Foucault Feminism

Foucault and Feminism Author(s): Shane Phelan Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34, No.
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Foucault and Feminism

ShanePhelan,University ofNewMexico
Foucault's approach challenges many oftheframeworks andconcepts ofboth liberal andcommunitarian political thought. By documenting thelinksbetween powerand knowledge at a variety of levels,he makesus suspect theories that pinpoint a singlesourceof oppressions and problems. He also calls into question thefamiliar belief that truth andpower areopposed,a belief that leadsto a particular sort of "liberatory" action that mayin fact be a simple denialofthefact ofpower in our lives.I shallarguethat thishas strong implications fortheevaluation and development of feminist theory andother political theory. Foucault's work hasbeenchallenged on theground ofincoherence andnihilism. Thischallenge has been madeby bothfeminists and nonfeminists. The latersections of thepaperaddressthese charges and arguethat he is neither incoherent nornihilistic butis searching fora new ground for political theory that willovercome many of thedefects of modem"humanist" In this,he is theory. an allyof feminists who seek to demonstrate and challenge thefalseinclusion and equality of humanist discourse.
MichelFoucault was one ofthemost controversial andprovocative thinkers ofthiscentury. Though he diedmuch too early, he left us an approach to social that ofthethreads thought pulledtogether left many between Marxand dangling Nietzsche. His work on sexuality, in thefirst especially that of TheHisvolume has been of interest tory ofSexuality, to feminist forhe reconceived theorists, the terrain of the battleover sexuality thatis so central to modern Western society. Nonetheless, manyfeminists have rejected Foucault'swork.Some have done so becausehe himself failedto understand or support somefeminist perand struggles. spectives Others have suggested that of his theveryfoundation work is defective forfeminists, as it is forall political Thisviewdoes struggle. notseparate feminist objectives from other ones; it asserts that Foucault's ideas areequallyinadequate foranyrealstruggle. This study will arguethat Foucault's workis indeedvitalforthedevelopoffeminist ment ifnotfor theory, feminist issue. Thisdoes notmeanthat every we mustaccepthis authority on everything, nordismiss himcompletely when he failsus; theimpulse behind suchreactions is one that he himself enablesus to see and critique. We mustsee himas an allybecausehe ultimately provides theseedsofa democratic anda reconception ofthevaluesoffreedom and theory individuality that have sucha fundamental rolein feminist and activity. theory The first sectionwill briefly outlineFoucault'smajor conceptsas they in hislater work.Thiswilllead to a discussion ofthewaysin which his emerge work on sexuality offeminists. I shallthen address with theconcerns converges theclaimsof his critics, bothfeminist and nonfeminist, that leavesus Foucault
American Journal ofPoliticalScience,Vol. 34, No. 2, May 1990,Pp. 421-40 ofTexasPress,P.O. Box 7819, Austin, C) 1990bytheUniversity TX 78713
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that he deprives us of thebasis or social change, with no ground forresistance and practices andregimes, andcomparisons between for making anyevaluations thechallenge of the brings withit therejection that to thestatus of thesubject I shallargue that Foucault's responses tothese anddignity. possibility offreedom infact he is crucially concerned activity makeclearthat charges andhispolitical withtheseissues butprovides a new analysisof themthatmayenable us to andsolutions. posedbyhumanist definitions address theproblems 1 femiwork has intersected with The most placeinwhich Foucault's obvious rejection of theassumptions His radical nistconcerns is in theareaof sexuality. foranalysis concerning sexuality openedup a new terrain governing discourse of methodis in turn related to a number and action.His stance here,however, to feminist inquiry. concerns that arecentral ologicalandphilosophical entitled La History of Sexuality, The first volumeof Foucault's projected hisinquiries for theframework de savoir(The Willto Know),described volonte of whathe labels "the beginswiththerejection intosexuality. This framework is of societyand sexuality thebeliefthattherelation repressive hypothesis," ofcensorship. He asserts that one ofrepression, fundamentally
prudishness of language, concern to hide sex, rather thana general rather thantheuniform thewidedispersion of devicesthat centuries is thevariety, whatdistinguishes theselastthree about,forinducing itto speakof aboutit,forhaving itbe spoken wereinvented forspeaking whatis said aboutit: around transcribing, and redistributing itself, forlistening, recording, transpositions intodiscourse. of varying, specific, andcoercive sex, a wholenetwork
andpolymor"a regulated Whatwas involved butinstead was, notcensorship, (1980a, 34). phousincitement to discourse" were and are By sayingthis,Foucaultdoes notwishto denythatthere is that these andlimitations on sexuality. Whathe hopesto suggest prohibitions thattheyare function within thelarger"apparatus"of sexuality, prohibitions identifies as sexualdiscourse not"the problem," butare simply whatmodern theissue. withhis terms.By "disTo understand his point,we mustbe familiar, for ofpossibility knowledge" (Philp1985, course"Foucault refers to "a system of statements that we andlimit thesorts define 69). It is thebodyofruleswhich rules which allowtheformation canmake;itis thesumof "thesetsofdiscursive forus. However, therulesof the of groups of statements" havea meaning that that learn. not a method discourse not rules of that we are are the They grammar form "thenecessary we consciously learn within a system orlanguage, butrather and of statements." Thus "theplace, function, fortheformation preconditions ofa discourse ofthe'knowers,' authors andaudiences arealso a funccharacter tionofthese discursive rules." referred to as "epiformations earlier These discursive are whatFoucault
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stemes."As he describes is "thestrategic it,theepisteme apparatus which permitsof separating outfrom amongall thestatements whichare possiblethose willbe acceptable that within. . . . The episteme is the'apparatus' which makes possible theseparation, notofthetrue from thefalse,butofwhat what mayfrom maynotbe characterized as scientific" (1980b, 197). Thustheepisteme is a particular sort of apparatus. What,then, is an apparatus? It is "a muchmore general case of theepisteme"; theapparatus "is both discursive and non-discursive, its elements beingmuchmoreheterogeneous" thanthoseof theepisteme. The apparatus is "strategies of relations of forces and supported supporting, by,types of knowledge" (1980b, 196). He includes in thisbothsuch linguistic formations as laws and regulations, scientific and philosophical pronouncements, and nondiscursive structures such as architectural andeconomies. designs Theseelements areboundtogether bytheir effect, by their rolein a larger that coordinates and structures social relations strategy at a given point. The reference to strategy brings us to another majorpoint.Foucault's work in the 1970sshifted increasingly toward an analysis of therelation of powerto His histories knowledge. suggested that knowledge, whichwas formed within discursive particular was somehow fields, boundto theriseand declineof particular powerfoci. In Disciplineand Punishand The History of Sexuality, he turned toward oftheapparatus, formation study that which butwas not