Professional Documents
Culture Documents
AT LOS ANGELES
THE
HISTORY
OF
G R E E C
VOL.
II.
E.
S 3
c^
/*/
THE
HISTORY
OF
GREECE.
By
WILLIAM MITFORD,
Esq.
LONDON:
Printed by Luke Hansard
^-
FOR
T.
^ii>?^
v.*
*-
b?
CONTENTS
OF THE
SECOND VOLUME.
CHAPTER
Affairs of
XIII.
Greece, from the Thirty-Years Truce to that commonly called the Peloponnesian War; with a summary
earliest
Administration of Pericles
Science,
in
Arts,
:
Athens.
Change
at
in the condition
of
Women
Greece
Popular
extended.
p, j_
licentiousness
Athens.
---------_.
-----_
Epidamnus
: :
:
asserted
and
Skct. II. War between Samos and Miletus: Interference of Athens: Armament under Pericles : Samos taken. Funeral solemnity at Athens in
honor of the Slain in their Country's service
p. lo.
Sect.
III.
Affairs
of Corcyra
:
Sedition
at
War
between
deficient
Naval
of
the
Peloponnesians
Sea-fight
:
off
Actium
Accession of the
:
Corcyraans
to the
Athenian Confederacy
-
-to
Infraction
-p.
14,
Sect. IV.
history of
Macedonia.
:
War
-
of Athens
-
with Macedonia
dependencies
in
Enmity of Corinth
:
Athens
Revolt of Athenian
-
Thrace
p. 2
s.
Sect. V,
damon
Second Assembly
to
War
with
Athens.
p. 33,
Sect. YI.
p. 52.
Vol.
II.
CHAPTER
4QGE0G
CONTExNTS.
CHAPTER
Of
the
Sect.
I.
XIV.
Peloponnesian War, from its Commencement to the Death of Pericles, with a summary view of the History of Thrace.
State of the Athenian
and Peloponnesian
Peloponnesians.
Confederacies.
Invasion
the fVestern
:
Spartan Brasidas
Ravage of
the Peloponnesian
and
acquisition
of Cephallcnia
to
security
of
Athens
Remarkable Decree
Invasion
and ravage of Megaris by the Athenians - - - - - - - p. 58. Summary view of the History of Thrace: Alliance negotiated Sect. II. by Athens with Sitalces King of Thrace and Perdiccas King of Macedonia.
Public Funeral at Athens in honor of the Slain in their Country's service.
Expedition of the Corinthians against Acarnania and Cephallcnia
-
p. 70.
Sect.
III.
Pestilence at
Athens.
under Pericles
coast
under Agnon.
Effects of
Fleet.
effort
of the
Peloponnesian
Barbarity
Ah
-----------CHAPTER XV.
-
Death of
p. 74.
DJEMON
Sect.
Sect.
I.
Siege of
p. 89.
II.
and Acarnanians
Battle
near Stratus
Machcn, and
CONTENTS.
Pkormion.
iii
p, p^^
Third Invasion of Attica. Sect. III. Revolt of Mity^ kn'e. Flight of Part of the Garrison ofPlataa. Siege of Mitylene by Paches.
Fourth Campain
:
Distress Alcidas,
and Exertions of Athens. Transactions under and the Athenian Paches on the Ionian Coast
State of the Athenian Government after the
C/eon.
the -
Lacedemonian
-
p. io8.
Sect. IV.
Nicias
:
Paches.
Plata taken
-----------p.
-
Sect. V.
stratus
p.
12?.
Sect. VI.
An
to Sicily
under Laches.
:
Fnd
of the
Pestilence at Athens.
War
Peloponnesian
Army
sent into
Confederacy
of the Acarnanians
cesses
ciots
Battle of
:
Important suc-
of Demosthenes
Peace
_._-__..._
Fifth
Invasion of Attica.
Acarnanians
Sect. VII.
Seventh Campain:
Conquest
Athenian administration.
appointed
General of the
Athenian
to
Forces
-
Sphacteria
-
taken
p. 157.
Lacedemon
Athens
CHAPTER
tenth Year.
Sect.
the
I.
XVI.
Of the Peloponnesian War, from the Application for Peace from Laced^mon, in the seventh Year, to the Conckision of Peace between Laced^mon and Athens in the
Expedition under Nicias to the Corinthian Coast.
Sedition.
Conclusion of
Embassy from Persia to Lacedamon. Lacedtcmonian Hand of Cythera., and Mginetan Settlement at Thyrea, taken by
Corcyraan
Inhumanity of the Athenians
-
the Athenians.
p. 178.
Sect.
II.
in the
War:
Se-
dition of
Megara
Distress of
Lacedamon b 2.
Movements
in
Thrace and
Macedonia,
iv
CONTENTS.
Macedonia.
the Helots.
toward
Thrace
p.
:
a Peloponnesian army
:
into
Lacedemonian
Alegara
i86.
Sect.
III.
Sedition
:
against Bceo/ia
Battle of Delium
Siege of Deliutn
p. 194.
Sect. IV. and Thrace Sect. V. Negotiation for Peace between Athens and Lacedemon.
concluded for a Tear.
oppressed by Thebes.
Transactions in Thrace.
March
of Brasidas into
-------------p.
War
:
Thrace.
Transactions in
Macedonia
loi.
Truce
Thespie
renewed.
War
Remarkable
-
p. 211.
Sect. VI.
Qeon fined :
-
Clean
p.
221.
Sect. VII.
to the
Lacedemonian
troops.
Negotiation for
Peace concluded
------------p.
XVII.
partial
229.
CHAPTER
Of
the
Sect.
I.
Alliance
New
Con-
Peloponnesus
p.
234.
Sect.
the Peace.
of Change of Administration at Lacedemon : Intrigues of the new Administration ; Treaty zvitk Boeotia ; Remarkable Treaty with Argos j
Resentment of Athens toward Lacedamon
-
II.
Continuation
of the
articles
----\
p. 243.
Sect.
III.
Alcibiades.
A third
-
the leading
power
---.-_-_._
War
Peloponnesian Confederacy
and Athens
p.
248.
Sect. IV.
Con-
tinuation of dispute
Affairs of the
La-
Commonwealth
monwealth
Epidaurus.
:
Influence of Alcibiades in
of Argos and
-
Lacedamon
p.
257. Sect.
CONTENTS.
Sect. V. Sect. Yl.
V
near Mantlneia: Sie^e
p. 263.
War
of Epidauriis
-----___.
:
Battle
Change
in the Administration
:
of Argos
betzveen Argos
and Lacedamon
Expulsion
bettkjeen
in Peloponnesus.
of the
A'gos,
and
the
renewal of Alliance
Athenians
.
Melos bv
the
Fresh
Instance
Inhumanity
Athenians.
CHAPTER
Of
the Affairs of Sicily, and of the
into Sicily.
XVIIL Athenian
Expedition
Sect.
I. Affairs of Sicily : Hieron King of Syracuse. Expulsion of the Family of Gelon, and Establishment of Independent Democracies in the Sicilian Cities : Agrarian Law. Ducetius King of the Sicels. Syracuse
Lacedamonian
:
Confederacy
War
First inter-
Peace through
~-
Sicily
procured
p, 281:.
by Hermocrates of Syracuse
--
Sect.
II.
New
Troubles in Sicily:
Nezv
Assistance solicited
from
:
Athens by Egesta
against
Selinus.
Contention of parties
at Athens
and Lamachus appointed to command. Mutilation of the Terms of Mercury : Completion of the, preparatiens for the Sicilian expedition, and departure of the Fleet -- _ p. 20Q.
Nicias,
Alcibiades,
III.
SaCT.
armament.
Alcibiades,
Able conduct of
iii.
Athens
---------Resolution to
p.
Sect.
IV..
First meaIntrigues
among the
ception
Sicilian
Cities.
Rewith
of Alcibiades
at
renew the
War
p,
Athens
328.
Sect,
vi
CONTENTS.
of the Athenian
Sect. V.
Measures Measures of the Peloponncsians tfi relieve Syracuse. armament in Sicily : Reinforcement to the Athenian
in Sicily
:
armament
Siege of Syracuse
Capitulation proposed :
Arrival
Relief of Syracuse.
-
Official Letter
of
p.J3il.
Sect. VI.
the
in
Lacedamonians.
Sicily.
Fresh
action
in
Reinforcements
the Athenian
armament
Naval
Distress
in
of Athens.
Athens.
rinthian gulph
--------------p.
Sicily.
Massacre
Bceotia.
Sect. VII.
Syracuse:
thenes
Affairs in
harbour of
Third naval
action.
opposed by Nicias
Secret
Negotiation in
Syracuse.
Retreat resolved
:
Moon :
-
Fourth
-
naval action
-
Distress
p. p.
of the Athenians
366. 382.
Sect. VIII.
CHAPTER
AfFairs of
XIX.
to
Greece, from
till
the
Expedition,
the Return of
Alcibiades
nevus
Athens,
in
War.
in
Sicily:
Sicily.
Effects
at Athens
of the
of the
overthrow
Change
of L&cedamon.
Proposals from
to
to the
Peloponnesian confederacy
p.
396,
Sect.
II.
New
implication of Grecian
and Persian
to
interests.
Death of
Effect
Isthmian Games.
gulph.
A Peloponnesian
p.
and
404.
Sect. III.
Progress
of
revolt
against
Athens:
Exertions
of
Athens.
Siege of Chios.
Battle of Miletus.
ment
CONTENTS.
mettt to the satrap
vu
with the
title
of Carta.
Spartan
officers,
of Harmost,
placed in the
cities
of the Confederacy.
Operativiis
cities.
and
intrigues
Change
to
of Sparta.
Comwith
23.414.
Ionia, refuse to
RevoU of Rhodes io
Alcihiades,
SCT. IV.
persecuted by
new Spartan
administration;
constitution
of Athens: Synomosies, or
Bread
betiveen Alcibiades
and
-
the managers
of I he
plot.
Netv
treaty between
Lacedxmon and
Persia.
-
Continuation
-
fleets
p.
42
c.
Sect. V.
Proposed nexv form of government : Establishment of the nezv council of administration : Negotiation of the new government for
Oligarchial party
p.
439.
Sect. VI.
of Athens
:
and army
at
Samos
to the
new government
Thrasybulus.
Dissatisfaction
with
its general. Assistance sent from the Peloponnesian armament to Pkarnabazus satrap of the Hellespont. The restoration of Alcibiades decreed by the Athenian armament: Alcibiades elected general by the
armament.
succeeded
in
Astyochus
the
command by Mindarus.
to the
-
Commissioners from
:
nezv
government of Athens
conduct of Alcibiades
armament at Samos
-
Able and
-
beneficial
p. 447.
Sect. VII.
revolution
Schism
-
--
---------
of Athens: Theramenes :
A second
p. ^60.
SscT. VIII.
Wily
and
treacherous policy
Trojan shore.
and capture of the Peloponnesian fleet. Laconic official letter. Liberality Able conduct and popularity of of Pharnabazus to the Peloponnesians.
Hermocrates the Syracusan general
-
------
p.
469.
Sect. IX.
Effects of the
Reinforce
'.cast.
Winter
(tdamonian administration
-------p.
Sect,
viU
CONTENTS.
-
Sect. X. Importat successes of Alcihiaiis. Friendly communication opened Embassies to the king of Persia. Rewith the satrap Pharnabazus.
turn of Alcibiades to Athens
--------p.
XX.
489.
C
Affairs
till
H A
T E R
ofGREECE, from
the Returnof
Sect.
I.
Darius
II.
river Halys.
Lysander
consequences
II.
---------p.
:
fleet
Sea-fight of Notium,
and
498.
Sect.
the
Callicratidas of
Peloponnesian.
Arginusa
Sect.
III.
Arginus<
-.-----_.---__-------.-------p.
who commanded
in
besieged
by
Callicratidas.
Sea fight of
p.
^08.
at the battle of
Sect. IV.
Cyrus. Unsteddiness of the Athenian government. Measures of thefleets : Battle of Aigospotami p. 530.
favor
Sect. V.
Conclusion
Consequences
of the Peloponnesian
war
-------p.
Siege of Athens.
^42.
THE
THE
HISTORY
OF
GREECE.
CHAPTER
Affairs of
XIII.
to that
com-
monly called the Peloponnesian War; with a summary View of the History of Macedonia from the earliest
Accounts.
SECTION
Administration of Pericles
:
I.
and Jine Taste at Athens. Change in the Condition of JVomen in Greece : Aspnsia. Popular Licentiousness at Athens. The Athenian Empire asserted and Project for Union of Greece. extended.
Science, Arts,
ATHENS
above forty
invasion.
now
any
hostilities;
a
in
known
wonderful and singular phenomenon in the history of mankind, too little accounted for by anything recorded by anticnt,
It is a
or imagined
hi
by modern
writers, that,
Vql.
II.
scarcely
HISTORY OF GREECE.
scarcely to thirty thousand families,
art,
Chap.XIII.
and
polite-
mistress of
tli
world, through
all
succeeding ages.
indeed have been carried higher in modern times, and art has put forth
new
branches, of which
in that age,
but
Athens,
have looked up
to, as
a polar
guided in
restoration to splendor,
will
future corruption
and decay.
]\Iuch of these circumstances of glory to Athens,
and of improvegenius
ment, since so extensively spred over the world, was owing to Pericles.
Peisistratus
x\ttic
Pericles
brought
it
to maturity.
Avas
known, science
lent period
that, in the
magic touch
to exhibit
them
US
"
The philosopher Anaxagoras of Clazomene, whose force of understanding and extent of science acquired him the appellation
splendor.
Pint. vit.
of the Intellect, had been the tutor of the youth of Pericles, and
Pcric
riper
years.
Among
those Avith
whom
whom,
Pheidias, in
with a capacity for every science, was united the sublimest genius for
the fine
arts,
music, was esteemed the ablest speculative politician that the world
enumeration of those to
riat. Meneji.
;
whom
it
Pericles
was indebted
we have
woman.
upoa the manners any more
Pericles
;
arts
} et it
may
Sect.
I.
CONDITION OF WOMEN.
Homer has
described.
The
political circum-.
much
to
to
exclude
women
made
But
The turbulence
which
them
to
go
abroad.
The
all
the meanest citizen being there of equal value v/ith that of the highest,
the more numerous body of the poor was always formidable to the
or something
to the multitude;
and not to
among
all
Not
those alone
who sought
lionors
or commands, but
these
men upon
gymnasia and
The
ladies, to
with the
men, even
in public,
but
women
toward them.
and, as
Hence
them exhibited in lively picture, in the little treatise upon domestic economy remaining to ns from Xenophon, they were
fixid
we
Diogeiiou.
To
women
country had
superinduced upon the better manners of the heroic ages, was owing
that comparative superiority,
courtezans attained
extraordinary renown.
B 2
HISTORY OF GREECE.
converse
CnAP.XIir.
and ta
talents, if
became cultivated
their liouses
most polished company, the charms of female conversation, Mhich, with women of rank and character, was
Hence, at the time of the invasion under Xerxes,
city
is
plut. vit.
'^^
totally forbidden.
said to
in the Persian
With uncommon beauty were joined in Aspasia still more uncommon talents; and, with a mind the most cultivated, manners so decent, that, in her more advanced
celebrity has preserved her father's name.
years,
accompany
their
Pericles
hereclf to
him during
he had
according to Plutarch
ill
lie
whom
on
terms, to
marry
her.
We
are informed,
on higher autho-
&
p.
yXlrib.'i.
rity? t'l'^t
us.
t.
?.
by Plato
he passed his
in
nians in general delighted, and seldom seen by the people, but in the
exercise of
some public
who were yet but aspiring at greatness, or wealthy without power, who desired security to their property.
and
call forth their finest
The Athenian
was to
skill
That
fine taste
which
Sect.I.
science, arts
in
;
AND
TASTE.
some degree general among the of that fine taste was one mean by
which he retained
remained perfect,
all
calcu-
accommodation, or
Plieidias
in
some way
the multitude.
many
whose merit
is
intitled
them
Attic marble, their principal material, and the mildness of the Attic
atmosphere)
the lapse
which have escaped the violence of men, still after of more than two thousand years, exhibit all the perfection of
relics
Nor
docs
now
totally, or
almost totally
rest
session of
relics
the
most
exfjuisite productions of
Grecian
art,
scanty
of which have excited the wonder and formed the taste of modern
works of Pheidias.
ture, it
When
of painting could
a;ul
Zeuxis
and Parrhas.us,
among
of the great tragic poets iEschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and that
extraordinary mixture of the most elegant satire with the grossest
buffoonery, the old comedy, as
in
it is
called,
immense
Tims captivating the Athenians by their relish for matters of taste and their passion for amusement, Pericles confirmed his authority
principally by that great instrument for the
his
management of
a people,,
eloquence:
but
this
as.siduity ia.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
it;
.Aptid Pint,
Chap. XII.
the vords of
and, above
all,
by an ostentatious
all
its
integrity.
commonwealth
thus, with
appurtenances,
Di\'''rT? cotcmporarv authors, revenues, armies, fleets, ilands, the sea, friendAlcib. 1. ships and alliances with kings and various potentates, and influence
that
all
commanded
in
were
during
fifteen years,
economy
Isocrates,
his
Auger.
it
his father.
But the
political
much, and even to bear much, that a better constitution would have put under more Such, under his administration, M'as the popular licentiousrestraint.
he professed, of democracy, he was obliged to
Pint. vit.
Pexic
the grossest jokes upon his person, the severest invectives against his
administration, and
character.
satire.
She was
and
much
much
would indeed be scarcely possible to distinguish almost any truth amid the licentiousness of wit, and the violence, not to say the atrociousness, of party-spirit at Athens, had we not generally,
both of them.
for this interesting period of history, the guidance of a cotemporary
of
uncommon
abilities
and
still
more uncommon
tions,
impartiality,
in the
commonwealth, opened
is
to
him superior
means of information. Grecian affairs, which he has prefixed to his history of the Peloponnesian war, we have sometimes some testimony from Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, or the orators. To later writers, when not in some
1
For what
degree
Sect.
I.
seldom safe to
;
trust.
Sometimes they
find Plutarch fre-
and
often, as
we
often,
and especially
He
by some evident
generally impartial.
We
may
Thucydides, Isocrates,
and Plutareh, notwithstanding the vague accusations reported by Diodorus and others, that the clear integrity of Pericles, not less than the
wisdom of
his public
make
One
great point
however of
employed.
gallics
his policy was to keep the people always either amused or During peace an exercising squadron of sixty trireme was sent out for eight months in every year. Nor was this
without a farther use than nieerly ingaging the attention of the people,
in vigor.
command
pire,
settled
bound
his
voj'ages
and an opposing
party,
there
Lamachus with
body of
landforces, with
whose
lots,
were expelled.
and volunteers were Hot wanting to go upon such conditions to settle at Sinope. To disburthen the government at liome, by providing advantageous estabcitizens;
were offered to so
many Athenian
The expression
kind which
of Thucydides
is
is
of that
from
u>
ciny
Ji/taTC5
forcible
his
ru
ytu.y.T,,
_v^^/iTa ti
^laipatw;
diupTa-r'
yfo'fi-.
Thucyd.
1.
C.
weight that
it
c.65,,
We
8
Ch.io. S.4. of ihisllisi.
Diod.
1.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
We
5Qpj^
.
CHAr.XIII.
same
year, accord*
^vas
in the
le.
ing to Diodorus, in which the thirty years truce M'as concluded, that
the deputation
Ch^lf'/o*^'
of this Hist,
the
under
his patronage,
Thurium.
also bearing
some characters of authenticity and truth. It -was no less than to unite all Greece under one great feder.al government, of which Athens shouUl be the capital. But the immediate and direct avowal of such a purpose would be likely to raise jealousies so numerous and
extensive,
as
to
The
which
In
itself,
in
common
interest.
the vehemence of public alarm, during the Persian invasion, vows had
sacrifices, to
an extent beyond
what
territories
Taking
these circumstances
then for his ground, Pericles proposed that a congress of deputies from
every republic of the nation should be assembled at Athens, for the
of inquiring concerning vows for the safety of Greece
purpose
fust,
yet unperformed,
all
Greek
The naval
question, but
befallen
more
th.e
Northern
felt
Greece,
its
and
evils,
especially
nothing of
On
decree of
llie
Sect.
I.
of ministers, to invite every Grecian state to send its deputies. Plutarch, rarely attentive to political information, has not at all indicated what
attention M'as shown, or what participation proposed, for Laceda;mon.
But, judging
from the friendship which, according to the authentic information of Thucydides, subsisted between Pericles and Archidamus, king of Laceda;mon, through
life,
it
is- little
likely
tliat,
in
project for the peace of Greece, Pericles would have proposed anything
jiroject
of contest.
Pericles,
when he formed
his
views of that great man, and with the hope that, through their coalition,
in
however evident, from the narrative of Thucydides, that Archidamus rarely could direct the measures of the Lacedaemonian government. On a
It
is
view of
all
information then
it
interest
from a
new
was no object
and accurate
which precedes
Vol.
II.
10
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Chap. XIII.
SECTION
War
befzceeti Scnnos
II.
and JMiletiis : Interference of Athens : Armament Funeral Solemnity at Athens in under Pericles: Samos taken. honor of the Slain in their Country s Service.
indispensable toward
in the
vant of such a
far
union
it;
as Pericles
from insuring
settle-
and when war began anywhere, tho among the most distant
it
B. C. 440.
two Asiatic states, of the Athenian confederacy, led Athens into a war, which greatly indangered the truce made for thirty years, when it had scarcely lasted six. Af iletus
dispute between
^"^^
Thucv/l
c.
Samos, claiming
a free
Priene,
itself
origi-
115.
nally
tensions
defeat,
by arms.
The
Milesians, not
redress, as
till
The
"the
their clamor
for,
leaders of the
enemies of their
Athenian people.
measures,
The
but
it
appears
:
the
as
The Samians, unwilling to submit of those who they knew were always
any
deputies.
systematically adverse to
1
tlie
Sect.
II.
MILETUS.
ii
deputies.
in
immediate submission; their government was changed to a democracy, which those who had lieaded the opposition of course took the lead
to insure
and
fifty
aristocratical party,
men and
boys, of the
first fam.ilies
iland of
Lemnos.
that the lower people were most unpleasant associates to the nobles'.*
number of
these,
whom
At
the
of their party
the city of
intei-est
Byzantium,
subject-ally of Atlicns.
channel which separates Samos from the continent, and being joined by their friends, they surprized and overpowered the new administration.
to
Lemnos, and so
m'cII
con-
ducted
To win more
eflfectually the
i.
'^'
^^'^'^^^
command, hastened
to
Samos with a
fleet
of sixty trireme
the Carian coast, to look out for a Phenician fleet in the Persian service,
Being
Sutcixtifta uxcii'TinuToy.
7. C. 156.
c 2
gallics
,e
gallies
HISTORY OF GREECE.
city of the
Chap. XIII.
from Athens, and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, he debarked his infantry on the iland of Samos, and laid siege to the
Intelligence meanwhile same name, by land and sea. arriving that the fleet from Phenicia was approaching, Pericles went with sixty of his gallies to Caunus in Caria; apparently apprehensive
for his small
squadron
there.
able Melissus, (who, as was not unusual in that age, united the charac.
ters
absence.
they
rest
of the
fleet,
hastily
sea,
Becoming thus
opportunity for
masters of the
1.
j\Iean\vhi!e
states
of the Pelopon-
nesian confederacy w^s held at Sparta, to consider whether the aristocratical party in
in what,
according to
rebellion'*.
Grecian
was
The
Corinthians, yet
their last
war
Avith Athens,
proposal.
been
effeatual, tlie
;
it
into exe-
cution
for
its
that of Athens.
were weakly supported by the satrap, and the promised succour from
Byzantium was delayed. The return of Pericles therefore compelled them to confine themselves within tlieir harbor: and shortly a reinforcement arrived to him, which might have inabled a
^ Txi afo^v^ar.'i^ai; jaD; for which may be consulted Scheffer's treatise de Wililid
:
less
skilful
an account to the Athenian assembly of what iiad passed at Sparta upon the occasioa
Navali, 1.3
satisfactory.
c. !.
1
p.
IDS. tho he
is
not very
would not however uiidtrvalue his laborious compilation, which may often guard against the supposition of what was not, where it fails to inform what was. * ^linisters from Coiinih, afterward giving'
mentioned in the text, affirmed that their deputies had asserted the right of every
leading
city
to
ruxiSH
its
allies:
ti>l
Thu-
eyd. J.
1.
c,43.
commander
Sect.II.
funeral solemnity.
to overbear opposition
;
13
commander
under Tlepolemus and Anticles, while thirty came from Chios and
Lesbos.
mencement of the
to the
they capitulated
their ships of
bound themselves
payment of
sum of money by
the war, and they gave hostages as pledges of their fidelity to the
soverein
commonwealth of Athens.
fleet,
The
This rebellion, alarming and troublesome at the time to the administration of Athens, otherwise little disturbed the internal peace of the
commonwealth
and
its
in the
its
command
over
dependencies.
ta
On
armament
to Athens,.
who had
fallen in the
war
and
in
he
e>rerted the
of the people.
.sented
powers of his eloquence very highly to the gratification As he descended from the bema, even the women prechaplets; an idea derived from the ceremonies of the
him with
public games, where the crowning with a chaplet was the distinction of the victors, and, as something approaching to divine honor, was held
among
The
men-
mentioned
first
in history.
No certainty can
is
who
he was.
be
had,^
not important;
but the
supposition appears to
me
far
Menow
become,
reconciled to huii
known
to us.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Chap. XIII.
SECTION
Affairs of Corcyra
:
III.
Sedition at
Epidamnus
Defect of the antient Ships of JTar : d(fcient Naval Skill of the Peloponnesians : Sea-Fight off Actium : Accession of the Corcyrxans to the Athenian Confederacy : Seafght off Sybota :
and Corinth
The
b}
war
in
little
importance that no
raising fire in
account
fatal
spark then,
little
inso-
much
is
some splendid
itself.
episodes,
which the
The
by a colony from
Corinth, became,
dency, and, becoming independent, was too near a neighbor, and too
much
inaae-ed in the
metropolis.
It
was
common
for the
Grecian
colonies,
1.
by a kind of
cedency
religious superiority.
At
all
it
Thus,
was supposed,
still
its
con-
nection with Corinth, Avhen the resolution was taken by its goverment to settle a colony on the lUyrian coast. An embassy was therefore
Sect.III.
sedition AT EPIDAMNUS.
tlie
3
Phalius,
leader.
Avas
of a family boasting
its
descent from
Hercules,
accordingly
accompanied him
Corcyraean, not a
But
in process
was then,
during many
years, lorn
by sedition
it fell
neighboring barbarians,
much from
former florishing
state.
These,
among
them
in a predatory
and
Unable thus to
rest,
subsist,
from Corcyra.
when
tlicir
time aristocratical
and hence
arose, with
On
1.
Delphian
oracle.
Whether
it
Avould be
'
its
'authority?'
le
^
HISTORY OF GREECE.
a deputation was
in
Chap.XIII.
do so
;
and
The
Corintliians were
witli Corcyra.
The
now among
most powerful of
all
claim seeming
moreover to justify
the
number of adventurers was collected to strengthen the colony and a body of Corinthian troops, with some Ambraciot and Leucadian
^- ss-t-
B.C. 436. auxiHarics, was appointed to convoy them. Fearful however of the naval force of Corcyra, which far exceeded that of Corinth, they passed
by land
to
Epidamnus.
No
sooner was
it
known
at
had refused
ment.
Twenty-five
triremes
were immediately
requisition to the
(for these
Epidamnians to receive
being refused,
Illy'rians,
laid siege to
I.e. 27.
E -aapaSoUii KofiMtif
is
oixirxTc
hyifioiai;
'o
Tr,t ;o'xir,
but
we are
S:'avToii
assT^i
nraJaai,
xa)
woisiVGai.
Thucyd.
1.1. c.25.
and iyi/xoaf oraSai, and we are equally uninformed of the proper authority
whom we
we have more
in
its
metropolis, thjin
is
As
Sect.III.
17
As soon
therefore as intelligence of
and
also to
present circumstances,
would pay
fifty
What
we
part,
the advantages
M'ere
time only thirty ships of war, whereas Corcyra was able to put to sea
near four times the number; being, next to Athens, the most powerful
made
to
the
for naval
the Palcans of Cephallenia, five from Epidaurus, one from Hermionc, Thucyd.
j,
'
two from Treezen, ten from Leucas, eight from Ambracia, and the Eleians lent some unmanned. Loans of money were moreover obtained
from the Eleians, Phliasians, and Thebans.
It
'^'~''
'^'
and strong
they had
c.
3','.
&
seq,
the Pelopon-
and with
at
this policy
hitherto prospered.
But,
alarmed
it
now
still
might
;
who
28.
states
existing differences.
states,
on which
tliey
could agree
nor Sicyon would take any active part against them, refused to treat
terms,
had
collected.
j>
435
The
oi.78|.
18
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Tlie troops were already imharked,
Chap. XIII.
when they
it, till
it
But tho they would not omit might in the least possible degree
consisting of seventy-fiveinfantry, under the
answer
proper purpose.
The armament,
triremes, with
command
Ambracian gulph.
it,
more
im--
cating
hostilities.
came to them with a herald from Corcyra, depreThe Corcyrjeans had manned those of their ships*
hastily prepared
some of those
less in'
when
their
herald returned,
With eighty
imme-
kcpt
in
bonds.
Epidamnus surrendered
same day.
were not
The
ojjportunities
now
and
profit,
They
first
plunderedthe territory of
ith
still
connected w
the mother-countrv.:
then going to the coast of Peloponnesus, they burnt Cyllene, the naval
arsenal of Elis.
sea, there
was scarcely an intermission of their smaller enterprizes; by some of which they gained booty, by others only go-ve alarm, but by all togeR. C. 434. Ol 87 i ^'
allies.
It
was not
till
Corinthians sent a
fleet
and
some troops
to
rnsuing summer
without
within
coming
Thucyd.
*"^''
to action,
retired,
But, since their misfortune off Actium, the Corinthians had been un-
loss,
and
in preparing to
revenge
it.
Sect.
it.
III.
19
Triremes were
where
else
they
The
Corcyreeans,
commonwealth stood
single,
of
which, tho a part only had yet been induced to act, more powerful
exertions were nevertheless to be apprehended.
it
alliances.
Thucydides gives us
would have
;
Thuryd.
l.i,
induced,
government.
it
by the circumstances
c.
3u
mined
to
measure of
among
which
modern
ages.
unknown;
but public
their rank
and
situation,
of knowing
facts
which they
related.
of Olorus,
who
are
we
now
ingaged.
No
from him, was the purpose of the Corey rttans known at Corinth,
than ambassadors
ao-amst
it.
M'cre sent
The Athenian people were assembled to receive the two embassies, each of which, in presence of the other, made its proposition in a formal oration. The point to be determined was highly critical for Athens. A truce D 2 existed
^0
HISTORY OF GREECE.
existed, bat not a peace,
force,
Chap. XIII.
was
territory,
Thucyd.
1.1.
in the
Samian
'
ing whether the Samians, an Ionian people, a colony from Athens, and members of the Athenian alliance, should not be supported in war
against their metropoUs, the head of their
confederacy,
could
but
weigh
in the
such an assembly, to discuss such a question, strongly indicated the disposition of a powerful party at least in the Lacedcemonian confederacy; and the determination of the question, in the negative, demonstrated a present unreadiness, principally
among
renewal of
hostilities,
than
any friendly
cipally
disposition to Athens.
it
was expressly
stipulated, that
any Grecian
state,
was
little
44.
Ifss
and
this
con-
much
On
the
first
day,
nothing was decided: on the second, the question was carried for the
alliance M'ith Corcyra.
in this
conjuncture.
If
it
was
impoffible,
as
it
seemh
Lacedsmon,
it
would
become
future war;
sion of strength
Lacedfemonian confederacy.
But we
are
cir-
Pericles
cumstances.
sect.iii.
ciinistauces.
si
of keeping
civil order in a
comnumit}' of
lordly beggars, such as the Athenian people were, which had diivcn
Cimon,
in
advanced
years,
to end his
life
in distant enterprize,
we
the
fittest
that Plutarch had ground for asserting, that the eloquence of Pericles
was employed
to
The
may
and
Thucyd.
'
"
Pericles,
the alliance
was
offensive
defensive;
with Corcyra
it
Meanwhile the
by
now
to be supported
mark confidence in support, on their some members of which side, indeed were evidently of ready zeal. The Corinthians increased their own trireme galleys to ninety. The Eleians, resenting the burning of
from the Lacedeemonian confederacy
;
manned to join them. Assistance from Megara, Leucas, and Ambracia, made their whole fleet a hundred and fifty the crews would hardly be less than forty thousand men. With this
:
The Athenian government, meanwhile, desirous to confirm their new alliance, yet still anxious to avoid a rupture with the Peloponnesian
confederacy, had sent ten triremes to Corcyra, under the
i.
].c.45.
command of
fight, unless
made on the iland, or any of its towns should be The Corcyra:ans, on receiving intelligence that the enemy
1.
was approaching, put to sea with a hundred and ten triremes, exclusive
of the Athenian, and formed their naval camp on one of the small
ilets
1.
c.4T.
called
Sybota,
own
and
iland
HISTORY or GREECE.
in Core via, to be prepared against invasion
;
Chap. XUI.
Lucimnc
Corinth,
assembled in large
coast.
The
iucamp
necessity
among
the antients
for
debarking continually t^
their ships of war.
their crews,
make of
To
obtain that most valuable property for their manner of naval action,
swiftness in rowing, burden was excluded
Tliucvd
c- -<
:
1.4.
could not carry any stock of provisions, but the numerous crews could
neither sleep nor even eat conveniently aboard.
When
the Corinthians
Corcyrfean
fleet
to action,
to have
which
Thucydides seems
1.7. c. 39,40.
it
the night, the Corinthians, with the daWn, perceived the Corcyrajan
fleet approacliing.
1.
So great a
1.C.4S.
number of
C.50.
ships
in
and Greeks.
c.4<.
The
on
either side,
with
little skill.
and Corinthian ships were equipped in the antient manner, very inartificially.
soldiers,
some heavy-armed,
some with
weapons
Once
made
free
motion impossible
it
was
enemy's
improved naval
tactics
armed
.
soldiers
who fought on
the decks.
prevailing everywhere,
fighting,
The Corcyra-ans
Sect. III.
E A-F
GHT
O FF
OT
A.
23
and
tliem.
The Corinthians
became
acts
fight,
the
Corcyra'ans
fled,
the Athenians
and
in the confusion
of a running
their
own
In tbe action several gallevs had been sunk: most bv the Corin- Thncyd.
thians,
l.i,
but some by
c.
Coreyr^an
and
it M'as
50.
fleet.
Tlie
common
for
when they could seize any. of these, to take them in tow and make the men prisoners: but the Corinthians, in the first moment of success, gave no quarter; and, unaware of the disaster of
the right of their
fleet,
in the
easily distinguishing
stroyed
many
Wh^n
and they had collected whatever they could recover of the wrecks and of their dead, they, carried them to a desert harbour, not distant, on the
Thesprotian coast, called,
depositing
like
the neighboring
ilets,
Sybota
and
who were
The Corcyrceans meanwhile had been considering the probable conr sequences of leaving the enemy masters of the sea. They dreaded descents upon their iland, and the ravage of their lands. The return of
their victorious squadron
spirits
Lacedjemonius incou-
hostilities
to afford
them
his
utmost support
port,
and they
Instantly
battle.
they,
24
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Xhe Corcyrasans uere
had concealed
tain
V,
Chap.XIII.
they proceeded to put this in execution. The pR;an, the song of battle, was aheady sung, wlicn the Corinthians began suddenly to retreat.
Thucyd.
at a loss immediately to
account
for this
but
coming round
hostile,
a headland,
Still
which
uncer-
hether
;
might be friendly or
but shortly, to their great joy, twenty triremes under Glaucon and Andocides, sent from Attica in the apprehension that the small force under Laceda-monius might be unequal to the occurring
their port
Next day
ships, for
in the action,
show themselves
offer battle.
oif the
the
enemy
lay,
and
The Corinthians came out of the and so rested. They were not desirous of
they could not remain conveniently in the station they had occupied, a desert shore, where they could neither
recruit their stock of provisions
;
refit
complements of
their galleys.
home
C.63.
truce as broken by the action of the preceding day, would not allow
an unmolested passage.
disposition,
It Avas
by sending a small
Vessel,
who were
near
their
enough
to observe
'
what
vehemence of
;'
animosity,
m hich, consider-
ing them as enemies, would have been within the law of war of the
Greeks.
to hold
a different conduct.
To
them
that
it
protect their
allies.
to go, they
might
Sect. III.
'
^yAR.
25
might go without interruption from them; but any attempt against Corcyra, or any of its possessions, would be resisted by the Athenians
to the utmost of their power.'
'
Upon
]. i.
homeward.
at the
by stratagem Anactorium,
wealth and the Gorcyra?ans
to Corinth.
;
town
mouth of
the
Ambraciau
common by
their
commonproceeded
there,
Of
been
slaves,
fifty,
and
kindness.
Among them
men
of Corcyra; and
The
Corcj'rteans,
meanwhile,
had
gratified
The Athenian
of
or,
returned
home
is
action which
distinguished by the
name of the
CorcyriEan,
some-
SECTION
Summary View of
Alacedonia
:
IV.
En?nity of Corinth
in
Athens
Dependencies
The
cotemporary historian has strongly marked the difficulties of those who might have desired to guide the soverein people of Athens in the
M-as far
too small
c.
44.
new
no
enterprize.
Nor
;
was
it
Where
spoil allured
difficulty
daunted
and the wild vision of conquest was extended from Calabria to Tus-
VoL.
II.
cany,
e6
HISTORY OF GREECE.
cany, and from Sicily to Carthage.
Chap. XI 11.
riut. ibid.
&
1.
Thucvd.
1.
c. 14-1.
The
'.
jAvns
their
dependency on the
northern shores of the iEgean, some highly valuable for their mines of
gold and
silver,
and
.^'scliyl.
all
of IMacD0NIa.
Danaid.
Justin.
c. 1.
1.
states,
connection with Athenian history. is almost only known through Thucydides, who must have had superior opportunity, appears to have
been able to discover
Avard
little
its
kings,
down-
ander son of Amyntas, the reigning prince at the time of the invasion
of Greece under Xerxes.
Ilerod.l.s.
c. 137.
in ascribing the
Thucyd.
*
1.2.
I\Iacedonian
monarchy
to Perdiccas;
call
but
later writers
...
meeting'.
foundation of the
honor to
a prince
wliom they
reckon Perdiccas.
the Olympian
Tliree
of
whom Gavanes
was the
eldest,
from Argos into Macedonia, where the latter acquired the sovereinty and it seems not improbable that the ingenuity of chronologers, with a
little alteration
grandfather*.
The founder of
however
' Thus the learned and geneiallyjudicious Henrj Doriwell Tres illos reges Eusehiams
:
to reign 8l\ years before the '^'hrisliau and 36 before the first Olympiad; Per-
resciiidiiidosarbitror.
Sinn.
*
diccus
Chris;i;.in
ara,
A. C.
454-.
in the fourth
According
to the chronologers
Caranus
the
Sect. IV.
MACEDONIA.
commonly
called
27
Temenids.
By
held
I.
8.
remain, he acquired
clan,
command among
inland
who
the
Macedonia
of Thrace.
accordino;
.
to
fahle,
fahricated
its
origin from
and
iEthria.
How
came
to assume
it,
and
are not
wanting whence to
clans
The innumerable
who shared
among
when the Argive advenamong them, might be such as to make them glad to
whose
skill
associate strangers,
in
superior to
their
own.
new comers, and royalty became established in name of the antient inhabitants, as the
more numerous, remained. In the course of six or seven reigns the Macedonians extended their dominion over the neighboring provinces
of Pieria, Bottiaja, Mygdonia, part of Pteonia, Eordia, Almopia, Anthe- Tlmcjd.
nious,
1.2.
all,
together with
^'^^^
Strymon.
Tiie people
of some extirpated;
The expelled Pierians established themselves in of mount Pangjeus the Bottifcans found a settle;
ment
Lyncestis
^ jqi_
c.
99-
own
prince, yet
HISTORY OF GREECE.
among
Chap. XIIL
so little estimation
was
Macedonia held by
when,
as a competitoi for
Temenus,
M'as aduiitted
;
the assenibiy
Herod.
c. 22.
1. ().
and that
1.5.
&
1.
among
2,
;ill
'.
C.45.
Thucvd.
c.
disputed
sister
59."&
1.
1.5. c. SO.
Macedonian
Herod.
c. 21.
1.
&
136.
1.
8. c.
lustiii.
7.
and Peisians
he had
many
M'ars to
c. 3.
advancement of
arts
and
knowlege among
his people.
Long
ilands
consequence
While he
8.
lived,
the
fi
36.
impaired,
the commonwealth,
Deniosthenes,
illiberal
language, adapted
against the great
excite
las
audience
call that
Philip,
would
and
prince a barbarian.
niostbenes
a
mcerly thrown oui ihe ugly nickname to the Athenian populace, for the chance of the vogue it might obtain, and the eliect it
barbarian,
showed
his
might produce,
ground for
it;
His
Sect.IV.
29
His son and successor Perdiccas was honored with adoption to the
citizenship of Athens, forhis merit witlr the
a
body
th
alliance passed
arose.
One
r.
2.
^'^^'
About
Athenian administraits
protection,
and
a breach of the antient alliance, and perhaps he was not without reason
jealous of the ambition of the Athenian people.
The
authority
and
priiiccs,
attack them, while they could be supported by the power of the Athe-
The
Tlie
Athenians
hati just
known
to Perdiccas
and an
ivoultl
commonwealth
in war,
Lacedaemon, occurred in
neighborhood.
Thus
invited, Per-
The town
nects the fruitful peninsula of Pallent with the coniines of Thrace and
tar
sti'l
among
the tributary
allies
of Atiiens.
He
Lacedtemon
state, or to
and
he negotiated not only with the Potidaaus but also with the Chalcidians
30
HISTORY OF GREECE.
tUans and Bottifcans, subjects of Athens in
liis
Chap. Xllf.
ncighborhuocl, to induce
ihcm
to revolt.
transactions,
and aware
command on
a
of the .-Egean.
accompanied by
thousand heavy-armed
According
Tluicvd.
c. 50"
1.
2.
57.
fidelity,
and
to send
away
c. 58.
very averse to obey, yet afraid to dispute these commands, sent ministers
to
Athens
them
common
requisition.
men
in
and the leading " the Spartan administration promising that a Peloponnesian
petition to Athens proving ineffectual,
The
army should invade Attica, if the Athenians attempted to inforce their commands by arms, the Potidceans communicated with the Chalcidian.: and Bottiaeans, a league was formed and ratified in the usual manner by oaths, and all revolted together.
We
command
always
arbitrar}',
but as scarcely any accounts of the times have been preserved but
through Athenian
It
is
writers,
us.
The
would be open to ravage from the superiority of the Athenian and its produce not only m'ouUI be lost to them, but would
the
assist
enemy
To
as
Sect. IV.
as far as
REVOLT
be,
of
CHALCIDICE:
all
$i
might
tliat
ir
Olynthus should be
made
tlieir
people,
would
require,
them about the lake of Bolbe in Mygdonia; by the cultivation of vhich they might subsist tdl the war should be over. This proposal, severe as the sacrifice on the part of the Chalcidians must be, Ma*
acceptetl,
Athens,
when
and
the
armament
Tlmcyd.
1.
command
;
of Archestratus.
see the orders
to Potida^a,
that might appear expedient for preventing revolt in any other towns
till
tliesc
in
Macedonia.
On
he judged
there,
and he therefore
Meanwhile the Corinthians, who had dissuaded war when the com-
c.40
i^ (Jo.
mon
in the call to
interest
of their
own
state was
c
infringed.
No
;
69. 71.
&
accommodated according
inentioned
'^"
among
their cause
by
force.
Six-
among
of Peloponnesus, were sent to Potidiua, under Aristeus son of Adeimantus, who had particidar connections with that colony, and was esteemed there: and so much diligence was used in the equipment,
that
it
c.
61.
ccedings
32
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Ciiap.XIIL
army under Macedonian condeemed of
successful,
Archestratus.
federates,
its
Callias arrived.
The
were made
to that prince.
little
He was
not
confidence in any
A treaty
interest of the
and
six
marched
for
2,
62.
some present purpose, and then immediately sent two hundred horse to join the army of the Corinthians and their allies. In this
serve
army it was necessary to establish, by common consent, some system of command. By election, therefore, Aristeus, general of
confederate
A
;
but he deputed
execute the
office.
after
approach-
the duty more of a brave soldier than of an able general, broke and
line,
remaining army, and drove the survivors for refuge within the
Potidiea.
Callias,
of
the Athenian
but Aristeusy
by a hazardous
sat
64.
down before it, and being soon after reinforced with sixteen hundred men under Phormion, they blockaded it by land and sea.
Aristeus, who, notwithstanding his error in the battle, appears to
*=
^^-
have
Sect. IV.
53
and indefatigable
activity,
the best manner for sustaining the siege, found means to the harbor, unnoticed by the Athenian guardships.
out of
to
Going himself
command
be saved
for
com-
army some
to ravage Chalcidice
territory,
and he took
smaller towns.
E C T
V.
Assembly of Deputies of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at Lacedcetnon The Thirty-years Truce declared broken. Second Assembly : JFar
with Athens resolved.
to
Athens.
is
cated and lasting war, to which the affairs just related immediately
led, that
we derive our
best
knowlege of the
political
and military
are
state
arts,
of Greece, with
much
collateral information
concerning science,
most
when
com-
monwealths had a
political
importance, in the
of the world,
beyond
all
art arose
among them
in
all
unknown
in
preceding ages,
and never
view appear
narration
little
if
if
the affairs
it
since
Vol.
II.
those
34
those apparently
IIISTORV OF GREECE.
little
Chap. XIIT.
among
Among
their
those Greeks
who
by the
rising
power of Athens
their colonial
dependencies, not
common
for the
The
irritation excited
particularl}^
and
by the
and
relations in
1.
67.
intellio-ence
far
-with
Lacedsemon, to take up
*
their
'The
truce,'
they exclaimed,
At the
their subjection
make any open demonstration of a disposition complained, by secret negotiation among the Peloponnesian
and they redoubled
hostilit}'.
found
growing disposition to
Thus
complaint
The
whVh
given by Thucydides, so
much
insight
manners, and the temper of Greece at the time, that, with the risk of
some appearance of uncouthness to the modern reader, I shall venture to report the more material parts without abridgement, and with the
least deviation that
5
may
The
deputies
Sect.V.
PELOPONNESIAN congress.
it
35
appears Thucyd.
^'
].
i,
'*
There happened
some
c.
72.
other public business; and these were allowed to attend the audience,
M'ith the deputies
of the confederacy.
c,
67,
Many
that,
anil
excluded from
all
The Corin"
warmer
instigation,
and then
That
strict
faith,
c.
6s.
'
duct
in public
and
you
to disregard accu-
'
of moderation and equity, but you remain ignorant of the transactions of forcin
states.
'
'
we had already
'
and
hostilities
sumnmn
this
'
'
come forward,
injured as
we have been by
we alone
the Athe:
'
Not
states
that
are inteiJsted
all
'
Greece
tiou,
concerned; many
have,
from
Corcyra,
'
capable of furnishing
'
confederacy,
is
already
taken from us
'
is
Nor can we
injuries,
56
Thiicvd.
c. 69'.
'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
1.
'
Chap. XIII.
After the Persian
'
you permitted the Athenians to fortify their city; then to build and still you have continued to look on, tliO boasttheir long walls
war,
;
itig
have
'
'
deprived of freedom, not only their own, but our confederates. Even now the convention of this assembly has been with difficulty obtained and even now we meet apparently not for the purpose which ought
to be the object of our consideration.
'
For
is
this a
time to inquire
'
whether
we have been
injured
'
You have
facts
but
'
*
*
we know, came against Peloponnesus from the farthest parts of the earth, before you had made aay ade.quate preparation for defence and now you are
do not justify the opinion.
The
Persians,
Thus,
'
through
Let
his
own
misconduct, so
to
their errors,
main-
'
'
is
;
'
err
injure us.
are,
c.
70,
'
and
how
from you.
and scheming,
their schemes.
;
You
upon the
in
you possess
averse to projects
and
execu-
'
'
above
own
opinion of
It
is
'
yoiir
do
less
'
when acting on
free
'
from danger.
They
are quick,
you
dilatory
ing,
'
'
you more than all others attached to your home; they eager to make acquisitions in any distant parts, you fearful, in seeking more, to injure what you already possess. They push victory to the utmost, and are least of all men dejected by defeat; exposing their bodies for
their country, as if they
'
had no
'
minds
and their
one.
Sect.V.
one.
PELOPONNESIAN congress.
loss
;
37
and, defeated in
any attempt, they turn immediately to some new project by which to make themselves amends insomuch that through their celerity in
:
tinue ever, amid labors and dangers, injoying nothing, through sedulity to acquire
;
festival, in
and holding
To sum up
their character,
may be
truly said, that they were born neither to injoy quiet themselves, nor
to suffer others to injoy
'
it.
When
such a commonwealth
is
you still delay. You will consider those only as your enemies who avow hostility; thinking to preserve peace through your antiquated maxims of policy and equity, defending yourselves but offendinonone, which are no longer
maxims, by new
rience,
all.
arts,
fit for these times. It has been by other and by a policy refined through modern expe-
Let
give at length
you owe them, and relieve the distressed Potidieans. This can no longer be effectually done but by an immediate invasion of Attica; which is the measure necessarily to be taken, unless you would leave a friendly and kindred people a prey to your most determined enemies; and compel us, disposed by every considera! ion of
affection, and habit, to maintain our connection with you, through despair, to seek some new alliance. Consult then your own interest, and do not diminish that supremacy in Peloponnesus which your forefathers have transmitted to you.'
interest,
The Athenian ministers judged it consonant neither to the dignity of their commonwealth, nor to the commission under which they acted, to answer particularly to the charges thus urged by the deputies of the Pcloponnesian confederacy before the Lacedemonian people yet they
;
Tin-cyj
c.
l.
j.
72.
thought
4C3206
38
HISTORY OF GREECE.
thought
it
Chap. XIII.
silent.
They
'
aj)plied tlieiefoie to
Thiic)-d.
'
1.
1,
'
not at
all in
'
'
had any right to assume connizance of the conduct of the Athenian commonwealth or of its allies yet as they had been so publicly
;
'
'
it
c.73&:74.
'
Greece
Having then mentioned the merit of the Athein the two Persian invasions, and the sense
at the time expressed of
it,
they
75.
proceeded to observe,
*
*
That the command of the Athenian people among the Grecian states had been acquired, not by violence, but by the dereliction of the Lacedicmonians, and by the consent, and even
'
had a
fair
'
'
'
it,
'
apparent, and
now
'
c.76&i7~,
'
to palliate,
the general despotism of the Athenian people over their subject states,
c.
78.
and the particular measures of severity which had been taken against some of them. In conclusion they asserted, that tlrc truce was not
broken by them, neither had they yet to complain that the Lacedaemo-
They exhorted therefore perseverance in peaceful measures; they claimed for their commonwealth the justice to which
nians had broken
it.
it
was
iutitled
treaty,
which directed
tiis
acccssissent.
This
translation
is
justi-
to
fifcd
ol'
by
tlie
Cum
igitur
ad Lacedaemuniuruni ma"htia-
the author.
might
Sect.V.
might
'
PELOPONNESIAN congress.
;
S9
their
arise
and
tliey
name of
'
com-
monwealth, readv to
Should the
they submitted
'
and
their
and
just
command
1.
to the utmost.'
When
the
concluded,
1.
Lacedemonians
to debate
^'
'^'
Thucydides, in his
exile, as
himself
5.
c.
26.
relate,
had
l-i- c.79.
declared their opinion that the Athenians had already broken the truce,
and that war should be immediately commenced, Archidamus came forward the prince who, above thirty years before, had deserved so well
J
in the
Helot rebellion.
In advanced age
'*,
and
c.
'
I,
80.
I see those
'
as
happens to
its
among you, my equals in age, who many through inexperience, urge war as in
consequences certain.
states,
'
itself desirable, or in
Within Peloponnesus
arise,
'
indeed,
against bordering
when
hostilities
decision
*"
may
be quick;
'
other
is
may
be a subject
'
of calculation.
widely different:
'
operations are to be carried far from our frontier, against those whose
fleets
'
command
who
many
fleet
?
tributary
allies.
In our
we
;
To
our
No we
To
our riches
Far
less;
'
We
are superior,
it is
c.
'
si,
'
theu*
40
HISTORY OF GREECE.
their countrj'.
Chap. XIII.
beyond the reach
Avith the
it
;
come and go
produce,
while your
has made.
itself
enemy immediately
to terms
by
such measures,
I rather fear
you
will leave
to your posterity.
Thucvd.
c. S2."
1.
1.
'
Let
it
I advise to suffer
tamely
tlie
oppression of our
till
the
moment of
execution.
Let
us,
war;
let
alliances,
among barbarous
from
from our private properties to form a public fund equal to the probable need. But in the mean
;
them
demands
let their
have
its
best conclusion.
In
all
events hoM'ever,
till
we
is
It
diminish.
I advise,
83.
'
Nor
let
it
will
mark
any pusillanimity.
Money
therefore
must
in
first
As
and
dilatoriness,
with Mhich you have heard yourselves upbraided, they flow from
those institutions of our ancestors, which teach us, in public as in
private
life,
racter to be,
than
:
all
others, either
Hence elated by
it
is
our cha-
prosperity or
dejected by misfortune
flattery
by the reproach
;
and hence
we shall not be disposed to utter sounding words against our enemies, when we are unable to follow them up by deeds.' Let us not then wander from those maxims and institutions of
*
'iff
miMjAti
lip^
ojrTMn TUtfiiti,
Siratfii, it'vt
*vfi
ufiMT,
C,
83.
'our
Sect.V.
'
congress at LACED.EMON.
all
41
our forefathers, through which our state has long florished great and
free,
and beyond
daj',
others glorious
nor
let
portion of a
to a decision,
the lives
many
states
many
'
Other
may be under
to
necessity of
leisure.
'
'
submit the
'
appears
little
consonant
who
offer
themselves for
trial.
'
meantime
Thus,
will
be formidable to your
your honor.'
The
effect
this sensible
Tlmcyd.
^'
1.
1.
have had, was obviated by the following blunt speech of the ephor
Sthenelai'das
*
:
prebendrious
The verbose oratory of the Athenians I do not comThey have been large in their own praise, but their inju'
* *
allies,
not denied.
was
'
praiseworthy, and
now
*
'
punishment
not
it.
we
are wise,
we
shall
now overlook
wrong done
revenge
allies,
ships,
and horses
we have good
'
Nor
are
such
not
It has
'
'
'
been by words that they have been injured. We must therefore avenge them quickly, and with our utmost force; nor let any one persuade that when we are injured we ought to deliberate. Those rather
'
injury.
'
as
becomes
'
the dignity of Sparta, for war; nor isuffer the Athenians to increase
in
allies,
'
Sthenelaidas,
(42
HISTORY OF GREECE.
1.1.
Chap. XIII.
