3. separation pay equivalent to 1 month pay or at least month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; 4.

. must be done in good faith; 5. fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed. Retrenchment is an authorized cause for termination of employment which the law accords an employer who is not making good in its operations in order to cut back on expenses for salaries and wages by laying off some employees. The purpose of retrenchment is to save a financially ailing business establishment from eventually collapsing. Conditions under which an employer may retrench: 1. substantial loss which are not merely de minimis in extent; 2. imminence of such substantial losses; 3. retrenchment would effectively prevent the expected and additional losses; 4. the alleged losses and expected losses must be proven by sufficient and convincing evidence. 4. Closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking; To abolish means to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy completely. It denotes an intention to do away with the office wholly and permanently. A valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the

incumbents. No dismissal or separation arises because the position itself ceases to exists (Tan vs. DPWH, GR No. 143289, November 11, 2004). Requisites for validity: 1. must be in good faith; 2. purpose should not be to circumvent the provisions of the Labor Code; 3. no other option available to the employer except to close or cease operations; 4. notice requirement; 5. separation pay. Obligations of Transferee in case of Sale in Good Faith- There is no law which requires the purchaser to absorb the employees of the selling company. As there is no such law, the most that the purchasing company may do, for purposes of public policy and social justice,, is to give preference to the qualified separated employees of the selling company who in its judgment are necessary in the continued operation of the business establishment (MDII Supervisors Association vs. Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, 79 SCRA 40). Sale in Bad Faith- Although the purchaser of the assets or enterprise is not legally bound to absorb in its employ the employees of the seller of such assets or enterprise, the parties are liable to the employees if the transaction between the parties is clothed with bad faith. In case of Merger- A succession of employment rights and obligations has occurred.

The principle that employment contract is in personam and binding only between the parties applies only when the transferee is an entirely new corporation with a distinct personality from the integrating firms and NOT where the transferee was found to be merely an alter ego of the different merging firms. 5. Disease Requisites for validity: 1. employee is suffering from a disease; 2. his continued employment is either: (1) prohibited by law; (2) prejudicial to his health; or (3) prejudicial to the health of his co-employees; 3. certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is incurable within 6 months; 4. notice of termination; 5. separation pay of at least 1 month salary or to month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least 6 months shall be considered 1 whole year. CASES: NDC-GUTHRIE PLANTATIONS vs. NLRC and EDWIN M. CRUZ et.al G.R. No. 110740 August 9, 2001 DE LEON Facts: Petitioner companies are both government-controlled corporations, 60% of their stocks being owned by the

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National Development Corporation. They were incorporated in the early 1980's to develop, operate and maintain integrated palm projects in Agusan del Sur. Pursuant to their purpose clause, NGPI and NGEI hired hundreds of farm workers to establish and maintain their respective plantations as well as several supervisors to oversee and superintend their workers. Kumar Das was the designated general manager of petitioner companies at the time of the supposed illegal dismissal. NGPI discovered that it was sustaining tremendous losses which threatened to further upset its precarious financial condition. In a desperate attempt to reverse its fortune and prevent its coffers from further depletion, NGPI terminated the services of 72 field workers. Still, the company was confronted with an audit report prepared by COA reflecting losses. Faced with mounting losses, NGPI further terminated the employment of 49 field workers, followed by another 158 farm hands. With this as backdrop, several employees of petitioner companies bonded together and formed the NDC-GUTHRIE Union. Petitioner companies notified the DOLE of their financial condition and their decision to retrench employees numbering 120. Subsequently, petitioner companies sent notices to 17 of their office and supervisory employees advising them that in view of the companies' financial problems, they would be retrenched from their employment. Believing that their dismissal was resorted to because of their union activities and hence, in violation of their rights to self-organization and to collective bargaining, the said 17

employees who were laid off filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against petitioner companies and petitioner Kumar Das. NLRC ruled in favor of private respondents. Issue: WON private respondents were illegally dismissed. Ruling: As the retrenchment programs undertaken by petitioner companies were purely business decisions properly within the reasonable exercise of management prerogative, the NLRC cannot delve into their wisdom and soundness. Indeed, management cannot be denied recourses to retrenchment if it can successfully prove the existence of the following factors: (a) substantial losses which are not merely de minimis in extent; (b) imminence of such substantial losses; (c) retrenchment would effectively prevent the expected additional losses; and, (d) alleged losses and expected losses must be proven by sufficient and convincing evidence. In the case at bench, these guidelines were faithfully observed by petitioner companies. However, notwithstanding the propriety of the retrenchment programs, petitioner companies are not excused from complying with the required written notice to the affected employees and DOLE at least one month before the intended date

of termination. In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner companies informed both the retrenched employees and DOLE of the impending retrenchment. The requirement of law mandating the giving of notices was intended not only to enable the employees to look for other employment and therefore ease the impact of the loss of their jobs and the corresponding income, but, more importantly, to give the DOLE the opportunity to ascertain the verity of the alleged authorized cause of termination. Accordingly, inasmuch as private respondents' separation from service was both substantively and procedurally just, petitioner companies should only be held liable for separation pay and the proportionate 13th month pay. Petition is granted. EDGAR AGUSTILO vs. CA and SAN MIGUEL CORP G.R. No. 142875 September 7, 2001 MENDOZA Facts: Petitioner Edgar Agustilo was hired by respondent San Miguel Corporation (SMC) as a temporary employee at its Mandaue Brewery in Mandaue, Cebu. On October 1, 1979, he was made permanent and designated as a safety clerk. He was transferred to the Engineering Department of the SMC Mandaue Brewery as an administrative secretary. SMC Mandaue Brewery adopted a policy that managers would no longer be assigned secretaries

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and that only director level positions may be given secretaries. As a result, petitioner's position as administrative secretary was abolished and he was transferred to the company's Plant Director's Office-Quality Improvement Team. Petitioner was informed that 584 employees, including him, would be retrenched due to the modernization program of the company. Petitioner was told that his services would be terminated and that he would be paid his benefits 30 days after he was cleared of all accountabilities. SMC notified the DOLE of its modernization program. Petitioner then filed a complaint against respondents for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and payment of separation pay. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. Issue: WON dismissed. Ruling: Art. 283 of the Labor Code provides: The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title xxx. In the case at bench, petitioner was not constructively dismissed but his services was terminated on the ground of the petitioner was illegally

installation of labor saving devices by SMC. As stated in the notice of termination sent to petitioner the PDO-QIT GROUP has been abolished after a thorough study. Consequently, petitioners position therein has also been abolished. As stated by the Court of Appeals: Private respondent demonstrated before the Labor Arbiter by clear and convincing evidence that the Mandaue plant where petitioners used to work had instituted a modernization program. The operations of which are "all automated using microprocessor and electronic process controllers and instrumentation systems through intelligent interfacing with Siemens Industrial computers." All of these hightechnology innovations, at the cost of 2.6 billion pesos, truly render the functions of the Plant Director's Office Quality Control Unit, where private respondent was transferred after his post as Administrative Secretary to the plant manager was validly abolished, upon management prerogative that the same "did not add value to the organization." Petition is denied. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR vs. NLRC and PATALON COCONUT ESTATE G.R. No. 127718 March 2, 2000 DE LEON Facts: Petitioners are bona fide members of the National Federation of Labor (NFL), a legitimate labor organization duly registered with DOLE. They were

employed by private respondents Charlie Reith and Susie Galle Reith, general manager and owner, respectively, of the 354-hectare Patalon Coconut Estate. Patalon Coconut Estate was engaged in growing agricultural products and in raising livestock. In 1988, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which mandated the compulsory acquisition of all covered agricultural lands for distribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries under the socalled CARP. Pursuant to R.A. No. 6657, the Patalon Coconut Estate was awarded to the Patalon Estate Agrarian Reform Association (PEARA), a cooperative accredited by DAR, of which petitioners are members and co-owners. As a result of this acquisition, private respondents shut down the operation of the Patalon Coconut Estate and the employment of the petitioners was severed. Petitioners did not receive any separation pay. The cooperative took over the estate. Petitioners filed complaints praying for their reinstatement with full backwages on the ground that they were illegally dismissed. The petitioners were represented by their labor organization, the NFL. NLRC ruled that petitioners were not illegally dismissed. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON dismissed. Ruling: Under Article 283 of the Labor Code the employer may also terminate the petitioners were illegally