included, limited to, theepisteme and itsrules.Speaking of his writing prior to 1968, he saidthat "whatwas lacking herewas thisproblem ofthe'discursive regime,' of theeffects ofpower peculiar totheplayofstatements" (1980b, 113). In addition to archaeology, themethod by which we study "theprinciples of ordering, exclusionand rarity in a discourse,"we mustnow focuson genealogy, which examines theconstitution of domains that we mayalso study archaeologically. The twomethods are notopposed,notmutually exclusive.Whilearchaeology examines a system as a system, as an entity, genealogy exposestheplayofpower in thedevelopment of systems. In 1977Foucault in an article bestexplained genealogy entitled "Nietzsche, The purposeof genealogy, he tells us, is not to trace Genealogy, History." notto find andprovide continuities butis rather "to maintain origins, pedigrees, events in their it-is theaccidents, proper to identify theminute deviadispersion; tions-or conversely, thecomplete reversals-theerrors, thefalse appraisals, and thefaulty calculations that to thosethings to exist gave birth that continue and havevalue forus" (1977, 146). Rather thanestablish and stabilize, genewas previously what alogy"disturbs considered immobile" it (1947), depriving of itsmajesty and authority. Usingthemodelof Nietzsche's (1956) Genealogy forand development of Morals, Foucaultlooks fortheexplanations of those thatseemmostobvious,most"natural," things to us. This amounts to a sustained to oursubjectivity. challenge in thename This challenge is notmounted
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of "objective truth," however, butis rather bound tothequestioning ofthat truth that seemsobjective butin factrests inescapably on language and itsstructures ofunderstanding. Two things becomeclearin thispresentation ofgenealogy. First is theidea that truth is notuniversal andtimeless, beyond discourse (and therefore beyond social formations); citingNietzsche's (1974) pronouncement in The Gay Science,Foucaultsaysthat"truth is undoubtedly thesortof error thatcannot be refuted because it has hardened intoan unalterable formin the long baking processof history" (144). Truth is a concept thatthegenealogist rejectsas a "truth," an essence;thegenealogist looks at theformation of truths and of the systems ofmeaning which they presuppose. The secondpointconcerns power.Without theveil of truth as a simple presence, a thing prior to andindependent ofsocialsystems, we see revealed the playof power.Here, we see thefulldevelopment of thetheme, foundin his earlier work, ofthedualnature ofthemodern is the subject. The modern subject subject rather than objectofknowledge, itis theknower rather than theknown. However, withtheadvent of thehuman sciences,we also becometheknown, thesubject we (subjects) study. Subjectsarealso theproduct of a of subjection, particular domination. This domination operates through languageto structure all ourother institutions andrelations. is notopposedtoknowledge Power, then, ortruth, butfunctions through itandthesystems ofmeaning uponwhich itrests. Power operates through discourses that define andlegitimate itsoperation. Modern is boundto knowledge in a specialway.The modern power age is theage of thefreesubject, and as suchitcannot admit of or legitimate a power that overtly dominates and controls. in sucha Thusmodern power must operate wayas to prevent us from seeingitfor whatitis. It playson theassumed opposition between truth and powerby "producing a discourse, seemingly opposed to it butreallya partof a larger of modern and deployment power" (Dreyfus Rabinow1983, 130). In contemporary society, Foucaultargues, poweris not"juridical,"nota creature ofprohibition andnegativity. It is instead one which a positive element, produces our discourses and structures, whichconstructs our selves and selfon thelaw,itsproblems is toremain To focus anditsguarantees, understandings. mired in an analysis fit for a world has died.It is to missall thenew,crucial that avenues of power, avenues that thenetworks of thelaw, function partly through around them. It is forthisreason the partly that he saysthat "we needto cutoff King'shead" (Foucault1980b, 121); we needto builda political that is theory notcentered around law andsovereignty. Thisis whyhe studies insti"carceral tutions": in these of powergenerated The forms hospitals, asylums, prisons.I
'Those who find Foucault's claimsto be too generalized to be useful areurgedto readDisciplineand Punishas a case study oftheoperations ofpower. Other attempts to developa "Foucaultian"analysis ofcontemporary events areDumm1987;Phelan1989.
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havespread toother settings thelaw with locations, bypassing itssimple formula of prohibition andpunishment. The maintheme of Discipline and Punishis the waytheshift from punishment to discipline tookplace in penalinstitutions, that thehumanist drive torehabilitate thecriminal, moved into pedagogy (as itmoved intoasylums).2 Such rehabilitation, sucheducation, amounts to theproduction and normalization of subjects,and as such shouldbe verysuspiciousto us. The discourses in theseinstitutions generated moveintoall ourrelations. As he putsit:
What is tobe understood bythedisciplining in Europesincetheeighteenth ofsocieties century is not,of course,that theindividuals who arepartof them becomemoreand moreobedient, northat setaboutassembling they in barracks, schools,or prisons; rather than an increasingly better invigilated processof adjustment has been sought after-moreand morerational and economic-between productive activities, resources ofcommunication, andtheplayofpower relations. (Foucault in Dreyfus andRabinow1983,219)
It is crucial to poweras conceived by Foucault that it is a relation that can onlyadhereto freesubjects.Poweris notforceor violence;"what defines a relationship of poweris that it is a modeof actionwhichdoes notact directly and immediately on others. it actsupontheir Instead actions."Powerrelations require that"'the other'(theone overwhompoweris exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to theveryend as a personwho acts" (220). The exercise of powerconsists, notin overt control or prohibition, but "in guiding thepossibility of conductand putting in orderthepossibleoutcome"(221). Poweris a matter of "government," in thesensethat government is a matter of fieldsof actionforothers.Powerrelieson freedom; structuring theyare not mutually as mostmodern exclusive, theory suggests. is a majorvehicleforthisshift."Beforeit took sex as a key Sexuality target," and Rabinowargue,"powerin factoperated Dreyfus through prohibitionand restraint" (1983, 60). Medievalrelations werestraightforwardly hierarchical, obviously power laden.Their mainvehicle was law.Whether in defense of a ruler or in opposition, thelanguage of thelaw predominated in describing relations. This predominance has continued intomodernity; we can see it in liberalism's on legalform reliance andmethod as wellas in Marxism's rejection ofthebourgeois state. TheMarxist does notso much reject legalforms as expose thestate for itsmystification ofpower relations through law; an abuseofthelaw, notthelaw itself, is at stake. is a vehicle for in that Sexuality modern itis through power discourse about sex (though notsolelythrough thatdiscourse) thatwe are controlled and normalized.Sex comesto be at thecenter of our being;our truth is in sex. The "will to truth" becomesa "will to sex" in thesensethat we are encouraged to
2Fora clearer description of theconnections amongtheseinstitutions and apparatuses, see "The History of Sexuality" in Foucault1980b,esp. 184-85.
