Singapore's climate change policy: the limits of learning by Natasha Hamilton-Hart

Introduction Until 2005, Singapore completely rejected the possibility of adopting the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN FCCC), which is the only international instrument that commits parties to any kind of greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets. In 2006, Singapore became the 168th country to adopt the protocol. This article explores Singapore's changing policy on the issue of climate change, both in terms of its position regarding international cooperation on the issue and in terms of its domestic energy policy. How substantially has Singapore's policy changed, and what are the reasons behind its decision to accept the Kyoto Protocol? While the direct consequences of Singapore's decision to accede to the protocol are unlikely to be that significant at a global level, the reasons for its decision are worth exploring. At the local level, examining the evolution of Singapore's policy throws light on a policy process in which foreign policy, environmental policy and energy policy intersect. At the global level, understanding the influences on Singapore's climate change policy can contribute to a better understanding of the routes by which the global climate change regime may be strengthened. This article examines two routes suggested by theories regarding the diffusion of international norms and the relationship between development and environmental policy. Policy Change: The Significance of Competing Explanations On the surface, Singapore's adoption of the Kyoto Protocol is insignificant. The country of less than four million inhabitants accounts for only 0.2 per cent of global GHG emissions, and thus does not contribute that much to increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. (1) It is possible to argue that Singapore's accession marks a step towards universal acceptance of the protocol and thus helps legitimate the UN FCCC regime as the vehicle for securing international agreement to curb GHG emissions. (2) While this regime remains limited, it represents nearly two decades of international negotiations on the issue and thus offers the best chance for reaching more extensive agreements. (3) Critically, however, the future of the global climate change regime depends on further strengthening its provisions and extending its coverage. While the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in February 2005, its emissions reduction targets are unlikely to do much to mitigate future climate change, for several reasons: first, the United States, which leads the world in GHG emissions (accounting for nearly a quarter of total global emissions), has rejected the protocol; second, several of the countries that did accept emissions targets when adopting the Kyoto Protocol either made very limited commitments and/or are unlikely to be able to meet their commitments (Dessler and Pearson 2006 pp. 129-30); third, developing countries, even though many have adopted the protocol, have not accepted any emission reduction targets; finally, the protocol only governs commitments until 2012.

Given the need to strengthen and broaden the global regime, understanding why a country took an overt step towards acceptance of its objectives is potentially important. However, the lessons that can be derived from Singapore's policy shift depend on the details of its policy and the reasons behind them. Does its policy shift signal a kind of environmental maturing--a change to the country's attitudes towards environmental risks and values as a result of increasing material affluence and exposure to global environmental norms? Alternatively, is Singapore's policy shift simply the result of a reevaluation of the short-term, narrowly economic, costs and benefits of the Kyoto Protocol? New Perceptions of Environmental Risks and Values? In this line of explanation, Singapore's decision to accede to the Kyoto Protocol came about as a result of a change in the country's perception of environmental risks and values. These would include a new readiness to accept the accept the scientific evidence that global climate change is occurring as a result of anthropogenic activity and that it poses a serious threat to future welfare. Willingness to mitigate climate change also implies an attitude to environmental risks that leans towards the "precautionary principle", which argues that governments and societies have an interest and obligation to manage potential environmental risks even in the presence of scientific uncertainty. (4) This means taking a longer-term view and increasing the value placed on future welfare. It may also, although not necessarily, imply a willingness to recognize a broader definition of welfare, one that places some intrinsic value on environmental goods such as ecosystem stability and diversity, rather than a more narrowly-defined economic measure of welfare. Finally, perceptual change underlying a decision to become more involved in the global climate change regime might involve a reappraisal of a country's interests and obligations regarding international action, including a concern for a country's international reputation or a redefinition of a country's international responsibilities. Rising affluence is one potential factor behind such a shift in policy on environmental issues. (5) In this line of thinking, when present survival and welfare is precarious, the future tends to be steeply discounted. For example, on the issue of climate change, several developing Asian countries have reported that climate change is not a priority compared to more pressing issues such as food security and poverty (IGES 2005, p. 78). As the immediate constraints of poverty recede, individuals and governments are able to make different trade-offs between present and future welfare, and between narrowly economic conceptions of welfare and broader definitions. As societies become wealthier they also have a greater ability to invest in creating the institutional infrastructure necessary to develop and enforce environmental policy. Finally, rising affluence and education levels have in some countries been associated with an increase in the number and activity of a range of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including environmental groups, which may act as a source of pressure on governments to change their policies. A complementary set of factors which might change perceptions of environmental risks and values have been identified by scholars studying global institutions and epistemic

