
27 VOL. 60, APRIL 5, 1934 27 Sanson vs. Araneta
plication, any subsequent registration under this Act procured by the presentation of a forged duplicate certificate, or of a forged deed or other instrument, shall be null and void." Wherefore, I am of the opinion that the appealed judgment should be affirmed and that charges for falsification of a public document should be filed against the brothers Juan T. Tabien and Genaro T. Tabien, without prejudice to the appellant's right to recover from Genaro T. Tabien or from both of said brothers the amount paid by it for Timoteo Olviga's land. BUTTE, J.: I concur fully in the views expressed in Justice Diaz dissenting opinion Judgment reversed. _______________ [El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17(1934)] No. L-16589. September 29, 1961. JOSE O. DURAN and TERESA DIAZ VDA.DE DURAN, applicants-appellants, vs. BERNABE OLIVIA, FE ALMAZAN, HEIRS OF VICENTE GODESANO, MANUEL ARCE and ESPERANZA SALUD, oppositors-appellees. Land registration; Torrens system; Rules of Court applicable to land and cadastral cases in a suppletory character.By express provision of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the rules contained therein apply to
land registration and cadastral cases in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient (Dulay v. The Director of Lands, Vol. 53 O.G. p. 161). The Land Registration Act does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. As a motion to dismiss is necessary for the expeditious termination of land registration cases, said motion contained in the Rules of Court can be availed of by the parties. Same; Same; Fundamental purpose; Homestead patent and sales patent; Effect of registration under the Land Registration Act.The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System of registration is to finally settle the titles to land and putto stop any question of legality of title thereto. That being the purpose of the law, there would be no end to litigation if every property covered by torrens title may still be relitigated in a subsequent land registration proceeding. Pursuant to this purpose, a homestead patent once registered under the Land Registration Act, can not be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, and any title issued thereon is null and void. The same may be said of a sales patent. Once a certificate of title is issued under the Land Registration Act in lieu of a sales patent, the land is considered registered under the Torrens system and the title of the patentee becomes indefeasible. Same; Same; Court of First Instance without power to decree again registration of land already decreed.A Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceeding being in rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of the first registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the latter applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the efficacy of the registration law. (Rojas, et al. vs. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L13333, November 24, 1959). APPEAL from the orders of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Reyes & Dy-Liacco for applicants-appellants. German G. Vilgera for oppositors-appellees. LABRADOR, J.: This is an appeal from two orders dated July 31, 1959 and September 12, 1959, both of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Hon. Perfecto R. Palacio, presiding, rendered in Land Registration Case No. N-
564; G.L.R. Rec. No. N-7544, entitled Jose O. Duran and Teresa Diaz Vda. de Duran, applicants, versus Bernabe Olivia, Fe Al-
156 156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Duran vs. Olivia
mazan, Heirs of Vicente Godesano, Manuel Arce and Esperanza Salud, oppositors. The order of July 31, 1959 is for the dismissal of the land registration case for lack of jurisdiction of the lower court with respect to Lots Nos. 3, 6, 7, 9 and 15, and that dated September 12, 1959 with respect to Lots Nos. 12 and 16. On December 3, 1952, Jose O. Duran and Teresa Diaz Vda. de Duran filed an application for the registration in their names of sixteen lots (denominated in said application as Lots Nos. 1 to 16, inclusive) under Plan PSU-128386 in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. On April 20, 1954, the case was heard initially and on May 5, 1954, the oppositors filed their opposition to the application. On August 27, 1958, the oppositors filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to decree registration of the lots respectively claimed by them, because said lots are already registered and certificates of title have been issued thereon in their names. They attached to the motion to dismiss the following: Original Certificate of Title No. 2342, in the name of Bernabe Olivia (covering Lot 6); Original Certificate of Title No. 2343, in the name of Fe Almazan (covering Lot 7); Original Certificate of Title No. 514, in the name of Manuel Arce (covering Lots Nos. 9 and 15); Original Certificate of Title No. 433, in the name of Esperanza Salud (covering Lot No. 16); and Original Certificate of Title No. 7439, in the name of Heirs of Florencio Godesano (covering Lots Nos. 3 and 12). The applicants filed their objection to said motion, alleging that the reasons for the motion to dismiss do not appear in the application but are mere assertions of the parties and that the trial court has jurisdiction to consider the application even though the lots subject matter thereof are already covered by certificates of title. After a reply to the opposition was filed by the oppositors, the lower court resolved the motion to dismiss and rendered successively the two orders of dismissal appealed from. Hence this appeal. The applicants-appellants assign two errors of the lower court, to wit: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AND GRANTING THE OBJECTORS-APPELLEES MOTION TO
157 VOL. 3, SEPTEMBER 29, 1961 157
Duran vs. Olivia