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thesex at our root.In Foucault'sanalysis, get to therootof our sex, to find "sex" is a production oftheapparatus of sexuality. Rather than beingnatural, a "pre-given datum"whichwas distorted or described through theapparatus of sexuality, sex is a product, thesignof a particular organization of the(personal andpolitical) body. As a discourse, sexuality builtupontheearlier pastoral institution of confession, whichwas gradually expanding. Foucaultarguesthatthe confession becamea major vehicle ofpower inWestern societies, evolving from a particular tooloftheChurch intoa basicfeature ofeveryday life.Psychoanalysis is treated as one more type ofconfessional therapy in a society that increasingly mandates exposure. Thisneedto confess is no longer seenas themark of power.Rather, theconfession comesto seemtheliberation that truth demands. Truth nowfeels in us, buttrying secret, hidden to escape. Andifit does not,"thisis becausea constraint holdsit in place, theviolenceof a powerweighsit down,and it can finally be articulated onlyat thepriceof a kindof liberation" (Foucault1980a, as 60). We do notsee that thedesire for revelation is notnatural, butis induced; ifbylegerdemain, ourattention is redirected from We thecause,theimposition. come to believethatif we feela needto confess, thensomething mustbe reus whenwe keepsilence.It is for thisreason that oursexualdiscourse straining is so obsessed with repression. We senserepression notbecausewe areforbidden oursex butbecausewe feelcompelled to confess.3 This apparatus of sexuality is a majorfocusof whatFoucault labels "bioof techniques of bodies power,"theensemble that allowed"theadministration and the calculated of life" (1980a, 140). Such management remanagement that notsimply killorremove thisis doneat quires power transgressors (though a certain a point), butthat they be madeuseful, docile,normal. It requires that be notsimply population passive,butproductive andreproductive. It is thisthat makessex central. Moderneconomies required, on the one hand,increasing of popuofbodiesand,on theother, theregulation discipline and management so that lations they might be properly productive. Sex becamethelocus of the ofsubjects in thedualsensesofthis term.4 production Thussex becamea political issue: "It was at thepivotof thetwoaxes alongwhich theentire developed ofthe oflife.On theone hand,itwas tiedto thedisciplines political technology of populations" body.... On theother hand,it was appliedto theregulation (1980a, 145).
3Fora moredetailed of thisprocessin lesbian-feminist discussion communities, see Phelan 1989,chap.6. 4Foucault has in mindheresuchprograms as eugenics, publichealth, enforced sterilization, sex education, censorship, "homeeconomics," and so on. All of thesefunction to make/help us to fitin, to be productive if possible,and neutralized if not. Theymakeus good citizens/parents/ spouses/workers.
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2 This view has strong forfeminist implications theory. BiddyMartin has argued that Foucault's work provides ofa feminist an avenue for thedevelopment materialism that improves uponbothtraditional Marxism andradicalfeminism. She states that
of materialism thedevelopment necessitates approaches to sexuality, subjectivity and power whichgo beyond bothtraditional Marxist and radicalfeminist analysesand can providea wayoutof a theoretical impassein all attempts to relate theabstractions patriarchy and capitalism.It requires thatwe suspendour commitment to universal, explanatory categories at least long enoughto get at the operations of powerat theirmost material and con(Martin crete. 1982,4)
Thusourcentral concern must notbe simply whether sexismis an independent in an interlocking focusof oppressions of someother system, is theresult more basic structure suchas class or race oppression, or is thesinglesourceof all others. Rather, ourlarger In such problem maybe thewholesystemic approach. a theory, "all local and specific manifestations of powerbecomethereflection oftheprohibitive powerof a system exterior to us, or interior onlyin thenegativesenseof our "socialization." of thisis that The consequence described by Foucault: "Liberation, then, is articulated in terms of thedemand fortransgressionof or end to external prohibitions-an essentially liberallineof thinking" (Martin 1982, 5). As seen before, suchthinking is boundup withwhatit opthequest for"enlightenment, poses. It allows us to continue and liberation, manifold pleasures,"to feelthethrill of transgression, butit does not,in the us from ourconstitution as modern end,free normalized subjects. Foucault helps us tosee that in contemwith sex is part ofpower theobsession oftheoperations porary Western societies, whichwe arecontrolled at themostintimate through level.In this reading, to demand simply more andfreer sex is "to misunderstand in waysthat of desiretoallowfora systematization and regulation 'sexuality' In case ward we must particular socialandpolitical ends" (Martin 1982,8). this not"search for thetruth aboutsex" butinstead must "ask whatis at stakein the in thecompulsion historical to speakabouttheunspeakable" question, (9). of discourses is to call intoquestion of theFoucauldian The effect analysis theusualpicture as an opposition a hegemonic, ofoppression between repressive an If flows notsimply force andan underclass truth. possessing unspoken power if it is notcentralized thebottom topdown,butfrom up, in capillary fashion, butlocal anddiffuse, then we cannot to capture itby meansof a centralexpect ized, systemic theory suchas Marxism or liberalism. ifnotmost time with the feminists havebecomedisenchanted By this many to themforexplanation majorpoliticaltheories offered of the position(s)of haveoften Foucault would women.In so doingthey begunto makemovesthat