Thucyd.
each side (for in the Lacedjemonian assembly votes were given by the
voice,
and
not, as at
Thinking
therefore, as
Thucydides
more openly
his party,
would
urge every one the rather to vote for Mar, he put the question again
thus
*
:
'
Whoever
is
is
him go
side.'
whoever
'
Upon
the division a
The
was the
-wish
all
who
should
come
the
authorized and prepared to decide, both concerning peace and war, and
how
the war,
if
With
this
of their
for
war; not
much, according
by the
representations of their
as
by
their
own
ap])rehensions of the
rival state.
ing empire had been gaining consistency, during fourteen years which
had
.122.
'^^''is
its
force
no
with
which
118.
they sent a
Sect. V.
CONGRESS AT LACEDiEMON.
'
43
That,
if
they carried
oir
the
vio-or,
'
l.
i.
states
and
method
commencement of hostilities.
The
and then
having
spoke thus:
*
We no
longer, confederates,
Avho,
c.
120,
'
now
summoned
'
'
own
particular situation
:
we pay tliem, and the command impose on them the duty of constantly we
are indeed persuaded, to
'
consulting the welfare of the whole; and hence flows their present
determination.
nish any of you,
It M'cre needless,
*
'
admo-
the Athenians,
;
how
Mill
'
much
it
but we
'
observe that
reflect,
Avill
'
that, unless
states,
be deprived of the
accrue,
till
even to
'
they look on
'
must
follow.
going to decide;
the evil to
'
more
us,
in
we may expect
upon
is
It
injuries,
c.
121.
'
tious view,
we
'
Our cause of complaint is ample: but when we have redressed our be our object. Nor have we reason to doubt of
are earnest for war.
G 2
'
success.
44
success.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Our
landforce
;
Chap. XIII.
in
is
greater than
a
theirs,
and
zeal
military skill
we excel them
and surely
more unanimous
may
be expected
:
incur confederacy than in theirs. They are strong at sea but if we duly employ the means which v,e severally possess, and add the wealth which we may borrow from Delphi " and Olympia, we can
equal them even on that clement.
intice the people of their alliance
The
from
offer
is
to be
purchased
tiian
upon ourselves.
One
But
dis-
sea,
we
possess
abundant means to
them
It
is
common
within
its
On
the contrarv,
them
gether
and, what
is,
is
the question
subjects.
whether we
We
fall
freedom
while we
state,
anxiously oppose
establishment of
monarchy
any
tvrant over
all'*.
To
'
It
tlie
Lacedre-
folU.wing ones
that through
larly
c.
c. J}.)
monian
mentioned
a
would operate to the same purpose, were put under oligarchal government.
interest; or, wliicli
'* Ti'fanoj il (fte fyxa9ira>ai woAi*.
bably
consequence of the
Tliu-
under
Lacedxaionian influence,
Sect.V.
'
45
1.
To undei-'vo any
i.
X23,
'
would
it
'
become us now
powerful as
much
richer
in the
and more
midst of
'
we
'
'
abundance what they gained in penury. Let us therefore cheerfully ingage in a war which the god himself hath recommended, Mith even
a promise of his favor in
it.
'
is
'
on our
testified.
side
as
'
Nor
let
for be
it
Potidfeans,
by
an Ionian army.
'
'
may
we
may
restore
states,
which
are
now
so inju-
'
This speech concluding the debate, the question was put, and M'ar c
125.
was presently
found, so deficiently prepared yet was the confederacy, that delay was
unavoidable.
to strengthen their
Athenians the
own preparations should be advancing; own cause among the Grecian states, by making the refusers of offered peace; and to sow dissention among
commisc.
With
126.
sioned to
make
everything that had yet been in dispute between the two republics, and of no importance but what Grecian superstition might give. Complete atonement,
it
committed, near a century before, when, under the direction of the archon Megacles, the partizans of Cylon were taken from the altars to
Cleon, when speaking to the Athenian asembly, and having in view someUiing very
difierent
c.
from reproach,
r^it
b. 3. c. 63.
i^x}iv.
and
b. 3,
be
46
HISTOPwY OF GREECE.
be executed.
citizens, it
Chap. XIII.
of Athenian
which, accordthe descendants
of the sacrilegious.
down
all
common
such persons should be banished, and the pollution completely expiThis was intended
as a
ated.
Thucvd.
*^'
Pericles,
who,
1. 1.
by
his mother,
~''
with the hope that, through alarm to the popular mind, some embarrassment might be created for the administration.
Pericles was
however not
at a loss for a
measure to oppose to
this.
Two
nias,
principal families of
the execution of some Helots Avho had been dragged from the sanctuary
The
lattep
that tre-
mendous calamity the great earthquake of Sparta. required of the Lacedaemonian government to set
by removing
sacrileges.
all
It
was therefore
tlie
example of
protectors,
regard for the welfare of Greece and respect for the gods
those
its
either of those
With an answer to
Laceda.*monian ministers
returned to Sparta.
c.
159.
after,
very differently
instructed.
As
independency
against
insisted,
;
The two
rejected.
'
propositions,
ceremony
To
the third
it
was answered,
to gods
'
'
which
Sect. V.
*
DEBATES AT ATHENS.
runaway Athenian
;
47 With
answer
Avliich
'
this
and soon
men
ministers,
as
Thucydides
by name.
manded,
as the
all
states held in
An
assembly of
it
Many
spoke,
tending for peace, and particularly insisting that the offensive decree
against
to remain
an obstacle.
:
At length we
Pericles
IVly opinion,
1.
j.
'
men seldom
must
'
but that,
in disasters,
s])irits
'
even such
droop,
as
in the course
'
Beforehand therefore
claim,
me
in opinion
'
arise; or else, at
'
With regard
to the grounds of
my
'
now more
two
For notwithstanding
'
manner
in M'hich
'
and declare
that,
'
mean
what
it
only they have not desired such adjustment, but they refuse to admit
it.
'
They
are, in short,
" E7^^Ka^5^E5 Itt' Ipyaffiaj to:{ Miyafruo-i * yvi tS; lEfS; xal T?5 uofira- Megaiensibus
quod sacrum, nullisqae liniitibus finitum solum colcrent. Lund that * was sacred; land not marked out for culcrimini dantes
ture.'
Smith.
These
inferpretations are
totally unsatisfactory.
The
scholiast,
who
difficulty,
seems
'
the text
is
not of consequence.
'
allegations'
48
*
'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
allegations against us, not
us,,
Chap.XIII.
'
th;it
^gina
over
shall
be indepcn;
'
and,
now
is
'
we
shall
renounce our
command
all
Grecian
states.
'
Let
it
too
'
That comparatively
'
'
your steddiness.
'
to underas
must
treat with
you
as equals, not
command you
'
Thucyd.
c. 141.
1.
1.
'
It behoves
you
or,
state of
'
of resistance,
a
what appears
to
me
arms Mith
hold
"
'
whether concerning a
nor, at
'
matter in
of great or of
in fear
little
moment,
any
rate, to
'
For the
moment you
command,
'
'
'
decided.
If then
Me
cast our
'
'
'
must be drawn from the produce of Peloponnesus for they have no forein dependencies capable of affording considerable supnesians
plies;
'
and
'
'
enced
them
for both,
TJiey
'
cannot equip
every
nor can
tliey
'
liome.
man must
subsist
'
We
repeated more
than once in
Corinthians,
the
sfeeches
reported
by
rich,
ruined.
Sect.V.
ruined.
debates at ATHENS.
A
superfluity of wealth
alone,
49
with their persons than with their purses: they hope that those
finally escape
;
but these
may
yet unfinished.
their allies,
might be equal to
their great
common
separate
own
particular concerns,
the general
good
'
will
and no great
1.
1,
tified
within your country, M'ith which some would alarm you, nor
now above
affairs,
fifty years,
naval
Naval
science,
and the
skill
moments of
leisure
Olympic or Del-
c.
U3.
phian treasures, will even that avail them, to the degree that some
commanders possess among our own citizens, more and Greece besides: nor is it to be supposed that the seamen
cannot, with these, form naval
for a temporary increase of pay,
v/ill
of our
allies,
banish themselves
from
their country,
of final success.
'
Such then
labor, Avhile
we not only
ourselves.
are free
from
peculiar to
we waste but
while
we
VoL.TI.
'
have
50
HISTORY OF GREECE.
liave bur choice
Chap.XIIL
continents.
sea
is
ilanders,
who would
be so secure against
all
hostile attempts?
What
therefore should be
no vain attempt
made
to protect
enemy: our whole attention should be directed to the safely of the Could we gain a battle, fresh and city and the command of the sea.
perhaps greater forces would be brought against
lose one, the revolt
us.
But should we
of our
allies,
would follow
tion,
no longer
Not
lives,
the loss of
M'henever
it
may
let
happen,
is
to be deplored
for lands
and we
If therefore I thought
show
the Pelo-
is,
1.
'
have indeed many other grounds for clear hope of success, pro-
144.
vided our
injure us not
enemies.
On
for
these
topics,
admonition
they
arise.
may
:
be better reserved
the
circumstances Avhea
The answer now to be returned to Lacedsemon should be this Our ports and markets shall be open to the
*
Mcgarians, provided the Laceditmonians will abrogate their prohibitions of the residence of strangers M'ithin their territory, as far as
allies
We will
'*
in
expulsion of strangers
Meton.
Ti
J'
ActKt^atnou,
XlKr,ycn av^ta.1
xaT
irf.
v.
1114.
for strangers to
Where
it
go
thiUier,
SfiCT.V.
END OF NEGOTIATION.
51
of our alliance, which were independent M'hen the truce was " concluded, whenever the Lacediemonians will allow to the states of
states
"
" their alliance free agency in whatever concerns their several govcrn" ments, and will no longer inforce among them a constitution and A
" mode of administration, which, under the show of independency, " keep them in effectual subjection to Lacedoemon ". Finally, we arc
^'
" according to the terms of the treaty; and we will not begin war, but " we will defend ourselves to the utmost." Such an answer will be
'
just, will
'
'
The assembly
1.
That the Athenian commonwealth would obey the commands of no power upon
;
'
earth,
mode
answer the Laceda;monians returned home, and no more embassies were sent. Hitherto the people of the two states had com-
With
this
c. J
for,
and war
as
impending.
hostilities
side,
exchange of commodities.
In the difficulties
made
for
commerce by
would always have advantage over the exchanger, not a professional trader. *' We want information from Thucydidcs " 'Otcc KixiTfot rxTf iai/Lw aviiuat ^oMri what that A^kt; xari raj ^i/tfiixa?, which he o-^ia'i ToTi Actxi^ixi^oi'ioiir twiTuJiiw; afxcvoX. turn this fitic^M, T. i. To into modern so repeatedly mentions, wa to have been,
jj.li
circumlocution
ie
necessary.
we
513
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Chap. XIII.
SECTION
jlerod.
6. 2.
VI.
While
Mant of preparation
still
Tbucvf).
^^-
1.
now
moment of
blishment of their
own sovereinty
over Eoeotia
them
Athens would
little
The
it
was
less
U hucyd.
1
1.3.'
I
c. 55.
When, before the Persian war, Cleomenes king o of Sparta was with an army in the neighborhood, the Plata;aus, to obtain the protection, had
offered to put themselves
The
Greece
*
'
We,'
thy.
upon the occasion, strongly paints the state of said, live afar off, and ours would be a cold kind
'
slaves,
'
us.
We
recommend
to
'
you
therefoi-e rather to
a bordering state,
the Athenians
by embroiling
The
Platx\ans
The solemnity of
ter
occasion, ambassadors were sent to Athens, but in the habit and charac-
of suppUants.
altar,
according to the
That
their
*^
'1
he
e.Ki
ression of Herodotus
i/xe'a;
av'ac, to
give yoursches.
'
and
Sect.VL
'
attempt against
first
PLAT7EA.
to the
-55
humble
marched
to pro-
same time
new dependency of
interfering,
the commonwealth.
The Corinthians
their arbi-
however
tration.
as
tlie
Thebans were
iutitled
to
''
tlie
'
homeward
views, followed
feated; and then the Athenians took upon themselves to dictate terms:
extending the limits which had been prescribed by the Corinthians for
Hie Plataean territory, and taking the neighboring
also
little
town of Hysias
under their protection, they made the river Asopus the boundary
of the Thebaid, both against the Plateean and the Hysian lands.
Thenceforward
Plata;a,
to Thebes,
became
little
warm
in political
attachment to Athens.
tlie
The
In the
an inland
command
its
of Aristeides,
in
other circumstances,
halJi
given celebrity to
name.
at Piataea.
Athens
in
itself
was
Fiatjea persons
whom
sive,
would be
dissatisfac-
tory.
of Athens,
Thebes
J4
HISTORY" OF GREECE.
tion in their favor.
Chap. XIII.
Tliebes was the protecting power to which they looked for an altera*
TUucyd.
1. -2.
man of
who
Thebes.
it; an<l,
The official
directors of
thcTheban
Thirty-
years truce, v/hen Chrysis M'as in the forty-eighth year of her priest-
hood
P. C.43I.
OJ. 87.1. 7th Mhv,
Aim.
Tlui.
the spring sixth month r r o then becinnino:, (tlms, in the want of a readier and more perfect method, Tluicydidcs
of
Potida,*a,
Jikelv's'th
^^^^
tliree
April*'.
The
Bocotarcs
by Eurymachus.
was kept
Through confidence
no guard
now opened by
unresisted.
tlie
party
Thebans entered
Naucleides
and the Platseans about him, in the too commonly atrocious spirit of Greek sedition, would have completed the business by the immediate
'
Boeotarcs,
Reckoning themselves already masters of the place, and depending upon the ready support of a body of troops, which was to follow from Thebes, they lodged their arms in the agora; and sending
heralds aroun^l the town, with a conciliating proclamation, they invited
all
Thucyd,
C.5.
1.
2.
who were disposed to accede to the confederacy of the Boeotiaa people, to come and place their arms by theirs. The Plataeans, hastily and in great alarm assembling, were, in the moment, rejoiced to find a disposition so far friendly, among those
v/ho seemed to have them, their families,
*'
and
their
Eighty days
after,
according to Thucy-
nearly ripe.
Eighty days after the seventh of May, namely the twenty-sixth of July, wheat is
often ripo in the south of England.
pletely
Sect.VI.
attempt against
They showed
But
in the course
PLAT^.A.
55
pletcly at mercy.
the Thebans
Avere,
who had
them; and the resolution was (jitickly taken to make the attempt. That they might not be noticed in preparation, they broke ways through the partition-walls of houses, and they formed a barricade of carts and
waggons, from behind which they might make their assault. Waiting then till just before daybreak, while darkness might yet at the same
time give them the greater advantage from their intimate knowlege of
the place, and increase the alarm and uncertainty of the enemy, they
Twice
repulsed
but they
women and
slaves at the
Avith
complete.
The Thebans
thus unable to
each
in dirt,
mostly ignorant of
the Avays, Avhile their pursuers Avere acquainted Avith cveiy turn.
Plateean had shut the gate of thetOAvn by which they had entered, and which alone had been open; and for Avant of other means at hand, fastened it by thrusting the head of a javelin into the catch of the lock. Checked thus in their hope of flight, some of the Thebans mounted the
down on
]\Iany Avere
more
in a
This Avas
fire
to the building
and
burn those
in it;
were received
as prisoners at discretion
and shortly
after, all
the
rest,
who remained
their arms.
The
50
Tiiucyd.
c.
1.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
0.
Chai'.XIII.
The
found
Upon
so swelled that
was with
difficulty forded;
could reach
of those
who had
this,
was complete.
As soon
as
they determined to
and
and
could
find, that
own
But
eifects
any farther attempt was made against the persons or of the people of Platasa, but promising to restore them if the
their territory.
The agreement was presently made and ratified by oath, and the Theban array retired accordingly. Such, says Thucydides, is the Theban account but the Platfeans deny that any oaths passed, and that any promise was given
Thebans Mould immediate)}' quit
:
The
Platteans, however,
death
all
number of
The
it,
conformity to what
may
be called
principle as spies,
and
pirates,
nations in
humanity
But the
Platsaus, aware that the Thebans would feel upon the occasion, and
town was
surprized, a messenger
with the intelligence; and another as soon as the Thebans were made
prisoners.
Upon
5
receiving the
all
first nCM's,
Sfxt. VI.
ATTEMPT AGAINST
till
PLAT/EA.
made
in Plattea in
57
custody,
the Athenian
Unfortunately,
haste of the Platccans, the fatal execution liad taken place before the
messenger with
fio
tlie
operation upon
An
sent with a
would be
useless in a siege,
Vol..
II.
^8
CHAPTER
Of
the
XIV.
Peloponnesian War, from its Commencement to the Death of Pericles, with a summary View of tlie History ofTHRACE.
SECTION
I.
Invasion and State of the Athenian and Peloponnesian Confederacies. Ravage of Attica by the Peloponnesians. Operations of the Athenian
Fleet in the JVestern Seas under Cai'cinus
Gallant Action of the Spartan Brasidas : Ravage of the Peloponnesian Coast, and AcquiOperations of sition of Cephallenia to the Athenian Confederacy.
:
Measures
for
the Security of
Athens
Remarkable Decree
Extermination of
the jEginetans.
Thucyd.
'^''
1.2.
"1
HIS
which no prudence in the leading states could prevent or foresee, made accommodation more than ever impracticable and both parties At this time, prepared for hostilities with the most serious diligence.
;
Jl
c. 8.
says Thucydides,
who was
while,
among
those of
more sober
age,
many
apprehension.
Many
many
;
signs
reiilly
occurred, of a
to raise
men
in a superstitious age
Among
these,
which never,
Amid
this
while
animosity
Sect.
I.
and oppressive command, which a large portion of the Grecian people experienced, and the rest dreaded, from the soverein Many of Athens.
The two
confederacies,
now upon
very
With the Lacedaemonians all the Peloexcept the Argians, who remained neuter, and
the Pellenians only took part in the beginning Thucyd.
l.s.
of
whom
of the
M'ar.
Of
Phocians, Ambraciots,
])onnesian alliance.
and Leucadians.
than
The
Boeotians,
was proposed to
raise
its
no
five
pro-
and contributions in
as the
king of
;
but
c. 9.
" '
"
and
Sicilian
Greeks,
who
allies,
properly so called.
On
the continent of
Thucyd.
''
Greece the principal were the Thessalians and the Acarnanians; the former little ingaged by interest or inclination, but bound by a treaty
of long standing:
1.
?-
*'"
most of the Acarnanian towns, tho some were adverse, joined with more zeal in the Athenian cause. The Plateaus
are besides named,
c. g.
the republic of
the former however, except the meer garrison of their town, existing
only within the walls of Athens; and that of the latter never capable of
existence but under Athenian protection.
Of
among
the
of Athens.
Corcyra assisted
interest.
pendent
6
pendent states
ilands of
tlie
;
HISTORY OF GREECE.
and they
sea,
still
Chap. XIV.
All the other
possessed their
own
fleets.
jEgean
and Thera,
nian people
all tlie
of Asia Minor,
Athens
Tl-.ucyd.
2.
for protection,
and
liable to every
state.
Xews
Summons were
which
met the
-^
The command-in-chief was not denied to the venerable king Archidamus, notwithstanding his known disapprobation of the war, nor did he scruple, in that command, to show his steddiness in the principles
he had always professed.
ing storm,
Before he would lead his forces out of Pelo-
trial
now
Thucydides has
left
that his purpose was liberal and generous, or that his influence to guide
generosity,
way
common good
Laciedemon and
common good
that,
if
withdraw
their
army,
:
homes
the
herald w^as required to leave Athens the same day, and conducted by a
Upon
this
Archidamus proceeded on
his
all
their
troops
were assembling,
Pericles was
Sect.
I.
MEAN
O F ATH EN
S.
6i
people for what M'as to follow; obviating the clamors of faction, the
own
situation of
first-
minister of the commonwealth would now more than ever expose him.
He had
command
But
now
so
elected.
in
habits of
friendship
Possibly Archidamus, in
possibly, to excite
To
if
prevent
any of his
no longer
his
own but
He took
all
opportunity at
the same time for repeating his exhortation to the people, to disregard the waste of their possessions in Attica, and by
means
to avoid
any
navy.
This alone, he
said,
final
success,
He
proceeded
The annual
amounted now
to six
hundred
talents,
fifty
thousand pounds
sterling.
The
sities
6i
sitiesof the
HISTORY OF GREECE.
commonwealth
require, offerings public
Chap. XIV.
and
private, sacred
and a
would amount
hundred
Beside
all this,
'
and
this quantity of
to the statue
settled peace
afforded means,
might be replaced.
The
com-
monwealth
so that
offer.
;
The
the
foot-bowmen were sixteen hundred and the whole native force of the commonwealth thus amounted to near thirty-two thousand men,
exclusively of the numerous light-armed slaves always attendant upon
Grecian armies.
raised
What
allies
among
us,
the
has not
informed
The
fleet
con-
sisted of three
fifty
thousand men.
How
states,
how
far the
citizens of subject
TLucyd.
1.
I'ut
every
6,
less a
^*
worked
upon occasion,
sailor
the
by
land.
citizens, carried
''
ton weight
means
to .make interest of
it
quantity of gold to be so
employed; yet
antient
were not, in those days, ready; and to secure it against dsmocvatical extravagance,
for
among commentators,
or
-modern.
so eflectual as dedicating
in a temple.
tary
Sect.I.
tarj,
measures of ATHENS.
g
j
63
Hal.
2.
1.
1.1. C-.2.
soldier.
2.
accustomed
^' ^*'
and
its
fixino-
kind,
which the
inclosed.
walls surrounding
All their
and connecting Athens and its ports furniture they brought with them and many even
;
;
the
latter,
tho
and attending
slaves,
cipally to Euboea.
great and small, were transported to the neighboring Hands, prinThis measure however was not resolved on, even
cattle,
costly.
Their
upon conviction of the pressure of necessity, without extreme reluctance for the Attic people, continues the cotemporary writer, were, beyond all otlier Greeks, attached to their country possessions and a
;
country
life.
The ravages of
now
repaired,
with
most of the houses were newly built; some lately completed, and elegantly and expensively isocr.Areiop furnished, so that, according to Isocrates, they Avere superior to the P-i^O-t- 2.
city. The temples also in the several borough towns, destroyed in the Persian war, had been zealously restored ; and the people were warmly attached to those which they esteemed their own
houses in the
inherited religious
town which had been the town of their ancestors, before Theseus concentrated their religion, government, and jurisprudence of the country in Athens.
rites,
peculiar to that
Beside the prejudices thus to be violated and imaginary evils to be supported, the real inconveniencies, unavoidably attending the measure,
were great.
While their improvements were to be demolished, and the revenues from their estates to cease, only a few of the more opulent
could obtain houses for the habitation of their families; and but a small proportion could be received into those of their friends. The
shelter
to
were occupied, excepting those within the citadel, and the magnificent and highly venerated Eleusinium, the fane of the mysterious
all
many:
Ceres,
04
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Ceres, with one or
Chap. XIV.
Even the
two
others,
superstition
the Pelasgic, as under a curse from the deity, yielded to the pressing
necessity of the times.
Those who,
took
and hazardous
it
upon
and hence perhaps the distressed individuals from the country were not objects, as apparently they ought to have been, of the care of government, but were
discretian.
left
their
own
Many
families
formed In
were
able,
on the vacant
walls
diligence which
all
accommodated.
energy.
might have been Pleasures against the enemy showed ability and
effectual steps were taken for applying tlie force of
The most
fleet
IS.
'phe Peloponnesian
(Enoij,
and the
first
situated for the defence of the border against Bojotia, and therefore
The
if the
Com-
was
in
That worthy
now
given up
all
open a
pf
p. 19,
its
treat}',
siege had been pressed for several days, with the machines then in use,
Sect.
aiul
I.
N VA S
ON OF ATT
of. attack
A.
*,
65
in all
the
known ways
upon
fortifications
and
little
among
'26th June,
Archidamus yielded
after the
Theban
The
body of Athenian horse was defeated near llheiti; and the army, keeping mount iEgaleon on the right, passed by the way of Cecropia to Acharns, the largest and richest borough of Attica,
a
situate Avithin eight miles of Athens.
people, strong in
for
num-
Thucyd.
^' "'^'
1,2.
naturally hi^h-spirited
war as
they had never before bfen, would not have borne, without opposition,
the waste of the Eleusinian and Thriasian lands; but he depended
still
more upon the ruin now hanging over Acharna". The peo])le of that borough formed no fewer than three thousand heavy-armed foot; they
could not but have great weight
in
and
Archidamus thought
it
when the
little zeal
ravage
all
What
passed
c.21.
From
Persian war,
now remembered
had never
felt
the ravage of
The Eleusinian and Thriasian plains had been plundered about fourteen years before by the army under Pleistoanax; and so much was supported now as matter to be expected. But when the Peloponnesian army incamped within sight of Athens, and the rich
an enemy.
was
in uproar.
for
marching out
to defend
Vol.
II.
their
m
their property
;
.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
others as
;
Chap. XIV.
warmly opposed a measure which would so indanger the commonwealth but on all sides there was an outcry against Pericles; who, whether as advising the war, or refusing the
means of ingaging the enemy, was reproached
of the present
evils.
as the principal
author
Tliucyd. 1.2.
Amid
all
Leaving
among
individuals, he
;
would
convene no assembly
his
own
first
much
as possible
to what, in any
moment
of sober reflection,
all
would admit
to be of
the
order.
parties of cavalry to
cut off stragglers and prevent the extension of ravage to any distance
raised,
and an
interest
was
diverted, popular
comIn an
action with the Boeotian horse, the Athenian and Thessalian had the
advantage,
till
up, compelled
their
them
arms
to retreat.
as,
They
so far
was not
a trophy on the
. 53.
fail in
Ravaging the lands between the mountains Parnes and Brilessus, they proceeded by Oropus, whose territory they also ravaged, into Boeotia, and having thus traversed
Attica fixjm west to east, they returned into Peloponnesus, and dispersed to their several homes.
first
summer of the
under Carcinus,
retaliate devastation
upon
Peloponnesus.
Sect.I.
gallant action of
Fifty galleys from
IJRASIDAS.
Thucyd.
*^"^^"
67
Peloponnesus.
Corey ra, and a few from some of A descent was made first ou the other allies, joined this armamen^. the Messenian coast, and the troojjs marched toward Metlione a town
;
1.
a.
then
ill
fortified,
and without a
garrison.
As
it
was
same time
to prevent valuables
from
But
Brasidas,
who commanded
established
among
he brought
officers as
By
this bold
and successful
effort,
Sparta,
as
commands which might require activity and daring exertion. The Feloponnesians early found that a navy was not to be created so rapidly as some of their warmer politicians had promised them. A
wide extent of coast remained, and was likely to remain, open to the
attacks of the Athenian
fleet.
The
tlie
To keep Pheia
Athenian commanders, the Eleians were no sooner collected in force sufficient to oppose them, than they reimbarked their troops, and proceeding northward along the coast,
continued their depredations
least danger.
They took c
do.
and gave
it
in Acarnania,
'
and, expelling
is
'Ai9fwu 8x liiUvt,
in
first
LacedKmo-
Thucydides
sidus
speaking of !Methone.
tliat
Bra-
TuTi
it
T x^f'f-
'^'^
meaning
and consequently uo soldiers; the inhabitants being all unarmed Messenians and Helots.
nians in the place,
supreme
55
HISTORY OF GREECE.
which was
at that time divided
CuAr.XIV.
supreme power to the popular assembly, and the city became a member of the Athenian confederacy. They proceeded then to Cephailenia,
between no
less
The
particularity with
dides describes
its
situation
generally
known among
hostility, the
2.
While the war was thus carried into the western seas of Greece, a squadron of thirty galleys, under Clcopompus, sailed eastward and
northward, to protect Euboea, and to annoy the hostile states
in its
Some of
town of Thronium,
hostilities,
payment of a
field
to relieve
32.
To
coast of Locris, was fortified, and a small naval force was stationed
there.
of the Peloponnesian
on
coast.
Thucydides wrote and Pericles spoke, and while Pericles held the
^
eipal influence in
not to be touclied
city
implied
tiie
Athenian
it
was
commonwealth.
But
Sect.
I.
6y
But
only by the present will of that giddy tyrant the multitude of Athens,
whose caprices since the depression of the court of Areiopagus, no balancing power remained, the denunciation of capital punishment was added against whosoever should propose, and whosoever should
against
concur
in,
any decree for the disposal of that money to any other pur any other circumstances.
autliority, that a
tleet,
pose, or in
It
was
at the
by the same
to he
Another measure, of no small actual severity, was thought justifiable by public expediency, and by the right and the duty of obviating
public danger.
It
1.2.
in
Athenian garrison, that iland which had been emphatically termed the
Eyesore of Peiranis.
It
The iEginetans
A
A
garrison
was thus maintained without public expence, and the government was relieved of some portion of the care incumbent on it, to provide for
those citizens
tion
distribu- Plut.vit.
^^^^^'
No
made
exterminated iEgi-
obnoxious people, a Grecian people, reduced to slavery by a Grecian people, that it might perhaps be thought an act of clemency to allow
them
to
migrate.
The
I.aceda:monians
tlie
Thucyd. u:
'"^'
Thyreatis, a small territory on the confines of Laconia and Argolis, a situation probably inconvenient enough, from the constant enmity of
Argos to Lacedajmon.
establishments
dides mentions,
among their friends in other parts of Greece. Thucyamong the events of this summer, a nearly total
eclipse
70
Aug.
i\un.
3.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
eclipse of the sun, beginning-
Chap. XIV.
Thu.
chronology.
Toward
the close of
under the command of Pericles, to retaliate the vengeance and reap the profit of ravage, where it could be done most readily, and now with
complete security,
in the
Carcinus, just returned from the western sea, v/as lying at iEgiua.
its
to
citizens,
the
When
and Athens.
SECTION
Summary View of
Athens with
donia.
II.
Jlliance negotiated by
Sitalces
and Cephallenia.
Such were
first
summer of
;
the war.
kmg
this,
Thrace was
desirable.
Sect.
II.
THRACE.
But
instead of advancing with the Greeks in
71
know-
the oldest Grecian traditions, beamed upon their country before they
who overwhelmed
leading
the
iniiabitants
of
the
coast,
becoming
Herodotus,
principles
made
To
and
live
by war and
glory
;
rapine,'
is
1.3.
'
their
and
'
agriculture.'
was
its
found
anticntl}'
among
;
our ancestors the Britons, in the extreme of the old world, and lately
among
who,
must have remained ever equally unknown to the people of the old Between mount Htemus world, and of what has been called the new. supposed lived the Getes, by some and the Danube the founders of the
Gothic name
;
1.2.
resembling
in
*^
'
who wandered
to an
unknown
Danube and
the Euxine.
Under the
been brought
The
retreat of tlie
its
people, an
empire such
led to
it
or
what policy
we
29,
are uninformed
of
all
the Thracians, from the TEgean sea to the Danube, and from the
to the
Euxine
Strymon
all
Greece.
the
plains, in
themselves in independency.
coast, all
it
commerce, found
have safety
contributinji
and towns.
So
far then
7C
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Chap. XIV.
buting to the strength and splendor of the monarchy, they were not
objects of jealousy and oppression, but rather of protection and incou-
richest metals,
and
On
to
the sister of
citizen of the
of Alliens.
An
government
for
with
the Thracian
king.
:
Through Nj'mphodorus an alliance was formed with Sitalces and such was the ascendancy which the little republics of Greece had
acquired
'''
among
admission to the
name and
The
brother-in-
Perdiccas joined
the
Thracian prince
in
the
Athenian
Winter setting
in,
custom
offered,
for
of triumph.
service
Thucyd.
1.
The
funeral of those
;
who had
and
the manner of
remains
2.
particularly
described by Thucydides.
collected
mony
bodies
Ci
previously
burnt, according to
recks,
were artlie
ranged under
an ample awning.
they lay in
While
thus,
according to
modern
visit
phrase,
state, it
was usual
living.
The day of
on
Sect.
II.
B L
N'
E R A
anil
7i
on
carriages,
an eleventh carriage
to the Tbucyd.
c.
bore an empty
not be recovered.
public
made
in
solemn march
1.2*-
tomb
34.
in the
6c
Not. ed.
^'^^^
1.3.
From
tomb in the Cerameicus had been the recepwho had been honored with a public funeral, excepting
fallen at
who had
Marathon
merit,
of
battle,
Some
by the people
therefore the
On
the
public
choice to Pericles.
When
the croud to a lofty stand raised for the occasion, so that he might be
least
Thucydides,
1.
1-
c.s:.
'^'
who was
manner
it is
from
his
in
own
professions to be pre-
46.'
which
it
was spoken.
a finished model of the simple and severe sublime in oratory, which has been the admiration of all succeeding ages; but which must sink in
any
translation,
denies abridgement,
and
defies
either
imitation or
paraphrase, perhaps
to writing.
for all parts of Greece, as for Athens, a season Evarchus, the expelled tyrant of Astacus in Acarnania, applied to Corinth for assistance to restore him to his little dominion.
1-
2-
c,S3.
of repose.
The
in
short days
rockiness of their coast, the frequency of sudden squalls, and the of a guide in cloudy weather, rendering it far more dangerous
want
than
is
at hand,
vessel,
under guidance
of
Vol.
II.
74
HISTORY or GREECE.
of the compass, distance from land
is
Chap. XIV,.
zeal of
safely.
sl)ips
The
Corinth
to be deterred.
Forty
moving homeward, debarked in Cephallenia, on tlie Crantpan lands. The Cranfeans, amusing- them witli the pretence of a disposition to capitulate, attacked them unawares, and forced them to reimbark with loss upon which, witliout attempting anything further, they returnedi
;
to Corinth.
SECTION
Second Invasion of Attica
bi/
III.
Operations of the Athenian Fleet on the Peloponnesian Coast under Pericles ; and on the Macedonian Coast under Agnon. Effecis of
Persia.
Barbarity of the Grecian System of JJ^ar. An Athenian Squadron stationed in the iVestern Sea. Surrender of Potidcea to
the Athenians.
Death of Pericles.
first
The
*
events of the
and of Archidamus,
in the counsels
commencement of
prepared to wage
hostilities.
offensive
consumed, carried off, or destroyed. Cut Athens could support that and the Athenian fleets had meanwhile, with less expence and loss
;
profit,
its confederate and gathering spoil in At the same time negotiations had been concluded which prostates. mised great access of strength to Athens for the campains to insue;
In
Sect.
III.
75
and toward
beginning ofsunnner,
still
under
tlie
commaml
now
But a natural
points nearly
calami fy, far more terrible than the swords of their enemies,
attacked the Athenians;
a pestilential fever,
in
many
resembling that scourge which, under the name of the plague, has been,
in
modern
yet,
circumstances.
plague,
it
in Ethiopia;
into Egypt,
Persian
empire.
Among
the Greeks
it
was
first
observed in some
ilands,
particularly
among the Athenians was in Peirseus; and they were so little aware how it came, or what it was, that a fancy arose, and gained some credit among them, that the wells had been poisoned by the Peloponnesians. Quickly it made its way into the
Lemnos.
Its first
appearance
upper town,
rapidly.
as
called,
What was
will
describe
its effects,
which
can undertake to do exactly; having both experienced them in own person, and seen numbers of others under the same afiliction.
my
till
The
year,
it is
Thuoyd.
^" ^^'
1.
2.
to.
lost its
symptoms
in the
redness and inflammation of the eyes; then quickly the tongue and
throat assumed a bloody appearance, the breath
became
;
fetid, frecpient
cough came
on.
affected; evacuations in
all
meanwhile, not externally hot to the touch, appeared reddish and livid, and broke out in pustules and ulcers. But the internal fever was such
r,
that
76
that
tlic
HISTORY OF GREECE.
the affection of the
relief,
Chap.XIV.
;
and what
sort,
moment gave
to imagine as the
most agreeable
ill,
Many
of the poorer
attended, ran t& the wells, and there indulged, to extreme, the
diate calls of iminoderate thirst.
;
imme-
Through the whole of the disorder to sleep was impossible yet considering the violence of the symptoms^ the sufferers were less weakened than might have been expected. The
fever was mostly spent by the seventh,
or, at farthest,
and
if
not without
and the
consequence^,
destroyed numbers.
For
tlie
disease,
finally fixed
all
so thatthet^
who had
supported
the vehemence of
loss
attack upon
tlieir
of
hands, their
Some were
totally deprived of
memory
Thncyd.
*'
1.
on
knowing
even
2.
themselves.
singular virulence
of
the
disorder
touch
Of
birds of
prey indeed there was a very remarkable scarcity, almost a dereliction of the
in dogs.
<.
iio
For
A'ain,
and
attempted remedies
to reUeve
tain
what seemed
injurious to
others.
Nor
the patient lost the ability even to struggle for life; and this
fatal
thpse
whom
they served,
or to
whom
their
Many
Sect.III.
pestilence AT ATHENS.
:
77
little
Many
dreadful calamity
disease
or, at least,
not perfectly
secured,
by once
of the infectious matter, yet incapable of receiving twice the of the disorder.
lence,
force
infected,
tlie
diseased, as to appear in
any danger of
upon those
yd
in health,
thus alarm
first
The
mortality was however tremendous; and the misery was greatly Timcyd.
in the city,
1.
s,
52
The want of sewers, a convenience unknown in Grecian towns, and of which the Romans appear to have given the first example,
would
also be severely felt
Strab. 1.5.
^*
upon
this occasion*.
It
fully occupied,
but very
many
:
families
of the poorer people were crouded together in stifling huts, where they
To bury
all
corpses were
and there
them
to seek relief.
What would before have been esteemed a now familiar; the temples of the gods,
filled
with
dead bodies.
rites
were not
less
marshy which accumulated, in the hollow between the Palatine hill and the C'apitoline, seems to have given occasion to that wonderful strucsoil, as
The
among
filtii
when Shaw
Roman
does
maxima
173S.
kind.
Sewers are
became
78
HISTORYOFGREEC:^^.
became common.
Chat-.
XIV,
When
pile,
those
the bodies
others
less
and immedipile
to
it.
With
of course, where a
it
was
a corpse,
and go
their M'ay,
effects
The moral
notice.
judicious eye-Avitness to
whom we owe
this
whole
detail,
deserve our
good and
deeds in this
and
to make both hope and fear converge to the great Author of nature, the all-powerful, all-wise, and all-just God, who can recompense the sufferings of the good with endless blessings,
any short-lived joys that can arise from the perpetration of evil. But in Athens, where the deity was looked to very generally and very anxiously for the dispensation of temporal good and evil only, it was
otherwise'.
for
it
The
or
availed nothing.
exposing
suffer.
An
before
unknown, licentiousness of manners followed. let us, if possible, drown thought in pleasure
die,
we
No
crime,
therefore, that could give the means of any injoyment was scrupled;
for such were the ravages of the disease, that for perpetrator, accuser,
and judges,
all
chance.
The
final
by Socrates and
persecuted for
it
his disciples,
aud he was
as
an
atheist.
innocent,
gECT.Iir.
7D
hmocent, by the
human
tion,
How
most
;
to injoy lite
this relaxa-
-while life
and
is
almost to a dissolution of
moral principle,
lamented by
Thucydides
of Athens.
the ravage of Attica Thucyd.
I.2
'
The Peloponnesian army had already begun when the pestilence was fiut publicly observed.
:vale
They wasted
toward the
all
the
'
fruitful
hills,
silver-
The
firm
mind of
Pericles
meanwhile Mas
pestilence,
and, above
all,
from the
avoiding any decisive action with the landforce of the enemy, he prosecuted offensive operations by
sea, as if
affliction
mind from
s6,
He
took the
command
0.
triremes, with an
It appears
was
new
the Persians had, sixty years before, sent a large force of horse across the JEgean, under Datis
and Artapherncs.
horse-transports.
converted under the diiection of Pericles. The first descent was made *n the Epidaurian teiiitory, the greater part of which ^as ravaged. The operations of waste and plunder were then continued along the coast, through the Trcezenian, Ilalian, and Uerniionian land.s. The
troops being then reimbarked, the
.jecond descent was
fleet
made
town of Prasis,
wliich
was taken.
80,
HISTORY OF GREECE.
country,
as
far as
Chap. XIV,
armament
circumstances
permitted,
the whole
They found
of an enemy.
of
its
fatal
Athens,
blazing of funeral
tlie
Tli.ucyd.
1.
piles,
had hastened
homeward, about
fortieth
day from
?.
'Yhe Athenian
armament soon
sailed
again under
Agnon son of
to press
blockaded by Phormion.
an
unfortunate
This was
measure.
apparentl}'
an ill-judged,
and
The
fresh troops,
down themselves
in
great numbers,
but communicated the infection to Phormion's army, which had before been healthy. After losing, within forty days, no fewer than fifteen
Ibid, et
\.
3. c. 17.
hundred of his four thousand foot, Agnon sailed with the remainder to Phormion, with about three thousand, continued the blockade Attica.
of
Potidffia.
1.2. c. 59.
Accumulated evils, public and private, at length Irritated tej'ond Popular discontent will sufferance the minds of the Athenian people.
find an object
on which to vent
itself,
Pericles.
nians and their allies became arrogant, and the negotiation failed.
The
it
shame
added to former
In his capacity of
if
first
we may
he had a right to
summon
he thought proper.
stand.
states,
1.2. c.6o.
He began
The people met, and he mounted the speaker^s urging a maxim applicable to all
'
the
little
Grecian republics,
interest
Sect.III.
*
oration OF PERICLES.
;
si
for the
decay of Thucyd,
:
1.
2-
*
*
private affluence
but
*^'
^'
while the country flourishes, opportunity will be open for the recovery
of private fortune.'
He
proceeded then to
assert, M'ith
manly con-
fidence, his
own claim
reproach the people with that want of firmness, which disposed them
to impute, as a crime to him, a public misfortune, impossible equally to
for that
in full possession
No
c.
61, 62,
possessed such a
navy
as theirs,
and,
now have
all
What
then were
and
fields,
the
momentary
?
To
or, at
Their
fleet,
c.
63.
not only to their prosperity, but to their safety against the revenge
which that invidious empire, that tyranny which they had long
extensively held, could not
gods,' continued Pericles,
our enemies,
forefathers.
What we suffer from the we should bear with patience; what from with manly firmness; and such were the maxims of our From unshaken fortitude in misfortune hath arisen the
fail
to excite ^
'
c.6i.
all
still
sent to Lacedasmon,
nor
let it
fi?
Ttjam'J* ya^
'X''''^
Thucyd.1.2.
c.
63.
'
Vol. IL
under
BZ
'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
under your misfortunes
will
;
Chap.XIV.
'
Thucyd.
1.
2.
it.
So
he prevailed, that
from Sparta.
But
the acri-
mony
excited
among
be immediately appeased
Avhile the rich
many of
favorite residences,
was, that
far
war
from
home, but
all
The ferment did not subside till Pericles was deposed from his military command, and mulcted in a heavy fine^ At the same time with tliis public disgrace, Pericles was suffering
under the severest domestic misfortunes.
in this year,
some
some
in the former,
of
warm
The same
cruel disorder
whose assistance
affairs.
During
more
distracting b}^ the public calamity, and the pressure of that popular
around him.
his leisure,
Tliucydides,
in
mentioning the
fine,
name the sum. According to Diodorus, it we may trust our copies, it was
does not
made
thousand
no
c.
less
fifty talents, about twelve hundred pounds; whereas some asserted it to have been no more than
it
exceed
live
thousand pounds
45.)
(Diod. 1.12.
that
fiiteen, less
But
Plutarch says,
among
ling.
and
Sect. III.
of PERICLES.
and o-ood
it
server of nature.
No
complaint
to feel
to custom, in
the funeral ceremony, he approached the bier to put the chaplet on the
head of the deceased youth, the sight overcame him, and he bufst into
a flood of tears*.
piut.vit.
P^^^cl.
In this accumulation of
distress, to retire
from public
moment, a
relief
But the people had no sooner vented their anger than the}- repented
of what they had done
affairs,
:
man was
equal to
integrity,
an}-, in
eminent
in tried
in all
None
with
all
the multitude.
to
mount
the
With loud and anxious voices Pericles M'as called for bema, as the stand whence orations delivered to the people
his opinion
was
called,
and declare
of public
afl^airs,
'
what measures, in
his judgement,
taken.
He
summons
and quickly
if
of that power, which absolute possession of the favor of the people gave
empire'.
pestilence,
Thucyd.
^'
*'
"
1,
2.
spirit, Avas in
naval expedition.
*
A hundred
triremes, Avith a
thousand heavy-armed
(Xen. Mem.Socr.
1.
According to Plutarch, Pericles lost all by the pestilence, one of his own name, who survived him, being illeBut Xenophon mentions Pericles gitimate.
his legitimate sons
3.
and
it
his father.
irre-
not as illegitimate.
tTTtTfti^oo,Thucyd. 1.2. C. 65.
ki
isrutrei
t Wfiyftara
Lacedaemonians,
84
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Laceclffimonians, sailed to
Chap. XIV.
an Achaian colony, but of the The troops debarked, and ravagetl great part
Zacyntlms
fortified
places
all
either deterred or
by
be induced to treat,
Thucyd.
Herod.
c,
1.
J.
line.
1.
7.
^^'-
more important advantages were expected. An embassy was appointed to go to the Persian court, with a view to negotiate an It consisted alliance, and particularly, to obtain pecuniary assistance. Ancristus, Nicolaiis and Pratodemus, Avith of three Lacedaemonians,
the Corinthian Aristeus, Timagoras of Tegea, and Polls, an Argian,
his
own commonwealth;
a circumstance
AVhich indicates that he was of the party in opposition to the ruling party
their
all
commanded
the Hellespont
by the way of
first
Phoenicia, were
many, to
It
their
Athens did not bind him to be the enemy of Lacedtemon. On the contrary, hopes were entertained of detaching him from the Athenian
interest
his
;
and his protection was depended upon for the journey through
side of the
Hellespont,
to Susa,
The ambassadors accordingly fonnd a courteous reception from the Thracian prince, tho two Athenian ministers, Leiirchus and Ameiniades, were with him. Their endevors however to withdraw him from the
Athenian alliance not succeeding, they proceeded on their journey.
The Athenian
their views
;
to send a party,
under
who were
\s
of the people,
ithout a
trial,
consigned them
all
fellowcountry-
men
Sect.III.
surrender OF POTID^A.
instigating- this
85
men
as,
in part at least,
abilities
enterprizing
of the
conspicuous
in operations against
them
in Chalcidice
and Macedonia.
it
;
The law of
retaliation
illiberal
in justification of
and
and cruel
spirit
of war
among
Tln-.cyd.
*^"
1.
2.
even
''
in
consequence of
command
to
in Chalcidice,
was
sent,
ships,
block the
Corinthian gulph.
yet their priva-
fleet at sea,
ing the Athenian trade with Asia minor, and with the eastern parts of
the Mediterranean.
both to prevent such depredations, and to collect the tributes due from
the dependent states in those parts.
little
was overpowered
far
in
advanced when the Potida;ans, so pressed by famine that they had begun to eat oneanother, and hopeless of succour,
desired to capitulate.
70.
generals
Xenophon son of Euripides, who with two other now commanded the besieging army, taking into consideration
must
suffer in winter operations,
the commonwealth had already incurred by the siege, which was not less than two thousand talents, about five hundred thousand pounds
sterling,
Mas induced to
treat.
The
men each
women
with
two; and both with a small specified sum of mone}-, which mio-ht inable them to travel to such retreats as they could find in Chalcidice,
'
To
1.
2. c,
69,
or
S6
HISTORY OF GREECE.
or elsewhere in the neighboring coiuitry.
(lid
Chap. XIV.
his collegues
Xeiiophon and
not escape censure from their sovereiii the Athenian people, for
first
granting, without
who were
was found
Thus however
their
the Athenians,
unable,
to defend
own
amid
affliction
and resisting
immediate
rise to
the war.
know
it
he
fell
a victim to that
off so
many
He
survived however
the violence of the fever, and died, in full possession of his senses, of
a lingering ilness
which
it
No man
as Pericles.
ablest writers of
renown
The
pliilo-
rest his
fame upon
It
is
essentially great
brilliant actions.
forces,
Saxe's moirs.
yet,
Me-
battle,
what to
conception
battle.
practice.
maxim Mas
It
is
of his soldiers;
bloodshed.
said to
have been
his consolation
and
tliat a felloM'-
citizen
Sect.
III.
11
AR A CTE R O F PE R
in
C LES.
suljject
f?
citizen
of of
in the struggles
contests in
have made
soldiers
commonwealth
for
when
his
fell,
tliey fell
Had
brilliant,
from the mouth of Socrates, and the report of Plato, the praise of supereminence in whatever was wise, great, and becoming ".
This splendid character however perhaps
may seem
to receive
some
at
'
which
is
imputed
to
him
in
and
But
it
will also
deserve
state of the
Athenian
'
constitution in his
'
own
time,
less
Pericles
perfect than
still
tolerably
profit,
good
own
it
*
*
but leaving
father,
from
his
'
,
two millions
revenue,
'ri
over and above the proceeds of the sacred r ^1 Ihis concurrence of three such men, in successive ao-es
sterling)
'^'^''-
^^
Pace. p. 25i.
(of whom,
Thucydides,
probably had
<ro<poy
personal
t.
acquaintance)
all
at^fcc,
iion. p. <)4.
2.
mouth
the Greek,
expressing
Plat.
Mc-
friendly
HISTORY OF GREECE.
friendly to the aristocratical interest, and
all
Chap. XIV.
may
conduct was,
;
sity
a necessity produced
at
him
damus.
By no
political
the liberty of every other Grecian state, yet the independency of Athens, as the event showed, was indispensable for the liberty of Greece.
On
may seem
Pericles,
to
have
formed
liave
judgement of the
his
political
conduct of
and to
reckoned that on
his influence,
had
89
CHAPTER
or
the
XV.
the
Death of Pericles,
in the third
VJEMoa
SECTION
N
I.
g q
^og^
Ol. 87 j.
1.
2.
far
from
^'^^
the enemy,
it
not be provoked to risk a battle, and the great purpose of the war was
little
Of the
continental dependencies
of Athens none was so open to their attacks, none so completely excluded from naval protection, none so likely by
induce that war of the
that
field
its
danger to superAgainst
;
as Plattca.
town
therefore
it
was determined
at
Athens,
public
restrained,
merit of their
commonwealth
it,
in
solemnly granted to
c.72.
Vol.
II.
neutrality.
90
Thucyd.
1,2,
HISTORY OF GREECE.
neutralit}'.
Chap. XV.
selves,
they should willingly accept his offer; but without the consent
of the x^thenians, in whose power their wives and children were, they
could decide nothing.
Besides,
Athens, they could never be secure against the superior power of the
army remained
fears,
in the
neighborhood.
this
To
all
objection,
'
Archidamus made
deliver
remarkable proposal:
If such are
your
your
your
cit}',
your immoveable
'
Show
us the boundaries of
'
number your
find the will
fruit-trees,
whatever
Go
then yourselves
'
'
and we
will
most convenient residence while the war provide that your lands shall be duly cultiover, everything shall be restored.'
it
'
vated;
we
The
to the
Platffian
government could be
obtained.
sition that the Platseans should abide by the terms of their confederacy
The
they
7i.
Platceans in
alliance;
and, without
the
it
Peloponnesian camp,
'That
comply with the demands of the Lacedaemonians.' Archidamus then Ye gods and made this solemn address to the deities of the country
: '
'
heroes,
tfeans
who
till
the Pla-
'
'
the Greeks,
after
it
we
'
We have
made
liberal offers,
which have
been rejected.
Sect.
*
SIEGE OF PLATtEA.
faith deserves,
91
and that we
may
obtain the
'
intitles.'
I.
2.
small,
'
may
be judged from the very small force which sufliced for an effec;
tual garrison
78.
women
to prepare
slave.
The
first
tlie
town with
spot,
which
c.
75.
Then, in a chosen
was to
fill
which a force
also the
might ascend.
For
this operation
woods of Cithajron
Either extremity
of the
was
filled
Seventy days were employed unintermittingly on this work; being established through the army, and Lacedtemonian
superintending
;
officers
always
of Xenage.
Such was
his age.
Thucydides
was
The
numbers.
To
oppose this
mode of attack,
the
first
raise,
on that
mound
M'as
forming, a strong
this,
The
it
firm to a considerable
and Avorkmen
But
this
mound
still
on the wall
rose,
and
superstructure
while
92
wliile the
HISTORY OF GREECE.
mound was
liable to
Chap. XV.
it
no counterbalancing defect,
was neces-
Accordingly they
wall,
J.
i^
^nd brought
in the earth.
The
'^*
mound
with clay or
mud
inclosed
and
it
Within
at the extremities.
;
bevond the
mound
enemy
possess themselves
less
favor-
Machines
According
says
it
known among
first
the Greeks.
us,
Pencl.
Plutarch informs
the-
he
they were
used by Pericles at
Artemon
liad
carried
among
his
works
in a litter
',
of
much
left
have
Thucyd. ut
*"^'
engine
among
happened Mithin
it
;
his
own memory.
itself
The
was
it
adapted to
its
upon the Peloponnesian monnd, battered the superstructure on the Platsan rampart, and shook it
afterward became.
ram, advanced
violently
effect.
;
but to yet
less
purpose.
The
Platseans,
letting
tion
;
down
some out of
their direc-
<I>OCIW.
Sect.
I.
SIEGE OF PLAT.EA.
No
means however were neglected by the besiegers that
yet, after
03
with chains.
promote
their purpose
efl'ort
much
of the
fouml every
vigilance, activity,
little
began
more
Preparing a very
around
the place, wherever ground or any other circumstance gave most advantage.
on-fire.
On
the faggots they put sulphur and pitch, and then set
all
The
Thucydides, to have been prepared and made by the hands of men, tho, in mountain-forests, the friction of dry wood, by the agitation of
the wind,
favored,
it
greater.
Had
the wind
:
must have had all the effect that the besiegers desired great part of the town actually became unapproachable. But fortunately for the garrison, a heavy rain, brough/t on by a thunder-storm without wind, extinguished the fire, and relieved them from an attack far more
formidable than any they had before experienced.
This attempt
failing,
1.
^.
which, tho slow and consequently ^'j\ expensive, would in the end be sure. To the palisade, which already
Mith a double
sufificient
one
after the
middle of
Sept. 13.
September, the rest of the army was dismissed for the winter.
^1
HISTORY OF GREECE.
S
Chap. XV.
ECT
ON
ir.
fail's of the JVestern Parts of Greece : Assistance sent by Peloponnesus to the Ambraciots against the Amphilochian Argians and
Acarnanians: Battle near Stratus: Sea-fght bctzceen the Peloponnesian Fleet under the Corinthian Machon, and the Athenian Fleet
and
the
Athenian
Fleet
under Phormion.
While
rations
P \v^3*
Thucyd.
1.
town of
Xenophon son of
Euripides,
Potidsea,
was sent again into Chalcidice, with a body of two thousand and two hundred horse.
^
heavy
of the
foot,
A little
Bottijea,
and
Greeks among
than arms.
Through such
battle insuing,
the superiority of
enemy
officers
his col;
and above four hundred of their heavy-armed, were killed and the remainder, who found an immediate refuge in Potidasa, too weak to
prosecute offensive operations, returned to Athens.
c. 63.
Through this extensive war, upon which the Athenians fixed the name of the Peloponnesian, we become in some degree acquainted with the history of some parts of Greece, which would otherwise have remained totally unknoM'n. The Amphilochian Argos, a city on the
4
border
Sect.II.
operations IN ACARNANTA.