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employment of any employee due xxx closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking xxx. In cases of xxx closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year. It is clear that Article 283 of the Labor Code applies in cases of closures of establishment and reduction of personnel. The peculiar circumstances in the case at bar, however, involves neither the closure of an establishment nor a reduction of personnel as contemplated under the aforesaid article. When the Patalon Coconut Estate was closed because a large portion of the estate was acquired by DAR pursuant to CARP, the ownership of that large portion of the estate was precisely transferred to PEARA and ultimately to the petitioners as members thereof and as agrarian lot beneficiaries. Hence, Article 283 of the Labor Code is not applicable to the case at bench. Even assuming, arguendo, that the situation in this case were a closure of the business establishment called Patalon Coconut Estate of private respondents, still the petitioners/employees are not entitled to separation pay. The closure contemplated under Article 283 of the Labor Code is a unilateral and

voluntary act on the part of the employer to close the business establishment as may be gleaned from the wording of the said legal provision that "The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to xxx. The use of the word "may," in a statute, denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only. In other words, Article 283 of the Labor Code does not contemplate a situation where the closure of the business establishment is forced upon the employer and ultimately for the benefit of the employees. In this case, the Patalon Coconut Estate was closed down because a large portion of the said estate was acquired by the DAR pursuant to the CARP. Hence, the closure of the Patalon Coconut Estate was not effected voluntarily by private respondents who even filed a petition to have said estate exempted from the coverage of RA 6657. Petition is denied. c. Procedure of Termination (Procedural Due Process of Dismissal) i. Notice and Hearing a. For Just Causes: 1. Written Notice- a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side;

2. Hearing- A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and 3. Written Notice of Termination- A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination. In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employees last known address. b. For Authorized Causes: The requirements of due process shall be deemed complied with upon service of a written notice to the employee and the appropriate Regional Office of the DOLE at least 30 days before effectivity of the termination, specifying the ground or grounds for termination. NOTES: When termination of employment is brought by the failure of an employee to meet the standards of the employer in case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is served the employee within a reasonable time from the effective date of termination. When termination is brought about by the completion of the contract or phase thereof, no prior notice is required. ii. Burden of Proof

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 The employer has the burden of proving the lawfulness of his employees dismissal. The validity of the charge must be clearly established in a manner consistent with due process. iii. Preventive Suspension When there is an imminent threat to the lives and properties of the employer; his family and representatives as well as the offenders co-workers by the continued service of the employee, then he may be placed under preventive suspension pending his investigation. Preventive suspension should not last for more than 30 days. The employee should be made to resume his work after 30 days. It can be extended provided the employees wages are paid after the 30 day period. CASES: VH MANUFACTURING vs. NLRC and HERMINIO C. GAMIDO G.R. No. 130957 January 19, 2000 DE LEON Facts: Private respondent was employed in petitioner's, business of manufacturing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. He served as a quality control inspector with the principal duty of inspecting LPG cylinders for any possible defects and earning P155.00 a day. His service with the company was abruptly interrupted on February 14, 1995, when he was served a

notice of termination of his employment. His dismissal stemmed from an incident wherein petitioner's company President, Alejandro Dy Juanco, allegedly caught private respondent sleeping on the job. On that same day, private respondent was asked through a written notice to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his violation of Company Rule 15-b which provides for a penalty of separation for sleeping during working hours. Without delay, private respondent replied in a letter which reads: Sir, ipagpaumanhin po ninyo kung nakapikit ako sa aking puwesto dahil hinihintay ko po ang niliha hi Abreu para i quality pasensiya na po kung hindi ko po namalayan ang pagdaan ninyo dahil maingay po ang painting booth. Notwithstanding his foregoing reply, he was terminated. Feeling aggrieved, private respondent initially instituted a criminal suit for Estafa, for alleged withholding of his salary, against the company President. Said complaint was dismissed for improper forum. He then filed a complaint for illegal. Labor Arbiter declared that private respondent's dismissal is anchored on a valid and just cause and the latter's contention of denial of due process as devoid of merit. NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and ordered herein petitioner to reinstate private respondent with full backwages less one-month pay. Issue: WON private illegally dismissed. Ruling: respondent was

While an employer enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in the promulgation of policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees, those directives, however, must always be fair and reasonable, and the corresponding penalties, when prescribed, must be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. In the case at bench, petitioner's claim that private respondent slept on the job on February 10, 1995 was not substantiated by any convincing evidence other than the bare allegation of petitioner. The report of Ronaldo M. Alvarez, Acting Quality Control Department Head of petitioner corporation, on the circumstances which ultimately served as basis for the termination of private respondent's employment, did not confirm the alleged violation by private respondent of the pertinent Company Rule 15-b. The report merely stated private respondent's denial and response to petitioner's allegation which he reiterated in his written reply. Moreover, the dismissal meted out on private respondent for allegedly sleeping on the job, under the attendant circumstances, appears to be too harsh a penalty, considering that he was being held liable for first time, after 9 long years of unblemished service, for an alleged offense which caused no prejudice to the employer, aside from absence of substantiation of the alleged offense. The authorities cited by petitioner are also irrelevant for the reason that there is no evidence on the depravity of conduct, willfulness of the disobedience, or

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conclusiveness of guilt on the part of private respondent. Neither was it shown that private respondent's alleged negligence or neglect of duty, if any, was gross and habitual. Thus, reinstatement is just and proper. Petition is dismissed. MARICALUM MINING CORP vs. ANTONIO DECORION G.R. No. 158637 April 12, 2006 TINGA Facts: Antonio Decorion was a regular employee of Maricalum Mining who started out as a Mill Mechanic assigned to the Concentrator Maintenance Department and was later promoted to Foreman I. The Concentrator Maintenance Supervisor called a meeting which Decorion failed to attend as he was then supervising the workers under him. Because of his alleged insubordination for failure to attend the meeting, he was placed under preventive suspension on the same day. He was also not allowed to report for work the following day. A month after, Decorion was served a Notice of Infraction and Proposed Dismissal to enable him to present his side. He submitted to the Personnel Department his written reply to the notice. A grievance meeting was held upon Decorions request, during which he manifested that he failed to attend the meeting on April 11, 1996 because he was then still assigning work to his men. He maintained that he has not committed any offense and that his service record would show his efficiency. Decorion

filed NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. Maricalum Mining insists that Decorion was not dismissed but merely preventively suspended. Petitioner contends that constructive dismissal occurs only after the lapse of more than 6 months from the time an employee is placed on a "floating status" as a result of temporary preventive suspension from employment. Thus, it goes on to argue, since Decorion was suspended for less than 6 months, his suspension was legal. Issue: WON private responded was merely suspended from work. Ruling: Under the IRR of Labor Code, The employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or his co-workers. No preventive suspension shall last longer than thirty (30) days xxx. The Rules are explicit that preventive suspension is justified where the employees continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of the employees co-workers. Without this kind of threat, preventive suspension is not proper. In this case, Decorion was suspended only because he failed to attend a meeting called by his supervisor. There is no evidence to indicate that his failure to attend the meeting prejudiced his

employer or that his presence in the companys premises posed a serious threat to his employer and co-workers. The preventive suspension was clearly unjustified. What is more, Decorions suspension persisted beyond the 30-day period allowed by the IRR. A preventive suspension which lasts beyond the maximum period allowed by the Implementing Rules amounts to constructive dismissal. Similarly, from the time Decorion was placed under preventive suspension up to the time a grievance meeting was conducted, 55 days had already passed. Another 48 days went by before he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Thus, at the time Decorion filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, he had already been suspended for a total of 103 days. Maricalum Minings contention that there was as yet no illegal dismissal at the time of the filing of the complaint is evidently unmeritorious. Decorions preventive suspension had already ripened into constructive dismissal at that time. While actual dismissal and constructive dismissal do take place in different fashion, the legal consequences they generate are identical. Decorions employment may not have been actually terminated in the sense that he was not served walking papers but there is no doubt that he was constructively dismissed as he was forced to quit because continued employment was rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely by Maricalum Minings act of preventing him from reporting for work. Petition is denied.

