British Journal of Religious Education Vol. 32, No.

1, January 2010, 1929

Educational pluralism and freedom of religion: recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
Eugenia Relao*
Department of Ecclesiastical Law, Complutense University, Madrid, Spain (Received 4 September 2008; final version received 8 April 2009 )
Taylor and Francis CBRE_A_433382.sgm British 10.1080/01416200903332049 0141-6200 Original Taylor 2010 0 1 32 erelanop@der.ucm.es EugeniaRelano 00000January & Journal Article Francis (print)/1740-7931 of 2010 Religious Education (online)

This paper addresses the sensitive issue of the teaching of religions and beliefs in schools by analysing two recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. In these cases, the Court asserts that students should be exempted from compulsory courses on religion or from courses that are not conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralist manner in order to protect the rights of parents to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs and to protect the childs religious freedom. What emerges from both decisions are sound principles about how to implement and teach these kind of courses without violating the freedom of religion and belief or undermining the state competences on education. Keywords: religious pluralism; right to education; freedom of religion

In Folger (ECHR, 29 June 2007) and Zengin (ECHR, 9 October 2007), the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) analysed the delicate balance between the states obligation to ensure a pluralist and neutral education directed at forming tolerant and critical citizens with regard to religious matters, and the right of parents to raise their children according to their own convictions. Both decisions highlight educations fundamental role in fostering a dialogue between different religions and contributing to the fight against religious stereotypes; they also stress the schools importance in the formation of a critical spirit in their students, something only possible in the context of educational pluralism. Through these two decisions, the European Court affirmed a doctrine that strengthens the criteria now upheld by other international institutions and organisations regarding this matter. The facts in Folger and Zengin Folger versus Norway The teaching of Christian religion in Norway has formed part of the educational curriculum since 1739 (Hostmoelingen 2005). Over a decade ago, an important reform involved incorporating the study of other religions and philosophies into the core Christian teachings (the subject was called Christianity, religion and philosophy KRL). This 1997 reform reinforced the teaching of Christian religion, specifically Lutheranism. Those students of different faiths or beliefs could enjoy an exemption that was limited to certain parts of the subjects, at the request of their parents, so long
*Email: erelanop@der.ucm.es
ISSN 0141-6200 print/ISSN 1740-7931 online 2010 Christian Education DOI: 10.1080/01416200903332049 http://www.informaworld.com

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as they provided reasons for their request and justified them with a difference of beliefs to those taught. There was no need to provide these explanations in order to request exemption from activities that were explicitly religious. It was in this context that four Norwegian families, all members of the Norwegian Humanist Association, brought a complaint before the European Court against the Kingdom of Norway on 15 February 2002, in response to the competent domestic authorities refusal to grant their children full exemption from the KRL subject. The applicants maintained that the KRL subject was not taught in an objective, critical or pluralist manner, and was therefore not consistent with the interpretive criteria embodied in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.1 They declared that the subjects main objective was to reinforce a specific religious identity through the use of textbooks that contained Christian sermons and Christian teachings. Since the possibility for total exemption which existed before the 1997 reforms was eliminated, the parents were left only with the partial exemption, which forced them to study the syllabus in detail in order to determine how beneficial exemption would be for their children (Folger 63). In its defence, the Norwegian government used the criteria established by the European Court in its judgment of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen (ECHR, 7 December 1976), maintaining that a right to full exemption as demanded by the applicants would make impracticable all compulsory and institutionalised instruction in which different religions, ethical questions or philosophies of life are studied. As the European Court upheld in Kjeldsen, the European Convention protects against indoctrination, not against the acquisition of knowledge about religions and philosophies of life presented in the form of objective, critical and pluralistic information. For these reasons, the conditions imposed on parents in the exemption clause could not be considered disproportionate, nor did they create an unreasonable burden that warrants the creation of a right to full exemption (Folger 81). The case was decided by the 17-member Grand Chamber by nine votes to eight, in favour of the Norwegian parents. Zengin versus Turkey In the Zengin case, the plaintiffs maintained that compulsory classes in religious culture and ethics violated the rights as guaranteed by the second sentence in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, and those present in Article 9 of the Convention.2 The Zengin family belonged to the Alevi faith, a branch of Islam which has deep roots in Turkish society and history. On 23 February 2001, Mr. Zengin contacted the Provincial Directorate of National Education (the Directorate) at the Istanbul Governors Office, requesting to have his daughter exempted from the aforementioned subject. The request was dismissed. Since 1990, the only exemptions allowed by the Supreme Council for Education have been directed at students of the Jewish faith, the Christian faith or atheism. The Zengins argued that the teaching programme and the manuals for the class had as their main objective the reinforcement of students Islamic culture in its Sunni conception. In response, the Turkish government argued that:
There were legitimate grounds in contemporary Turkish society for granting more time to the study of Islam than to other religions and philosophies of life. This was particularly so given that Turkey was a secular State and that schools were therefore the most appropriate institution for transmitting such knowledge. (Zengin 42)