DISMISS THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION WITH RESPECT TO LOTS 3, 6, 7, 9, 12, 15 and 16 ALTHOUGH IT WAS BASED MERELY ON THE SUPPOSED FACTS ALLEGED IN THE SAID MOTION ITSELF; AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPLICATION WITH RESPECT TO LOTS 3, 6, 7, 9, 12, 15 and 16 FOR ALLEGED LACK OF JURISDICTION UPON THE MERE ASSERTION OF THE OBJECTORSAPPELLEES THAT THESE LOTS ARE COVERED BY CERTIFICATES OF TITLE BASED MERELY UPON PUBLIC LAND PATENTS GRANTED TO THEM. In support of their first assignment of error, appellants claim that oppositors-appellees can not avail of a motion to dismiss in a land registration case and that the application and the titles do not show similar identities between the lots covered by said titles and those applied for in these proceedings. The first assignment of error can not be sustained. By express provision of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the rules contained therein apply to land registration and cadastral cases in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient (Dulay v. The Director of Lands, Vol. 53 O.G. p. 161). The Land Registration Act does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. As a motion to dismiss is necessary for the expeditious termination of land registration cases, said motion contained in the Rules of Court can be availed of by the parties in this case. With respect to the alleged failure of the oppositors-appellees to prove similar identities of the lots covered by the titles and those applied for, We have examined the certificates of title and the application, and We concur with the finding of the trial court that the lots covered by said titles are the same as some of those applied for by the appellants. We, therefore, find no justification for reversing the orders appealed from based only upon the first assignment of error. Appellants argue in support of their second assignment of error that a certificate of title based upon a mere homestead, sales or free patent covering private land is null and void; that it is the decree of registration, not the cer-
158 158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Duran vs. Olivia
tificate of title which confers the character of incontestability of title; that the appellants have been deprived of their property without hearing; and that the cases cited in the order of the lower court do
not apply to the case at bar. Consequently, they claim that the lower court possesses jurisdiction to try and decide the instant land registration proceedings even with respect to the lots already covered by certificates of title. Appellants claim is without merit, if we have to consider that a patent once registered under Act No. 496 becomes indefeasible as a torrens title (Manalo v. Lukban, et al., 48 Phil. 973). Sec. 122.Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. x x x After due registration and issue of the certificate and owners duplicate, such land shall be registered land for all purposes under this Act. (Act 496) The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System of registration is to finally settle the titles to land; to put to stop any question of legality of title thereto. That being the purpose of the law, there would be no end to litigation if every property covered by torrens title may still be relitigated in a subsequent land registration proceedings. Pursuant to the above purpose, we have held in a long line of decisions that a homestead patent once registered under the Land Registration Act can not be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding and that any title issued thereon is null and void. A homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title, and cannot thereafter be the subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in a cadastral case. Any new title which the cadastral court may order to be issued is null and void and should be cancelled. All that the cadastral court may do is to make correction of technical errors in the description of the property contained in its title, or to proceed to the partition thereof if it is owned by two or more co-owners. (Ramoso v. Obligado, et al., 70 Phil. 86; See also Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558; El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17; Republic v. Carle, et al., G.R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1959; Samonte et al. v. Descallar, et al., G.R. No. L-12964, Feb. 29, 1960).
159 VOL. 3, SEPTEMBER 29, 1961 159 Duran vs. Olivia
The same may be said of a sales patent. Once a certificate of title is issued under the Land Registration Act in lieu of a sales patent, the land is considered registered under the Torrens system and the title of the patentee becomes indefeasible. As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that the Court of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain
proceedings for the registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of the respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas, et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November 24, 1959, in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:. As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court. All the other contentions of respondent regarding possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, while perhaps valid in an appropriate ordinary action, as to which we here express no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the court a quo, sitting as land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the registration, in favor of respondent city, of a lot already previously decreed and registered in favor of the petitioners. In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void.1Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558, 561; Timbol v. Diaz, 44 Phil. 587, 590; Perez v. Bolbon, 50 Phil. 791, 795; Singi-an v. Manila Railroad Co., 60 Phil. 192, 203; Addison v. Payates Estate Improvement Co., 60 Phil. 673; Sideco v. Aznar, G.R. No. L483... This is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of first registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the later applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title so that _______________ 1 Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558, 561; Timbol v. Diaz, 44 Phil. 587, 590; Perez v. Bolbon, 50 Phil. 791, 795; Singi-an v. Manila Railroad Co., 60 Phil. 192, 203; Addison v. Payates Estate Improvement Co., 60 Phil. 673; Sideco v. Aznar, G.R. No. L-4831, prom. April 24, 1953.
160 160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Bayer vs. Board of Coms. of the Bureau of Immigration
he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the efficacy of the registration law.2Ventura, Land Titles & Deeds, p. 183; Legarda v. Saleeby. 31 Phil. 590, 593.