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d. Termination by Employee i. Resignation Resignation- is defined as the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and, that he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. Resignation is withdrawable even if the employee has called it irrevocable. But after it is accepted or approved by the employer, its withdrawal need the employers consent. a. Requisites for Termination without Just Cause: 1. written notice of the termination (resignation letter); 2. service of the resignation letter to the employer at least 1 month in advance. NOTE: An employer upon whom no such notice was served may hold the employee liable for damages. b. Termination with Just Cause: No written notice (resignation letter) is necessary in the following cases: 1. serious insult by the employer or his representative on the honor and person of the employee; 2. inhuman and unbearable treatment accorded the employee by the employer or his representative; 3. commission of a crime or offense by the employer or his representative against the person of the employee or any of the immediate members of the family; and

4. other causes analogous to any of the foregoing. e. Constructive Dismissal This refers to an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to an employee. An employee is likewise deemed constructively dismissed where his status is changed from regular to casual. An unwarranted transfer or demotion of an employee, or other unjustified action prejudicial to the employee may give rise to a complaint for constructive dismissal. f. When Employment not Deemed Terminated (Art. 286) The bona fide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period exceeding 6 months, or the fulfillment by the employee of a military or civic duty shall not terminate employment. In all such cases, the employer shall reinstate the employee to his former position without loss of seniority rights if he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than 1 month from the resumption of operations of his employer or from his relief from the military or civic duty.

Article 283 speaks of a permanent retrenchment as opposed to a temporary lay-off. There is no specific provision of law which treats of a temporary retrenchment or lay-off. To remedy this situation or fill the hiatus, Article 286 may be applied but only by analogy to set a specific period that employees may remain temporarily laid-off or in floating status. 6 months is the period set by law that the operation of a business of the employees concerned. The temporary lay-off wherein the employees likewise cease to work should also not last long than 6 months. After 6 months, the employees should either be recalled to work or permanently retrenched following the requirements of the law. g. Consequence Termination i. Separation Pay of

General Rule- If there is valid cause to terminate an employee, no separation pay need by paid. Exceptions: 1. Article 283, Labor Code Installation of labor saving device and redundancy- 1 month pay or moth pay for every year of service, whichever is higher Retrenchment to prevent losses and closure or cessation of operation or establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses- 1 month pay or

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2.

3.

4.

5.

month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. If due to severe financial losses, no separation pay. Article 284, Labor Code Disease- 1 month salary or month salary for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least 6 months shall be considered 1 whole year. Discerning Compassion Doctrine Separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice for instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other that serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character (i.e. Employee was found to have demanded and received money in consideration for promise to facilitate approval of telephone line application). Antipathy and Antagonism Reinstatement is no longer possible Strained relations in order that is may justify award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement with backwages, should be of such, that they are so compelling and so serious in character, that the continued employment has become inconsistent with peace and tranquility which is an ideal atmosphere in every workplace. Even if an employee resigns, he shall be given a separation pay if there is a company policy to that effect.

NOTE: Financial assistance may be allowed as a measure of social justice and exceptional circumstances, and as an equitable concession. Pay Includes not just the basic salary but also the regular allowances the employee has been receiving. However, commissions are not included in such base figure. Effect- Receipt- An employee who received his separation pay is not barred from contesting the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance of those would not amount to estoppel. iii. Backwages Backwages- the relief given to an employee to compensate him for lost earnings during the period of his dismissal. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalents computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Backwages in general are granted on grounds of equity which a worker has lost due to his illegal dismissal. As a general rule, an employee is entitled to backwages only where his dismissal is due to the unlawful act of the employer to the latters bad faith. ii. Computation of Separation

While generally, an order of reinstatement carries with it an award of backwages, the court may not only mitigate, but absolve the employer from liability for backwages where good faith is evident. Separation Pay vs. BackwagesSeparation pay is the amount that an employee receives at the time of his severance from the service and is designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another employment. Backwages, on the other hand, represent compensation that should be earned but not controlled because of the unjust dismissal. The basis of computing the two are different, the separation pay is being computed usually on the basis of the length of the employees service and the backwages are computed from the actual period when he was unlawfully prevented from working. Inclusions to Backwages: 1. transportation and emergency allowance; 2. vacation or service incentive leave and sick leave; 3. 13th month pay. NOTE: Facilities such as uniforms, shoes, helmets and ponchos should not be included in the computation of backwages because said item are given free to be used only during official tour of duty and not for private or personal use. Circumstances that prevent award of backwages: 1. death of the employee; 2. physical and mental incapacity

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3. business reverses; 4. closure of business; 5. reinstatement of dismissed employee confinement in jail. iv. Reinstatement Reinstatement- is a restoration to a state which on e has been removed or separated. It is the turn to the position from which he was removed and assuming again the functions of the office already held. Reinstatement presupposes that the previous position from which one had been removed still exists, or that there is an unfilled position more or less of a similar nature as the one previously. Forms of Reinstatement: 1. Actual or Physical Reinstatement- the employee shall be admitted back to work. 2. Payroll Reinstatementthe employee is merely reinstated in the payroll. Q. May a court order the reinstatement of a dismissed employee even if the prayer of the complaint did not include such relief? A. Yes, so long as there is a finding that the employee was illegally dismissed, the court can order the reinstatement of an employee even if the complaint does not include a prayer for reinstatement, unless, of course, the employee has waived his right to reinstatement. By law, an employee who is unjustly dismissed is entitled to reinstatement, among others. The mere fact that the complaint did not pray for reinstatement will not prejudice the employee, because technicalities of

law and procedures are frowned upon in labor proceedings (General Baptist Bible College vs. NLRC, 219 S 549). Q. What happens if there is an order of reinstatement but the position is no longer available? A. The employee should be given a substantially equivalent position. If no substantially equivalent position is available, reinstatement should not e ordered because that would in effect compel the employer to do the impossible. In such a situation, the employee should merely be given separation pay consisting of one month salary for every year of service. Circumstances when company may not reinstate despite order of reinstatement: 1. Transfer of Business OwnershipThere is no law requiring a purchasing corporation to absorb the employees of the selling corporation. A fortiori, reinstatement of unjustly dismissed employees CANNOT be enforced against the new owner UNLESS there is an express agreement on the assumption of liabilities by the purchasing corporation; 2. Reinstatement is rendered impossible due to abolition of the position; 3. When the business has closed down; 4. Physical incapacity of the employee; and 5. Doctrine of Strained RelationsWhen the employee can no longer trust the employee and vice-versa,

reinstatement could not effectively serve as a remedy. This doctrine only applies to positions which require trust and confidence. Under the circumstances where the employment relationship has become so strained to preclude a harmonious working relationship and that all hopes at reconciliation are nil after reinstatement, it would be more beneficial to accord the employee backwages and separation pay. v. Damages Moral damages are recoverable in dismissal cases only where the dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Exemplary damages in dismissal cases may be awarded only if the dismissal was effected in wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. vi. Quitclaims Generally, quitclaims are commonly frowned upon for being contrary to public policy, there are, however, legitimate waivers that represent a voluntary and reasonable settlement of a workers claim which should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties. Where the person making the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full

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1. 2. 3. 4.

understanding thereof, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as being a valid and binding undertaking. Not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against policy, except: (1) where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or (2) where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face; in these cases, the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. Requisites for Recovery of Wages, Simple Money Claims and Other Benefits: The aggregate money claim of each employee or house helper does not exceed P5K. The claim is presented by an employee or person employed in domestic or household service or househelper. The claim arises from ER-EER The claimant does not seek reinstatement.

summary proceeding and after due notice, to hear and decide cases involving recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interests. Article 292. Institution of Money Claims- Money claims specified in Article 291 shall be filed before the appropriate entity independently of the criminal action that may be instituted in the proper courts. Pending the final determination of the merits of money claims filed with the appropriate entity, no civil action arising from the same cause of action shall be filed with any court. This provision shall not apply to employee compensation cases which shall be processed and determined strictly in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code. Worker Preference in case of Bankruptcy (Art. 110): Principle- Workers shall enjoy firs preference as regards their unpaid wages and other monetary claims, ay provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. Just establishes a preference and not a lien; Applicable only to ordinary preferred credit, hence, must yield to special preferred credits e.g. secure creditors. This Article did not sweep away the overriding preference accorded under the scheme of the Civil Code to tax claims of the government.