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The government emphasised that the compulsory nature of the course stemmed from the need to protect children from the myths that incite and promote fanaticism. Furthermore, the Turkish government stressed that its position, in compliance with the constitutional principle of secularism, is supported by the European Courts jurisprudence, which has extended a margin of appreciation to states with regard to the public school curriculum. Unlike Folger, Zengin was decided unanimously by a chamber of seven judges who considered that the system of religious instruction of Islam taught in the public schools violated the provisions of the Convention. An evaluation of the European Court in Folger and Zengin In both cases, the Court makes it clear from the beginning that should both countries concede a broader range of knowledge of Christianity and Islam, respectively, than of other religions and philosophies in the school curriculum for primary education and the first level of secondary education, this should not be viewed as a departure from the principles of pluralism and objectivity, nor amount to indoctrination (Angelini vs. Sweden (December), No. 1041/83, 51 DR (1983)). As the European Court has repeated, it is necessary that states have a margin of appreciation to define a curriculum in conformity with the place Christianity and Islam hold in the history and traditions of the respective respondent states. The main question becomes whether, in fulfilling their education duties, the states ensured that the information or knowledge that formed part of the curriculum for the KRL subject and the lessons in Religious culture and ethics was imparted in an objective, critical and pluralist manner or, contrarily, the purpose was to indoctrinate, thereby violating the religious and philosophical convictions of the applicant parents. In the Norwegian curriculum, the KRL subject was created to be a meeting point for different religious and philosophical convictions. However, the European Court assessed that the subject had the purpose of transmitting a profound knowledge of the Bible and Christianity from the viewpoint of the Evangelical Lutheran faith, and that the other religions and philosophies did not enjoy the same depth of knowledge that was dedicated to the Lutheran religion. With regard to the system of exemption provided, the Court considered that the mechanism for partial exemption was not very effective considering that any differentiation between activity and knowledge exemption only involved the activity and not the knowledge, as argued by the Norwegian government was very difficult to determine (Folger 48). Therefore, after confirming that the Norwegian state had not sufficiently ensured that the information and knowledge present in the KRL subject were transmitted in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner, the Court concluded that refusing the applicants children full exemption violated the European Convention. The joint dissenting opinion of the remaining eight judges concluded to the contrary that there had not been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, maintaining that the majority of the Court had overstepped their limitations as to their scope of the case when discussing the partial exemption scheme. They also considered that the partial exemption scheme did not entail an excessive or unreasonable burden for parents who wished to make a request for an exemption, and therefore falls within the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the respondent state under Article 2 Protocol No. 1.