Ampbilochus himself fought
the
95
border of Acarnania against Epirus, was founded, according to Thucydides, by Ampbilochus, son of tbat Amphiaraiis wbo is celebrated
aniono- tbe heroes of the war of Thebes.
at Troy.
little
On
satisfied
with the
state
of things under
usurpation of
he departed with such as chose to follow bis fortune, and settled his colony at tbe bottom of that gulph antiently called the Ampbilocbian, but afterward the Ambracian. To the town which be
jEo-istbeus,
he gave the name of that from which he had migrated; and the same partiality fixed upon the river, near whose mouth it stood, the name of tbe Peloponnesian stream of Inacbus. The epithet Ampbilobuilt there
cbian was added to tbe town for tbe convenience of distinction. Situate among barbarians,at the extremity of Greece, the city of Ampbilochus
florished;
clans, to
whom
its
the Ampbilocbian
itself as
an
independent commonwealth; and to obviate other evils, its people recurred to a dangerous expedient for weak states, that of associating a
number of
bracia.
families
Am-
Disputes arose between the two people, and in the end the
These applied
who, a
little
Phormion with
officer,
Through
taken by assault.
The
city
and
with
whom some
not unusual with the most polished of the Greeks, tbe Ambracian inhabitants
slavery.
alliance of both
when
In
96
In
llie
HISTORY OF GREECE.
at Athens, the Ambraciots, incensed
Chap. XV.
ment of
neighborhood, they overran the territory of Argos, but, after some vain
Thucyd.
c. 80.
1.:.
home.
the siege of Platsea, they proposed not only to take Argos, but to con-
quer
all
Acarnania.
that,
if
With
this
promising
they might
and
military',
as they desired,
the Acarnanians, but they would bring over the neighboring ilands of
to the
Thus the Athenians would be deprived of what principally inabled them to carry expeditions around PeloponThe project was alluring nesus, and keep a fleet in the western seas. the Corinthians instantly and zealously ingaged in it; incited by their
hoped
also to take
Naupactus.
the
desire
of
any success
in the
The Athenian
and
preparations,
his
most proper
as
for the
command
seen, with
in
there, recalled
naval
and the Spartan admiral Cnemus had the good fortune to join them from Cyllenc, with a small squadron and a thousand heavy-armed Pelo])ounesian infantry, undiscovered in his passage by
assembled at Leucas
the Athenians.
naval force,
The Corinthians and Sicyonians were preparing their but could not so readily escape out of their own gulph.
for Stratus, the largest
it
Cnemus
rations,
by marching directly
town of Acarnania,
so
in the
Sect.
ir.
OPERATIONS IN ACARNANIA.
it
97
conquest.
The Acarnanians, meanwhile, informed that beside the formidable army already in their country, a fleet was expected, which might chiise
its
1.2.
points of attack
upon
their coast,
respective towns, and attempt the protection of their fields only so far
v'ith their strength,
and opportunities
offering,
might be prudent.
The
whom
them
fleet,
The
allied
army
therefore
marched
territory, into
Acarnania,
was disposed
left,
in three
forming the
right,
and the barbarian Epirots the center. The Greeks kept their columns
regularly formed,
and chose
their
camps carefully
But the
among
and pressed
first assault,
town would
own.
b}'
yield to their
all
their
they planted an
forces from the
The
town
a great
number were
and the
rest
were pursued
till
The
would neither make any attempt upon these, nor risk any ingagement against the superior discipline of the Peloponnesians; but they gave unceasing annoyance from a distance with their slings;
Stratians
close
in the use of
Information of the important success obtained by the Stratians, was rapidly forwarded through all the Acarnauian towns, accompanied with
exhortation to assemble the force of the country, and drive out a half-
conquered enemy,
his
measures so broken
Vol.
II.
by
58
HISTORY OF GREECE.
by the
the river Anapus, ten miles from Stratus.
des're a truce for the burial of the slain
;
Chap. XV.
Thence he sent
a herald to
allies,
Acarnania thus
alarming an
invasion.
Thucyd.
1.
2.
Durina," these
transactions
by
fleet,
consisting of
and Agatharchidas,
It
was the
pvu'pose of
them pass
skill,
the
straits,
in the
ships,
more open
but
less
sea.
The Corinthians,
as far as
strong in
men
confident in naval
and thence,
in the night,
coast; their object being less to ingage the Athenians, than to join
their allies in the prosecution of the preconcerted purposes of the
cam-
pain.
The
daring vigilance of
in the
middle
of the passage.
Tho
it Avas
Immediately they
not to give
the diecplus,
formed
who outnumbelieve,
if,
he
H.
own
abilities
and expe-
and
first
possible
Sect.
II.
9^
him.
He
well
knew
that
when
which seldom
failed
not long
remain perfect; and his purpose was, by alarming, to hasten and in-
It
happened precisely
as
he foresaw
the
first
of
the breeze drove the windward ships again-st the transports in the
center; confusion immediately arose; clamor, with expostulation from
ship to ship, insued
;
orders were
no longer heard
v/as
signals remained
in
wholly ingaged
obviating
many
any
against one
and the
swell, that
by rowers
so
Phormion seized
In the
first
the critical
moment
onset
one of the Corinthian admirals Mas sunk; several other ships were
quickly disabled; and such was the confusion that resistance was
scarcely attempted, but the
first effort
twelve triremes, the greater part of whose crews they put to the sword.
Having pursued
as far as
seas, the
On the
their
of the captive
triremes, after
station at Naupactus.
Then
first
Cnemus, with the forces from Acarnania, soon after joined them. This action of Phormion, tho the forces employed on cither side
were too small for the consequences to be very important, yet for the boldness of the attempt, the ability displayed in the execution, and the
completeness of the success, has been deservedly reckoned by Plutarch
among
have
^
It appears to Thucvd
<=
disturbed, not a
find a
-in
s^-
We
ebstracter,
the
v.
551.
Lacedeemonians.
100
Lacecltemonians.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
government, unversed in naval
superiority of science
affairs,
CuAr. XV.
their
among
among
own
The imwise
but now, in
little
some indignation
only twenty
ships,
which were
Timocrates,
ofiicers,
5.
his
command.
The
ships
damaged
repaired;
Peloponnesus; and a
c.
S5.
Panormus on the Achaian coast; where a land-army, in the antient manner of naval war generally capable of advantageous cooperation with a fleet, was also assembled. Phormion, informed of these preparations, had sent intelligence of them to Athens, and desired a reinforcement. Twenty triremes were
which proceeded from Cj'Uenc
in
It
is
upon
we
first
of public
affairs,
which
had
his
and commanded
success.
own
Cydonia in Crete, a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy. It would be an easy conqifest, he said, for the fleet which was ready to sail for Naupactus, and with the assistance to be readily procured within the iland, could occasion little delay. The Athenian people were ill-advised enough to decree as he desired. The armament went
to Crete,
but the
and
its
it
Sect.
siege,
II.
loi
or
long in Crete.
Meantime Phormion was left to exert his abilities and his vigilance Yet tho they had against an enemy who too much outnumbered him.
nearly four times his strength, so confident was he in superior
skill,
that Thucyd.
1.2.
not only he did not refuse, but he appears to have been desirous to
Moving
therefore from
Naupactus, he took a station just without the gulph, near the headland
of the Molycrian or northern Rhium; and a small army, composed
chiefly of Naupactian Messenians, joined his naval
c.
po.
camp on
the shore,
to assist in case of any attempt from a superior force upon the fleet in
its
station.
;
proved
appears to have been his motive for quitting the security of his statiou
all
their
advantage of numbers,
all
the zeal of
in naval action, from the event of the late ingagement, that they pec-
severingly avoided the open, and directed their endevors to draw the
sea.
The two
more.
headlands,
:
than
a mile asunder
would be something
oneanother without
During
moving.
gulph.
six
or
seven
days they
watched
c. s(j.
well imagined, for forcing the Athenian admiral to action within the
its
youth were
in the
was
left
army At
102
HISTORY OF GREECE.
an advanced guard.
pactus.
Chap. XV.
for
Nauhis
With
all
march along the shore toward their town. This was precisely Avhat the Peloponnesiaus wish. ;!. They no sooner saw the Athenian
their
fleet
Nauline,
pactus, they formed for action in line of battle abreast, and pushed
The
through superior
wing of
the Pelo-
its
whole crew
all
many escaped by swimming the rest were mostly put to the sword. What followed, reported by the authoritative pen of Tliucjdides, proves how
the hands of the Peloponnesians
;
but,
of their people,
army might be
through the
to a
fleet.
zealous in hereditary
armed
2.
Meanwhile the twenty galleys of the Peloponnesian advanced guard were pursuing the eleven Athenian which had overstretched the main body. Ten of these reached the harbour of Naupactus and forming
:
^against
c.gu.
against them.
A Leucadian
in
seemed impossible.
It
The Athenian
it,
captain having
his
and judged
time so well,
and managed the evolution with such combined rapidity and exactness,
that with his beak he struck the galley of the
amazed Leucadians
Timocrates,
in
11
Sect.TI.
in a
fit
103
up
there.
The
rest
M'as at this
completely conquerors
ing within sight of
all,
''.
The
Some
rested
on
main body of
their fleet,
was
far off,
upon
aware of
all
circumstances, advanced in
yet in confusion.
for their port of
The
about
The
The
they took six of the enemy's triremes; they sunk one: they recovered
all their
aboard
own
slain
and erecting
their trophy,
which
every ordinary
mark of decided
victory.
The Peloponnesians
also
tory,
The song of battle and the song of vieboth hymns to the gods, one a prayer
'
his
usual
fleet in
the
among them something of that mismanagement frequently incident to confederate armaments, of which he was not himself perfectly informed.
occasion
's^xwh^qh
re
ecft*
w^o^^5,
tlie
10^
HISTORY OF GREECE.
the eariy part of the
clay,
Chat. XV.
and placed by
as
it
indignation at Lacedcemon,
would give
Cnemus, and
while the
his
to apprehend
no very favor-
remained
yet assembled on
the
Corinthian coast,
for attempting an
nmcyd.
1.2.
It
harbour of
M as proposed to surprize.
by land to Megara, each carrying his oar, his cushion, and his thong*.
Arriving in the evening, they with
haste launched forty triremes
laid
up
in the port
made for the Attic coast. A contrary wind, gave them to apprehend that they should not be able
in time to accomplish a surprize.
which was
'
Tr,
rfoTrur7,fx.
Cum
quos
luiirr.t
xai
to
txritptVieF,
xxl
To
singulis
remis,
Sf
singulis
marble fragment, which, before the spoliations of the Freuch, was in the \'aticau
pulvinis,
fent,
4"
sibt
remigantibus
subsfcrne-
museum
at
cum
singulis scalmis.
Tlie thong,
representation
known
in a most of an
us,
and
In that curious
monu-
cushion
Thames wherrymen
yet
pensable an implement as
the text would
readily
gives
the account in
of our small ships of war; but at the aperture every oar has a bag about
it,
it
whose
the
explanation,
which
the
er
Latin
to xia?
iSiJ-9<i
in.
leave
it
for those
who have
h;ive
a,
tri/irlf
whether the
cushioQ to
of Thucviiides
may
suspicion that
it
meant another
upou.
eirceus,
Sect.
II.
MEASURES
debarked on
in
IN ACARNANIA.
los
PeivEBus, they
Salainis.
by
fire-beacons,
thing experienced
Avas,
The immediate
that the
enemy were
town of Salamis, and that the attack would reach them without delay. At daybreak the whole strength of Athens moved down to the port
;
known.
The
making some
apprehension that their leaky vessels might founder before they reached
that port.
Had
have succeeded.
it
The event
by
due
the admonition
Peirffius,
gave.
the
mouth of
As soon
active
as the
fleet,
the ships
up
But the
let
A
1.
party adverse to that which favored the Athenian alliance was strong Thuryd.
in
2.
As soon
was
as certain
intelligence
^' ^^'^'
Debarking there
Messenians, he
the
as
many
inarched
and
concerting
measures with
the obnoxious.
among marshes
cities,
near the
mouth of
the Acarnanian
maintained
his escort,
its alliance
he returned to Naupactus.
V'ith
ships,
whom
the freemen
were
loG
HISTORY OF GREECE.
were shortly exchanged for so
Peloponnesians.
Chap. XV.
many
Tluicyd.
c. f)a.
1.
2.
During these transactions in the western part of Greece, while, in Laceda?mon and Athens, war seemed to sleep for the M'inter, far more alarming movements occurred on the northern borders. Philip, brother
^
'
.
Upper Macedonia.
,
1
Perdiccas,
,.
it
on
,TTi
well defined.
Amyntas however
Sitalces.
not
said,
had ingaged
to
in
Chalci-
Ready
by
his father,
he
was more
forces of
common
Tbiicyd. e. 9S.
1.
The
2.
gijalces
rivalled
republics,
far alien
....
to be
almost
from Asiatic
the
effeminacy,
as the
Mars and
the
<C.
marched toward him the Macedonian Macedonian kingdom, which had been
Here Amyntas had
still
father's
appanage.
friends,
100.
mean talents, and commanding a considerable dominion, yet weakened by civil war with the princes of his family, was utterly unequal to meet the Thracian army in battle. With his cavalry only he attended
upon
its
towns;
Skct.II.
invasion OF MACEDONIA.
as these in
107
towns; but
marshes.
:
little
improved, were
to
The
first
which he took by
in sieges,
He next
for them,
and unprovided
horse^
he there
failed.
Meanwhile the
Macedonian
fear to
armed
numerous body of Thracians, wherever they made a charge, they made an impression. Being neverlh.eless constantly in the end overpowered,
and continually
liable to
It
Thucyd.
^*
1.
-2
with the Athenian government, that an Athenian with the Thracian army
;
fleet
^^'*
it
was so
little
would perform
sent.
his
never
As soon
as it
was known
Macedo-
nia,
presents,
Sitalces,
;
in
some degree
made through
many
other
:
for
little
g-
The
were in alarm, and took measures for resisting the storm, should
reach them.
The
less
less in
motion.
the rigor of the season began soon to press severely upon such a mulso unprovided as the
is
army of
Sitalces ^
The
There
who accom-
Khan
p s
used
108
HISTORY OF GREECE.
used the opportunity for negotiation.
fidential persons, to
Chap.XV.
He found
was
him
The
intrigue succeeded:
the restoration of
allowed; and,
dice,
father's principality
was of course
in wasting
his forces
home.
SECTION
Fourth Cavipain
:
III.
Third Invasion of Attica. Revolt of Mitylene. Flight of Part of the Garrison of Platcea. Siege of Mitylene by Paches. Distress and Exertions of Athens. Transactions under
the Lacedcemonian Alcidas,
and
the Athenian
Coast.
Thiicyd. 1.3.
c. 1
as
we have
seen,
*C
in the
^^
Ol. f|. 4. P. \\ . 4,
we now
damus.
ar,
under the
as
command
the
They chose
usual
their
little
After no long
stores
brought with
home
as
more dangerous
Among
its
of Lesbos,
13
between
Sect.
III.
REVOLT OF MITYLENE.
which claimed
their separate
109
between
dency.
six republics,
Methymne
1.
were
far
The
3.
nian alliance; but more especially to the Boeotian, rather than to the
as danders,
had
led them.
commonly among
all
and
blinded to
tical
all
In
its
Methymne
the democra-
by the same
political
principles.
to Athens.
Mitylene the
if
aristo-
not oppressed,
must be always
could
insecure,
Nor
men of
all
hension, what had already befallen other states of the Athenian confe-
deracy
Accordingly, before the war broke out between Athens and Lacedjemon, the principal Mitylena?ans had sent ofters to the Lacedaemonian
administration to renounce the Athenian, and reunite themselves with
than the meer change of their domestic constitution and forein connections: they proposed to reduce the rival republic of
at least to repress the
Methymne,
or
c. 5.
democracy there
influence in
commonwealths
iland Avould be
Tlie
however, seem to have judged far better on the occasion than the
Mityknsans
ally, across
110
proposal.
HISTORY OF GREECE,
pestilence, in deep distress, they
Chap.XV.
The same sentiments nevertheless continuing to animate the Mitylena-ans, when they saw the Athenians, between invasion and
thought the season favorable for the
;
they strengthened
harbour
and.
they increased their military force by hiring archers from the same parts.
Tlnicyd.
c. 3.
J.
3.
INIitylene,
political
by the Tenedians, and by the democratical party in Mitylene itself. At length commissioners of inquiry and inspection were sent, with a
requisition for the Mitylengeans to desist from
The Mitylenjeans
On
its
was deter-
mined
beginning, an evil
which, in
progress,
tion
and
people.
command of
tha.t
Clcippides,
sian coast.
was ready to
It
in procession
out of
them
ceremony
deemed necessary
Tp
tri-
fleet,
A private
Lesbian
vessel,
from
-Sect. III.
SIEGE OF M IT Y LExV E.
leaving
in
arriving
Thucyd.
^'
'
from
bis
Athens.
The Mitylenrcans
for
in
consequence kept
Cleippides
prepared
defence.
demanded
1.
3.
the surrender of
all
The
^Mitylenceans,
endevored to gain
time by negotiation;
and Cleippides,
thinking
them
to
The
who had
delay from this measure, the Mitylensans at the same time privately
dispatched a
state of things,
to Lacedgemon,
to
report the
The
<=
5.
cause,
The Mitylenteans at first endevored to gain credit to their by making a parade of their strength in taking the field against
fortifications.
Then
allies;
who came
in
The Mitylena^an
disposition to ingage in their cause. The Lacedaemonian government would neither of itself undertake it, nor call a congress of the oonfederacy. The Mitylen^ans were coldly told, that the season of the
jj
c'408
July,
Olympian
festival M'as at
hand
would
ii'2
HISTORY OF GREECE.
would
find
Chap. XV.
Lacedemonian
Avas
some
alliance,
disposed.
Thucyd.
'' ^^'
1.
readier favor
among
states
the
3,
of the
held, in
festival,
of deputies of the
was
Mhich
it
alliance,
and to make
of Attica.
Summons
confederacy to
repair
and
to give
new
which lay
in tlie
for
weakened
as the
Athenians
without withdrawino*
employed
This new
people.
crisis
It M'as
still
they had
and
still
strength to execute.
The
navy
at this time,
which inabled
so small a
commonwealth
to
command such
is
whom
first raised,
and of
Pericles,
by
whom
principally
it
was main-
on the Thracian coast; thirty under Asopius son of Phormion were circumnavigating and ravaging Peloponnesus and there were guard;
and Euboea.
None
were called
in.
A
in
hundred ready
it
for service
remained in the
use.
some degree a seaman. Excepting only those of the highest orders, distinguished by the titles of knights and penta cosiomedimnians, to whom, with the superannuated and the minors,
left, all
well as
Athenians,
went aboard.
Sect.
III.
SIEGE OF MITYLENE.
for the isthmus,
;
113
its
moved immediately
and displayed
strength in August,
who remained
Debarkations were made at pleasure, on various parts of the Peloponnesian coast, and a watch was kept on the
ponnesian army.
The Lacedemonian
well-judged
leaders
in
the 'nmcjd.
*^'
1.3.
'^"
pliance
of their
They had depended upon the comwith the summons for their proportions of
people
are
at the
c, ij.
troops for the invasion of Attica, and there too they Mere not less
disappointed.
Where the
and
soldiers,
they cannot be
alwa3's ready to
go on distant expe-
ditions,
slaves.
women and
harvest;
their
of Attica,
and
obey the
call
to
arms
Meanwhile
intelligence
which, Avithout
armament under Asopius was ravaging Laconia; upon more delay, the projected invasion of Attica was aban-
doned,
Then
the
Athenian
within
its ports.
c. 18.
The Athenian
in
aristocratical faction
it
IMethymne,
marched
affairs
betrayed to them.
They
were disappointed
; leisure, the of the subordinate republics of Antissa, Pyra, and Eresus, and,
Upon
receiving intelligence of
this,
sent
Avith a
reinforcement of a thousand
heavy-armed Athenians,
sufficed to insure
take the
command
in
Lesbos.
This
superiority; and, by the beginning of winter, a contravallation Avas completed, and Mityleue was blockaded by laud
and
sea.
VoL.IL
The
114
Thucyd.
1.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
3.
Chap.XV.
treasury, wealth)' as
it
The
as
no
less
own
The pay of
may imply
the con-
to Lesbos, themselves
rowed the
vessels
which
carried them.
Upon
we
find Athenian soldiers doing duties that M'ould seem to be rather the
by
the
historian,
allowed.
age,
must suppose the indulgence was not always Sieges were the most expensive military operations of the
m'C
and generally
lasting.
and
first
to the
ranks.
reduction of pay to the soldiers and seamen seems to have taken place,
as a correspondent tax
for
we
learn
from Thucydides,
states it to
that, the
liave been
this time.
cities
supplied
20.
While the vengeance of Athens was thus directed against the seceders
from
its
confederacy,
its
Closely blockaded
now
for
above a year
and a half, distress was coming fast upon them. It was already winter they had nearly consumed their stores, relief Avas despaired of, to hold
out
much
expected.
affairs
the
garrison, Eupoli)idas,
eitlier
by reputation or by
Sect. !ir.
SIEGE OF PLATiEA.
their passage across the
115
proposal was at
by forcing
first
enemy's
lines.
The
whole garrison, and preparation was zealously commenced for the execution: but on the nearer view of so
full
About two hundred and twenty however persevered with the commander. Ladders were prepared, equal to the height of the enemy's wall, which was calculated by counting the rows of bricks. The interval between the walls of circumvallation and contravallation, to use terms the nearest to the
half retracted.
hazardous an undertaking,
feet.
This space,
Thucyd.l.
^^'^^ 3,
being roofed, formed barracks for the besieging army, the appearance being that of one th.ick wall, with a parapet and battlements on each
side.
At the
width
by the walls
in these
when
all
was ready
dark, B. C. 427.
'^^'^^'
stormy night
were
all
Avas chosen,
~^^^^
Jan.
Thucyd.l. 3.
'^'^'^'
the slippery
avoid the clashing of arms, they directed their way to the middle of
the interval between two towers.
ladders were placed, and twelve light-armed, with only a short sword
and
a breastplate,
mounted under
command
of
Ammeas
son of
On
their shields,
that they
might climb more nimbly, being borne by those who followed, ]\iany were already mounted, while the din of the storm and the extreme
darkness of the night prevented discovery,
fell
with so
neighboring tower.
The
call to
The remaining
from the opposite part of the town, and made a feigned attack
contravallation.
in darkness
The besieging army being thus distracted, and tempest unable to discover what were the real circumstances, Q 2
nc
HISTORY OF GREECE.
circumstances, none tlared quit his post
only, appointed as a picket-f>-uard to
:
Cjiap.
XV.
body of
three
hundred
might
their
rcfjuirc,
Thebes
formed similar
Meanwhile those
their ladders
Plataeans,
who
first
mounted the
wall,
had forced
the towers on each side,'put the guards to the sword, and proceeding by
missile
who approached
to
to
make
The parapet between the towers, down; ladders were placed as soon as over the outer ditch, formed on
rest.
To
for there
was
much
water in
it,
but not so as
last
bear; and
before those
descend,
could effect
of
little
use to
themselves,
anabled the Platfeans to direct missile weapons against them, so efficaciously as to give opportunity for the last of their
'
own
people to get
off,
and,
Theban
road, as that
least
be expected to take.
Having themselves followed the Theban road about three quarters of a mile, they turned short to the right, and passing by Erythri3 and Hysite, soon gained the mountains, whence they proceeded
mount
Cithjeron.
securely to Athens.
Of
those
who ingaged
in this hazardous
success: none were killed; one only was taken on the counterscarp of
the circumvallation;
1
five
or
six
returned into
tlie
town without
attempting
Sect.
III.
SIEGE OF MITYLENE.
These told the garrison that
all
117
their
who
persevered, were
cut
off.
Next morning
town.
therefore
a herald was sent to solicit the dead for burial, and by his return the success of the undertaking was
first
known
in the
The
relief
1.
3.
"^'
and toward
r,
M'as
forwarded with a
25.
what might
be necessary.
Sala^thus, landing
at Pyrrha,
some defect
in the contravaliation,
where
it
to enter Mitylene.
The
duct of Paches
in
by the able and vigorous conthe command of the besieging armament, were
people, pressed
already talking of
capitulation;
fleet,
which
tlie
zeal
of the con-
j]
r
W.
26."
^27
3.
P.
j._
commanded by Cleomenes,
nephew
Not
now laid
waste
of the second year of the war, this was the most destructive inroad
that Attica had experienced.
c,
25.
Mitylenaeans,
c.
27,
in the
The
oligarchal party in
Mity-
common
in the
Grecian commonwealths,
weapons of the heavy-armed, and allowed the lower people the use of
the inferior arms, and the practice of the inferior discipline, of the light-
armed
118
HISTORY OF GREECE.
armed only.
Saltethus,
Chap. XV.
bj'
the extraall
the
ithin their
meet Paches
in the field,
niade under
The lower
new
;
they assumed
civil controul:
case of refusal, to
Thncyd.
^" ^^'
1,
make immediately
3.
nians.
which
to the
:
all
should be included.
was sent
accepted
That the JMitylensans should surrender themselves to the pleasure of the Athenian people That the Athenian army should be
:
any RIityleua?an.
active in the
The concluding
stipulation
was intended
party,
negotiation with
Laceda^mon.
faith, or
Many
means
who through
their
took Paches removed them under a guard to the iland of Tenedos, there to await the judgement of the Athenian people,
refuge at the
altars.
c,
59.
Alcidas, with the ileet vvliich should have relieved Mitylene, was no
farther
ilands of Icarus
of
its
Sect. III.
coast;
COx\ST.
had
a council of
ng
possession of IMitylene, he
summoned
richest
war
to concert measures.
In the
fleet
refu<rces, M'ho
dependency of
Tlmryd.
1.3
Athens, the great source of that revenue which supported the war.
people they affirmed would be found not averse:
necessary,
it
The
Mould onlv be
to get possession of
some one Ionian city, or of Cuma in iEolis, for which the strength of the armament was more than sufficient, and the business would be
done; and besides that
Athenian power,
it
a greater
would
lead of course to
communication
M'ith
the
The
who
fleet
from Peloponnesus.
But Alcidas
c.
all
so.
Weakness
M'as praise-
worthy
coast,
He
without any decided object, unless to make prize of merchant-ships, of which he took numbers for since he had
;
32.
been
in those seas
his fleet,
none had avoided him, some rather makino- toward supposing it Athenian; being without suspicion that a
fleet
Peloponnesian
could show
itself
on
tlie
Asiatic coast.
At Myon-
nesus, in the Teian territory, he put to death the greater part of the
Alarm spred
in
toward Ephesus, deputies from Samos came to him, deprecating such barbarities. Convinced by their representations, at least of the impolicy of his proceeding, he dismissed
many
and he made no more such executions. Meanwhile intelligence brought to Paches, that the Peloponnesian
little
c.
33,
fleet
was
was on the Ionian coast, occasioned no small uneasiness for there or no Athenian force in Asia Minor, and most of the towns
;
were unfortified; having been rendered purposely incapable of defence, that they might be the less capable of revolt. Paches therefore
hastened
no
self
HISTORY OF GREECE.
hastened thither with his
fleet;
Chap. XV.
before he could
beyond
his reach
in the
way
to Peloponnesus,
arrive.
Thucyd.
C.34.
1.
3,
he turned toward Ionia, where opportunity offered to do a service to his country; but by an act of united treachery and cruelty, which, through
the impartial justice of the admirable historian his cotemporary and
iiif\\my a
character
^jeople,
profited
from the
by-
its citizens,
being torn
1.4. C.4.
Thucyd, ut
iup.
treat-
officer,
we have only an ordinary occurrence among the Grecian republics. What followed is marked by more singularity. The fugitives possessed themselves of Notium, the seaport of Colophon, and became there a separate commonwealth.
expelled
their opponents.
Thus
far
also,
one
them from
Pissuthnes ordered
assistance.
expelled
ment of
their
of Colophon, of things
him then
tion,
Mho had preoccupied the satrap's favor. Such was the state when Paches came with his fleet into the neighborhood. To the new fugitives from Notium applied claiming his protec;
asserted,
and
rebels,
by
whom
they were
commander of
went
the Arca-
dian troops.
into his
camp,
and put
with
this
Not
satisfied
Sect.
III.
MEASURES
tiie
after
SURRENDER
mockery of good
of
MITYLENE.
conductint;
i2
f;tith,
The Colophonians of
after strengthened
by a colony of Athenians
the anlient constitution was superseded by the Athenian law, and the
town
to Mitylcne,
ing
in the city
all
the
aristocratical party,
were apprehended
been hastened that another might safely follow, which was probably
required
finances
state of
its
sent
the general
affairs
SECTION
State of the Atheiiian Govermnent after
IV.
the
Death of
Pericles.
:
Nicias
Clean.
the Mitylenceans
Death
of Paches.
Platcea taken.
The
the
affairs had now passed into very different hands from those whose extraordinary abilities had raised
commonwealth
its
present power.
and even
which
reduced the aristocracy, while democratical sway was gradually advancing, illustrious birth had still been greatly considered among the
Vol.
II.
Athenian
18S
HISTORY OF GREECE.
situations.
CHAy.XV.
Athenian people, and was almost necessary for rising to high political
For, little as the Athenians Mere willing to allow superiority
political situation
it less
of rank, superiority of
they had been accustomed for ages to respect, than in new men, yester-
day
whom
raise,
high ancestry.
set
the injuriousexample,
first
The
man
com-
as
he had wielded
years,
it;
manding, with
individual of
little
interruption,
for fifteen
a people,
every
whom
men
himself, as if
he had, by the
But a constant
not to be expected
among
the small
highest- rank in
any
state.
men
now
looked as the
commonwealth, was a man of high merit, but unfortunately not, like the great men who had preceded him, born for the peculiar circumstances of the situation for which he was wanted.
tical
His
abilities, poli-
and
military,
were considerable.
him.
employment of his
humane and
liberal in
advantages
Sect. III.
N I C I A S:
inclivlduais, that
C L E O N.
diffident
:
l'^3
advantages of
tlie people.
field,
in the
was a coward
as if it
while a reserve,
effect
him
of
It
his generosity
Under a
it
better
government,
to live, gave
his character
turbulence in which
was
his fate
*,
man such
as never before
was known
as
remark-
its
exaltation.
lowest of the people, the son of a tanner, and said himself to have exercised that trade,
pohtical interest.
Of
little
courage,
slack in the field but forward and noisy in the assembly, corrupt in
practice as in principle, but boastful of integrity, and supported by a
state of things,
sur- p. C. 427.
^-^-
rendered their lives and fortunes to the pleasure of the Athenian people.
^J: l1.
On the arrival
3.
To
obtain a respite
'^'
^'^'
and,
among
The assembly then deliberated concerning the punishment to be inflicted upon the Mityleneans and sentiments of anger, inflamed by the boisterous
;
'
*
'
'
suffer
more by
Lord
Cosmo
every
defects.
R 2
124
every
HISTORY OF GREECE.
man
to death,
Chap. XV.
all
ranks
Such Mas the right vhich the Athenian people claimed_ over Greeks whom they called allies, and who had every pretension so to consider themselves; and such the punishment for renouncing that
to slavery.
alliance,
Paches to carry the decree into immediate execution. But the Athenians were not universally of a temper to sleep upon
The very next morning extensive many of the principal men joined the repentance became evident; and IMitylenazan deputies, in pressing the summoning of a second assembly, and they prevailed. The for the purpose of reconsidering the decree
such a deed without remorse.
;
people were hastily called together, and various opinions Avere delivered.
weak opponent
'
to the insolent
Cleon,
who
in support of the
What
folly,'
he
said,
37, 38,39>
40.
stability
regard to the
could be found.
treated
with justice but with kindness, not only without offence but with
cautious respect.
And
as
the revolt, so nothing could be less defended upon any plea of necessity.
had
it.
Injoying then
these advantages, they had before their eyes the example of others^
under a
felicity,
strict subjection.
Such being
;
'
would be weakness to
let
and.
Sect.
*
III.
it
425
and
would be
which wisdon>
'
would want
resolutioji to
inhuman sentence. But Cleon would inforce argument by menaces; and knowing that he could not use a more effectual weapon against the timid Nicias, impudently imputing corrupt motives
in support of the
to any
who
The
upon
this
occasion, was
He must have
but upon
this occasion
In
the debate of the preceding day he had been the principal opponent of
Cleon; and he
at the
now
zeal,
and
Tbucyd.
^'
'
1.
3.
he
insisted, was.
much
of
*?.
them to
put into their hands,, than they compelled the aristocratical party to
treat with the Athenian general. Setting aside however the question of right and justice, he would consider the matter at issue upon the point of expediency only. The terror of capital punishment, it was
vent
revolt,
evils, to
draw
profit
it was the business of a wise policy to from conquest, and not to convert a city, capable of paying
A
crates,
Eucr.)
manner
which family-names were usually distributed among the Greelis, would favor
'
TJie.
126
'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
The lower
'
Chap. XV.
nothing
were
it just,
therefore,
'
'
would
'
He concluded
by Paches
ing",
'
that those
selected
most involved in
the guilt of revolt, should be, not condemned in haste and in anger,
but judged at leisure with dispassionate deliberation, and that the rest
of the JVIitylensjan people should have a free pardon.'
Thucyd.
^'
].
s.
prevailed; but the influence of Cleon was such that he prevailed but
It was, after
all,
very
much
feared that
orders for
for-
trireme was in
haste dispatched,
They rowed
and
oil,
by
reliefs.
with the
first
way.
It arrived
however
when
the second
The
self
case of those
whom
to
Athens, as principal
actors in the revolt, seems to have been hopeless, since Diodotus him-
offer a
word
in their favor,
farther than to
^^^'
trial.
a thousand,
and
all
Nor were
demoto
w^ere disposed of in a
was calcu-
emolument than public advantage, being either required by the soverein people, as an indulgence which they wished and 11
SECT.Iir.
DEATH OF PACHES.
or proposed
127.
as a bribe to
The whole
it
might be thus bribed, not only to pardon, but even to favor the most The remainder was divided by lot among the atrocious inhumanity.
Athenian
lands
:
citizens,
tjiat
A territory
Both the
and
tlie
and
But
was provided
for,
very remarkable
fact,
throughout
his
command, appears
On
honor and
called
respect,
found himself
upon
people.
The
orators
who conducted
eflect
less
their harangues
had evident
we become
so famili-
committed
in cold
blood, generally
not without at
least a claim
pretence to the execution of justice, that the horror lessens, and prepared for the tragedy which closed the siege of Plattea.
we
are
We
find
du-e
garrison of that place, had there been any prospect of sucwit|iin their
power.
We may
conceive, indeed,
tUat
123
,
HISTORY OF GREECE.
that the pestilence
first,
Chap. XV.
but
weaken
their
making
all risk
The
and the
loss
of a
circumstances of that
time,
Athens
Thucyd.
c.
1.
3.
inability of the
52.
course of the summer, the third of the sicgt, the garrison began to be
by famine.
The
first
nevertheless
pursuance of
upon record
to her shame.
The
ponnesians in the war, not having been so great and so rapid as they
it
was foreseen
taken
But
it
As soon therefore
as
it
was known that the garrison were in extremity of want, the general
'
'
The
these,
acceded to
and surrendered
the
their
to the Lacedaemonians.
doom of
No
accusation \ras preferred, but the simple question was put to the Plalaeans,
' *
the Laced<Emonians or
more largely
denied.
Sect.IV.
denied,
surrender OF
latter
PLATiEA.
connectpd by hospitality
After urging
129
trial,
them
commonwealth
all
They
tection of their
above ninety years before had given origin to their alliance with
Athens
not have deserted without the basest ingratitude and the foulest dishonor.
They expostulated on
Greece
with liberty, through the glorious success obtained against the Persians,
abolition, which,
their
comraon-
whose
they
said,
after
having successfully
mode of
perishing
The Thebans,
witli exasperation,
not abated
by
time,
but rather
revenge their friends and relations, murdered, according to their sentiment, by the Platteans, undertook to reply. They began with asserting
their claim to sovereinty over Plattea, derived
*-
founders of
all
Vol. IL
18ft
HISTORY OF GREECE.
their exertions in the Persian M-ar
insisted,
:
Chap. XV.
led,
it
to
was
spirit
common
not even of
3.
their city,
in their city.
No
connection with
Athens however could excuse their defection from the general confederacy of the Greek nation, under the presidency of Lacedsmon, of
Avhich Athens itself
On
the contrary, if
it
was
vas
it
to betray the
much more dishonorable and more criminal common cause of Greece, by supporting the Atheallies,
nians in their endevors to subdue the whole nation, against the Lace-
its
liberties.
Thus,
had been a
commonwealth
to a state of subjection:
liberal offers
yet,
and had
been rejected.
.
65.
'
'
With regard
us,
Theban
orator,
'
to the attempt
is
so vehemently
'
objected to
had
it
'
attacl-ked
your persons,
us.
'
own
citizens
they invited us
'
who had
the
'
among
;
you,
'
'
c. 66,
'
withdrawing you from a forein connection, and reiiniting you to the body of the Boeotian people. Nevertheless the death of those of our
fellowcitizens
'
who
in
'
the assassination
mercy,
whom
we are willing to pass over; but for of those others, who submitted themselves to your the moment you spared, and for whose safety you
fell
in arras,
t. Ch.
'
pledged yourselves to
us,
how can
it
be excused?
Shall then,
Lace?
'
'
The
thus murdered,
'
were
Sect. IV.
'
SURRENDER OF PLAT^A.
men
who, by their deeds in the
field
it
m
of Coroneia,
to the
Grecian
'
confederacy.
Some of tliem
fell
there; some,
now
'
We
therefore
punishment of
'
avoids declaring
transaction
it
;
uncommon in a cotemporary historian, any sentiment as his own upon this extraordinary
some
detail,
because
was afterward but too much drawn into precedent, and because the
much
to
explain both the nature of the Grecian confederacy, and the ideas,
prevailing at the time, concerning the Iq^ws of nature aiid of nations.
It
is
not indeed likely that the speeches made upon the occasion would
very exactly reported even to Thucydides.
come
what he
several parties.
It appears to
have been
among
human law
and not only M'ithout the breach of any divine law, but prayers were
addressed to the gods for favor and assistance in the commission of
such violences.
Those connected with them by political or social compact the Greeks described by a term peculiar to themselves,
ENSPONDi; meaning,
whom
whom
they had
made
:
a compact, sanctified
by the ceremony of pouring wine to the gods those M'ho were bound to them by no compact, or who had forfeited their claim to the benefit
of a compact once existing, they called ecsponci, out of compact, or
S3
outlaws.
13
Tlniryd. 1.3.
c. 68.'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
outlaws.
sion,
Chap. XV.
siege,
-were
ecspondi
the
who had
It
treated
injuriously.
was therefore
resolved that the sentence should rest upon the answer that could be
given, and supported, to the simple question
first
proposed. Accordingly
'
Whether
in
the present war they had done any service to the Lacedaemonians or
their allies
?'
to
in
whom
probably
less hesitation,
consequence of
The women
;.
the
town and
territor)'
whom
own
Afterward,
let to
Theban
citizens
on
*vith the
adjoining to the temple of Juno, an inn two hundred feet square, some-
thing like the modern caravanserais of the East, was built with the
materials.
In the
spirit
hiade of the iron and brass found in the town, was dedicated to
feet
Sect. V.
SEDITION OF CORCYRA.
13^
SECTION
Sedition of Corcyra
;
V.
From
this scene
is
the tenor of
Grecian history, we
proceed to another
still
we should
fable,
may
be derived from
it.
its
con-
nection with Athens, the democratical had been the prevailing interest.
s.
3.
we have
seen,
and
it
became
*^'
'^"^ ^'^'*
through
tliem,
to bring over
ponnesian confederac}^, which would of course restore some portion at least of the antient influence and authority of Corinth in the iland.
The
less
first ideii;
and possibly a
Thucvd. 1.3.
^-
reward than the change from a dungeon, with daily fear of death,
^^
them
to accetle to
the second
They
were however
set at liberty.
It
sufficient pledges to
ransom appeared
rately for
his
in
pay a large sum for their ransom, but the real the sequel. Every Corey ra^an was canvassed sepain
support,
the
general assembl}^,
to a question for
alliance,
its
mother-city.
Success
commotion.
The democratical
It
happened that
ministers
154
HISTORY OF GREECE.
ministers from Corinth arrived nearly at the same time.
Chap. XV.
An
;
assembly
the question
far preit
How
no
far rt
stop there,
might have heen possible for the aristocratical party to and preserve quiet, we have not means to judge; but that amply appears.
in the
prosecution was
party, the
commenced
warm
Athenian
Athenian commonwealth.
'
The vague
had so
The
aristocratical party
ill
ill
was acquitted.
him
to ruin those
repel
who would
the attack,
five
him would be
ruin
and the
interest
likely to give
He accused
in the
We
have
difficulty
men of
the penalty, which was a stater, about a guinea, for every stake.
five
The
alter-
were
all
condemned
in fines, to
to indigence.
by
flight, if
now
practicable,
They
hoping that
penalty.
their friends
them a
mitig-ation of the
;
The
interest of Peithias
however prevented
and,
more
The
suppliants,
looking
upon
their ruin
and that of
<?arried, in
some of
into
their
adherents,
rushing
the
counsellors,
some private
persons,
Sect. V.
persons, to the
tical party,
SEDITI ON O F COR C Y R A.
number of
sixty.
13.5
Mho avoided
trireme,
which lay
in the jiarbour.
Thucyrl.
c.
I.
The five were no sooner thus masters of the council than thev summoned an assembly of the people, acknowleged M'hat they had done, and claimed merit from it, as what alone could save the commonwealth
from subjection to Athens
;
s.
71.
and
any
attempt to introduce
Their
an act of
hostility.
own
influence
was
purall
approbation of
was
carried.
dispatched to Athens
for
to apologize, as far as
passed,
might
Athenian
what had
crisis
produced by the
possible, with the
Corcyra?answho had
apprehension of the
Meanwhile the
Corcyra were
far
from being
citadel,
in
the town.
73.
ments into the country, to invite the peasant-slaves to their assistance, with promises of freedom. In this the democratical party had the
greater success.
The
On
13G
Tliucyd.
'
'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
1.
Chap.XV.
crisis.
3.
On
System
was now
become
settled in
command and
more com-
manding
tliey
situations.
the
women took
from the house-tops, and supporting the tumult of Late dides, with a resolution beyond their nature.
aristocratical party were
Thucytheir
in the
evening the
compelled to yield
last refuge,
fire
to
all
own houses
(for
were consumed
city, tl>e
whole
would have been destroyed. The conflagration effectually checked pursuit, and prevented that immediate destruction M'hich the aristocratical party
had apprehended
but their
affairs
nevertheless suffered
their friends.
made
awav.
At
c
75.
the beginning of this civil war, the democratical party had sent
where Nicostratus son of Deitrephes commanded the Athenian squadron. On the next day after the departure
intelligence to Naupactus,
nrmed
?>Iessenians.
tlie
demo-
cratical,
who dreaded nothing so much as the unrestrained revenge of their Nor did he deceive their expectation: proposing a fellowcitizens.
1
treaty,
Sect.V.
treaty,
sedition of CORCYHA.
rt
1S7
was
as the
brought to
rest
He
pro-
vided then that even the selected ten should have opportunity to
escape; and thus a sedition, begun with the most outrageous violence,
was composed
in a
manner
little
without bloodshed.
The
Naupactus;
but,
the
would leave
five
many
it
The
was to appoint
against fresh
among
these,
was only a
feint
them
to Athens
Under
this persuasion
among
Arming
themselves, they broke into the houses of the nobles to seize their
if
Nicostratus
party then
The alarm of
the
aristocratical
became
universal,
in the temple
of Juno.
All the
mony
sibility
they
meditated by them.
To
prevent
this,
therefore,
they proposed to
remove them
which the
temple stood, promising not only safety, but regular supplies of pro-
VoL.
II.
visions.
IM
visions.
HISTOR\^ OF GREECE.
The
utter inability of the suppliants in
Chap. XV.
any way to help
earlier
given to the oaths of their adversaries, and to the faith of the generous
Nicostratus, might have prevented the miseries that followed.
Tliucyd. c 76
1.
3.
In
this state
when
a PeloponneIt
war appeared
in sight.
was conl-
manded by
cyra, with thirteen additional ships, taking Brasidas for his collegue in
r.77.
command.
now triumphant
scarcely
or their
own
little
felloM'citizens.
They
Sixty were
little
imme-
selection, that
some
others, the
among
themselves.
The
Pelo-
to oppose
less
the
Athenian squadron.
military, than prudeait
Nicostratus showed
himself not
able in
and humane
in civil
command.
Cy
superiority
and
sunk a
ship.
The Peloponnesians
Rhium, formed
Nicostratus, as Phormion in a circle. triremes he was thus acting With twelve had done, rowed round them. with advantage against thirty-five, when the detached squadron, which
Phormion
off
79-
port, in
such order
loss
it
without farther
It
was now evening, and nothing could exceed the alarm and confusion in Corc^ia. Au immediate attack was expected from the
victorious
fleet,
while
it
domestic
foe.
The
suppliants of
Sect.V.
sedition of CORCYRA.
moment, were judged
proper.
i3J
Peloponneslans, and such measures for defence of the town were taken
as, in
and apparently
cowardice,
uncommon
as
After his naval victory, instead of immediatel}' pushing his success and
profiting from the consternation of the enemy, he retired with his prizes
Even on the next day, the active zeal of Brasidas in vain exhorted attack upon the city; Alcidas would carry his exertion no farther than to debark some troops on the headland of The democratical CoreyLeucimntj, and ravage the adjacent fields. rasans nevertheless remained in the most anxious suspence. Tlieir
to the harbour of Sybota.
Thucyd.
'
1.
s.
enemy might
for
It
make some
arrangestill
ment
aristocratical party
refused
all
who had
consented to serve in
crews,
to
the fleet
and
thirty
triremes were
those of the
so
as
best
obviate
his
of sixty
si.
way
and hastening
his
No
Athenian
passion
.fears
;
and the
itself
flight
mixed
one of
history.
The
IMessenians,
to oppose
now
The
fleet
town port
In the way,
T 2
of the aristocratical
party
140
party
HISTORY OF GREECE.
among
massacre began in the
city.
Chap. XV.
temple of Juno
in the
remained protected by that superstitious dread, which so generally possessed the Greeks, of temporal evil from the vengeance of the gods
for affronts to themselves, while
no apprehension
The
induced about
to quit their
tifty
nents,
situation
and submit
to a trial.
They were
all
summarily condemned and instantly executed. Their miserable friends in the sanctuary, informed of their fate, yielded to extreme despair some killed oneanother within the temple some hanged themselves on
;
all,
in
end to
their wretchedness.
city,
In the
iland,
quickly closed.
hunting out their opponents, and massacring wherever they could find them. Some had taken sanctuary in the temple of Bacchus. Superstitious fear
around the temple, and they were starved to death. Nor was difference of political principles and political connections the only criterion of
capital offence.
murder of
hands
;
by each-other's
from the temples to be murdered, and some even murdered in them ; and every enormity, says the historian, usual in seditions, was practised,
The Athenian
with his
admiral,
fleet,
Eurymedonson of Thucles,
till
powerful
Thucyd.
*^"
1.3.
^^'
The imhad carried revenge to the utmost, sailed away. policy of his conduct seems to have been equal to the inhumanity. Nicostratus, interfering as a generous mediator, had put Corcyra
into a situation to be a valuable ally to Athens.
The
licence
which
Eurymedon
gave, to massacre
all
Athenian
Sect.v.
Athenian
sedition of CORCYRA.
interest,
Ul
five
had a very
different effect".
About
hundred
had escaped; some aboard the triremes which had deserted to the They took possession of Peloponnesians, some on other occasions.
some
forts
all
the activity
on
hostilities against
Corcyra; seizing
ships,
coast,
living
off.
carry
who
would no more
of Athens, they,
debarked on Corcyra.
who made their whole number only six hundred, The conduct of these undoubtedly brave, but
who
lived in an age to see
and
to advert at
of his fellowcountrymen.
in party disputes
and petty
them
for
mutual destruction,
union, might have inabled them to defend their independency for ever,
against
The
aristocratical Corcyrasans,
had they directed their views to their establishment on the soil where they had found refuge, might probably have raised a powerful city
Thucydides in his manner of marking the different characters and different merits
of the two Athenian commanders, offers an
eneni}', interfered as a
generous mediator,
and so
rage.
fleet
Eurymedon came
:
conmianding a
Without any offensive remark, tlie simplest manner, he gives the reader fully to discover which Reserved the highest praise, and which disgraced himself and his country. Nicostrahistory.
terred opposition
during which
all
comabso-
This
is
medon
with so
tion, with
had soon
of words, he repeats
it.
there.
142
there.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
But
passion,
to an
Chap. XV.
directed their
extraordinary degree,
in
still
measures.
Immediately on landing
mount
Istone,
that advantageous
their adversaries
compelled
to confinement within
and themselves
commanded
the country.
The
calamities
will
SECTION
^n
Athi^nian Squadron
VI.
End
of the
Pestilence at Athens.
Operations of the
State of JEtolia:
Defeat
oj
Demos-
Peloponnesian
to
Army sent
Provinces
racy : Demosthenes eltcted General of the Acarnanians ; Battle of Olpa; ; Battle of Idomen'e : Important Successes of Demosthenes : Peace between the Acarnanians and Ambraciots.
The
T>
(-.
.
and
ingaged
_
Ol. ss. 2.
'liucyd!
c. 80.
War and toward the end of summer, among themselves out now broken had ^^^^^ ^^^^ return of Eurymedon from Corcyra, the Athenians sent a
had given no assistance
;
in operation.
squadron of twenty
Dorian
ships,
assist
who were of
The consequences did not become immediately very important and it may be most convenient to defer all farther account "of Sicilian affairs till the period when Sicily became the principal scenfe
of military operation,
c. S".
but
Sect. VI.
145
first
out in Athens.
intirely ceased,
:
fury
it
itself out,
and we hear of
no more.
In
its
whole
carried
oft'
not
less
Of
the
among the heavyhundred men of the higher rank who served in the multitude of other persons who perished by it, no
who
were inrolled
means existed
number.
Archidamus king of Sparta did not long outlive the friend of his youth, whom in old age he was destined to oppose in arms, the illustrious citizen, Avho M"ith more than regal sway had directed the affairs
of the Athenian democracy.
third campain of the war.
Pericles died about the beginning of the
army
fifth
and
it
is
the last
In the
year Cleomenes, regent for the minor king of the other reigning
;
and now,
in the
r,
command was
Ol. ss f.
The
forces were assembled at the Corinthian isthmus for a proposed xhucvd Ls. invasion of Attica, when the terrors of repeated earthquakes, which Sy.
uncommon
As the war drew out in length, every circumstance tended more and more to justify the counsels which led the Athenians to ingage in it.
Notwithstanding that calamity, beyond human prudence to
foresee,
which had
commonwealth
first
notwithresources
;
its
years of hostility
Athens
Avas
conduct
of
in the administration,
men
of
uncommon
abilitieSj
a powerful
tlie
The highest
lowest
people*
,44
people.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
that
Chap. XV.
men
Thus Nicias seems to have been rather compelled by circumstances, than induced by his own inclination, to accept the situation in wdiich he was placed. He had succeeded
inferiors.
Plut. vit.
"'c-
commands where
;
success
might be
would be small
he was
less afraid
of Megara.
left in
it.
was without
much
to prevent
any future
lately
attempted upon Peira;us, and to curb more effectually the JNIeganotwitlistauding the
trade.
it
Having recovered the principal of those dependencies in Thrace, whose revolt had given rise to the war, having checked defection in Asia by the severe punishment of the Lesbians, having
learnt to despise the ravage of Attica, and, safe within their walls,
commanded
3.
and means to prosecute offensive operations. Nicias, with a fleet of sixty triremes, \vent to the iland of Melos; whose people, a Lacedasnioniaa colony, tho through dread of
tlie
had avoided acting with the Peloponnesians, yet rejected the Athenian It was expected that, the waste of alliance, and refused to pay tribute. but the Melian-i their lands would have brought them to submission
;
not to
treat,
enterprize,
fleet
left
Attica.
met by
the
Sect. VI.
14
Eurymedon son of
conduct at Corcyra,
soverein.
it
appears,
The
ships.
wasted what was readily within reach, and then he also returned home.
to have
had no great
little
object.
Apparently,
on those of
their enemies
who
The purpose of
allies,
and
Thucyd.
c
1.3.
01
war.
Phormion,
during his
command on
that
c- 7.
some
In the
Avar,
\vas
appointed to the
command
ing
With
these he successfully
ravaged the coast of Laconia, and then, according to his orders, send-
home
Naupactus,
and
after an unsuccessful
attempt
In
tlie
.
in an
c.
91.
Thirty were
cisthenes.
now
sent to Naupactus,
c.
9i-
Vol.
II.
of
U5
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Chap.XV.
of the Leucadian territory, whose garrison he put to tlie sword; and then, collecting the allies of those parts, Acarnanians, Zacynthians,
and Ccphallenians, in addition to the Xaupactian Messenians, who Avere in effect Athenian subjects, and obtaining fifteen triremes from
Corcyra, he proceeded against Leucas itself
to resist such a force in
the
field,
abandoned
The Acarnanians
were highly desirous to reduce a city perpetually hostile to them, and But, before the siege could situate in a manner within their country.
be formed, Demosthenes was allured by a more splendid, tho far more liazardous project, suggested by the Naupactian Mcssenians.
yEtolia
was a
much more
formidable
foe
to
Naupactus
the
than
Leucas to Acarnania.
Always numbered
among
members of
the Greek nation, yet even in that age, M-hcn science and art were
in Attica, scarcely
borders,
the
iEtolians
v.'ere
Since the
among them.
Tliuryd. 1.3.
'^'^^'
They
they spoke
them
flesh:
they used
senians urged, that this hostile people might be subdued with the
force
now
collected
in that part
Not only
these argu-
ments ingaged
which they
Having reduced
within his
command,
Cv Union
in Doris.
him with
by the
allies
of the Ptloponnesians
and
if a
Sect. VI.
U7
he
friends.
that powerful hostile province, that, with due cooperation from Athens,
and some assistance from a party favoring democracy, which was to be found in every Grecian state, there was no degree of success against
the enemies of the
commonwealth
if
which
it
The The
Acamanians, disappointed
own
viev/s,
and offended
at the preit.
its
for returning
home.
The
all
remained
infantry
apparently
were
any
and
practice in
valuable.
acquainted with
the strength of iEtolia, and were likely to be the greatest sufferers from
in
recommending
it;
and
to give It
up a favorite
recur.
the siege of Leucas should be postponed, and that the forces under the
Athenian general should enter .Etolia by the nearest way from QEneon,
while the CEueonians took
country.
in
the interior
whole Timcyd. the precinct of the temple of Nemeian Jupiter, on the ^' ^
so little numerous, that the
1.
3.
V 2
and
148
HISTORY OF GREECE.
and Ticliium, were taken
in as
Chap. XV.
many
clays;
tasuch an amount
M'as sent to
Eupoliuni
army remained
Tichium.
Thucyd.
c. 57*'
1.3.
As soon
iiians,
as it
was
still
without waiting for the Locrians, who had not yet joined him,
his
c 07.
&1.4.
He was now
with his
little
in a
full
of
defiles,
infantry.
Meanwhile the
1.3. C.96.
who had
from
his
preparations,
had already
neigh-
most distant
borhood
of .Egitium.
come
to
no regular ingagement
throwing their
made down
army
and,
in various parts,
running
the
hills,
darts,
retiring
retired,
arrival,
armed
tlie ^litolians,
and accustomed
action.
to as
in their desultory
mode of
As long
98.
the few
bowmen
ill
kept off
armed
for defence.