communities. In the most direct line of reasoning, international cooperative action may not only be the result of concerted activity by an "epistemic community"--a set of actors sharing a common framework of scientific knowledge--but may also institutionalize the role of such scientific communities in generating further knowledge that can in turn feed back into the policy process (Haas 1990). In the case of the UN FCCC, the evolution of international cooperation has been closely entwined with, though far from fully responsive to, the generation of scientific consensus on several climate-related questions. The UN FCCC was preceded by the establishment of an international scientific assessment body in 1989, to gather and assess the state of knowledge on Climate change. This body, known as the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has issued a series of reports that have figured prominently in the ongoing inter-governmental negotiations on climate change, although there has been a marked gap between the evolution of the scientific consensus and the policy debate. The IPCC's assessments have, however, given authoritative status to what is now a scientific consensus that increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and some fluorinated gases) in the atmosphere are responsible for an observable increase in average global temperature since the 1970s, and will lead to further increases in average temperature in the next two centuries. (6) IPCC assessments of the impacts of this warming effect point to a rise in sea level, increased climatic extremes and severe weather events as likely. By sponsoring an international and credible process of scientific assessment, the UN FCCC regime has reduced the areas of perceived scientific uncertainty and disseminated developments in scientific understanding of the causes and effects of global warming. Acceptance of this knowledge by policymakers may affect their policy choices directly, as new information feeds into cost-benefit calculations. But the process of international cooperation may result in "learning" at a deeper level, by providing participants with ideas as to what their interests are, altering their definitions of what is a problem and "teaching" them to aspire to particular goals (Finnemore 1996; Jachtenfuchs 1996). As a global regime develops, it may diffuse new norms and standards of action that resonate globally. For example, the notion of sustainable forest management emerged as a global norm that set standards for the use of forestry resources as a result of being endorsed in multiple international agreements and further legitimated in the discourse of nongovernmental groups (Dauvergne 2005). While the spread of such global norms is uneven, with much depending on local circumstances (Acharya 2004), it is arguable that they potentially influence state policy. Consistent Prioritizing of Short-Term Economic Considerations? A competing explanation for Singapore's policy shift is that the change resulted from a re-evaluation of the short-term economic costs and benefits of acceding to the Kyoto Protocol. Such a re-evaluation differs from the kind of "deep" learning envisaged by theories of the transformative potential of global norms and institutions. Since it involves neither a change to the time horizon and discounting rates adopted by policymakers nor a broadening of their definition of welfare, a re-evaluation of this sort also cannot support

most theories of the "greening" effects of affluence. However, if policymakers adjust their assessment of the costs and benefits of enhanced international cooperation due to other factors related to increased affluence--for example, technological development-then this factor may still be important. If Singapore's policy shift on the Kyoto Protocol was consistent with a continued emphasis on relatively short-term economic considerations, this finding would also raise further questions about expectations of fundamental learning or normative change due to involvement in global institutions. As well as being an original signatory to the UN FCCC, Singapore is a highly globalized country with a lot invested in its continued participation and acceptance in global diplomatic arenas. It is also highly globalized on many other measures, from its population to its cultural consumption, making it in many ways a good candidate for theories about the effects of exposure to global institutions and norms. If, despite this, Singapore remains impervious to global norms regarding environmental management, it should raise real doubts about the supposed normative or socializing effects of global interaction. Since Singapore shares several similarities with the other high-growth East Asian economies, it suggests that the economically-defined developmentalism of the region is resilient in the face of competing paradigms. Singapore's Climate Change Policy Singapore does not appear to have played much of a role in the negotiations leading up to the signing of the UN FCCC in 1992 (Mintzer and Leonard 1994). However, it is a signatory to the convention. As such, Singapore's foreign policy position on climate change can be construed as supportive of the general objective of the convention to stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere "at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (quoted in Dessler and Pearson 2006, p. 13). The FCCC does not contain any specific emissions reduction obligations for members, who are only required to report on emissions, support climate research, and report on (voluntary) national measures to limit emissions. As a signatory to the FCCC, Singapore can also be assumed to accept the principles articulated in the convention as a guide to further international action. Of particular importance is the principle of "common but differentiated responsibility", which states that developed country parties to the convention should take the lead in combating climate change. This principle was the result of concerted pressure by developing countries, on the grounds that developed countries were responsible for most of the increase in atmospheric GHGs to date and continued to have per capita levels of GHG emissions that far exceeded those of the developing world (Dasgupta 1994). Singapore chose to present itself in these negotiations as a developing country, despite levels of wealth and per capita GHG levels that, even in the early 1990s, were much closer to averages in the developed world than its putative peers in developing countries. (7) With developing country status, Singapore was able to sign the convention as a "nonAnnex 1" party, hence avoiding even the inprinciple obligation of developed countries (the "Annex 1" parties) to lead mitigation efforts. (8)

