Ideological Realignment in the Contemporary U.S.

Electorate Revisited n
William D. Schreckhise, University of Arkansas Todd G. Shields, University of Arkansas
Objective. In this study, we revisit the ideological-realignment theory proposed by Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) by assessing the varying impact a persons ideology had on his or her partisan identication for individuals in different regions and between men and women. Method. Through an examination of the NES cumulative data le and the 19921994 NES Panel Study, we present a series of tabular ndings, an OLS regression model, and partial correlation coefcients to assess these changing subgroup dynamics. Results. Between 1978 and 1994, the impact of a persons ideology on his or her party identication grew in magnitude, while the impact of respondents parental party identication on their own party identication waned. However, these changes were not felt uniformly throughout the electorate, with Southern white males and Southern white females exhibiting the greatest changes. In the case of Southern white males, racial issues now appear to be related to their party identication. Conclusion. We nd support for the ideological-realignment theory, but nd evidence that such changes occurred rather unevenly throughout the electorate, suggesting that different dynamics of realignment may be at work simultaneously.

Partisan Realignments

Political scientists have studied extensively the impact of party identication on vote choice and the long-term fates of parties in the electorate. The authors of The American Voter (Campbell et al., 1960) established the primacy and longevity of partisan identication on vote choice. According to this view, partisanship is developed at an early age, handed down from parent to child, and acts as a lens through which the rest of the political world is viewed (Cutler, 1970; Converse, 1979). Although a great deal of subsequent research counters the assertion that party identication is absolutely unresponsive to short-term inuences (Abramson, 1976, 1979; Pomper, 1975:1826; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik,
n Direct correspondence to William D. Schreckhise, Department of Political Science, University of Arkansas, 428 Old Main, Fayetteville, AR 72701 /schreckw@mail.uark.eduS. The rst-named author will share all data and coding materials with those who wish to replicate this study.

SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Volume 84, Number 3, September 2003 r2003 by the Southwestern Social Science Association

Ideological Realignment in Contemporary U.S. Electorate

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1976:5966; Luskin, McIver, and Carmines, 1989; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson, 1989), party identication remains the single most effective predictor of individual-level vote choice (Converse, 1966; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1976; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson, 1989; Franklin and Jackson, 1983; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Bartels 2000). Although party identication is largely stable, the long-term fates of the political parties may change considerably. As a result, partisan realignments have been a topic of great interest among political scientists (Key, 1955, 1959; Burnham, 1970; Sundquist, 1973; Anderson, 1979b; Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingle, 1980; Ladd, 1995). Examining the history of American political parties, some scholars theorize that changes in the American party system were wrought from cataclysmic eventssuch as the Great Depression or the Civil Warduring which new partisan allegiances were forged (Key, 1955; Burnham, 1970; Sundquist, 1973). Others point to slower and more long-term secular realignments in which changes in partisan allegiances result from broader societal changes or by large-scale infusions of new social groups largely allegiant to either of the two major parties (Key, 1959; Burnham, 1970; Ladd with Hadley, 1978; Anderson, 1979a, 1979b; Beck, 1976; Campbell, 1985; Carmines and Stimson, 1989). Noticing substantial gains by the Republican party in congressional races in the 1994 and 1996 elections, and the inability of traditional theories of partisan realignment to account for such change, Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) concluded that a decidedly unique nationwide secular ideological realignment was underway. Traditional realignment theory did not provide much explanatory leverage for the emerging Republican strength as there appeared to be no obvious precipitating cataclysmic event, no emergence of new voters, nor any specic critical election. Further, the American electorate appeared to be choosing their party afliation based on something more than simply an inherited sense of party loyalty from their parents. Instead, citizens were able to distinguish between the political parties ideological positions and, thus, were better able to select a party that approximated their own political ideology (Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998). In fact, the proportion of survey respondents able to correctly identify each partys stance on certain political issues doubled from 16.7 percent in 1978 to 32 percent in 1994, and the relationship between respondents parental party identication on their own partisan afliation decreased substantially during the same time (Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998:644). Ultimately, Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) present an entirely new theory of how realignments may occur. Their ideological-realignment theory does not require cataclysmic political events, newly mobilized voters, or dramatic changes in socioeconomic circumstances as prerequisites for a partisan realignment. Their ideological-realignment theory contends that if political parties become more ideologically distinct, and citizens are able to clearly identify these ideological differences, then, over time, citizens will begin to alter their determinants of partisan support by placing greater