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. With costs against appellants. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and De Leon, JJ., concur. Concepcion, J., took no part. Orders affirmed. Notes.While with the due registration and issuance of a certificate of title over a land acquired pursuant to the Public Land Law, said property becomes registered in contemplation of Act 496 (Sec. 122, Act 496), in view of its nature and manner of acquisition, such certificate of title, when in conflict with one obtained on the same date through judicial proceedings, must give way to the latter (Nieto v. Quines, et al., L-14643, Sept. 29, 1962reiterated in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, et al., L17696, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 71. A homestead patent, however, is null and void when it covers land already segregated from the public domain, over which the Land Department has no longer any control. The rule is that once a patent is confirmed by registration and replaced by a torrens title, the land covered thereby is removed from the domain and sphere of the Public Land Act and of the department charged with the administration and disposition of the public domain (Cabrera, et al. v. Sinoy, et al., L-12648, Nov. 23, 1959). [Duran vs. Olivia, 3 SCRA 154(1961)]
No. L-33676. June 30, 1971. MARIANO PAJOMAYO, PATRICIO PAJOMAYO, EUSEBIO PAJOMAYO, SOLEDAD PAJOMAYO assisted by her husband FLORIANO CHITONGCO, DEMETRIO PAJOMAYO, CRISTITA PAJOMAYO assisted by her husband MANUEL RAMIREZ, PATROCINIO PAJOMAYO and CRISPO PAJOMAYO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. RODRIGO MANIPON and PERFECTA ZULUETA, defendants-appellants. Land registration; Preference between two titles covering same parcel of land.Where the parties submitted a stipulation of facts raising therein the sole issue of which of the two certificates of title covering the same land shall prevail, and no other, the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff's O.C.T. No. 1089 prevails over defendants' O.C.T. No. 14034, the former having been issued on 27 November 1931, or prior to the issuance of the latter on 1 April 1957. Same; Where two titles cover the same land, the nullity of one results in the validity of the other. Where the same parcel of land is covered by two titles, necessarily, when one of the two titles is .held to be superior over the other, one should be declared null and void and should be cancelled. Land registration; Public Land Act; Legal effect of title issued under Public Land Act.Once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, as amended, the Certificate of Title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration Act.
Same; Rule on same land covered by two titles.It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties, and in case of successive registration where more than one certificate is issued over the land the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who relies on the second certificate. APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Bacani, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Francisco T. Gualberto for plaintiffs-appellees. Tomas Tadeo, Jr. for defendants-appellants. ZALDIVAR, J.: Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IX) in its Civil Case No. U655. The decision was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals on November 3, 1964. In the resolution of the second special division of the Court of Appeals. promulgated 011 April 27, 1971, this case was certified to this Court as one that is within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Courtonly errors on question of law being involved in the appeal.1The record of this case was received in the Supreme Court on June 21, 1971. On June 5, 1963 the plaintiffs filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IX, at Urdaneta, Pangasinan) a complaint alleging that they are co-owners pro-indiviso of the parcel of land described in the complaint which is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 in the name of Diego Pajomayo, issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan; that they had acquired the land as an inheritance from their late father Diego Pajomayo; that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in actual, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of said property in the concept of owners for a period of more than 70 years until the early part of the year 1956 when the defendants dispossessed them of said property, resulting in their having suffered annual damages amounting to around P1,100.00 representing the value of the crops of rice; mongo, corn and vegetables that they failed to harvest; and that because they have to file the present suit they must spend P800.00 for incidental expenses of litigation and attorney's fees. The plaintiffs prayed that they be declared the Iawful owners pro-indiviso of the land in question,, and that the defendants be ordered to vacate the land and pay them the damages they have suffered. In their answer the defendants, after denying some of the allegations of the complaint, alleged that they are the exclusive owners of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 14043 issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, the said land having been adjudicated to them in the cadastral proceedings of the Malasique cadastre, and that apparently the plaintiffs are claiming the same parcel of land. The defendants claim they had acquired the land mentioned in their answer by inheritance from their deceased father Pioquinto Manipon, and that they and their predecessorsininterest have been in actual, peaceful, and adverse possession of said land for more than 70 years, to
the exclusion of plaintiffs; and that as possessors in good faith they have introduced on the land improvements worth P1,000.00. As affirmative defenses, the defendants allege that plaintiffs' action is barred by res-judicata and/ or prescription and that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The defendants set up a counterclaim for damages in the sum of P500.00 representing attorney's fees that they paid their counsel. The defendants prayed that they be declared the owners of the parcel of land mentioned in their answer; that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay them damages in the sum of P500.00; and, in the alternative should judgment be rendered against them, that the plaintiffs be ordered jointly and severally to pay them the sum of P1,000.00 represent-
679 VOL. 39, JUNE 30, 1971 679 Pajomayo vs. Manipon
ing the value of the improvements they have introduced on the land. When the case was called for trial on July 6, 1964, the counsels f or the parties, submitted to the court a stipulation of facts, as follows: "1. That plaintiffs are the children and compulsory heirs of the late Diego Pajomayo; "2. That parties agree that the land in question is covered by two Certificates of Title, one in the name of Diego Pajomayo under Original Cert. of Title No. 1089 issued under Free Patent, owner's copy attached hereto as Annex A; and Original Cert. of Title No, 14034, in the name of the Defendant Rodrigo Manipon, issued in Cadastral Case No. 91 of Malasique Cadastre, certified true copy of which is attached hereto as Annex B; "3. That parties agree to submit this case on the above stipulations without further presentation of evidence. "WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed this Honorable Court that decision be rendered upon the foregoing stipulation af ter the parties have submitted simultaneous memoranda within a period of twenty (20) days from today. "Urdaneta, Pangasinan this 6th day of July, 1964." On the basis of the foregoing stipulation of facts, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IX) made a finding that Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 held by the plaintiffs was issued earlier than Original Certificate of Title No. 14034 held by the defendants, and on September 10, 1964 it rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court, rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, hereby orders the latter to vacate the land in question and deliver possession thereof to the former who are entitled thereto as the heirs of Diego Pajomayo who is hereby declared the legal and lawful owner of the said property. The Register of Deeds for Pangasinan is hereby ordered to cancel de oficio Original Certificate of Title No. 14034. "With costs of this suit against the defendant."