NOTE: In the absence of any of the requisites, it is the Labor Arbiter who shall have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, except claims for employees compensation, SSS, Philihealth and Maternity benefits. The proceedings before the Regional Office shall be summary and non-litigous in nature. The RD or any of his duly authorized hearing officer is empowered through

Conditions sine qua non to the operation of the preference accorded to workers under Art. 110: 1. formal declaration of insolvency or bankruptcy 2. general judicial liquidation proceedings of the employers business 3. filing of claims by workers The worker preference is not applicable in case the employer is under rehabilitation. Art. 110 covers not only unpaid wages but also all other monetary claims. Attorneys Fees (Art. 111): a. In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the amount of wages recovered. b. It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery of the wages, attorneys fees which exceed 10% of the amount of wages recovered. Attorneys fees presupposes attorneyclient relationship. Any agreement on such other provisions of the CBA made within 6 months after the date of expiry of the CBA is subject to automatic retroaction to the day immediately following such date of expiry. CASES: MOBILE PROTECTIVE & DETECTIVE AGENCY vs. ALBERTO OMPAD G.R. No. 159195 May 9, 2005 PUNO

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Facts: Respondent alleged that he was employed by the Agency as security guard in January 1990 and was, since then, detailed to its various clients. He claimed having worked 12 hours a day, even during rest days and holidays, without receiving overtime pay, rest day pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. Sometime in June 1997, respondent inquired from the project manager of the Agency's client, Manila Southwoods, if the latter had already paid their backwages to the Agency. When petitioners found out about his query, respondent was allegedly relieved from his post and never given another assignment. Petitioners allegedly promised that they would pay respondent his money claims provided he signs a resignation letter. He was also told to copy in his handwriting the same resignation letter. As he needed the money, he complied. Thereafter, petitioners would give him only the meager amount of P5,000.00, which he rejected. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and prayed for reinstatement with backwages or backwages with separation pay and money claims. Petitioners denied respondent's allegations and claimed that respondent was not dismissed but resigned as evidenced by another resignation letter signed by respondent. Issue: WON respondent has resigned. Ruling:

As a rule quitclaims, waivers or releases are looked upon with disfavor and are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the measure of a worker's legal rights. In this case, the Supreme Court sustained the findings of CA and NLRC that the two resignation letters are not resignation letters but a bare reading of their content would reveal that they are in the nature of a quitclaim, waiver or release. They were written in a language obviously not of respondent's and "lopsidedly worded" to free the Agency from liabilities. As held by CA: "When the first resignation letter was a pro forma one, entirely drafted by the petitioner Agency for the private respondent to merely affix his signature, and the second one entirely copied by the private respondent with his own hand from the first resignation letter, voluntariness is not attendant." Moreover, it is a rule that resignation is difficult to reconcile with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. Hence, the finding that respondent's resignation was involuntary is further strengthened by the fact that respondent filed the instant case the day after the alleged tender of resignation. Petition is dismissed. LITONJUA GROUP OF COMPANIES vs. TERESITA VIGAN G.R. No. 143723 June 28, 2001 GONZAGA Facts:

Respondent Teresita Vigan alleged that she was hired by the Litonjua Group of Companies as telex operator. Later, she was assigned as accounting and payroll clerk under the supervision of Danilo Litonjua. She had been performing well until 1995, when Danilo Litonjua who was already naturally a very ill-tempered, illmouthed and violent employer, became more so due to business problems. In fact, a complaint letter was sent by the Litonjua Employees to the father and his junior regarding the boorishness of their kin Danilo Litonjua but apparently the management just glossed over this. Danilo Litonjua became particularly angry with Vigan and threw a stapler at her when she refused to give him money upon the instructions of Eddie Litonjua. From then on, Danilo Litonjua had been rabid towards her and even threatened to hit her for some petty matters. Danilo Litonjua would order the security guards to forcibly eject her or prevent her entry in the office premises whenever he was angry. The incidents prompted Vigan to write Danilo Litonjua letters asking why she was treated so and what was her fault. She suspected that Danilo Litonjua wanted her out for he would not let her inside the office such that even while abroad he would order the guards by phone to bar her. She pleaded for forgiveness or at least for explanation but it fell on deaf ears. Later, Danilo Litonjua changed tack and charged that Vigan had been hysterical, emotional and created scenes at the office. He even required her to secure psychiatric assistance, but despite proof that she was not suffering from

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psychosis or organic brain syndrome as certified to by a Psychiatrist of Danilo Litonjuas choice, still she was denied by the guards entry to her work upon instructions again of Danilo Litonjua. Left with no alternative, Vigan filed this case for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding Vigan diseased and unfit for work under Article 284 of the Labor Code and awarded the corresponding separation pay. CA ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed. Issue: WON respondent is entitled to damages and attorneys fees. Ruling: The Supreme Court sustained the findings of CA that respondent Vigan did not abandon her job but was illegally dismissed. In Vigans letter addressed to petitioner Danilo Litonjua, respondent Vigan had complained of petitioner Danilos inhumane treatment in barring her from entering her workplace. Notwithstanding the fact the she was refused entrance to her workplace, respondent Vigan, to show her earnest desire to report for work, would sneak her way into the premises and punched her time card but she could not resume work as the guards in the company gate would prevent her per petitioner Danilo Litonjuas instructions. Respondents actuations militate against petitioners claim that she did not heed the notices to return to work and abandoned her job. She had been going to her workplace to report for work but was prevented from resuming her

work upon the instructions of petitioner Danilo Litonjua. It would be the height of injustice to allow an employee to claim as a ground for abandonment a situation which he himself had brought about. Since respondent Vigan was illegally dismissed from her employment, she is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and (2) backwages. The award of moral and exemplary damages to the respondent is also proper. As a rule, moral damages are recoverable only where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In this case, bad faith attended respondents dismissal from her employment. Bad faith involves a state of mind dominated by ill will or motive. It implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity. Petitioner Danilo Litonjua showed ill will in treating respondent Vigan in a very unfair and cruel manner which made her suffer anxieties by reason of such job difficulties. Respondent Vigan is also entitled to exemplary damages as her dismissal was effected in an oppressive and malevolent manner. The award of attorneys fees is likewise sustained. It is settled that in actions for recovery of wages or where an employee was forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his rights and interest, he is

entitled to an award of attorneys fees. Petition is denied. OSS SECURITY & ALLIED SERVICES vs. NLRC and EDEN LEGASPI G.R. No. 112752 Feb. 9, 2000 DE LEON Facts: Private respondent worked as a lady security guard of OSS Security Agency from June 16, 1986. Petitioner of acquired the assets and properties of OSS Security Agency and absorbed some of its personnel, including private respondent. As a lady security guard she was assigned to render security services to the different clients of petitioner. In a memorandum addressed to petitioner's company President, the Building Administrator of VM Condominium II complied of the laxity of the guards in enforcing security measures. In compliance therewith, petitioner issued Duty Detail Order relieving private respondent and another lady security guard of their assignment at VM Condominium II for reassignment to other units or detachments where vacancy exists. Private respondent was detailed to the Minami International Corporation from to replace lady security guard Susan Tan who filed her vacation leave for August 1991. However, it appears that private respondent did not report for duty at her new assignment. Private respondent filed her complaint for under payment and constructive dismissal. Labor Arbiter declared that private respondent's transfer