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importance on congruency between their partisan afliation and their political ideology and are less likely to simply choose the party to which their parents were loyal. The ideological-realignment theory provides a powerful explanation for contemporary changes in American politics. In fact, if the theory has widespread applicability, we may expect to see continued, and perhaps even greater, Republican dominance in not only national-level politics but Southern-state-level politics as well. However, there are reasons to believe that the ideological-realignment theory may, in fact, be limited to a comparatively small segment of the populationmost notably, Southern white menand perhaps less useful for explaining changes among women. If the ideological-realignment theory is limited in scope to the partisan changes witnessed among Southern white men, then both the theoretical and practical importance of this particular variation of realignment theory may not be as great as initially believed. On the other hand, if the ideological-realignment theory has applications beyond a conned segment of the electorate, then the theory has both great theoretical and practical importance.

Southern White Men and the Gender Gap

Research investigating the partisan afliation of Southern residents suggests that while dramatic political changes have occurred across the entire South, much of the change is conned to Southern white men. In fact, the movement of Southern whites, and men in particular, toward the Republican party was anticipated as early as the 1960s (Converse, 1966; Phillips, 1969) and has been well documented since (Schreiber, 1971; Beck, 1977; Ladd with Hadley, 1978; Bullock, 1988, 1996; Edsall and Edsall, 1991; Nardulli, 1995; Brunell and Grofman, 1998). As Miller and Shanks (1996:160) explain: The most vivid contrast between the changes occurring in the South and virtual absence of change outside the South is provided in the regional comparison of white male voters : : : [alternatively] outside the South, there is no evidence among men or women voters of a trend either away from the Democrats or toward the Republicans until [the mid1980s]. Consequently, while several studies suggest that partisan change in the South is primarily limited to white males, none have explicitly evaluated the ability of the ideological-realignment theory to explain the partisan changes of Southern residents generally, or Southern white men in particular (see Schreiber, 1971; Ladd with Hadley, 1978; Black and Black, 1992; Bullock, 1996; Tuchfarber et al., 1995; Gaddie, 1995; Brunell and Groffman, 1998).1
1 Even the analysis by Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) does not examine this possibility, focusing, instead, on Southern residents generally.

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Similarly, research investigating differences in the partisan afliation (as well as voting behavior) of men and women across the electorate, commonly referred to as the gender gap, suggests that women have become more likely to identify with the Democratic party and more likely to turn out to vote and cast ballots for Democratic party presidential candidates (Piven, 1985; Gilens, 1988; Kaufman and Petrocik, 1999; Center for the American Woman and Politics, 2000). If women as a group are choosing afliation with the Democratic party in greater numbers then there may be additional reason to expect that, if a secular ideological realignment occurred, it did do so unevenly. Specically, the ideologically-driven realignment may have been much more limited in scope and largely conned to Southern white males. Our expectations of differences across men and women (as well as region) are certainly compatible with the ideological-realignment theory proposed by Abramowitz and Saunders (1998), as well as the many investigations of both partisan change across the South and the gender gap, but verication of the ideological-realignment theory among these specic groups has yet to be conducted. Such an investigation is important because the ndings have implications for how extensive a contemporary ideological realignment may become. If the ideological realignment is largely conned to a relatively small group of voters, the potential of the current ideological realignment to have enduring effects comparable to, say, the enduring consequences of the New Deal realignment (which inuenced much larger segments of the population) is substantially reduced. Also, at a theoretical level, the combination of these disparate bodies of research suggests that it may be possible for an ideological realignment to occur among some groups in the electorate while a nonideological realignment may occur among other groups. In what follows, we examine the robustness of the ideological-realignment literature across region and gender in order to assess its magnitude across gender and region. We aim to determine whether such a hypothesis is appropriate for making electoratewide generalizations, or is more useful for explaining changes among specic subgroups. Additionally, we seek to determine the source of these changes by examining the role of specic political issues in shaping party allegiances over time.
Data and Methods