680 680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Pajomayo vs. Manipon
From the above-mentioned decision of the lower court, the defendants brought up the present appeal. In their appeal the defendants made the following assignment of errors: 1. The lower court erred in declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 14034 of herein appellants null and void notwithstanding the fact that this is not one of the reliefs prayed for by the appellees. 2. The lower erred in ordering the herein appellants to vacate the land in question and to deliver the possession thereof to the herein appellees although the latter failed to prove their cause of action against the herein appellants. 3. The lower court erred in not applying the doctrine of res judicata in favor of herein appellants. The appeal has no merit. There is no question regarding the identity of the land Involved. The only question to be resolved in the present appeal is: which of the two original certificates of title should prevailthe No. 1089 held by the plaintiffs-appellees which was issued in virtue of the homestead patent, or the No. 14034 held by the defendants-appellants which was issued in connection with the cadastral proceedings? Necessarily, when one of the two titles is held to be superior over the other, one should be declared null and void and should be ordered cancelled. And if a party is declared to be the owner of a parcel of land pursuant to a valid certificate of title said party is entitled to the possession of the land covered by said valid title. The decree of registration issued in the cadastral proceedings does not have the effect of annulling the title that had previously been issued in accordance with the provisions of the land Registration Law (Act 496). The lower court, therefore, had correctly ordered the cancellation of Certificate of Title No. 14034 held by the defendants when it declared that Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 held by the plaintiffs
should prevail. Likewise, the lower court had correctly ordered the defendants to vacate the land in question and deliver possession thereof to plaintiffs after declaring plaintiffs entitled thereto
as the heirs of Diego Pajomayo, the lawful owner of the land. Contrary to the claim of defendants, the doctrine of res judicata can not be applied in their f avor in the present case. The undisputed fact is that the plaintiffs base their claim of title to the land in question, on Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 issued to their father, Diego Pajomayo, on November 27, 1931 in virtue of a; free patent that was granted to him. The law requires that the homestead patent must be registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province where the land covered by the patent lies. Section 122 off the Land Registration Act (Act 496) provides as follows: "SEC. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging (to the Government of the United States or) to the Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. It shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the province where the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds and conveyance, whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and an owner's duplicate certificate issued to the grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as contract between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and effect the land, and in all cases under this Act registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. The fees for registration shall be paid by the grantee. After due registration and issue of the certificate and owner's duplicate, such land shall be registered land for all purposes under this Act." (Italics supplied). Thus, it has been ruled by this Court that once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496
682
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Pajomayo vs. Manipon
(Land Registration Act), the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration Act. In the case of Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850, this Court held: "The procedure under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final. (Act No. 496, secs. 35, 38, and 45, as amended; Act 926, secs. 59 and 63, as amended; Escueta vs. Director of Lands, 16 Phil. 482; Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49; Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Legarda, et al vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 591)..."2Chapter VI of Act 926 (the old Public Land Law) is now found in Title II (Chapters III to VIII, inclusive, of Com. Act 141, the present Public Land Law). In the case of Manalo vs. Lukban and Liwanag, 48 Phil. 973, 979, this Court said: "The record shows that the land covered by said judgment had already been granted by the government to Monico Corpus Manuel as homesteader under the provisions of Act 926, the corresponding certificate of title having been registered and issued to said grantee. By virtue of said registration and issuance of the certificate of title, that !and is considered registered within the meaning of the Land Registration Act, No. 496 (sec. 122 of said Act). "So that when the trial was held in the cadastral proceeding which covered said land, and when the judgment of June 29, 1922 concerning said land was rendered in said proceeding, the title to that land could no longer be the subject of any inquiry, determination or judgment, for it had already been adjudicated to Monico Corpus Manuel more than ten years before, with all the legal formalities and with all the force of a title under Act 496." The doctrine laid down in the two cases above-cited has been affirmed and applied by this Court in a long line of decisions.3El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17; Ramoso vs. Obligado, 70 Phil. 86; Duran vs. Olivia, L-16589, Sept. 29, 1961, 3 SCRA 154: De la Cruz vs. Reano, L-29792, Aug. 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 585 (and the cases cited therein). The ruling regarding the validity and force _______________ 2 Chapter VI of Act 926 (the old Public Land Law) is now found in Title II (Chapters III to VIII, inclusive, of Com. Act 141, the present Public Land Law). 3 El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17; Ramoso vs. Obligado, 70 Phil. 86; Duran vs. Olivia, L-16589, Sept. 29, 1961, 3 SCRA 154: De la Cruz vs. Reano, L-29792, Aug. 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 585 (and the cases cited therein).
