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The Fundamental Truth 1 Etinne GilsonNovember6,2012

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ThomasisheldintheCatholicChurchtobethemodelteacherforthosestudyingforthepriesthood. TheworksforwhichheisbestknownaretheSummatheologiaeandtheSummaContraGentiles. Oneofthe35DoctorsoftheChurch,heisconsideredtheChurchsgreatesttheologianand philosopher. Etsicfitutadeaquaesuntnotissimarerum,nosterintellectussehabeatutoculusnoctuaeadsolem, utIIMetaphysicorumdicitur(Summa contra Gentiles 1.11.2). [So it comes about, as is said in Metaphysics 2, that our intellect is related to the most knowable thingsastheeyeofanowlisrelatedtothesun.Aristotle,Metaphysics 2.1,993b9.]

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Few philosophers avoid the temptation of philosophizing without other presuppositions than thoughtitself.Fichteyieldedtoitwithoutreservationinbuildinghiswellknownimmensestructure. No Christian philosopher has gone that far, but some of them do not conceal their displeasure when they are urged to consider and, if possible, to see a primary truth which as such cannot be demonstrated. That is why, holding the composition of essence and existence in finite beings as the fundamental truth of Christian philosophy, they could not tolerate the idea of leaving it as an arbitrary assertion and have tried to demonstrate it. In order to avoid any confusion, let us say at the outset that the distinction (or composition) of essence and being in finite beings is indeed demonstrable under certain conditions, but it is extremely important to understand their nature. AnexcellentstudyoftheDe ente et essentia reducestothreethemaintypesofargumentsbywhichSt. Thomas establishes the famous scholastic distinction. The first, which certainly originates in AvicennabutwhichSt.ThomascouldhavereadintheworksofWilliamofAuvergne,isclearlyset forth in De ente et essentia : Everything that does not belong to the concept of an essence or quiddity comes to it from without and forms a composition with that essence, for no essence can be conceived without its parts. Now, every essence or quiddity can be conceived without knowing anything whatsoever about its existence. I can conceive what a man or a phoenix is and yet not know if they exist in reality. It is clear, therefore, that being is other than essence or quiddity. Theargumentisirrefutable,butwhatdoesitprove?First of all that actual being is not contained in the notion of an essence.AsKantwilllatersay,inthenotionofahundredthalersthenotionofa thaleristhesamewhetheritbeaquestionofsimplypossiblethalersorrealthalers.[Kant,Critique ofPureReasonA599/B627,trans.NormanKempSmith,2nded.(London:Macmillan,1933)] Next,as St.Thomasexplicitlysays,it proves quad esse est aliud ab essentia vel quidditate (that esse is other than essence or quiddity).Foranessencetopassfrompossibilitytobeing,then,an external cause must bestow actual existence on it No Christian theologian or metaphysician has ever doubted the soundness of this conclusion. Because a finite being is not the cause of its own existence, it must hold it from a higher cause, who is God. In this sense, what is called the distinction between essence and being simply means that every finite being is a created being. Now all theologians grant this, but many refuse to conclude from it that a finite being is composed of two metaphysical principles: its essence and an act of being through which it exists. Itisonethingtosaythattheessenceofafinitebeingdoesnotcontainthe cause of its being, which is all the dialectical argument of Avicenna, taken up by William of AuvergneandSt.Thomas,proves.It is another thing to say that in this same finite being existence comes from an actus essendi to which it owes precisely its actual being. This by no means follows from the above argument Here is a good subjectformeditation. Excellent philosophers and theologians have devoted their lives to the study and teaching of the Thomistic doctrine without ever suspecting the true meaning of this fundamental thesis. Theyhaveseeninitonlyaformula,alittlemoreabstrusethan others,forsayingthat every finite being is contingent and created.Ifnothingmorethanthiswere involved, every theologian without exception would teach the distinction between essence and existence,whichweknowwellisnotthecase. Letusmoveontothesecondgroupofarguments.Theyaresaidtohavethefollowinggeneralform: There must be only one being in which essence and existence are not distinct, whose essence itself is its existence, because it could not be multiplied without being diversified, and there is no way in which it can be diversified. Hence being is distinct from essence in all created beings.