We analyze data from the American National Election Study (NES) collected from 1976 through 1996. Our analysis begins in 1976 because it marks the last presidential election before the Reagan Revolution and the increased popularity of Reagans conservative Republicanism (see also Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998, 2000). This is also the election before the landmark achievement of womens participation in the 1980 election where,

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for the rst time in U.S. history, a larger percentage of women than men turned out to vote. Further, except for 1982, this gender gap in voter turnout has been maintained in every national election since (McGlen and OConnor, 1998). Consequently, 1976 provides a benchmark to examine the partisan and ideological changes in the electorate that have occurred during the 1980s and 1990s. We focus most of our attention on the 1978 and 1994 NES studies because both years included identical policy and party position questions. Further, focusing on mid-term elections allows us to minimize the short-term uctuations in party identication caused by the heightened attention during presidential election years (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson, 1989; Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998:638). In addition, we pool survey data from subsequent presidential and mid-term elections creating data points at 19761978, 19801982, and so on through 1992 1994in order to minimize the effects of temporary changes in party afliation (see also Abramowitz and Saunder, 1998; variable descriptions are listed in the Appendix).2
Results

Trends in Partisanship As shown in Figure 1, the changes in party identication among Southern whites are largely the result of the Republican gains among men (from approximately 28 percent to 52 percent).3 Although there is evidence of a gain in the number of Southern white women who identied with the Republican party, the gain is not nearly as large and the Democratic party maintained a 10 percent lead in this group. Among non-Southern whites, there are substantial differences between men and women. As shown in Figure 2, both parties have consistently received about 45 percent support from non-Southern white men. Although the Republicans maintained a six to seven percentage-point lead over the Democrats through the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the parties appear to be evenly split during the 1996/1998 election cycle. Among non-Southern white women, however, the percent of Democratic party identiers has increased since the 19881990 election cycle. This change to the Democratic party among non-Southern white women occurred as Southern white men became increasingly Republican. A gender gap in partisan afliation was produced by large gains for Republicans among Southern
2 African-American and other minority respondents were excluded from these analyses. In the time period studied, minority respondents, as a group, were overwhelmingly Democratic. Moreover, the small number of minority respondents in the ANES samples (once we disaggregated across sex and region) made generalizations from our disaggregated analyses potentially unreliable. 3 Our analysis closely parallels the investigation presented by Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) in order to provide a strict test of the ideological-realignment theory.

Ideological Realignment in Contemporary U.S. Electorate

FIGURE 1 Party Identication, Southern Whites
Republican Men Republican Women
Percentage of Voting Group

601

Democratic Men Democratic Women

60 50 40 30 20 76/78 80/82 84/86 88/90 Election Cycle 92/94 96/98

FIGURE 2 Party Identication, Non-Southern Whites

Republican Men Republican Women
Percentage of Voting Group 60 50 40 30 20 76/78 80/82 84/86 88/90 Election Cycle 92/94 96/98

Democratic Men Democratic Women

white men (throughout the 1980s and 1990s), and Democratic gains among non-Southern white women (during the 1990s).4 Intergenerational Change Although children generally adopt the party afliation of their parents (Campbell et al., 1960; Cutler, 1970; Abramson, 1976, 1979; Converse, 1979; Luskin, McIver, and Carmines, 1989; see also Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998:640), during a period of partisan realignment children may
4 We also examined changes in the partisanship of African-American women and men in the North and South, but the Democratic dominance among all these groups is so large and greatly unchanged that we omit these gures here. We also note that Democratic gains among non-Southern white women were generally unexplored in the work by Miller and Shanks because of their focus on elections prior to the 1990s.