But when,
Morn
with long exertion, and their arrows were nearly spent, their com-
the darts
of the ^Etolians,
Aveapons, they
retreat.
could
no
resource
in
Pursued
by
men,
practised
killed.
running
among
on
rocks they
and
mountains,
many were
depended
those
^lessenian,
whom
had principally
as their
among
and, a
to
it,
who
early
fell.
Some then
dells,
fire
and
all
were destroyed.
lost,
ilight
historian,
ricnced
Sect. VI.
149
command, was
Avhole
M'ar,
killed,
heavy-armed Athenians
and of
all
fell in
the
Of the
allies
The
at
The
for burial, through the usual ceremonies, those of the Athenians were
carried to Athens
by the returning
fleet;
mander, fearing to meet the anger of his soverein the Athenian people,
remained at Naupactus.
circumstance which,
in the
i.
3.
^"^'
lians
moment, the indignation of an ill-informed public. The ^Etohad sent three ambassadors, one from each of their principal
Corinth and Lacediemon, to request assistance against the
;
clans, to
common enemy
pactus,
Naufor
means
and
keeping a
in the western
seas.
The
success
obtained against
it
scruples,
was
royal
command.
The
allies only,
i&ii-
The Ozolian
iEtolia,
Locrians,
were
then in
alliance
more appre-
in alliance
with Laceda^mon
all
and
him
that he
the Ozolian
Locris,
,Vo
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Locris, so little firm was
it
Chap. XV.
by negotiation
in the
Athenian
interest,
than by arms.
The
through
all
The narrow
Urged
at the
nesian confederacy.
Of
the Pelopon-
but refused to ingage in offensive alliance against the AtheHj^reans refused even to give hostages,
their territory
The
the Peloponnesian
villages.
forces
entered
The
in fidelity to their
ingagemeuts
with Athens and with their neighbors of Naupactus, their towns were
Thucyd.
'-
1.
3,
sent to Cytinion in
lO--
Doris, and the iEtolian forces having joined the Peloponnesian, Eury-
lochus entered the Naupaclian territory, ravaged the whole, and took
the suburbs of Naupactus, which were unfortified.
Postponing then
Uncom-
missioned he went
into Acarnania
and, tho at
first
ill
received, he
till
he obtained
whom
he passed by sea to
Naupactus.
The
security
The disappointment on
had
solicited
his
Argos.
Skct. VI.
iji
submission of
would
Lacedemo-
drawing
his forces
Autumn was
already advanced,
when
a body
!..?.
Ambracian heavy-armed foot entered Argeia (so the territory of the Amphilochian Argos was called) and seized Olpa?, a strong fortress upon a hill close upon the gulph, belonging to the Acarnanians, but
little
^^^'
communicated through Acarnania, and the force of the countr}' was assembled part marched to the assistance of Argos, part was stationed
:
at Crenffi in Amphilochia, to
the motions on
all
sides
At
commanding
;
requesting succour
but,
had taken
and while he was yet afraid to meet the judgement of the despotic multitude in his own country, in this critical moment
at him,
office
of commander-in-chief
forces of
all
This remarkable
fact,
highly honorable to Demosthenes, proves more than that he was personally respected
among
the Acarnanians.
slaves
among
number of
village republics,
Hence,
in a great measure,
the admitted superiority of the Athenians and Lacedfenionians to the other Greeks; and hence the Acarnanians felt the want of a
moment
of their
affairs,
Eurylochus,
156
Thucvd.
1.3.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Chap.XV.
Eurylochus, upon receiving information of the movement of the Ambraciots, crossed the AcheloLis, and hastened through Acarnania.
the
women
in
the fortified
till
he reached
a detached district,
occupied by an
8.
OOP
^tohan
tract,
Thence proceeding over an uncultivated mountainous ^^ and evading thus the body of Acarnanians appointed to watch
tribe.
his
in Olpee.
Strong with
this junction,
who brought
Mes-
The
Amphi-
whom
the allied
the
enemy
The army
in
107, los.
Thus
many
line
his flank.
nians, apparently
whom
The
Amphilochians,
of the
line:
the Argians
Sect. VI.
BATTLE OF
On
left
O LP
iE.
i^5
the other side Eurylochus, with a chosen against Demosthenes and the Messe-
of his
line,
mixed with the Ambraciots; who, being a Corinthian colony, preserved the Peloponnesian arms and discipline, and were
esteemed the best soldiers of that part of the continent.
left
flank,
the
rear
and
this
was communi-
Demosthenes
profited
particular seconding
antient heroes
him with a valor worthy of the fame of their and quickly the left and center of the enemy were
But
in the
others,
who
held the
of
battle,
loss,
The
great,
generals,
By the unforeseen train of circumstances which led to this battle, and much by the activity and able conduct of Demosthenes, both in previous measures and in the action itself, the face of things was now
completely changed in the western countries
;
if
Meneda^us, with
at
a loss
whom the command of the defeated for measures. He had force indeed
he held, but means
Avere v/anting to
Thucyd. is.
'^^
^^9-
defend
tlie fortress
Vol.
II.
subsist
U4
subsist there.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
He bad no
fleet,
Chap. XF.
stores,
the Athenian
therefore,
excluded supplies.
On
when he
granted
and quickly.
objects
;
in their
service, at
mercy
and
Menedceus
and then the Peloponnesians, of whom the Mantineians were the largest surviving portion, went out in small parties, under pretence of gatherino;
others, as soon as
it
was
observed that
them.
their
camp perceiving
interfered,
this,
without
commanders
some went
so far
interest betrayed.
The
pass-
and much contention, which the Ambraciots i-etaiued so nearly the armour,
arose,
and speech of
difficult.
Thucyd.
'*
1.
3.
About two hundred were killed; the rest reached Agrais, whose prince, Salynthius, gave them a kind reception. The administration of Ambracia, on receiving intelligence that their
troops were possessed of Olpae, had hastened to support them with their
^^^'
U2i
had already entered Amphilochia, when information of their march Immediately that general sent a strong ^vas brought to Demosthenes.
detachment of Acarnanian troops to preoccupy the
4
defiles
of the highl^vnt'S),
Sect. VI.
lands,
-vvliich
!5if
enemy must cross to enter the plain of Argeia. A fevr miles from Olpse were two loft}^ hills, called Idomene, at the liighest of which the detachment arrived by night, unperceived by the Ambraciots, who were incamped on tlie other hill. Demosthenes, after having made the remainder of his army take refreshment, marched in the
evening
in
two divisions
plain, the
About daybreak
still
at their
his
own
The
surprize
was
in
lout immediate.
among
their
own
Some who had made toward the gulph, seeing the Athenian close in with the shore, swam to them; in the urgency of the
to receive their death from Grecian
Amphilochians.
As
if
more than
Next day
Thncyd.
'^'
1.
3*
^^^'
killed
on that occasion.
at the
and astonished
whom
with
on being informed of the extent of the calamity, that he returned without executing his commission. During the whole war,
grief,
it
assault.
in their chiefs
cj
^oCr
tliere
HISTORY OF GREECE.
were
cities,
Chai-.
XV.
in
tliose parts,
be treated with deference; but when nothing- remained adverse to the Alhenian interest, they would not long avoid the fate of so many other
slates,
Tliuryd. 1.3. people.
once
allies,
but
now
from warfare;
so,
meet
his
fellowcitizens,
carried
the con-
liberal policy,
of
vhich we cannot but wish that Grecian history afforded more examples. They permitted the refugees in Agrais to pass, under assurance of
safety, to
they concluded
treaty
the Amphilochians;
Ambraciots should
be bound to act offensively with the Acarnanians against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians with the
and the only concessions required were, that whatever towns or lands the Ambraciots had taken from the Amphilochians should be
nians
:
restored,
war in
a\
assist
Anactorium
in
the
reward.
established for a
long time,
among
tended to
Polyb.1.4.
we
P'299-
v'ere respected
Sect. Vir.
157
SECTION
jected by the Athenian Administration.
thenes
:
VII.
Conquest
in Sicilij pro-^
Pi/liis
occupied by Demos-
Blockade of Sphacteria : Negotiation of the Laccdcemoniuns Clcon appointed General of the Athenian Forces at Athens. Application for Peace from Lacedcemon to Sphacteria taken:
Athens.
The
Athenians were
now
and waste of
their forti-
Attica,
fications,
want of
in
his
were however
felt
the general
conduct of
affairs
an authority
fifth
c. 425.
?^i1.
contrary to the admonition of Pericles, were looking after forein con- Thucyd.
quest.
i.
allies
to support
^' *"
power
led
them
to covet
might reduce
1.
In the winter a
fleet
3.
off,
with
command
in Sicily;
and
1.4. c.2>
in spring
tlie
number
followed, under
Sostratidas.
that the city of Corcyra was reduced to extreme famine by the expelled
now
masters of
all
it,
Eurymedon and
Those officers,
lishment.
way
to Sicily.
and Pythodorus
also,
158
lislimcn!".
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Dcmostlicnes
Avas in
CuAr. XV,
no
office military
beyond the term for which the people specifically granted it. But he M-as now become a favorite of the people; and irregularities of all kinds seem to liave been growing familiar in the Athenian government.
character,
rank'*, he was
fleet
force, the
'^
No
occurred,
when,
oflf
the
Laconian shore,
and
Avas already
at Corcyra.
Eurymedon and
Sophocles, probably
never well
please<l
thought tliemselves
contrary, claiming
now justified
tlie
voyage for
Demosthenes on the
and when that service for which he was commissioned, and which the interest of tlie commonwealth required, was performed there, it would
be time enough
refusal,;
but
it
The admirals persisted happened that a storm compelled them to seek refuge
to proceed for Corcyra.
in
ia
which Demosthenes
desired to make.
4.
best of Greece,
was
at this time
Str
b*^^l
Descr. de
par^elliD.
Demosthenes to
rison
fortify
some advantageous
and place
a gar-
** '0*Ti Ihurn.
'^
We
nature of the joint commands, so usual in the AOieuian and othtr Grecian services,
given
to
different kind.
Thucydides
sufficiently
possession,
Sect. VII.
possession,
155
views,
and whose Doric speech would give them great advantage for incursion irpon the Lacedemonian lands. Unable however to persuade
the generals at
all
still
in vain.
A regular
spirit
must have been great, when, with subordination so deficiently inforced,. and in some cases so ill understood, a regularity of cmrduct so generally prevailed, that
disci-
pline. It
ef the
fleet
tired of inaction,
fort.
took
No
for
made
laid in the
size permitted:
were
filled
want of
on
and
The
was used
should be attacked, and the greater part of the circuit was strong by
nature.
1.4,
now
proceeded on
its
When
so
the
first
c. 5.
which
much ingaged
the Greeks.
for,
little
excited ridicule:
and
1.G0
HISTORY OF GREECE.
and
of Laceda?mon
Chap.XV.
intelligence,
a foit raised in six days, they thought, could not cost ihc strength
much time
there,
to take
and
<lestroy.
The same
in Attica,
made
a different impression.
4.
The invasion
commonly
Tliucyd.
1.
4,
of only fifteen days in Attica, Agis hastened back into Peloponnesus. It was not long before the business of Pylus began to be more
seriously considered also at
Lacedoemon.
A
sea,
lortress
on
their coast,
slaves, of
whom
cause, ever apprehensive, might indeed give very reasonable alarm; and the measures immediately taken in consequence, would alone go far to
deemed
at
first,
foes, the
Beside prorelieved,
the
being
was again
all
within Peloponnesus
city
marched
Lacedtemo-
The
situation of
critical.
Already
little
part of the enemy's forces were arrived, to form the siege of his
garrison,
when he
He just
saved
medon
sea.
at
It
to push
fleet
Athenian
could arrive
difficult,
against a fort
rate,
At any
however,
tlie
command of
the
SxcT.VII.
lOi
the harbour; and then the fort, scantily provided, and cut off from
supplies, could not hold long.
is
Pylus,
now
Navariuo,
Thiicyd.
pgg'cr.
'^j^lfc
!. -i.
at each
end of an iland,
du
de
The northern
nine.
admitted two triremes abreast; the southern not more than eight or
This iland the Laced asm oni an s occupied with a body of troops
:
other troops they disposed along the shore; and both entrances of the
harbour they proposed to defend with triremes, moored with their prows
toward the
sea.
without landing-place
Meanwhile Demosthenes,
his
to
make
1.
1.
command, hauled ashore the three triremes M'hich remained to him, and formed of them a kind of outwork against the sea, under his fort.
small Messenian privateers had accidentally put into Pylus; and
Two
with some shields, mostly of wicker, and other sorry armour which he
tlve
sailors
from
Forty
In the hasty
it
construction of his
toward the land, as the side on which the LacedEemonians were generally most to be apprehended. Toward the sea it was far weaker, but
tlien
on that side
it
To
resist
an army and a
his
fleet
moving
in
whole
force,
bowmen, whom he
whom
he took
to the
Where
power
soldiers
are
which soverein
legally
resides,
may
with impunity be
officers,
;
incouraging speeches
little
may
be often necessary
and to such a
band
" Naiirat. Tliose who constructed tlic fort were soldiers, rjaTnirai, but Ibe bisforian does not mention what proportion tliere was of each.
Vol.
II.
as
i64
HISTORY" OF GREECE.
as that with
1.
Chap. XV,
very arduous under-
V
Tlnicyd.
*"
'
in a
4.
taking,
'
companions
'let
no man
'
now think
to
show
'
the safety
of us
all.
'
we
'
make
enemy
We
Athenians,
'
know
'
no easy
'
ponnesians then,
now
try
it;
for,
'
adding the
difficulties
us,
*-
we
This
of enterprize,
which
in the
deliberate valor
Mhich defence
requires,
effect,
and the
The Peloponnesian fleet consisted of forty-three triremes, mostly of the allies, but commanded in chief by Thrasymclidas, a Spartan'*,
While the
cipal
was threatened on all sides, by sea and land, the prinattack was made from the fleet, precisely where Demosthenes
fort
expected.
at a time,
and those
there-
not without
fore carried
surf.
on by
exertion.
Some of
nevertheless, hesitating
at the view of the dangers of the shore, the Spartan Brasidas, wlio
com-
manded a trireme, became presently distinguished by the Athenians, ^oud in expostulation: 111 it became them,' he said, to spare their timbers, when the enemy possessed a post in the countr}^ the Lace'
'
'
'
allies.
Striking, splitting,
'
make themselves
'
it.'
''
ECT.VII.
PYLUS BESIEGED
by the
LACEDAEMONIANS.
'^'
ino
Thucyd.
^^'
Having compelled his master to lay his galley close to the shore, he was stepping upon the gangboard '^ to lead the landing, when a number of the enemy's missile weapons at once struck him; insomuch that he fainted,
and
fell
1.4.
which
lose,
among
sea.
Notwithstanding
success of Brasidas,
c. i3.
the attempt to force a landing was repeated through the whole of that
day, and part of the next, but was resisted so efficaciously that at length
the
fleet
drew
off.
Demosthenes then,
for the
incouragement of
his
c. i3.
people,
trophy, of
became the
honorable ornament.
No
stain,
of the owner
Greece,
it
of the inci-
dent, that
to Brasidas.
now
of succeeding by
siege,
and with
Before
make
battering-engines.
Eurymedon
Approaching
enough
enemy's
it
their army,
On
the
morrow he
sea.
ill
The Peloponnesian
fleet
commanded
the
the resolution was taken to ingage within the bason; .where the confined space,
was entering unopposed by both Tlmcyd. ^^' the mouths, while the greater part of the Peloponnesian crews were
fleet
'^'
advantage.
4,
but
iC4
HISTORY OF GREECE.
way
;
Chap. XV.
the crews
how-
The Athenians then proceeded to attack the ships upon the beach, and to haul away those from w Inch The Lacedemonian landforces, mortified by thg the creus had fled.
ever escaping from
all
except one.
but
far
more alarmed
pressed
down
to the shore.
their galleys,
fierce
Athenians from
After
all
much
off,
on both
five
sides,
the
Lacedeemonians secured
first
taken.
With
drew
which they
Euryas
medon
Thucjd.
*' ^' 1.4.
erected his trophy, and then directed hi& care to keep a strict
Sphacteria, looking
watch upon
lot
from the several lochi of the army, with attending Helots, whose number the historian does not mention. These indeed were little
thought of; but among the others were some connected with most of
the principal families of Lacednsmon.
The
transactions,
all
without inconvenience.
felt,
loss of inhabitants to
when four
killed or taken
it
was the
ties
loss
of those inti-
of blood, by religious
and most of
all if
by party prejudices.
But the military
bring boys to manhood, and by fresh biilhs; unless the invidious and
slaves
Sect. VII.
165
slaves to be citizens.
who
filled
number of
public measures.
Intelligence of the transactions at Pylus
nation.
filled
The men
in Sphacteria
had not,
like the
Romans, whom, we
disgraced themselves by
situation in the accidental turn of dut}', with their honor clear, they
were likely to become a sacrifice to the mismanagement, or deficient exertion of those who, by more eifectually opposing the Athenian fleet,
ought to have preserved them from such calamitous circumstances. The principal magistrates therefore of Lacedfemon, the leaders of the
administration
the exact state
'',
came
to the
camp
it
enter into negotiation with the enemy, with a view to a treaty of peace.
truce was accordingly agreed upon, of which these were the con'
ditions:
all
and
of the Lacedemonian
Pylus
That the
time, the
truce should hold during their absence, and that, on their return,
the ships delivered should be restored
:
That, in the
mean
Lacedaemonians should be permitted to supply their people in the iland with provisions in specified quantities, under the inspection of
That the Athenians should still keep their naval guard over the iland, hut not land upon it; and that the Laceda3monians should send no vessel thither, but in conformity to the terms of the truce That a breach of any one article of the treaty should be
Athenian
officers
: :
The
IC6
HISTORY OF GREECE.
The Lacedcemonian ambassadors
to manage, in itself difficult,
", arriving at
Chap. XV.
The
distress
M'as peculiar to
;
their
own
state,
but
any treaty
their allies
must be included
the
to
it
avoid offence.
Before the
In their speech,
alliance offensive
possessed
in
and
their fellowcountrymen,
manner prisoners in Sphacteria, they glory which would redound to Athens, from a peace
a
in a situation rather to grant
whence might
4,
It
was not without probable ground for supposing the proposal would
Aristopli.
Pax
et
They knew
AchcLlR.
the Athenian people had always been averse to the war; and that a
majority' of them, since they
had experienced
its evils,
it.
had more
tlian
for a conclusion of
But, at this
favor which Cleon had acquired with the lower people, proved
an
commanded
in war,
that
all
of their confederacy; and that these possessions had been wrested from
them, not
mity,
but by a treaty
that which
to the
similar
to
now
had
compelled them to consent. This therefore was the time for recovering
*
The name of
'dides, is given
by Aristophanes, Equit.
those
Sect. VII.
those possessions.
CLEO
xV
DEMAGOGUE.
that the Lacedtemonians in
167
It should be insisted
soon as Nistea and Pegte were surrendered to the Athenians, and the
administrations of Achaia and Troezcn restored to the footing upon
Accordingly such
To
1,
4.
utterly imprudent.
Instead therefore of
more
of a general
assembly admitted.
it
afforded opportunity
and an opinion of
it,
his
own
political sagacity.
'
He
exclaimed against
before,'
Well he knew
he
*
came with
injurious
now
tlieir
requisition
it
to treat with a
all.
manifest to
If
they liad anything just and honorable to propose, they need not
hesitate to speak
publicly.'
anj'
desirous of
an accommodation upon
among
them,
ill
allies,
which might
They
c.
23,&39.
<-'^
The Lace-
l^'^i
June,
little
all
Thuof
it.
spirit
Whether
16S
HISTORY OF GREECE.
\Vhetlier Dcmostlienes or
business,
Chap. XV.
Eurymedon was
;
we
but
in
favor of either
may
be
observed,
that
was extremely
hazardous,
when
responsibility
tlie
wayward
soverein
If Cleon, or any other turbulent orator, could persuade the people that
their o-enerals
tao-e
ought not
own
authority,
that the letter of the treaty warranted, their utter ruin, even
capital condemnation,
conduct.
Both
parties
now
The
and
tlie
at
two triremes Mere constantly circumnavigating it during day, night the whole fleet kept watch; in moderate weather all around
;
iland
A reinforcement
the fleet seventy.
made
the
number of
Rut the
object for which the Lacedaemonians were most anxious was to relieve
1.4.
was famine.
freedom to Helots,
JNIany
especially
bloMMng nights,
when
Some supply
skins filled
was
also carried
by
divers,
and dragging
after
them
The blockade of
which
tliey
In their fort
ample
armament
whole which was reduced to the use of brackish the sand under the fort. All the rest of
and
Sect. VII.
i6!)
and the
triremes, far
of time, had not convenient room even for their crews to sleep or to
eat aboard
;
it,
among
ships
upon
went ashore by
reliefs
The
army was
that
it
ere long
com-
Thucyd.
1.
4.
municated to Athens, and reasonable apprehension arose that approaching winter would increase the
difficulties
;
would become
in
and
that,
could be
obtained, the fleet could not remain, during the stormy season, on a
It
if
at least the
first
proposal
for the
Lacedemonians would
evil
coun-
felt or
apprehended.
lie found
(if,
in the
want of
'
another,
we may use
insisting,
lie
This assertion
who brought
'
The assembly
to this request,
and Cleon himself was named among those to be comPressed by this proposal, which he was
his end,
others,
It
were
idle
waste of time,' he
to send
comto
missioners to inquire,
Vol.
II.
execute.
170
'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
execute.
''
Chap.
tlie
XT.
com-
would be
which they
'
band
it.'
in Sphacteria
Thucyd.
c.
1.
4.
'
The unenterthus
calle<I
tlie
2S.
prizing Kicias,
oftice.
'As
fav as
said,.
p.lea.sed,
offer,
thinking
made
5:
Nicias,
he,
his proposal had not displeased the people, declared solemnly before the assembly, that for the business of Pylus he waved his right to com-
mand.
still
more the
temper of
that Cleoa
mobs",
make
his
command, and
should take
danger, was
it.
Thus appointed
the
elated with
extravagant honor
'
He
did not fear the Laced asmonians,' he said; 'and for the expedition
to Pylus, he
'
would
desire
no Atlienian
forces
*
*
allies;
'
'
Lacedaemonians in
'
Amid
the
many
business, this
yet even the graver men, says the historian, were, upon the whole
pleased with the event, upon considering that of
OTty
l^Xoi (fiMi
isoiitt.
Thucyd.
l.-t.
it
c..'28.
"
was
in
it
so.
the
-Sect
V IT.
CLEO
or,
N GEN
-
K RA
L.
j.?i
the Lacedasmonians,
finally delivered
It however soon appeared, that tho. for a man, like Cleon, unversed in
mililary
command, the
and the
bratfginpj
was
in the
moment
generally imagined
and
of
far-
man
himself,
He had
received intelligence
Tliucyd. I.*,
^'
that Demosthenes had already formed the plan, and was preparing for
the attempt, with the forces upon the spot or in the neighborhood.-
~^'
Hence
his apparent
judiciously
accommodated
by He further showed his judgement, when the decree was to be passed which was finally to direct the
avoiding to require any Athenians.
expedition, by a request,
which was
in the
Demosthenes
command.
there,
The
lune in jEtolia
But
it
had
happened that a
provisions,
fire,
made by
bad burnt almost the whole. Their best defence being thus destroyed, Demosthenes, now inabled to see his enemy and his ground, no longer
hesitated concerning measures.
as
He had
allies,
to an
anomalous command,
commonin the
and
it
made any
difficulty
of yieldin"-
of
his soverein,
command with
Cleon.
it
When
his reinforcement,
was determined
z 2
not
j7
not.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
be
Chap. XV.
managed by negotiation
men
in Sphactcria
come
to
some accommodation.
intire
This being refused, Cleon and Demosthenes prepared to use the force
Giving one
a little
day of
all their
on both
sides of Sphacteria,
An advanced
c.
313.2.
As soon
as
rest
bowmen, about
many
middleand,
fort,
name of
The
force
all
it
of
whom
been originally but four hundred and twenty, and thirty of those were
killed in the outpost.
who,
after landing
slaves,
and of those
in the iland,
we
are
liis
not informed.
main body,
in the central
iland afforded.
by
next Pylus.
Among
the
first
when
:
and cul-
tivated fruits
to hold a secure
numerous
slaves.
the more determined courage requisite for the use of them, and of their
greater efficacy in the hands of brave and able
men wherever
they can
be
Sect. Vir.
ATTACK OF SPHACTEllIA.
in plains
17?
But
as,
mountainous countries,
all
and of
Greece,
it
and yet
with his
to give
suffering for
want of
little
them annoyance, we fiud the Lacedaemonians often light troops and missile weapons. Epitadas chose, band, to meet an enemy who so outnumbered him, in
;
necessary to him, but because there the weapons and the discipline of
his people
would be most
efficacious.
the
first
cultivated; and
we
find the
Demosthenes had been taught by misfortune both how to value light troops, and how to use them and Cleon's prudence left him the direction of operations. He placed
superior troops of their kind.
his light-armed
in
it,
lie
Epitadas
did not
advanced
to
meet superior numbers; but, as he attack Demosthenes, he was assailed on each flank and
refuse
to
Thucyd.
^'
1. 4-.
^^'
and
stones.
If he turned, those
who
thus
fled
from
his attack,
and
his
heavy-armed would
his
them
but the
moment be resumed
annoyance.
march toward
their
of the LacedEemonian heavy infantry at this time in Greece, that with all the advantage of numbers on their side, the light-armed of the
Athenian army had not approached them without awe, and, as Thucydides expresses it, a kind of servile apprehension. But, incouraged by
the effect which their
sition
wary exertions derived from the able dispoof Demosthenes, and by the evident inability of the Lacediemofirst
This desultory manner of action astonished the Lacedaemonians with its novelty: the ashes and dust, formed by the late conflagration,
rising
17
risiup:
HISTORY OF GREECE.
and mingling
llicir
Chap. XV,
missile weapons,
tiieir
disabled
their
;
arms
tlicy
TlMicvd.
1.
4.
of command. when many ere already sevevely wounded, they retreated in a compact body toward The light-armed, their reserve in the castle, which wa not far distant.
iKHse of the irregular assailants
tlie
drowned
voice
cfl^'ectual
opposition,
v\
gained the
fort, -but
not without
loss.
The
now
obviated, Demosthenes
old walls,
was already
thirst
in the
day
and
the
when
35.
troops
coming
to
way by
The
through confidence
in the natural
difhcult}-,
he made
his
way
57.
now no
therefore,
checked
their troops,
who would
offer quarter,
the sw ord
Lacedtemonians
would submit
to
become
approaching, they grounded their shields and waved their hands, inti-
Epitadas was no
more;
iiippa^retes,
his
wounded
S^CT.Vir.
SURUENTDER OF SPHACTERIA.
laj'
173
wounded
the
that he
for lifeless
among
whom
was
command had
monian army; and after tlie interchange of two or- three messages, a final answer came to the garrison of the iland in these terms The
:
'
''
own
their
safety, admitting.
'
'
nothing disgraceful*'.'
Greek expression,
On
the
the
The
killed
and the prisoners two hundred and ninety-two. Of the fate of the Helots and- others, who were with the Lacedaemonians in Sphacteria,
harbour Thucyd. L^.^ ^^^' to that i the iland, had continued seventy-two days, including the
in the
truce of twenty days, during which the garrison was regularly served
with provisions.
For the
rest
economy of Epitadas, provisions remained when the iland was The Athenian commanders, leaving a siifificient garrison in taken. Fylus, sailed away with the fleet; Eurymedon with his division for
the
Corcyra and
Sicily,
the;
port of PeirtEus with their prisoners within twenty days after he had
it.
Thucyd. 1,4.
event; for
it v/as
among some
race,
it
same
with
J7C
HISTORY OF GREECE.
with their comrades
liary,
Chap. XV.
killed.
with more
ill
wit,
Tiiucyd. 1.4.
'
men of
superior rank
'
To which
the Spartan
if it
coldly replied,
'An arrow
'
'
The
c. 41.
prisoners, behig
with the
first
families
by a decree of the
come
to
some accommodation,
Such were
to
at that
time
the
be the most
civilized,
the motives for preferring death in the field to the condition so mild,
in
in
of war.
By
new
to them.
From
the
first
establishment of
such a number of their citizens had fallen into the hands of an enemy;
and
it
was as
little
country
bers,
u'ith
num-
found
.sure
monian government, anxiously desirous of peace, expected only insult from the haughty temper of their enemy, should they send ministers
publicly to propose ternis.
**
(^
repeated trials by
Ka^oi KayaCoi
secret
Sect. VII.
NEGOTIATION BROKEN
The
wiser and
OFF.
177
fecret negotlatien.
more
those of higher rank in general, would gladly have profited from present
prosperity, to
make an advantageous accommodation. But the arrogance of the people, fed by success, and inflamed by the boisterous eloquence of Cleon, now the popular favorite, made all endevors for
the salutary purpose fruitless.
Vol.
II.
AA
173
CHAPTER
from
Year.
XVI.
for
Peace
Laced^mon
the tenth
SECTION
Expedition under Nicias
Corcyrcean Sedition.
dcemo7iia'n to the
I.
Corinthian Coast.
Conclusion of the
Embassy from Persia to Lacedxmon. LaceHand of Cythera, and JEginetan Settlement at Thyrea,
Inhiwianity of the Athenians.
at this point of Grecian history,
IF,
stopping for a
moment
we turn
pen of the cotemporary historian, we cannot but admire the able policy, the clear foresight, and the bold firmness of him who has by fome writers,
antient and modern, been traduced as the
end, unfortunate war, the all-accomplished Pericles
any
now
offered,
and to exert
which might have given stability to peace through the country. What might have been done, had Pericles and his virtuous and venerable friend the Spartan king
Archidamus met
in
such a
crisis,
we
might amuse
were
we
by Thucydides, and illumined with no inconby other cotemporary and nearly cotemporary
for carrying into effect the noble
project,
Sect.I.
expedition UNDER
NICIAS.
"''^''^*
179
Plut.vit.
project, said to
But the
wanting
Greece.
such a union
;
among any
people
some
pressure of a forein
power
is
superiority of force
in surrounding states.
No
such pressure at
:
this
so
well understood,
so little
abounded
the
scarcely known.
The
little
repub-
lics therefore
the past, for they were not always led by the capacious mind of a
Pericles, vainly
resist
likely to arise
upon earth
among
and tho Xenophon was aware of their error, yet he was not aware of any good remedy for the weakness of the antient
republics,
political
system of Greece.
moderation
own
arrogance.
The conduct of
and by the
the war moreover, on the part of the Athenians, was so far rendered
easy,
pledges in their hands, which secured them from invasion, that they
might chuse
formed, so
measures.
Any
likely to be
to success.
Passion seems
1
first
upon
all
occasions,
'"
*2;
"
fleet
q'i
P.
'^'
7,
and a landforce imbarked, consisting of two thousand Athenian heavyarmed foot and two hundred horse, with the auxiliary troops of Miletus,
Andrus, and Caiystus.
Nicias commanded.
w.
^'^l'^*^''^''*
A A
180
HISTORY OF GREECE.
of
tlie
Chap. XVI.
ing up the Saronic gulph, made the shore between Chersonesus and The Corinthians, apprized Rheiliis, scarcely eight miles from Corinth.
its
hundred
men
marched
Thucyd.
^'
in
the night unobserved, landed his troops near Chersonesus. The Corin1.
4.
thians, quickly
half their
*^'
efforts,
The Corinthian
rest
of the army, distressed for want of cavalry to oppose the Athenian, but in good order, to some strong ground in
its rear.
retreated,
The The
theirs,
otherwise small: they dared not await the junction of the forces from
less,
and
and
would come
in.
him two of
his dead,
not been immediately found. Apprehensive then of the popular ill-will to which this might give occasion, he sent a herald to
the Corinthians to request the bodies
;
^'c-
But the decided command of the sea, which the Athenians possessed, gave them means to distress their enemies greatly, with little risk to themselves. The antient ships of war were singularly commodious for
operations
in
any wind,
if
and
Tbucyd.
*^'
for debarkation
1.
4.
boats.
their forces
iii
the
*^'
now unguarded
Sect.
I.
SEDITION-.
tlie
181
the adjacent country, incamperl for the night, and reimbarking early
in the morning, were thus at once secure from the revenge of
Corin-
They then proceeded to the Epidnurian coast, and seizing Methone, a town on a small peninsula between Epidaurus and Troezen, they raised a fortification across the isthmus. The fleet then returned home but a garrison, left in Methone, carried depredation, as opporthian arms.
;
summer brought the tragedy of the Corcyrsean Eurymedon and Sophocles, according to sedition to a conclusion. their instructions, making Corcyra in their way from Pylus to Sicily,
The
close of this
debarked their
the fort on
forces, and,
city,
stormed
;
mount
it
Istone, held
by the
aristocratical
Corcyraans
most
difficult
was inexpugnable.
to subsist there, they were soon obliged to surrender; their auxiliaries to the discretion of the besieging army, and themselves to that of the
Athenian people.
Eurymedon and
Sophocles,
unwilling to give to
others the triumph of leading their prisoners into Athens, and to lose
is
pre-
new
objects, placed
them
of Ptychia,
as
on
should attempt escape, the benefit of the capitulation should be forfeited for
belief,
all.
if it
The atrociousness of what followed would be beyond came attested by less authority than that of Thucydides '.
were the Athenian people to decree the
for mercy,
The
They devised
them
were
to their
own
destruction.
employed
to infuse
vessel in
in France
had beggared
all
ideas formerly
Lyons, after
its
among
some
principal circumstances.
they
18
Thucyd.
^'
1.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
4.
Chap. XVI.
they so beyond
snare,
all
things abhorred.
The
*^'
and
M'ere
The
if
we may
com-
pleted,
and that as
order, the
among
The
prisoners
were placed
The
door.
Twenty
whom
they bore
excited.
any
c.
ill-will,
moment
48.
when the
of what
would neither go
people, not to
in.
The
roof,
and taking
off"
the covering,
some beds which were in the place, some with strips of their own clothes, some used the weapons which had been discharged at them. When day broke, all were found dead. The corpses, heaped upon waggons, were carried out of the
strangled themselves with the cords of
city,
among the
after the
Eurymedon,
completion of
Athenian
Being attacked
and
Sect.
I.
NEGOTIATION WITH
new colony drawn from
PERSIA.
183
and the
pied by a
From
it
the beginning of the war, intrigue had been carrying on by the Thucyd.
;
1.
4.
Grecian
republic
and contrariety
in
maxims of government,
the superior weight of the Persian empire, had prevented any treaty
After 24
'w. 7.
the
command of Aristeides
9}-
^'
"*
was to bring to
and the
passed
of several ministers
carried the
who had
Persia,
no two had
same proposals.
was not
examine
Greece
for Artaphcrnes
to conclude any treaty, but only to conduct into Persia ministers from
hitherto solicited
any
they were anxious not to embroil themselves with that powerful empire,
They would not however permit the minister to proceed to Lacedsemon. He was conveyed to Ephesus, and ambassadors from the Athenian people were appointed to attend him to the Persian court. But, on their arrival in
while they were ingaged in war with Peloponnesus.
Ionia,
Spring
J84
B. C. 424.
^'- TT-f-
HISTORY OF GREECE.
tunes, remained inactive
;
Chap. XVI.
still
many were
desirous
it
restless
and ardent
spirits prevailed,
and
was
all sides.
1.4.
The
iland of Cythcra
;
monian dominion
dation
the possession of
and
and
it
might
its
institutions
;
would permit.
The lands
were
stered
all
possessed
by Lacedaemonians
34.
The
any condition
c,
55.
this
much
to direct
may be
more
this
any
fortifications,
In opposition to
and strong
posts,
The consequence
risk
;
was,
anywhere without
they wasted
body of
An
unknown
and tho the consequence of the defeat was otherwise trifhiig, the fame of the event made a strong impression through Greece, and the Lacedaemonians
Sect.I.
daemonians
J8S
Tlmcyd.
1.4.
The Athenians
then sailing again from Cythera, after ravaging a part of the Epidaurian coast, proceeded to take their last
JEginetans,
now
Thyrea was
situated,
like
shore, hut
on
But the
and
they
still
On
fleet
deficiently
his
whole
in the
force, quickly
assault,
who
did not
fall
became prisoners
Lacedsemo-
Thyrea, being
once declared by an
oracle,
and confessed by
all
enemy
that ever
people directed
by a
deliberate decree.
established
by
all
executed.
number of
living pledges,
Another decision then waited the pleasure of the Athenian people, the fate of their new conquest of Cythera, and, particularly, that of
Vol.
II.
whom B b
it
unsafe
196
HISTORY OF GREECE.
unsafe to leave there.
Atlienian dominion.
Chaf.XVL
whom
the capituin their
The
rest
of the Cytherians, to
were however
left
unmolested
possessions; with a reserve only, from the whole iland, of four talents
in yearly tribute to Athens.
SECTION
Megara
:
II.
Sedition Thr-ace
of'
Distress of Laced(xmon
Ati'ovious Conduct
Jllovements in
jllaccdonia.
of the
Brasidas appointed
lead a
Peloponnesian
Army
B.C. 24.
<^'-tIt4.
into Thrace
The
superiority
now
tlie
appear decisive.
Their
commanded
their
more formidable
in a
own
protection to their
still
numerous
allies
among
the Athenian
flattery
to inflame, are
marked by
own
Aristoph.
esp. %.
satirist
'A
thousand
cities,'
comedy of
jije "Wasps,
'
Now
in a
'
us might live in
all
'
comeciy,
Aristopb.Av. " V 1 2''5 "
'
The
Birds,
is
tuous haughtiness
i
It
is
intolerable,' says
cs
*
'
1,050.
commanding man}' cities, should be treated ^^^*^^^ ^" ^'' ^^ superiority by the gods, who ought to know how to respect us as their betters.' And iu the same piece, the inordinate
craviiig
Sect.it.
craving of their
spred of a
sedition OF MEGARA.
restless
187
ambition
is
new
city
founded
in the air
by the
birds, the
Athenians are
enmity became of course mixed wifh the fear which the prevalence of
their arms infused
now
requiring attention.
The
circumstances
of the
little
republic
1.4.
Tho
demo-
^'
'
of their adherents, in
Megara
cease.
>vhileadversityinforcingmoderation
it
had
a fortified
communication.
At
ilet of Minoa, taken, as we have seen, by Nicias, upon the mouth of the harbour, was occupied by an Athenian and twice in every year it had been as a rule for the Athegarrison
;
rian
city,
much
The
they
were
power
which
this
lower people
friends of aristocracy.
and to
impending
ruin.
The
* The French, in the paroxysm of their democratiral niiinia, seem to /rom this antique joke their ideii of sending commissioners to fraternue
13
liave
all
borrowed
nations.
B 2
leaders
183
HISTORY OF GREECE.
leaders of the democratical party, finding this proposal
Chap.XVL
grow
popular,
fall
exile,
of their ,.ower, and perhaps the necessity of might follow, negotiated secretly with the
Athenian generals, Hippocrates son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes. Terms being settled, it was proposed to put the Athenians in possession of the walls connecting the city with
its
port
and,
in the former,
and the
it
latter,
was.
fall,
4.
conducted a squadron by
sufficient landforee,
Demosthenes marched a
little
and
After 13
July.
the long
v.alls
opposition.
The
IMegariaii
conspirators
Athenian army
among
its
oald probably not hold long. The select force which they had first led from Athens was joined by all the troops that could be spared from
the guard of the city, together with their usually attending slaves.
conlravallation was immediately
those houses
of the suburbs which lay conveniently for the purpose, formed a part
of
it;
work was
that in
two dajs
it
The
but
Not
being-
now
deprived of
this,
all
communication
precluded, tliey supposed the city already in the power of the opposite
party.
make any
effectual
all
resistance,
The Athenian
generals required
the
Lacedaemonians as prisoners at discretion: the others they agreed to ransom at a specified price.
Jyacedfemon, from the beginning of the war, far from having any
aiau
Sect.il
distress OF LACED..MON.
affairs,
IS^
man
and activity of a Phormion or a Demosthenes in the conduct of a campain. At this time, as Thucydides assures us, a general and very
unusual dejection prevailed in Sparta.
series
of misfortune and
defeat was what the LacedEemonians had not for ages experienced.
tomed
cation
to overbear opposition
insomuch that
:
it
seemed
as if great
abilities in a leader
were superfluous
appeared as
sufficient, as it
But a new
forbad.
for
which
To conduct
other abilities
and and
management were
The good
did not follow him in his succeeding attempts; he had been foiled
in
learn
as persevering,
as fruitful
as his
he alone among
new
enterit,,
which might
from the
evils
which pressed
M'as fallen,
which threatened.
favorable to his views, and particularly
sides, at the progress
sea,
long since
irresistible
by
midable by land.
The
terror of
Sicilian
Greeks to Thucyd.
^'
1.4.
and accommodate the differences MJiich had & cities of their Hand. Those who
^^'
seq,
had
190
Iiad
HISTORY OF GREECE.
been friends to Athens would no farther promote
its
Chap. XVI.
power
;
those
irritate its
vengeance: the
But
4.
the revolted cities in Thrace had not equally the means of chusing
Expecting that the vengeance which had cut off the people of iEgina from the face of tlie earth, would next fall ujjon them, there was nothing which they were not ready to undertake in oppotheir
party.
sition
to the
sucli apprehensions.
Nor was
the king of
Macedonia easy
any confidence that he could place in with the Athenian commonwealth, with which he
in
:
its
prince Arrhibteus.
These circumstances bringing the Macedonian monarch and the towns to a communication of counsels, they
in
had carried on
. 80.
common
They
vide
all
gladly received a
now
pressed them,
for
;
by sea
and by
fleets
through the
territory, in part,
of uncertain friends,
if
man
really so.
But the Lacedemonian administration was composed of men far from Brasidas. Tho they anxiously desired to carry the war to a distance, they feared to diminish their force at home;
4
where
Sect.
II.
MASSACRE OF HELOTS.
slaves,
191
ever,
^
objects
of jealousy
not
re-
be imagined.
Proclamation
M^as
Thucyd.
1.
by
their actions in
^ j^j^j
c.
,.
uumber should
be
67.
for the
same high
spirit
incite to seek
citizens,
by deeds of danger,
opportunity
Lacedsemon
Lace-
dtemon.
crowned with
temples.
About two thousand were accordingly chosen; and, being chaplets, were marched in solemn procession around the
Thus, as they were given to expect, they were to receive
in religious rites
with the
Soon
such careful secresy, that in what manner any one of them perished
Still
march by land as far as Thrace. But prudent and ingaging conduct among
the
xhucyd. 1.4
'^^'
in
the
Laconia, and
a colony in
Helots.
Lepieum. But in the 67th chapter of the same book we find the Brasidian soldiers,
Bfaa-i^iiDi
-faTiurai,
holding apparently
a.
from the
citizens.
71s>t,
Nia^afuihif,
the
newly admitted
in the
book we learn that the Helots who fought under Brasidas were presented with
but they were removed from
their freedom,
revolted
^9^
HISTORY OF GREECE.
revolted towns, had solicited his appointment to the
Chap.
XVL
of the
command
armament intended
vishes of Bras id as
;
for tlieir
support.
not refuse
him an honor
n-i J 1 . 1 luicyd. J. 4,
for
He
c c
SO. 70.
force assisjned him, was to increase the scanty o ' Peloponnesian states. the or by hire, among
It
as
he could, bv interest, .
'
in
his country.
The
allies
and a thousand Sicyonians and Phliasians, put themselves under his command and a requisition was dispatched into Boeotia for the force
;
On
his
army
at
Tripodiscus, he hastened,
hundred chosen
men, to
'.7i.
ISIegara,
nians.
in
The democratical
exiles,
LacedcEmonian general
and
own banishment
inevitable ruin.
by
Both
parties
expected
when
alarm
Sect.
II.
SEDITION OF MEGARA.
allies
19S
;
and
by hundred of their heavy-armed foot, with the very important addition of six hundred horse. The whole of his heavy-armed foot amounting
thus to six thousand, a force superior to the regular troops of the Athenian army before Megara, he marched immediately for that place.
The
Boeotian horse presently put to flight the Athenian light troops, scattered
The Athenian cavalry advancing to protect them, a commander of the Boeotian horse was
advantage otherwise gained on either
with
little
how
to dare.
Mcgarians
their measures.
camp an advantageous situation, very near Megara, and waited The Athenian generals, having already carried their purpose in a
it
1.4..
'*
what remained, to risk army they commanded, under disadvantageous circumstances, against a superior force. As soon then as the Megarians of the oligarutterly unadvisable, for
the
c. 7-t.
chal party were convinced that the Athenians would not venture a
battle, they
and
its allies,
thus
own
What
among
the instances
Tliucyd. 1,3.
*^'
of depravity in Grecian manners, to which Thucydides has in general terms adverted, imputing it in some degree to the example set in the
^~"
Those Megarians of the democratical party, who had been most forward in the Athenian interest, fearing apparently
Corcyrasan sedition.
the concurrence of the enmity of Lacedrcmon with that of their fellowcitizens,
1.
4, c,74,
exile.
Those %vho
had been
make
a composition with
What the
Fegx.
that
was aoreed
Vol. IL
194,
HISTORY OF GUEECE,
that a complete amnesty for
all
Chap. XVI.
sworn to by
all.
The
exiles
They vere
people of the Grecian towns were usually from time to time assembled,
whom
been most their enemies; preferred an accusation of treason against them before the assembled people and, condemnation being pro;
nounced,
all
were executed.
The
says
SECTION
Sedition in Bceotia
III.
and Phocis
Siege of
Del ium.
its
B. C. 424.
Ol-
The
T-
The partizans of democracy in all the oligarchal republics, effects. but with still more eagerness the numerous democratical exiles, were everywhere watching for opportunities to profit from the turn in the
affairs
of Greece.
Thucyd.
-
1.4.
revolution in Boeolia.
ij^Q
Theban
exile,
76.
some banished Orchomenians were among the most and a party in Phocis was prepared to join zealous and active in it occasion. The Orchomenians undertook to favorable them on the first
business
;
in
Peloponnesus
by
prin-
by circumstances disposed to favor democracy, or open to the persuasion of bribery, were to be found under all oligarchal governments. Ptoeodorus meauM'hile communicated with the Athenian
generals Hippocrates and Demosthenes, and a project was formed for
betraying Siphae and Chseronaea into their hands; the former a small
seaport of the Thespian territory on the Corinthian gulph
;
the other,
territory,
at the
same time to
seize
Delium, a
temple
Sect. III.
SEDITION IN BCEOTIA.
195
temple of Apollo in the Tanagiiean district, near the coast overagainst Kuboea and the intention being that these attempts on distant points
;
it
would prevent
made from
them
1.4.,
around Peloponnesus to Naupactus ; and, to prevent suspicion of the principal design, began operations against the enemies of the Athenian
confederacy in
the western provinces.
On
his
arrival,
he found
of that province.
allies,
he marched against
to
submit to
his terms.
of inferior note,
c.
89.
and other
allies
his arrival he
and well provided, and the whole strength of Bosotia prepared to oppose
him.
It appeared afterward that
was to be
executed,
to
make the
To
attempt anything at
Sicyonian coast,
c.
:oi.
Naupactus.
The
c.
90.
c c 2
19C
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Hippocrates therefore,
-
Chap. XVI.
a\vare of wliat was intended against the opposite side of their country.
citizens,
marching with the -whole force of Attica, metics, and foreiners*, to Delium, on what he conceived to be
The
object
so as to render
it
tenable by a garraised,
rison.
A ditch
The
antient
manner of
fortificatioa
-vvith
formed of the timbers of some neighboring houses, and faced with interwoven vine-branches, cut near the spot. The work was begun on the morning of the third day after the army marched from Athens ;
and being nearly finished by noon of the fifth, the general then ordered the army to move homeward, while he should give final directions to
the garrison, for the disposition of their guards and the completion of
the works.
their
The
:
irregulars
and
all
march
4.
^^'
under the eleven Boeotarcs, at Tanagra. them that the Athenian army had begun
and the majority determined not to Pagondas, however, one of the two Theban Boeotarcs^
held,
it
command
dissatisfied
Having
thus provided for obedience to his orders, in opposition to his collegues in office, tho it Avas already late in the day, he would not lose the
opportunity, but immediately led the
4
army
'A9r,ai9U{
i7a>c>i/nt,
00-01
ofTHf,
xa
Taj
a,Ttixoi/
xai
|i4i
crafSa-a*
Onaui
incoHs,
et
Atheniensiura
populo,
civibus,
Duker.
ci/izfiis
The
as so-
These translations are not satisfactory and we find no assistance from notes. The precise distinction, however, between fiirowoj and |ijo{, tho we should be glad to know
.lell
what
here.
it
was,
is
eieii the
forciners who
there.
Smith.
Where
Sect. III.
BATTLE OF DELIUM.
hill
197
Where an intervening
inarching up the
hill,
distance was small, he halted to form his order of battle; and then
rested
upon the
top.
1.
4.
all
When
line,
he arrived
it
M'as already
formed
He
the
making
ragement; but scarcely had reached the center when the Boeotians
moved down
it
hill,
battle.
Upon
this
he ordered
the onset.
The heavy
The
Boeotians
had, besides, a thousand horse, five hundred targetcers, and above ten
thousand light-armed.
appears,
The Athenian
in time,
it c. 94.
less dis-
Boeotian army, if
we may
no
less
trust
commanders.
in files
of eight men.
The
horse of
The
extremes, however, of
come
by the intervention of
;
deep water-gullies.
action so close,
was well disputed between the rest in that they joined opposing shields; and where weapons against the compact arrangement of defensive armour,
field
The
With
so that the
tov/ard their
own
right.
Next
whose
left flank
greatly.
But
meeting
,98
HISTORY OF GREECE.
meeting
in action,
Chap.
XVL
of his own
left,
who
came unawares upon the victorious wing of the Athenians, Mhile they
were yet in the
Panic
seized them,
and they
line,
already severely
to the
hope of safety
A
suit,
moment
Being comparatively
;
fresh,
their escape.
^'^^^
It
was upon
c'
'v*
served
among
p. 221. t.3.
enemy, was in imminent danger of being put to the sword, when his pupil Alcibiades, coming up with a body of cavalry, gave such effectual
protection, thac Socrates, with those
retreat*.
Thucyd,
c.
1,4.
^^^^^ ^^'^^^
commanding
101,
irregulars.
When
c. 97.
enemy's dead, retired with the main body of his army to Tanagra.
Next day
by the surviving commanders of the accustomed leave for burying the slain.
On
'
his
way he met
a Boeotian herald,
who
itiu T^^>|.
Anacharsis, not
pupil
Xenophon
in this battle.
Athena-us,
as
IS
observed by Casaubon,
in his this
note on
shown
Yet
tliat
could not
his
be (Atben.
1.
5. c. 15.)
and he deduces
purpose.
Bartlieleiui, iu his
Avould
Sect.
III.
S
vain,
EG E OF D E LI UM.
199
Mould be
and that he would do best to accompany him back to the Athenian camp, whither he was going. The Athenian complied ;
to the Boeotian herald
by the principal
he represented,
'
common
in for-
was established,
that, in
any invasion
'
'
had made the sacred precinct a habitation for men, and whatever men usually do in a profane place was done there particularly the water, which the Boeotians had always held it unlaw;
all
'
'
own name and in invoking the gods of the country and Apollo, warned that of the god,
uses
:
common
it
Amid
all
own
that,
Thucyd.
^-
i.
4-.
9*-
that the Athenians neither had profaned the temple, nor would intentionally
'
do so:
*
'
that
who had
'
*
*
own
that
if,
in the necessity to
'
which the Athenians were impelled by the unjust violence of the Boeotians and their other enemies, to use extraordinary means for
securing their country against invasion, they had disturbed the sacred
fountain,
'
transgression, if
that, on.
'
finally,
'
'
'
The
of
200
Thucyd.
'^'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
1.4.
Chap.XVL
They
said,
tlie
^^'
by an evasion.
battle
which
tlie
was
theirs,
but
if it
was an Athe-
was superfluous.
With
We
learn,
from the
details of sieges
that the Greeks of his age were not only very deficient in
of
who had
carried the
age, in theinethcacy of
that
it
so,
fortification
far
The
Boeotians Mere
from thinking the army, with which they had defeated the whole
in three days,
wood, constructed
Corinthians, a
rison
and hopeless of
relief.
Two
tliousand
for
slingers
from the
!Malian bay.
After
want of instruparts,
ments
for boring,
was sa\\ed
in two,
being
by
by chains a
pipe, a
large cauldron,
into which,
On
Novem,
the seventeenth
com-
plete.
to that part
of the fort where vine-branches and wood appeared to have been most
used in the construction.
pitch,
with sulphur,
lire
Sect. IV.
sible for
DELIUM TAKE
N.
20i
moment
killed, and,
prisoners.
SECTION
3farch of Brasiclas into Thrace.
IV.
Transactions in Macedonia
and Thrace.
These
g q
424
Meanwhile
set
having
Ol- ^9. i.
forward on his
difficult
summer was not yet far advanced, had and hazardous march toward Thrace. He
in addition to
ximcyd!
';
1.4.
July.
f^*
hundred Laccdfemonians.
As
far as the
new Laceda;moniau
terri-
but there he arrived on the border of a country, not indeed at declared enmity with Sparta, but allied to Athens; and across the
band, -which, including the light-armed and slaves, would scarcely exceed four thousand men, he could not attempt to force his way. The
greatest part of Thessaly was nominally under democratical govern-
in the
Athenian alliance
interest of a
pally
public measures.
less
and
Em])loyino-
sometimes the Interest of the king of Macedonia, .sometimes that of ihcr allies, and never neglecting the moment of opportunity for
Vol.
II,
gaining
2oa
gaining a
step,
HISTORY OF GREECE.
he obtained free passage as
in arms,
Chap. XVI.
their resolution
progress,
in reproaches to his
4.
them and, after no long treaty, Through the remainder of Brasidas obtained unmolested passage. Thessaly, dubiously disposed to him, but unprepared for immediate
nevertheless softened
;
opposition, he
made
his
till
he reached Perrhs-
bia;
among whose
had provided,
by previous negotiation, for a favorable reception. The difficult passage over mount Olympus, which was next to be undertaken, made the friendship of the Perrhcebians particularly important. Under their guidance he arrived with his force intire at Dium, on the northern side
of Olympus, where he was within the dominion of his ally the king of
Macedonia.
Here the
"kind arose.
difficulties
A common
of Lace-
some points, opposite. The principal object of Perdiccas was to subdue the province called Lyncus, or Lyncestis, among the mountains on the western frontier of Macedonia, and far
and
their views, in
LacediEmon
all sides,
mand of general of the cavalry, while a citizen of Corinth M'as appointed commander-in-chief. He seems to have been then httle pleased with such a compliment, and apparently it was his purpose now to preclude
the means for a repetition of
Brasidas, he assumed
it.
Joining
his forces
with those of
command, and
directed the
The
Sect. IV.
TRANSACTIONS IN MACEDONIA.
little
203
The
therefore,
and representing that the apprehcHsion of so great a force, ready to fall upon his country, would probably induce the Lynccstian prince to a reasonable accommodation, he declared that, for the Lacefrontier
;
daemonians, he judged
till
it
Accordingly a negotiation
M'as
opened,
among
the
allies
of Sparta.
resent-
ment by
would
provisions for an
army
so little disposed to
his interest,
he
The accommodation
preserved,
nevertheless
would be upon the whole satisfac-^' Grecian allies. The dominion of Arrhibajus
in the balance against the
growing power of
now of
Their
there
first
Some of
the principal
in
men
Thucyd.