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endorse. Andindeed, Foucault applauds feminists for goingbeyond "sexualliberation," so easilymanipulated, to "desexualization of thequestion."In an inof thewomen's terview he saysthat"thereal strength liberation movements is notthat of having laid claimto thespecificity of their sexuality and therights pertaining to it, butthattheyhave actually departed from thediscourse conducted within theapparatuses of sexuality," focusing notsimply on "sex" but on "thedemand forforms of culture, discourse, language and so on whichare no longer part ofthat rigid assignation andpin-down to their sex which they had initially in somesensebeenpolitically obligedto acceptin order to makethemselvesheard"(Foucault 1980b,220). In AdriThesefeminist projects do notalwaysmatch Foucault's, however. enneRich's (1980) groundbreaking article,"Compulsory Heterosexuality and is notsimply a personal LesbianExistence," shemadeclearthat heterosexuality choice,notjust a biological or evenpsychological condition, butis a crystallizationof male power"at thelevel of discourse and social practice"(Martin com1982, 11), what Foucault wouldrefer to as apparatus. However, Richparts whenshe treats as unified evenin itsdiverse panywith Foucault thisapparatus manifestations and the"otherside"-the lesbiancontinuum-assome sortof to thatunity. moreattuned to the continuous opposition Rich,who is perhaps anddifferences white difficulties between us than anyother feminist writer, here tries to pullmany diverse andmovements one umbrella. The Fouwomen under cauldianmustask, Why?Whatis to be gainedby this?Whatis its effect for power? In fact,Rich'sproject betrays thedesirefora singlesourceof oppression, on the one side, and resistance, on the other.While her documentation and it beanalysis of themechanisms of compulsory heterosexuality are revealing, comes dangerous at thepointwhereit is hinted thattheseall worktogether. Foucault's workshouldlead us to suspect that thesevarious sitesof oppression as partof a are indeedvarious, that we must examine each of them notsimply as operations wholebutin their that larger particularity, mayopposeand chalevenas they endfor women.Similarly, tend toward a common lengeone another and theresistances ofwomen arevaried and sometimes opposedto one another, butof thepluof deception of falseconsciousness, thisis notsimply theresult ofa society. As such,they oflocations within thecrisscrossing rality apparatuses of by simply theunity "beneath"thedifference; are notto be disposed finding is a production, andunstable, as aredivisions. unity shifting disaster forMaryDaly. In Whatis onlya danger forRichis a full-fledged of womenaroundthe the tortures Gyn/Ecology (Daly 1978), she described world,acrosstime.She toldus whatwas doneto thebodiesof women,and it suchacwas horrible. that andjustified thediscourse has rationalized Refusing or culture wherethere is violence,we thatmakesus see civilization tivities, As Daly's workbeforeand after intolerable. beginto findsome things Gynl
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ofwords to shapereality. Ecology has shown, sheis intensely awareofthepower language, Her work,in Gyn/Ecology and since, has focusedon rebuilding women. As Jean Grimshaw (1986) changing themeanings ofwords to empower Nietzschean at times.This and others have noted,Daly's workis profoundly suchas footbinding, witchburnemerges clearly inher"genealogy" ofpractices ing,suttee, andgynecology. In theend, however, thatthere is a truth, the truth of Daly is confident She does notabandon therepreswomen, which hasbeendenied andrepressed. ultimate truth sive hypothesis. Indeed,it seems thatthe idea of a universal, to explain itssimultaneous exisrequires something likea repressive hypothesis In thiscase theultimate tenceand nonrealization. truth is found in thelivesof and powerexceptinsofar as it is women, as beingswho escape representation ontologizes imposed on them bymen.As Martin says,Daly's work"ultimately interms woman ofan essential anda privileged relationship to nature superiority andtruth. of reality, she can only Whileshe is acuteaboutmalerepresentations think of them which violate'theauthentic experience which can as 'distortions' be readoutof women's texts andlives'" (Martin 1982, 14). ThusDaly's generoom.Martin argues that Foucault's work alogieshaltatthedoors tothewomen's andunification of woman."To totalize or uniwarns us against suchreification versalize as an answer to thequestion ofwomanis to leave ourselves Otherness forunderstanding or intervening in theprocessesthrough withno possibility is produced, in relation which andtransformed to theshiftmeaning distributed of Daly's refusal to genealogize femiingarticulation power in ourworld"(15). nismandwomen's to the work of power among women, worlds leavesherblind in thecase of race by AudreLorde(1984, 66-71). as was notedmostacutely is oftheFoucauldian and challenge. Can we recognize This,then, theheart ofpower, that useduponus andas something trace theeffects both as something of we participate in?Foucault's leavesnoneofus with thesimple status analysis nor does the category of oppressor remain quitethe same as before. victim, in factit is thisrecognition that Whilethismayseem like ground fordespair, to leave enablesus to beginto see howwe might theworld.The attempt change intheabandonment to (theworst) men. women oftheworld purecan onlyresult leads to recognition of our of our common however, Recognition implication, to act. capacity 3 theaspect The analysis described abovehasnotgoneunchallenged. Perhaps forand opponents that has been seizedon mostprominently by bothadvocates of the workis theNietzchean theme truth is simply an effect of Foucault's that necof statements, rulesof a discourse. If discourses define thepossibility they andlimit the"truth" available to us. Thishas obviously structure probessarily canbe no transcendental truth. Ifwhat he saysis so, there lematic consequences.