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was not sanctioned by law, hence illegal and tantamount to unjust dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ordered for respondents reinstatement and payment of backwagedHence, this petition. Issue: WON respondent is entitled to reinstatement and payment of backwages. Ruling: In the employment of personnel, the employer can prescribe the hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of work, subject only to limitations imposed by laws. These are called management prerogatives in which the free will of management to conduct its own affairs to achieve its purpose, takes from. Thus, the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of management prerogatives. However, a transfer amounts to constructive dismissal when the transfer is unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee, and it involves a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other privileges. In the case at bench, nowhere in the record does it show that that the transfer of private respondent was anything but done in good faith, without grave abuse of discretion, and in the best interest of the

business enterprise. First. No malice should be imputed from the fact that private respondent was relieved of her assignment and, a day later, assigned a new post. When a security guard is placed "off detail" or on "floating" status, in security agency parlance, it means "waiting to be posted. Private respondent has not even been "off detail" for a week when she filed her complaint. Second. Evidence is wanting to support the Labor Arbiter's conclusion that petitioner discriminated against private respondent when it ordered her relief and transfer of assignment. Petitioner proved that such transfer was effected in good faith to comply with the reasonable request of its client, Madrigal Condominium for a more disciplined service of the security guards on detail. The renewal of the contract of petitioner with MCCI hinged on the action taken by the former on the latter's request. Third. It appears that private respondent declined the post assigned to her inasmuch as she considered it "a booby trap of crippling and dislocating private respondent from her employment". Private respondent lived in Sta. Mesa, Manila, and her new assigned post is in Taytay, Rizal, as against her previous post at VM Condominium II in Makati. Her new assigned post would entail changes in her routine, something that she was not agreeable with. But the mere fact that it would be inconvenient for her, as she has been assigned to VM Condominium II for a number of years, does not by itself make her transfer illegal. Thus, there was no basis to order reinstatement and back wages inasmuch as private

respondent was not constructively dismissed. Neither is private respondent entitled to the award of money claims for underpayment, absent evidence to substantiate the same. Petition is granted. CANDIDO ALFARO vs. CA and STAR PAPER CORP G.R. No. 140812 August 28, 2001 PANGANIBAN Facts: Petitioner Candido Alfaro was employed as a helper/operator of private respondent Star Paper Corp. since November 8, 1990. Alfaro took a sick leave. When he reported back to work, he was surprised to find out that another worker was recruited to take his place, and instead, he was transferred to the wrapping section where he was required to work with overtime up to 9:30 PM, from his regular working hours of from 7:00 a.m., to 4:00 p.m., despite the fact that he had just recovered from illness. He was given a new assignment where the work was even more difficult and when he complained of what he felt was rude treatment or sort of punishment since he was being exposed to hard labor notwithstanding his predicament of just coming from sickness, petitioner was told to look for another job because he was dismissed, when petitioner was seeking his 13th month pay and 15 days SIL, he was ignored when he refused to sign documents which indicated that he was renouncing claims against private

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respondent. Petitioner sought private respondent to pay him, but he was told to come next year. When petitioner came back, private respondent dangled to him a check worth P3,000.00 which would be released to him, only if he signed the documents, being forced upon him to sign on the day he was dismissed. Desperate for the money to support his subsistence, and against his will, petitioner was constrained to sign the said documents which contained no amount of money released to him. The actual sum of money received by petitioner from private respondent amounted to P3,000.00 in the form of check, while his claims for 15 days sick leave pay was secured by him from SSS. The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner was not illegally dismissed bur resigned from employment. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON petitioner separation pay. Ruling: Generally, an employee who voluntarily resigns from employment is not entitled to separation pay. Voluntary resignation is defined as the act of an employee, who finds himself in a situation in which he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service; thus, he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. In this case, The factual findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, reveal that is entitled to

petitioner resigned from his work due to his illness, with the understanding that private respondent would give him separation pay. He was already suffering from a lingering illness at the time he tendered his resignation. His continued employment would have been detrimental not only to his health, but also to his performance as an employee of private respondent. Hence, the termination of the employment relations of petitioner with private respondent was ultimately, if not outrightly inevitable. Petitioner negotiated for a resignation with separation pay as the manner in which his employment relations with private respondent would end, because resignation with separation pay was the best option for him under the circumstances. Rightly so, this was the mode adopted and agreed upon by the parties, as evidenced by the Release and Quitclaim petitioner executed in connection with his resignation.Clearly then, the claim of petitioner that he was illegally dismissed cannot be sustained. It should be noted that dismissal and voluntary resignation are adversely opposed modes of terminating employment relations, in that the presence of one precludes that of the other. Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represented a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned, simply because of a change of mind. Unfortunately, it private respondent did

not keep its promise to grant the separation pay, prompting petitioner to institute the present action for illegal dismissal. Thus, the Supreme Court gave due course to this petition. Petition is denied. GLOBE TELECOM vs. JOAN FLORENDOFLORES G.R. No. 150092 September 27, 2002 BELLOSILLO Facts: Petitioner GLOBE TELECOM is a domestic corporation while respondent Joan Florendo-Flores was the Senior Account Manager for Northern Luzon. Joan Florendo-Flores filed an amended complaint for constructive dismissal against GLOBE and alleged that Cacholo M. Santos never accomplished and submitted her performance evaluation report thereby depriving her of salary increases, bonuses and other incentives which other employees of the same rank had been receiving. GLOBE claimed that after receiving her salary in the second week of May 1998 Florendo-Flores went AWOL without signifying through letter or any other means that she was resigning from her position; that notwithstanding her absence and the filing of her case, respondents employment was not terminated as shown by the fact that salary was still provided her until July 1998 to be released upon her presentation of the attendance-record sheet indicating that she already returned and reported for work; that she continued

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to have the use a of company car and company "handyphone" unit; that she was replaced only when her absence became indefinite and intolerable as the marketing operations in Northern Luzon began to suffer. Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled that petitioners did not dismiss respondent but that the latter actually abandoned her employment because of a disagreement with her immediate superior which she failed to bring to the attention of GLOBE and its officers. However, NLRC ordered GLOBE to pay backwages to respondent. Issue: WON respondent is entitled to backwages. Ruling: Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay. In constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer and demotion of an employee are for just and valid grounds such as genuine business necessity. The employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee. If the employer cannot overcome this burden of proof, the employee's demotion shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal.

All these are discernible in respondent's situation. She was singularly edged out of employment by the unbearable or undesirable treatment she received from her immediate superior Cacholo M. Santos who discriminated against her without reason - not preparing and submitting her performance evaluation report that would have been the basis for her increased salary; not forwarding her project proposals to management that would have been the source of commendation; diminishing her supervisor stature by assigning her to house-to-house sales or direct sales; and withholding from her the enjoyment of bonuses, allowances and other similar benefits that were necessary for her efficient sales performance. Although respondent continued to have the rank of a supervisor, her functions were reduced to a mere house-to-house sales agent or direct sales agent. This was tantamount to a demotion. She might not have suffered any diminution in her basic salary but petitioners did not dispute her allegation that she was deprived of all benefits due to another of her rank and position, benefits which she apparently used to receive. For this act of illegal dismissal, she deserves no less than full back wages starting from the time she had been illegally dismissed until her actual reinstatement to her former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits earned, accrued and demandable. She shall continue to enjoy her benefits, privileges and incentives including the use of the company car and "handyphone." It should be noted that the award of back wages in the

instant case is justified upon the finding of illegal dismissal, and not under the principle of "act of grace" for past services rendered. Decision appealed from is modified. PATERNO S. MENDOZA vs. SAN MIGUEL FOODS G.R. No. 158684. May 16, 2005 CALLEJO Facts: Paterno S. Mendoza, Jr., was hired by San Miguel Corporation (SMC) as a marketing coordinator in its Trading Department. He was transferred to San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI), a subsidiary of SMC, and was assigned to Instafood Corporation of the Philippines (Instafood) as a Purchasing Officer. He, however, remained an employee of SMFI. In the course of its operations, Instafood suffered serious business losses for successive years and was closed. SMFI also suffered serious business losses; it had to implement a redundancy program and give benefits to affected employees. One of those whose employment was terminated on account of redundancy was Mendoza. He accepted benefits equivalent to two months salary for every year of service. SMFI, sent Mendoza a letter of termination informing him that the severance of his employment was to take effect at the close of business hours of November 30, 1996, and that his separation benefits would be released 30 days thereafter. Pursuant to company policy, Mendoza was allowed to go on a one-month terminal leave before the date