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be more likely to adopt an alternative party afliation (Beck, 1976). To identify the presence of a nonideological realignment that could hinder the parent-child transfer of party allegiance since the late 1970s, we compared the party identication of survey respondents in the 1994 mid-term election with the party identication of their parents.5 Following a similar investigation, Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) discovered that even though southern whites were much more likely to report growing up in Democratic families than non-southern whites, by 1994 they were substantially more Republican in their party loyalties than northern whites (Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998:641). We suspect, based on the research of partisan change in the South as well as investigations of the gender gap, that the ndings regarding parental-child transmission of partisan afliation may be dramatically different among men and women and some of the most signicant changes may, in fact, have occurred primarily among Southern white males. Looking rst at Southern white men, we see that over time Democratic parents had proportionately fewer Democratic children (and more Republican children). The same holds true for Southern white women and non-Southern white men, albeit to a lesser extent. Among the groups listed, only non-Southern white women were more likely to adopt the same party allegiances of their parents, increasing from 72 percent in 1978 to 79 percent in 1994. Although much has been written about partisan changes within the South, these ndings suggest that Southern change is only half the story, with substantial intergenerational movement in party identication among non-Southern white women.6 Also central to the ideological-realignment theory is the importance of distinct ideological differences between the political parties that voters are able to distinguish. In their original study examining the possibility of a contemporary ideologically-driven realignment, Abramowitz and Saunders found substantial increases in the awareness of party issue positions from 1978 to 1994 across the entire American electorate. They concluded that this awareness was leading to an increased likelihood that respondents would choose a party afliation more suited to their political ideology (1998:644). Although useful, such aggregated ndings could mask important individuallevel differences. In Table 2, we see that awareness of party differences increased across all subgroups, but with substantial variation. The greatest decreases (from 1978 to 1994) in the number of people who demonstrated the lowest levels of awareness of party issue differences occurred among Southern white men and women (approximately 29 percentage points) followed closely by non-Southern white women (25 percentage points). Among those with the highest awareness of party issue differences, the greatest increase from 1978 to 1994 occurred among non-Southern white
5 6

The respondents parental party identication was based on the respondents recall. However, the chi-square is only signicant for non-Southern and Southern white men.

Ideological Realignment in Contemporary U.S. Electorate

TABLE 1
Party Identication of Children of Democrats in 1978 and 1994 1978 Non-Southern white men Republican Independent Democrat N Chi-square 5 17.49 n n Non-Southern white women Republican Independent Democrat N Chi-square 5 1.82 Southern white women Republican Independent Democrat N Chi-square 5 5.48 Southern white men Republican Independent Democrat N Chi-square 5 14.86 n n
n

603

1994 43.2 9.2 47.4 76 13.6 6.2 79.0 80 27.9 6.9 65.1 43 44.4 7.0 46.7 45

Change 23.8 1.7 22.3

19.4 10.9 69.7 211 17.4 10.4 72.2 270 13.1 7.9 79.0 152 17.0 12.0 70.9 141

3.8 4.2 6.8

14.8 1.0 13.9

27.4 5.0 24.2

po 5 0.05; n npo 5 0.001. SOURCE: NES cumulative data le for 1978 cross-sectional data and 19921994 panel study. The chi-square statistic reects differences in the distributions for each group of individuals across years.

women. Although all groups experienced substantial upgrading in their awareness of party issue differences, Southern white women experienced the greatest overall improvementincluding the largest decrease in the number of respondents at the lowest level of awareness, the second largest increase in the number of people moderately aware of party differences, and a substantial increase in the number of those who were highly aware of party issue differences. Consequently, if the ideological-realignment theory is entirely applicable to all groups, we might expect to see ideology play a strong, if not the strongest, role among Southern white women, who experienced the greatest overall improvement in their ability to distinguish ideological differences between the political parties. To determine whether the impact of ideology on partisan afliation has changed and if the impact varies across groups, we regressed respondents party identication on respondents parental party identication and ideology (along with the respondents age, income, education, and gender)