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relevant says?Morepolitically whathe himself How, then,are we to evaluate if notby an appeal our own positions How are we to justify is thequestion: to truth? are thought of Foucault's of thisfeature critics Two of themostprominent ofthe"regimetheeffect notes that Taylor andCharles Taylor. Habermas Jurgen ourown against of truth raisethebanner is that"we cannot of truth" relativity of couldonlybe thesubstitution in thenameof 'truth' regime.. . . liberation is "easy thisposition of powerforthisone." As he suggests, system another intothelogicof one's "to integrate impossible likely to state,"butvery enough of thisis thewidely 1985, 178). The consequence (Taylor discourse" analytical work"can onlybe thebasis fora kindof local thatFoucault's held position strategy. positive (179), nota coherent, within theregime" resistance is deeperthanthis.NancyFraser(1981) arguesthat Indeed,theproblem and thetoneof his work.His words thestatements between is caught Foucault that;he are simply his stories he tellsus that position; disavowanynormative At thesame to them. element anynormative or suggest does notmeanto imply is utterly thatmodernity the conviction "his rhetoric betrays time,however, (Fraser1981, 286). She notestheuse of phrases features" redeeming without arenotthat archipelago" society"and "thecarceral suchas "thedisciplinary a He is in factoffering neutral. held to be-normatively cannotbe seriously truth to us. is notfirm truth Foucault's that feared havegenerally however, Feminists, work to Foucault's of feminist opposition The heart fortheir purposes. enough and unbased on stableentities of thought his suspicion has been thefearthat of appealsbasedon justice thepossibility eliminates relations power ambiguous a anyclaimsagainst of thebasis formaking women or truth, andthusdeprives in result suchviewsas Foucault's that (1988) argues LindaAlcoff sexist society. feminist and that 'woman'is a fiction that a position arguesthat"thecategory argues (417). Alcoff thisfiction" dismantling toward mustbe directed efforts everyfeminism, deconstructing sucha feminism "couldonlybe a negative that (418). to construct anything" andrefusing thing and bothfeminist thinkers, in many contemporary We do see thisposition thelabel reject terms) (in American feminists SomeFrench nonor antifeminist. of idena freezing humanism, as another see feminism becausethey "feminist" to points thisrejection feminists For American liberate. that will notreally tity in thatrejectsfoundations of struggle of a program weakness theunderlying theuse of unableto argueagainst themselves thosewho do so find humanism; to or "membership" to "rights,""dignity," unableto makereference power, resistance. their justify of cautionsthatwe cannotsimplyabandonthe category Martin herself the that does not acknowledge of thiscategory woman.Hastyabandonment
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claimsof thosepersons identified as female havepolitical force as onlyinsofar can appealto American of "humanity." they notions Whatever their philosophical status, categories of gender, as of truth andvalue,havepolitical force.The political situation is suchthat women cannot simply abandon themajorbasis of political has developed in ourtradition. claimsthat whowishto Thusfeminists question suchcategories as manor womanmust in them retain enough stability that For strategic they maybe usedforpolitical women struggle. purposes must continue to use theidea of woman.We cannot afford woman to saythat simply is a fiction or a location created by a discourse, foritis a central, powerful one, stillcapableof working against us by ourdisavowal.As Martin notes,"If we failnow to assertthecategory womanfrom our own shifting and open-ended points of view,ouroppression mayeasilybe lostamongthepluralities of new theories of ideologies andpower.Thereis thedanger that Foucault's challenges to traditional if taken categories, to a 'logical' conclusion . . . could makethe ofwomen's question obsolete"(1982, 17). Thatthisis notFoucault's oppression intention, northeinevitable effect of his line of thought, will becomeclearer whenwe examine theconcept ofrights. Di Stefano Christine has written of somefeminists' of the deep suspicion to thepriority challenge of thesubject and of liberatory truth. She notesNancy Hartsock's (1987) question: "Why is it,just at themoment in western history whenpreviously silencedpopulations havebegunto speakforthemselves and on behalf oftheir subjectivities, that theconcept ofthesubject andthepossibility of discovering/creating a liberating 'truth' becomesuspect?"(Di Stefano 1988, 17). She suggests that there is a "feminist case against postmodernism" consistingof several claims.First, she says,"postmodernism expresses theclaimsand needsof a constituency (white, privileged menof theindustrialized west)that has already had an Enlightenment foritself is nowreadyandwilling andthat to subject that legacytocritical scrutiny" (17). She contrasts this with constituency that ofwomen, composed nonwhite, has yetto be nonbourgeois peoples,which liberated and so continues to need thevocabulary of freedom and dignity formulated by theEnlightenment. Internal is fineforhegemonic critique groups, buthereitmayplaytheroleofdisarming thosegroups that havenotyetwonthe right to critique themselves. Second,postmodern have centered on "deconstructing" projects the Enlightenment legacy,and to thatextent theyremain phallocentric, Eurocentric enterprises. The postmodern areinseparably projects boundto theconditions of advanced patriarchal capitalism and, as such,are either irrelevant to nonhegemonicgroups or are partof thecontinuing of white hegemony men. bourgeois she notestherampant Third, to gender issuesin "purportedly insensitivity politicized of history, rereadings politicsand culture" (17). This has certainly beenthecase formany, ifnotall, malepostmodern thinkers. We maysee thisin
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thanas thesubject of occasionalreferences, Foucault's neglect of gender other as wellas in thework ofmany others. project, is thecharge that"thepostmodernist Mostfundamental, however, poliwouldmakeanysemblance ofa feminist ifseriously adopted byfeminists, of ticsimpossible" (17). This is no idle charge.We see heretheconvergence uponFoucault's project; Di Stefano joinsTaylor feminist andnonfeminist attacks onlyin in herbelief respect andfreedom aresecurely rooted andHabermas that claimsmadebysubjects as subjects. we must This is a legitimate notinsuperable problem. First, butultimately mentions as "postmodernist" (Di Stefano separate thethinkers grouped together Someofthese thinkers aremoresuscepDerrida, Lyotard, Rorty, andFoucault). Foutibleto thesecharges it has been argued (Weedon1987) that thanothers; more ofsocialpower makeshiswork cault'sconcern for history andtheexercise thought. useful forfeminists sorts of postmodern or poststructuralist thanother ofthese ofphallocentrism, So letus return Is he guilty charges: toFoucault. ofEurocentrism, ofinsensitivity? A strong case can be madethat he