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The Zengin case was decided unanimously by a chamber of seven judges. The European Court analysed the case similarly to Folger, examining firstly whether the classes in religious culture and ethics were conducted in an objective, critical and pluralist manner, and secondly, whether the state provided the parents with a guarantee to protect their religious and philosophical convictions. As regards to the first question, an examination of the curriculum and textbooks indicated that the subject was not confined to neutral information about different religions and philosophies. Not only did they dedicate more time to the knowledge of Islam in comparison with other religions or philosophies, the subject also included texts intended to instil the principles of Muslim religion into the students, even memorising suras from the Koran. Consequently, the Court concluded that the classes did not meet the criteria for objectivity and pluralism. In terms of the second question regarding the mechanisms the Turkish education system provided to respect the parents religious or philosophical convictions, the Court concluded that providing only two categories of students those of either Christian or Jewish faith the possibility for exemption was not appropriate for various reasons, mainly: (a) there was no alternative considered for those children whose parents faith was not Sunni Islam, Christianity or Judaism; (b) the subject could create a conflict of allegiance for the children between the school and their own values; and (c) the subject was specifically about Islam in such a way that it should not be compulsory because it endangered both the parents and the students freedom of religion. General principles in the European Convention on Human Rights regarding freedom of religion and education The teaching of religion in public schools is a widespread practice among the European Council member states; 43 out of the 46 member states offer a religion class at public school (Jackson et al. 2007). The majority of them offer to students who do not wish to be educated in these matters either a mechanism for exemption or the option of taking alternative subject matter (Schreiner, Kraft, and Wright 2007). It is the role of the states to define the scope and content of what is taught. The jurisprudence of Strasbourg in decisions like Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen versus Denmark or in Valsamis versus Greece (ECHR, 18 December 1996) maintains the compatibility between the demands of the Convention and the compulsory instruction of different religions and beliefs, and history of religions and morality, as long as it is conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralist manner. Within the legal reasoning in Folger and Zengin, the Court announces major interpretive principles regarding the freedom of religion within the educational sphere derived from the major previous cases decided by the Court: Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen versus Denmark, Campbell and Cosans versus the United Kingdom (ECHR, 25 February 1982) and Valsamis versus Greece. These principles may be summarised in four points: (1) The right of the parents to respect their philosophical and religious convictions is grafted on a fundamental right that does not distinguish between public and private teaching, or between religious instruction and other subjects. The parents may require the state to respect their religious and philosophical convictions when fulfilling their natural duty towards their children. The word convictions denotes views that attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness,

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cohesion and importance (Valsamis 257 and Campbell and Cosans 36 7). The parents could not oppose the integration of education, information or knowledge of a directly or indirectly religious or philosophical nature in the school curriculum, for otherwise any institutionalised teaching would run the risk of rendering itself impracticable. (2) The states duty to respect the parents convictions implies some positive obligations on the part of the state, including ensuring that any information or knowledge included in the curriculum is conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralist manner. The states obligation to impartiality and neutrality towards different religions, faiths and beliefs is incompatible with whatever assessment the state makes about the legitimacy of beliefs or their forms of expression (Manoussakis and others versus Greece, 26 September 1996 47 and Hassan and Tchaouch versus Bulgaria, 26 October 2000 78). Moreover, it is the duty of the state to determine the school curriculum (Valsamis 28). (3) The European Convention is designed to maintain and promote the ideas and values of a democratic society (Kjeldsen 53). Pluralism requires a balance that guarantees minorities a fair deal, and which avoids any abuse of a dominant position (Valsamis 27). Pluralism in education is essential for the preservation of democratic society. (4) Teaching is an integral part of the process whereby a school strives to achieve the objective for which it was established: the development and formation of the students character and spirit and their personal independence (Zengin 55). Application of these principles: towards a convergence of criteria in the international sphere Within the European Courts legal reasoning, it is becoming increasingly common to find references to rulings and recommendations made by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe with regards to education, democracy and religion; references to the recommendations of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) concerning the respect for cultural pluralism; and mentions of decisions made by other international bodies. In fact, there is a growing convergence among various European and international bodies on the need to balance the interest of the role of religion in the education of youth and the prevention of religious intolerance. The events of 11 September placed the need to promote greater social cohesion through a tolerance for religious diversity on the political agenda. This requires a greater knowledge of different religions in the public sphere, including the public school system, one of its pillars. UNESCO has led initiatives regarding the importance of school in promoting an understanding between different religions (World Education Forum 2000),3 and, regionally, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union have recently become more aware of the fundamental role teaching religion has as a cultural fact in the primary and secondary levels of instruction (OSCE/ODIHR 2007). This does not mean reducing religion to the level of a cultural phenomenon, but rather highlighting its relevance in social life and in the understanding of interpersonal relationships (see Steering Committee for Education). In addition to this, the Alliance of Civilizations has established a specific high-level group on education which focuses on implementation of programmes that can provide the means to increase knowledge about beliefs, practices, and cultural expressions of diverse