of a certificate of title issued in virtue of the registration of a homestead patent is applicable to certificates of title issued in virtue of the registration of other land patents under the Public Land Law. In the case of Lahora, et al. vs. Dayanghirang, et al., G.R. No. L-28565, January 30, 1971,437 SCRA 346. this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held: "The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and 'the character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of said Act In other words, upon the expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title becomes irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding." It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties,, and in of successive registration where more than one certificate is issued over the land the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who relies on the second certificate.5Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; De Villa vs. Trinidad, G.R. No. L-24918, March 20, 1968, 22 SCRA 1167, 1174. See also Hodges vs. Dy Buncio, G.R. No. L-16096, Oct. 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 287; Register of Deeds vs. Philippine National Bank, L-17641, Jan. 30, 19... In the case now before Us, it appearing that Original Certif icate of Title No. 14034 upon which the def endantsappellants base their claim of ownership over the land in question was issued on April 1, 1937, while Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 upon which plaintiffs-appellees base a similar claim was issued on November 27, _______________ 4 37 SCRA 346. 5 Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; De Villa vs. Trinidad, G.R. No. L-24918, March 20, 1968, 22 SCRA 1167, 1174. See also Hodges vs. Dy Buncio, G.R. No. L-16096, Oct. 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 287; Register of Deeds vs. Philippine National Bank, L-17641, Jan. 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 46; Alzate vs. Philippine National Bank, L-20068, Jan. 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 422 (and cases cited therein).
684 684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Pajomayo vs. Manipon
1931, under the law and the authorities We have herein cited, the latter certificate of title should prevail, and the f ormer should be cancelled. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with costs against the defendants-appellants. It is so ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. Castro, J., is on leave. Decision affirmed. Notes.(a) Res judicata.See the annotation in 23 SCRA 301-309. (b) Effect of registration of homestead of free patent.A certificate of title issued on registration of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate in judicial proceedings as long as the land is .really part of the disposable land of the public domain, and the certificate becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible after the expiration of one year following the date of its issuance (Lucas vs. Durian, L7886, Sept. 23, 1957). A later case involving free patent would even go further. According to this case, once a patent is issued the land acquires the character of registered property under Section 122 of the Land Registration Act and is therefore, brought within the operation of said Act (Nelayan vs. Nelayan, L-14518, Aug. 29, 1960, citing Roco vs. Gimeda, L-11651, Dec. 27, 1958). o [Pajomayo vs. Manipon, 39 SCRA 676(1971)] G.R. No. 132644. November 19, 1999.*THIRD DIVISION. ERNESTO DAVID, RICARDO DAVID, NELIA DAVID, EMILIA DAVID, LOLITA DAVID, BASILIO LEMQUE, NICANOR LEMQUE, FELIX LEMQUE, NORMA LEMQUE, WILFREDO LEMQUE, RODOLFO LEMQUE, ROGELIO LEMQUE, VICTORIA LEMQUE, ESTATE OF MARIA ESPIRITU and ANDRES ADONA, MILAGROS DE UBAGOUMALI, FELISA GUBALLA DE UBAGO, VANESSA DE UBAGO-UMALI, ANTONIO DE UBAGO, JR., JOSEPH GUBALLA DE UBAGO, MARIETTA DE UBAGO-TAN, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ZAMBALES, petitioners, vs. CRISTITO MALAY and NORA MALAY, DIONISIO MALAY, FRANCISCA T. CAPACILLO, PEPITO ALCANTARA, NICOLAS SORIANO and JUAN MORA, respondents.
Actions; Courts; Land Registration Act; Under the Land Registration Act (now PD 1529), title to the property covered by a Torrens certificate becomes indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration.A certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent covering a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141 is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding. Under the Land Registration Act, title to the property covered by a Torrens certificate becomes indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. Such decree of registration is incontrovertible and becomes binding on all persons whether or not they were notified of, or participated in, the in rem registration process. There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law or the Land Registration Act (Act 496), now Presidential Decree 1529, fixing a similar one-year period within which a public land patent can be considered open to review on the ground of actual fraud, such as that provided for in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, and now Section 32 of Presidential Decree 1529, and clothing a public land patent certificate of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, this Court has repeatedly applied Section 32 of Presidential Decree 1529 to a patent issued in accordance with the law by the Director of Lands, approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines. The date of the issuance of the patent corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary cases. Just as the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, so also, the patent issued by the Director of Lands equally and finally grants and conveys the land applied for to the applicant. Same; Same; Same; The nature of an action is determined by the body of the pleading or complaint itself than by its title or heading.The caption of the case before the court a quo while denominated as being one for Annulment of Sale with Damages is in reality an action for reconveyance since the ultimate relief sought by private respondents would be for the property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 398 to be reconveyed to the estate of Andres Adona. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is determined, more importantly, by the body of the pleading or complaint itself than by its title or heading. The Court of Appeals did not err in treating the action brought by private respondents as one for reconveyance or as one that seeks the transfer of the property, wrongfully registered by another to its rightful and legal owner. It would seem that Andres Adona did perfect his homestead 713 VOL. 318, NOVEMBER 19, 1999 713 David vs. Malay
application prior to his death, the right to the issuance of the patent on which vests after complying with all the requirements of the law. Same; Same; Same; A person in actual possession of a piece of land under a claim of ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right and
