The genealogy of misrecognition from Hegel to Fanon Charles Villet (charles.villet2@gmail.

com) Doctoral Research Seminar (27 June 2011) St Augustine College, Johannesburg Introduction: In a nutshell, my thesis is that Fanon is a theorist of recognition that provides an important account of misrecognition (in the forms of racism and violence) within the colonial context, as well as some clues towards the possibility of mutual recognition in face of violence. My dissertation investigates the course of misrecognition1 using Fanon as vantage point. Fanons work is the locus for what can be called the story of misrecognition, which starts with Hegel and then runs through Marx and Sartre, culminating in Fanons work. Each of these thinkers influenced Fanons account of misrecognition in the colonial context. I follow Fanons thought in his appropriation of Hegel, Marx and Sartre in the attempt to come to grips with the misrecognition that he witnessed within that context. The starting point for this story is Hegels model of the master-slave relation, which is taken up and further developed by Fanon. Fanon gives this model political and racial content and he was at pains to find a solution to the misrecognition that characterizes this relation. Fanon saw violence as a viable reaction to misrecognition, which would aid the slave in forcing the master to recognize the slave. Therefore, with the aid of violence the slave does attain some form of recognition which provides a manner of freedom and emancipation, and this can be seen as a kind of mutual recognition in a political sense. However, the problem for Fanon was that the masterslave relation is simply recreated within the postcolony. This means that the mutual recognition that is attained is rather a phoney recognition because the master-slave relation is perpetuated and not dissolved. In bringing the above selection of thinkers together this study throws light on the struggle for recognition: Hegel provides a phenomenological account that provides the structure of intersubjective knowing where mutual recognition is absent (as pointed out by Westphal, 2003) whilst Marx, Sartre and Fanon provide more concrete accounts based on the experience of the historical events of their time. I do not attempt to develop a full account of the struggle for recognition (a task that would be too ambitious), which thinkers such as Honneth and Ricoeur have done in good fashion. I rather seek to provide a genealogy of misrecognition within the thinking of a particular line of thinkers. This account with its one foot in the colonial context is the one side of the moral and philosophical crisis of Western humanism (as argued by Gordon, 1995) in face of crimes against humanity (the other being the Holocaust in Europes own backyard). Further, this study helps to trace a part of the colonial offshoot of the struggle for recognition based on Fanons work.2 Despite the focus on misrecognition I venture an exploration of the possibility of mutual recognition towards the end of the study by way of a Hegelian reading and critique of Fanon. The value of combining Hegel and Fanon in this manner will be to throw new light on the struggle for recognition and how to address the problem of violence. The originality of the project lies in a constructive attempt at bringing the work of Fanon into the discourse on recognition. This does not mean that other thinkers have not referred to
1 2

I borrow the concept from Taylor (1994) and the phrase (with my alteration) from Ricoeur (2005). I say a part because a number of other thinkers have contributed to this offshoot as well, such as du Bois, Cesaire, Senghor, Said and Mamdani.