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groups through schooling and public education efforts (Alliance of Civilizations Secretariat 2006, 4). What is noteworthy about the aforementioned organisations is that they coincide in calling attention to the need for intercultural and religious dialogue as a basic element in the culture of learning to live together (Johnson 2003). To that end, the information and knowledge of different religions and philosophies must transcend the family environment. It becomes a matter of state and states are recommended to introduce the teaching of religion and beliefs into the public school curriculum in an objective and impartial manner, and with due respect to the right of freedom of religion. This approach finds its inspiration in the general guidelines adopted by the OSCE and in the recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 1202/1993 on religious tolerance in a democratic society, on religion and democracy 1396/1999, and on education and religion 1720/2005. Indeed, in the case of Folger as opposed to Zengin the interest the Norwegian government has in the promotion of religious diversity is clear in its attempt to provide the KRL subject with objective and pluralist content, even though it proved to be insufficiently implemented, violating the parents right to freedom of religion. In Folger, the European Court brings up the communication brought before the UN Human Rights Committee by four groups of parents, parties to the Norwegian domestic proceeding, who decided to address the United Nations with the same matter that prompted other parents to appeal for the protection of the European Court (UN Human Rights Committee. Leirvag versus Norway, 23 November 2004).4 The UN Human Rights Committee carried out a detailed analysis of the situation to determine if the compulsory instruction of KRL, combined with only limited possibility of exemption, violated the authors right to freedom of thought, opinion and religion, as guaranteed under Article 18 of ICCPR and, more specifically, the right of parents to ensure a religious and moral education for their children in conformity with their own convictions (Article 18.4). As extracted from the Committees General Comment No. 22 on Article 18, the Committees conclusions have great relevance for the purposes of this paper: [A]rticle 18.4 permits public school instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics if it is given in a neutral and objective way, and public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with Article 18.4 unless provision is made for nondiscriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents and guardians (UN Human Rights Committees General Comment No. 22: 6). In the Committees final decision, it concluded that the aforementioned subject did not fulfill the criteria for neutrality and objectivity in its instruction, and that the exemption scheme did not protect the right of the parents to ensure that the religious and ethical teachings were in accordance with their beliefs. As a follow-up measure, the Committee recommended a modification of the KRL subject through amendments to the Education Act 1998 and the curriculum. Surprisingly, in Zengin, the Court does not mention the Committees decision, nor does it allude to the interpretation of Article 18.4 of the General Comment No. 22, yet it is filled with trends highlighted by the Council of Europe and the ECRI. Recommendations from both the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the ECRI re-emphasise the role of education in combating different religious stereotypes and the need to incorporate the study of different religions into the school curricula in order to promote a dialogue within, and between, religions and a greater level of tolerance.

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Obtaining a peaceful coexistence based on the respect of human rights is the aim and purpose of the international community, demanding not only respect for the principle of nondiscrimination, but also respect for cultural diversity. For this reason, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has recommended to the governments of the member states that they provide religious studies at primary and secondary levels, following the set criteria: impartiality, providing young people with the educational tools to fight religious fanaticism, suitable methodology and specific teacher preparation (Recommendation of Parliamentary Assembly 1720 2005, no. 14). It is also worth noting the publication of the Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs (TARB) (OSCE/ODIHR 2007) developed by the Advisory Council on Freedom of Religion or Belief, a consulting body to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE. TARB offers recommendations and guidance for preparing curricula in public schools so they can fall within the framework of respect for the parents and pupils religious freedom and be in accordance with the international documents on human rights. This rationale is based on two core principles: first, that there is a positive value in this kind of teaching because it consolidates a persons respect towards others beliefs; second, that this subject is essential in countering stereotypes and ignorance, sources of social conflict and religious fanaticism. Although studying religions objectively, without indoctrination, raises complex questions about the legal interests at stake (the discretions of the state in terms of curriculum, the right of the parents in terms of the convictions of their children and the religious freedom of the child), it is a very effective tool for promoting educational pluralism. An insufficient analysis Both decisions mark an important step forward for Strasbourgs case law regarding the limits of the right of religious freedom; furthermore, the Courts reasoning hints at the consolidation of certain guiding principles within the public educational politics. Although this does not mark a departure from previous jurisprudence, it does incorporate new significant nuances while demonstrating a certain lack of consideration for the principles and contradictions within previous decisions holdings. In both decisions, the Court reiterates on numerous occasions what was established in Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pederson versus Denmark, which resolved a case of parents that sought exemption for their children from a class whose curriculum included sex education. In this case, the Court considered that the purpose of one ministerial circular about sex education in public school was not indoctrination, and the parents were, therefore, not justified in their request. In the separate opinion of Judge Verdress, he analyses what is to be tackled 30 years later in Folger and in Zengin: can parents oppose compulsory education in a state school even if such education does not constitute an attempt at indoctrination? Referenced often in Folger and Zengin, this separate opinion points out how the absence of exemptions from compulsory sexual education could violate the religious convictions of the parents. So the question becomes when and in what circumstances exemptions could be requested. Since Kjeldsen, a doctrine referred to as the margin of appreciation was established to protect states autonomy in order to gauge the restrictive measures on rights and freedoms within its territories (Brauch 2004; Donoho 2001). If such controversial