Despite having the protection of not being an Annex 1 country, Singapore did not sign the Kyoto Protocol when it was finalized in December 1997. Again, it did not play a public role in the negotiations, which were dominated by splits between the United States, which opposed near-term emission reduction targets, and the European Union and Japan, which argued for decisive cuts in emissions. However, Singapore ratified the UN FCCC in 1997, a move it described as demonstrating "our commitment to join the international community in mitigating climate change" (Republic of Singapore 2000: i). Consequently, Singapore was required under the terms of the convention to submit a national statement of its climate change policy and emissions position by 2000. This statement, which was submitted in 2000, is instructive on a number of counts. The statement is cautious as regards the evidence for anthropogenic climate change. It notes that there has been an average temperature increase since 1974 but considers that, "it is still unclear as to whether this is due to the greenhouse effect or due to the natural variability of climate" (Republic of Singapore 2000, p. 9). At this stage, the major IPCC report that spelt out clearly the degree of scientific agreement that the most recent global warming trend was due to increased atmospheric concentrations in the GHGs (IPCC 2001) had not yet been published. Aside from this comment about uncertainty, however, the Singapore statement does not enter into any debate on the science of climate change or dwell on the issue of uncertainty. In this national statement, Lee Yock Suan, the then Minister of Environment declares bluntly that "there is little potential for us to develop alternative sources of energy that are non-fossil fuels based" and that "our carbon dioxide emissions will inevitably grow as our economy develops". He also denies that Singapore had any obligation to set emission control targets, due to its developing country status (Republic of Singapore 2000, p. i). (9) This point is reiterated later, when the statement draws attention to an article of the UN FCCC calling for consideration of the "specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties" and links this to Singapore's reliance on fossil fuels and a claim that "there are no renewable energy sources that Singapore can harness to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels." Solar energy was described as having "some potential" but the technology to make commercially viable was still some way off' and, further, the country's small land area presented a limit on its potential use (Republic of Singapore 2000, p. 19). As regards vulnerability to climate change, the Singapore statement identified four areas of potential concern: land loss, loss of water resources, flooding (all as a result of a rise in sea level) and the resurgence of diseases (Republic of Singapore 2000, pp. 30-34). On each count, the statement concludes that government policy responses would be able to contain or adapt to the threats posed by climate change. If threats are limited to the four areas of concern identified, the statement's sanguine outlook is supported, at least as regards the costs of adapting to sea-level rise, by independent research (Ng and Mendelsohn 2005). Given Singapore's wealth, technological sophistication and bureaucratic effectiveness, the statement's confidence in the engineering and public regulation measures it outlines as ways of responding to the threats identified appears reasonable. What the official Singapore statement does not address in any way are the