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TABLE 2

Social Science Quarterly

Awareness of Party Issue Differences in 1978, 1988, and 1994 Awareness of Party Issue Differences 1978 1988 1994 Difference (78 to 94)

Non-Southern white women Low (01) Moderate (23) High (4) N Chi-square 5 99.639 n n Non-Southern white men Low (01) Moderate (23) High (4) N Chi-square 5 53.91 n n Southern white women Low (01) Moderate (23) High (4) N Chi-square 5 58.2 n n Southern white men Low (01) Moderate (23) High (4) N Chi-square 5 50.53 n n 55.2 23.6 21.1 322 42.9 25 32.1 249 25.8 36.9 37.3 252 29.4 13.3 16.2 68.8 19.7 11.4 376 64.8 24.4 10.8 307 39.8 32.9 27.3 289 29.0 13.2 15.9 51.5 25 24 615 30.6 35.8 33.6 536 31.4 26.8 41.8 500 20.1 1.8 17.8 63.2 24.8 11.9 757 45.9 34.2 19.9 679 37.9 31.9 30.3 552 25.3 7.1 18.4

n po 5 0.05; n npo 5 0.001. SOURCE: NES cumulative data le for selected years. The chi-square statistic reects differences in the distributions for each group of individuals between years 1978 and 1994.

(see also Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998).7 The ndings, presented in Table 3, indicate evidence of ideological realignment among Southern white men and, to a lesser extent, among Southern white women and nonSouthern white men. Among Southern white men, the unstandardized coefcient of parental partisanship drops substantially from 1978 to 1994 and in 1994 does not even reach conventional levels of statistical signicance. Comparatively, the impact of ideology remains large in both
7 We also conducted additional analyses, similar to Abramowtiz and Saunders (1998), including a path analysis of the 19921994 panel study, and found similar evidence that there are important theoretical and practical differences between men, women, and region. We omit those ndings for sake of brevity but they are available upon request.

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1978 and 1994 among this group, indicating that ideology remained a primary determinant of partisan afliation while the impact of parental partisanship declined. Among non-Southern white men and women, as well as Southern white women, we see some evidence of an ideological realignment. In each case, the impact of parental party identication decreased from 1978 to 1994 (although it remained a signicant predictor) among these groups. Consequently, the ideological-realignment theory nds some support across men, women, and region. We do nd, however, the strongest support among Southern white men, with parental partisanship playing an insignicant role in the partisanship of this group in 1994. As voters were able to realize greater ideological differences between the Republican and Democratic parties during the 1980s and 1990s, voters altered their partisan afliation to reect accurately their own ideological leanings. Among non-Southern white women this meant a greater tendency to identify with the Democratic partyboth because of parental partisanship, which remained a signicant predictor of party afliation among the group, and because of their ideological orientations. Among Southern white males, there was a growing tendency throughout the 1980s and 1990s to adopt a Republican party afliation and by the mid-1990s, this group chose their party identication primarily because of personal ideology rather than parental party identication.
TABLE 3
The Effects of Parental Partisanship and Ideology on Party Identication in 1978 and 1994 Independent Variable Non-Southern White Men Parental partisanship Ideology R2 Non-Southern White Women Parental partisanship Ideology R2 Southern White Women Parental partisanship Ideology R2 Southern White Men Parental partisanship Ideology R2 1978 0.427 n n 0.458 n n 0.337 0.552 n n 0.476 n n 0.335 0.635 n n 0.308 n n 0.304 0.495 n n 0.633 n n 0.366 SE 0.047 0.065 0.045 0.069 0.072 0.110 0.068 0.087 1994 0.395 n n 0.834 n n 0.510 0.532 n n 0.806 n n 0.565 0.319 n n 0.774 n n 0.471 0.154 0.673 n n 0.383 SE 0.071 0.086 0.100 0.076 0.122 0.154 0.135 0.159

Cell entries are OLS unstandardized regression coefcients. 1978 results based on NES cumulative le for this year. 1994 results based on NES 9294 panel study. n po0.05; n npo0.01.

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Discussion and Implications: The Importance of Race?

