Equipoise Rule Corpuz vs.

People Facts: Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower courts decision finding him guilty for malversation of public funds. The accused was the acting supervising cashier at the Provincial Treasurers office. He denied having misused the whole amount of P72,823.08 which was discovered to be a shortage from the government funds contending that the P50,000.00 was the unliquidated withdrawal made by their paymaster Pineda thru the 4 checks he issued while the petitioner was on leave and that he was forced by their Provincial Treasurer Aluning to post said amount in his cash book despite not actually receiving the amount. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of innocence of the accused of the charge against him Held: It is held that presumption of innocence of the accused should yield to the positive findings that he malversed the government funds considering all the evidences presented that point out to his guilt on the charge imputed against him. Records shows that the checks issued for the paymaster were duly liquidated to the accused and there were inconsistent entries on his cash books and that he was not really on leave on the day the said checks were disbursed by the paymaster.

parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other coaccused. Appellant was found guilty of murder and made to suffer the death penalty. Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the rights of the accused. Held: YES. The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the basic rights of the accused. Citing People vs. Domingo (55 SCRA 243-244): the trial courts should exercise solicitous care before sentencing the accused on a plea of guilty especially in capital offenses by first insuring that the accused fully understands the gravity of the offense, the severity of the consequences attached thereto as well as the meaning and significance of his plea of guilty; and that the prudent and proper thing to do in capital cases is to take testimony, to assure the court that the accused has not misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of guilty. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient compliance. X X X

Improvident Plea of guilt People vs. Magsi Facts: Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled before the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case was actually set and rescheduled for six (6) times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that date, despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of accused desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably acted on by the court on September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third hearing date, neither the de

Right to lawyer of choice PEOPLE VS. MALUNSING Facts: It was the failure of the lower court to respect the constitutional right to counsel, so it is alleged, that is the basis for seeking the reversal of a conviction for murder of appellant Manuel Villegas. The appellant is a very old man, ignorant and unlettered; during the entire proceeding in the case, the appellant while present did not know what was going on; the trial court never apprised the appellant of his fundamental right to be assisted by a lawyer; the trial court did not even bother inquiring why the appellant Manuel Villegas did not take the witness

stand. Attorney Geronimo Pajarito explicitly manifested in the opening of the trial that appellant intimated to him that he had his own lawyer. There was an admission that he did appear for him in the preliminary investigation but only because there was no other counsel. Parenthetically, it may be observed that while in the original complaint there were two other accused with the same surname as the lawyer, Geronimo Pajarito and Samuel Pajarito, after such preliminary investigation, no doubt due to the efforts of Atty. Geronimo Pajarito, possibly a kinsman, they were both discharged for lack of probable cause, the court ask the appellant if he has a lawyer; after answering in the negative, the Court then appointed Atty. Pajarito as counsel de oficio for the defendant. After marking it of record that he was appointed as counsel de oficio, the Attorney was ask whether he wanted to confer with the appellant. This was answered with: I think I know the case. The Court then immediately proceeded with the hearing. In the decision itself, there is this meaningful admission by the court: No evidence was presented for and in behalf of appellant Manuel Villegas. Issue: Whether or not the appointed counsel de oficio Atty. Geronimo Pajarito lacks candor in the exercise of his profession. Held: It is not enough that a counsel de oficio was appointed, were the accused has indicated that he wanted a lawyer of his own choice, a decision prompted moreover by the fact that he had lost confidence in the number of the bar thus designated. Nor is it to manifest respect for this right if the counsel de oficio thus named, instead of conferring with the accused, would just blithely inform the judge that he was already fully prepared for his exacting responsibility. It was unintended but the result could not rightly be distinguished from pure travesty. Appellant could then rightfully invoke this constitutional guarantee of right to counsel.

Applicability of Juridical Persons Feeder Intl Line vs. CA Held: The main issue for resolution is whether or not there was an illegal importation committed, or at least an attempt thereof, which would justify a forfeiture of the subject vessel and its cargo. Petitioner avers that respondent court erred in finding that an illegal importation had been committed on the basis of circumstantial evidence, erroneously relying on Section 5 (now Section 4), Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. As earlier stated, forfeiture proceedings are not criminal in nature, hence said provision of Rule 133 which involves. such circumstantial evidence as will produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt does not apply. Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to unload therein. It is clear from the provision of the law that mere intent to unload is sufficient to commence an importation. And "intent," being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts, 11 and therefore can only be proved by unguarded, expressions, conduct and circumstances generally. 12 In the case at bar, that petitioner is guilty of illegal importation, there having been an intent to unload, is amply supported by substantial evidence as clearly demonstrated by this comprehensive discussion in respondent court's decision: Deprivation of Right to be heard Molares vs. CA While it is true that the right to present evidence may be waived expressly or impliedly, it cannot be said that petitioner had waived said right in this case. The postponement sought by petitioner and counsel appear to be justified and were not vexatious and oppressive as borne by the record of the case. The intention and the willingness of petitioner to present evidence can be gleaned from the fact that he had already presented one witness and has other witnesses ready for presentation, although this was delayed, but for meritorious reasons, such as illness of the petitioner and his counsel, petitioner's confinement at a hospital, ongoing negotiations between the parties, and substitution of counsel.

The rights of an accused during trial are given paramount importance in our laws and rules on criminal procedure. Among the fundamental rights of the accused is the right to be heard by himself and counsel. Verily, this right is even guaranteed by the Constitution itself. This right has been recognized and established in order to make sure that justice is done to the accused. Further, the constitution right of the accused to be heard in his defense is inviolate. No court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right (People vs. Lumague, Jr., 111 SCRA 515 [1982]). It would have thus been more befitting and seemly of the Court of Appeals had it ordered the trial court to reopen the case for the reception of petitioner's evidence. Granting that petitioner had sought a number of postponements, the requirements of substantial justice mandate that he should have been given his day in court. The grant of a reasonable continuance would have been sounder judicial discretion to ferret out the truth, than to have a speedy disposition of the case, but at the expense of a fundamental right. Hence, it was error for the trial court to have proceeded with the promulgation of decision on the premise that petitioner had waived his right to appear in court to present his evidence. Likewise, the Court of Appeals, in affirming said decision, gravely abused its discretion as it sustained a decision of the lower court rendered in violation of the right of petitioner to due process. As enunciated in the case of Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization vs. Laguesma (254 SCRA 565 [1996]), the most basic tenet of due process is the right to heard. As regards the third assigned error, the Court of Appeals held that the defense sought to be established by petitioner would not, even if considered by the court, exonerate him from his criminal liability under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. This disclaration seems to be no less than, and is tantamount to, prejudging the nature of the testimony of petitioner and his witnesses.