variety of other potentially severe impacts of climate change, such as extreme weather events or the effects of climatic extremes on food production. While Singapore, as a nonagricultural and technologically advanced country would not be that vulnerable to these impacts in a direct sense, estimates about the impacts on the wider Asian region point to potentially very serious effects (IGES 2005; IPCC 2001, Working Group II, ch. 11). Serious disruption to food production, for example, in neighbouring countries could easily produce negative spillovers for Singapore. Over the next years, Singapore continued to have a low profile in international meetings on climate change such as the regular Conference of the Parties of the UNFCC or sessions of the IPCC. For example, reports of the various sessions of the IPCC, which record major interventions and proposals, do not mention Singapore except for listing it as a member of the IPCC. Neither is Singapore recorded as being among the countries to have made official submissions to the IPCC on its activities. (10) The UN FCCC records Singapore as having three people listed as delegates, a relatively small number compared to other countries with comparable diplomatic resources. (11) In the domestic sphere, the government has given the issue of energy efficiency increasing attention since the 1990s but until 2006 did not do much to link its energy efficiency programmes to an official climate change policy. An inter-agency committee on climate change was formed to author the 2000 National Communication to the UN FCCC but seems to have been wound up after making its report. An inter-agency committee on energy efficiency was formed in 1998 and expanded (and renamed as the National Energy Efficiency Committee), under the auspices of the Environment Ministry, in 2001. Until 2006, the government's official statement of its environmental policy and plans, the Singapore Green Plan 2012, did not mention climate change (Focus Group on Air and Climate Change 2005, p. 20). The government's National Environment Agency (NEA) did not sponsor research on climate change prior to 2006, although energy efficiency in the building sector and industry were listed as being of interest to the agency. (12) However, in August 2006 the NEA announced it would sponsor a major two-year study to investigate the impacts of climate change on Singapore (Srinivas 2006). The National Energy Efficiency Committee, the NEA and the powerful Economic Development Board have supported programmes and funding schemes for the private sector to adopt environmentally innovative technologies and renewable energy research and applications, although the actual amounts spent on these initiatives since 2004 are not publicly available. While not contributing to the assessment process, the government came to accept the global scientific consensus on the link between increasing atmospheric GHGs and climate change. Speeches by ministers of the environment from at least 2004 refer to global warming "caused by greenhouse gas emissions" as a "global concern" (Ministry of Environment 2004). The Ministry of Environment and Water Resources (MEWR), on its official website describes GHGs as being "increasingly linked" (13) to global warming and several official speeches accept this link unproblematically. The 2006 update of the official "Singapore Green Plan" states clearly that, "The truth is out. There is now scientific evidence that greenhouse gas emissions, mainly carbon dioxide resulting from

human activities, have contributed to climate change". (MEWR 2006a, p. 20). At no point do official statements justify inaction or limited action on the issue on the basis of scientific uncertainty. The government continued to justify not acceding to the Kyoto Protocol because of the country's "unique circumstances", namely dependence on fossil fuels and being "unable to tap on renewable sources of energy or non-carbon alternatives in a big way" (Ministry of Environment 2004a). The government's position on Singapore's international obligations was still equivocal in 2004. Lim Swee Say, then minister for the environment, stated that "we firmly believe that all countries, Annex 1 or non-Annex 1, developed or developing, ought to play our part in enhancing carbon efficiency (Ministry of the Environment 2004a). Although the reference to other countries playing "our" part was no doubt an unintended error, an official statement issued as a follow-up to this speech was careful to point out that Singapore was not subject to any legally binding targets for emissions reductions (Ministry of the Environment 2004b). Further, this statement can be read as implying that concern about the possibility of future obligations for non-Annex 1 parties might be a reason for Singapore's non-acceptance of the protocol. (14) 2005 appears to be a turning point of sorts for Singapore's policy. In a parliamentary statement in March, Singapore's new Minister for the Environment and Water Resources, Yaacob Ibrahim, mentioned that his ministry was in the process of studying acceding to the Kyoto Protocol (MEWR 2005a). In May that year, Singapore hosted a Climate Change Roundtable, apparently the first major conference on the issue to be held in Singapore, which was opened with a speech by the minister for the environment and water resources (MEWR 2005b). This speech reveals that the government was "now studying the timing of our accession to the Kyoto Protocol" and outlines various energy efficiency initiatives. The minister's speech also announced that the government aimed to put in place a Climate Change Action Plan to map its strategic direction, and expressed hope that the roundtable's discussion would help provide the building blocks for developing the plan. This suggestion seems to have been taken up, as the governmentappointed Focus Group on Air and Climate Change, formed in 2005 as part of the process of consultation leading to the update of the Singapore Green Plan in 2006, observed that its recommendations draw heavily on the discussions at the May Climate Change Roundtable (Focus Group 2005, p. 20). The focus group's members were largely drawn from industry and business (including the oil industry), although it was co-chaired by the head of Singapore's largest environmental non-governmental organization, the Singapore Nature Society. Its recommendations were almost entirely in accordance with previously announced government policy. Its major concrete recommendation was that the government should target a 25 per cent reduction in the carbon intensity of the economy from 1990 levels by 2012 (Focus Group 2005, p. 20). This target had already been announced as government policy in 2004, and the government had reported having achieved a 17 per cent reduction from 1990 levels by 2003 and a 22 per cent reduction from 1990 levels by 2004 (MEWR 2005b, 2006c). The focus group also debated Singapore's accession to the Kyoto Protocol and recommended that Singapore accede to the protocol without further delay, but with the caution that this