The empirical evidence presented supports the argument of the ideological-realignment theory, with some clarications. We nd evidence suggesting a secular ideological realignment toward the Republican party among Southern white malesbased largely on ideological factors. We also nd evidence of an ideological realignment among non-Southern white women toward the Democratic party, based on both ideology and the transmission of parental partisanship. Although the impact of ideology on party identication has grown for all groups, our ndings suggest that the changes in the link between ones parental partisan identication and his or her ideology on their party afliation have not been even throughout the electorate. Although the impact of parental party identication has waned completely for Southern white males between the years 1978 and 1994, it has remained stable for non-Southern white males as well as for both Southern and non-Southern white females. Our ndings contribute to our understanding of realignments by further uncovering the mechanisms by which realignments may occur and providing verication of the ideological-realignment theory. The ndings regarding the different directions and intensities of the ideological realignment across men, women, and region help to clarify the unique politics of the 1990s, in which a surprising Republican takeover of Congress during the 1994 mid-term elections occurred congruently with increasing numbers of women identifying with the Democratic party and voting for Democratic presidential candidates. Our disaggregated ndings suggest that different dynamics of realignment may simultaneously work and may work differently among various subgroups. The realignment of Southern white males seems to be driven largely by ideology (as the impact of parental party identication on the respondents party identication wanes to statistical insignicance), suggesting the presence of an exclusively ideological realignment among Southern white males. Why would different groups in the electorate realign in different ways? Why would Southern white men become more ideologically oriented in their partisanship, while Northern white women become similarly ideological, with their parental party identication still paying a role? In the former case, some have suggested that partisan changes among Southern white males are the result of the Republican partys Southern Strategy, wherein the Republican party sought to gain adherents in the South by advocating a national party platform taking a conservative stance on racial issues (e.g., Edsall and Edsall, 1991; Carmines and Stimson, 1989). This, in turn, provided some Southern voters a clear distinction between the parties. Although rigorous theoretical and empirical examinations of these explanations are beyond the scope of this investigation, we present initial evidence that issues related to race may be a driving force among the ideological realignment of white male Southern voters. In Table 4, we

TABLE 4
Party Identication Partial Correlations North Women 1978 N 0.38 n n 450 0.53 n n 467 0.14 n n 415 0.12 n n 557 0.19 n n 313 0.16 n n 596 0.25 n n 481 421 99 0.18 n n 422 0.39 n n 138 0.03 182 0.17 160 183 0.28 n n 423 0.24 n 127 0.04 175 0.11 144 0.21 n n 140 0.09 70 0.39 n n 70 0.32 n n 188 0.23 64 0.14 186 0.30 n n 186 0.54 n n 368 0.56 n n 0.48 n n 153 0.42 n n 0.48 n n 168 0.14 1994 N 1978 N 1994 N 1978 N 0.27 n n 153 0.51 n n 150 0.06 142 0.20 n n 176 0.30 115 0.09 192 0.30 n n 156 Men South Women 1994 N 0.63 n n 144 0.37 n n 72 0.17 59 0.13 192 0.35 n n 37 0.19 n n 192 0.17 n n 184

Men

1978 N

1994 N

Ideology

Parents party identication

0.38 n n 449 0.47 n n

0.58 n n 355 0.35 n n

Busing to ensure integration n n n

398 0.17 n n

151 0.23 n n

More aid to blacks

Ideological Realignment in Contemporary U.S. Electorate

Federal govt too powerful

366 0.03 503 0.06

207 0.23 n n 391 0.24 n n

Womens role

Jobs/standard of living

379 0.12 516 0.19 n n

122 0.14 n n 382 0.31 n n

466

390

607

NOTE: Coefcients are partial correlations between seven-point party identication scale, seven-point ideology scale, ve-point parental party identication scale, and each issue area, controlling for respondents age, income, and education. nnn This question was not asked in 1994. Results reect responses from 1992. n po0.05; n npo0.01.