that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim.There is no doubt about the fact that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust ordinarily prescribes in ten years. This rule assumes, however, that there is an actual need to initiate that action, for when the right of the true and real owner is recognized, expressly or implicitly such as when he remains undisturbed in his possession, the statute of limitation would yet be irrelevant. An action for reconveyance, if nonetheless brought, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, or its equivalent, an action that is imprescriptible. In Faja vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has held that a person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Innocent Purchaser for Value; An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.This Court sees no cogent reasons to disturb the finding of the Court of Appeals that the de Ubagos may not be considered buyers in good faith. Said the Appellate Court: x x x An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property. A purchaser can not close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith. (Sandoval vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 283, 296 [1996]) PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Agerico M. Ungson for petitioners. Virgilio C. Manguera & Associates for private respondents. VITUG, J.: The instant case is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing that of the Regional Trial Court on an action for reconveyance of property. The issues submitted by the parties may not really be all that novel. The spouses Andres Adona and Leoncia Abad, husband and wife for a good number of years, were blessed with five children among them being Carmen Adona. Carmen married Filomeno Malay; three children were begotten by the marriage, namely, Cristito, Nora and Dionisio (among the herein private respondents). Following the death of Leoncia Abad in 1923, Andres Adona cohabited with Maria
Espiritu, herself a widow, apparently without the benefit of marriage. Andres and Maria sired two children, Esperanza, represented herein by her heirs all surnamed David, and Vicente Adona. Maria Espiritu likewise had a child by her previous marriage, Fulgencio Lemque, now herein represented also by his own heirs. During his lifetime, Andres Adona applied for a homestead patent over a parcel of agricultural land located at Dirita, Iba Zambales, containing an area of 22.5776 hectares. After Andres Adona had died, Maria Espiritu, predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners, succeeded in obtaining Original Certificate of Title No. 398 over the land in her name. After Maria Espiritu had died in 1945, the children, as well as descendants of Andres Adona by his marriage with Leoncia Abad, continued to be in peaceful and quiet possession of the subject land. Sometime in 1989 petitioners executed a deed of Extra-judicial Settlement with Sale over the subject property in favor of Mrs. Venancia Ungson. Private respondents protested the sale claiming that they were the true owners of the land. Ultimately, in any event, the sale in favor of Mrs. Ungson was rescinded in view of the latters failure to pay in full the consideration agreed upon. Subsequently, petitioners executed another deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale. In this new instrument, dated 15 December 1990, petitioners divided the land equally among themselves and sold their respective shares to their co-petitioners herein, Antonio de Ubago, Jr., Milagros de Ubago-Umali, Felisa Guballa de Ubago, Vanessa de Ubago-Umali and Marietta de Ubago-Tan and Joseph Guballa de Ubago. On 27 November 1992, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-42320 was issued in favor of the de Ubagos. Less than a month later, or on 07 December 1992, private respondents filed a complaint docketed Civil Case No. RTC-905-1 for Annulment of Sale with Restraining Order, Injunction and Damages against petitioners before Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court of Zambales. In their complaint, private respondents averred that the disputed land sold by the heirs of Maria Espiritu to the de Ubagos was the subject of a homestead application by their great grandfather, Andres Adona, but that Original Certificate of Title No. 398 was instead fraudulently issued to Maria Espiritu, on 04 December 1933, upon her false representation that she was the widow of Andres Adona. In its decision of 25 July 1995 after a hearing on the merits of the case, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and on the ground of prescription. It opined that the action being one for annulment of sale anchored on a fraudulent titling of the subject property, the cause of action constituted a collateral attack on the Torrens Certificate of Title. The court aquo added that even if the action were to be treated as being one for reconveyance, the suit would still have to fail since an action for reconveyance could only be
716 716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED David vs. Malay
brought within ten (10) years counted from the date of issuance of the certificate of title (in 1933). On appeal, the Court of Appeals in its judgment of 11 February 19981Speaking through Mme. Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (now a member of the Supreme Court), concurred in by Justices Bernardo Salas and Demetrio Demetria. set aside the order of dismissal of the case decreed by the trial court and directed the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-42320 in the name of the de Ubagos and the reconveyance of the property to the estate of Andres Adona. Petitioners were additionally ordered to pay damages and attorneys fees to private respondents. The appellate court, more particularly, ruled: The evidence on record shows that OCT No. 398 issued in favor of Maria Espiritu was obtained by her fraudulent concealment of the existence of Adonas first marriage to Leoncia Abad, as shown by the affidavit she executed on September 21, 1928 and filed with the Director of Lands. Consequently, Maria Espiritus fraudulent concealment of material facts created an implied or constructive trust in favor of the plaintiffs, the excluded co-heirs and actual possessors of the subject land. Article 1456 of the Civil Code reads: If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Although it is true that after the lapse of one year, a decree of registration is no longer open to review or attack, although its issuance was tainted with fraud; however, the aggrieved party is not without a remedy at law. Notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens Title already issued in favor of Maria Espiritu, she and her successors-in-interest, although the registered owner under the Torrens system, may still be compelled under the law to reconvey the subject property to the real owners. The Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith (Amerol vs. Bagumbaran, 154 SCRA 396, 404 [1987]). _______________ 1 Speaking through Mme. Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (now a member of the Supreme Court), concurred in by Justices Bernardo Salas and Demetrio Demetria.