was on the understanding that "Singapore as a non-Annex 1 party has no emission target to be met in the 2008-2012 commitment period, and would have to agree to any post2012 targets before they could be imposed." Further the group's report noted that, "we wish to highlight that some FG [Focus Group] members had asked that the impact of possible post-2012 commitments be studied carefully" (Focus Group 2005, p. 19). Later in 2005, MEWR was studying the focus group's recommendations with a view to considering how they could be adopted (MEWR 2005c). The minister expressed inprinciple support for the group's target of a 25 per cent reduction in carbon intensity, making energy efficiency labelling compulsory for major appliances, and promoting public awareness of climate change. The 2006 update of the Singapore Green Plan 2006 describes climate change as "now looked upon as one of the most pressing environmental challenges of the global community", but does not elaborate on potential impacts other than "rising global temperatures and seal levels among other things" (Singapore Green Plan 2006, p. 26). It reiterates the target of reducing the carbon intensity of the economy by 25 per cent below 1990 levels by 2012, which it describes as a new target (Singapore Green Plan 2006, p. 23). The plan does not take up the recommendation to make energy efficiency labelling compulsory for major household appliances, but says the government will "work towards" this outcome. The main initiatives concern promoting awareness, voluntary "win-win" solutions to energy efficiency and encouraging renewable energy demonstration projects. The plan does not explicitly mention the Kyoto Protocol or the UN FCCC, merely observing that Singapore will continue to "stay committed to international environmental efforts and obligations under international environmental treaties" (Singapore Green Plan 2006, p. 69). Singapore's intention to accede to the Kyoto Protocol was formally announced in parliament in March 2006. In his parliamentary speech, as part of the annual budget debate, Yaacob Ibrahim, the minister for the environment and water resources, described climate change as "one of the major environmental challenges of our time" and asserted that "Singapore's commitment to climate change" was "consistent with our good record on environmental issues" (MEWR 2006b). The speech does not give any background information on the Kyoto Protocol or the international climate regime, (15) or explicitly justify Singapore's accession to the protocol. It notes that "Singapore intends to engage in the ongoing international debate on how to manage greenhouse gas emissions in a manner that is not harmful to economic growth". In terms of domestic policies on the issue, the only new move announced at this time was that air conditioners and refrigerators would have to carry mandatory energy efficiency labels from mid-2007, since most still did not carry labelling despite the voluntary scheme in place since 2002. In conjunction with Singapore's decision to accede to the Kyoto Protocol, the National Energy Efficiency Committee was further expanded and renamed the National Climate Change Committee (NCCC), made up of representatives from several government agencies and private sector groups and companies. (16) It has a mandate to promote energy efficiency and less carbon-intensive energy, promote awareness, promote competence to respond to climate change and to understand Singapore's vulnerability to climate change. The NCCC will provide stewardship for Singapore's National Climate