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examine the relationships between respondents party identication, ideology, parental party identication, and attitudes across various political issues. Our ndings are limited by the number of issues asked in the ANES study in both 1978 and 1994 election years and only represent a preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, the results suggest a relationship between Southern white male respondents party identication and racial issues, relative to the other issues included in the analysis. In 1978, there appears to be no relationship between party identication among Southern males and their opinions regarding busing and governmental economic assistance to blacks. By 1994, however, the relationship between their party identication and opinions regarding busing and aid to blacks reached higher, statistically signicant levels. In short, in 1994 Southern white male Republicans were far more likely to oppose busing and economic aid to blacks than were Southern male Democrats. Perhaps surprisingly, no relationship was apparent between Southern female respondents party identication and their attitudes on racial issues. Instead, attitudes toward the size of the federal government appear to be the important issue. In both 1978 and 1994, non-Southern men and womens party identication was linked to their attitudes toward the role of the federal government to ensure a minimum standard of living and, to a lesser extent, their attitudes toward governmental assistance to African Americans. To be sure, Abramowitz (1994) found that racial issues played less of a role in the electoral fortunes in the South for Republicans than did their stances on issues of national security and welfare and an abundance of data suggests that Southerners and Northerners have converged on their views of race (Tuch, 1987; Firebaugh and Davis, 1988; Schuman and Bobo, 1988). Regardless, ndings from more recent studies suggest that racial attitudes are more difcult to measure, and that the South is, in fact, still more conservative on racial issues than has been previously believed (Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens, 1997; see also Gilens, 1996; Berinksy, 1999). If this is true, then race could be a catalyst for the ideological realignment in the South and play an important part of the ideological realignment among Southern white men. Of course, there is much needed work before we fully understand the ideological realignment that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s. Apparently, during the last 20 years, different segments of society realigned in different wayssome were disproportionately mobilized by one party, others switched parties to better suit their own ideologies. For some, party identication is more a product of ideology than it is for others, illustrating that there may be multiple forces behind party system change. Additional research must focus on explaining why these different changes have occurred, and, we believe, based on the arguments and ndings from this investigation, scholars should not expect to nd similar answers among all segments of the electorate.

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Appendix: Variable Description

Party identication 7-point scale ranging from 1 5 strong Democrat to 7 5 strong Republican. The category Independents refers only to pure independents. Respondents who reported that they were independents who leaned toward the Democratic or Republican parties were included with strong and weak party identiers. Total number of Democratic partisans (including independent leaners) divided by the combined total of Democratic and Republican partisans. 1 5 both parents Democrats, 3 5 one parent a Democrat, or both parents Independents, or one parent a Republican, 5 5 both parents Republicans. See Jennings and Niemi (1974) as well as Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) for why this measure may underestimate the extent of intergenerational change in party identication.

Democratic party support

Parental partisan identication

612
Awareness

Social Science Quarterly

Respondents were coded aware (1) or not aware (0) for the relative placement of the two major parties on four issues: government versus personal responsibility for jobs and living standards, government help for disadvantaged minority groups, liberal-conservative placement of the political parties, and government versus private responsibility for health insurance. Respondents who placed the parties on the ideological scale and placed the Democratic party to the left of the Republican party were coded aware of party issue difference on that issue. The scores were summed to create a scale ranging from 0 (unaware of any differences between the parties on these four issues) to 4 (aware of differences between the parties on all four issues). 7-point scale ranging from 1 5 strong liberal to 7 5 strong conservative. 0 5 see to it that white and black children go to the same schools; 1 5 stay out this area as it is none of the governments business. 7-point scale ranging from 1 5 government should help minority groups/help blacks; 7 5 minority groups/blacks should help themselves. 0 5 the government has not gotten too strong; 1 5 the government has gotten too powerful. 7-point scale ranging from 1 5 women and men should have an equal role; 7 5 womens place is in the home. 7-point scale ranging from 1 5 government should see to job and good standard of living; 7 5 government should let each person get ahead on his own.

Ideology Busing to ensure integration

More aid to blacks

Federal govt too powerful

Womens role

Jobs/standard of living