Professional Documents
Culture Documents
April 29,2004
Background: The attacks on the United States on September 11,2001 exposed severe
shortcomings in our intelligence capabilities. We did not have effective access in
countries where we have no official presence; we were unable to penetrate hard targets
like terrorist organizations operating abroad or cells established in the United States.
The structural problems are the simplest to understand and their remedies
straightforward. The government agencies charged with foreign and domestic intelligence
are the creatures of a different age with laws, regulations and organization fashioned for
external wars and internal threats of the last century where strict separation of foreign and
domestic activities was desired.
More important than organizational reform is dealing with the second category of
dysfunction we have broadly defined as cultural; process over output; bureaucratic
careerism; groupthink; a law enforcement rather than preventive mindset; deep aversion
to covert operations; fear of abusive litigation. These problems cannot be solved by
organizational changes however bold. They can be changed only by appointing,
confirming and supporting proven leaders of talent and experience to the top positions of
the intelligence establishment. It is they who must sweep away the irrational security,
classification and career path obstacles to create a new, agile innovative career
environment in which excellence not mediocrity will flourish.
To accomplish such change these leaders must have new community wide authorities
over personnel policies, certain budgets and appropriations, and security classifications
and clearances.
Some of these changes can be done by executive order, many will require legislation, and
to succeed all will require major changes in Congressional oversight. We are making
specific recommendations for congressional oversight reform.
1
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
9-11 COMMISSION SENSITIVE
NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE THE COMMISSION
3
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
9-11 COMMISSION SENSITIVE
NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE THE COMMISSION
5) Fixing the information sharing problems among the intelligence and law enforcement
communities that have come to light from the investigation of the September 11
attacks:
a) A new approach of managing and sharing "meta-data" should be established to
combine information about intelligence reporting, open sources and law
enforcement cases into one database. This meta-data would provide "pointers" to
the content generated by, and protected within, the intelligence collection
agencies including the FBI. This meta-data file would be available to all analysts
for research. [This approach is similar what was recommended by the Scowcroft
Review and the Markle Foundation Task Force on Creating a Trusted Information
Network for Homeland Security]
b) Establish the position of NIA Chief Information Officer, independent of any
intelligence agency, reporting to the DNI, for oversight of all major IT systems
and the establishment of standard IT protocols across intelligence and law
enforcement agencies to facilitate seamless, real time information integration.
c) The NIA/CIO would execute a strategy to phase out legacy systems, acquire
compatible replacement systems, make recommendations to the DNI on
information security and approve all major information technology acquisitions in
the NIA.
6) Establish an NIA Chief of Security responsible for developing a common set of
security rules, guidelines and programs across the National Intelligence Authority to
allow for improved information sharing, the breakdown of unnecessary
compartmentation, the increased protection of vital sources and methods and a
streamlining of the background investigation process for new hires.
7)
5
COMMISSION SENSITIVE