717 VOL. 318, NOVEMBER 19, 1999 717
In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name, to its rightful and legal owner or to one with a better right. (Amerol, supra) However, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute. It is subject to extinctive prescription (Amerol, supra; Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 401, 405-407 [1989]; Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 112 SCRA 542, 550 [1982]; Ramos vs. Ramos, 61 SCRA 284, 299-300 [1974]) An action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. (Amerol, supra; Caro, supra; Casipit vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 684, 694 [1991]) This rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance does not prescribe. The reason for this is one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain the nature of the adverse claim of third party and its effect on his title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. (Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 108547, February 3, 1997) Hence, the undisturbed possession by plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest gave them the continuing right to resort to judicial intervention once their claim to ownership was challenged. It was therefore the defendant Heirs act of executing the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale which constituted the express act of repudiation of the constructive trust which gave rise to plaintiffs cause of action.2Rollo, pp. 23-24. Aggrieved, petitioners have come to this Court and seek to dispute the judgment of the Court of Appeals ordering the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. 398 issued on 16 November 1933. It is the contention of petitioners that to allow private respondents to question Original Certificate of Title No. 398 fifty-nine years after its issuance would undermine the Torrens system and sanctity of the certificate of title. Private respondents, upon the other hand, ask this Court to sustain the decision of the Court of Appeals on the thesis that the property in question indubitably belongs to the estate of Andres Adona whose incontestable right to it is derived from the perfected homestead application two years prior to his death as so admitted by Maria Espiritu herself in her affidavit submitted to the Director of Lands. The Court rules for the affirmance of the challenged decision. A certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent covering a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141 is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding. Under the Land
Registration Act, title to the property covered by a Torrens certificate becomes indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. Such decree of registration is incontrovertible and becomes binding on all persons whether or not they were notified of, or participated in, the in rem registration process.3Trinidad vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 204 SCRA 524. There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law or the Land Registration Act (Act 496), now Presidential Decree 1529, fixing a similar one-year period within which a public land patent can be considered open to review on the ground of actual fraud, such as that provided for in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, and now Section 32 of Presidential Decree 1529, and clothing a public land patent certificate of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, this Court has repeatedly applied Section 32 of Presidential Decree 1529 to a patent issued in accordance with the law by the Director of Lands, approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the _______________ 3 Trinidad vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 204 SCRA 524.
719 VOL. 318, NOVEMBER 19, 1999 719 David vs. Malay
President of the Philippines.4Ybaez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA 743. The date of the issuance of the patent corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary cases. Just as the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, so also, the patent issued by the Director of Lands equally and finally grants and conveys the land applied for to the applicant.5Sumali vs. Judge of CFI of Cotobato, et al., 96 Phil. 946. Original Certificate of Title No. 398 was issued in the name of Maria Espiritu on 04 December 1933 and would have become indefeasible a year thereafter had not its issuance been attended with fraud. The attendance of fraud created an implied trust in favor of private respondents and gave them the right of action to seek the remedy of reconveyance of the property wrongfully obtained.6Armamento vs. Guerrero, 96 SCRA 178. In Javier vs. Court of Appeals7231 SCRA 498. this Court ruled: x x x The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year, a decree of registration is no longer open to review or attack although its issuance is attended with actual fraud. This does not mean however that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance is still available. The decree becomes incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one (1) year from the date of the decree so that the only remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name as to bring an ordinary action in court for reconveyance, which is an action in personam and is always
available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third party for value. If the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action for damages.8At p. 504. The caption of the case before the court aquo while denominated as being one for Annulment of Sale with Damages is in reality an action for reconveyance since the ultimate relief sought by private respondents would be for the _______________ 4 Ybaez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA 743. 5 Sumali vs. Judge of CFI of Cotobato, et al., 96 Phil. 946. 6 Armamento vs. Guerrero, 96 SCRA 178. 7 231 SCRA 498. 8 At p. 504.
property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 398 to be reconveyed to the estate of Andres Adona. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is determined, more importantly, by the body of the pleading or complaint itself9Castillo vs. Galvan, 85 SCRA 526; Nactor vs. IAC, 158 SCRA 635. than by its title or heading. The Court of Appeals did not err in treating the action brought by private respondents as one for reconveyance or as one that seeks the transfer of the property, wrongfully registered by another to its rightful and legal owner.10See Amerol vs. Bagumbaran, 154 SCRA 396. It would seem that Andres Adona did perfect his homestead application prior to his death,11Rollo, p. 21. the right to the issuance of the patent on which vests after complying with all the requirements of the law.12Vda. De Delizo vs. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216. The next crucial issue focuses on the ruling of the Court of Appeals to the effect that if a person who claims to be the owner of the property is in actual possession thereof, the right to seek reconveyance does not prescribe. There is no doubt about the fact that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust ordinarily prescribes in ten years.13Alzona, et al. vs. Capunitan and Reyes, 114 Phil. 377; Gonzales vs. Jimenez, Sr., 13 SCRA 80; Cuaycong, et al. vs. Cuaycong, et al., 21 SCRA 1192; Armamento vs. Guerrero, 96 SCRA 178.