Fanon when the issue of recognition is at hand but limited use has been made of his work in this respect, which ranges from mere mentions (a sentence by Honneth (1995: 160) in The Struggle for Recognition) and simple statements of Fanons status as a theorist of recognition (Bernasconi, 2004: 107), to discussions of no more than a couple of pages (in Taylors The Politics of Recognition (1994: 65-66)), or perhaps parts of an article (see Liberman, 1999; Chari, 2004; Honenberger, 2007) or a dissertation (Brence, 2001). Fanons work has been linked more explicitly to the master-slave dialectic, partly because he himself discussed the dialectic in a chapter of his work (see Fanon, 1967), but also because his other works so clearly display the dynamics of the dialectic (for discussions, see Gendzier, 1973; Zahar, 1974; Turner, 1989 and 1996; Serequeberhan, 1994; Sekyi-Out, 1996; Gibson, 2003; Honenberger, 2007). In this sense this project contributes to the (limited amount of) studies done on the dialectic in Fanons work, but it provides something fresh and new in substantially linking Fanons work to the discourse on recognition. Therefore, the originality of this study lies with the serious consideration of Fanon as a theorist of recognition and it will fill a lacuna found in both the literature on Fanon and scholarship done on recognition. The course of misrecognition: The focus of my study is on an explanatory understanding of misrecognition within the colonial context, taking the model of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic as the point of departure. I understand recognition here as the phenomenon of intersubjective recognition as experienced in the encounter between persons. To recognize in this context means to recognize the others humanity. This recognition can be adequate or inadequate: It could be a full and mutual recognition, or an inadequate misrecognition which is distorted by power and in which the humanity of both sides are not acknowledged. Recognition is a pervasive theme in the work of Hegel, who offers a variety of reflections on the topic (see Honneth, 1995; Williams, 1997; Ricoeur, 2005; Anderson, 2009), the most prominent being his account of the master-slave relation. I give special attention to the account of the master-slave found in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), which could be considered as an account of misrecognition (or phoney recognition, following Williams (1997: 60)). The master-slave account in the Phenomenology is often (but wrongly) assumed to be the definitive account of both recognition and intersubjectivity in Hegel and the focus of many studies on these themes within his work.3 I do not view this account as definitive in Hegels corpus but nevertheless use it as my focus because it is this account that is further developed by Fanon as influenced by his philosophical sources, i.e. Marx and Sartre. Fanon makes explicit use of this account in the penultimate chapter of Black Skin, White Masks (1952) entitled The Negro and Recognition. Fanon elaborates on the dialectic in that chapter, providing both a defence and critique of Hegels account. Further discussion of the development of the dialectic and the ways in which it helps to illuminate the struggle for recognition is implicitly found in Fanons analysis of a number of important themes (violence, decolonization and nationalism) in especially The Wretched of the Earth (1961). Hs analysis of violence is pertinent to this study because it provides an account of misrecognition. Violence for Fanon refers to the phenomenon in general although one can distinguish different types, namely physical, psychological and structural violence (following Jinadu, 2003). Violence for Fanon is a reaction to
3

Some thinkers have looked away from the Phenomenology in looking at questions of mutual recognition. For instance, constructive use is made of Hegels works written during his time in Jena (prior to writing the Phenomenology) by Honneth, Williams and Ricoeur in providing accounts of mutual recognition. Habermas (1996) states that these works mostly go unnoticed and are greatly underutilized in comparison to works like the Phenomenology.

misrecognition, expressing the frustration of being misrecognized, i.e. not to be recognized as human. I argue that Fanon provides an implicit account of misrecognition (i.e. misrecognition in other words), which is the consequence of his experience of the historical events of his time but also of the philosophical sources that he draws from. The benefit of the consideration of Fanons work as concerned with misrecognition is that it throws new light on the philosophical sources that influenced him and in so doing allows for a closer understanding of misrecognition. Apart from Hegel, Fanons philosophical sources most notably included Marx, Freud (via Lacan), Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.4 I treat Marx and Sartre (with an interlude of the influential Marxist interpretation of Hegel by Kojve) because both owe much of their thinking to an incorporation of Hegels ideas, especially the passage about the master-slave in the Phenomenology. What will come to the fore is that because of their focus on this passage Marx and Sartre had a one-dimensional reading of recognition in Hegel (as pointed out by Honneth, 1995), i.e. on Hegels account of misrecognition. Due to their respective agendas Marx and Sartre radicalized this minimal reading of Hegel: They took Hegels account of misrecognition to be definitive and further saw violence as the only logical consequence to the struggle for recognition. Fanon inherits this reading of Hegel in his appropriation of Marx and Sartre, hence the focus on misrecognition. However, the use of this account of misrecognition was appropriate and well-suited for Fanons context in which misrecognition was a concrete reality. I look at how Fanon used and rightly abused his philosophical sources. I say this because Fanon himself said that Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial problem (1963: 40) and this is pretty much what he did with the work of each of Hegel, Marx and Sartre, stretching it slightly in order to understand the colonial context. I explore the continuities and discontinuities of the thought of these thinkers with that of Fanon, especially with regard to misrecognition, i.e. the failure to attain full mutual recognition. A common feature found in the work of these thinkers is that the struggle for recognition is a struggle for freedom and, especially in the work of Marx, Sartre and Fanon, the struggle for humanity. Therefore, there is a significant link between freedom and humanity, characteristic of the Marxist and existentialist thinking that Fanon inherits. Misrecognition implies a denial of freedom and humanity, and the problem then is how to attain freedom and humanity. Seemingly for Fanon (and also Marx and Sartre) violence is a significant (if not the only) way of doing this. Therefore, this study shows how conflict and violence are factors in misrecognition. This will help us to understand the dynamics of the misrecognition of humanity in light of the problems presented by violence (which is used in the wider sense of the term). The master-slave dialectic as used in the work of Fanon struggles exactly with the possibility of moving beyond violence. What Fanon demonstrates is that violence reveals the expression of the frustration at being misrecognized whilst at the same time attempting to get rid of it. However, in this way violence ends up with a performative contradiction, i.e. in its attempt to deal with misrecognition it simply perpetuates misrecognition but nevertheless reveals the urgency for recognition. In a sense the struggle for recognition requires violence as the only way to force the master to acknowledge the freedom of the slave if he is being misrecognized. However, violence also problematizes our sense of what it means to be human. The key problem is how
4