is. Butthis is notthemainproblem. "If Foucault's of discourse andpowercan protheory which enables duce in feminist ofpatriarchal powerrelations handsan analysis thedevelopment of activestrategies forchange,thenit is of little importance his ownhistorical fallshort of this"(Weedon1987, 13). The whether analyses foractionother than worsepossibility is thathe indeedleaves us no ground problem can be overcome, individual resistance, basedsolelyon ourwill.Ifthis then that hisother byfemishortcomings maybe remedied we maybe optimistic wouldbe thebasisfor rejection. His position nist thinkers, rather than remaining tothat ofFreud; evenifpersonally bound to sexism.We must, useful, analogous is thenihilist he has been Foucault that whether then, takea moment to consider painted. to thesatisfaction thischarge, though never Foucault can andhas answered ofhiscritics. "I am wellawarethat that In an interview givenin 1977,he states that I havenever I do notmeanto say,however, written butfictions. anything withhis truth is therefore absent"(Foucault1980b, 1983). This is consistent MarkPhilpexplains that is manufactured rather thandiscovered. truth position establish whichseek to forge stories connections, that Foucault's "are fictions of discourse"(Philp andunity andtransgress theestablished order relationships of "integrating" whathe says "intothelogicof 1985,79). He has no intention in thatparticipates one's analytical discourse";it is thatlogic, thatdiscourse, it. His is a visceral appeal,designed normalization evenas itclaimsto challenge to oursubjected to reacharound ourconstructed subjectivity body.If we underhimon somelevel,ifwe are "disturbed stand bywhathe says,"thereasoncan as familiar" "his fictions arerecognized (80). Theyshakeus loose onlybe that coherent from thediscourses thatlegitimate modern power.To be sufficiently
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in that and logical forcritics such as Taylor, theywould have to participate legitimation.5 Womenhave for This chargeshouldbe of central concern to feminists. in the adult centuries been challenged to qualify themselves formembership fields, whilethey population bydemonstrating their competence in "masculine" in whichthiscompehave simultaneously been excluded from theinstitutions tenceis produced. to question the The circleof exclusion has nowled feminists womenhave apparently self-evident nature of thesecompetences, to arguethat can found membercompetences andknowledges that mendo notandthat these in masin factare superior shipin human communities that to thosegrounded culinepractices and understandings. This is an exampleof whatFoucaulthas of the refusal of these labeled "the insurrection of subjugated knowledges," (and consequently of other knowledges to concede"the" ground of knowledge membership) to thehegemonic discourse, butit is also an exampleof thedoby these mestication of insurrection. Foucaultwould arguethatthe adoption of the dominant knowledge subjugated knowledges of theclaimsand criteria and amounts to self-destruction In claiming superiority rather thanliberation. theclaimsof mascuspecialknowledge, suchsimplefeminism in factreverses of menand women. lineculture without questioning thehierarchical opposition A truly without simply renew,nonhegemonic discourse mustspeakits truth this versing thevaluations of itsopponent. The difficulty withconceptualizing work.6 shift accounts formuch ofthehostility evokedbyFoucault's ThusFoucault is notarguing all knowledge has thesame status vis-athat vis power,and he is especially thesame as clearthat knowledge is notsimply I wouldhave was power, power:"if I had said,or meant to say,that knowledge said it, and havingsaid it, I wouldhave had nothing moreto say-once they relations?" I work so hardat showing their different wereidentified, whyshould
that thisis that Foucault reason;theperception 5I do notmeanhereto suggest simply rejects thatis basic to Western thecase is theresult of theopposition between reasonand body/emotion unified he wantsto suggest thatour bodieshave reason,thatwe are notsimply thought. Rather, talkto to talkto one another's languageand apparatuses beingswhouse language reason,butthat we havean "intuition" that he is ourbodiesas well. One wayof describing thisis to suggest that is another thathas been suggested to me is thatFoucault,as manyotherpostmodernists, right; what we mayrecognize us through our"right rather than our"leftbrain,"so that brain" addressing to scientific discourse. it at a levelthat is acceptable he is saying without yetbeingable to verbalize Ifthis amounts to a rejection is thecase, then theinsistence that be said logically anything important of new,presently inchoate whentheold ones seem so well ideas; thisseemsespecially dangerous us. articulated or relieve theproblems andso unableto address facing is quiteclear 6Notethat I am notabandoning herethenotions of truth or freedom. Foucault thatsuchnotions forus, even as we bracket themand call themintoquestion.The are essential is not,howdo we eliminate or theneedforit,howdo we problematize forFoucault truth question thecategory This includes of freedom out of existence, how do we makeourselves? butsimply, howdo we makewhat we understand as truth andfreedom? asking,
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lies inelucidating theexactnature ofthe (Foucault 1984,22). The difficult work fordistinguishing amongdisrelation. I shall arguethatFoucault'scriterion and,specifically, to their openness courses has to do with their relation topower to changeand thepossibilities them.Because theyoperate foragencywithin is always moreambiguous than we may through themedium oflanguage, which It is thisgap that wish,there existsa gap between powerand knowledge(s). allowsfor politics at all. work.Politics in thisviewis not Politics, then, is at theheart ofFoucault's noris ittheepiphenomenal trace simply free individuals speaking tooneanother, ofother, as an activity of human agents, is fragile determining, forces. Politics, andyetcrucial.Theories than that denythisareof less use to us in ouractivity refuse are thosethat to close every hole,to be "consistent" beyond theconsisoftheworld livewith paradox, with that which tency they describe. Ifwe cannot new ground defies"common sense," we cannot everbe opento new thought, for mayfind themselves accusedof contrathought. Thosewhochooseparadox of groping diction or appreciate theexperience bythosewhocannot understand of do notquitehaveproper namesyet.This is thepoint aboutin thespacesthat "woman." Commonsense simultaneously questioning and usingthecategory it is a realcategory, so muchso that tellsus that ourpolitical agendamustbe its history and use. We may wantto shapedby it, and yetwe mayquestion of the and challenge, completely escape thestrictures question butwe cannot as itis presently to do so is to fooloneself. world constituted. To attempt In 1981Foucault to aid theVietnamese boatpeople.The others joinedwith theboat action was nongovernmental, a matter ofsending private shipstoprotect was not thestatement peoplefrom pirates. He wrote aboutthisaction,though at