Change Strategy, which was launched at the end of May 2006. It aims to develop a comprehensive approach to forging Singapore's response to climate change, bringing together various public awareness, energy efficiency and mitigation initiatives through a process that includes avenues for public consultation and feedback. (17) To sum up Singapore's climate change policy, there are three major elements that can be discerned. First, the issue has gained increasing attention and profile within both the country's environmental policy and its energy policy, both leading to, and as a consequence of, the country's decision to accede to the Kyoto Protocol. While this is a definite change in policy, it is one that came comparatively late. By comparison, Europe's climate change policy began to take shape in the 1980s (Jachtenfuchs 1996) and all of Singapore's Asian neighbours acceded to the Protocol before Singapore. Japan, Korea and even some of Singapore's much poorer Southeast Asian neighbours have paid more attention to the science of climate change and been much more involved in scientific and policy discussions on the issue (Fort 2004; IGES 2005). Second, by clinging to its official developing country status, Singapore has continued to refuse to accept any obligation to reduce absolute emissions. In fact, its declared emissions target is for a substantial increase in emissions over 1990 levels. This is because its goal of reducing the carbon intensity of the economy--the amount of carbon dioxide emitted per dollar of GDP--by 25 per cent from 1990 to 2012 is consistent with a substantial increase in absolute emissions, given that the economy has grown at far higher rates than the targetted annual average decline in carbon intensity. By 2004 the carbon intensity target had already almost been met, which was consistent with the recorded doubling of absolute emissions between 1990 and 2000, and an increase of per capita emissions by over 50 per cent in the same period (Earthtrends 2005). Third, Singapore's energy efficiency policies and programmes are based on voluntary action by consumers, government agencies and businesses. It has only recently moved to introduce compulsory efficiency labelling for some household appliances and does not envisage any move to compulsory emissions limits. While modest support for alternative energy research and efficiency applications for business potentially alters the incentives they face, it has not introduced any major scheme of differential subsidies or taxes aimed at influencing behaviour. Greening or Greenwash?
The decision to sign [the Kyoto Protocol] suggests that the government is now confident that Singapore is capable of attaining the Kyoto target of cutting its greenhouse gas emissions by about 5 per cent of their 1990 levels by the target date of 2012.... By agreeing to sign up to Kyoto, Singapore makes a statement that it accepts a responsibility as a developed country to make certain sacrifices for the sake of the environment. (Gee 2006)

This view of Singapore's accession, which appeared in the local business daily newspaper, offers an interpretation of Singapore's policy shift that mirrors arguments about the "greening" effects of rising affluence and exposure to international norms of

environmental sustainability and responsibility. It is an interpretation that is wrong on every count: Singapore has not committed to any cuts in GHG emissions, refuses to designate itself as a developed country and does not explicitly recognize any trade-off between environmental goods and economic performance. In fact, although it does not put in these words, Singapore's official policy endorses increases in its national GHG emissions and insists on the right to prioritize economic growth over environmental concerns. This raises questions about why Singapore decided to accede to the Kyoto Protocol and what perceptions of environmental risks and values underlie its climate policy. Reasons for Accession to the Kyoto Protocol There appear to be two major reasons for Singapore's accession to the Kyoto Protocol: a desire to protect the country's international image and to benefit from the economic opportunities that the protocol opens up. Singaporean officials and others associated with Singapore's environmental policy may also be inspired by a sincere wish to address the problem of global climate change, and may see accession as a useful first step in giving the issue a greater national profile. This has certainly occurred, but such concerns have yet to produce a policy shift that would contemplate absolute emissions cuts or nonvoluntary measures. A concern with Singapore's image and reputation speaks to theories about the effects of global norms. This concern is explicit in official documents, statements by policymakers and those involved in the policy process. For example, when the environment minister announced that his officials were studying accession to the Kyoto Protocol, he claimed that Singapore "wants to be a part of the global environmental sustainability effort ... Indeed, Singapore has always been active in supporting the global climate change effort" (MEWR 2005b). In the same speech, he said that action to address climate change would enable Singapore to "do our part as a global citizen". Similarly, the non-governmental focus group's recommendation to accede to the protocol was justified on the grounds that "Singapore's non-accession to the Kyoto Protocol raises questions about its commitment towards fighting climate change and we feel strongly that this question will come into focus in any effort to heighten awareness on climate change" (Focus Group 2005, p. 19). Selective presentations of Singapore's mixed environmental record, along with explicit statements about wanting to be seen as a responsible "global citizen", provide rather double-edged evidence for theories about the socializing effects of global norms. At one level, Singapore has been influenced by norms such as environmental sustainability and responsibility, since it has taken the trouble to present itself as conforming with them. Clearly, however, theories about the diffusion of global norms need to distinguish between a concern with reputation leading to substantive adoption of global norms and a concern with reputation that leads to cosmetic changes. Singapore's climate change policy also confirms that states can be highly selective about what they learn from their global interactions. Singapore's adoption of carbon intensity as the target for its climate change policy appears to have been borrowed from the United States, which in 2002 (after rejecting the Kyoto Protocol) introduced the concept of carbon intensity and took