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of his severance from employment. In this case, petitioner challenges that deed of release and quitclaim that he signed and insists that he was merely forced to execute and sign it, and that he received only half of what he was entitled to receive; worse, he spent as much as P300,000.00 for processing the release of the subject shipment. The petitioner invokes the rule that quitclaims are disfavored and do not bar recovery of the full measure of a workers rights and benefits. Issue: WON the quitclaim in question is valid. Ruling: Generally, quitclaims are commonly frowned upon for being contrary to public policy, there are, however, legitimate waivers that represent a voluntary and reasonable settlement of a workers claim which should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties. Where the person making the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as being a valid and binding undertaking. Not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against policy, except (1) where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or (2) where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face; in these

cases, the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. In the case at bench, the petitioner is not an unsuspecting or a gullible person. As adverted to by the respondents, the petitioner is a graduate of the University of the Philippines no less, with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics. Surely, he knew the nature and the legal effect of the said deed. Neither is the amount involved in the quitclaim unconscionable. Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, in case of termination of employment by virtue of redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In this case, the amount involved in the quitclaim is a rather hefty sum, a gross amount of P1,102,386.25, equivalent to two months salary for every year of service. Even assuming that the petitioner, indeed, spent half of what he received in facilitating the release of the shipment, the remainder thereof is still compliant with the provision of the aforesaid Article 283, as it would still be equivalent to about one month of his salary for every year of service. Petition is denied. SPS. AGABON vs. NLRC and RIVIERA HOME IMPROVEMENTS G.R. No. 158693 November 17, 2004 YNARESSANTIAGO Facts:

Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims and the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims.NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that the petitioners had abandoned their work, and were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. The other money claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter were also denied for lack of evidence. Petitioners assert that they were dismissed because the private respondent refused to give them assignments unless they agreed to work on a "pakyaw" basis when they reported for duty. They did not agree on this arrangement because it would mean losing benefits as SSS members. Petitioners also claim that private respondent did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had abandoned their work. In fact, private respondent sent two letters to the last known addresses of the petitioners advising them to report for work. Private respondent's manager even talked to petitioner Virgilio Agabon by telephone to tell him about the new assignment at Pacific Plaza Towers.

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However, petitioners did not report for work because they had subcontracted to perform installation work for another company. Petitioners also demanded for an increase in their wage to P280.00 per day. When this was not granted, petitioners stopped reporting for work and filed the illegal dismissal case. Issue: WON dismissed. Ruling: To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for termination by the employer: xxx (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; xxx. Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified. petitioners were illegally

In the case at bench, petitioners were frequently absent having subcontracted for an installation work for another company. Subcontracting for another company clearly showed the intention to sever the employer-employee relationship with private respondent. This was not the first time they did this. In January 1996, they did not report for work because they were working for another company. Private respondent at that time warned petitioners that they would be dismissed if this happened again. Petitioners disregarded the warning and exhibited a clear intention to sever their employer-employee relationship. The record of an employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty that should be meted out to him. In a decided case, it has been held that an employee who deliberately absented from work without leave or permission from his employer, for the purpose of looking for a job elsewhere, is considered to have abandoned his job. We should apply that rule with more reason here where petitioners were absent because they were already working in another company. The law imposes many obligations on the employer such as providing just compensation to workers, observance of the procedural requirements of notice and hearing in the termination of employment. Issue: WON private respondent is liable to indemnify petitioner. Ruling:

Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions attributable to the employee while dismissals based on authorized causes involve grounds under the Labor Code which allow the employer to terminate employees. A termination for an authorized cause requires payment of separation pay. When the termination of employment is declared illegal, reinstatement and full backwages are mandated under Article 279. If reinstatement is no longer possible where the dismissal was unjust, separation pay may be granted. Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and DOLE written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation. From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for health

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reasons under Article 284, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was not observed. In the first situation, the dismissal is undoubtedly valid and the employer will not suffer any liability. In the second and third situations where the dismissals are illegal, Article 279 mandates that the employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual reinstatement. In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there

anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee's last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. In cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the twin requirements of notice and hearing, t the dismissal was for just cause and should be upheld but imposing sanctions on the employer. Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights. The sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer. Petition is denied. JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORP vs. DARWIN PACOT G.R. No. 151378. March 28, 2005 GARCIA Facts: Respondents Darwin Pacot et.al were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA Foods Processing Corporation (JAKA) until the latter terminated their employment

because the corporation was in dire financial straits. It is not disputed, however, that the termination was effected without JAKA complying with the requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of a written notice upon the employees and the DOLE at least one (1) month before the intended date of termination. In time, respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and nonpayment of service incentive leave and 13th month pay against JAKA. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the termination illegal and ordering JAKA to reinstate respondents with full backwages, and separation pay if reinstatement is not possible. NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter and set aside the awards of backwages, service incentive leave pay but ordered JAKA to indemnify petitioners for its failure to observe due process in effecting the retrenchment. Issue: WON petitioner is indemnify private respondents. Ruling: In a decided case, it has been held that where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights. The violation of petitioners right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such liable to

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damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. A dismissal for just cause under Article 282 implies that the employee concerned has committed, or is guilty of, some violation against the employer, i.e. the employee has committed some serious misconduct, is guilty of some fraud against the employer. Thus, it can be said that the employee himself initiated the dismissal process. On another breath, a dismissal for an authorized cause under Article 283 does not necessarily imply delinquency or culpability on the part of the employee. Instead, the dismissal process is initiated by the employers exercise of his management prerogative, i.e. when the employer opts to install labor saving devices, when he decides to cease business operations or when, as in this case, he undertakes to implement a retrenchment program. The clear-cut distinction between a dismissal for just cause under Article 282 and a dismissal for authorized cause under Article 283 is further reinforced by the fact that in the first, payment of separation pay, as a rule, is not required, while in the second, the law requires payment of separation pay. For these reasons, there ought to be a difference in treatment when the ground for dismissal is one of the just causes under Article 282, and when based on one of the authorized causes under Article 283.