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Onceagain,theargumentisconclusive,andnowitresultsinestablishingthetruthofthedistinction betweenessenceandexistence.Hereis undoubtedlythetheologiansroyalandfavoriteroad,forif Godisthepureactofbeingheistheonlyonewhocanbeit.Whatwouldlayclaimtothistitlewould beipsum purum esse,andthiswouldbeGod.ThatiswhysomanyThomistictheologiansoftenaccuse ofpantheismthosewho,deaftotheirarguments,denythedistinctionbetweenessenceandexistence in finite beings. These theologians give themselves an easy advantage, for in order that their demonstration be conclusive it would first be necessary to establish that, for God, to be Being is to be the pure act of esse, whose essence is being itself. Hence the value of the argument depends entirely on the validity of a certain notion of God which, whatever its real worth, never seems to have entered the mind of many theologians, some of whom were saints. The proofs in the third group, drawn from the nature of created being, corroborate these conclusions. The historian summarizes them for us with great subtlety. Since by definition it is causedbyanother, created being does not subsist by itself, as the being whose essence is to exist subsists necessarily. On the other hand, being an effect cannot be a property of created being because of being itself; otherwise every being would by essence be an effect, and there would not be a first cause. Hence being an effect is a property of created being by reason of a subject distinct from its being. Nothing makes us see more clearly the fundamental difficulty all these demonstrations face. The proof that, because created being is not essential to being itself it can only belong to being by reason of a subject distinct from its being, presupposes the conclusion it was intended to demonstrate. For if we grant the premises of the argument, how do they lead to the conclusion that the subject of created being is really distinct from its being? Now it is precisely this and nothing else that is at stake. Everytheologianwillagreethatbydefinitionacreatedbeingisnotidenticalwithitsexistence.Itis not, because, being created, it must receive existence in order to be. But, on the other hand, for a createdessencetoexistitsufficesthatGodmakeitexist,whichproperlyspeakingistocreateit. It might be true that God cannot create a finite being without conferring on it an act of esse really distinct from its essence, but supposing this to be demonstrable; the argument has not demonstrated it. Thesearguments,andallthoseofthesametype,arealikein.presupposingtheconceptionofbeing, notinthesenseofabeing(ens, habens esse,thatwhichis),butratheroftheactofbeing(esse)which, combining with essence, makes ofit precisely a being, a habens esse. Now, as soonasthis properly Thomistic notion of esse is conceived, there is no further problem; there remains nothing more to demonstrate. Tobeconvincedofthiswehaveonlytorefertothetextsof.St.Thomaswhichhisinterpretercitesby way of proofs. Two things clearly stand out in them. First of all, that the notion of pure being (ipsum puruin esse) thus understood is always presented in them as something taken for granted. Second, it is taken for granted in them only because, for the theologian, it is the proper name of God. To think pure esse is to think God. The progressive dialectic of the Summa contra Gentiles leads St Thomas to establish that in God being and essence are the same(Contra Gentiles 1.22).Healreadyconceives,then,thepossibilityof theirdistinction.Now,ifhedoesconceiveit,thequestionisalreadyanswered.Indeed, engaged here in establishing Gods simplicity, St. Thomas must deny of him every conceivable distinction. That is what he does in demonstrating, with Avicenna, that when there is a necessary being (tertia via) it exists of itself. Nowitwouldnotexistofitselfifithadanessencedistinctfromitsbeing,forinthis case its being would belong to that essence and depend on it (Contra Gentiles 1.22.2). More briefly,

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andevenasbrieflyaspossible:Everything is through its being. Hence, what is not its being is not through itself a necessary being. Now God is through himself a necessary being. Therefore God is his being(Contra Gentiles 1.22.5). Itisimpossibletogofurtheralongthesameroad,foronlyoneotheroperationwouldremaintobe carriedoutifthiswerepossible.This would be to prove that the necessity of necesse esse is indeed the same as the necessity of what St. Thomas calls ipsuin esse, the pure act of being, beyond essence itself, which in this unique case is as it were consumed by it.Nowitmustbeadmittedthat agreatnumberoftheologiansareindoubtaboutthisnotionorevendisputeitsvalidity. As far as we know, St. Thomas himself nowhere gives a demonstrative proof of it No doubt he argues, If the divine essence were other than its being (esse), the essence and being would thereby be related as potency to act. But we have shown that there is no potency in God but that he is pure act Gods essence, therefore, is not other than his being (ContraGentiles 1.22.7). This is undeniable, but the conclusion would be the same if, instead of conceiving being as the act of essence, it were simply conceived as the actual essence itself. Far from being unthinkable, such a notion of God seems to be common to all the theologians who, coming before or after St. Thomas, have adopted a metaphysics of being different from his own. Abouttheseads

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