up the target of reducing the carbon intensity of its economy as its preferred alternative approach to climate control. (18) The second reason for Singapore's adoption of the Kyoto Protocol appears to be a desire to profit from the business opportunities it presents. A corollary of developing country status under the terms of the protocol is eligibility for business carried out under the protocol's "Clean Development Mechanism", under which developed countries are able to meet some of their emissions reduction targets through projects in developing countries (Fort 2004). The business opportunities offered by the protocol were explicitly cited in the ministerial speech announcing Singapore's intention to accede (MEWR 2006c). Indeed, the speech dwells more on this theme than on the issue of climate change or Singapore's climate policy. Similarly, the invitation for further enquiries in the official press release announcing Singapore's accession is directed to businesses interested in pursuing projects under the CDM (MEWR 2006d). Opportunities under the CDM and associated proposals for emissions trading are highlighted in the National Climate Change Strategy and form part of the work programme of the National Climate Change Committee. (19) Underlying Perceptions of Environmental Risks and Values A determination to make environmental policy conditional on avoiding economic costs is an underlying constant in Singapore's policymaking. At the level of declaratory policy, Singapore has presented environmental and economic goals as essentially compatible, and business as part of the solution to environmental problems (for example, Koh 1991). In its 2000 statement to the UN FCCC, Singapore reiterates the position that economic competitiveness and environmental sustainability are complementary, "two sides of the same coin" (Republic of Singapore 2000, p. 15). In its chapter on mitigation efforts, consisting of a variety of energy efficiency measures, the statement presents responsible environmental management as being complementary with business efficiency. This complementarity is repeatedly emphasized in almost all subsequent announcements of climate change and energy efficiency initiatives and is consistent with the essentially voluntaristic nature of Singapore's climate policy. International collective action dilemmas are never raised in official pronouncements on climate change policy, which do not justify Singapore's inaction on the basis that cuts by Singapore would be ineffective in the absence of guarantees of cuts by enough other GHG emitters. The possibility that environmental and economic objectives might not align is never explicitly addressed in official pronouncements but is inherent in Singapore's bottom line position on climate change policy: that it cannot reduce its emissions without harming its economy. Singapore's growth strategy has brought a large industrial sector into being, which now contributes over half of the country's high per capita GHG emissions. The petrochemical industry alone is an important contributor to GHG emissions and also a major source of foreign investment, as Singapore continues to develop its role as an oil hub (Doshi 1989; Lim 2006a, 2006b). ExxonMobil, with cumulative investments of US$6.5 billion in Singapore, is the single largest foreign investor in the island (Chew 2006). This pattern of development means that Singapore faces unavoidable trade-offs