thetime.7 In thestatement writes that"no one" has comFoucault published He sugourright." missioned theactivists andthat itis thiswhich"established has which which has itsrights, "there exists an international citizenry, geststhat no itsduties, andwhich up against every abuseofpower, promises toraiseitself or thevictims. After all, we are all governed and,to that matter whotheauthor the in solidarity." As members of thiscitizenry, we must alwaysprotest extent, misandlosses" of "human actions ofgovernments which "calculate theprofits or tolerated fortune decisions by their negligence." People's provoked by their thosewho hold an absolute misfortune "founds to riseup and to address right in the we maynotonlyspeak;we can and must"intervene power."However, inof individuals must will order of politicsand international The strategies. a moto reserve in a reality havewanted scribeitself overwhichgovernments for nopoly themselves." for Not turn theantihumanist Foucault? notsoundlikea humanist Does this withFoucault's thatwe butin manyways.It is consistent suggestion entirely,
is reproduced in Keenan1987,20-21. 7Thetext ofthestatement
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cannot andrights-talk, simply disposeof right that"against thedisciplines, the is a return onlyrecourse to theverycode of right thatthe analysisof those has discredited" disciplines (Keenan1987,27). Whatis neededis, nottheend ofright, but"a newright, one which must indeed be anti-disciplinary, butat the same timeliberated from theprinciple of sovereignty" (Foucault1980b, 108). Right must be eliminated, and yetcannot be dispensed with.The lessonto be learned is that we must always negotiate. The attempt to find theposition beyond politics, beyond negotiation, is doomed;andwithin politics, we can never hope for total thought, for neatness, for completion. Andyet, negotiation is notsimply "done." It is a continual struggle, a continuing pressure whichwe put upon andothers. ourselves Theories that denythisdo us an injustice byleading us to lookfor"the" obstruction to "our" securefreedom andby forcing us to disciplineourselves so as to qualify for that freedom.8 is This theproblem of humanism that feminists must address. The history has beena history that andextermination ofnonwhite, justifies thecolonization has been non-European, submiddle class, nonmalepeople. Thatjustification boundto thedisciplining of thesepeople,to theproduction of orderly subjects. Foucault challenges thisby insisting that there is a ground morebasic thanhumanist rights bywhich tojustify protest andparticipation; that, infact, thequestionoftheneedforsucha ground is a symptom ofthefailure ofmodern society to respect itsmembers. truly We must claimright(s) noton thebasis of conforto standards mity promulgated bya certain group ofmen,buton thebasisofour as actual existence peoplewhohavetroubles. This stance, forces us to listen to others. however, It forces us intopolitics theprivileged some by removing ground by whichwe might rightfully ignore us withbothclaims and people. The factof our common existence provides responsibilities. The exactshapeoftheseis notclear,butthenecessity of workis. Thiselucidation ingon their elucidation begins with theacknowledgment that humanism to datehas notsufficiently dealtwith these issues. Thus opponents are mistaken whenthey that Foucaultcontradicts suggest himself whenhe values freedom and individuality. Theirchargerestson the forsuchvalues.If we chalbelief that humanism theonlysureground provides then ofcritique socialforms we mayhavea lever lengethisassumption, against ofhumanist that does notreinsert us within thedisciplinary structures "sciences ofman."
we is beingusedherein a specialized be said that theword"discipline" 8It must wayandthat allowfor is notthat we should must evenhere.The argument each simply "do ourownthing" irony butthat we must of arguments that sortofperson alwaysbe suspicious compelus to "be" a certain oftheself for andinclusion. Somesort ofordering (male,white, heterosexual, etc.) to qualify rights is of coursenecessary to anysocial order; whatFoucault is thepeculiar modemorganichallenges we arenotawarethat we were,are, zation that internalizes that covers itup so that andthen ordering orcouldbe anything other than whatwe are.
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Foucault's fundamental problem withdisciplines is thelack of reciprocity thattheyallow. Disciplines, according to Foucault,"have thepreciserole of introducing insuperable asymmetries and excluding reciprocities" (1979, 222). Individuals whoaresubject tothese disciplines areless ableto "understand what is happening tothem" orto choosetheir response than they wouldotherwise be, andthislack "is notan accidental butan essential factor in theefficiency of the power theindividual encounters" (Hooke 1987,41). The ideal of reciprocity is betrayed that is notsimply a by thedisciplines ideal forFoucault; it emerges in many times various humanist andplaces, with supports and interpretations. In fact,Alexander Hooke argues,Foucaultsaw as "participating humanism intherupture ofpossible reciprocal relations among humans" con(42), notmerely providing one possibleexpression. Humanism's andformative. nection to theidea ofthesocialcontract is essential "Man" parin thecontract; ticipates thosewho do notparticipate (amongothers, women) are sub-or quasi-human.9 do nottransgress Those who "breakthecontract" againstthe sovereign ruler, theking,but against"society." "For Foucault," Hookestates, "thesocialcontract anda disciplinary arecomplementary" society (1987, 42). of thedisciplines The center is thepower-knowledge thatwe thatasserts can be known in ourentirety willmakeus free.We will and that thisknowing be free,notby taking are not power,but by knowing all. However, humans in their knowable Becauseofthisfact, theproject is doomedto failure, entirety. and so we alwaysfeelthedanger of the"outside"in a particularly urgent way. to thedanger is to increase ofthedisciplinary The response thescopeanddepth force. Thuswe enslave intheattempt and ourselves tobecomesimultaneously free safe. Foucaultmakesus question thesetwo goals can be compatible whether and highlights therisksof striving This is directly to the forsecurity. relevant offeminists, for ofa world oneofourmajor struggles goalshasbeenthecreation a newspace, safefor women. toooften we havedonethis However, byenclosing in the correct anddisciplining ourselves encircling ourselves, making politically 10 fear that without thesestandards we shallhaveno community. The antidote Foucaultoffers is anonymity. is resistance beAnonymity of cause itpreserves ourindividuality or restricting "by withholding knowledge that can serve andopposing thedisciplines oneself, particularly knowledge powers" (Hooke 1987,42) and also by "enabling theselfto increase thescope of actions andrelations notsusceptible orinterpretoofficial observations, records,
9Theliterature documenting thisexclusion is too voluminous to list;I suggest that thereader beginwith Lloyd1984. '?Forfurther discussions ofthispoint, see Phelan1989;Sawicki1988.