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subjects like sex education have an objective and neutral content, the right of the parents to receive an exemption can be limited. In the two decisions, the Court considered that both states established subjects that lacked objectivity and neutrality without a mechanism for exemption for all students equally, and consequently did not fall within the margin of appreciation; that is to say, the European Court limited the autonomy of the Norwegian and Turkish governments. Paradoxically, in Leyla Sahin versus Turkey (ECHR, 10 November 2005), the Court validated the Turkish authorities actions regarding the prohibition of wearing headscarves on university precincts; and by signaling that the national authorities are better equipped, in principle, than an international arbiter to offer judgment on the local needs and contexts, the Court grants importance to the decision-makers at a national level and maintains the margin of appreciation for the Turkish government. There is no doubt that the Strasbourg body can vary its legal assessments of the margin of appreciation in each case; whats more, it does this continually, complicating the consolidation of a general theory (Brauch 2004,145; Yourow 1996). But in the matter of Sahin, Article 24 of the Turkish Constitution, which regulates the right to religious freedom and beliefs, is referenced in order to support the governments interpretation of the subsegment of Article 24 that education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision and control. In Zengin, the Court not only considers the interpretation of this article to be inadequate, but it also agrees that the root of the problem is in the Turkish educational system and the domestic right, which has to be brought into conformity with the Council of Europes provisions as a form of redress that would bring an end to the stated violation (Zengin 84). Although the states enjoy the ability to disseminate, by means of teaching and education, information or knowledge of a directly or indirectly philosophical kind, which parents cannot contest, since, in such a case, any institutionalised teaching would be impracticable (Kjeldsen 53), the Courts reasoning in the two cases, still recognising Kjeldsen through direct citations, reiterates that Article 2 of the aforementioned protocol does not permit a distinction to be drawn between religious instruction and other subjects, and orders the state to respect the convictions of the parents, religious as well as philosophical, in the public school curriculum as a whole. As such, the margin of appreciation for the Norwegian as well as Turkish government diminishes substantially since both have to respect the parents rights, which means more than acknowledge or take into account (Zengin 49). This nuance has important consequences, almost the inversion of the Kjeldsen provision, because, by narrowing the states margin of appreciation, so expands the exercise of rights and freedoms. Therefore, states enjoy autonomy when setting the educational curricula in accordance with its own traditions, history and national politics, but with some limits: the information must be conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralist manner. This leads to a fundamental question that the European Court does not tackle: how to discern whether education is neutral and objective. These terms can mean that the teaching does not show any preference to one religion or another, or it could be understood to mean that all religions deserve fair and equal attention. In the case of Zengin, the Court understood the Turkish government to have granted privilege to the teaching of Sunni Islam. In the case of Folger, it maintained that the Norwegian government did not provide equal attention to other faiths as it did Lutheranism. Other questions that remain unanswered are whether objective and neutral means that the teaching is carried out in a critical way and whether the official

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interpretations of each faith should be taught by professors who are members of these religions or by a third party (Plesner 2006). It is also worth noting in both cases the absence of any mention of the rights of the child. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child establishes that a childs education should be aimed at, among other things, the development of the childs personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential (Article 29), as well as preparing the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin (Article 29). How is it possible for the European Court to insist, by analysing the objectivity and neutrality of education, that educations purpose is the development and formation of pupils character and spirit, as well as their personal autonomy, and not give any mention of the rights of the child? Why, when analysing the facts in both cases, does it say the two sentences of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 must be read not only in the light of each other but also, in particular, of Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the convention and not allude to the religious freedom of the child to be exempt from indoctrination or from all possible violation of his or her right to freedom of religion? The Court constantly safeguards the protection of the parents right for their children to receive education in accordance with their convictions and for the fulfillment of the aim of creating critical and tolerant students. Why is there no mention of the rights and duties of the parents to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right to freedom of religion in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child? (Article 14.2). At the same time, in both cases there is no doubt that by imposing a set syllabus on the public school system, the states find an external limit on their action with the aforementioned right of the parents, but they also bump into an internal and more fundamental limit which lies in the intimate sphere of the individual: the right of the child to be free from all and any attempt at coercion of his or her right to freedom of religion (McKinley Brennan 2006, 154). Another relevant aspect is that in highlighting the deficiencies of the Turkish educational system (Zengin) and the benefit of reforming Turkish legislation as a compensatory measure, the Court stresses the importance of the passive side to every legal relation. Because of this, the Zengin decision is significant as it imposes redress on the legal subject who is obliged to rectify and structurally reform the education system. The prospect of duty must be introduced to fully achieve an effective protection of rights. In this respect, the recommendations to the states incorporated into the Toledo Principles are very useful because of their insistence that reinforcing a context of guarantees is, however it is looked at, the best way to avoid a possible violation of rights. Conclusion From these reflections, we may conclude that the Court has consolidated two apparently contradictory trends. On one hand, the states should respect the parents convictions, religious as well as philosophical, throughout the public school curriculum, which implies not only a slightly negative commitment, but also a positive obligation on the part of political powers to protect this right. On the other hand, the states have the power to disseminate, through education, information and knowledge which is, directly or indirectly, of a religious or philosophical nature, and not even the parents can contest the integration of this instruction into the curriculum because, in such a case all institutionalised teaching runs the risk of becoming impracticable.