Accordingly, it is wise to hold that: (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee; and (2) if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employers exercise of his management prerogative. In the case at bench, , JAKA was suffering from serious business losses at the time it terminated respondents employment. It is, therefore, established that there was ground for respondents dismissal, i.e., retrenchment, which is one of the authorized causes enumerated under Article 283 of the Labor Code. Likewise, it is established that JAKA failed to comply with the notice requirement under the same Article. Considering the factual circumstances in the instant case and the above ratiocination, the Supreme Court deem it proper to fix the indemnity at P50,000.00. SC held that CA erred when it ordered JAKA to pay respondents separation pay equivalent to 1)month salary for every year of service. This is because the rule is that in all cases of business closure or cessation of operation or undertaking of

the employer, the affected employee is entitled to separation pay. This is consistent with the state policy of treating labor as a primary social economic force, affording full protection to its rights as well as its welfare. The exception is when the closure of business or cessation of operations is due to serious business losses or financial reverses; duly proved, in which case, the right of affected employees to separation pay is lost for obvious reasons. Petition is granted. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC vs. DIOSCORO D. SEDAN G.R. No. 159354 April 7, 2006 QUISUMBING Facts: Petitioners hired on a per-voyage basis private respondent Dioscoro Sedan as 3rd marine engineer and oiler in one of the vessels owned by petitioners. His last voyage was on July 27, 1997 on board the vessel M/V Eastern Universe. His monthly pay was P22,000. Additionally, after each voyage his earned leave credits are monetized and paid in cash. He said he was disembarking because he was going to take the board examinations for marine engineers. Two months later, Sedan sent a letter to petitioners applying for optional retirement, citing as reason the death of his only daughter, hence the retirement benefits he would receive would ease his financial burden. However, petitioners deferred action on his application for optional retirement since his services on

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board ship were still needed. Nonetheless, according to petitioners, the company expressed intention to extend him a loan in order to defray the costs incurred for the burial and funeral expenses of his daughter. Sedan sent petitioners another letter insisting on the release of half of his optional retirement benefits. Later, he said that he no longer wanted to continue working on board a vessel for reasons of health. Sedan sent another letter to petitioners threatening to file a complaint if his application was not granted. In reply, according to petitioners, the company management sent a telegram informing Sedan that his services were needed on board a vessel and that he should report immediately for work as there was no available replacement. Sedan claims he did not receive the telegram, nor was this fact proved by the company before the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC. Sedan proceeded to file a complaint with the Labor Arbiter against petitioners demanding payment of his retirement benefits, leave pay, 13th month pay and attorneys fees. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Sedan. CA sustained NLRC and the Labor Arbiter and ruled that private respondent is entitled to financial assistance. Issue: WON private respondent is entitled to financial assistance. Ruling: The Supreme Court is not unmindful of the rule that Financial assistance is allowed only in instances where the employee is

validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Neither it is unmindful of this of the Supreme Courts ruling in one case where it has been held that when there is no dismissal to speak of, an award of financial assistance is not in order. The Supreme Court did allow, in several instances, the grant of financial assistance. Financial assistance may be allowed as a measure of social justice and exceptional circumstances, and as an equitable concession. In the case at bench, private respondent joined the company when he was a young man of 25 years and stayed on until he was 48 years old; that he had given to the company the best years of his youth, working on board ship for almost 24 years; that in those years there was not a single report of him transgressing any of the company rules and regulations; that he applied for optional retirement under the companys non-contributory plan when his daughter died and for his own health reasons; and that it would appear that he had served the company well, since even the company said that the reason it refused his application for optional retirement was that it still needed his services; that he denies receiving the telegram asking him to report back to work; but that considering his age and health, he preferred to stay home rather than risk further working in a ship at sea. These special circumstances warrants the grant of financial assistance. Petition is denied.

HA YUAN RESTAURANT vs. NLRC and JUVY SORIA G.R. No. 147719 January 27, 2006 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Facts: Respondent Juvy Soria worked as a cashier in petitioners establishment located inside the SM Food Court Makati. Respondent assaulted her co-worker Ma. Teresa Sumalague resulting in a scuffle between the two. Despite the intervention of their supervisor Fiderlie Recide, they were not pacified, prompting Recide to call for security assistance. The two were then brought to the SM Food Court Administration Office where they continued to cast tirades at each other notwithstanding the request of the SM Food Court Manager to stop. Because they refused to be mollified, they were brought to the Customer Relations Office for further investigation. As a result of the incident, the SM Food Court Manager banned the two from working within the SM Food Courts premises. Respondent then filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal which was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for lack of merit. NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter and awarded separation pay to private respondent. Issue: WON private respondent is entitled to separation pay. Ruling: In a decided case, it has been held that separation pay shall be allowed as a

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measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice. Separation pay therefore, depends on the cause of dismissal, and may be accordingly awarded provided that the dismissal does not fall under either of two circumstances: (1) there was serious misconduct, or (2) the dismissal reflected on the employees moral character. In the case at bench, respondents cause of dismissal in this case amounts as a serious misconduct and as such, separation pay should not have been awarded to her. Thus, the petition should be granted. While it is true, that the Labor Arbiter did not tag private respondent cause of dismissal as serious misconduct, nevertheless, it is its nature, not its label that characterizes the cause as serious misconduct. There is no question as regards the incident that caused respondents dismissal. While respondents co-worker Sumalague was eating at the back of the store, respondent rushed toward Sumalague and hit the latter on the face causing injuries. A scuffle ensued and despite their supervisor Recides

pleas, the two continued to fight, prompting Recide to call the mall security. When the two were brought to the administration office, they continued bickering and did not heed the request of the manager to stop, and thus they were brought to the Customer Relations Office. Because of the incident, the two were banned from working within the premises. The fact that Sumalague sustained injuries is a matter that cannot be taken lightly. Moreover, the incident disturbed the peace in the work place, not to mention that respondent and Sumalague committed a breach of its discipline. Clearly, respondent committed serious misconduct within the meaning of Art. 282 of the Labor Code providing for the dismissal of employees. Her cause of dismissal amounting to a serious misconduct, respondent is not entitled to an award of separation pay. Petition is granted. h. Retirement (Art. 287) Retirement AgeThe age of retirement is that specified in the CBA or in the employment contract. In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in an establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of 60 years old or more; but not beyond 65 years of age which is hereby declared as the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least 5 years in said establishment.

The rule is different with respect to underground mining employees whose optional retirement age is 50-60 provided they have at least served for a period of 5 years. Benefits: A retiree is entitled to a retirement pay equivalent to at least month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least 6 months being contracted as one whole year. Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one half month salary shall means: 15 days plus 1/12 of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of NOT more than 5 days of SIL (22.5 days per year of service). Under Section 26, RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers), public school teachers having fulfilled the age and service requirements of the applicable retirement laws shall be given ONE RANGE SALARY RAISE upon retirement, which shall be the basis of the computation of the lump sum of the retirement pay and the monthly benefit thereafter. NOTE: Exempted from the payment of retirement pay are retail, service and agricultural establishments or operations employing not more than 10 employees or workers. AGE 60-65 65 RETIREMENT Optional but the employee must have served at least 5 years Compulsory (no need for 5 years of service)

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CAINTA CATHOLIC SCHOOL vs. CAINTA CATHOLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES UNION (CCSEU) G.R. No. 151021 May 4, 2006 TINGA Issue: WON a stipulation in a CBA that allows management to retire an employee in its employ for a predetermined lengthy period but who has not yet reached the minimum compulsory retirement age provided in the Labor Code is valid. Ruling: Retirement is a different specie of termination of employment from dismissal for just or authorized causes under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code. While in all three cases, the employee to be terminated may be unwilling to part from service, there are eminently higher standards to be met by the employer validly exercising the prerogative to dismiss for just or authorized causes. In those two instances, it is indispensable that the employer establish the existence of just or authorized causes for dismissal as spelled out in the Labor Code. Retirement, on the other hand, is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the latter after reaching a certain age agrees and/or consents to sever his employment with the former.

Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended, governs retirement of employees, stating: Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract. In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, That an employees retirement benefits under any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements shall not be less than those provided herein. In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least onehalf (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.We are impelled to reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the validity of the termination of employment of Llagas and Javier, arising as it did from a management prerogative granted by the mutually-negotiated CBA between the School and the Union. In the case at bench, the CBA provided that the School has the option to retire an employee upon reaching the age limit of

sixty (60) or after having rendered at least twenty (20) years of service to the School, the last three (3) years of which must be continuous. The CBA established 60 as the compulsory retirement age. However, it is not alleged that either Javier or Llagas had reached the compulsory retirement age of 60 years, but instead that they had rendered at least 20 years of service in the School, the last 3 years continuous. Clearly, the CBA provision allows the employee to be retired by the School even before reaching the age of 60, provided that he/she had rendered 20 years of service. Would such a stipulation be valid? Yes, such stipulation is valid. In a decided case, it has been held that Labor Code permitted employers and employees to fix the applicable retirement age at below 60 years of age. Moreover, there was no illegal dismissal since it was the CBA itself that incorporated the agreement reached between the employer and the bargaining agent with respect to the terms and conditions of employment; hence, when an employee ratified the CBA with his union, he concurrently agreed to conform to and abide by its provisions. By their acceptance of the CBA, the Union and its members are obliged to abide by the commitments and limitations they had agreed to cede to management. The questioned retirement provisions cannot be deemed as an imposition foisted on the Union, which very well had the right to have refused to

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agree to allowing management to retire retire employees with at least 20 years of service. i. Periods of Prescription (Art. 292) CAUSE Money Claims Period of Prescription 3 years from the accrual of the causes of action ULP 1 year from the accrual of the cause of action Illegal 4 years from the accrual Dismissal of the cause of action Reinstatement 4 years The period of prescription under Article 292, Labor Code, refers to and is limited to money claims, all other cases on injury to rights of a workingman being governed by the Civil Code. Hence, reinstatement prescribes in 4 years. AUTO BUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS vs. ANTONIO BAUTISTA supra. Issue: WON the 3-year provided under Article Code, as amended, respondents claim of leave pay. Ruling: Article 291 of the Labor Code states that all money claims arising from employeremployee relationship shall be filed within prescriptive period 291 of the Labor is applicable to service incentive

3 years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever barred. When does the cause of action for money claims accrue in order to determine the reckoning date of the three-year prescriptive period? It is settled that one of the elements of a cause of action is the act or omission on the part of the defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. Thus, in the computation of the three-year prescriptive period, a determination must be made as to the period when the act constituting a violation of the workers right to the benefits being claimed was committed. For if the cause of action accrued more than 3 years before the filing of the money claim, said cause of action has already prescribed in accordance with Article 291. Consequently, in cases of nonpayment of allowances and other monetary benefits, if it is established that the benefits being claimed have been withheld from the employee for a period longer than three 3 years, the amount pertaining to the period beyond the three-year prescriptive period is therefore barred by prescription. The amount that can only be demanded by the aggrieved employee shall be limited to the amount of the benefits withheld within 3 years before the filing of the complaint. It is essential at this point, however, that in the case of SIL, the

employee may choose to either use his leave credits or commute it to its monetary equivalent if not exhausted at the end of the year. Furthermore, if the employee entitled to service incentive leave does not use or commute the same, he is entitled upon his resignation or separation from work to the commutation of his accrued service incentive leave. Correspondingly, it can be conscientiously deduced that the cause of action of an entitled employee to claim his service incentive leave pay accrues from the moment the employer refuses to remunerate its monetary equivalent if the employee did not make use of said leave credits but instead chose to avail of its commutation. Accordingly, if the employee wishes to accumulate his leave credits and opts for its commutation upon his resignation or separation from employment, his cause of action to claim the whole amount of his accumulated service incentive leave shall arise when the employer fails to pay such amount at the time of his resignation or separation from employment. In the case at bench, respondent had not made use of his service incentive leave nor demanded for its commutation until his employment was terminated by petitioner. Neither did petitioner compensate his accumulated service incentive leave pay at the time of his dismissal. It was only upon his filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, one month from the time of his dismissal, that respondent demanded from

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his former employer commutation of his accumulated leave credits. His cause of action to claim the payment of his accumulated service incentive leave thus accrued from the time when his employer dismissed him and failed to pay his accumulated leave credits. Therefore, the prescriptive period with respect to his claim for service incentive leave pay only commenced from the time the employer failed to compensate his accumulated service incentive leave pay at the time of his dismissal. Since respondent had filed his money claim after only one month from the time of his dismissal, necessarily, his money claim was filed within the prescriptive period provided for by Article 291 of the Labor Code. MEDICAL AND DENTAL SERVICES Art. 156- First Aid Treatment First Aid Treatment- adequate, immediate and necessary medical and dental attention or remedy given in case of injury or illness suffered by a worker during employment, irrespective of whether or not such injury or illness is work-connected, before a more extensive medical and/or dental treatment. First Aider- any person trained and duly certified as qualified to administer first aid by the Philippine National Red Cross, or by any other organization accredited by the former. Workmens Compensationa general and comprehensive term

applied to those laws providing for compensation for loss resulting from the injury, disablement or death of a workman through industrial accident, casualty or disease. Compensation- money relief offered according to the scale established under the statue as differentiated from compensatory damages recoverable in an action at law for breach of contract or for tort. Workmens Compensation Act There is presumption of compensability There is a presumption of aggravation There is a need for the employer to controvert the claim within 14 days otherwise he is deemed to have waived the right Payment of compensation is made by the employer. Employees Compensation Law No presumption of compensability No presumption of aggravation No need for the employer to controvert the claim

arising out of and in the course of employment. Conditions for an injury to be compensable: 1. The employee must have been injured at the place where the work requires him to be. 2. The employee must have performing his official functions. 3. If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer. 4. The injury was not due to the employees intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill himself or another, notorious negligence or as otherwise provided under this Title. 5. Injuries incurred by a health worker while doing overtime work shall be presume work-connected. Sickness- any illness accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contraction the same is increased by working conditions. i. Conditions for an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable: a. The employees work must involve the risk described therein; b. The disease was contracted as a result of the employees exposure to the described risks; c. The disease was contracted within the period of exposure and under

Payment of the compensation is made by the SSS/GSIS through the State Insurance Fund

Art. 167. Definition of Terms Injury- any harmful change in the human organism from any accident

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such factors necessary to contract it; and d. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the employee. Death- loss of life resulting from injury or sickness. Disability- loss or impairment of a physical or mental function resulting from injury or sickness. Direct Premises Rule- as a general rule, the accident should have occurred at the place of work to be compensable. Exceptions to the Direct Premises Rule: a. IngressEgress/ Proximity Rule- When the injury is sustained when the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of the employer, the injury is compensable. b. Going to or Coming from WorkWhen the injury is sustained when the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of the employer, the injury is compensable. 1. the act of the employee of going to, or coming from, the work place, must have been a continuing act, that is, he had not been diverted therefrom by any other activity, and he had departed from his usual route to, or from, his workplace; and 2. an employee on a special errand must have been official and in connection with his work. c. Extra-Premises Rule (Shuttle Bus Rule)- The company which

d.

e.

f.

g.

provides the means of transportation in going to or coming from the place of work is liable to the injury sustained by the employees while on board said means of transportation. Special Errand RuleInjury sustained outside the company premises is compensable if his being out is covered by an office order or a locator slip or a pass for official business. Dual Purpose Doctrine- allows compensation where a special trip would have to be made for the employer if the employee had not combined the service for the employer with his going or coming trip. Special Engagement Rule- covers field trips, outings, intramurals and picnics when initiated and sanctioned by the employer. Positional and Local Risks Doctrine- if an employee by reason of his duties is exposed to a special or peculiar danger from the elements, that is, one greater than that to which other persons in the community are exposed and an unexpected injury occurs, the injury is compensable.

An employee who is over 60 years of age and paying contributions to qualify for the retirement or life insurance benefit administered by the system shall be subject to compulsory coverage. Art. 170. Effective Date of Coverage The employer is covered compulsorily fro the first day of operation and the employee from the first day of employment. Art. 172. Limitations of Liability No Compensation can be obtained if the injury, death or disability is a result of the employees 1. intoxication; 2. willful intention to injure or kill himself or another; 3. notorious negligence; or 4. otherwise provided by the Labor Code. Notorious Negligence- deliberate act of the employee to disregard to is own personal safety. As a rule, death through suicide is not compensable. However, a selfinflicted death could be compensable: 1. by agreement of the parties; 2. if the suicide/death is caused by work-related or compensable illness or disease. Art. 173. Extent of Liability Simultaneous recovery under the Labor Code and the Civil Code cannot be

Art. 168. Compulsory Coverage Employees Compensation Law applies to all employers, public or private, and to all employees, public or private including casual, emergency, temporary, or substitute employees.

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