'^^^^'
1.
i.
renounc-
zealous in August or
sept.
enemy
in the field,
now
ready to gather.
Upon
a knowlege of these
as
who ought
was besides
He began
p p
2
i-
that
04
'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
*
CHAr.XVI.
that the great object of the Lacedaemonians in the -war was to give
liberty to Greece.
It
'
him joyfully
'
the confederacy
'
opposing their own deliverance, and that of Greece, from Athenianc Nothing in reason could hold them to such a purpose, subjection.
but apprehension of the power of Athens
;
'
'
hension was, he had himself had the good fortune to prove to the
workl, when, before the walls of Megara, the whole force of Athens
feared to ingagc that small
'
'
commanded in Thrace.' This politic boast, tho totally false, for he commanded at Megara more than triple the force that he led into
'
ill
He
1.
1.
tell
'
his audience,
'
that he
^^'
'
whatever
cities,
'
'
From himself he
held,
on account of any
or
any
political
for he
was deter-
'
mined
to support
'
ranks,
If,
'
own
country.
t.
87.
'
'
'
of other Grecian
states,
justified,
hira
'
'
Thrace
The
army
at tlieir
gates,
Sect. IV.
gates,
TRANSACTIONS IN THRACE.
its full
205
had
effect
Acanthus thus became a member of tlie LacedEemonian confederacy and before tlie end of the summer, the example was followed by the neighboring city of Stageirus-.
from Athens.
city of
;
The
Of the
it
should
were usually
Eucles and Thucydides, the historian, son of Olorus, no.v held that
Amphipolis: Thucydides was at the Tlmcyd. ^ iland ofThasus, witb the squadron of the station, consisting of only
station.
commanded
in
1.4
'^'
'
seven triremes.
It
in
behoved Drasidas,
;
make
season was rather favorable lor some of the enterprizes which he meditated.
upon a noble
river, M'hich it
banks, Mith
neighboring
hills,
bore a
'
excellent ship-timber.
and the
mouth of the
river,
age of Amphipolis.
Mas but an appendage, yet a valuable appendThis advantageous spot had been colonized, first
from Miletus by the unfortunate Aristagoras, and afterward from Athens by Cimon; whose colony, also unfortunate, was destroyed, as
we have
Pericles,
seen,
by the Tin-acians.
and thirteen years only, according to Diotlorus, before the campain of Brasidas in Thrace, a new colony passed from Atlicns, under the conduct of Agnon, an Athenian of rank, and of very popular
character.
1,
12.
^^'
The
1.4.
^"'^
On
these
c.
102,
Amphipolis
the
Lacedaemonian confederacy.
Communication
Mas
406
HISTORY OF GREECE.
was managed
them.
M'ith
Chap. XVI.
Collecting then
allies, on,
December,
which he
pre-
waters of the lake of Bolbe discharge themselves into the sea; and,
halting there only while his
the night to Argikis.
to Athens,
in
The
people of that
Its teiritory
was divided
Strymon,
lOi.
Becoming thus master of the bridge, was open to him. Extreme alarm and con-
among
man
in his neighbor;
and
if,
instead of
plundering the country, Brasidas had led his forces directly against the
town, he would have become master of it, probably as soon as he arrived
at the gates.
This, however,
his authority
could
efiect.
him and in any action in open field he promised himself which would not fail to incourage his friends in the town, and
;
promote
his measures.
The inactivity of Eucles disappointed Brasidas. No movement was made from the town and it was to be apprehended that the arrival of
;
Thucydides,
terprize
:
v/ith the
would
and
Thucvdideshad great
his presence
interest,
and
would
assist
but
much toward
Peloponnesians.
Sect. IV.
AMPHIPOLIS TAKEN.
Thucyflitles imputes expressly
207
no blame
to Tluicyd.
'^'
].4.
his coUegue; but the conduct of Eucles appears evidently to have been
^^^'
deficient either in
judgement
Brasidas
his
found means
'
that
it
was not
'
might chuse
'.
free citizens, or
c. io5i.
depart with their effects; only, if the latter was their choice, they
'
must go within
five
days.'
con-
and highly
colonists,
had supposed
and
their families,
:
most imminent danger of the worst that could befall them the terms were incomparably more favorable than, from the common pracand in. tice and policy of Grecian commanders, was to be expected
in the
;
appeared,
The promoters-of
the revolt,
accepted
the city.
his forces,
That active
officer,
then, without a
moment's
loss
of time,
fleet
from the
river.
But
tlie
late in the
harbour
Avith his
made unexpected haste from Thasus, entered squadron. Eion was thus secured, but Amphi-
polis
To
owe our best information concerning the history of the limes with which we are ingaged, and almost our only means for any accucipally to
most interesting.
successes of Brasidas
c.
10s.
made
great
impression
i08
HISTORY OF GREECE.
hnpression at Athens; and the more, as the pubHc
the recent calamity at
-of
Chap.
XVL
mind was
sore with
Dehnm,
the
enemy
from whose wealth the republic principally derived its power, had been esteemed hitherto secure under the guard of the Athenian navy, M'ith
which no potentate upon earth could contend but now, through the adventurous and able conduct of Brasidas, they were laid open to the
:
which,
if
the Thessalians
should not oppose, might be poured in upon them to any amount. Dwelling upon these considerations, and irritated more than instructed
^"
'
banished from
life
Attica for
twenty
years.
it
compose that history which has been the delight and admiration of The affairs of Athens continued to be known to him all posterity.
to
in
high situations
there.
His banishment,
Eucles at Amphipolis, and disappointed through the activity of Thucydides at Eion, had however done, with a very small force, very
ihucyd.
c.
1.4.
was unremitting, and he liad now greatly increased his means. The. reputation of his unassuming and conciliating behaviour toward the
allies
108.
whom
he had gained,
Thrace.
Grecian
cities in
and
the ijreat purpose oi his commission was to give perfect freedom and
independency to
prince
all
Grecian
cities,
it
that
found general
credit.
Perdiccas, a
of much
policy and
little
<lesirous of profiting
from
his
and
Sect.IV.
transactions in THRACE.
visit
209
and condescended to
for prosecuting the
him
common
interest
of the confederacy.
Meanwhile
now
spreil
it
over
tlie
which he
connnanded
in
The naval
Shortly
less
an object of
fear,
M-hen
it
was supposed
land.
yetto
declare themselves,
intimated pri-
in
sending to
him
and attempt
and
still
greater things.
man who
civil
command, who
Lace-
his acquisitions,
But
talents so
man not
uncommon
liberalit}',
affection of
all
with
whom
among
the
cautious
elderhood of Sparta.
totally denied.
The Athenian people meanwhile, however illiberal, to those who served them, were not so untrue
some reinforcements were sent
own
No
his successes
he inlarged
now
project
210
TUucvd.
c.
1.
HISTORY or GREECE.
4.
Chap. XVI.
Avith his small
Meanwhile,
he could
109.
force of Peloponnesians,
and what
allies
collect,
he marched
rate repuhlics.
The
first
Andrus.
The
mixed
people,
a few
who
formerly inhabited
by
and
Clio,
113
ll'2,
in the
neighboring peninsula
him
to support
them
in revolt.
still
fifty
heavy-armed Athenians
tri-
Nevertheless,
was taken.
Brasidas
The Athenians,
except a few
<-
who were
killed,
fled to the
neighboring
fortress
summoned
the
place, offering permission for the Athenians to depart with their effects,
full
enjoyment of
their rights as
whatever of their
The terms
were inviting to
men
What
patriotism
among
which they often adhered to party-principle. Brasidas granted two days, and used the opportunity for employing all his eloquence
and
all his
his
Sect.V.
his interest.
cii
But the democratical party remained true to the Athenians; and not till machines Avere prepared, and a force was assembled, scarcely possible for them to resist, nor then till an accident occasioned a sudden panic, they quitted their fort of earth and wood, and most
of them,
getting aboard vessels lying at hand,
ECT
ON
V.
Negotiation for Peace between Athens and Lacedcevion. Truce concludedfor a Year. Transactions in Thrace. fFar renewed. Thespicc
oppressed by Thebes.
Reinark-
Intelligence
among
the subject
was of powerful
effect to
damp
among them,
whom
making an advantageous peace, as that which had been proudly rejected, might not again recur. Fortunately for
them, at this time, no
councils.
spirit
The
some apprehension among the Lacedemonian leaders, that their own allies, and even the Lacedjemonian people, might be excited to desire
the continuance of the war, to which they were anxious to put a conclusion.
The
kinsmen and
Athens
much
Such
fii2
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Such being
the sentiments
Chap. XVI.
peace were
on both
opened, and, in the beginning of spring, a truce for a year was conThucyd.
'^'
'
1.4.
cUided.
it
however conceded
command
excluding themselves totally from the use of long ships (the general
term for ships of war) and of any vessel of the row-galley kind of above
five
hundred
talents
scarcely
To
Lac^dtemonians,
on the
and
new
fewel to animosity.
The people
Pallenii,
120.
in
Peloponnesus,
who had
among
the Scionteans,
communicated to Brasidas
Athens, and
their
desire to
dominion of
correspond
To
com-
manded
by the
therefore,
commanded also the communication by land. Brasidas who chose always to depend upon his omu address rather than that of any deputies, and who refused no danger in the prosecution of the great objects of his command, resolved to go himself to
completely
Scione, and, in a small swift boat, escorted
safe in the harbour.
by one
trireme,
he arrived
He
useful.
He
began
Sect.V.
began with
transactions IN THRACE.
his usual declaration,
'
ai3
less-
that no
man
He was
' '
'
M'ho,
notwith-
'
which
till
at present
commanded
'
'
and he and
all
protection,
his
wish to do
all
'
prove themselves
rhetoric
among
who
most meritorious
allies
of Lacedcemon.'
effect. Thucyd.
1,
and the
those
it,
liberality
4i.
became
now
satisfied
with
From
usual
mark of approving admiration to the conquerors in the public games which, as something approaching to divine honor, was esteemed
;
among
Mende,
in
when commissioners arrived, y\ristonymus from Athens, and Athenasus from Lacedsmon, to announce the cessation of arms. ,The intelligence was joyful to the new allies of Lacedgemon in Thrace, as the
terms of the treaty removed at once
Avhich they had placed themselves.
all
122.
vote in assembly, by which they formally acceded to the Lacedsemonian alliance, had not passed
articles,
till
two days
sidas,
declared them excluded from the benefit of the treaty. Braon the contrary, no way pleased with a truce that checked him
214
HISTORY OF GREECE.
revolt, truly considered,
articles,
Chap. XVI.
and he refused
made
commonwealth by arms.
to support
Brasidas,
The
Lacedaemonian government,
strated
;
disposed
remon-
not only
subjects, but
now even
those
who were
in
made
a decree,
declaring that Scione should be taken, and the people put to death.
despotism
was passing, an event occurred, which might have taught the Athenians, if a mob could be taught, the superiority of the generous policy
Thucyd.
t. 123.
1.4.
Some of the
menof
of Palleue, had already gone so far in measures for leading their city to
revolt, that
of Athens.
way
the treaty
by urging counter-complaints of infraction of by the Athenians, partly by maintaining that nothing forbad
partly
his receiving
alliance,
by arms their own sense of the conditions of it.' Brasidas, expecting this, removed the families and efl^ects of the Scionsans and
Menda'ans to Olynthus, strengthened the garrisons with five hundred heavy-armed Peloponnesians and three hundred middle-armed Chalcidians, and, having put everything in the best state for defence that
time and circumstances would permit, he appointed Polydamidas,
3
apparently
Sect.:V.
transactions IN THRACE.
command, and returned himAvas
2i5
ingaged,
Thrace, while
among
Grecian towns his negotiations succeeded beyond hope, he found insuperable difficulty in
managing
and
his interests
haughty,
capricious,
faithless
king
Whether
Brasidas thought
it
of so
much importance
of Perdiccas as to be induced himself to break with ArrhibiEus, Thucydidcs does not inform us
;
Thucyd.
'^-
1.
4.
armed foot formed the principal strength of the former, and a thousand
horse that of the
latter,
^^*'
who was
besides followed by a
numerous body
of barbarian irregulars.
battle
but the country being mountainous, they soon reached the heights,
where neither the Macedonian horse nor the Peloponnesian foot could, with any hope of advantage, follow them. Perdiccas proposed then to
overrun the plain country.
particularly those of
Brasidas
vi^as
new
allies
Mende,
disposed
to
the Athenian
of higher rank,
peril.
common
allies.
;
were disputed
body of
Illyrian mercenaries,
expected
c.
125.
to remforce the
their
ingagemcnt, and
joined Arrhibieus.
The term
7rAiT));
readily
216
HISTORY OF GREECE.
readily concerted between them.
Chap.
XVL
Night was approaching, and nothing yet determined, when exaggerated reports of the Illyrian numbers excited a panic through the Macedonian army, and the whole multitude of barbarian irregulars, w ith many of the Macedonians themselves, took to sudden flight. Already the evil was beyond remedy, before Perdiccas was informed of it; and his camp was so distant from the
Peloponnesian, that
it
When day
The
his
subsistence, left
heavy-armed
:
hollow square
center
and he
command
. .
4.
120.
irregular barbarians,
however alarming
numbers and
their
clamor
might
began
c.
he
march.
vociferation and
127*
already
victois,
and slaughter
their
only business.
They attacked
success
and presently
its
drew
off;
but a
to
occupy the
defile
of
Brasidas, aware of
all
haste
to dislodge the
at least
on one side of
one of the
hills,
.
the pass.
the
They succeeded
in acquiring possession of
at Arnissa, the
enemy evacuated the other, and the army arrived on the same day first town of the dominion of Perdiccas.
tliis
In the course of
in with
fell
Macedonians, following,
as
Sect.V.
as the
transactions IN THRACE.
able, scattered,
217
conductors were
and without
Irritated
by the base
desertion, as they
esteemed
it,
vas most valuable and most portable; and then, loosing from their
yokes the oxen employed
dering about the country.
in
drawing the
carriages, turned
them wan-
less
On
returning into Thrace, Brasidas found reason to regret his unwil- Thutyd.
1.
1.
new
allies,
^'
'
country.
An armament had
under the
command
hundred bowmen of
a considerable
body of
middle-armed of their
allies,
of
Mende
the
their operations
with an
near
force Polydamidas
from a strong
to Scione,
situation
Reimbarking
however
lirst
Ment
assault
but, unable to
make any
A
it
party favoring
into their hands,
enough
to put
was nevertheless powerful enough to deter the ruling party from quitting their walls to protect their fields. Next day therefore the army was
divided: half, under Nicias, ravaged the borders of the Sciontean and
half,
approached
".
who had
retired
into that place with his Peloponnegiven, in which Smith's translation has been
The
followed,
is
just.
note, however,
which
to
modern annotators
give
we do not
find, to
any assistance. It is nevertheless pretty clear, from the context, that the sense heie
our satisfaction.
Vol.
11.
sians.
218
sians, tliouglit
HISTORY OF GREECE.
himself strong enough,
if
Chap. XVI.
He
'
that the
Mendians
'
would not march against the Athenians, and that no true interest of theirs had led them into their present ingagements with the Peloponnesians.'
'
pline,
and of that authority which Lacedaemonians in command usually everywhere assumed, rather than of the policy which his situation
man
with his
own hands, and was proceeding to drag him out of the assembly.
These, imagining that meaat the gates,
This violent and arbitrary act so incensed the democratical party, that
they immediately assaulted his adherents.
sures
also retired.
now joined
ignorant of what had passed within, and wondering why they were not
opposed.
The
soldiers accordingly
difficulty restrained
The tumult, hoMcver, being soon comsummoned to the agora. The Athenian generals
about the
past,
concerning those,
left
"watch the citadel, the generals proceeded with the larger part against
Scione.
hill,
town with
a contravalto
form
its
their lines.
effect in
Mcnde had
reducing the place into the power of the Atlienians; but the
garrison^
1 1
Sect. V.
garrison,
TRANSACTIONS IN THRACE.
by a bold
effort,
19
saved themselves.
evening, they overcame the Athenian guard next the sea, and proceed-
ing under cover of the night toward Scione, broke through the Athenian
camp there, and the greater part got safe into the town. During these transactions, the negotiation for renewing the
alliance Tliuryd.
^'
1.
4.
hetween Athens and Macedonia, concerning which, presently after Ills retreat from Lyncestis, Perdiccas had begun to tamper with the
Athenian generals, was brought to a conclusion; and the immediate
consequence was of great importance.
^^*'
The party
it
in
Lacedtemon M'hich
to
was determined
send a
Intel-
body of forces, by
to their
the
way of Thessaly,
new
ally,
Perdiccas had alwaj's maintained a strong interest in Thessaly, principally through personal
communication
men.
common road
from
their purpose.
of Mhora
with the
title
A^'ith tlieni
from Sparta,
towns.
It
is
all
solicit-
became disposed
made an attempt
before he
j,_
j^j^
by the
sentries,
During
this year of
prosecuted by arms in
Thrace,
20
Thrace,
Thucvd.
1.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
some circumstances
for notice
Chap.XVI.
in
occurred
Greece.
as they
The
termed
4.
'
^'''^'
The
Thesj)ians, however,
had
near
Delium
sion
little
city
134.
ing authority, led to a petty war, and in the autumn of this year an
obstinate battle was fought between the INIantineians and
Teaeans.
raised
its
both cndevored
133.
battle.
time,
through
priestess
then in
the fifty-
office,
Juno
was destroyed
by
fire.
Meanwhile the informed Athenians were offering a very remarkable instance of popular superstition. E\er looking up to a superior cause
for the direction of the events of this world, they did not attribute the
reverse of fortune,
own
folly which,
commit
Nor
,
and
all
their
shocking cruelties to
attribute
those
5.
whom
.
1.
their misfortunes to
^^
^^^^^ ^^^^ purification
The fancy
arose
c '73
Sect.VI.
circumstances in GREECE.
ere expelled
2^1
performed, and it was proposed to secure the favor of the god by a new Tlie whole Delian people, subjects who had act of cruel injustice.
v.
from their Hand, without having any other settlement provided for them. Those miserable Greeks, thus inhumanly treated by the most
polished of their fellowcountrynien, found, however, charity from those
whom
SECTION
State of Athens
:
VI.
Battle of AmphipoHs.
After
man o?
affairs.
When
all
graver
undertook their
stage.
The
comedy
still
any disguise,
their
names.
who could
vent
fur-
their
topics
in the
want of that
art
Mhich now
The
interest of a
party thus might be promoted on the stage as in the agora; and those
opinions might be propagated, and those passions excited, on one day
by
228
HISTORY OF GREECE.
by
tlieatrical
Cuap.XVI.
exhibitions,
in the height
of his
'""'
in the
Pry-
of
The
Knights.
Cleon
;
is
minious light
satire
by
a single
name
of
Demus
as Swift,
whose
Avritings,
by
their
elegance,
buffoonery,
and
political
of-
John
Bull.
the Athenian people, and such the dread of the intemperate use he
530,
might make of
sent
it,
him on the
stage,
nor any
artist to
make
mask
:
in his likeness.
But Aristophanes would not be so disappointed himself a man of rank, personally an enemy to Cleon, certain of support from all the first
families of the republic,
and trusting
in his
own powers
to ingage the
favor of the lower people, he undertook himself to act the part; and,
for
want of
a proper
manner of
The immediate effect of this extraordinary exhibition was great. The performance M'as relished and aj)plauded Cleon was ridiculed and
;
reviled
Aristoph.
in
this
temper of the
pcoi)le
against
'
him
money: and,
&
Nub.'^
support, he
was condemned
sterling.
in
v-j-ty.
hundred pounds
lasting but
The reproach of
likely
a con-
vilest,
was not
long to affect
Cleon.
the
Sect.VL
tlie
C LEON
general
;
in THRACE.
he did not, with
his repu-
22S
people
afiairs.
the
men
of the commonwealth.
The
abusing him.
field
oflficer,
unknown
as a public speaker,
him
by degrees
first
man
have
its
His success at Pylus gave him to delude, not only the people but Thucyd. ^'^' himself, with the imagination that he possessed military talents he
:
thought he could
now command
and another fortunate expedition M'ould drown the memory of what his reputation had suffered from the attack of Aristo;
Demosthenes
him
to overbear rivalship.
He
;
therefore opposed,
urging continually
and
its
losses repaired,
it.
ravished from
commonwealth ought to be restored, what had been lately His arguments were calculated to make impression
by
at least the recovery of
on the passions of the multitude: and the truce was no sooner expired
than a decree passed for sending a force into Thrace, to the
of which he was appointed.
command
Thueytl.ibid.
The armament
two hundred
thirty
foot,
and
in
in
M'itii
arma-
p'\v''^io'
Touching
first
in Pallene,
224
HISTORY OF GREECE.
He had
been informed that,
Chap. XVI.
^'^y-
of the army which was besieging Scionc, he proceeded to a place called the Colophonian port, not far from Torone, in the neighboring peninsula of Sithonia.
in
pursuance of a plan
new
Intelligence
now came
to
him by
sudden
1.
5.
assault
was in
and the
governor, Pasitelidas,
made
who
all
survived the
first
slaughter,
round Athos, and entering the Strymon, the armament anchored in the
portofEion.
post.
Hence he
for the
made
a fruitless attempt
Galepsus.
Macedonia
and
Polles,
Odomantian
Tliracians.
less
upon any force he could M'ith certainty command, than upon his own activity and address and the
Brasidas,
faults of his
who depended
relief
of Toronij;
five
his
attention to Amphipolis.
He
The
strength of
sentiments among so mixed a people. The Edonian Thracians, however, voluntarily joined him with the whole force of their clan, horse and middle-armed foot, and he ingaged fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries. With a bodv of fifteen hundred
ditference
in
political
men.
Sect. VI.
BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS.
tlie
225
men, selected from these various troops, he occupied Ccrdyhum, a lofty and strong situation on the western bank of the Strymon, whence he
could observe the motions of
opposite bank.
The remainder of
hi;^
command
of Cleiiridas.
Thucyd.
*^''''*'
1.
5.
some time
assures us,
through
^^'
meer ignorance,
bers
as
Thucydides
how
on each
those
Confident in
their
own
ability,
command
c. 7.
in inactivity; while
talents
but, in the
mean
an opinion of
by a movement
similar to what,
much
would
His declared purpose was, not to attack the enemy, who, he trusted,
feel
their inferiority
too
much
ments should
town.
arrive,
He
it
place,
approached the
its
on the
other,
through which
Here he
remain
formed
or
his
retire,
unmolested.
close,
he began to think he
which,
had been
Vol.
II.
226
H'hich, in
HISTORY OF GREECE.
assault might, he imagined,
Chap. XVI.
Thucyd.
^'^'
1.
5,
own
more confident
he
knew
as he
was anxious
his post
to bring
As soon therefore
on Cerdy-
saw Cleon
in
motion, he also
moved from
hum
c.
into Amphipolis.
9,
By
Mhich the Greeks generally attached great importance, he expected to gain two points first, to throw the enemy into a confusion, M'hich might reduce their troops to a level with his own; and
:
then to prevent the incouragement which they would derive from the
observation, if he allowed
them means
for
it,
which
his regular
heavy-armed bore to
his total
numbers.
He
could
from the height which they occupied, could plainly distinguish the sacrifice performing in Amphipolis, before the temple of Minerva, and
c.
10,
men
in great
of these circumstances,
it
and then
with his
own
eyes,
commanded
army
to Eion.
from the
left;
Greek system of tactics, was highly disadvantageous. To remedy the defect and obviate the consequent danger, Cleon thinking he should have leisure for it, as soon as the ground permitted,
wheeled round his right.
to expose his
If he
had been
enemy
army
measures.
Sect. VI.
BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLTS.
compact arrangement whence arose the
security
22;
measures more effectual for the purpose. The evolution not only broke,
for the time, that
and
strength of the Grecian phalanx, but exposed the soldier's right side,
This was an
for.
An army moving
the victory
is
in that
ground
men,
already ours
the
most
rest
In
this situation
left,
already some
way
toward Eion, and, breaking away from the center, was soon out of reach
of the enemy. This conduct was justified by that of the general,
whom
first
purpose, to retreat.
its
Quitting his
security, he
was intercepted
by a Myrcinian
deserved,
targeteer,
from
whom
flight.
The
the
in
first
moment of
contest, Brasidas directed his efforts to the right; which, tho deserted
by
its
general,
firmly.
had preserved
its
order,
resisted
.soldier,
much
and
as a private
of which his
uncommon
him
to be over-fond,
Brasidas received a
wound
falling, unper-
The heavytill
and
in front.
Compelled thus
toward
the
G G 2
22!i
HISTORY OF GREECE.
culty and
to Eion.
Chap. XVI.
diffi-
much
loss;
fled,
each
as
he best could,
that his
army was completely victorious, and soon after expired. Scarcely any Spartan known in history, and indeed few men of any
shown themselves
so
nation, have
indowed with
talents to
command
testified
make and
to maintain conquests, as
toliis
memory
as well as
the
A spot
in front
of the agora
ground,
monument
was erected there to perpetuate his memory every testimony to the foundation of the colony by the Athenian Agnon, whether public
building or whatever
else,
it
was ordained
by public
conclude
Plutarch,
relate, tiiat ambassadors from the Thracian Greeks to Sparta (and such a mission is mentioned by Thucydides, 1. 5. c. CI.) were questioned by the mother of Brasidas, Ar-
fairly told,
was more partial lo her country than just to her sun, and tho the sentiment had something noble, the assertion was not
true
;
In
re))ly,
behind him
Greece.
apparently in
all
said,
behind him.
leonis,
'
Strangers,' answered
Arga-
'you mistake:
my
son was a
man
supec. 74-.
many
is
per-
parallel,
he says
fectly
consonant to the
it
spirit
of patrioiism,
in-
so,
:
for
he might be comConviv,
vhich
pared to Achilles
uTttixda-inr p.
-'-'1.
t.
stitutions
into
every citizen of
its
at
xal
Bfaa-iScm.
either sex,
tion in fact
and
:
founda-
3.
Tiiis
mark
tbe
11
Sect. VII.
MOTIVES TO PEACE.
229
SECTION
tiation
VII.
Neo-opartial
Peace concluded.
Too
late the
had
Thucyd.
^" '"*
1.
5.
tlie commonv.-ealth, Mhich wanted and a body of nine hundred heavyarmed, under the command of Ramphias, Aulocharidas, and Epicydides,
to his assistance.
Toward
the end of
summer they
Mid. Sept.
when
intelligence of
it
reached Thucyd.
'^'
1.5.
them; and about the same time a declaration Mas communicated to them from the Thessalians, that their march through Thessaly would
be opposed.
^^'
The
the consciousness, as
Thu-
the advantages already gained there, and the knowlege that the lead-
ing
men
little
army home.
concurrence of circumstances
now
c.
u.
The Lacedaemonians
that Wolfe
ferences
are,
commanded
regular;
the
and
tion in battle.
an honor not
less
less
tliat
was attack,
tliat
of Brasidas
him with a
soldier of our
own
his
country, not
man
of rank,
The concluding
part of
life,
at least,
and of distinguished
genera! worth,
abilities,
bore a strong resemblance to that of our eonqueror of Canada. The obvious dil-
had
Si3o
HISTORY OF GREECE.
had and
originally ingaged in the
in full
Chap. XVI.
war
in
hope that the waste of Attica, with a battle, which they expected would insue, and in which they had no doubt of being victoThe event had everyrious, would bring the Athenians to their terms.
their expectation.
way deceived
no important consequence; they found themselves utterly unable to on the contrary, raise that formidable navy which they had projected their allies harl been exposed to continual danger, and suffered exten:
and
at length the
blow had
fallen
severely on themselves.
Their
loss
in killed
was such
'
as
never within
the
cir-
enemy
a most galling
cumstance, and
them, which
commanded
manner before
in fcrein
totally unexperienced.
bers,
assistance
Thucyd.
1.
5.
and, to
.*.
make
the prospect
more alarming, a
truce,
u.
eluded for thirty years between Lacedsemon and Argos, was on the
point of expiring, and the Argians refused to renew
it
while at the
to
a schism in Peloponnesus,
late turn
At
The
defeats at
Delium and
ideii
many
command
Sect. VIT.
231
With
it
1.
5.
men
concurred.
By
'^'
left
undisputedly
was not insensible, led liim to seek the reputation of being the peacemaker for his country, while peace could yet be made with certain advantage. At the same time, among the Lacedaemonians, the interest
of Pleistoanax, the reigning prince of the house of Eurysthenes, led
him
Pleistoanax, as
we have
heretofore seen,
cii 12.
s.
5.
in early youth,
''iistiist.
The Lacedaemonian
ministry,
it
own
inability
applied for advice to the Delphian oracle; and they were disturbed
son of Jupiter.'
The
divine admonition to restore that prince, the descendant and representative of the
in
consequence
cir-
culated,
priests
in
make advantage of
any
every adversity that befel the Spartan arms, to the anger of the gods
at the restoration of Pleistoanax, at
but
doubly
so, as
Thus
it
es
it
HISTORY OF GREECE.
became
calamities from war.
Chap. XVI.
Tbucyd.
*'
1.
5.
Such being the disposition on both sides, conferences were opened, and they were continued through the winter. Toward spring the
negotiation was so
notices
little
among
of
Soon
the fundamental
principle of which was, that each party should restore wliat had been
taken in the war; except that Nisa;a was reserved to Athens, in consideration of the refusal of the
Thebans
to surrender Plata^a.
A conven-
tion of deputies from the states of the Lacedtemonian alliance was then
assembled,
when
states,
who formed
ment proceeded
c. i,
name of
deracy.
'
'
rites,
'
named) should be equally open to all, to pass to and from at all times in safety, by sea or by land; and that the Delphian people should be independent, yielding obedience and paying tribute to
larly
'
none
if
That the
That
'
'
That the
cities to
'
free,
paying
'
this treaty,
be bound in confederacy
'
own
be
'
'
racy:
That Amphipolis,
:
being an Athenian
colony,
should
'
restored unconditionally
'
tlie
Sect. VII.
'
233
the Boeotians.
in
'
'
which Pylus was situated) Cythera, Methone, Ptelenm, and Atalanta should be resjored to Lacediemon. Prisoners were to be equally
restored
'
on both
sides.
The
Seionteans,
now
'
the mercy of the Athenian people; the safe departure of the Pelo-
'
for.
It
was
then stipulated that every state acceding to the treaty should severally
'
it,
its
own
religious
'
made
for itself
'
should
be repeated annually
'
inscribed, should
name by
which Homer
in use as a
calls Delphi,
'
'
more solemn and sacred appellation) at the isthmus, at Athens in the citadel, and at Lacedeemon in the AmyclEeum and, finally, that it should be lawful for the Athenians and Laccdaimo:
'
nians,
after
is
due
then Thucyd.
c
19.
1.5.
'
discussion, to
:
make any
The
date
added thus
'
Pleis-
tolas,
'
Artemisius, and the archon of Athens, AlciEUS, on the sixth day before
the end of the Athenian
'
make
two
states, assisted at
The name of the ephor Pleistolas stands at the head of the Lacedifimonians, thatof Lampon is firstof the Athenians; among whom we find those of Nicias, Laches, Agnon, Lamachus, Demosthenes, and others who had been in high situations in the government.
Vol.
II.
11
2S4
CHAPTER
Of
the
XVII.
E CT
O N
I.
Difficulties in the
Alliance
Intrigues of the Corinthians Dispute betueen Lacediemon Peloponnesus : Nero Confederacy in and Elis : Dispute between Lacedccmon and Mantineia. Tyranny between LacecUemon and Athens.
Superstition of the
TH E
affV.irs
remission,
now
ill
in the
conduct of the
all
showed
itself in
allies,
by
whom Lacedaemon
whom
the alteriti&n since the srmple age of her great legislator) were unparThucyd.
'^^'
1.
5.
donably neglected.
all
to recover
allies
and necessary
Soleium
and Anactorium
in
With
all
the
cany
Sect.I.
tzo
articles
of their
own
1.5.
^-
was to be decided by
perform
its
parties Thucyd.
^''
should
places taken,
and the
upon Lacedsmon.
;
Accordingly the
Athenian prisoners
M'cre
immediateh'^ released
two other commissioners, M'as sent into Thrace, to direct the surrender of Amphipolis, and to require compliance with the terms of the treaty,
from the towns which had been received into the Laceda;monian But those towns refused; and Clearidas, who had succeeded alliance.
Brasidas in the
command
in chief in
to the
became appre-
himself, the others sent deputies, to apologize for their conduct, but at
away
all
The congress of deputies of the confederacy remained still assembled Lacedtemon, and the Lacedemonian administration had been in vain urging the dissentients to accede to the treaty. They were equally unsuccessful in the endevor to accommodate matters with
in
c.
ni.
Argos
so that,
all
with that
state,
v.^ar
seemed inevitable,
j)art
in
which,
according to
of Peloponnesus would be
against them.
they proposed a
c. c:3.
defensive alliance with Athens, which was hastily concluded; and then
Meanwhile
c. c-u
among many of
*^'
~~-
-"^
of Greece.
intrigues that insucd
The complex
among
not
indeed the most splendid, but one of the most curious and instructive
portions of Grecian history.
Nothing gives
in
to
know
so intimately
H H
I'Uitacs
S36
HISTORY OF GREECE.
parties in the principal republics;
Chap. XVII.
nation.
among the numerous and scattered members of the Greek It may indeed be difficult, even with that able and exact
to avoid
;
some
tediousness.
confusion
in
the narration
wliich
1.5.
^7.
The Corinthians, irritated now against Lacedtemon, were not less warm than at the beginning of the war in enmity to Athens. When
the convention of the confederacy was dismissed, their deputies, instead
'
were open to
resign-
them.
'
To
'
'
of protectors of the liberty of Greece, had made not only peace, but
a close alliance, with the Athenians,
enemies,
at least,
it
'
its
'
'
of Peloponnesus.
'
for
'
it
would be only to
by
'
'
cities,
'
The Argian
;
chiefs
but
a difficultv occurred
In regular course,
all
more public than suited the views of the Corinthian deputies, men in some of the republics with which they meant to negotiate. The Corinthian minior could consist with the safety of the leading
sters therefore advised to propose, in general
'
Till
Ti?iti.
people,
Sect.
I.
'
23?
people,
made with
and when
this proposition
concurrence of circumstances at
purpose of
the Corinthians.
While the reputation of Lacedaemon had been conthe contending powers, had thriven in peace.
siderably lowered in Greece by the events of the late war, Argos, keeping
all
Ambition grew with increasing wealth and strength, and the decay of
to offer an opening for Argos, to recover
in
its
antient
and command
Peloponnesus
when,
as at present,
Thus the
Thucyd.
'^"
1.
5.
"
men was
power to conclude
treaties
any Grecian
should
offer,
states,
it
if either
of these
laid before
Not any
first
liberal
c.
cp.
the presidency
fully
of Argos.
com-
mon
own
interest
would urge the Lacedemonians to interfere, and prevent such exercise of sovereinty over any people within Peloponnesus. The universal liberty of Greece had been held out as the tirst principle of tiie new
confederacy
;
but to
make
allies,
was
adherence
any such
principle.
:
like their
in
own,
oppo-
was democratical
sition to
Lacedsemon, and
Mantineia
^38
HISTORY OF GREECE.
states.
Chap. XVII.
Tl)is
in the
article in
in
concurrence, at
in the conditions to
them should
seem
fit;
which was
little less
two
law to Greece.
The
accession of Mantineia
:
to the
new confederacy
for,
while intelligence
;
of the fact was circulated, the motives were not universally obvious
and
it
generally
to
weigh
all.
5.
all
these poli-
30.
By
majority of the states should bind the whole; with an exception, howrequired perhaps by Grecian superstition, but singularlj' ada])ted
'
provided no hindrance
^A'hatever
in desiring the
The Lacedtemonians,
in
all
places
But
this,
however a
real
projjcrly be urged
by the Corinthians
They
allcdging that
they
Sect.
I.
239
they had bound themselves by oath to protect the Potidteans and their other allies in Thrace; whence arose a hindrance from the gods, such that they could not accede to the terms of the treaty. To the complaints of the
'
Lacedaemonians about the Argian confederacy, they replied, that they would consult their allies, and do nothing but what ' should be deemed proper and jnst.' With these answers the Lacedsnionran ministers, unable to obtain any farther satisfaction, returned
home.
In the disputes, difficult by any means to
settle,
].
5.^
'
more than
town of Lepreum, oppressed by the united enmity of some neighboring Arcadian villages^ had applied to Elis for protection,
offering half their lands to obtain
dition,
it.
The
Lepreans
to
territory,
in
unconnected independency,
as
the Lepreans.
But when the war with Athens broke out, the members of the Laceda'munian
This
the Lepreans
but
tlw;
Eleians,
there,,
waved the
arbitration,
The Lacedgemonians
nevertheless
tlie
free
Lepreum
for
protection.
Irritated
by
this
arbitrary,
and,
as
they esteemed
tlie
it,
unjust pro-
opportunity which
now
40
sition to
-
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Lacedscmon.
Chap. XVII,
They
who concluded
Then
the
pledged their
coinmon wealth
to the
new confederacy.
The
their influence
decided
th.e
Boeotians
Laceda?mon
to declare
made them
hesitate to conclude.
Tbucyd.
c.
1.
5.
"While these intrigues M'ere going forward, for the purpose of sub-
33.
by force of arms, that undefined and arbitrary kind of jurisdiction, Mhich the Peloponnesians seem, in some measure, by common consent
to
have committed to them, and which, tho not often successfully, had
party at
subjected, applied to
Lacedtemon for
relief.
more particularly
for
of Laconia.
to Lacedcemon, the
whole
force of the
Pleistoauax.
The
of Greece,
state of
among
their
whole force in
own
city,
with their
families,
and indeed
all,
They were
Cypsela was
Lacedcemonian protection
might
Sect.
I.
AFFAIRS OF LACED^MON.
became again an independent state. The fidelity of the their trust, however, cemented the new connection between
and Mantineia.
Clearidas returned to Lacedtemon,
^41
night
be,
Argians to
their state
with the troops which had fought under Brasidas in Thrace; and the Thuryd.
1,5.
zeal
themselves
find a livelihood.
The
ment
for themselves.
had been
now
those persons
members of any
state
The
all
established in Lepreum, as an
measure of arbitrary severity, not indicating a good and firm conwas about the same time taken, on the plea of necessity for
stitution,
men who
rank, but
long languishing in
Not
in
only
high
offices.
among
so
casion,
and hitherto
unknown,
it
Some
to prevent which, a
them incapable of
precaution or
after,
what appears extraordinary, whether as punishment, incapable of buying or selling. Some time
office,
and,
Isocr. Ai
now
philipp.*
sword, drawn against external enemies, only to give the freer oppor-
VoL.
II.
tunity
Ui
racy.,
HISTORY OF GREECE.
tunity for internal convulsion.
Chap.XVIL
civil order.
In
that state indeed of the Athenian constitution, which gave means for
C'leon to
become
first
tJie
That
Xenophon and
restraint
Isocrates,
rts
greatest
its.
Not
satisfied
it
sent those
who
'
de
thousands, the Athenian people would indulge in the pride and vanity
ostentation of tyranny.
1!.
So
'
were they
Auger.
^Q discover
that,
by a
money
to be exhibited,
'
at the
Dionysian
'
talents; thus
their allies,
numbers of whont
'
would be
present,^
*
*
very mercenary force, by which they were held in so degrading a subjection; and setting the other Greeks, of
tend,
whom
also
many would
at-
'
'
'
Athenian people.'
Such was the character of the Athenian government, when the unfortunate Sctonaeans,
.
all
assistance
it
reduced to the dreadful necessity of surrendering themselves at discretion to the Athenian forces;
manv
despotism,
full
reduced to slavery
the
Amid such
we have difficulty
to discover
any
Sect.
II.
2i%
any value
what they
called religion,
which we
the minds of
late change in the fortune of war, and the losses commonwealth, gave the Athenians to imagine that sustained by the the gods iuul taken offence at something in their conduct; but they never looked beyond some vain ceremony whether, in its concomitant
the Greeks.
The
i:'nmoral.
The
as a
Tlmcyd.
c. CJ2.
1.
s.
work
The
contrary imagination
now
Possibly
their
ends
in
SECTION
Continuation of Obstacles
Peace.
neio Administration;
to
IL
Argos ;
Change of Administi'ation at Lacedcemon : Intrigues of the Treaty with Ba'otia; Remarkable Treaty with Resentment of Athens toward Lacedcemon.
The
c_
35^
p q
^^j^
on the
complaint,
The Peloponnesian
their hands.
The
j)arty.
In consequence of repeated
if all
those
members of the Peloponnesian confededid not comply with the terms, Lacedasmon should hold them
as
I
j
as
144
as
HISTORY OF GREECE.
enemies,
Chap. XVII.
in
her
measures.
made
excuses.
they had
withdrawn
their troops
they
still
allies, as
to their desire with the Corinthians and Boeotians the prisoners in the hands of the latter, about
particularly anxious, they
whom the
therefore
disposition
by surrendering Pylus
pledge,
or,
if
they would
they should
with
Athenians only,
With
plied
;
much
altercation,
com-
established in Cephallenia.
Thucyd.
^' ^"*
1.
5.
The change
Lacedasmon
in the politics
Greece.
like
factions;
now
an opposition, if
we may use
modern term
perfectly apposite,
The
political
lated
name of the
a despotic
people,
acquiring, to their
own
office,
administration
being
change,
two of the
opposition,
elected ephors.
all
the principal states of Greece, was assembled at Sparta, for the pro-
fessed purpose of
diffisrences;
but, after
much
Sect.
II.
POLITICAL INTRIGUES.
antient preeminence
245.
conceived, for the purpose, at the same time, of serving their party, of
relieving their country from evils actual or threatened, and of confirm-
its
among
the Grecian
In Argos
itself,
good terms
Avith
and they were upon the leading men of Corinth and 13ocotia, which
not been.
promote the projected alliance of Boeotia with Argos, and then to endevor to ingage Argos itself in
to
That being
eflfected,
it
would not be
dif-
Elis;
renew the connection with Boeotia, Corinth, Mantineia, and and thus Lacedtemon would find itself at the head of its whole
commonThucyd.l. 5.
^'
The
plan, so laid,
returned
home.
The
^^
measure.
ment, even
was necessary
for the
c.
38.
They
to
which a majority in
the councils would have had no repugnancy, could they have been
whom
were already arrived at Thebes; but the leading proposal of an alliance with Corinth being rejected, the Boeotarcs did not venture any mention
of an alliance with Argos, and, for the present, the whole business dropped.
q.37.
While
this
intrigue was
going forward,
another business
from c
39.
Lacedasmon
246
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Lacednjmon was negotiated
LacedfEinonians so
at
Chap. XVII.
Thebes.
much
as the retention of
and
tlicy
knew
much
as the
iij
Panactum
by the Boeotians.
tlie
The
olyect of Lacedsomon
therefore
was to
procure from
tlie pri-
might obtain
difficult}'
Pylus from
the Athenians.
JBoeotia.
The
Tlie
I.acedffimon,
upon precisely
lately con-
cluded with the Athenians; but this was directly contrary to an article of the treaty between
Laccdsmon and Athens, Mhich positively declared that neither party sliould form anj' new alliance but in concurrence with the other. Through the interest nevertheless of the party in
cluded
;
X,aceda:mon, which desired a rupture with Athens, the treaty was conand, after
all,
which might arise to themselves, from a upon their borders, instead of surrendering
it.
5,
and alarm
there.
Not imagining
ment
that thus Argos would be precluded from any advantageous connection with Athens,
to as a certain resource
Lacedsmon
Avith
Urged by
tliis
imme-
diately to attempt an
tiators they
accommodation
Sect.
Avho,
citv,
ir.
REMARKABLE CONVENTION.
their party-connections (for these, in every
247
on account of
extended
Grecian
among
now
in
power.
Tlie negotiation
how
the
which
had not taken a leading part in the affairs of the nation. The object in dispute between Lacedasmon and Argos was the territory of Cynuria.
Thucyd. 1.5.
riglit to
this territory,
**'
of some indivi-
who might be agreed upon by the two parties. This was posiThe Argians tlien, anxious for peace, but anxious also tively refused. to maintain their claim, ofllcred to make a truce for fifty years, without
any other condition than
question, according to a a provision for the future discussion of the
mode of which
other,
furnished an example
liberty to call
party should be at
upon the
when not ingaged in war nor afflicted meet them in battle on the disputed lands,
decide the right of property
;
finally
but,
to
negotiation for near a century, while their state had presided over
But
it
democracy, so
be
ratified
it
should
into
c.
42.
S48
HISTORY OF GREECE.
together with the fort of Panactum.
already destroyed;
Chap. XVII.
was
^Mien they
this,
it
was pretended
that,
Panactum was to be the exclusive property of neither people, and cultivated by neither, but to remain a pasture for the common use of both. The prisoners were however delivered to the Lacedaemonians, who repaired with them to Athens; and, in restoring
the territory of
many
less
were
obliged
to
return,
without
effecting
any of the
SECTION
Alcibiades.
III.
third Peloponnesian
Confederacy ;
leading Power.
While
Thncyd.
1.
5.
new
young
to
birth, great
con-
their descent, as
wc
Thus,
ii to
cote
may
be consulted.
Plato
Sect.
III.
A L C
mouth of
A D E
S.
S49
His great-
^'''
li
,
named
also Alcibiades,
.
1
-r.
Isocrat. rfe
common-
bigis, p. 152.
liad
first
gained the honorable reward of cif's^^^^* action with the fleet of Xerxes, of this Hist.
fitted at his
which he had
own expence
and
his father, called also Cleinias, fell in the service of his country, in Plat.Alcib.i.
His mother,
^'
*
'
"
Deinomache,
first fainily
M'as
wlio,
on the death of
became
his guardian.
Unfortunately
' *
man
j!^
who
so
all
the cares of
gave so
much
attention to science.
Left therefore
degree to invite.
The
by cotem-
Plat.Conviv
^^"'
j^^"^'
to the seduction of
c.2. s.24.
Alcib.
more
when
sacrifices
and
are
Alcibiades, as
we
many
The
he was connected, at the same time Athenian drew about him a croud of flatterers of the otlier sex
:
whom
citizens, allies,
subjects,
and
strangers, vied in
'
Ala
ftJf
jtaWiO!
vttI
lat^Wm xui
Socr.
1.
irtpLtSi
yvmziKU)
.
&rijiijf.'inii.
Xen.
Mem.
1. c.
2.
has been owing to the want of intercourse between the sexes, wliicli alone can give
24.
manners
an elegant
writer
among a '
refined people,
Vol.
II.
Kk
aud
459
HISTORY OF GREECE.
singular talents of his mind.
Ill this
Chap. XVIT.
and there was danger that the intoxicating powers of adulation might have destroyed, in the bud, all hope of any valuable fruit from the
period of his
life
sopher Socrates.
become acquainted with the philoThat wonderful man, who had then for some time
was his
pleasure, gratuitously to instruct the
made
it
his business, as it
youth of Athens
science
in those
men
to
God, justly
far to
who
virtues or vices
might go very
decide
Plat. Alcib.
more the love of distinction than the love of power, was the ruling passion of his mind. To obtain instruction tlierefore, which might promote the gratification
Ambition, but
pf
|-])a|;
*;ConMv.
ruling passion,
lie
of the philosopher.
Consciousness of superior
and ambition
A
Plat.Conviv.
lsocrat"^de'
bigis, p. 154.
t.
singular friendship
in
that of his
. .
firmness than
3.
manhood.
battle,
The
soldier-sage, yielding to
all
none
in
courage
day of
for his
Alci-
it
was particularly
3.
his
of Ibis Uist.
Plut.
vit.
two coUegiies,
lost his life,
were
killed,
PlHtX'onviv. f. 220. t. 3.
The daring
who fought by his side. which had led him into the danger. was
Sect. III.
A L C
his
A D E
S.
fi51
perliaps a little
says Plutarch, to
much
but the
it
was
first
decreed.
as
we have already seen, from the swords of the pursuing Boeotians. But the passions of Alcibiades were too strong for constant perseHis
in everything,
"''
was not
No
than the splendor of his style of living became such, been utterly unknown.
time and country,
Athens had
Much
Olympian
festival; it
1.6.
where he
won
jjogrkt
de
commonwealth nor any prince had before done so much. In the same manner in all those public offices, which in his rank and circumstances were not to be avoided, presidencies of theatrical entertainments
No
bigis, p. 153.
piut. vit.
Alcib.
and
athletic games,
This osten-
manner of
followers,
attracted
some
friends
and numerous
excited also
censure and
many murmurs.
They were
much much
demoand
citizens of a
spirit,
reducing those large means, which might otherwise have been more
dangerously employed.
252
HISTORY OF GREECE.
at the
Chap.XVII.
tlie
of
ness.
Nicias, who, since the death of Pericles, had stood at the head
eqo'iri'^
131.9.
i3(X),i3l3.
of similar
liis
birth,
fc*^V^"^''
Ti)ucyd. 1.8.
Plut.'vit.
cessor to
influence
people.
In this situation
whom
for 3" associate to the successor of Pericles; and the gravity and mild Kic&AJcib. dignity of Nicias, it was hoped, might temper the too vivacious spirit
of Alcibiades.
Young
as he was,
With
by
assisted
power; and
who sought eminence in any Grecian commonwealth, to have connections among the other states of Greece. The family
Thucyd.
].
5.
1.8. C.6.
Lacedsmon, and they had been connected by private hospitality with some of the first Lacedaemonian families. Alcibiades was a Laconic name; first given, among the Athenians to the great-grandfather of
the pupil of Socrates, in compliment to a Spartan family, with which
the Athenian was connected in close friendship.
Ch.5.
oc c. 7
s.
5.
"^
we have
of this
r. 4-3
iiiJt.
Thiicjd. 1.5.
Hh great grand-
prisoners
Sect.
m.
POLICY OF ALCIBIADES.
But the Lacedemonian governmeut, systematiyouth
to
in
25.1
prisoners in Attica.
cally indisposed
to
not
less syste-
matically indisposed
the
wild
;
and
luxurious
extravagance of
it
1.
5.
of he
*''^^*
Nicias.
He was
about
his twenty-sixth or
first tried
The
affair
faith-
certed
He was
Alci-
abilities as a speaker,
demoadded
made
him
He
continued his
but inimical
as the
Argians
ally,
that
The
peojrle
continued
authority daily.
men
cumstances on
who
in
will
the
will
judge for
Low
I'ar
to give credit
at least thirty.
The reader
to that calculation.
The
254
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Chap. XVII.
The Argian people were no sooner undeceived concerning the B. C. 470. Ol. t!9. 4. circumstances of the alliance between Lacedsnion and Boeotia, and
Thucvd.'i. 5.
* '*^'
became
about peace with LacedsEmon, and inclined much rather to renew and improve their connection with Athens; an antient all}-, and, what was an important consideration, of congenial government.
Upon
this disposition
his project.
He
Athens
Aro:ian
from
their state,
from
Elis,
inaaae to
make
the Athenian
confederacy.
those
commonwealths met
in
Athens.
Not
bulus and Xenares, from which such important advantages had been
expected, was likely to be thwarted, but there was apparent danger that
establish Lacedirmou.
Anxious
an embassy
whom
q;uest
of
measure neither
Panactum
and
bj' all
45.
On
&"
Aldb.
Kic.
now resumed
its
importance,
go
parly
Sect.III.
party in Athens
policy,
;
policy of ALCIBIADES.
and no
255
common
any honorable
ingaged the Lacedtemonian ambassadors in a which he persuaded them by no means to acknowlege, before the Athenian people, the fulness of the powers M'ith
in
:
He
they would
find,
he
said,
the arrogance of
way
to check the
most
unreasonable demands would be to deny their plenipotentiary comIf they would only take his advice in this matter, his oppomission.
sition should cease,
cause.
and he would even become the advocate of their The reasoning, in itself plausible, was urged in a manner so
plausible,
and with such professions and protestations, that the Lacedaemonians implicitly assented to it.
After they had declared the purpose of their mission, Alcibiades put Whether they came with full powers or with the question to them,
'
The members of
the council,
whom
their
Nicias, with
whom
;
was astonished
of gross and
nian people, w
ith
commonwealth
success
superstition, at
it
The
no mischief
followed
The
delay of a day thus gained, giving time for passion to cool and
la
1.5,
the people ought not to Thucyd. '^'' decide hastily, and in the midst of uncertainty, concerning a matter
'^'-
of
fcjy
HISTORY OF GREECE.
of very great importance, he prevailed so
instead
Chap.
Xm.
it
was
determined
which Nicias
convert
or,
rather, to
own
purposes.
The embassy
to
Laceda?mon
;
and
it
was
Panactum, the
with BcEotia,
instead of
it,
e.xtent,
Tiie year
of magistracy of the ephor Xcnares was yet unexpired, and the party of Xenares
still
prevailed,
was of course
ill
his collegues
their mission.
among
and
art
The
at
Alliens,
and a
the
league offensive and defensive, for a hundred years, with their republics,
the dependent
is
pillars
of marble,
should be
Athens in the
in the
temple of Apollo
in the agora,
and at Mantineia
^^'
in the temple of Jupiter; and that a brazen pillar, with the treaty also
common expence
of the confederacy,
By
in politics, Athens,
and no
longer Lacedtemon, was the leading power even of the Dorian states,
in
Peloponnesus
itself.
Sect.IV.
-complicated POLITICS.
^57
SECTION
IV.
Conti'
Affairs of the
Importance of the
daitrus.
Office
Influence of Alcibiades
of General of the Athenian Commonwealth iii Pelopo?inesus : JFar of Argos and Epi-
Bt
now
lately
1.
5,
48.
Inimical to Sparta as
certainly was,
commonwealth
and
not
less in direct
as the treaty a
before concluded
hy Lacedtemon with
Boeotia
appears, the
subsisted.
alliance
Argos,
Elis,
49.
Lacedsmon, then
Meanwhile the
their claim
by
their
sacred
character
festival.
Before
citizens,
the Olympian
tribunal,
composed of
own
principal
after the
Olympian armistice; and sentence was pronounced, according to the Olympian law, condemning the Lacedienionian commonwealth in a fine of two thousand mines, between seven and eight tliousand pounds sterling being tu'O mines for every soldier
the
;
commencement of
employed.
anxious, on account
Grecian
politics,
common
laws and
common
Vol.
II.
that
58
HISTORY OF GREECE.
guilty of the crime; but they insisted that,
Chap.XVII.
the hostilities
that they would submit to the penalty, had they or their officers been
when
com-
plained of were committed, the armistice had not been made known
to
when the
The
it
Eleians main-
was proclaimed
within their
own
territory
immereason,
diately
bound
and
not
less
The Lacedccmonians
an involuntary crime.
just,
still
from any member of the Greek nation. insisted that they ought not to be fined for
that the sentence was
but, if the Lacedismonians
would
seized,
selves,
they would not only remit the portion of the fine due to them-
but also pay for the Lacedsemonians that due to the god.
The
Thucyd.
1.5.
fine,
in the sacrifices
common
Greek nation.
To
fore, the
many
assist in
Such a measure
to
be kept.
this
precaution,
general apprehension.
from entering
the
it
in his
own name, he
it
in
it
name of
3
won.
Sect. IV,
won.
AFFAIRS OF LACED.EMON.
to be so satisfied
:
tS9
to
make
it
known
forward before the assembly, and placed a chaplet on the head of his
charioteer.