This rule assumes, however, that there is an actual need to initiate that action, for when the right of the true and real owner is recognized, expressly or implicitly such as when he remains undisturbed in his possession, the statute of limitation would yet be irrelevant. An action for reconveyance, if nonetheless brought, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, or its equivalent, an action that is imprescriptible. In Faja vs. Court of Appeals,1475 SCRA 441. the Court has held that a person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and _______________ 9 Castillo vs. Galvan, 85 SCRA 526; Nactor vs. IAC, 158 SCRA 635. 10 See Amerol vs. Bagumbaran, 154 SCRA 396. 11 Rollo, p. 21. 12 Vda. De Delizo vs. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216. 13 Alzona, et al. vs. Capunitan and Reyes, 114 Phil. 377; Gonzales vs. Jimenez, Sr., 13 SCRA 80; Cuaycong, et al. vs. Cuaycong, et al., 21 SCRA 1192; Armamento vs. Guerrero, 96 SCRA 178. 14 75 SCRA 441.
that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. In the words of the Court x x x There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. No better situation can be conceived at the moment for Us to apply this rule on equity than that of herein petitioners whose mother, Felipa Faja, was in possession of the litigated property for no less than 30 years and was suddenly confronted with a claim that the land she had been occupying and cultivating all these years, was titled in the name of a third person. We hold that in such a situation the right to quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued
only from the time the one in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own and it is only then that the statutory period of prescription commences to run against such possessor.15At p. 446. The same dictum is reiterated in Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of Appeals;16227 SCRA 330. thus With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of times before that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual posses_______________ 15 At p. 446. 16 227 SCRA 330.
sion of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.17Ibid., at pp. 334-335; see also the more recent case of Vda. De Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 339. Finally, this Court sees no cogent reasons to disturb the finding of the Court of Appeals that the de Ubagos may not be considered buyers in good faith. Said the Appellate Court: x x x An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property. A purchaser can not close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith. (Sandoval vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 283, 296 [1996]) It is well settled that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the same, but only has to rely on the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. (Sandoval, supra, at p. 295)
The aforestated principle admits of an unchallenged exception: that a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has some knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith and hence does not merit the protection of the law. (Sandoval, supra.) (Italics supplied) Applying the aforequoted jurisprudence, the defendant buyers can not be considered as innocent purchasers for value. A perusal of _______________ 17 Ibid., at pp. 334-335; see also the more recent case of Vda. De Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 339.
defendant buyers TCT No. 42320 reveals that it contains an entry by the Register of Deeds which provides that their ownership over the land is subject to prospective claims by any possible heirs and creditors who might have been deprived of their lawful participation in the estate. The said entry reads as follows: Entry No. 102385Section 4The property described in this certificate of title is subject to the provisions of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court for the period of two years in favor of in any other possible heir or heirs and creditors who might have been deprived of his or their lawful participations in the said estate. Date of instrumentDecember 15, 1990. Date of InscriptionNovember 27, 1992 at 2:00 p.m. (Exh. E; Rollo, p. 137) Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court reads, in part, as follows: Sec. 4. Liability of distributees and estate.If it shall appear at any time within (2) years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two
sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation x x x The record shows that the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale was executed on December 15, 1990 Plaintiffs complaint for Reconveyance was filed on December 7, 1992. Hence, the two -year period has not yet elapsed. It likewise appears that the subject land was the object of a sale between the defendant Heirs and one Mrs. Venancia Ungson which was subsequently aborted due to the intervention of defendant Vicente Adona and plaintiff Cristito Malay. (Exhs. K, K-1 and L) However, defendant Heirs nevertheless executed another sale in favor of defendant buyers who are admittedly relatives of Mrs. Venancia Ungson. (TSN, January 23, 1995, p. 14) Plaintiff Cristito Malays intervention in the previous sa le should have put defendant buyers on their guard.
Moreover, it is unbelievable that the defendant buyers would not have noticed the plaintiffs who were in possession of the land when the defendant buyers inspected the same. Had they made further investigations, they would have discovered that plaintiffs were in possession of the land under a claim of ownership. The rule is settled that a buyer of real property which is in the possession of per sons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith. The buyer who has failed to know or discover that the land sold to him is in the adverse possession of another buyer in bad faith. (Embrado vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 335, 347 *1994+).18Rollo, pp. 25-27. Altogether, the Court sees no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Melo (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Reviewed decision affirmed.
Notes.What determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff. (Tamano vs. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 [1998]) The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. (Republic vs. Doldol, 295 SCRA 359 [1998]) o0o [David vs. Malay, 318 SCRA 711(1999)]

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