See David Maceys biography of Fanon (2000) for an account of these intellectual influences, especially in the case of his friendship with Sartre.

to move beyond the perpetuation of misrecognition, which is a perpetuation of the masterslave relation albeit in new and different forms and manifestations. Violence provides the slave with a way of dispensing with oppressive notions of humanity, but the question is how to proceed from there to mutual recognition and thus new forms of humanity. Fanon took note of this problem and the struggle for humanity permeates his work and despite his allusions he can not quite find the way to mutual recognition. What Fanon lacked was a bridge from violence to the new forms of humanity that he seeked.5 Conclusion: I suggest a return to the work of Hegel (and Hegel scholarship) in seeking this bridge that Fanon required. It seems pretty self-evident that Fanon inherited an interpretation of Hegel from Marx and Sartre (as well as Kojev) that was one-sided in its focus on a specific passage in Hegels work. This interpretation is unfair to the wider corpus of Hegels work because openings are found within the work of Hegel for the possibility of the mutual recognition, e.g. in the Jena-writings that precedes the Phenomenology or in the Philosophy of Mind, written 20 years after. I choose to turn to what the Jena-writings has to offer for the simple reason that other contemporary thinkers (such as Honneth and Ricoeur) have made constructive use of these underutilized writings in addressing questions of mutual recognition. My aim (which also sets this study apart from those mentioned) is to make use of these writings in a critical evaluation of Fanon and the problem of violence, i.e. reading Fanon through Hegel. The critical question in this reading is: how would the alternative model of mutual recognition suggested by the Jena-writings deal with the introduction of violence into the master-slave relation? This question helps to lead a Hegelian critique of Fanon, i.e. a return to Hegel to see what Fanon missed in his analysis of colonialism and issues of recognition. In this way one is able to assess both the successes and failures of Fanons thinking.

Selected bibliography Allesandrini, A.C. 2000. Humanism in Question: Fanon and Said, in: Schwarz, H. & Ray, S. (Eds.), A Companion to Postcolonial Studies, 431 450. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Allesandrini, A.C. 2009. The Humanism Effect: Fanon, Foucault, and Ethics without Subjects, Foucault Studies, 7 (September), 64 80. Anderson, S. 2009. Hegels Theory of Recognition. London: Continuum. Baugh, B. French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism. New York and London: Routledge. Bernasconi, R. 1996. Casting the Slough: Fanons New Humanism for a New Humanity, in: Gordon, L.R., Sharpley-Whiting, T.D. & White, R.T. (Eds.), Fanon: A Critical Reader, 113 121. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Bernasconi, R. 2004. Identity and Agency in Frantz Fanon, Sartre Studies International, 10 (2), 106 109.

The clues that Fanon provides regarding his vision of a postcolonial humanism has been given a thorough treatment by a number of thinkers. For notable attempts at a Fanonian humanism, see Onwuanibe (1983), Turner (1989), Gibson (1994, 1999 & 2003), Bernasconi (1996), Allesandrini (2000 & 2009), Pithouse (2001 & 2003), Brence (2001), Makuru (2005), Jean-Marie (2007) and Gordon (2008). Some of these thinkers also attempt to articulate the bridge between violence and new forms of humanity that Fanon lacked but also so desperately seeked. Turner and Gibson to some extent made use of Hegel in this attempt, which is why an extensive use of Hegel sets the contribution of my study somewhat apart from most in the field.