The
rod-bearers,
whose
office it
as iu
it seems do, without any authorized to consideration were for they the dignity
of the
man
Such an
affront,
it
Avas feared
might bring a LacediEmonian army to Olympia; but the Lacedcemonian government, not subject to passionate counsels, overlooked the
offence to an individual, and the affair had no immediate consequence.
After the conclusion of the festival, Corinth became the seat of political negotiation.
The Argians
new
confederacy.
The Lace-
Corinth.
effect,
much
little
or no
is
The The
affairs
Thucyd.
'^'
'
1.
5.
title
Success had
in
After 30
"^P^'
such
loss,
In the next spring therefore the Boeotians, fearing that, while Thucyd.
7\
1.5.
might
seize Heracleia,
this story
P.W.
sometimes
difficult to
estimate the
suppose that
to receive
when
it
customs of which
formed.
we
The manner
which Lysias
tells
L h i
direct
4C0
tlirect its affairs,
HISTORY OF GREECE.
sippidas, as
Chap. XVII.
and to send away the Lacedjemonian governor HegeThe Lacedasmonian government, unfit for his command.
with this species of kindness, had however too
not a
little dissatisfied
much upon
B.C. 419.
01.
5)0. i.
their
While these transactions ingagcd some of the principal states, Alcibiades had been prosecuting intrigue, ably and successfully, within
and without Attica,
His measures at home procured his election to but which, beside
it,
command,
carried with
anj'
not nominally
power than
of the permanent
of them
times,
assemble
council
bly,
;
tlie
people at
command
Nearly absolute soverein thus in Athens, he was hardly Argos, and his influence extended widely among other
Peloponnesus.
certed
tion,
in
states
in
matters
the
leading
men
of
the
Argian administra-
made a
To
by
little
city of Patrte in
Achala, he persuaded the people to connect their town with their port
fortifications,
b}'
Among
republic of Epi-
it
communication
Sect. IV.
26i
for
if
the Corinthians,
who
were
now
by-
made only
and
this,
in case of a serious
make
assistance
modern
it
due
as a quit-rent for
On
this
ground
it
and mea-
as
Meanwhile preparation was made by the LacediEmonian government, for some very important enterprize, the object of which was kept a
secret.
Thucyd.
'^'
1.
5.
^^'
profound
allies,
Such requisitions are more than once menand they strongly indicate the importance of
M'hole force of Laconia marched, under the
The
command
beyond
move
in
amis
own
border-passing sacrifice
being, on this occasion,
was performed.
the
pomp and
all
the labor
and expence of preparation, Agis immediately dismissed the allies and led the Lacedasmanian forces home. The allies were however directed
to hold themselves in readiness to
march
again,
The Argians, before restrained by the alarm of the great preparations made by LacedanPiOn, determined to use the opportunity, now so unexpectedly allowed them, for prosecuting their purpose against Epidaurus,
for whicli the Carneian festival
The
Carncian was a
festival
common
Its
many
days, a
we-11,
The
their
measures
ill;
more
defective.
tea
defective,
HISTORY OF GREECE.
gious festivals, and the
inefficiency
Chap. XVII.
among
the
Grecian
Four
,
days before the holidays, the Argians entered the Epidauiian lands in
arms, and immediately
Thu'cyd.
^' ^^'
1.
5.
commenced plunder. The Epidaurians sent to Some excused themselves on account of the their allies for succour. which, as tliey affirmed, they were religiously bound to celefestival none brate some came as far as the Epidaurian borders and halted time this very a convention assistance. At any effectual of gave
;
: :
Intelligence
among
it.
The Argians
Argians
consequence with-
drew
their troops,
concluding anything;
and
the
recommenced
hostilities,
little effect,
Laconia to Epidaurus
it
dominion.
travening this
to Epidaurus.
This
may seem
by Alcibiades,
;
and
to
mark
for,
was
really
an acknowlegement
that the Grecian seas, even to the very shores of Peloponnesus, were
The reparation which they required for this modern times, scarcely less extraordinary than
the accusation
it
nian garrison from Pylus, and replace there the ]\Iessenians and Helots
who
Sect. V.
263
vas concerted with Alcibiades, or perhaps suggested by him; for he was tlie mov'er of the measures which followed in Athens. A decree of
the people directed, that, on the column on which was ingraved the
late treaty with
ground,
it
and an attempt,
failed.
SECTION
JVar of Lacedmnon and Argos:
V.
Battle near
Mantinda
Siege of
Epidawus.
The
Thucyd.
*^'
1.5.
^^'
mand and
accrued to their
By midsummer
still
g
P.
C. 418.
Lacedsemon, to great
distress.
Some
W.
4. 1*.
effort
must be made,
their
or
all
com-
mand and
be gone.
influence in Peloponnes\is,
It
beyond
own
territory,
would
the trumpet,
monian people
allies
The
summoned
nian array, strengthened with the greatest force of Helots that could be
trusted,
sently
not,
marched under the command of king Agis. They were prejoined by the Tegeans, and all those other Arcadians who had
:.
equally those
within
204
HISTORY OF GREECE.
within and those without Peloponnesus.
lieavy-armcd, as
soklier
Chap.XVII.
than five thousand
No
less
many
light,
and
five
hundred
horse,
with a foot-
Corinth
sent
two thousand heavy-armed; Sicyon, Pallenc, Epidaurus, and Megara, all they could spare, and the Phliasians Avere prepared to join
The
ponnesus was divided at arms within itself; Avhile Athens, preparing indeed assistance for her ally, but risking little, looked on, and injoyed
the storm.
The
It
was evening when Agis hicamped on a hill overagainst them, as if intending to ingage next morning but moving silently in the night,
;
he passed on unperceived so
as to secure his
way
they
to Phlius.
The
Argians had then to expect the invasion of their country by the whole
To
prevent
this,
moved
a
to a posi-
Nemea;
the only
way by which
numerous army
disposition,
Corinthia.
Agis,
fruitless.
Leading the Lacedaemonians by a rough and dithcult mountain-road, he entered the Argian plain unopposed, and placed himself between the Argian
The
Corinthians, Phliasians,
also difficult
and
little
Tlie Boeotians,
Megarians, and
Nemean road, with orders to avoid ingaging, move against either of the divisions in the
*
enemy should
What
those
attc-rKliiig
foot-soldiers were,
whom
ef
i^iira-ef,
we
are informed
ohK by
late writers,
Boeotian
Sect. V.
Boeotian
265
tlie
enemy,
if
indeed the
enemy had
destruction
saw
with Alciphron,
in
its
success, if
Thucyd.
^'
1.5.
^'
with him to grant upon the spot, of his sole authority, a truce for four
months; and,
By
phron hoped
to acquire
might
two
They
were,
their
scale,
The Argian
people,
and even
howcomwere
so unaware of the danger from which they had been rescued, that
they imagined they had been deprived of a most favorable opportunity for crushing the Lacediemonians
advertently, between the allied
;
inclosed, they
imagined
in-
The
of an altar to which he
property confiscated.
fled,
c.
6i.
The
After iitli
momentary rage of the people, were nevertheless strong and they would immediately have dismissed the Athenian forces, as no longer wanted Vol. n. m
fiG6
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Wanted
in
Chap. XVII.
But
Quickly
informed of
,
all
two
generals,
demanded an audience
The
and not Avithout a degree of compulsion from their INIantiueian and Eleian allies, who were still present. The eloquence of Alcibiades then prevailed. The Argian people felt his reproaches for breach of
faith with Athens,
gave credit to
of
the confederacy, and of the circumstances now pecuharly favorable for prosecuting the war and, a proposal being suggested for striking an
;
little
risk,
it
towns of
their alliance,
whose
fidelity
whom
The
allied
army
instantly
marched to Orchomenus.
;
The
fortifications
of that
little
arrive,
by an early capitulation.
to their charge,
own
1.
5.
03.
allied
The Eleian
The Mantiin that
The
marched home.
The
rest
^3.
than
Sect. V.
aG7
than the Argians with their general, had been however more temperate
While peace was the apparent consequence of his measure, the pubHc discontent vested itself only in expressions of disill
their ariger.
But when, instead of breaking the force of Argns by one blow, or even taking the city, to which some thought the opportunity
approbation.
of some importance
lost,
and
their
was
Thucy-
dides,
IJe
judicially
condemned in a line amounting to more than four thousand pounds sterling ^ and moreover to suft'cr the indignity of, what was othervvise probably no very important loss, having his house levelled
with the ground.
with
his
his
former assiduity
in service,
unblameable deportment on
command
of
ten persons
were appointed to be
at
Thucyd.l.
^'
5.
would be annexed
to the
Argian confederacy.
The whole
force
celerity,
allies
Arcadian
ji
allies,
S68
allies,
H ISTO RY O F G
armies followed.
11
EEC
E.
Chap.
X VIL
Thucyd.
1.5.
fiie
views of the
confederates
nothing remained for *hem but to retreat and leave their own country
They determined upon the latter, and, approacliing the Lacedaemonian army, occupied some Agis, eager to do away the disstrong ground, where they formed, grace he had incurred, took the earliest moment for leading his forces He was already within arrow's flight of the enemy, when to action. one of the elder officers ' called aloud to him, in the terms of a Greek proverb, that he was going to mend evil with evil ':' meaning that,
'
he was
now
rushing to an
admonition,
and incouraged by
to the measure
which prudence
drew
Whatever, on the other hand, might have been the abilities of the
Thucyd.
1.
5.
it
little avail.
The
geuerals
w ished
advantageous
ground
little
and
Unable otherwise
This
compose the
disorder, they
marched
he had been
lands.
in
when he suddenly
Never,
saj's
in order
Lacedtemonian arm3\
however, inabkd the
discipline,
Tut
t;ficv\i^u TK,
king
Sect.V.
269
king to form bis order of battle in a sbortertime tban would bave been
possible M'itb any otber troops tlien in tbe
and, before
it.
tbeir allies,
after
Tlmcyfl.
'^'
1.
'
5.
Tbe Lacedtemonians,
less
^''
knowing that
discipline,
long andcare-
fuUy
practised,
fine
however
To
first
numerous
lines".
flutes,
their front
Tbe numbers, on
due to
who Tbe
;
ever, within
the
bounds of
tradition,
had met
in
Peloponnesus.
On
Athenian, of the other army the LacediEmonian, was the only cavalry.
In
all
among
on both
sides,
commonly
c. 71..
"
It is
forest
huge of spears
Of depth immeasurable.
In perfect phalanx, to
tlie
Anon
Of To
flutes
and
soft recorders;
such as raised
Arming
unmoved
overstretclied
270
IIISTOar OF GREECE.
overstretched the left of the opposing- army.
Chap. XVII.
hand to
lefl
For, ingaghig
arm,
was
in the
extreme
of the right wing, to avoid exposing the undefended part of his body,
would
toward the
Thus, on
right, to profit
left.
Agis,
observing
this,
when
he apprehended.
The
Skirite
latter
name
were
IMantineians from taking the army in flank; and two lochi of Lacedce-
1.
5.
manded, from another part, to till the interval. but Hipponoidas and Brasidians instantly obeyed
:
The
Skirites
and
Aristocles,
whether
tlie enemy were so near that it army would justify their whole disobethe movement to danger of the The Skirites and Brasidians therefoie, dience, kept their former post.
the
being presently attacked by the M'hole force of the JNIantineians, together with a thousand chosen Argians, were cut off from
tlieir
main
retreat,
and pursued
to the
baggage
of their army.
Meanwhile the
Avhere the
ail
rest
took
post.
73.
fled the
came
who
formed the
of the confled,
while
but
Sect. V.
271
by
their
own
cavahy,
Even
would scarcely have been inabled to save themselves, had not the defeat
of the Skirites and Brasidians called the attention of the Lacedtemonian king.
their
The
victorious Mantineians,
the rest of
army
by hasty
make
victory sure.
The
killed therefore
the generals
fell,
are the
numbers of the
Of
the
allies
little
ingaged.
of the
field
them ceremoniously.
restored,
on the usual
The
1.5.
and at the same time messengers were dispatched to Corinth, and the more distant allies, to countermand the march of their troops. The
victorious army, after paying honorable attendance
of the
slain,
The event of this battle restored the Lacedaemonian character in The advantage of numbers, indeed, had been on the side of
;
the Lacediemouians
superiority in discipline,
and
in that valor
which discipline
the soldier,
infuses,
by
whom
they act.
This discipline
in
we
find,
was,
in
272
HISTORY OF GREECE.
in the confederate
Chap.XVII.
army rendered superior abilities in the commanders of no effect". The misfortunes, the misconduct, and the apparent slackness of the Lacedasmonians, in the course of the war with Athens,
were in consequence no longer attributed to any degeneracy in the
people, but to the
mismanagement of
leaders,
a contempt, whicli
discipline,
and
;
as if hitherto respected
wonted
superiority.
all
the Grecian
moon,
began
this year
about the
:
seventh of August.
Its principal
but the
cleids
and of L3'curgus,
this
more
and extensive
policy,
when
wars,
be'
to be maintained
been allowed
however,
to
interrupt public
business.
The Lacedaemonians
Thucvd.
. 76."
1.4.
Avere,
so
institutions,
that,
till
the
upon
ble,
it,
in a
manner
sufficiently intelligi-
rather obscure
and well supported by practice ; and which, in his account of the battle
he shows to have been not
less adnii-
terms:
i/iTTsifia
'AXXa paX>r
Aaxtoocifionoi
EOEilai
xari <ra>-a
toti,
t5 tS
itself,
iXaa-^uiiifTcq
rablc in effect.
Kara
oraiTa
aiijs'ia
ivK
i<7i7ot
'
aefiyenijittcii.
Thu-
cyd.
'
1.
5. c. 72.
But on
all
this
occasion,
'
respects outdone in
'
'
proofs of
valor.'
A
him
true
manly
this
occasiou
and
dis-
more openly.
military
Sect.V.
siege of EPIDAITRUS.
"
ara
Mantineia.
Soon
after
that
event,
the arrival of a
all
thinking
men
in the
Argian con-
in democratical government,
oppressive
The Epidaurians, objects hitherto of unjust ambition and policy, had now made themselves objects of revenge; enterits
pro-
The
their festival,
was completed.
to
sufficient force
was
appointed
guard the
and the
rest
tlieir
several homes.
Vol.
11.
S74
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Chap. XVII,
SECTION
:
VI.
Change in the Administration of Argos : Peace and Alliance between ArgDs and Lacedoimon Overthrow of the Athejiian Influence, and
of the Democratical Interest
Lacedaemonian Administration
:
in
Peloponnesus.
Inertness of the
Party
from Argos, and renexcal of Alliance betueeii Argos and Athens. Siege of Melos by the Athenians : Fresh Instance of atrocious Inhumanity
in the Athenians.
Transactions in Thrace.
Con-
Year of the
Ha r.
a Grecian
Scarcely any
zens.
commonwealth
that-
its citi-
The unfortunate battle of INIantineia strengthened the oligarchal cause in Argos. The fear of such another blow, and of the usually, dreadful consequences of unsuccessful war among the Greeks, brought the Argian people to a temper to bear advice about an accommodation
with Lacedaemon
;
while
the
unbalanced, which had been so severely experienced in the circumstances of the battle, disposed
them to
government
to a few.
On
all
this turn, in
the public mind, the oligarchal leaders founded a project to overset the
present politics, not only of their
own
state,
but of
would
first
conse-
make
alliance
a\
ith
Laceda:mon.
Having thus
measures, they would tr^en turn those very measures against the power
of the people
ment.
Such
Sect.VI.
^70
him
to suspect the
yet the measures of the oligarchal party M'ere so well taken, and the
in the
moment such
oppor-
carried.
Mat-
articles
all
were soon
1.
settled
*
according to Avhich
it
was agreed,
'
That
Peloponnesian Thucyd.
'^'
'
5.
cities,
'
theii"
That
'
That,
if
'
severed in prosecuting
unitedly
it,
'
oppose them
'
78.
b}-
Lacedaemon and Argos, accompanied with a renunciation, on the part of Argos, of the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantineia. Among
the articles which Thucydides has reported, in the Doric dialect in
written,
'
:
and apparently
at large,
have the
their
their
own
or
it
'
polity,
it
'
shall be
any third
KxTa ra. varpici. Kari Ta narcia. '' I know not how more satisfactorily to paraphrase the single word of the original,
'*
iiaxpbni/.'.f
:
rule
v.'liiit
of law,
translators
;
and commentators
dis-
was
be managed.
give no assistance
N^
'to
476
*
HISTORY OF GREECE.
to both.
i\lilitary coniinaiul shall rest
; '
Chap. XVII.
and impar-
Argians
tially,
who
shall,
by
TtiucyH. 1.5.
o. so.
As soon
to Athens, in the
name of
pru-
forces.
showed
:
his usual
commission
he saved the
by
restoring,
in
some degree,
good
corres-
cities.
by oath,
in the
name of
formerly
made by Lacedsmon.
spirit
of equity,
each
state,
went
to Sicyon, and,
by
their
power to an oligarchy of
their
own
selection.
would vindicate by asserting that the antient constitution of Sicyon was oligarchal, and the democracy a usurpation.
Measures, which had been for sbme time preparing, toward a revolution of the
same kind
at Argos, were
now thought
mature.
Accord-
of the
state,
assembly was
expressly
abolished.
Meanwhile
the
Mantineians,
seeing
Sect. VI.
COMPLICATED POLITICS.
of that powerful
their
27?
with
Laceda'mon, yielded,
very reluctantly,
command
made
the
their
The
little Thucyd. 1.5.
^' ^^'
regulate
as to restore
where
it,
it
where
so threatening to Lacedajmon,
Avas
This important change seems to have been produced by springs, not within the power of human wisdom in the Athenian administration to
Laceda;mon through the want of energj', which had so long been conspicuous in the administration of
controul.
Its
lost to
advantages were
that state.
in Argos,
Tho
and, early in
spring, a conspiracy
was formed
it
The time
j]_
(^
4^-.^
into effect,
Sparta.
O'- 9o- 1.
the
Naked Games,
at
After 2d"
'M"^'''
Intelligence of
The
it
two
parties in
Argos to arms
it
But
it
two
parties
rest
Some of
first
army
own
misfor-
They expressed
restored
at the
:
their affairs
might yet be
such
^iis
HISTORY OF GREECE.
such a revolution,
to
it
Chat-: XVTI.
powerful an army
would be
city
easj'',
;
they
said, for so
and to
added
Had we
we should scarcely
who
much
monians.
marked Ly
makes the conduct of the Lacedsemoniains appear the more extraordinary and more inexcusable. Confident neither in their own strength, nor in the expectation of assistance from Athens,
measures,
make
Lacedromon.
The
exiles did
not
fail
The Lacede-
monians,
were heard
as
might be
and
it
army should be
tlie
sent to carry
it
into effect.
The weak
itself,
executiou of
decree
their
mon
would scarcely
at length
to fall
upon them.
The
landforce of
Lacedasmon would be decidedly superior to any they could expect to assemble upon their walls therefore ihey must depend for protection,
:
sea, if
com-
sea,
by long walls
such
as
connected
ports,
and such
.
Athenian govern-
ment
S-ECT.yi.
raent had
RENEWED ALLIANCE
recommended
to
of
279
many
oLhev Grecian
the
influence of Alcibiades,
builders,
eA'cn the
gave large
and
artificers
and
all
women,
assisted in
the work.
to
want
the following
autumu that
the
Lacediemonians Thucyd.
'
1.
5,
"
Lacedaemonian
alliance,
all
had ingaged
in the
measures througli
rela-
their property
in
now
upon
languished
for the
exile.
Then
was
called
Some
yet remained in Argos: these had communicated with the exiles and
it
inable
them
The precaution
and the Lacedae-
They however destroyed the yet unfinished works of the long they took Hysiaj, a small town of Argolis, and put all the freeforces.
men to the sword; and then returning home, dismissed their The Argians used the opportunity thus left open for revenge.
most of them
tlie
Their
The
The
federacy, was but a small step toward the recovery of that influence in
Peloponnesus, which Athens had lately held, and a very deficient gratification
for
the ambition
of Alcibiades.
That
restless
politician
his
ibid,
y^i"[{^^^'
own
power and consequence, through an extension of the empire of his Mc. commonwealth;
089
'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
commonwealth
;
Chap. XVII.
and particularly carried his views forward to a war, An expein which he would certainly command, and hoped to shine. dition had been prepared, under Nicias, for the reduction of the revulted
cities
of Thrace; but
it
became necessary
to
consequence of the neglect of Perdiccas king of Macedonia to send His tlie troops which, according to treaty, he should have furnished.
alliance with
Argos and Lacedienion becoming also known, he was, for the two offences, declared an enemy to Athens, and the Athenian fleets
Intrigues of the oligarchal party being
^" Argos,
j.
still
41 r
t.
Ol. I?,
and, with the support of the democratical party, seized no less than
three hundred of those supposed
interest,
p. ^v. 10.
tlie
oligarchal
whom
may
Athenian dominion.
politics,
among
The next
step of the
much
common
rights of
defensible
recommend any direct hostility against Lacedaemon policy forbad; but he recommended everything that might most provoke Lacedsemon to begin hostilities. The
political necessity.
])eople
in hostility
against Athens.
They
were,
howit
was now determined by the Athenian people to subdue the iland. armament was accordingly prepared, consisting of thirty Athenian,
three hundred
fifteen
An
six
all
Athenians, and
command
dominion.
Sect. VI.
SURRENDER OF MELOS.
;
28i
and
was supposed
that,
With the
was
an account in
detail;
meaning
own
way
than
if
own
person.
The claim of
Avas
the strong- to
command
so familiar
among
on this occasfon,
assert
it
in
the most
of that favor of the gods, which had already Inabled the -Athenian
people to exercise so
to subjection.
many
cruelties,
in
Thucyd.
1.
5.
refusing to submit, the blockade of their city was formed by sea and
^^^~- ^^*-
c.
uj.
the
iiS,
from Athens
among
the
hending
The town being then closely lower people. The chiefs apprebetray them to the enemy, and
rcso,urce
of
in
it,
Athenian
After
all
command
Connected
by blood, by habit, and by their form of government, with Lacedajmon, those ilanders had nevertlieless been cautiously inoffensive to
Vol.
II.
Co
Athens,
82
Athens,
till
HISTORY OF GREECE.
forced to become enemies.
Chap. XVII.
for this invoin
The punishment
all
degree friendly,
when
all
the Athenians, was no less than what the unfortunate Scionceans h^.d
The
iland
women and children, of all ranks, Mere sold for was divided among five hundred Athenian families.
a tribe of savages,
With
horror
ceive
we
arts;
where Thucydides was then writing, where Socrates was then teaching,
where Xenophon and Plato and Isocrates were receiving their education, and where the paintings of Parrhasius and Zeuxis, the sculpture
of Pheidias and Praxiteles, the architecture of Callicrates and Ictinus,
and the sublime and chaste dramas of Sophocles and Euripides formed
the delight of the people.
Tho
the late battle near ^lantineia had restored the tarnished glory
of the Lacedaemonian arnjs and the sullied character of the people, yet
the conduct of their administration continued to earn for them those
imputations of
ill
faith,
illiberal policy,
and
mouth of the
In the existing
;
tumult of Grecian
but
it
was
less
to little objects.
No
than thrice, since the beginning of hostilities with Argos, the Lace-
frontier,
was stopped by
the
border-passing sacrifice,
and
re-
turned
home
a circumstance
affairs.
little
known when
able
and active
men
directed public
politically
accounted
for.
Sect. VI.
FEEBLE CONDUCT
of the
LACEDAEMONIANS.
intel-
28
garchy
in
ligence that the plot was discovered occasioned the stop, M'hich was im-
sacrifice.
At
high in Lacedtemon
itself;
fell,
an effort was
made
.
Thucyd.
c. 7.
1. o".
and
distress the
Argians in possession
but, tho the preparations promised something great, what followed was
little
and inefficacious.
But, from the
The
forces of
all
the Peloponnesian
allies,
them.
first,
waggons
incompletely executed.
with a small
which was so
their safety
who
held
it
consulted
by immediate
animated by the
abilities,
power and
While
for
and
it
his
wiles,
own government,
;
as well as
The
troubles within
Macedonia disabled
niaa
o 2
^64
nian garrison
HISTORY OF GREECE.
;
Chap. XVII.
on the borders, became an asylum for Macedonian who, together with a body of Athenian refugees and malcontents
horse stationed there,
employed themselves
least resistance.
in
wan
2S.5
CHAPTER
Of
the
AflPairs
XVIII.
Athenian
Expedition
SECTION
Affairs of Sicily
:
I.
Hieron King of Syracuse. Expulsion of the Family of Gelon, and Establishment of Independent Democracies in the Sicilian Cities : Agrarian Law. Diicetius King of the Sicels. Syracuse the Soverein
City of Sicily.
:
Lacedcejnonian Confederacy
Sicilians:
War
Peace through
^
I
^
HE
-^
but whose
men were
all
soldiers
and seamen
no
resist,
and
political
system upon
the whole admirably arranged, with large revenue from mines and from
tributary states; there
is
no foreseeing how
far their
tyrannous domi-
among
forein
Avork
its
own
ruin.
The
1.6,
of the
iland of
rliit. vit.
wild ambition of the people of Athens became eager in project for the
Nic,
many
its
of them, of
its
its
population,
means
to
conquest.
In
t%8
Ch. 10. of
this Hist.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
In
from
cuse,
Chap.XVIII.
we have
seen Gelon,
become king of
His dominion
comprehended
extensive
de Rep^l. 5. Diod.
T>
1.
command
next
11.
D.
.^r C 479.
r^
...
by
The only
.
gentum
who,
like
advancement.
He
first
of the seventy-seventh
home, he ingaged
in
Being defeated, he
lost the
respect of his
own
people
and
made
government was
difficulty as that
Gelon's reign was too short for completing a work of such complex
many
population was
become
original
how-
Among
the advan-
the
soil,
sufficiently hard.
lutirely
site
On
hill
composed
Sect.
I.
287
its
hight
its
summit
level
The
became
into
two
fortifications
;
the former
sea,
the other
craggy
higlit
so
that Syracuse
consisted
now
of three
towns,
common enemy,
Whether the
beginning under
population how-
which Syracuse
exactly fitted
of superior character, but of a Demetr. de for the dhlicult situation to which, on his '^^^' ^'^^^'
man
affairs
of a state so
compounded
for war,
as that
capital.
He had talents
After he
his Diori.
i.
brother's reign.
came himself
u.
command
but
his
fleet
relieved
the
5i.
fleet.
In peace there-
fore his wealth iuabled him, as his taste disposed him, to shine in the
liberally to
reward
those
who had
talents for
mixing
his
of Pindar have
At the
parts of
among whom
mentioned.
we may
3S
in"- his
HISTORY OF GREECE.
tyranny into a constitutional monarchy.
Chap.XVIII.
there pathetically
He
kd
fear,
he could be
it
free
from
and
all,
nor, in
any pro-
art, like
Gelon, to
citizens,
and compose
and perhaps the great business of fleets, armies, and forein connections, than to the detail of interior government, and the secret
workings of
M-ith
political fermentation.
illiberality,
It
is
not unlikely
that, disgusted
petulance and
For
and most
most
orderly as well as
contrary, disdain-
employment,
Xen. Hier.
Aiistot. de Rep. 1.5.
S;.^j'
that to
Of
particulars
i
we
we
i
learn
i
station,
liim,
Diod. C.66.
I.
,, II.
He
died
nevertheless in peace, in the eleventh year of his reign, and was suc-
B C
467
are
Thrasybulus
The democratical
dominion
:
they ingaged in
11.
who
67, 68.
Selinus,
The
people
two
between them
Thrasy-
insurgents.
War was
some
time
Sect.
T.
INDEPENDENT DEMOCRACIES IN
final success,
SICILY.
289
time: but at length Thrasybukis, finding his force insufficient for any
hope of
Diodorus
is,
whom we
have any
in political matter,
at the
same
is little
establishment,
and
in
as
little
Gelon's
hile
a confused
mass, injudiciously
reports, evidently,
of contending factions.
as
it
is,
Thucydides, we
may
On
1.
predominating, and the democracy of Syracuse not being yet strong o/-q " or settled enough to assert command, every town of the dominion of B. C. 4G3.
the tyrants assumed
its
separate independency.
But
as the acquisition
it
all,
;
was proposed
to secure
it
by friendly
political intercourse
and
The
principal
was animated.
A festival
was
esta-
Freedom, common
for
the Sicilian
cities, at
oxen
less
'commonwealth.
The
historian,
M'ith
much
3.1 1.
'^'
'
Vol.
II.
90
HISTORY OF GREECE.
of two divisions of the
city,
Chap. XVIIL
01.79.4.
\var
From
in
similar causes
same time,
Agrigentuni, Gcla,
parties were nearly
;
and Catana.
Everywhere the
;
balanced
cultivation
was interrupted
it
and
was
called,
after
much
ant.
and a
retreat
was hoped
iland.
But
pertv, or to be assigned to
the
and of very
doubtful advantage
maintained.
any
Diod.
^'
'
1.
11.
hastily
and with
envied others
many
others,
deprived of both property and municipal rights, w hich they had before
pssessed, were reduced to
the condition of
New
In
many towns
the govern-
ment, with the favorite name of democracy, was so unstcddy, that through the discontent of the lower people, sometimes arising from
c.
86.
caprice, sometimes
from oppression, temptation arose for the powerful and wealthy to aspire to tyranny. In Syracuse especially this occurred
;
01. 81. 3.
'
but, of
many
Tyndarion
lost his
'
life
in the attempt.
common
to
title
of tyrant,
Sect.
I.
SICELS.
tlie
2&
as
terms,
we
short
made against
amid
all
the troubles, forein conmicrce had not ceased, and the marine of Syra-
pirates in
the western parts of the Mediterranean, but repressed by the able and
among
out a B_ Q^ 453 ao-ainst them, of sixty triremes, which, under the command of O'- **'*
fitted
The Syracusans
c.
67.
made
in Corsica,
Sicily, called
c.
78,
who still
of the Grecian
of the iland.
Long confined
to strong holds
among
the
hills,
carrying
thither from the vales M'hatever of their harvests they could save from
t!ie
rapacity of the Greeks, and cultivating the vales only as they could
at the risk of being carried off for slaves,
little
snatch opportunity,
Sicels
the
had maintained
its
connection
among
having
separate
and independent
polity.
Ducetius united
all,
S7.
move his residence and the seat of his government from Nese, among the mountains, to a new town which he founded, with the name of Palice, in the vale beneath, by M'hich he would of course acquire more complete command of that vale, and more efi^ectually
Whether ambition or political necessity produced the measures which followed, we are without means toDiod. 1. 2. know. Ducetius, becoming ingaged in war with the Agrigentines, 01, gV.. j.
vindicate
its
produce.
sans
29a
HISTORY OF GREECE.
sans sending assistance to
forces.
tlie
CuAr. XVIII.
vengeance
iUibcral
;
lie
was conpas-
demned
.ssion
But when
The power,
tomed
among
lead,
summer
sistance,
collected
retook
command
of a civilized nation.
his first flight,
still
had attended
Diod.
.
11.
Mounting
his horse
by night,
91.
the magistrates assembled the people, to receive their orders for measures to be taken with a suppliant of such importance.
Diodorus, the
prince, for
from
conduct
in
war
To
lie
common-
wealth.
The government of
at this time to
large, populous,
have been
some consistency
feel
its
and the
city,
Sicilian politics.
sible that
The people of the sniallcr towns were become senthey had been making themselves miserable for an indeable
pendency which they could not maintain, that they were equally un2
Sect.
I.
SICILY.
293
upon a
superior.
among
tion remained, lasting peace could not easily subsist between them.
The Syracusan chiefs brought back Ducetius from Corinth, apparent!}' to make him instrumental to their own views for advancing the power of their comraonweallh. They permitted, or rather incouraged him to establish a colony of mixed people, Greeks and Sicels, at Cale
Actti,
Dioci.
1.
12.
ou'sa 3 B. C. 446.
them
a war followed
and the
from Syracuse.
leading power
Thus the
S^^racusan democi'acy
among
One
Sicily,
among
;
all
1.
12.
and
people,
now
alone within
^* tI'
Ol. Si. 4.
most gallant
^'
*'^''
hands of
the sur-
viving inhabitants were made slaves, and the town was destroyed.
The
1.
12.
They exacted
of the Hand.
their
navy and
war broke
to time augmented the exaction, from all the With the revenue thus arising they increased their establishment of cavalry and when the Peloponnesian
;
out, Sj^racuse,
by
its
its
republics.
As a Dorian
cratical,
-
confederacy
294
HISTORY OF GREECE.
had
force heen exerted while
Chap. XVIII.
vithin their iland, to prevent them from giving that assistance which
the Peloponncsians hoped, and which, strong as Syracuse was in marine,
its
revolt,
Thucyd.
1.
3.
niod
c. 53.
V2
'
ni'
8T
from Chalcis
in Euboea,
and
their revolt
all
the Ionian
city of
The powerful
Camarina moreover,
its
originally a
re-
But
all
B. C. 427.
In the
fifth
sea.
still
The Ionian
more severe
relieve.
towns then
all
than that which had excited the revolt, would be the certain conse-
quence of the
fall
In
and a
deputation was sent thither to request assistance, urging the claim, not
The
factions of Sicily,
reported
rhetorician
who reduced
his profession to
an
art,
which he taught
for paj',
and he was
date
is
inaccurate.
bassy
Sect.I.
295
novelty of his
artificial
and flowery
elois
by maturer Attic
taste,
have
tlien
The
;
season was, however, favorable for the effect of his talents: the rebellious Mitylenreans
and
oli-
The
1.
3,
Sicilian seas,
manner of cruizing
to stop.
alliance, the
among
the antients,
on the
Sicilian coast,
that,
it
was proposed
state, increase
and
emolument
Thus incited, in opposition to the salutary advice left them as a legacy by their great minister Pericles, the Athenians ingaged in the affairs of
Sicily.
B. C. 427,
p'',^'^".^'
took
its
The immediate
by
sea M'as given
effect of this
reinforcement, as
3.
oj,
up or became
ineffectual,
intro-
duced.
^olian
ilands,
The
Lipara3ans held
M'ere
by maritime depredation.
failed.
C. 42G.
^"".i?'^;.^"
Leontini from
action.
the land
blockade being
Tliui-yd.
'
1.
s.
Charreades
forces
fell in
against
by capitulation,
and then
sailinir
eye
sailing to
Thurvd.
'^'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
the
1.
Chap. XVIII.
and took the small
citadel of
allies
3.
featetl
the Locrians,
Peripoliiim.
to protect
it,
^^'
town of
In
103.
Nessa
were
compelled to
retire
with
loss.
The Syracusans
from
own
seas,
where they
the enemy's
fleet.
with a recjuest for reinforcement; and, the success already obtained incouraging the Athenian government, it Mas determined to send such
a
fleet as
it
sea,
and, war.
was hoped,
command
speedy success
in the final
object of the
command
in chief, while
make
the
number of the
command
The conduct
commanded,
successful
and
we afterward
in
find him,
in
Athens or
Greece.
He was
whom,
when
government of Athens.
the
When
the
and he
lost
his
life,
as
mc have
seen, in
of Alautineia.
command began
his
operations
Sect.
I.
INTERFERENCE OF ATHENS IN
:
SICILY.
'^'
297
1.
operations inauspiciously
debarking his forces on the Locrian coast, Thucyd. ^^^" near the town of PeripoHnm, which Laches had taken, lie was attacked
3.
to retire
with
loss.
106.
The following spring was rendered remarkable by an eruption of c mount .Etna, the third remembered among the Greeks, from their first establishment in Sicily. The boiling matter overflowed a part of the
Catanian
territory,
In the beginning of
summer, faction disabling the Rhegian government, and the Athenian p general being either weak or remiss in his command, the Sy-racusans, Pthrough intelligence
in
^oq
^v. 6.
It
c.'i'.'^^
Thucyd.
'^'
1.
5.
Coming
it
to action, nevertheless,
'^'''
Scylla,
The circumstances of Camarina then, sedition raging, and the Syracusan party nearly prevailing, induced him to lead
thither.
his
whole
fleet
He
.taken
by the enemy,
city,
ever were fortunate in alliance with the Sicel barbarians, of their neigh-
borhood
who no
:
The
Sicels attacked
:
the
the
Naxians
sallied
opportunely
of the Messe-
and
others,
and, af the
rest,
only a small
The
Syra-
cusan
fleet,
it
Vox. IL
Qa
98
teclion,
HISTORY OF GREECE.
of the Athenian
their
fleet
Chap. XVIIT.
such was the antient marine, dared no longer await the return
to Messena.
The
town by land having been already abandoned, then marched to cooperate m ith tiie Athenian fleet, in an attack upon Messena. The
attempt however failed
;
armament remaining
in-
summer and all the following Minter, tho were continued among the Sicilian Greeks, nothing important
resulted.
Tlmcvd.
. iS,
1.
5.
seq.
j-]^g
alarm
among
thinking
During the
winter,
not actuated by
any extensive view, but meerly considering the separate convenience of their own communities, concluded a peace between themselves, for
themselves only; each city holding
its
itself
bound
to the conditions of
all
But the
its
leaders;
among
Hermon was
all,
rising to
eminence, for
sition truly
abilities,
for a dispo-
patriotic.
The
He
first
prevailed
with his
own
city,
ministers, at Gela,
from
so
all
among
many
made accommodation
Sicily, that
he
prevailed.
by the condi-
tions of
Sect.
II.
PEACE IN SICILY.
sum, the Syracusans restored jNlorgantina to the
vj'J
Caniarinceans.
The
of the
sailed
The commanders
home.
Eury-
medon,
Corcyra and at Pylus, apparently saved him from so severe a sentence, but he was condemned in a fine.
at
SECTION
New
Troubles in Sicily:
betzveen
11.
New
Interference of Athens
stopped by the
Peace
Athens by Egesta against Selinus. Contention of Parties at Athens Banishment of Hyperbolas. Assistance to Egesta voted by the Athenian Assembly : Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus appointed to
command.
Fleet.
Mutilation of the Terms of Mercury Completion of the Preparations for the Sicilian Expedition, and Departure of the
>
Hermocrates,
to have had no
it
appears, had
no
ideii,
of the possibility
Tliucyd.
'^'
'
1.
5.
Greek municipal governments into one commonwealth, or even of establishing among them an effective federal union. The Sicilian
patriot
is
represented,
bj^
commonwealths, since
made,
Q Q 2
300
HISTORY OF GREECE.
the expulsion of the family of Gelon.
Chap. XVIIL
poor rested
under
warm
number of new
citizens.
The landowners,
and,
it
expelled
Whether
all
we
common
temper of faction
It
among
ease.
ijess
the Greeks,
must appear
at least doubtful.
was however
hardly possible that the violent measure adopted could place them at
Having only
own,
in
circum-
For not
man can
inflict
and
not
constant exertion,
against plunderers.
The Syracusans
citizens, all
kindness so far
the
"
number of Syracusan
was totally deserted.
in their
tini
What,
new
men, appa-
we
it
number of them quitted that city in disgust, and seizing a part of the town of Leontini, called PhoceiE, and a fort in the Leontine territory named Rricinnias,
own
JMany of
mostly
in sufficient dis-
and Syracusan
Intelligence
S>!CT.n.
soi
prin-
Intelligence of
expulsion of
all
the
Athens.
It
The
throughout
manage
this business;
in public
and
p''^,^"^'-
it
ably.
Urging, both
the notorious
harangue
and
'
in
colloquial
communication,
oppression of the
Sicily,
At Gela he
failed;
and finding
no promising prospect
of the Sicels to
any other
city,
Bricinnia;.
The
and by
his assurances
Returning
way he added
by an advan-
among
summer of the same year. peace between Athens and Lacedsmon, begun
in the
The
in
negotiations
the succeeding
following spring.
The
the
the
maxims of
and
all
Pericles again
ac(iuisition to
rejected,
interference ia
The
states of
little
Greece
in Sicilian affairs
thus
two small
republics,
Hermoc rates,
308
Thucyd.
^' ''
1.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
6.
CHAP.XVail.
The
among
for
behooved them to
;
but
within Sicily
it
was impossible.
of what usually
befel a captured
P \V^i6
'"S'y
^^'''^'
'^^'^^"
The
'
If this passed
'
with impunity, and not this only, but that domineering people were
permitted to go on oppressing
it
'
all
the
allies
of Athens
in Sicily, let
'
'
now impending
Mar.'
To
these argutroops,
Athens was
tion
at this
sedi-
of Argos,
which
had
nearly
annihilated
extraordinary
The party of Nicias dreaded war on its more on account of the increase of influence and authority which would insue to Alcibiades; and they vigilantly
was
notorious.
still
his measures.
who had
citizens
slill
great weight,
raised
which had
Cleon to greatness.
overborne Nicias by vehemence of railing and by threatening prosecutions; but he could not so overbear Alcibiades.
Against him
therefore
Sect.
II.
303
tlierefore
The
vast ambition of
Pint. vit.
Alcibiades,
splendid
manner of
living,
""
^^
'"'
'
sedulously circulated
among
were greater
than could
be
democrac}',
men
to a just level.
alarmed at
this ideli,
it.
and
which the
on the
They endevored
counterwork
rested
intirely
favor of the people, but Nicias and the aristocratical party, were the
pei'sons really to be feared
;
Hyperbolas used
same time
M'as
should be banished.
But he had a
an
and
sedi-
Hyperbolus
Avas
named
as a person,
by
and
to
the commonwealth.
The
people were
surprized
for
no
man
and
Avith
this
Cimon.
To
the
whim
and the banishment of Hyperbolus was dehowever, lasted no longer than to strike this
The
blow
war
coiilition
of
parties,
ao-ainst a
One was still as earnest for maintain peace. The embassy from Egesta
feared.
As general of the
commonwealth, for he
the people.
still
held that
office,
None
more
effort
304
HISTORY OF GREECE.
decision in favor of the Egestans,
Chaf. XVIIL
But
ments and repeated supplications, which the authority and influence of the general gave opportunity to urge, in some degree prevailed
Avith the
people.
resisting the
Argian friends
in Ornese,
B.C. 415.
'
p'w^"
new
sixty talents
Thucyd.T.6. in silver,
about
fifteen
With
voucher in their hands, they were introduced into the The commissioners, devoted to the party of Athenian assembly.
them
in
false,
not
sum produced
its
temples.
but the assembly was persuaded, and the decree passed for
The
and
all
policy of Alcibiades
upon
this occasion,
unnoticed by Plutarch
is
Tho
Nicias so
The
decree for sending a force to Sicily being carried, the commanders were
to be
all
named.
The
still
the proposers of
;
Aristoph.
V.
597,601,
604!^'^^'
named first in command Alcibiades second and, for a third, Lamachus was chosen a man of birth, who, tho yet in the prime of life, had seen much service, but a soldier of
measures,
:
either by abilities
or
Sect.
II.
sos
or property.
then to restore the commonwealth of Leon; afterward take any measures they might judge proper for and to tini promoting the Athenian interest in Sicily. Fur carrying into effect
these purposes,
it
powers.
Such rapid decision could not but be hazardous, where the measures of executive government were directed by a whole people. I3ut it was
the oliject of Alcibiades and his party not to
let
Four days only were allowed before a second assembly was held, to decide upon the detail of the armament, and to grant any requisition of the generals, for which a vote of the people might be necessary.
Nicias, unprepared before to
him
to a great
command
reiilly
which he knew to be
now
stepped for-
To urge
to
Athenian tempers," he
'
ingage
;
'
yet I
'
think
my duty to
is.
endevor
to
rash
'
present purpose
at peace: yet
'
with which you have been at war, have not yet acceded to the treaty,
by
all.
In short,
it is
by ten-day
us,
truces,
which
will
hold only
till
some misfortune
befall
'
or
till
for war.
'
'
which they
are
still
maintaining
and some
others,
whom
great
'
states,
a precarious obedience.
*
'
new and
As some
'
to the
in Sicily,
which
desire to represent
from an object of
*
Vox,. II.
It
apprehension,
SOG
appreliension,
HISTORY OF GREECE.
it
Ciiap. XVIII.
security.
is
who
the
all,
they
will
be
forward ia
connection with Lacedtemon, and more cautious of opposing the Athenians; whose cause is similar to theirs, and whose interest
congenial.
*
'
at
my
years,
and
after the
long
my
my
is
conduct,
may
man
is
less
anxious for
my
welfare
commonwealth.
I
But
m'c
owe both
you
a
hold that
a o-ood citizen
who
is
If then there
man to be is among
whose
his
and splendid
situation,
him
far to exceed, in
suited his
command above his years, but with which, at his years especially, a man is likely to be delighted above all, if repairs are wanting to a wasted fortune, which may make such a command desirable to him, tho ruinous to his countr}-, it behooves you to beware how you accede to the advice of such a counsellor. I dread indeed the warm passions of that crowd of youths,
if
he
is
now
appointed to a
whom
all
1 speak:
and
last
assembly,
men
of sober
interfere,
commonwealth.
expedition, I
If therefore, honored as
my
command
left still
of the intended
may presume
;
to advise,
it
be not undertaken
seas
divided by their
war with the Selinuntines, so, without our they accommodate their differences; and that, in future,
in
own
distress.
Sect.
II.
307
distress, will
aflford none.'
'
to reply.
He began
command
have been
to
he was accused.
'
said,
'
now imputed
country for
me
as
all
own, and
it is
my
boast, that I
in magnificence,
and
my
The
the
M'ar.
Olympian
prizes:
festival,
the whole
Is this a
Greek
?
my
victory.
crime
On the
contrary,
it is
who
to
my
extravagance, as
whether in public
entertainments or in whatever
the envy of
perhaps I
citizens:
and
in
my
commonwealth.
'
my
country,
I will
let it
be inquired what
I
my public
how Have I
youth
Glory,
it,
own,
sought to acquire
my
success?
it is
Have
or was
been forward, as
said
sight,
hazardous war?
either
Peloponnesus to
fight
own
antient alUes?
my
services,
'
on
first
R R 2
S0
first
HISTORY OF GREECE.
entering upon public business,
Chap. XVIII.
you need
my
now be advantageous to you. then to Nicias, who has long anil honorably
situation of general of the
I
served
commonwealth, tho he
readily
:
has been
on
singular
prizing.
good fortune;
For want
am
it,
commonwealth
checked by
his prudence,
my
dispo-
sition to enterprize
*
cannot be dangerous.
To come then
to the question
the opportunity
Sicily,
now
offered to the
are
mixed
attached to a
disposed to
and
little
whether of
offer
political connection,
may
and
any advantage, or
relieve
from any
Nor
is
their mili-
well
known
But
it is
from Peloponnesus.
strated
what may
able to
demonThe Peloponnesians are always overrun the open country of Attica, even when none of our
to this, late experience has
suffice us to
With regard
know.
force
is
now
whom
treaties ratified
by oath bind us
Is
it
a just
are unable
'
to
Sect.
'
II.
30
'
but to
'
in Sicily
'
employment within
their
own
It has been
by readiness to
our choice
'
ASSIST ALL, whether Greeks or barbarians, that our empire, and all
empire, has been acquired.
'
Nor,
'
how
it
;
far
we
will stretch
it,
our
is it
now
in
possessing empire,
we
'
must maintain
or
'
we
shall,
our
own
subjection
to
'
to a forein dominion.
detain
*
'
observe,
that the
command which we
are assured in Sicily,
and the
party of which
we
sufficiently inable us to
if
'
keep what
^ve
fail
we should
much to
little
it
hope,
we have,
I
'
to fear.
am
'
ought not to be
'
This speech of Alcibiades was received with loud and extensive Thucyd. ^' applause. It was followed by speeches of the Egestan and Leontine
ministers, imploring pity
1.
6.
faith of treaties,
which
also
^'
had
their effect
and
of
it.
But, as
first
of the
was
his privilege to
;
name
and excite a
little
and he thought to damp the present ardor, reflection, by naming what, he expected, for the
service,
would be deemed
to accede to the
from
its
that would
'
oppose
its
accomplishment.
We
is
have, at
c.
20.
present,' he said,
'
It
to be
hoped
'
Naxus and
'
may
'
on
whose
310
HISTORY OF GREECE.
whose
op])osition
sea,
CHAr.XVlII.
we may
rely'; all of
of land and
The Syracusans,
in addi-
command
in
which they,
will
and of the
stores
which a
while
supplies
by
sea.
In addition there-
Unless
stir,
we obtain other
sidered that
allies
of the enemy.
It
we
shall
any
territory
not without
considered,
and
difficulty at
times;
These things
armed of our
advisable to
ThucTtl.
c. 22.'
1.
and
subjects,
if
in
6.
Peloponnesus,
far a
is
should be done.
body of cavalry capable of opposing the cavalry of the country impossible, we must add a large force of bowmen and slingers,
at least relieve our
who may
otherwise
Our
fleet
we can have no
will
so
numerous an
arise
distress that
might otherwise
from
Beyond all things, however, we must be amply supplied with money; because what the Egestans talk of, I
am
of.
enemy.
This
is
what the
welfare of the
commonwealth,
'
am
fully persuaded,
requires.
If any
man can
convince
Sect.il
'
sii
unfounded,
am
ready to resign
my
for Thucyd.
^'
'^'^'
1.
'
command
to him.'
match
6.
whom
he had to
The whole people were infatuated with the spirit of enterprize. Love of novelty and change, M'ith certainty of present pay, and hope of they knew not what
vidently
insure success.
all
ranks; while
the past successes of Athens, and the evident weakness and inefficiency
of the Lacedsemonian administration, incouraged even the more experienced and prudent
;
insomuch that
if
fined,
momentary
25.
people,
c.
what
precisely
He
would admit no
at length said,
bowmen and
men, those
stores
thousand
would be
insuflicient
and that
and
;
accompany
the
fleet
to be left dependent
itself to the
plies.
thus demanded
generals to
command,
The
now
far
3ia
M-ealth,
HISTORY OF GREECE.
vhlch
in
Chap. XVIIL
peace vere
trifling:,
made with
a celerity proportioned
During the equipment, and while the popular mind was bent with a singular degree of passion upon the proposed conquest, injoyino- already
in ideii large acquisition
ever\- Athenian citizen to be forever exempt from from po\erty, without occupation or profession but that of labor and arms, everything was suddenly disturbed by a strange circumstance, to
It
was a
custom among the Athenians, derived from very early times, when art was rude, to place an imperfect statue of Mercury, the head completely
carved, the rest generally a block meerly squared, in front of every
residence, whether of gods or
men
this
custom was
still
held sacred,
and
formless guardians.
unknoMu.
the city
the
omen foreboding
ill
to the proposed
free or
expedition
slave,
who would
in question, inquiry
not the
Andoc.de
Tiiucyd.lt).
c.
least
2S.
mock
and
was involved.
Thucyd.
ATc'ib! vd'^de
Of
nyiio
all
who
leaned to
men
of the commonwealth;
bigis,p. 13S.
young man, by
whose
by the splendor of
his birth,
of his fortune, and supported by the favor of the people, they found
themselves so overwhelmed, that they had for some time past submitted
in silence.
to be neglected
they
Sect.II.
prosecution OF ALCIBIADES.
rest,
sis
they set themselves instantly to take advantage from it to ruin him in the favor of the people, that foundation of sand on wliich all power
in
Athens must
reins of the
commonwealth would
of course pass into their own hands. The report was sedulousl}' propagated, that Alcibiadcs was the principal author of all the late outrages.
Facts known,
it
was
style of living
of Aicibiades, so
to all, for
unbecoming the
it
citizen of a
purposes, and th.at nothing less than the tyranny of Athens was the
tlie
enemies of Aicibiades,
the authors
of a revel
it
Nothing could
its
consequences
time, and nothing could equally favor the purposes of his opponents
hope
He
neither avoided
coming
'
in his absence.
If guilty,' he said,
:
he
Avas
if
'
it
'
man
'"command.
314
'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
command.'
But, as usual with
all
Chap.XVIIL
factions,
but an inferior
party was the
commonwealth was, with his opponents, consideration what would advance the power of their
;
first.
whom
the expedition \
its
1.6.
former object,
^^'
So great and so
c.
31.
forein
armament was never before sent by any Grecian state on service. The importance of the armament itself, the importance
its
and distance of
object,
it
uas favored, occasioned extraordinary allowance for the equipment. commanders of triremes not
sparing their
own
purses,
show and
for service.
The
daily pay of
to every private
by the name of
office
both
required more skill and was more laborious than that of the rowers of
The heavy
all
Greek
30-
On
17.
the day
named
K C
Ol Qi i
P.
on the parade
-r.
w.
The whole
i
city
After S June.
accompanied
*
their
march
to Pena^us
Accord-
This
is
Thiicydides's account.
Eion,
ing to an oration remaining from Isocrates, die accusers of Alcibiades were punished,
much
to refer
to the time to
which
it
belonged,
historian.
Sect.
III.
EXPEDITION TO
between hope and
tlie
it,
SICILY.
sis
historian, divided
fear,
nnmerous
more calmly
a spectacle.
gratified their
and interesting
As soon
as the
were put up to the gods with more than usual formality, heralds directing,
and the
M'hole
armament uniting
ship,
their voices.
officers
Goblets of wine
and
out of gold and silver cups, poured libations and drank to the
armament and of the commonwealth, the citizens and strangers on the beach joining in the ejaculation. This ceremony being
prosperity of the
fleet
moved
for ^T^gina,
thence to take
its
SECTION
Defects of the Syracusan Constitutmt.
ment.
III.
Measures of
the
Athenian Armament.
Able Conduct of
Alcibiades,
quences at Athens.
Intelligence of the extraordinary magnitude of the Athenian preparations passed from various quarters to Syracuse and the destination,
;
Thucyd.
1.6.
was long before the news gained such credit, among the Syracusan people, as to produce any measure for obviating the threatened evil. It is not specified by historians, but the account of Thucydides makes
it
it
Thucydides
calls
it
made
Sicily,
made
more
by any Grecian
slate.
The
coasting navis s
Syracuse,
316
HISTORY OF GREECE.
The democratica!
tlie
Cuap. XVIIL
party
now
bore
tlie
sway
At
were
The Ionian
interest, formerly,
now
v.'oukl
who would
dare to
own
it
himself
At
length, however,
each more
The
patriotic
when harassed by
as
internal M'ar,
to pro-
6.
forein
Representing the
Athenian armament
to
really
deficiency
of exertion, he
proposed
strengthen
the
Syracusan
confederacy
by
conciliat-
among
make
commonwealth upon earth, and therefore ablest to give that kind of assistance which was most desirable, as being most efticacious with least danger and it was reasonable to suppose, lie said, that apprehension of the growing power and extravagant ambition of Athens Application would dispose the Carthaginians to the connection. ought also to be made to Corinth and Laceda^mon, whose favorable Such in general was the negodisposition could not be doubted.
;
tiation which,
in his
"With
regard then to military operation, he was clear that they ought to meet
invasion before
it
reached them
Athenian navy was, yet local circumstances gave them such advan5
tagcs,
Sect.
tages,
states
III.
si7
were able to
might make
it
mouth of Hermocrates, by
clearest as M'ellas the
The
fleet,
Tarentines,'
to
said Hermocrates,
'
'
go from
Corcyra, their
known
'
'
'
So numerous a
fleet,
as that of the
enemy,
'
in the
so, in Thticydidcs's
'
Hermocrates terms
it)
'
We
shall
'
or,
should they,
if
'
expence of
it,
these,
we may,
prudence
'
require
retire into
fail
advantages.
Nor
can these
his
gallics
'
with
passage
'
'
'
to cra>;s the
'
in
1.
6.
merited.