between its environmental goals and its growth strategy. The decision to prioritize growth is never justified explicitly in official statements on climate change, it is simply taken as an incontestable given. This approach of prioritizing economic goals in practice while denying any trade-off between different measures of welfare marks Singapore's environmental policy more generally. While Singapore's record in managing pollution and maintaining a green environment is very good for an industrialized city-state, the kind of environmentalism espoused by its policymakers is conditional. The government's approach to environmental protection is dominated by concerns for human health and a desire to present Singapore as a pleasant destination for tourists and expatriate professionals, who are targetted to play a substantial role in the economy and whose preferences for a superficially green environment are therefore reflected in efforts to maintain the aesthetic appearance of Singapore as a "garden city". Indeed, the progenitor of the garden city initiative, Lee Kuan Yew, has explained that "clean and green Singapore" was intended as a strategy to distinguish Singapore from its neighbours in the eyes of foreign businesspeople and tourists (Lee 2000, pp. 173-74). As noted in a study of Singapore's environmental ideology, economic necessity and a desire to develop the tourist market, not ecological principles, were behind initiatives such the "garden city" campaign and the decision to sign the global treaty banning trade in endangered wildlife (Savage 1992, pp. 205-7). There is strong resistance to allowing the notion of inherent environmental values to infringe on economic goals. Environmental impacts of developments may indeed be "carefully assessed" as claimed in official statements, but this presents a rather misleading picture of the planning process. As noted by a legal scholar, "There is at present no legislation in Singapore making EIAs [Environmental Impact Assessments] compulsory for major developmental projects". Further, "there have been calls to enact EIA legislation to institutionalize the impact assessment procedure so as not to leave EIA decisions to administrative discretion. It appears that under the current system, EIAs are usually required, if at all, only of industries for pollution control purposes" rather than biodiversity or conservation purposes (Tan 1998, section 5.3). Indeed, as related in another account, Singapore's main environmental NGO have been frustrated by "the government's consistent deaf ear to calls for environmental impact assessments of all large-scale developments because the institutionalization of which would inconvenience the government in promoting physical development" (Chua 2005, p. 63). The reflexive priority given to economic considerations is also reflected in the government's attitude towards renewable energy sources and their viability in Singapore. As late as 2004, Lim Swee Say, then minister for the environment dismissed the possibility of any major application of solar energy in Singapore due to the country's cloud cover patterns (MEWR 2004a). This seems to be a case of arguing backwards from a pre-formed opinion that alternative energy sources threaten economic efficiency goals. In fact, industry players and independent scholars have argued that Singapore's position is notably advantageous for solar power applications (Shell Solar 2005). This position is

now supported by the government in some of the projects sponsored by the new National Climate Change Committee and other agencies. By 2006, the official view was that:
Singapore also recognises the benefits and growth potential of solar energy. Even though there is a constant presence of significant cloud cover over Singapore, we still enjoy a substantial amount of sunshine throughout the year. Thus, there is vast potential for us to tap into solar energy, a clean and renewable energy source which can assist in our efforts to reduce our carbon intensity. (MEWR 2006c)

This new readiness to endorse and provide some support for solar energy applications was not driven by proactive government policy seeking solutions to the problem of high GHG emissions (or any change in Singapore's cloud cover patterns). Largely it is based on a reassessment of the cost-effectiveness of alternative energy sources due to technological advances in the industry, which have brought the costs down significantly, and rises in oil prices. In addition, the cause of solar energy applications had been taken up by the Singapore German Chamber of Industry and Commerce, which took the lead in arranging two conferences on renewable energy in 2005 (Shell Solar 2006). Confirming the new cost-benefit balance, the Economic Development Board recently announced that alternative energy would be a new growth area for the economy. The National Climate Change Strategy notes plans to increase the economic contribution of the environmental industry from 0.6 per cent to 1.5 per cent of GDP. (20) As with other environmental goods delivered by Singapore, the desirability of renewable energy thus appears to be determined by its economic, rather than environmental, effects. Conclusion What lessons does the Singapore case suggest for the future of the global action to combat climate change? In many respects, Singapore's economic situation and policy process are unusual. However, the resilience of its "economics first" mindset which circumscribes the bottom line of Singapore's climate policy is likely to be shared with some other Asian countries. There is widespread agreement that a major factor behind the success of Singapore and other high-growth "newly industrialized" countries of Asia has been the consistent and urgent priority accorded to economic growth. To the extent that this mindset prevails, it suggests that the path to greater commitments towards GHG reduction needs to reckon with it explicitly. On the positive side, the Singapore case suggests that this mindset is consistent with a readiness to respond to changes in technology and economic conditions as they relate to energy use. On the other hand, an economics-first mindset raises the bar for environmental risks to meet the problem definitions held by policymakers, and this makes it harder to achieve the big policy changes required if global greenhouse gas emissions are to be cut. In the Singapore case at least, elite-level engagement in global institutions and societal affluence do not alter entrenched policy priorities. What does seem to have occurred as a result of global engagement is the diffusion of the language of global environmental responsibility, which has served to obscure the basic policy conflicts involved.