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as such,notfaceless, tation" nameless (57). The idealis notanarchy relations, butevasionofthecomplex ofpower-knowledge in theattempt to buildrelations of reciprocity andfreedom. ForFoucault is notrestraint theproblem butdomination: thesituation inwhich whoaresubject ofa system those to theconstraints areunableto change that system. Thuswe see that at heart Foucault addresses someof thecentral problems ofdemocratic theory. What is freedom? Perhaps itlies inthepossibility ofliving a lifewe freely endorse, or at leastcan argueabout.Perhaps individuality is not simpleisolation or particularity, butrequires respect forourself-understanding evenas that maybe challenged byothers. The power-knowledge complexes restrict theseby their particular manner of imposition of identity upon us. This imposition resists dialogue orconflict aboutselvesandtheir locations byrefusing to recognize itsownstatus as part ofthat instead themantle of struggle, seeking "truth" uponitsdiscourse. We must question thenecessary social supports to human relations and interactions. How muchand whatsortof structure is required forour politics? Whatsorts of institutions do we need,and is it conceivable that some areasof ourlifeneednoneatall? The answers tothese arenotclear.Whatdoes questions seemclearis that feminists needto explore urgently this.The disciplines have consistently operated to deprive of knowledge ofthemselves women whilemaking themobjectsof male knowledge, thusmaintaining themin asymmetrical relations. The flip side,thesocialcontract, similarly excluded women: attempts to include them haveoften failed bymaking "humans"so abstract that reallives cannot be livedas bothwomen and "humans." We maythen understand Foucault's work as an attractive alternative to both liberalism and antiliberal humanist theories such as Marxism.In thisreading Foucault notas a nihilistic emerges opponent of all valuesbutas one actively for a political searching language that willenablehumans tomakeclaimswithout resorting to (and thusconforming to) Enlightenment (whitemale) standards of andmembership. rationality Foucault is notsuggesting, inhisanalysis ofpowerknowledge, that is simply a toolofpower; knowledge rather, he is cautioning us thecomforting against humanist belief that (andfeminist) powerandknowledge aremutually is good.11 exclusive, that poweris bad andknowledge (or "truth") As longas we holdon to thisbelief, we shallbe unableto see therealsystems of constraint in ourlivesandourownresponsibility fortheir maintenance. Furwe shallbe unableto resist ther, thatwe notonly the "cultural imperialism" suffer butperpetrate on others.12 If it is truethat Foucaultvaluesfreedom and individuality, thenourabandonment of humanism maynotentailtheabandonof thesevalues.It does notneedto involve ment of foundaus in thequestion
IIIn a recent article, Brown (1988) has described thisopposition in Plato'swork andhas suggested that this Western opposition persists throughout theory, including feminist theory. 12J adopt thephrase "cultural imperialism" from LugonesandSpelman1983.
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bespeaksthelimited, forthesethiings tions,fortheveryneed forfoundations as an emerges ideals. The social contract exclusivequality of Enlightenment or willnotsee the amonga peoplewhocannot forhuman relations explanation have bond.Women itis a synthetic we areboundtogether; many waysin which as faulty, thinking havejudgedcontract in thiscontract, fought to be included or (metaphysical thatthe demandfor"foundations" buthave notrecognized that thought. is ofa piecewith epistemological) Enlightenof their womenwillbe deprived mayfearthat Manyfeminists cost of the us thetremendous Foucaulthas taught ment just as it approaches. to thecolonizedOthers, butto (European)"man" notsimply Enlightenment, to havevalues.We in order suchcolonization We do notneedto repeat himself. guarvalues," transcendentally of "universal havethecomfort mayno longer Fouimprovement. butthismaybe a great unchanging, anteed and historically values. we can stillhaveand act on somehuman cault'sexamplesuggests that ofsome (ornotsimply) thevalues,buttheauthority Whatis at stakeis notreally them to us. ofthosevaluesandofthosewhowoulddescribe versions lies thebeliefthat claims,there Underneath thesuspicion of postmodern beings,opposedto of women as distinct women havetwochoices:recognition that in fact eliminates "human" intoa generic ofwomen men,andsubmergence tools that thevery line,suggesting women from view.Foucault argues acrossthis on themen, andexcludewomen haveturned usedby modern mento dominate concerned personally andthus should with. No, he was notdeeply be dispensed of menis correct, of theplight with thesituation of women, butifhis analysis In menusedearlier. thetoolsthat wary of adopting should be very then women different. simply men,norarethey a Foucauldian women arenotgeneric world, and their is to tracespecific differences The taskof Foucauldian intellectuals but of all power, notwith theaimofelimination in power relations, implication ofpower. with theaimofa more andflexible system porous to pluralism? is a simple return a possibility that all this underneath Is there of Westhas beena matter No. Pluralism as we havepracticed it in themodern with certain approved categories it,investing difference bydescribing containing intact thebasic social whileleaving for relevant thecapacity difference, defining which seeksto reassure contract form. Pluralism has beena danceof sameness, is quite Foucault "don'tmatter," "aren't us that differences dangerous." certain howmatter. The wayto open thispossibility, clearthat do/should differences to tellus certain whichauthorizes experts ever,is notthrough theplayof truth where we of truly whatmatters, relations, reciprocal butthrough theformation from the becausewe arenotinsulated becausewe must, acknowledge difference refrain Ifwe aretobuildtheory, we must andaction ofthose"others." judgment not from on thebodiesand livesof thosewe havebeentrained theory building from the to hear,and we mustbe freeto buildit without seeking permission witheveryright. withno right, authorities. We need to speak forourselves,
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Foucault alliedhimself with this project, eventhough he failed women inspecific moments. Our workmustbe notto rejecthimforhis failures butto use his insights to further ourownsuccesses. 26 September Manuscript submitted 1988 Final manuscript received 28 July 1989
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Philp,Mark.1985. "MichelFoucault."In TheReturn ofGrandTheory intheHumanSciences,ed. Quentin Skinner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rich, Adrienne. 1980. "Compulsory Heterosexuality and LesbianExistence."Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 5:631-60. Sawicki,Jana.1988. "Identity Politics andSexualFreedom: Foucault andFeminism." In Feminism on Resistance, and Foucault:Reflections ed. IreneDiamondandLee Quinby. Boston:Northeastern Press. University Taylor, Charles.1985. "Foucault on Freedom andTruth." In Philosophy and theHumanSciences. Press. Vol. 2 ofPhilosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Chris.1987. Feminist Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Weedon, Practiceand Poststructuralist Theory.

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Foucault and Feminism Author(s): Shane Phelan Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34, No.

Foucault and Feminism

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