Many would
not
^''^^'
yet believe that the Athenians meant to invade Sicily with views of
conquest: some even ridiculed the idea: various contradictory opinions were warmly maintained; and Athenagoras, chief of the democratical party,
It
said,
would be
mad
as to invade Sicily.
itself
For himself,
double
'
'
Peloponnesus
'
the
318
*
HISTORY OF GREECE.
the
'
Chat. XVIII.
as so alarming-.
Sicily the
armament whose approach was represented cavahy, he well knew, was imbarked within
:
No
Athenians
'
'
'
Such being
their deficiency,
if,
instead of
commencing
operations,
'
as they must, from their naval camp, with scarcely a friend within the iland, they possessed a neighboring city equal to Syracuse, even so
'
their
tion.'
Thucyfl.l. 6.
'^'
<
Having declared
^'
'
by Hermocrates, he proceeded to invey against him and the whole The ambition of young men,' he said, panted body of the nobles. for military command; but the city would not so impose a yoke upon
'
'
'
itself.
On
the contrary,
'
purposes of those
who would
e.
41.
not
fail for
common
He was
pro-
generals (for the Syracusan constitution at this time divided the chief
command between a board of fifteen) interfered with He strongly reprobated the attempt to check authority of office.
military
on public
'
affairs
When
hostilities
were threatened,' he
said,
'
the
'
'
more
'
been obtained, and in the mean time to communicate with the of the commonwealth, and take
all
'
in
ment, was the unprepared state of Syracuse, the whole of the Athenian
c.
43.
The
fleet
consisted of a
Of
the triremes, a hundred were Athenian; and of these, sixty were light
for action, forty carried soldiers.
The other thirty-four triremes were of the allied state?, principally Chian. The heavy-armed were, in all, of whom two thousand two hundred were five thousand one hundred
;
Athenian
Sect.
Ill,
si9
tlie
appointed to
the other
Thetes,
fifteen
orders.
'J'he
armed were
ncsian
five
hundred
mercenaries,
The regular light-armed hundred Athenian and eighty Cretan bowmen, seven Jmndred
states.
Rhodiau
slingers,
A
by
The
storeships provided
artificers,
tlie
many
Through the
and the opposition by which the other was perplexed, so deficient had
been the preparatory measures, that
it
what
Italian or
I.
&,
meet the
fleet as
three divisions
which
made
Then they
Tarentum
even
make
fleet
reassembled, without
Rhegium, the
But even
;
al-
for
The
up
interest
Siio
HISTORY OF GREECE.
interest
Chat. XVIII.
and general
make
serious
some of the
;
to
controul othei-s
to
territory.
been as
till it
was arrived
harbour of Rhegium.
They brought
false,
information,
made by
sent
to inquire concerning
The richest temple of the Egestan Eryx where indeed the collection of
silver,
terri-
cups,
was considerable.
After
from neighboring' towns, Phenician as well as Greek. These commissioners had been appointed by the influence of Alcibiades and his part}'-;
Whether they were chosen for their ability but they had either believed, cult to guess
;
or their folly
may
be
diffi-
or affected to believe,
and
reported to the Athenian people accordingly, that thf}- could not sufficiently
The commissioners
first
sent from
in
command,
would approve
and
their
dence to promote a decree for the expedition, but to find means (for
purpose, they
made
strict scrutiny.
On
show
thirty talents,
between
Probably
;
seven and eight thousand pounds sterling, in their treasury, and that,
for anything more, their wealth
none of the generals had relied much upon the wealth of Egesta yet as it had been seriously proposed as the fund which was to afford
means
Sect, in,
ATHENIAN INVASION OF
first
SICILY.
its
321
means
for the
deficiency;
Athenian people were not likely to receive very favorably an immediate application for a supply. The disappointment however did
for tlie
The
who
common kinsmen
every
office
'
unless in
alliance.'
on account of the force of land and sea, tho not inconsiderable, which they could have furnished, than for the check it would give to negoless
Avas a
disappointment,
tiation
among
Rhcgium
would be of weight.
sequence
much
at a
The Athenian generals found themselves in conloss. In many places a disposition adverse to
:
but,
1.
through the divisions among the leading men of Athens, and the haste Thucyd. *^" of those who promoted the Sicilian expedition to profit from popular
"^^
^,
had been so neglected that the semibarbarian Egestans upon the verge of ruin through their war with Selinus, and the miserable Leontines, ejected from their city and territory, Avere the only confederates of Athens beyond the Ionian sea. When therefore
favor,
it
it
came
to be debated
what should be
tlie first
for his
opinion,
little satisfied
c. -if.
which was the primary object of their instructions and, unless the Egestans could fulfil their ingagement to furnish pay for the whole
armament, or readier means should occur, than yet appeared, for
storing the
re-
Leontines, not
farther to
treasures of the
commonwealth.
in the relief of
The
Egesta
disposition to assist
;
its
allies
would be shown
.
its
Vol. IL
ar
322
f'eslcd
HISTORY OF GREECE.
by the
to
siicli
CHAr.XVIII.
armament
return
a distance,
and,
satisfied
with
this,
he would
im-
mediately home.
Aleibiadcs, whose temper was impetuous, but his
mind capacious,
eil[^"t'cts
and
the extraordinary
in
wliich
had produced
Peloponnesus, and
had formed
foundation of
Such
a force,'
he
said, 'as
home without
achievement,
'
He would
all
therefore
cities,
'
the Grecian
'
In some places,
*
'
from
it
might be procured
;
in
some, supplies of
'
The
*
'
'
commodious city and port of the iland for their principal station, whence to carry on the war. When trial had been duly made what might be done by negotiation, when they were fully assured who were determined enebeginning should be made with
]\l'essena,
the most
'
mies, and
who
were, or
'
should have a clearer view of the business before them, and Selinus
first
Lamachus, much a
Thucyd.
soldier
and
little
the captious and greedy temper of the peTiple his soverein, differed
1.
6.
from both
'
his collegues
'Their whole
force,'
he said,
'
ought iinmc-
'
and
surprize.
'
which he thought not impossible, the other towns, of the would however
;
'
ritory
fall
them
'
could be removed be
theirs.
*
'
'
might
Sect.
'
III.
tlius
ATHENIAN INVASION OF
be provoked to risk a battle
;
SICILY.
in-
32S
might
stantly
'
Sicilian cities,
'
'
'
'
'
not of so
With regard to Messena, he thought much consequence. The deserted port of JMegara, comit,
'
would be
naval station.'
vhat
Lamachus,
if
I.
6.
^^
He
ever prevail so far as to bring the IMessenians to join in the war against
armament to contract for provisions throughout their territory. He then went with sixty triremes, Lamachus accompanying, to Naxus; and he found the people of that city, who
sion for the Athenian
much
them
to join in league,
Athens.
Thence
he proceeded to
to Syracuse.
port,
a,
the,
Athenian commonwealth,
'
'
which
ties
of blood
any Leontines would be received as friends by the Athenian armament.' This ceremony being performed, and such observation made, as circumstances permitted, on
'
;'
adding,
'
and the circumjacent ground, the detached isquadron rejoined the fleet, and all together went once more to Catana. Meanwhile T T 2
tlie
ports,
the
city,
3U
party
Tliiuyd. 1.6.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
]\Iean\vhile apprehension, either of the
Chap. XVIII.
in the
Athenian armament, or of a
among
their
own
people,
had so
far
wrought a change
leaders, that
The
being landed, were stationed without the walls, while the geneto
address the
Catanian people.
in the agora,
through which, in meer wantonness, they made their way into the
The
but
who imagined
liastily,
Some of them
rest,
ful
Grecian
after,
the
whole
fleet
which
was resolved to
make
weaken the Syracusan, had been extensively founded. A party in Camarina, incouraged by what had passed at Naxus and Catana, as well as by the reported strength of the Athenian armament, sent to request support in attempting a revolution. The fleet moved thither; but it was found that the innovators had been overhasty in their
measures, and the project could not be carried immediately into exe-
cution
3'et
an Athenian party
still
subsisted in Camarina.
In returning,
and collected considerable booty but the Syracusan cavalry quickly checked this mode of warfare, cut off some stragglers, and compelled
;
The
fleet
pro-
ceeding then to Catana, found there the Salaminian, the ship appropriated to purposes of sacred and solemn office, bearing an otder from
the Athenian people for the immediate return of Alcibiades and some
X)ther
Sect.
III.
32,5
Since the armament sailed for Sicily, Athens had been experiencing
the worst evils of democratical frenzy.
The
to open contention with the democratical, had resolved upon the bold
project of
making democracy
itself their
own
interest.
sedulous
suspicion
in
diftusmg rumours
1-/Y-
II and observations,
they became
Isocrat.
pro Alcib.
p. ]3s.
t.
3.
and alarm.
influence of Alcibiades,
his Tbucyd.
1.
6.
His
abilities, at
The
which had occasioned the expulsion of those celebrated the execration to which their tyrants were then magnified tenfold memory had been condemned, by the party which had overborne them,
;
was alledged
in
own
deliverance,
had owed
it
Shortly
mind.
authors.
rity for
Every one
-was
its
^^Qg' ^^
myst.
Examiners
*,
with
full
autho-
offiered for
any who would indicate anything. The most suspicious and incoherent evidence only was obtained, from slaves and men of the vilest characters.
It
was deemed
says Thucydides,
that just
men should
suflcr,
than that the constitution should be indangered. rank and most respectable character were
It appears indeed difhcult to discover for
in
Many
of principal
consequence imprisoned.
benefit the
whose
Athenian
at least
constitution, as
it
now
should
32G
HISTORY OF GREECE.
should have had some confidence
in
were,
Chap. XVIII.
that government for which they were so anxious, and in vhich they
nominally at
least,
supreme.
when
Pei-
saiider
office
by
Andoc. de
m}st. p. 19.
popular favor, declared their opinion that a plot for overthrowing the
(i^i^^ocracy
agitation,
one
fearful
indiscriminating jealousy a
humor
that had
its
hour and
*"P*
Suspicion extended; it held, and grew daily more severe. more persons were imprisoned and there was no foreseeing where
;
6.
It
rife,
yet v/hat or
whom
to
some movements in Bceotip. occasioned the march of a small body of Lacedsmonians to the Corinthian isthmus.
suspect was most uncertain,
re-
watched
in arms.
movement and, for one night, the whole people The panic spred to Argos: designs against the de; ;
divided
among
now
men
to be put to death
in plot
in
connected
severities
tlie
continuing
Andoc.de
Plut. A'
I
when one of
vit.
own
extant
in
was Andocides)
conversation with one of his fellow-prisoners on their present sufferings and farther danger, yielded to the argument that, guilty or not
guilty,
it
it
;
than perseverance in
'
asserting
Sect.III.
*
'
recall of ALCIBIADES.
own
safety,
327
quiet to
liiiglit
tlie
some must be
sacrificed,
'
mad
vengeance, excited by
which
'
now
tlireaic'iied so
tlie
Information,
thus extorted by
was
received
among
The dark
plot
was
whom
whom
tho proof of the facts alledged was utterly defective, yet none escaped
capital
condemnation
from
all
who were
fered death immediately, and public rewards were offered for killing
those
who
fled
this
democratical justice.
thus
far, little
To
tical
or
no
I'.
(J,
necessary.
The
the object of
as he
His death, as
Thucydides
assures,
but
it
of the army.
les-t
come
to the
and the
whom
the influence
of Alcibiades had obtained for the service, was looked upon as a certain
It
was therefore
re-
solved to send heralds in the sacred trireme called the Salaminian, not
to arrest
him
or
si-mply, in
the
name of
in his
the people, to
command
Imme-
minian
tion,
own
trireme.
tliey
The
made
their.
j.
prisoners
a-iS
HISTORY OF GREECE.
prisoners
ao-ainst
;
Chap.XVIII.
and the Athenian people pronounced sentence of death them, in what was called a deserted judgement
SECTION
among
with
IV.
First Measures Feeble Conduct ef Nicias : Oppression of the Sicels. against Sp'acuse. Preparations on both Sides in JFinter. Intrigues
the Sicilian Cities.
Thucyd. .&?.
1.
6.
The
and extensive
re-
mained
conquest,
it
Little
ing about measures, Nicias Ment with a small escort only to Egesta,
to
demand the
and
all
The concluding
straits
of ]\Iessena to
its
for
the same place by an inland road, through the country of the Sicels;
and
Sect.IV.
and
the
329
unhappy barbarians
the false
promises of the
Egestans.
They were
seized in such
numbers
that, a
market being
opened
twenty
The
on
celebrated
vit.
courtezan
Lai's is said
have been a
to a Corinthian merchant.
An
campain.
M'hich he originally dis-
command
little
but disappointment,
resign, cooperated
per of Nicias, and his generally scrupidous regard for justice, M'ould
tho,
among
commonly deemed
]\loney
the
expectations
of the
at Egesta, M'hich
he
made good by
Thucyd.
'^"
^.
6,
Notwithstanding the vaunts of the democratical leaders there, the first certain news that the Athenian armament had crossed the Ionian gulph, excited alarm that went far
to justify the advice of Lamachus.
terror abated
With
But when,
cibiades, the
and when, on
its re-
according to the manner of the multitude, as Thucydides remarks, e-rowins; i-n boldness, demanded of their chiefs to lead them to Catana,
but the parties of horse, sent, out to observe, M'ould sometimes approach the Athenian camp, give dl language, u Vol. II.
The
comply
3S0
HISTORY OF GREECE.
language, and ask,
'
'
Chap. XVIII.
if,
Thiuyd.
1.
6.
it
would have
The
their leaders,
Sicilian
in
As
in
most of the
towns
in the
Syracusan
still
interest, there
Ca-
a Syracusan party.
Through
the Syracu;
many, both
that, if
officers
and private
camp was negligently guarded that soldiers, commonly slept in the town
;
Catana would
rise,
fail
of
success.
A day was
Nicias and
made.
Lamachus,
meanM'hile,
accurately informed
all
;
of
their
Grecian
forces,
and
for
communication with
and
a
their
;
fleet,
and
at
pool of water;
felled trees,
Avas
less
The
first
intelligence of this
movement
filled
They
experiall
little
ima-
and many
would
not
Sect.IV.
ssi
of
battle.
The Syin
formed;
and,
however deficient
dis-
and
skill,
A sharp
action insued
but
rain,
gave way.
done
in pursuit,
and tlwy
conducted
having, in Tlmcyd.
*^
by
tlie
Athenian generals
but
it
was
little
On
the
morrow
6.
This
It re-
however, had
its
advantageous consequences.
stored the sullied reputation of the Athenian arms, confirmed the allies,
Sicily
it
as-
sisted
prepare the Athenian people for receiving more favorably any application for supplies and reinforcement.
The want of
was therefore
large supj)ly
of money
\y'as
moreover
in soli-
and
it
among
allies, in
;
unavoidable.
The
For the
was
laid up,
in quarters, at
their superiority to the Athenians, yet the misfortune was not without
salutary consequences.
The
mind imposed
silence
332
silence
HISTOR\^ OF GREECE.
upon
faction, repressed forward ignoiance,
abilities
Chap. XVIII.
and gave scope for
and patriotism to
come
forward.
The
said,
and the people listened with anxious attention, while Ilermocrates son
of
'
Hermon
spoke.
'
'
was no cause
for de-
Meer
it
people, as they
for
compara-
'
soldiers,
was much
them to have
shown
tion
'
in
'
was not
in
in strength,
but
'
and discipline
not
in bravery,
but
system of
command
'
inferior.
The
alteration necessary
was obvious; the chief commanders should be few, but they should
;
'
'
The
'
ing discipline
by
'
'
revive,
Courage and confidence,' he continued, will of course with improved system, improved skill, and increased force;
'
'
and
in spring, I
'
terms.'
more adverse to effectual exertion, than the system of military command which democratical jealousy, inforced by frequent sedition, had The supreme military authority was divided established at Syracuse. among no less than fifteen officers and even this numerous board,
;
if
the term
its
may
all
momentous
occasions,
to take
The command in chief Avas committed to Ilermocrates himself, with only two collegues, and they were vested with discretionary powers. The Pleasures equally vigorous and judicious immediately followed.
great object, for a town expecting a siege, Mas to obviate contravalThucyd.
^' ''''
1.
6.
lation.
On
Epipoke, the
new
and
the
Sect. IV.
S33
southward of the
bank of the
river Anapus,
for
their views.
armament was
spirits
remainder
had
left
near Catana.
Among
notthe
the cities
in alliance
least
powerful
among
Tho accounted
ITiucyd. 1.6.
a Dorian people, the Camarinieans had been from of old adverse: they
were the only Sicilian Dorians who had constantly refused to put
themselves under the degrading and oppressive protection of the Syra-
^'^'
cusan commonwealth.
while
To Laches commanded
in
had
ingaged
the
alliance
cities,
with Athens
among
re-
Sicilian
without
became
also of Syracuse.
armament under Nicias arrived in Sicily, the Syracusan government required assistance from Camarina; and, the dilatory conthe
When
duct of the Athenian oenerals brinoi no" their force into contempt, the Caniaringeans, fearful of the resentnient of a powerful neighbor, sent
a bcdy of auxiliary horse.
The
late
make
a change in sentiment
it
was
known To counterwork
cause,
Hermocrates
and win the Camarinteans to the Syracusan thought important enough to require that he
connection with Athens only was to be dissuaded, the The notorious conbusiness undertaken by Hermocrates was easy. duct, and even the avowed principles of the Athenian government,
As
far as the
were
334
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Chap.XVIII.
were such as could not but give alarm, wherever the Athenian power Being admitted to audience by the Camarimtan could be extended.
Tliucyd.
c. /{).
1.
6.
people,
,
&seq.
ontiiies,
'
of Sicilv,
a shalloM'
pretence.
'
lonians, kinsmen of the Athenians; bat what were the Euboic Chalcidians, tlie
'
whom
'
'
mediate origin? Equally kinsmen of the Athenians, they were held Protection to the in strict subjection, and denied the use of arms *.
semibarbarian Egestans could,
still
less tlian
'
armament
So
far
'
It
was
in short
'
arguments of Hermocrates were unanswerable. But when he was to justify the past conduct of Syracuse, and persuade thd Camariufeans to
assist the
own
a servitude likely
to
be more severe,
l>e
grating.
obtained,
by
'
solicitation or re-
being ingaged
itself, in
to Athens.
An
first
of Syracuse.
ministers to Lace-
dsemon, and
'
assist
in rousing the
So Smith translates
'Atrec^iffKivm,
and
believe properly.
State.
Sect. IV.
state.
A L C I B IA D E
AT
to
P A R T A.
tliere,
335
were free to
The
incoiirage
backward
ties
to give that
by negotiation, but
But an Athenian was now become the most formidable fee to Athens. Alcibiades had passed in a merchant-ship, from the Thurian territory
to the Eleian port of Cyllene,
his interest, as v.e
have
seen,
Ch. 17.
s.
3.
of his credit
fairest
now
M'ith the
"*
'^'^'
ground
They procured
He had
hi-
party
there favored
him
his
and
his services
to
many
individuals,
prisoners in Athens,
But he feared
Thucyd. 1.5.
and
risked,
in
talents,
and
the prejudice,
which
his
oli-
could scarcely
on account of
own
country.
The
general, even those otherwise less well disposed to him, aware that he
moment
willing
He
judged
it
Argos
afford
On
his arrival he
in
favor, rather
The
summoned
to
com-
Diunicated
336
Thucyd.
c. 90.
1.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
6.
Chap. XVIII.
con([uest enterfirst
'
The views of
It
were extensive.
was proposed
to
reduce
all
Sicily
With
it
the
was in-
fleet,
Spain and
;
all
whence mercenary troops might be obThese would tained, in any numbers, and the best of their kind. Peloponnesus by land, while the fleet should be employed against
ranean would then be open
blockade
it
by
it
gation of Greece.
as it
The conquered
6.
And however wild and visionaiy,' continued Alcibiades, these vast projects may on first view appear, I, who have long meditated upon them, who know the resources of Athens, who have seen the
' '
against which
is
its
not impossible.
The
Sicilian
Greeks have
little
or skill.
avoidably
fall.
Sicily
may
Thus not
but Peloponnesus
Having by
be averted.
'
'
fleet,'
he said,
you have
to form,
Athenian
but troops
may
be sent to Sicily,
their
'
own
passage, in sufficient
number
with the
com-
'
But, what
let a
'
Spartan general go to
'
'
'
among the Sicilians already firm in the cause, and whose authority may bring over, and hold united under one command, those not disposed to obey the S3Tacuestablish discipline
*
who may
sans.
5scT.IV.
'
ALCIBIADES AT SPARTA.
3.37
'
Tims, more than by any other measure, your decided friends will be incouraged, and those dubiously affected y> ill be confirmed in
sans.
'
your
'
interest.
it
But
will
'
in Greece.
Nothing can be so
efficacious,
Athenians so
much
'
'
Thus
'
country will no longer be theirs but yours ; accrue to them from it; even that from the silvertheir
:
'
"
but,
what
is
is
still
more im-
'
whence
derived, as the
know-
After having thus indicated and advised whatever v/ould most contribute to his
racter's sake,
country's downfall,
Alcibiades thought,
for
his
cha-
however persecuted by that country, some apology necessary for such conduct. I hold that,' he said, 'no longer my
'
Thucyd.
*^"
1,6".
'
country,
which
is
it.
^-
'
driven
against
me from
Nor ought
;
I to be considered as
persuading war
'
my
country
the country which was once mine, and to restore that country to
'
itself,
and
its
just situation
patriot, not
still
among
the Gre-
'
animated by love
'
Upon
you, Laceless
'
my
country not
'
than to myself.
'
no hardship,
You may trust me therefore that there is no danger, which I am not ready to undergo in your service, and
now usurped by
Athens, and restoring
'
'
down
'
situation, in
and not by violence, presided over it.' The eloquence of Alcibiades, his advice, but
.Vol.
II.
tion
more the expectsof advantage from the important information which he was un-
Thucyl.
'^'^'"
l.S,
questionably
S38
HISTORY OF GREECE.
affairs,
Chap. XVIII.
it
was resolved to
assist
Syrsc
cuse,
E C T
V.
Pleasures of the
to
the Atheniati
Arrival of Gylippus and Py then to the Relief of Syracuse, Letter of Nicias to the Athenian People.
The
Thucyd.
*J,',^^"
1.
resolution for
at
To command
son of Cleiindridas,
.
.
emwho bad
when
duct
in a
from
Pericles.
men
they
of Corinth and Syracuse, about the readiest and best means for transporting troops to Sicily
;
as
might among the allied states, Lacedaemon furnishing none. A man, however, more qualified than Gylippus, for the business committed to liim, could hardly have been selected; and, sparing as Lacedasmon was
of troops and
we
find
by
rest
The
first
P w'is^
Thucyd.
1.6.
On
11
its
arrival at
Cleonas,
an earthquake, a
common
cir-
Sect. V.
SICILY.
army immein-
33
into consternation
saw
in
it
Such conduct
monian
territory of Thyreati's,
twenty-five talents,
which was
nmcyd.
l.d,
little
tends to illustrate
The
garchal magistrates
port them.
The
some
Avere
rest fled
During winter, the Athenian generals in such measures for promoting their business,
mit.
their
Sicily
as the season
Soon
marched with
city,
in
through
before his flight, had been privy to the negotiation, gave warning of
therefore,
after suffering in
camp
was obliged
to return,
without effecting
own
party,
who were
seized
by
their opponents,
condemned
as
traitors,
and executed.
negotiations
Some
among
more fortunate
ilTue.
88,
Those of the
cusans as their natural enemies, were predisposed to the Athenian cause. Most of them readily furnished provisions, and some even paid
contributions in money.
who
were found adverse, and relieved some others, more favorably iu-
X X a
clined,
S40
HISTORY OF GREECE.
dined, from the restraint
garrisons.
iii
Chap. X\III.
Thucj'cL
1.
6.
Toward tlie ap[)roach of spring the whole Athenian armament moved from Naxus to Catana, to be nearer its principal object and nego;
tiation
was extended
as far as
Overtures had
result seems to
have been
littl
produced anything.
however succeeded
Iron,
in collecting,
bricks,
and other
and
made for undertaking the siege of Syracuse. Early in spring the army marched. The lands of jNIegara,^ whicli, B C 414 P. W. 18. since the depopulation of the city by Gelon, had been Syracusan praevery disposition was
'
''
t.s"!,^
An
garrison failed
opposed, the standing corn burnt, and, a small body of Syracusans interfering to cl>eck the ravage,
little
success a
some were killed, the rest fled. For this trophy was erected, and the army returned to Catana.
moved
again, gained
the Sicel town of Centoripa by capitulation, and burnt the corn of the
the passion of the Athenian people for conquest in Sicily had not
r. S3.
abated
met
beyond
their expectation
y
and
all their
No
two hun-
dred and
horses
five
;
amounting
of
all
to
about seventy-
and
stores
necessary kinds in
abundance.
e_
j5_
The
Nature,
strong
;
and to reduce a
was necessary.
Here
Sect.V.
Here two
of a
hill,
operations IN
difficulties
SICILY.
The
;
341
opposed
slopino-
'
from
its
The
;
Avere not
they uninformed of the usual mode of conducting- sieges; and they were aware how important it would be tO' occupy the hill of Epipola?,
Syracusan generals
in
command
;
their troops
and,
discipline
among
Not
therefore
till
was known that the Athenians had collected a considerable body of cavalry, and were already prepared to march for Syracuse, Hermocratcs and
his collegues ventured to take
distributing duty.
At daybreak they
Syracusan citizens,
meadow on
men
sistance wherever danger might press, but to be particularly a protection for that very important post.
An
was
appointed to the
command
critical aservice;
how
skill
and experience of
own
officers.
1.5.
On
the very night preceding these measures of the Syracusans, the Thucvd.
^'
Athenian generals, imbarking their whole army, had passed, undiscovered, to a place near Syracuse, called Leon, where a
5^'
body of infantry
to Epipoli3e,
less
hill
was
hastily debarked,
than a mile distant, and by a pass called Euryelus, moi>nted the unopposed.
meadow of
the
Anapus
at the
Courage however
did not
fail
them.
'
With much
zeal,
but
much
Jtearly
542
HISTORY OF GREECE.
repel the invaders.
little efiicacious
Chap. XVIII.
A fierce
conflict insued
whom
band.
fell
Diomilus, the
The Syracusans were comloss of three hundred heavy-armed, among newly appointed commander of the select
The
Next morning
but the temper of the Syracusan people, chastised by the event of the
preceding day, no longer disposed them to put violence upon the pru-
dence of
their generals,
stir.
The Athenians,
return-
among
Thucvd.
<: 9!s.
1.
6.
While thus employed they were joined by three hundred Egestans, and one hundred Naxian and
military chest and other valuables".
Sicel cavalry
;
of the army
all
now
six
hundred and
fifty.
The
army de-
scended into the plain, and the work of contravallation was immediately begun.
sea,
and
it
or the Ortygian port, which was separated from the great port
little
only by the
On
town
Epipolte ".
It
was the
business
' To^j
tixrt.
T (Txivourt
xi
Tof;
xt^l*'-"
*"'''"
'
Strabo,
amounted
'
by a
*
of Syracuse
traveller
:
is
thus described
antienl city
hundred and eighty Stadia, twenty-two English miles and a half; an account I
once suspected of exaggeration
spending two
;
'
The
'
'
but, after
* consisted
*
*
'
or the iland
'
croachments of the
of
the
sea, I
was convinced
on the
Two
Sicilies,
*^
"
'
'
Some
rocks.
It will
be observed that
it
this writer
its
speak*
of Syracuse when
extent,
had acquired
greatest
' *
around, except
in
Neapolis,
ponnesian war.
some time after the age of the PeloHis account of the exten-
Sect. V.
SIEGE OF SYRACUSE.
343
tlic
it
At
a loss for
mea-
They accordingly
the troops baffled
led
out
their
forces
but,
in
deficient discipline
it.
among
restore
They had
the
prudence immediately
to
command
hasty retreat,
it
tended to repress
led
him
The Athetown
on
Tliucyd.
'^'
the southern side therefore, between Epipola; and the great port, Her-
1.
C.
mocrates carried out a work from the town-wall, cutting the proposed
line
^^*
He
;
from
it.
If the
'
enemy
Euryelus
may
'
thousand inhabitants, seems to float on the bosom of the waters, guarding the entrance of
its
'
'
' Toward the north,' he says, ' tlie eye wanders over vast plains along a line of
noble harbour.
The Plem-
'
coast, to the fool of Etna, whose mighty cone shuts up the horizon with unspeakable majesty. The mountains of Italy rise like clouds, on each side of It. Southward
'
'
'
myrian peninsula locks it on the opposite shore, beyond which an expanse of sea i seen, stretching away to Cape Passaro. 'ITie hills of Nolo bound the view to the
southward, and the foreground
is
'
every
now reduced
once an
to
its
'
'
iland, but
'
where an expanse of rich level plains, thickly planted, and watered by the windiag stream/ of the Anapus,' p. 330".
'
now
a peiiiftsula,
still
containing eighteen
'
3-u
HISTORY OF GREECE.
of
of
tlicir forces, thc'ir
Chap, XVIIL
in
he would
;
retire,
and he had
his
end
the interruption
his
works
if Avith
a part, he
whle
force,,
and
Tluiryd. 1.6.
so
Mould probably be
business:
knew
tlieir
The Athenian generals hoM'ever they permitted him to complete his work without
superior.
it,
^^^^
and the
rest
Tho circumstances had occurred powerfully to' r-eprcss forward rashness among the Syracusans, yet Hermocrates had not yet been aljle to establish due subordination among those who,
drew into the
city.
having chosen him their commander, retained nevertheless, by the constitution of Syracuse, legal power still to command him. The
Athenians, from the heights of Epipola:, observed the disorderly
ligence of the Syracusan guard
;
neo--.
when
part were strayed into the city, and the rest mostly reposing in their
huts, a
fort,
fiilse
army
by
a.
The guard of
fled.
The Athenians and Argians pursuing, entered that quarter of Syracuse called Tcmenites. They were however quickly overpowered,
and compelled to
retire
loss;
but they
many of
101-
On
the next
the
contravallation
on
the
The
Syracusans,
success,
the town and the river Anapus, and nearer the sea than their former
work.
The Athenian
it
tliis
generals,
upon
this,
ordered their
fleet
from
Thapsus, where
had hitherto
lain,
Nicias
Mas at
time confined by
ilness.
Under
the
command
of
Lama-
Athenian forces issued at daybreak from Epipolte,' and making their way across the soft ground of the marsh upon planks,
cluis, therefore, the
stormed the new work of the Syracusans, and routed the forces Mhich-
came out of the town for its protection. The right of those forces' tasily reached the town again; but the left. made for a bridge over the
Anapus.
''i
to
intercept
SxcT. r.
SIEGE OF SYRACUSE.
horse, of
sio
which the greater part was in that wing, facing about -unexpectedly, charged tlie more advanced of the Athenian troops, re--
Sy racusan
pulsetl
tlieir
right winp-.
Lamachus,
to
-
vho was
hasteaing
of bowmen,
ditcli,
by
which ready assistance was prevented, he was overpowered and killed, wilh fi\e or six of tl^ose about him. The Athenian left, however,
advancing, the Syracusans retreated again hastily, but carried off with
them
the
general,
ri\er,
were
].
there secure.
6,
^^^*
Accordingly they took and demolished an outwork, and might have taken the whole, so weak was it left, but for the orders, judiciously
given by Nicias, to the numerous slaves attending the army, to set
to the wood, not sparing the machines, which lay before the wall.
fire
flame was thus quickly raised, wliich checked the assailants; and, the
relief
c.
103.
venting
its
completion, was
its
now given up by
the besieged
and despontliem.
dency, and
among
This
became quickly knou'u among the neighboring disposition to abandon the Syracusans, and to
Athenians, followed.
states;
and a general
flatter the
fear
and
cities
and sup-
flowed to
tlie
all
quarters.
Those of the
who had before su])ereiliously rejected invitation from the Athenians, now solicited their alliance and from Tuscanv three,
Sicel tribes also,
;
penteconters joined
tlie fleet.
their enemies,,
his
S46
HISTORY OF GREECE.
his collegues were
Chap. XVIII;
same name) was
in the
removed from
it
their office.
Heracleides (unless
stored,
u'as
com-
mand.
At
adverse circumstances,
gained ground.
Avere
far
capitulation
of frequent debate
to Nicias
greedy masters.
Thus
nearly however
was
a great point,
and per-
haps the most important, carried toward realizing the magnificent visions of the ambition of Alcibiades
;
will,
ever yet
made by Grecian
arms.
two Corinthian
Coill
when
him of the
lost,
if
To
therefore he deter-^
mined to
with him
Thucyd.ibid.
squadron, he went
to
Tarentum
where, as a
of
Di
xl.
1.
'
13.
'
C.93.
p'"
&'v
having passed
admitted
gotiation
tion of the Athenian arms, was not to be overborne, and he could obtain nothing.
he
S ECT. V.
E G E OF
-to
ll
ACU
S E.
S47
There
thej'
gained the
reiil
They
was
really
and so
far
wou]d be
rash,
might
along the
northern coast of Sicily, to Ilimera; and v.ith the people of that place
they succeeded.
his
march
He
to send with
him a thousand
foot,
heavy and
and a hundred
horse
his Peloponnesian
heavy-armed
He depended upon
;
arms of Athens
chief
-to
some of the
In
all
Sicels,
them
name of
Lacedeemon,
tivity
Thucydides assures
of Gylippus.
and
abilities
The
owed zeal to the cause, deceived his just expectation, sending only a small body of light-armed the Geloans also sent only a small body, but it was cavalry the Sicels joined him with a thousand men. His
others
:
force
all
might be about
five
thousand.
1.
7,
Gongylus, as
soon as himself and his trireme were prepared, pushing across the gulf,
without making the usual circuit of the Italian shore, arrived on the
Sicilian coast before the squadron,
unopposed.
348
HISTORY OF GREECE.
unopposed.
Chap. XVIH'.
in
contempt the force which he heard was approaching, kept little watch;
and tho he had not disdained to send four triremes to prevent the passage of Gylippus through the strait of IMessena, yet he sent them too late.
The
arrival of
critical.
issued
the surrender
Gongylus
of.
was aHowed
speedy and effectual succour, not from Corinth only, but from Lace-
ditmon
cydides,
was of
principal M'eight)
wrought such a
M'hich
tiu'n
in the
popular
mind, that the chiefs ventured to propose to march out and meet
lippus,
Gy-
approachirrg.
It could
with a force of
scarcely
for the
inferior troops,
Tilucyd.
1.
7.
^'
by the same way of Euryelus, by Mhich the Athenians had first obtained The Syracusan forces actually went possession of that important post. and to the- astonishment of the Athenian general' and out to meet him armj'-, busied in the works on tlie south of the city, tile combined forces
;
made
if
Sicily in five
'
make
wltli di.^chiin,
amid
their
selves
ordered to withdraw.
tlyat
;
thing
Sect.V.
no attempt
behind
siege of SYRACUSE.
Nicias
34!)
made
his -works.
camp for the night on the liigh ground of Temenites. Next morning the combined forces appeared again in
in front of the
order of battle,
of Labdalum, and
Nicias continued
unaccountably mo-
an Athe-^
Gyhppus having, by
Tlu)ryd.
1.
r.
insonuieh
that not only the city was very effectually relieved, but the Athenian
rather in a situation of
Labdalum,
Athenian
he began
works, using the materials which the Athenians themselves had collected.
Meanwhile Nicias, aware that the moment of opportunity; for that great success with which he had lately had reason to flatter himself, M^as gone by, and that, however he might still be superior in the
to take Syracuse was beyond his present strength, continued
field,
country where
his
fleet,
all
was inimical,
woulil be necessary to
work toward the sea. In a to keep his communication open with the subsistence of his army, and might
become necessary even to its safety. Occupying therefore the headland of Plemmyiium, on the southern side of the entrance of the great harbour, he rcu.ed there three redoubts, in which he placed the greater part of the baggage and stores of his army, and near them he stationed
his ships
ot'
:
craft.
This measure,
\ve\\
conceived in
regard to
great
iii
The
soil
w^as
water b
S.'O
TIISTO^IY OF GREECE.
Chap.
X VIII.
body of horse, stationed there by Gylippus, gave unceasing annoyauce; .watching- the wood and water-parties, cutting- off stragglers, and makiiig- it
dangerous to
stir
Thiicvd. 1.7.
'^-'
It ^^as
^'
fered battle;
meet him.
was very narrowj. confined between the contravallation and The Syracusan horse had net space for action, and the the city- wall.
The
field
by the superior discipline of the Athenians, soon reIt seems to have been the purpose treated within their fortifications.
infantry, pressd
necessity-
would hope
which
praised
his mis-
infantry
and
flattered
that,
ori-
He
Thucvd
c.
()
1
trial.
"
alarmed him.
Already
;
it
tlie line
of the Athe-
nian contravallation
and
dides, not only prevent the completion of the contravallation, but give
Gylippus so chose
in tlank.
ground that
his
thus
line,
thrown into a confusion, which spred in some degree through the and Nicias hastily withdrew behind liis works. Having thus
blished,
field,
esta-
in his
own
and
it
was
Thucydides,
if the
now have
Sect. V.
walls,
it
EGE OF
Y R A CU S E.
for the Athenians to
35!
twelve triremes,
when they saw the enemy's squadron, consisting of The strength, enter the little harbour of Syracuse.
It
c. 7.
thus added, gave the city, for the present, complete security.
therefore resolved to act
was
upon the
and with
for
this
tlie
view
it
greater strength,
which
own
situation,
we learn from
Avas
own
Writing
common use
or,
it
The
sally,
committed
to trusty messengers,
first
who
delivered
them
it
verbally.
his pracc. s,
general
who made
home
constantly in writing.
He had
ob-
times through
inability
to
express
themselves
clearly,
sometimes
of-
the
re'aHty.
hie
From
his
appointment therefore to a
little satisfied,
had always
usual for the
been
ducted
at- a
Athenian
arms,-
and
by the
secretary
Sii
HISTORY OF GREECE.
swretarv of the commonwealth
fjiicnce 01 his
ill
Chap. XVIII.
upon the defenit
".
He had now
For
this lie
clelermuiecl, in conse-
summer.
in his
thought
necessary to
dispatches to Athens.
He
therefore
committed thera to
officers
whom
that-
'
'
in Sicily,
'
face of affairs
'
enemy
in
'
much
for
him
to re:
'
*
'
that
within his
cipally
rior
forego offensive operations, and to consult prinbest insure the safety of his
it
'
how he might
for,
'
numbers;
instead of besieging,
:
was
ratlier
'
condition of a
camp besieged
of
'
gerous
evil,
12.
'
Athenian
interest,
'
sea.
'
The
fleet,'
fast to
'
decay; the ships were become leaky; the crews diminished; the
'
'
enemy had not only had more ships, but, secure against attack, they could chuse when they would attack him it was therefore necessary
:
c. 13.
'
watchful
'
'
'
wood and
water, were
'*
continually
the
SyracusaU;
'
horse.
Sect. V.
horse.
SIEGE OF SYRACUSE.
SoS
Meanwhile not only the slaves deserted in numbers to the enemy, but the auxiliaries and mercenaries, who had hoped that plunder more than fighting Avould be their business in Sicily, now they saw the Athenian armament declining, and the enemy gTowingin vigor, went home without leave. Sicily,' continued the unfortunate general,
'
is
is
im-
them
is
difficult;
is
:
and
of" all
losses to
an
are
Tluicyd. 1.7.
^'
''*''
least
easily
is
repaired.
Nor
what
to
me most
distressing,
both to
of you
feel
and to complain
is
of,
Your
a part
temper, Athenians,
;
adverse to subordination.
The army
is
on
whom my power
whollv
depends
and
find
my
some under
and we
my command.
are destitute
;
in
resources,
allies
in this part of
little
the Italian
cities,
whence our
by the
ill
we should be
at
once undone, and the enemy would have a complete triumph without the risk of a blow.
'
intelligence M'hich
to receive.
know your
when
it
dis-
know
the event
disappoints expectation
and
have
reiil
tlierefore
thought
best to ex-
state of things.
your army,
here,
c. 15.
your service
since
now
united against
I will
us,
Peloponnesus,
become absolutely
:
either
your
must be immediately
recalled
or an additional ar-
mament, not
must
be
Vol.
II.
Sbi
*
HISTORY OF GREECE.
be sent hither:
it
Chat. XVIII.
in spring,
'*
'
money for its use will be indispensable. For myself, I request that I may be superseded in the command, for which ill health disqualifies me and I hope I may be allowed to claim this as an honourable in;
my
past services.'
practised eno-igh in misfortune to listen
The
pertinacity
sidered together with the near prospect of success, even under the dis-
advantage of his removal from the execution of the vast projects which
he had conceived,
his
may
conduct
still.
in
none
could
Thncyd.
1.7.
Nicias, give
retire.
An
additional force
mand
in chief;
now
in Sicily,
were appointed his present assistants in the duty of Alcisthenes, who had already so
portant services,
Demosthenes son
much
at Corcyra, at Pylus,
and
in Sicily,
ment.
As an
Eurymedon was
sent for-
ward about midwinter, with ten triremes and twenty while Demosthenes remained to superintend the equipment of the
of the armament.
talents of silver,
rest
Sect. VI.
355
SECTION
merits
VI.
Naval Action Harbour of Syracuse. Distress of Athens. Tax upon the subject to Athens. Massacre in Bceotia. Naval Action
for
in Sicily^
the Athenian
Armament
States
in
the
Corinthian Gulph.
While
a more serious attack than they had yet experienced, was preparing against their own country. The success of Gylippus, the prospect of
assistance from the whole force of Sicily, the evident embarrassment of
Athens, the exhortations of Corinth, the advice of Alcibiades, and the important information and assistance which he was capable of givino-,
now
lities
all
together determined the Lacedfemonians to recommence hostiThucvd immediately against Athens. They weie farther incouraged, says ^' ^^'
bj'
-.
the historian,
ratified
by a solemn appeal
to the
gods)
now on
their side.
Their misfortunes,
of hostility,
-had led them to reflect that the beginning of the war had, on their
part, teemetl
faith.
determination
On
the
contrary, since the truce, the Athenians had always refused to submit
The same
thought had already bronght the vengeance of the gods on themselves, they concluded M'ould now bring it on the Athenians. The war thus
became
<litated
popular,
and to prosecute
It
hostilities
with alacrity.
and^ in pursuance of
the
356
HISTORY OF GREECE.
the advice of Alcibiades, Deceleia was the place chosen.
ter tlie necessary materials for fortifying
iron,
it
Chap. XVIII.
During win-
Sicily.
Tbiiryd. 1.7.
til
<-n
allies,
and
Deceleia
town
in sight
teen miles, nearly equally distant from the border of Boeotia, and critically situated for
commanding
About the
;
six
hun-
three hundred
all
together
difficulty
tri-
seven hundred.
in its passage
Tliurvd
'^-
squadron of twenty
To
favor the
!/
^
c.
20.
Summer was
when De-
having under
his
command
sixty Athe-
subject-states.
At
^gina he met
M'ho, in the
c.
21.
and
skill
against
From
the several
Sicilian cities,
who were
cause, he
inclined, or wliom. he
The
l>e
fortifications,
which
thought himself not strong enough to attack, unless he could divide their
strength.
Sect. VI.
strength.
SIEGE OF SYRACUSE.
He
proposed therefore another measure, which, to some,
still
357
might appear
enemy's
fleet.
bolder: he would
man
the
The
by
was
so established
in the
first
beginning of the war, that the Syracusans were startled with the
idea of ingaging
them on
water.
as
them.
'
The Athenians
:
had not
forced
first
why tlie Syracusans, them to become such more prepared for it now than the Athenians then, should not quickly even excel them.' Recent good fortune had prepared the Syracusans Having already, under the conduct of Gylippus, for incouragemcnt.
*
'
succeeded so
much beyond
Ingli.
were disposed
now
to
I.",
to his Thucyd.
'^'^'"
command:
thirty-five triremes
in the little port
in tlie
great port,
and forty-five
all
forts at,
Plemmyrium.
At daybreak the stir in the Syracusan fleet became visible to the Athenians, who hastily manned sixty triremes; of whic:h twenty-five were ojvposed to the thirt\'-five of the enemy already within the great
port,
and
thirtj'-five to
it.
On
enemy was
army made
assault;
their garport,
By
this
time the
fleets
were ingaged.
first
in
advancing
relief
SS9
ships,
fly.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Eleven Syracusan ships A\ere sunk
;
Chap. XVIII.
fleet to
made
were destroj'ed.
Thucyd.
the Syracusans erected three trophies for the three forts taken.
1.
7,
any
trophies,
re-
The
killed
and prisoners
fled,
were
many
officers,
large magazines of
fleet,
most of the
and
stores
of both
army and
laid
masts for
triremes,
three
complete
tiiremes
up ashore,
:
were
taken.
One
garrisons were
placed in the other two, and a squadron of triremes was stationed un-
camp or by
;
fighting
its
way.
consequences of the late complex action was very seriously disadvantageous to the Athenians; and while their general, never remarkable
for activity,
c.
25.
Meanwhile the conduct of the Syracusans, under the able direction all energy. Twelve triremes, under
sea,
with dispatches.
into his
He
he burnt
a quantity of
for the
Athenians.
made
homeward.
Syracuse.
One of
his
triremes was
the harbour of
Notwithstanding their
1
Sect. VI.
S59
the
command
sea.
in
the
fleet,
they
formed before
of
this,
it a kind of rampart of piles. To prevent the completion and to destroy what was already done, became an important object for the Athenians. The merchantships of the antients, capa-
cious,
deep,
and firm
modern
vessels for
gation, were
much
fitter
for
being
fitted with
turrets
close to the
to protect
them meanwhile a party in boats fastened ropes about the piles, divers went down and sawed them at the bottom, and thus most of them were hauled up or broken. To fortify and defend their naval station on
one
side,
and to destroy
it
on the other,
Avas
;
two adverse
parties
in which,
and boldness of the people were more observable than the science or vigor of the general. The Syracusans
Athenians, the
skill,
activity,
continued to drive
piles,
and some
in
yet
divers were found, for large rewards, to saw and fasten ropes even to
to be
renewed
view of the Athenian general was defence, and to gain time for the arrival of the reinforcement which he expected, his
and
as the present
afi^airs
Sicily,
Athens
itself Tlmcyd.
1.
7,
consequence of having a Peloponnesian garIn the former invasions the heart of its territory.
off,
and
whole country.
The injury however had not extended over the The Lacedcemonian army, for want of magazines^
could
360
HISTORY OF GREECE.
could not stay long; and when
it
Chap. XVIIL
ravages
the herds
tlu;
had escaped
its
to their pastures,
and
tlie
make any
admit.
city
till
summer would
it
But the garrison of Deceleia kept the whole rountry, and the
constant alarm.
little
itself, in
Its
to exertion:
chicflj'
supplied by their
assistance,
were to subsist
money
of the
measures.
all
Not
only
all
maintained, were lost to the Athenians, but more than twenty thou-
The Athenian
to
cavalry were to
little
Many
and the
Thucyd.
^'^^'
].
rest
7.
Among
enemy
and
in Deceleia,
one
is
The
large
of Euboea was at
all
the Athenians for supplying the deficiencies of the scanty and arid soil
of Attica.
Cliaiidler's
hilly road
'
of about forty-four
.
jnumev
Cirep.~o,
in
and Antonin.
Athens.
The
oc-
cupying of that post by the enemy therefore made it necessary to carry With the advantages of modern navigation, this every thing by sea.
would be incomparably the preferable method but the cotemporary author assures us that, in that age, the expeuce of the transport all the
;
way
Sseqv.VI.
PRESSURE ON ATHENS.
old practice
'*.
g6l
rest,
way by sea far exceeded that of the may readily conceive the force and
For the
wc
In-
of a garrison.
for subsistence.
Without a
territory, it
depended upon
su])plies
by sea
The whole
little
;
^o incessant as to admit
guard by
reliefs
who composed
not
this
continued through
Pressed thus by every inconvenience of a siege at home, such continued to be the zeal of the Athenian people for foreiu conquest, such
the ardor with which they insisted on the prosecution of the siege of
Syracuse, a city scarcely inferior to Athens in size or population, that
unless
it
it.
Thus
Greece
The
pressure of
new
evils served
All revenue
ceasing,
it
A
in the
total
change
Avas
made
in the
'
Those
less
modern navigation give to transport by sea, may form some estimate of them from the following circumstances. !Much of the trade between London and Canterbury is carried on by water and Vt'hitstable, six miles from Canterbury, is the port of that city for its communication with the Thames. The passage from
tages which the arts of
Mediterranean,
fAii
Jip'
is little
"
'0>
ottAoi?
iroimy.ittit,
^ iin tgD
ru'/av^-
ow^oi; woiot/iwoi,
of the day,
taiiied.
London
to
Whitstable
is
perhaps eighty
is
commentatorE and translators are very unFor discovering the meaning satibfactory. of Thucydides upon this occasion, the curious reader may however consult another passage of Thucydides, nearly to tlie same
purpose, in the 69th chapter of his eighth book ; and some similar phrases occurring
in
Whitstable and Canterbury, as for the eighty iy water, between Whitstable and London, Allowance must however be made for the
Xenophon may
assist
him.
Vol.
II.
collection
sea
HISTORY OF GREECE.
collection of revenue
dern customs
ports'*.
Thus
in
selves,
we
learn
from
liistory,
time
known
Yet
it
caused
much
discontent
among
it
the
dependant commonwealths;
comparativel}- a nothing.
was
was
itself
upon
The
Thuc
1.
circumstances,
'^^^'^^
little
^^
^^^^ ^^^'^'
7. c. 29.
times.
under Demosthenes
their
was gone.
ahead, daily.
Means
It
pay
sterling
charge them; but, by the way, to make any use of them against the
enemies of the commonwealth, for which opportunity might
offer.
The
on the
first
hostile shore
Tanagrtean territory.
Having
collected
to deposit it in
in Euboea,
and
in the
it,
some
different
to
whom
professedly he wrote,
which are evidently and grossly bad. The Latin translation runs thus Per id tempus tributi loco vicessimam mercium,
readings,
:
majorem
^a\ii<r<ra.t
iz>^'ni
T<
t5
^ofou
tn-axSois
litn'trta-nt,
whom
it
is
by no means a common
and tho
jofii^omj
<rpic-t
xf^ftara
btw
is
wfocritrai.
fault to
cautiously
his authority
is
X\
foi
Sect. VI.
SAVAGE BLOW IN
a large
BCEOTIA.
his
365
Mycalessus,
march toward
amity
in perfect
with Thebes, and at such a distance from the Attic border and from
the
sea,
watcli.
march
them from living among them, are commonly bloody-minded in success; insonmch that for sport they v/ould kill even the beasts that fell There was a very large school, in which the boys were in their way. just assembled, when the Thracians broke in, and put every one to Destruction so unexpected and so complete, continues the death. cotemporary historian, scarcely ever fell upon any town.
News
body of
Tliucyd. 1.7.
^'
'
any
relief to
the
and
in discipline
Theban cavalry; and Skirphondas, one of the Bceotarcs, was killed. They were, however, compelled to abandon all their booty; and when they arrived on
the beach,
in the confusion
of imbarkation,
those unpractised in
Athenian seamen,
little solicitous
themselves and their vessels out of the reach of the justly inraged
enemy.
fifty
Thracians were
killed
the rest
own
country.
c.
20.
evils suffered
by Athens
At Nauplia, he took aboard a body of Argian infantry. Turning back then upon the Epidaurian coast, he made a descent and collected some booty. Having thus ingagcd the cnem} 's 3 A 2
from the garrison of Deceleia.
SG4
HISTORY OF GREECE.
baikecl his forces, and
Chap.XVIIL
fn^my's attention toward the northern parts of Peloponnesus, he reim])roceeding to the Laconian coast, debarked
aoain ovcr.igainst Cythcra, as the historian marks the pUice, vhere the
The
It
first
business was
still
plunder, as far as
v/as
neck of land
then occupied
on which to erect a
who might
be disposed to live by
settled,
till
Laconian lands.
Deworks
Charicles remained
allies
Naupactus,
At Anactorium he found Eurymedon collecting Sicily'^, and from him he learnt the unwelcome news
the hands of the enemy.
prothat
arrived Conon,
Nearly
at the
same time
the
the
first
time mentioned in
hislor}',
who had
command
at Naupactus,
The
to
make
his
Such a
request,
made by such an
as
officer as
Conon,
officers
Both those
were certainly aware that the enemy had improved their naval practice,
experienced in the
na
more.
'*
x^i/iaree ayut
rftipht
tS
T^xriS..
Thucyd.
x^^rijiara for
necessaries in general.
Smith
'Htoi
t w^of
xf''"'*!"**
avm'nonx iJJoK. Schol. This is not the only occasion ou which Tbucydides uses the term
Demosthenes
SEer. VI.
NAVAL ACTION
in the
CORINTHIAN GULPH.
sGs
1.7.
through
whom
tribe.
From
JNletapontium,
a Grecian town in
the
neighborliood,
Proceeding
then to Thurium, they found a revolution had taken place there, favorable to their cause: the party friendly to Athens were in possession of
life,
After
for the
judged
most advantageous
Athenian
ment of seven hundred heavy-armed and three hundred dartmen, they proceeded to the Rhegian port of Petra.
As soon
tlie
as the
Athenian
fleet
clearl}'
quitted
c.
34.
He
by strengthening the
bows 'with an addition of timber and metal, M'hich might inable them to resist the destructive shock of the enemy's beak. In the accidental absence, apparentl}^ of Conon, Diphilus commanded the Athenian squadron
J
made by
own
the-
The Corinthians
it
retired,
but
tlie
The Corinthians
a trophy; thinking
much,
says
more
decisively defeated.
The Athenians, on
common
criterion of victory,
would
erect
3C5
erect
HISTORY OF GREECE.
retiring soon after into the harbour of
Chap. XVIH.
po trophy; dejected, as by a defeat, not to have been, with suThe enemy's fleet, howperior numbers, more completely victorious.
ever,
on the Peloponnesian
SECTION
Affairs in Sicily.
VII.
in the
Harbour of Syracuse
Retreat re-
Moon
Fourth Nax^al
DuRiKG
Thucyd.
1.7.
in Sicily.
Of the
Agrigentum alone
must be
sufl'er,
on
hands,
most acquainted.
through
The Agrigentines
their territory
:
it
to exasperate
so powcrfui a j)CopIc by
any
attempt to force the way, and the road through the Sicel country
Nicias, informed of wliat was going forward,
tliis
occasion, the
measures
Sect. VII.
s67
form-
fifteen
coming from under an experienced, enterprizing and successful general, Gylii)pus and Hermocrates determined to use the opportunity, yet reAthens,
had learned, from experience, the deficiencies of their triremes, and of their manner of naval action, and they adopted nearly the same idcii of improvement. The Athenians, confined within the great port,
five
in
circuit'^
could profit
little
from
and
They could
not easily find room to attack with the transverse or oblique stroke,
with which they had heretofore been so formidable": under necessity
of meeting pro
.v
vessels
through
to certain destruction
by the enemy.
The Syracusans,
commanders, prepared
All being
juiy.
ready, before the fleet moved, Gylippus drew out the landforces.
in the city,
Those
ThucyiLl. 7. c oT
at the
opposite sides of the Athenian camp, and ingaged the Avhole attention
full effect,
naval station.
The Athenians,
in
"
it
eci it,
eighty stadia
English miles.
cribers.
Swinburne
rather
more
"
'A^maluv
atlas
S
(tk? lui
faA>,o
than
five miles.