Brence, S.B. 2001. Multiculturalism: The Refusal and Reconstruction of Recognition. Unpublished D.Phil dissertation, University of Oregon. Chari, A. 2004. Exceeding Recognition, Sartre Studies International, 10 (2), 110 122. Fanon, F. 1967 [1952]. Black Skin, White Masks. Translated by C.L. Markmann. New York: Grove Press. Fanon, F. 1963 [1961]. Wretched of the Earth. Translated by C. Farrington. New York: Grove Press. Fanon, F. 1965 [1961]. Wretched of the Earth. Translated by C. Farrington. London: Penguin Books. Gibson, N.C. 1994. Fanons Humanism and the Second Independence in Africa, in: McCarthy-Arnold, E., Penna, D.R., Sobprena, D.C. (Eds.), Africa, Human Rights and the Global System. Westport: Greenwood Press. Gibson, N.C. 1999. Radical Mutations: Fanons Untidy Dialectic of History, in: Gibson, N.C. (Ed.), Rethinking Fanon: The Continuing Dialogue, 408 446. New York: Humanity Books. Gibson, N.C. 2003. Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination. Oxford: Polity Press. Gendzier, I.L. 1973. Frantz Fanon: A Critical Study. New York: Pantheon Books. Gordon, L.R. 1995. Fanon and the Crisis of European Man: An Essay on Philosophy and the Human Sciences. New York and London: Routledge. Gordon, L.R. 2008. An Introduction to Africana Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Habermas, J. 1996. Labour and Interaction: Remarks on Hegels Jena Philosophy of Mind, in: ONeill, J. (Ed.), Hegels Dialectic of Desire and Recognition, 123 148 . New York: State University of New York Press. Hegel, G.W.F. 1949 [1807]. The Phenomenology of Mind. Translated by J. B. Baille. London: Allen and Unwin. Hegel, G.W.F. 1971 [1830]. Philosophy of Mind (Part III of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences). Translated by J.N. Findlay. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hegel, G.W.F. 1977 [1807]. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hegel, G.W.F. 1983 [1805-6]. Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805-6) with Commentary (also known as the Realphilosophie II). Translated by L. Rausch. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Accessed online: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/jl/index.htm [11 Aug 2010]. Honenberger, P. 2007. Le Ngre et Hegel: Fanon on Hegel, Colonialism, and the Dialectics of Recognition, Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge, V (Summer), 153 162. Honneth, A. 1995 [1992]. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Translated by J. Anderson. Cambridge: Polity Press. Jean-Marie, V. 2007. Fanon: Collective Ethics and Humanism. New York: Peter Lang. Jinadu, L.A. 2003. Fanon: In Search of the African Revolution. London: Kegan Paul. Kojve, A. 1969 [1947]. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by J.H. Nichols. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Liberman, K. 1999. The Dialectics of Oppression: A Phenomenological Perspective, Philosophy Today, 43 (3), 272 282. Macey, D. 2000 Frantz Fanon: A Life. London: Granta Books.

Makuru, S.J. 2005. Violence and Liberation: Fanons Political Philosophy of Humanization in the Historical Context of Racism and Colonialism. Unpublished D.Phil dissertation, Boston College. Marx, K. 1988. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. New York: Prometheus Books. Onwuanibe, R.C. 1983. A Critique of Revolutionary Humanism: Frantz Fanon. St. Louis, Missouri: Warren H. Green, Inc. Pithouse, R. 2001. Frantz Fanon and the Persistence of Humanism, in: Giddy, P. (Ed.), Protest and Engagement: Philosophy after Apartheid at an Historically Black South African University. Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change, Series II (Africa), Volume 7 [Online]. Washington D.C.: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Accessed online: http://www.crvp.org/book/Series02/II-7/chapter_i.htm [14 May, 2008]. Pithouse, R. 2003. That the Tool Never Possess the Man: Taking Fanons Humanism Seriously, Politikon, 3 (2), 107 132. Ricoeur, P. 2005. The Course of Recognition. Translated by D. Pellauer. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Sartre, J. 1956 [1943]. Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology. New York: Citadel Press. Sartre, J. 1976 [1946]. Anti-Semite and Jew: An Exploration of the Etiology of Hate. Translated by G.J. Becker. New York: Schocken Books. Sekyi-Otu, A. 1996. Fanons Dialectic of Experience. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Serequeberhan, T. 1994. The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy: Horizon and Discourse. New York and London: Routledge. Taylor, C. 1994. Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Turner, L. 1989. Frantz Fanons Journey into Hegels Night of the Absolute, Quarterly Journal of Ideology, 13 (4), 47 63. Turner, L. 1996. On the Difference between the Hegelian and Fanonian Dialectic of Lordship and Bondage, in: Gordon, L.R. (Ed.), Fanon: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Williams, R. R. 1997. Hegels Ethics of Recognition. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Westphal, K.R. 2003 Hegels Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Zahar, R. 1974 [1969]. Franz Fanon: Colonialism and Alienation. Translated by W.F. Feuser. New York and London: Monthly Review Press.