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Perhaps the solution does not lie exclusively in weighing the legal interests at play in each particular case, but rather in rethinking the content and scope of the concept of educational pluralism when deciding what is to be its purpose, and specifying which are the most appropriate strategies for fulfilling that purpose (Van Praagh 1998). When talking about educational pluralism, it is essential for the preservation of democratic society, in the words of the case law of Strasbourg, to clarify if we are referring to a plural offer in education, that is to say, an offer of a plurality of information to the student body, or are we referring to respect for the plurality of understandings that the students bring (each with his or her own context, convictions and culture) to the classroom? In Zengin, the Court considers that in a democratic society, only pluralism in education enables pupils to develop a critical mind with regards to religious matters in the context of freedom of thought, and it recalls the inviolability of, and respect towards any religious or philosophical conviction. Knowledge of religious diversity and plurality promotes a tolerant and understanding attitude; it reinforces respect for all people and the beliefs of others, and it helps to reduce stereotypes and increase solidarity. Mutual acknowledgment means that religious and secular citizens are more ready to learn about one another from that main stage of public space: school (Habermas 2006, 10755). The values behind respect for freedom, democracy and pluralism cannot be imposed heteronymously nor are they changes in mentality that simply happen. It is a learning process that requires an arduous work of hermeneutic self-reflection must be undertaken from within religious traditions (Habermas 2006, 145) and from a self-reflexive transcending by secular citizens of a secularist self-understanding of modernity (Habermas 2006, 147). In short, solidarity depends on complementary learning and self-reflection. For this reason, the purpose of all education is the childs development of certain common values reached by general consensus (which therefore necessarily assumes a context of educational plurality) as the objective for which education was created is the development and molding of the character and mental powers of its pupils as well as their personal independence (Zengin 55). Fulfilling this purpose requires strategies for pragmatic and distinguished learning that logically include a neutral, critical and pluralist way of disseminating knowledge. Only then can those agreed-upon objectives mentioned in the Delors report be reached: learn to know, learn to do, learn to live together and learn to be (UNESCO 1996). Once these ideals are met, then conflicts over legal rights should decrease.

Notes
1. Article 2 of Protocol No. 1: No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise

of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the state shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and philosophical convictions. 2. Article 9: (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. (2) Freedom to manifest ones religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 3. The Dakar Framework for Action 20002015 is the basis for those UNESCO initiatives that make reference to the role schools have in the promotion of dialogue between

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religions. The Dakar Framework for Action, Education for All: Meeting Our Collective Commitments was adopted by the World Education Forum in Senegal, April 2000. 4. Four groups of parents and their respective children went to the Human Rights Committee; five parents and four children turned to the ECHR. Both bodies concluded that since the parties were different although the content of the claims was basically the same the claims could be addressed separately (UN Human Rights Committee. Leirvag v. Norway, CCPR/C/82/D/115/2003. Communication No. 1155/2003, 23 November 2004). Available at http://www.unhchr.ch

Notes on contributor
Eugenia Relao is an assistant professor of law and religion at Complutense University and legal advisor of the Spanish Ombudsman. She has published mainly on issues dealing with freedom of religion in multicultural societies (religious symbols and international religious freedom) and on religious minorities. She is a member of OSCEs Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief.

References
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