Trav. in Sic.
p. 34-3. v. 2.
Jia
to
f*>i
ailtTr^ufotc
And
m^mXcv
c.36.
rai?
J^foAarj
;^g?s-9t.
'I'hucyd. 1.7.
me
they reckon-
seventy-
363
HISTORY OF GREECE.
seventy-five triremes
Cuap.XVIIL
long:
The
fleets
contest was
two
7.
Next day
riority
^*'
arose hence to
Athenians.
They
felt
by
sea, as well as
now moored
much
loftier as well
fortresses,
any of
might
means
to return
far.
40,41.
The Syracusans did not disappoint the expectation of the Athenian general. The very next morning their land and sea-forces nmved at once toward his camp and naval station but the serious attack, as l)efore, was on the fleet. As before, also, much of the day was consumed in fruitless contest. At length Ariston, a Corinthian, esteemed
;
fleet,
circumstances, tho,
Thucydides,
both
Ck.
13.
s.
in their militar}^
3.
economy.
going
it
We
fleet,
when
But
to seek
appears that
as
on the present
occasion, the general practice was to leave everything but their arms
in their naval
single meal.
camp not incumberiag themselves ashipboard with a Toward midday, in pursuance of the advice of Ariston,
;
station
Sect.VIT.
station.
369
pursue.
eatables
The Athenians, fatigued with unavailing contest, did not The Syiacusans, on reaching the shore, found a market of The magistrates, in consequence of notice from provided.
all
whatever provisions they had ready, and the crews debarking, took
hasty refreshment.
Meanwhile the Athenians, retreating to their naval camp, had diswhen sudpersed, expecting no interruption of leisure for their meal
;
fleet
approaching again
in order
of
refreshment,
it
they
was no longer
the Syra-
the numerous
Syracusau
in that
manner
had
re(iuired,
new mode
chiefly
in boats,
of annoying an
skill
enemy, who,
depended
on the
of their
Dartmen
venturing under
1.
7.
their
the decks
much
damaged,
*'
Vloy.l
sVi f.ij(a 01
t>
only gratings;
I
tlieir
w;fi7r^ol5
V7rc.7ri7i-1i)i''i;
T ths Tafiraq
y.a,\
TroAsi^iut
y.ai
viwsi
i%
parapet, raised
in
K>.a.yiix.
'ica.fom'hioHic,
l| i.v]m
tk? vat;T;
little
a great
axoiTi^ovTE!.
This
is
is
assistance
anil
to be expected
from translators
commentators.
An
attentive cxamina-
weapons from the decks of the enemy's galleys, but the open or grated bottom gave passage for weapons
from boats underneath. 1 am sorry to have to say that Winkelman's description of the piece of sculpture in question, and the ingraving he
has given of
it,
Vatican
museum
at
Rome, mentioned
in
former note, assisting the idea furnished by general Melvill, first gave me to imagine I
understood
it.
doubt however
if
the verit
may
carry with
I
suf-
have
own
explanation.
suppose the
been
been evidently ignorant of what a ship or a boat ?hoidd be or could be. Vet \Vinkl-
opcn
at
man
Vol
i'"t
370
(lamagcd, and
HISTORY OF GREECE.
tlie
Chap. XVIII.
fasting, fatigue,
trews of
all
weakened with
and
Avomids, the whole licet souglit the shelter of their floating fortresses.
So
and three of
cess,
The
and confirmed
as
in
now
superior,
by sea as
whom
hended subjugation.
^"
was
therefore
earliest opportunity, to
Tlmcvd
<=;
^'^^
*2.
"
and the proposed execution, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived, with a fleet of seventy-three triremes, five thousand regular heavy-
would approach twenty thousand men. Alarm and astonishment now They were assured returned witli double force upon the Syracusans.
that Attica itself was in the possession of an
enemy
and
it
appeared
an unaccountable paradox,
that,
a force in
all
led to Sicily.
The power of
its
Athens,
appeared stupendous,
resources
beyond
and
their
endless.
could give,
formed
measures proper to be taken, with that cool and just judgement, which
officer
Powerful
the
armament under
their
struck sudden
success.
lliat
perhaps
\\e.
their accounts,
for us,
how
their
ships of
contemplated
of
all
the antients,
in
an
ness.
Sect. VII.
ness.
371
Now,
conquest,
in mature age, undazzled by the near view of unawed by the apprehension of popular rage, neither
of
profit,
country
The
the
army was not to be staked against gain would be a precarious advantage to the
His
first
commonwealth, the
next, to
fix
loss
resolution there:
his
in
:
some degree
and
failure
not
fatal
first
attempt be defeated,
would be improper to
commonwealth,
Upon
this occasion
Thucydides
conduct
spirited
conquest of Syracuse
eflfected
Had
gone
Nicias, he says,
at once against
The Syra-
confident in their
own
beyond means of
relief,
The Athenian
line
force
was
The
of the
Demosthenes ob-
served that the counterwork was only a single wall, without defence
behind
the counterwork.
He
would be the
best criterion
its
success or
its
would
best de-
The account
of Thucydides
may
it
does not
3 B i
378
HISTORY OF GREECE.
those of Nicias.
Chav.XVIIL
first
The
measure
In
this,
which was
enemy might
all
Thucyd.
c.
1.
7.
The next attempt, which counterwork, was unfortunate. The machines were
Demosthenes then
no longer deacceded to the
43.
layed
ofllcers
measure.
Apparently Nicias was at this time too infirm to take any active
part in a business which migh't require great exertion.
Under the
for the
arti-
command
dutv
:
therefore of Demosthenes,
Eurymedon and
]\Ienander, the
was ordered
of the ground.
To
surprize, so
deemed un:
the array
first
moved,
as
the hour,
about the
first
sleep.
Syracusan
camps
sans
in Epipolfe.
motion to
while
mounting the
liill,
who
by Gylippus, but
unsuccessfully
Sect. VII.
ASSAULT OF EPIPOL^.
now
of success, hastening to complete the acquisi-
373
but, in confidence
more
In
body of men, confined within narrow space, on rough ground, and by night, confusion once arising, To communicate commands was diiificult; and, tho spred rapidly. the moon shone bright, yet when established arrangements were once
and checked them.
disturbed,
it
Among
The
pointed spears.
the word
;
Rut beyond
things the
peeanism, the song or shout of battle, which the Greeks always used in
the
moment
allies
the
being the same with the Syracusan, alarmed the /Uhcnians wherever
they heard
it
;
and
Athenian
took to
army,
flight.
in
several
fought oneanothcr.
At length
all
for retreat
merous
by
falling
plain,
easily
down precipices. Of the more fortunate, who gained the those who had served under Nicias, acquainted with the country, reached their camp or lines; but some of the newly arrived,
missing their way, were next day cut off by the Syracusan horse. The morrow was a day of mourning to the Athenians, as of triumph
to the Syracusans.
Thucydides does not specify the number"; was considerable, but not so great as the number of shields
;
because those
who
fled
over the
many
one at
some escaped.
it
The Syracusans
round sum of
dred.
to
"
Plutarch states
at the
two thousand.
have had
which Thucydides
countrymen,
calls
it
two thousand
five
hun-
the
374
HISTORY OF GREECE.
the Boeotians
Chap. XVIII.
the beginning of the ascent of Epipolee; the other, on the spot where
made
the
Thucyd.
1.7.
Every circumstance appeared now to require that the Athenian The armament generals should quickly enter upon some new plan.
from the season, partly from the marshy and unwholesome ground on Avhich it was incamped and the hope of soon
was
sickly, partly
all
reducing
it,
seemed
frustrated.
Demosthenes
therefore
warmly urged
due experiment having been made and having failed, all purpose of conquest in Sicily should be at once abandoned, and the armament
conducted home.
Not
own
situation,
he
said,
great a portion of the public strength, and continue such waste of the
what
Avas
by M'hich
however
easy to perceive that he approved, upon the whole, both the advice
and the conduct of Demosthenes, as, for his country's Avelfare judiIt is not equally easy to cious, for himself disinterested and manly.
discover his opinion of the conduct of Nicias
c, 48.
:
to determine his
lead
'
is
own judgement of it. Nicias positively refused to The temper of the Athenian people,' he said, the armament home. warm in expectation, and jealous of their well known to me
'
:
'
Our conduct,
then, let
it
be
must be submitted
to the
'
who have
'
will
Even of
those
'
now
'
nay many,
'
become
I
'
'
am brought
death
Sect. VII.
'
^is
'
But
think
we
as the face
of our
is
aifairs appears,
I Avell
know
the
'
worse.
'
in others,
They
con-
Two
thousand
talents, already
sumed upon
and
their fleet,
'
Their
fleet
and on the
least failure
of payment, their
ecjual difficulty;
'
abandon them.
I
We
hold
are under
it
no
'
'
in the council
of war.
But, beside his extreme horror of the prospect of living under the
it
Thucyd.
'^'
1.7.
*^'
*^*
with
little
exer-
him
still
to return
home conqueror of
was unable to comif
49.
Syracuse.
Demosthenes, uninformed of
this negotiation,
c.
they must wait for a decree of the people to authorize their return
home, yet the army ought immediately to move from ground so unhealthy, and
it
still
more the
fleet
situation, in
which
opposing, deference
that
he might have
intelligence
unknown
them,
occasioned a
its station.
Unexpected
37G
HISTORY OF GREECE.
that credit which grows witli prosperity.
factions were violent in Agrigentum; and
critically given,
it
Chap. XVIII.
Unexpected success had now prc]jave(l the Syracusans for any exBut Gylippus and Ilermocrates would not omit to profit from ertion.
Thucy.l.
1.
7.
might
of the government.
c 50.
with
fifteen
t!ie
moment of opportunity
lost.
Gylippus
force among the barbarians, he was joined by a body of Peloponnesians, A\ho, to avoid the Athenian fleet, had made the coast of .Africa, and
,
was
also
weakening daily by
sickness.
had
excited
new
Eurymedon
regretted their
armament.
He
vhich,
in
pursuance of
fleet
station.
All
was accordingly
readv,
when the
full
darkened.
None had
tb.cn
in the order
armament with terror, as a portent boding ill to their purpose: application was made to the generals, deprecating tiie intended march the
:
that,
powers
Ml)
^anfui;
yi
a|ia ir,^'t(i7$ai.
lliis
We
tive.
the tomiiion
foiT.is
of proceeding on such
transl^itors
do nrt
lliose
who knew
again
Sect. Vir.
577
more
affirmed that,
till
that period
omen
imputes
to
persuade the
On
to the augurs
Plut. vit.
favor
of
tlie
gods
to
those
opinion of the power or of the goodness of the gods, whicli did not
make
such
as
un-
On the
Syracusans to derive
superiority Thucyd.
'^'
incouragementfrom the
portent.
1.
7.
by land; they considered the intention of secret retreat as proof of fear They resolved therefore not to allow the enemy to to stand a battle. establish themselves anywhere in Sicily, by which the war might be drawn into length, but to attack them by sea and land in their present
situation,
^^'
and by their
some
rest,
da3's,
they led
Giving then the seamen a day of out the infantry, and they gained some small advantage
who advanced
great
attack.
against them'*.
On
^
their
Accordingly
c.
52.
Dodvvell has
been,
With regard to the delay required by the augurs, whether there has or has not
clear.
been
tlie
He
has given
credit,
important,
either not
consistent and
Vol.
II.
seventy-
378
HISTORY OF GREECE.
spventy-six triremes
Ciiav.
XVIII.
by
station,
Eurymedon, who commanded the right, to nse that advantage which superiority of numbers gave, stretched away with a view to surround the left of the enemy. The center spreadten triremes,
met
their fleet.
ing,
visions,
weakened
itself
by making the
it
between
In this state
in close order,
now
the
fleet,
Eurymedon
fled,
The
left
Such
too
much
to relate in
first,
of
country ever
suffered
at sea
from an
neither
With his usual tenderness for characters, he names Nicias nor Demosthenes and expresses no opinion, nor imputes
;
7.
distress of the
Athenian
fleet,
The Tuscan
line.
The
approached
The Tuscans,
flight.
bj-
coming
also
prevailed, Mith
some slaughter of the enemy's heavy-armed, and they saved most of the stranded ships. The Syracusans however took An attempt was eighteen, and of these the whole crews perished.
made
Athenian
fleet,
within
its
stockade, by a fireship.
The
Sect. VII.
S79
1.
7.
The Syracusan
fleet
trophy
action,
so contrary to all
hope founded on
little
balanced
by the
On the
as
c.
56.
59.
liberties
of Greece.
now
to prevent
departure of that force, from which they had expected the worst
evils
of subjugation
and proposing no
less
formidable
fleet
and army.
only, from a sense of disgrace, and apprec.
60.
hension of the swords of their enemies, but the most urgent of wants
pressed the Athenians.
Naval
with Catana were gone; and thus the desire to depart was inforced, as
the means were rendered precarious.
summoned
to assist
The result of the deliberation was a whole armament by sea. This being deall
possible
means
enough only
to contain the
baggage and
far different
sick,
from that
open
sea,
3 c 2
S80
HISTORY OF GREECE,
customed to
in
Chat. XVIII.
similar to that
a decisive superiority,
must be unavoidably
inferior
numbers.
Thus
late
Thucyd.
1.
7.
therefore,
ingly.
Upon
in
was required.
rowing, and,
The
open
Syracuse would
stationary
tance.
little avail.
On the
fight,
as
man
capable of bearing^
bowmen,
of the enemy's stronger bows, and, preventing their retreat, give opportunity for their
to act.
Pui-suant to
these resolutions, about a hundred and ten triremes M'cre equipped and
c.
65.
manned.
in the
Avas
observed by
theSyracusans, and intelligence reached them of the grappling-irons with which the Athenian prows were armed. Gylippus and Hermocrates,
tho they could not equip eighty triremes, nevertheless determined to pursue the contest, so far successful, for naval sujx^riority.
Against the
it
neces-
69.
their confederates
seconded
among
The discouragement,
arising
was proportioned
under
his
com-
mand
seemed
Sect. VII.
381
Little
seemed to
ambitious,
rise:
in exertion,
and
command,
his activity
and animation
so
warm
in exhortation, that
might
soldiers
and seamen.
The
to
take the
command
ashiphoard
in
attending the
necessary preparation,
Wiien
all
was ready
said so
much
incouragement of his
and
trierarc separately,
mentioning
mode of
by
his
own
glory,
shore, he
there committed
under whose
harbour's
moved immediately
Kljuickly
to the
mouth
carefully
watched
their motions,
made
ti,uc\cI. 1.7.
'
^^
commanding
the center,
the Syracusans
With
the
first
ing to unmoor them and clear the passage, when the Syracusans approached, and a most obstinate battle insued.
Meanwhile the Athenian army stood on the shore, observing with the most anxious attention what passed, within such a distance that
they could see and hear almost everything.
When
in
therefore after a
words equal to the description) rose to the utmost pitch that any circumstances could produce in the human mind,
historian, at a loss
since
hopeless.
Entering
382
Thucyd.
'^'^"
1.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
7.
Chap.XVIIL
Entering
this
little
into detail,
and not at
all
disasterous battle,
quences.
The
armament was so
extreme, and the danger impending so urgent, that the sacred dues of
the dead, objects
neolected
no herald was sent to request the restitution of the bodies, no care was taken about their burial, but every thought was absorbed in the evils that pressed, and the perils that threatened, the hving. Amid
;
however,
lose
his usual
still
Going
to Nicias, he proposed
what might
have
He
sea,
thought
if,
it
still
To
;
;
they
was
all
they would go
anywhere by
land,
and
necessary
'
'
SECTION
Retreat of the Athenians
VIII.
from
Syracuse.
C.73.
Gyltppus and
whichtheir
last success
in effect, to
in
conquer Athens
and
it
itself in Sicily.
The
Syracuse,
justifiecf
the proposal of
But
the
Sect. VIII.
383
the SyraCLisan people, wearied with the labor of the day and exhilarated
with
so
its
success,
M-ell
happened
morrow was
whom
they esteemed
suade thera to quit the religious revel for nocturnal military enterprize.
Hermocrates,
at first
most urgent
for
knew
his fellowcitizens
they could be
little
distinctly seen,
to
Finding
those
whom
'
go and
tell
the general,
tliat
passes
were already
'
move
v/as
The
fatal Thucyd.
1.
7.
bait
taken,
in
''
"*
moment
to
the M'ishes of their people, found means, before the morrow ended, to ingage them in their own views. Their victorious fleet went to the Athenian naval station, and no opposition being attempted, they carThe army at the same ried off, or burnt on the spot, every ship there.
all
that line of
country which the Athenians would probably propose to traverse. On the next day'*, every thing being prepared, as far as circumC.75. stances would permit, orders were issued by the Athenian generals for
**
The
third
who counted
first,
marching.
381
marching.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
wanting, to describe adequately
occasion
;
Chap. XVIII.
are
when,
in the
human mind
that, instead
conceive.
No
uf so powerful a
was destroyed
;
that,
through their
failure, ruin
and
that, instead
an ignominious
flight
was their only, and that almost a hopeless resource, for avoiding
or death.
But,
in
slaver}'
the
circumstances of that
lamentable objects,
flight,
many
dreadful
considerations,
many
presented them-
selves, striking
home
The dead
many
of
a relation or a friend so
with horror.
whom
fruitless
tlicir
friends,
more distressing
it M'as
deemed, but so
silent dead.
far
excusable as
it
still
and
Such, in short,
saj's
it
move.
At length
historian,
the
city
modern
little
times.
less
importance
mostly
slaves,
they
deserted
Sect. VIII.
38,5
deserted openly; and in the instant of the army's moving, the greater
Thus even the cavahy and the heavy-armed were reduced to carry their own provisions and necessaries some beinowithout attendants, some mistrusting those who remained to them
part disappeared.
;
and the small portion of provisions they possessed demanded every care, since it was far from being equal to their probable wants.
Amid
the extreme dejection and anguish, not Avithout reason per- Thucyd.
*^"
1.7.
vading the armament, Nicias Avonderfully sujjported the dignity of his character and situation. Individually the distress of the existing
circumstances appeared not to affect him
;
'^^'
seemed to
among
all.
The historian's authority for the remarkable words he attributes to him on the occasion, tho not stated, certainly might be good but whether we consider them as conveying the sentiments of Nicias or of Thucydides, they are highly interesting, as they mark the opinion entertained of the divine providence, by a man of exalted rank, of ex:
life
as a state of probation,
and to
his voice
evil deeds.
From
line,
might be heard
with an unruffled countenance, desired the troops to advert to his own case: 'I,' he said, am in body (you may see indeed the state
*
77.
'
to
far
among
none
:
once
inferior to
but
now
is
evil,
have to apprehend
'
'
mand.
in every
Such
my
common with the lowest under my comwho have always been regular and zealous
as far as
'
depended simply
on myself, scrupulously
but
liberally charitable
among men.
change for
our enter-
Hence
the
will
the better.
The
affliction
we xiow
suffer
is
enemy have
and
if
it
cannot be
'
evils are
adequate punishment.
Vol.
II,
3D
fust
386
first
HISTORY OF GREECE.
M
Chap.XVIIL
and
what
gods
ordinary
bear.
among men,
only what
men may
against us
will at
;
objects, as
we
indignation.
'
in
let
us look to what,
are,
and surely we
we possess, with so large a proportion of regular troops, wherever we establish our abode, we are not only a formidable army, we are a commonwealth. Certainly no
Such
a force as
Sicilian state, Syracuse excepted,
Avill
easily drive us
from any
situ-
ation
we may occupy
desire.
;
occupying any we
may
To
be
safe,
indeed,
we have only
ritory
of the barbarians.
Firm
are
principally necessary to
your welfare
;
it
may
)
but in men."
i^ ''
'^'
~.
78.
two
commanding
The
i-oad
Grecian friends of Naxus and Catana, but that by which they hoped
most readily
At
the ford
little
and
light infantry,
hanging on
their
march of
still
only
tJiey
five miles,
commodious
iucamped
On
made
less
progress.
Sect. VIII.
progress.
387
Want
after a
march of
in a plain where,
among
the farms and villages, they could supply themselves with water,
liilly
much
greater annoyance,
hours wasted in unavailing attempts to repress them, distressed Athenians returned to the camp they had last occupied, could they
profit, as
many
Nor
their situation
in cavalry,
was
and hazardous.
curred
any
1.
opinion.
On
first
7.
they nioved earlier than usual, and pressed their march, with the
lost
their slowness
their arrival
fortifica-
An
.
which
I
v/as
not in the
1
moment
,
.
successfid.
.
historian,
as
in
is
common
its
consequence,
''^'^'^l'""'
Sep.
As constant exertion tqnds to maintain the animation which success has raided, so new and, unpersuade their troops to renew the attack.
body of men
to
The Athenian
Their
found no
difficulty in
checking
this purpose.
force was indeed yet such as to deter the enemy- from giving thepi
3
D 2
battle
S8'8
HISTORY OF GREECE.
battle
;
Chap. XVIII.
nigiit
still
force the passage of the mountains, they had no sooner quitted their
camp, than the Syracusan horse and light-armed were upon their
flank^^
and
rear.
;
enemy
instantly
retreated
but the
moment
renewed
and
this so repeatedly
and
Then
jrreat
the Sy-
7.
The
all
distress
now become
very
while
numbers were
were in
from wounds received in the many skirmishes, almost total want of provisions and of all necessaries. The
generals therefore
came
to a
their
camp
by night, and take the road toward the sea, the direct contrary to that which they had been hitherto following, and on which the enemy
waited to intercept them.
For, pursuing along the coast the
still
way
to
more
circuitous
country.
The
army was
Through
but
some unknown
fatality,
manded by Demosthenes.
c. 81.
Order was
after
some time
restored
The Syracusans,
minate Gylippus,
escape.
as soon as
To
discover which
difficult,
way
so large a
its
march,
and shortly
all
body of Syracusans raising M'orks to obstruct his passage across the gully, through which flows the brook Cacyparis. Ihcse he soon dispersed, According to the plan conElorus.
little
farther he found a
certed
Sect. VIII.
389
course of the
but,
army overtook him. From some difference of opinion between the Athenian generals, concerning the manner of conductinoNicias thought tlie safety of the army depended, beyond the retreat. all things, upon the rapidity of its march the insult of assault should therefore be borne, and halts made, to repel attacks, only when they
there the cavalry of the Syracusan
the
first
This evidently was what ThucyBut Demosthenes was more disposed, on every occa-
No
his
sooner thererear,
now
pressing
upon
than he
changed that
line
form
The
Too
where
tlie
Sut repeated
sufferings, in the
course of this long war, and especially the affair of Pylus, had taught
the Lacedsmonians the value of light troops and missile weapons.
made
bowmen,
darters,
and
slingers
and
from
rest.
these,
through the remainder of the day, the Athenians had no xhucyd. Ur. ^'- In the evening, v/hen many were thus wounded^ and all worn.
<=
with hunger,
thirst,
and
fatigue,
promising liberty to any of the danders who would come to the Syra-
in so hopeless
when
all
could
inflict,
;
comrades
an instance of
common conduct
attachment from
subjects
and while
it
does honor to
themsdves
'S<)0
HISTORY OF GREECE.
selves
Chap.XVIII.
credit
and to Demosthenes,
it
certainly reflects
some
on
the,
go-
vernment of Athens.
that, in the
So desperate indeed
M'ere
the circumstances,
troops,
same evening, Demosthenes capitulated for the rest of his surrendering himself and them prisoners of war, with no other
none should
.
through violence
all
it,
With
their
money, throwing
it
and
M'ith sjiver.
The
prisoners, in
number
tlie
faither bank.
-army hastened in pursuit, and the horse quickl}- overtaking him, gave
capitulation
1
1
him
to surrender lumselt
made by Demosthenes, and summoned and. the torces under his command. Re1
1
r-
conduct
.granted.
for a
horseman of
his
own
to
make
The return of
him of
the fact, he
reimbursement to Syracuse of
all
command might
The
depart in safety;
and for security he would leave Athenian citizens as hostages, one for
every talent that would thus become due.
proposal was rejected,
who
make nor
weapons.
Among the
-provisions.
.
disti'csses
least
assaults
on their
Kicias there-
march
Upon
this
he gave up thp
design.
Sect. VIII.
S.
sgi
camp
made
through, and, under favor of the obscurity, quickly got beyond im-
mediate pursuit.
march.
Even then the enemy, under the able conduct of Gylippus and Hermocrates, wonld come to no regular action, but only infested, as
and desultory charges of cavalry.
its
Sept. 8. or
Sicily,
raiher about
extent,
is
numerous
valleys,
whose
sides are
commonly
river Assinarus
While extreme
thirst
further
bank, they should gain some respite from the annoyance of the ene-
less formidable,
when
all
But, notwithstanding
close
felt
tiiey
hurried
down
first
The
with
all
the M'ays,
Meanwhile the enemy's light-armed, acquainted reached the opposite bank before them, and the
in the hollow,
was exposed,
helpless, to
weapons on both
for the Syracusans,
;
sides.
The Peloponnesians
still
at length led
the
way
down
slaughter
many
of them
Avater,
and
it.
i.;
pursued and cut off any who could escape up the banks, when Nicias, whom nothing could induce to submit to the Syracusans, found opportunity to surrender himself to Gylippus..
So.
manded
to give quarter,
Among
398
HISTORV OF GREECE.
the windings of the stream, a large
:
Chap. XVIII.
number of the Athenians found opportunity for either concealment or flight the rest were made priNo capitulation was made, as for the division under Desoners.
mosthenes
:
and,
prisoners
being valuable as
slaves,
the
Syracusan
In
this they were so successful, that the prisoners of the Syracusan state
detachment
1.
7.
hundred who broke through the Syracusan line in the niglit, and took them all. Tiie pubhc prisoners, with what spoil could be collected,
were conducted to Syracuse.
would have been a glorious and a singular triumph, for Gylippus, to have carried the Athenian generals, the two most illustrious men of
It
against
But
the
jealous, cruel,
and
faithless
temper
of
de-
democratical
cree of the
tleath,
and they
were
executed.
democracies,
in
individual, touching at
any
vil-
select
common
authors of
it
every public act, the shame of flagitious measures was so divided that
was disregarded.
solemnly granted in the name of the Syracusan people, appears, for a time at
least, to
stances immediately leading to the measure were not, in his time, with
It seems likely to
upon
others,
that
it
The
Plut.'vit.
^^'
But Diodorus, who, may have had sources of information not open to Thucydides, and Mho, the a zealot for democracy and of little judge-
men
1i
Sect.VIIL
ment, was of
catastrophe of
much
Tllli
ATHENIANS.
tlie flao-itious
sas.
decree positively to Diodes, then a leader of the democratical party, afterward, as we shall see, nder of the republic, anxl always the opponent
of Hermocrates,
And
it.
The
fears,
he says, of those
who had
them,
if
not to promote, yet to concur in the vote for putting- him to death; and the Corinthians had particular enmity to him, apprehen-
sive, for
power
in
All authorities
how-
was a public and solemn decree of the Syracusaii people which consigned the Athenian generals to execution "'.
ever agree that
severer lot.
whence the
for the
by public
auction.
But the
faith of the
Syracusan people, so
shamefully broken with the generals, was not very religiously kept with
those of inferior rank.
On
marked with
must be
to be
The Syracusans
Athenian
who would
life
Tho
more shown
of Nicias, proto colto his
in the scanty
allowance of water.
satisfactory chiefly
Plutarch, in Lis
life
cuse
as
it
is
fesscs to
lect
Vol.
II.
Nv-
594
HISTORY OF GREECE,
No
sliclter
Chap. XVIII.
slcy
;
and
'.vhtle
the rertectecl
and capacious
given to avoid
;
No
means
M'ere
Qwn
filth;
no
who sickened
and,
whea
their
anj' died, as
many
;
among
here as on a former
sums up
so
prisoners.
all
Toward the end of november, after a confinement of about seventy days, the ilandcrs, and others who were not citizens of Athens, or of some Grecian town of Sicily or Italy, were taken out for the milder lot of being sold to slavery. The Athenians, with the Sicilian and
Italian Greeks, remained
;
tliey
were ever
released.
Thucjd.
c, 85.
].
7.
Meanwhile
prisoners
army under Nicias, who, instead of public of the Syracusan state, had been made the private property
those, of the
fell
of individuals, suffered variously, according to the condition or temper of the masters, under Mdiom they
;
and, of those
by
flight,
for,
the
towns of
c.
Sicily
86.
fortune to
make
of action, to the
their passage to
Athens
but
servile
Nic.
and polite
Some,
manners of Athens
are said to
have been
beneficial to
many.
who were
tion,
made
its
way ta
Sicily
;
Sect. VIII.
Sicily
;
3u&
readily multiplied.
by memory,
strains,
much
touched the
Sicilians.
or
what
relief in
,'j
306
CHAPTER
Affairs
XIX.
of
Geeece, from
till
the
Expedition
the Return of
the Twenty-fourth
Year of the
in
SECTION
I.
Effects
through Greece of the Overthrozc of the Athenians in Sici/i/. Change in thepolitical System of Lacedfemon. Measure^! oj the Peloponnesian Confederacy for raising a Fleet. Proposals f-om Eubcea and Lesbos
to revolt from the
Athenian
to the
Peloponnesian Confederacy.
Thucyd.
'^^'
1.
8.
'T^HE
--
news of the total destruction of the most powerful armament ever sent out by any Grecian state, supposed so far from the
it
first
brought to Athens by no
messenger,
Tlut.
**"^'
vit,
but communicated accidentally in the uncertain way of reports, did not immediately find credit. Plutarch relates that a foreiner, landing
went into a barber's shop, which, like the modern coffeehouse, was the usual resort of idle newsmongers in the Grecian cities (as, we find, afterAV'ard in Rome) and spoke of the event as what he
at Peirasus,
weU known
;
there.
The
city,
barber, with
more
and communicated
summoned an
The
in-
assembly of the people, and produced the barber to declare his news.
The
people, in
whom
Sect.
I.
SICILY.
Sf)7
where to
him.
The indignant multitude immediately ordered the mode of punishment nowhere exactly
it
but Mhich
\va*
not released
Tluiryd.
^' ^'
1.
s.
not at
first
misfortune.
Multiplied
C.
ii.-?
became extreme.
the orators
who
'",* Popular rage began with venting contumely against p'\v had advised the expedition; as if, says the historian, October,
it
;
From the
who had
contributed to establish
the belief thai the gods wouJd favor the project of conquest in Sicily.
But
the prevailing
passion.
first
stimulated the
the
prime
of
life,
such a
and then
it
the enemy's victorious navy before Peirajus, and the blockade of Athens
by land and
In
sea.
wanting either
magnanimous minds among the Athenians, and the Wise measures crisis itself gave them the power to take the lead. and the most vigorous that circumstances admitted, were accordingly resolved on; to restore the navy, to collect stores, to raise money, and
able heads or to save
it,
_'
'E; Te
Tpp^of xaTaJfSiijj
irgtsAJi'Tg
7to>iiD
yj^kmi,
, t.
i. Plat.
vit.
N;c,
but
SOS
HISTORY OF GREECE.
states, particularly
Chap. XI-X,
but public luxury, which was already immoderate in Athens', and, above all things, to obviate the defection of the allied and subject
of Eubcca, the most valuable dependency of the
commonwealth, and without M'hich the population of Athens could not But the depth of misfortune, into which their own folly easily subsist.
induced,
is
among
government.
whose
office
was to deliberate on
all
measures,
assembly.
government, but not for vigor, not for secresy, not for dispatch; qualities
in
when a
resolve on measures,
and then
command
crisis.
It
was so resolved
'
and
it
Avas
'
Tliueyd. 1.6.
politics
c.Z
in
might have given, had been very general and very serious. No that could befall the aristocracies, which composed the Lacedaemo-
without alarm
for tho
tiie
to be accomplished by the Athenian arms, yet there was no inferior evil which might not be expected, and quickly. Already the Lacedamor.ians beheld,
not only
Tinker has
a judicious note
the
lassa^e of TliiKydiclus,
which
have thus
Athens
par'phrard.
.
The
dently
di'.:
not understand.
but
Sect.
I.
399
own
country, infesting a
Avith devastation,
At
commanded
the seas,
same time the Athenian fleets so that no prospect appeared of m.eans for
;
insomuch that not only the Lacedaemonians were unable to extend protection to any allies beyond
the ready reach of their landforce, but the extensive line of the Laconiau coast
insult.
In
all
these things
tlie
made a change, that nothing but the mad ammadder jealousy, of a despotic multitude could have produced; and that change was immediate and almost total. The navy of Athens
catastrophe at Syracuse
bition, or
fleets
now commanded
The
allies
thing from the enemy, became only anxious for exertion, that they
of the war, and relieve themselves from burdens under which they had
been long uneasy. The neutral republics, at the same time, thouglit the
moment come
it
late to
it
would be
unable to maintain the war through the insuing summer. JMeanwhile the
from
all
it
own permanent
as
superiority over
now looked
an acquisition completely
Among the
The LacedEemonian
kings,
who
in
Lacediemon,
were scarcely
all
political
in the
as a
command
more
The
interest
which
tliey
thus
had
-*oo
HISTORY OF GREECE.
had
in lead ins;
tlieir
Cha?. XIX.
by the law of Lycurgus, forbidding such wars; and that law, inforced sometimes by the opposite interest of the ephors, had been much more effectually and constantly inforced by the poverty of
restrained
and afterward,
in the
new and
vast
scene of action M-hieh the Persian war opened, Pausanias, tho not king
but mecrly regent and general of the republic, was able to prosecute
ambitious views to a great length. His
own imprudence
insuing downfall of the powerof Sparta checked, for a time, the ambition
of
its
When
in years,
had no
Greece.
object,
in
command, but
the
good of
his
all
man of moderate
talents,
had not
He
judgement, produced,
we ha\e
upon
liim
in
He
was
still
but of
force in Dcceleia
gave him, what none of his predecessors ever injoyed, a perennial military
flmcyd,
S. 1.
command.
8.
not only use at discretion the troops immediately under his orders, but
command
among
Thus
forfin states.
vested
wth independent
;
so that
much more
Agit;, in his
The
Sect.I.
measures of LACED7EM0N.
These were consequences apparently not in the
401
The
~
yet the
to check them.
The
Lacedsmon seems
to
have
of Lycurgus's system.
;
When
but we
Archidamus,
it
in the
speaking of
The length of that war, and the make attention to the revenue and thus again a new interest was created,
men
for forein
hence the influence of the king, tho at a distance, might keep together
Agis in his
8.
command
c. 3.
of
fleet
to
rival
that
of Athens.
Instead
The
of
five
took
for twenty-five.
An
equal
Epidaurus, and
Henpione.
judged
sufficient,
November; and
Vol.
II.
after receiving
Turning
toward
40t
mSTOUY
(Etsan
vallies;
OF GREECE.
still
Chap. XIX.
toward the Malian bay, he carried off considerable booty from the
and
then,
advancing
some other
8.
contributions.
Meanwhile the Athenians, recovered in some degree from the first emotions of grief and alarm, and submitting themselves to able guidance, were taking measures, suited to their reduced circumstances,
for resisting the
impending storm.
Their
first
was
be subsisted.
With
view therefore a
fort
montory of Sunium.
in the
moment.
his
way
^^^
in public affairs.
of the nineteenth year of the war, preparations were making on both sides, as if war was just then beginning.
But
it
for
allies
so
left
people
one interest with themselves, were foremost to take measures for breaking their dependency.
their
The
discontented
command
orders,
in addition to that
Sect.
orders,
I.
DEFECTION
gave large
of
403
incouragement;
of
the
news of the
whole island
tlie
to the
Lacedaemonian confederacy.
force
command
should be employed
and
in
com-
it.
Three hundred
citizens,
newly-admitted
command
of
this
body
into Eubcea,
without
at tlie
same time
to both.
He
to
the Eubo:ans
and
Athens,
But
they
Lacedsmon, had a
race,
whom,
as of iEolian
while the
Lesbians,
tho
connected by no
revered the
the
Lacedtemon or
his
own
Boeotians,
resolved to postpone
communication
Avith
government
F 2
404
HISTORY OF GREECE.
S
Chap. XIX.
ECT
O X
II.
Keic Implication of Grecian and Persian Interests. Death of Artaxerxes and Succession of Darius II. to the Persian Throne. Effect
of the terrors of an Earthquake. Congress of the Pcloponnesian Isthmian Gaines. Naval success of the Confederacif at Corinth. Athenians in the Saronic Gu/ph. Infuence of Alcibiades in the
Spartan Councils.
A Peloponnesian Fleet
to cooperate
companied by Alcibiades,
revolted lonians.
betxceen
Treaty of Alliance
Not
all tlie
writers^
of the
may
That event
in
the
new way
impli-
cated with those of Persia. Darius had succeeded his father Artaxerxes
in the throne.
of the empire.
orders,
While
troubles,
his cares
dis-
which
preceding
accession,
had produced
in the
central parts, the connection with the distant provinces remained loose
that,
Thus,
upon the
appointment of Tissaphernes
son of the late
Pissuthues,
Sect.il
affairs of PERSIA.
Regardless, however,
405
new
satrap only.
prince,
and
in defiance
officers,
self in the
Carian mountains.
M'ants
But the
whom
its
proportion as
its
weakness incou-
The
from
their provinces, not only the accruing tributes, but the arrears.
From
the time of the victories of Cimon, most of the Grecian towns in Asia
had been tributary to Athens, and many of them since those of Xanthippus and Leotychidas. The jealousy of the Athenian govern-
to
remain
.
fortified
secure,
as far as
history
. .
informs
us,
,
against any
Ch.ip. 15.
sect. 3.
of
tlie
this ilisu
of short duration.
towns
assessed
The wretched
policy of Athens, in
moted the views of the Persians, that there was in every Asiatic city a party, composed mostly of the higher ranks, who were ready to prefer
the more liberal supremacy of a Persian satrap to the oppressive and
insulting tyranny of the Athenian people.
it
Under
these circumstances
the
command,
dominion.
The
plea of inability
Thncyd. allowed at the Persian court, so far that the arrears of tribute due from
b.
Tissaphernes, for the Grecian towns within his satrapy, were no longer
3
VVl)at
we
find
upon ihe Grecian towns in Asia, and ingaged that no Persian troops should come within three days march of tlie western
coast.
by
sect. 3. ch.
1.
of this
by which
all
History,
the
court
of
Persia
gave up
claim
demanded.
406
HISTORY OF GREECE.
demanded*.
it
Chap. XIX.
was granted,
al-
But
at the
this indulgence
Tlnicyd.
c. 0.
1.
s.
commanded
however,
Amorges,
To
eflect
even
this,
means were
deficient or conduct,
by the defeat
;
in Sicily, the
command
and, throughout
immediately
The
but, diffi-
dent of their
own
strength,
their first
with Tissaphernes.
with his
The
satrap,
own
force, to give
them protection
At
the Hellespont and the Euxine, with the same view of acquiring re-
cities
He
arrived at Lacedasmon about the same time with the ministers from
who had
The
contest
which insued,
for preference
the
Lacedaemonian
Endius,
had had
s.
We
are
little
phernes,
and (Anab.
1.
1.
c. 1.
6.) that
command by
the
We
1.
learn
was
3^ c. 1.
5.
&
seq.
&
e;.
2. s. 10.)
that
proper
satrapy of Tissa-
of Lydia.
antient
Sect.
II.
407
With
it
was therefore
his purpose to
interests
alliance,
make Endius also the enemy of Agis; and the opposition of among those who were contending for the Lacedaemonian
afforded means.
them the
pre-
ference: they possessed no less than sixty ships of war: in every cir-
tliey
among
the
it
who
commanded
tives,
These mo-
who
directed
the councils
of Lacedtemon.
treaty
was
Chians
and Eryin
thra^ans,
their
proposed revolt.
it
sail
while
in-
spired,
to the
measure.
was supposed to portend that the command of Melanchridas would be inauspicious for the Lacedtemonian government immediately ap;
pointed Chalcideus
five ships.
to supersede
to
-The
same
instant, Thucyd.
1.8.
the usual
want of energy
came apprehensive
protection,
Athens, and they might be attacked before succour, sufficient for their
would
arrive.
Toward spring
Lacedjemon, urging the necessity of early assistance; and the ability p of Alcibiades and the power of Endius being united, to promote their
cause,
it
fleet in
was thought
and Corinth
was
appointed
408
Tiiucyd.
1.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
s.
Chap. XIX.
He
had the prudence not to mark any resentment at the interference with
his
command,
or
any M'ay to
irritate
ill
disposed to
go
first
to Chios,
when the Chians were put in a officer named by Agis, should take the
that,
;
command and
cotiduct the
proceed to Lesbos
command
who should
Twentywas hoped,
The
fleet in tlie
one were
in all haste
without delay.
Thus,
sail,
would act
i3ut
}t
and such Mas the respected sanctity of the armistice upon that occasion, that
The
and
many
But the
anxiet}' of the
mined the Corinthians not to stir. was already broken; and nothing
arise
The
force of Athens,
they said,
dis-
to be a])prehended
from any
covery of the purposes of the confederacy, nor any obstacle that could
from a
little
delay,
to prevent a large
portion
sacred festival, whose period would recur only in the revolution of four
years.
The
nothing transpired.
fleet
excited suspicion
the
Sect.
tlie
its
II.
409
Chios.
bound
Athenian
revolt
fleet,
Peirseus.
tical party,
The proposed
was a measure
any
The
in
At
Thucyd.
c. 10.
1.
the preparations were seen, the purpose suspected, and measures were
The
festival
them with
menes was
Peirfcus.
Alca-
The Athenians
c. 11.
them
According to the usual mode of naval operation in that age, leaving a few triremes to watch them, tliey withdrew with the rest
there.
much
alarm in Corinth.
as
The
neighboring
allies
could be
marched
armament.
tary
Where soldiers were citizens, not under any regular milicommand, but having every one a vote in the decision of all
it
public measures,
momentary danger.
ships in
tiie
Accordingly the
first
proposal,
concerning the
of
Vol.
II.
repairing
410
repairing the
struggle.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
loss,
Chap. XIX.
it
induced
tlie
without a
The
l)ody
of infantry
incamped for
their
protection.
Information of
carried to
mean time
all
it
of advantage, that had been opened on the other side of the iEgean.
itself,
even in those
cir-
friend, in their
and executed
for them.
He
urged that,
if
s.
news of the
disaster
there, the
might yet be
;
effected.
He would
;
himself
he would represent,
zeal of
revolt, not
Laced^mon
and he
all
la
which
and of the
still
alliance
was
own power
him
incited,
:
if
pass from
Thus
c.
in prosecution
of the plans of
14.
Alcibiadcs
In their
all
in
with, compelled
them to follow
to
as far as
coast,
Deputies
nishment
Sect.
11.
'
4i.
completely prepared.
sitting
;
The
was
tlieir proposals.
They boldly
:
them not a rumor of the defeat on the Corinthian coast had reached Chios a decree was proposed for renouncing the Athenian and ingaging in the Peloponnesian confefortunately for
:
from Peloponnesus
deracy
party,
and, without
it
;
was carried.
ample
and, three ships only being sent to Clazomenaj, that city also
five tri-
remes, Alcibiades struck a greater blow against his country, than the
advantage
to meditate.
in
The
of Athens were
now
it
was
Tlmcyd.
^'^^'
1.8.
thousand
necessity.
No
enemy's
fleet
emergency
than
if
For, the
most
allies
thus there would be an end of those resources without which the war
The
and
would
if
and that the speediest exertion should be used, for saving the dependencies yet remaining to the commonwealth, and recovering,
allow,
The
'
tionary powers, sent instant orders for arresting the crews of the Chian
ships acting with the fleet
fully executed
:
on the Corinthian
coast.
and
ships.
Eight
triremes
G a
412
HISTORY OF GREECE.
triremes remained equipped
in-
Chap.XIX,
:
they were
:
command
of Strombichidcs
;
twelve,
thirty
and
were put
Thucyd.
1.
them
as
soon as possible.
8.
Receiving
tlien
intelligence of a revolt
proposed at Teos, on the Asiatic main, he proceeded thither, and arrived just in time to prevent the immediate eftect of a negotiation with
Tissaphernes and the revolted cities of Clazomenaa and Erylhrce, sup-
He had however
him
increased,
scarcely
comwas
posed 'matters,
wheii information
reached
that C'iialcideus
now
by reinforcement from
arm}',
to twenty-three
triremes.
which would be
assisted
were then admitted into Teos, which became a member of the Peloponbut, the Athenian interest being supposed still nesian confederacy
;
prevalent
among
posed next to ingage that, the richest and most important of the In thus promoting Asiatic Grecian cities, in revolt against Athens.
the Peloponnesian cause, however,
it
have the Peloponnesian interest at heart. The success of the operations, which had been carried on under his direction, had been so rapid,
so uninterrupted, so important, aiul so little expected, that he could
it.
Lacedeemon
v.-as
moment
his services
ceased to be
necessary, he
than gratitude
among
the
otlier.
change of magistrates there, the ephor his friend would go out of oftice, and a new commander-in-chief would supersede Chalcideus whom his friend's interest, and perhaps his own recommendation, had
raised to the
to
have acted in
it
constantly
under
his intluence.
Sect.
II.
PERSIA.
M-as in-
413
in
whose service he
as
infantry in the guard of the iland, and taking Chian seamen in their
room.
who were
it
less
satisfied
with the
change.
views.
In
from Athens,
them
as
;
much
as possible to himself,
and
as little as possible
in his
Lacedasmon
how-
I-acedasmonian interest.
tri-
Apprehensive
already received
his friends
of the government.
a treaty of alHancc be-
new event
Grecian
politics followed
tyj'een
Tissaphernes, in the
name of
Lacedaemonian republic.
The terms of
this treaty
were
perfectl}'
all
accommodated
but not at
article a
By
all
the
first
for it
was
Tlmcyfl.
C.
1.
the cities
s.
IS,
monians and
their allies,
common
'
'
common
that if
that
'
other
any sub-
be held as enemies by
'
the"
414
'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
the Laccdcemonians
;
Chap. XIX.
of the Laceda?mo-
if
any
allies
'
by the king.'
SECTION
to the
III.
Progress of Revolt against Athens : Exertions of Athens. Siege of Battle of Miletus. Service of the Peloponnesian Armament Chios.
satrap of Caria.
title
of Har most,
of the
Dissatisfaction
Armain
Change
the
to Ionia,
to
Revolt of Rhodes
Ol. 91. 4.
The
l^^orce
by treaty ingagcd to
B.'c 412
P. VV. 20.
8.
to the fleet on the Asiatic station, took four Chian triremes, from
their allies
meanwhile obtained the more important advantage of ingaging in revolt the towns of Lebedus and Eras on the continent, and afterward the
c.
2S.
city of
Methymne
in Lesbos,
remaining to
Athens.
Sect.
xnider
III.
EXERTIONS OF ATHENS.
as
415
Laccdajmoniau
maritime
in
Diomedon
therefore,
Athenian alliance.
^,
c.
Thucyd.
21.
1.
8.
Meanwhile the body of the higher people of Samos, more depressed than all others since their redaction on their former revolt, were proposing to seize the opportunity that seemed to
offer,
through the
The lower
people,
with the assistance of the crews of three Athenian triremes then atSamos,
overpowered them, put to death two hundred, and driving about four
flight,
shared
among themdomi-
Nothing could
nion of that valuable ilaud equally with this measure, at which humanity
shudders.
But indignation
conduct
of Athens.
a decree of
administration of the
rebellion,
the
last
/government.
While success was thus beginning to shine again upon the Athenians, on the eastern side of the iEgean, they met with an unexpected reverse
The Peloponnesian ships in the Corinthian Peirceus, to the number of twenty, making a sudden attack upon an Athenian squadnearer home.
c.
co.
ron of equal force watching them, gained the victory and took four Astyochus was then sent from Lacediemon to conduct the ships.
victorious squadron to Asia, there to assume the
command
in chief
of the
fleet.
The
of ten
to be efficacious.
ships,
c.
24.
arrived in time to interfere, yet by their able management, with the co-
important
410
imporlant iland.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
They proceeded
renewed
its
Chap. XIX,
on the continent,
Such, in short
to ClazomeiiiE
and that
city also
had been the energy of the Athenian administration, and such the
siipineness of the Peloponnesians, that the
seas could
Athenian
fleet in
the Asiatic
now
The squad-
under
Chalcideus,
the
Lacedcemonian commander-in-chief,
;
but
force
Miletus,
Naval
iland
superiority
it
was determined to
contrary not only
find,
to their
own
all
managed
steddy prudence,
uncommon among
and power
for
the Grecian
cities.
Mo-
derate in prosperity,
and using
from the time of the Persian war, had never seen an enemy
bounds.
within
sides.
its
to attack
it
on
all
territory,
and the
little
as naval stations
whence
Chian
coasts.
Debarking troops
then
opposed them; and with such slaughter that the Chians attempted
action in the Held no more
for ravage, they
:
Under such
was likely that the democratical party would be looking for means of accommodation with the Athenians. The leading men,
circumstances
it
aware of
this,
who
in
It
S^ECT.
It
IIL
BATTLE OF MILETUS.
417
H. C. 4i2.
^'- y-P. W. 20.
was now toward the end of summer ^hen a fresh and powerful reinforcement arrived at Samos from Attica; fifteen hundred Athenian heavy-armed, a thousand Argian, and a tliousand of the various other
allies
Both
fides
battle, the
ad-
vanced before
against an
their
no good
order, as
enemy
attacking
fled.
the former
first,
defeated them,
this
and
oft'
tlie
others
immediately
Alcibiades,
upon
field
drew
the
>nion
Thr event altogether remarkably disappointed connnon opiamong the Greeks, as well as the superior estimation in Mhich
;
on each
fide the
The Athenians
take measures for an assault upon Miletus; but, in the evening of the
battle
from Peloponnesus, of
Onomacles
and
and
their
perhaps too fearful of the temper of the people, their sovereiu, to nse
judgement with due calmness, proposed to await tlie enemy's attack. But Phrynichus declared that he would neither be allured by a whatever Ifis false opinion of glory, nor yield to unmanly shame
:
in his opinion
it
most honorable;
ill
and
of the commonwealth,
naval force.
would
become them
to risk unnecessarily
The
Argians, fretted,
the late battle,
Thucydides
sailed
says,
own
-
fliare in
home.
3
V'oL. II.
Peloponnesus
418
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Peloponnesus had not alone sent out the fomidable
relieved
Chap. XIX.
fleet
which thus
Miletus.
At
his
com-
mand, which had however yet been joined by only two more, furnished The Lacedemonian Theramenes commanded the fleet in by Selinus
chief.
On
its
it
being gone,
Ihucyd.
1.
and
by
s.
ii^Q
commanders resolved
first
new
ally
the satrap,
directing their
The
fleet,
in its
fleet:
the
first
prisoner,
who
him
or at least
his head,
Some Greek
being mostly
troops which
in his service,
and
the
ca])ture
all
together
was
among
the richest
made
in the war.
made over
Grecian
claiming
armament returned
republics,
military
or political,
be hardly possible,
by
tlie
But the
readily,
of the
imperial
The
officers
all
Lacedtemonian
government
title
of harmost, regulator,
'
to reside in
tlie
The
price menlionrd by
stater, the
historian
is
very un
a Doiic
known.
beyond
Sect.
III.
L ACED^. M
The
tlie
ONIAN HARMOSTS.
autliority of these officers
419
would depend
much upon
and the weakness of the subordinate, whether the weakness of scanty numbers and property, or weakness superinduced Iiy internal divisions. The harstate at tlie time,
name
for a
governor.
Miletus.
Philippus,
Lacedtemonian,
Ptedaritus, sent
from Sparta
to hold the
same
office at Chios,
could not so readily and safely read) his destination. Landing, however,
at Miletus, he
a montli
...
pay to
it,
visited
the Peloponnesian
fleet,
Thucyd.
r.
3.
distributed '^p-
^ After 2d OcU
at tb.e rate
for
ot
an
pence
sterling,
daily,
in
each
man.
He
posing to give
he had consulted
he could obtain
if
authority for
it,
Theramenes,
having only a temporary command, for the purposeof conducting the fleet to Astyochus, under mIiosc orders it was to remain, was little
disposed to exerthimself about
its
it
so far
new
allies
good-humour,
that he at
length made an addition to the half drachma, but would not allow
the whole.
l.s.
'^'^^'
in
the
Asiatic seas.
was
in
former purpose the greatest part of the landforce was assigned, with a
for the
other,
the
rest
of the
fleet,
to Strombichides,
with
420
HISTORY OF GREECE.
an expedition against Miletus.
Chap. XIX.
with seventy-four, commanded the seas about Samos, and prepared for
Thucyd.
1,
s.
j\Iean\vhile
revolt,
Peloponnesus,
enemy's
fleet,
Having however
in
But
in all the
32.
were endless.
Cuma, the
aris-
tocratical party in Lesbos sent proposals for bringing that iland again
enemy,
M'ere
within their
own
iland.
Piedaritus,
let
33.
service.
him that
he de-
this threat
assume
his naval
command
at Miletus.
35,
to gain
among
the Sicilian
The
Lacedfenionlans,
adding one of
to
their
command
Cnidus having
tliither,
M'as sent
with orders to watch the town with six of his ships, while the
other six took their station atTrlopium, a promontory of the iland, for the
In-
Sect.IIL
fleet,
dissatisfaction
V/ITII
the PERSIANS.
six ships at Triopium^
421
was detached, which took the vhose crews however escaped ashore.
a squadron
The
loss
its
only by
of six ships ta the Peloponnesian confederacy, supported own means, might have been of some consequence, but
alliance,
it
was
little
re^^-arded.
l.g
Astyochus, on his arrival at IMiletus, found the Milesians zealous in tlie Thucyd. cause, and the armament in high spirits, notwithstandiiv the reduc- '''^'^' tion of pay, which had occasioned so many murmurs. The pa}' still
given by Tissaphernes was more than the Peloponnesian governments ever had given, or were able to give, and the booty acquired at lasus
was a great
not
gratification.
officers
could
little
rest satisfied
home,
as
that
made by Chalcideus
and, at
to be reconsidered.
Theramenes had now the conduct of the business on the part of Lacedtemon, and a new treaty was concluded in which
;
the sovereinty of the Persian king over the Grecian cities in Asia v/as
rather less explicitly acknowleged, but yet
was acknowleged.
The
made by
sky
allies,
of the united
bring.
evils,
Before the winter ended, the Athenians occupied the port and
far
3S.
from the
city.
The democratical
fleets
party
among
again
showed
its
cause so openly, that Pasdaritus and the oligarchal party were in great
alarm.
They
him
to
Lacedcemon
among
alli-
ance, the preference had been given to Tissaphernes and the lonians,
it
to slight the
overtures
422
Tliucyd.
^'
1.
HISTORY or GREECE.
8.
Chap. XIX.
overtures of Pharnabaziis.
IVenty-scven
sliips
-'
,
pared
Tut,
which
tlie
influence of Alci-
considerable change
of counsels insued.
The men
were
in
command, and
on the Asiatic
coast,
The
command
of Antisthencs,
to the Hellespont or
it,
men and
on the Asiatic
station.
They were
particularly authorized to
command
in
any
commander, or not
to send
making
j\Jelos, in their
way
Athenian triremes.
They took
This
infor-
three, but the crews escaped, and the other seven got clear away. adventure gave them more alarm than satisfaction. They feared
at Samos,
Instead therefore of
making
farther
away southward
sent to ]\Iiletus
for Crete,
and
so
on
to
Caunus
in Caria,
whence they
inteUigence of
their arrival.
^ ^j
Meanwhile
Astyochus,
notwithstanding
relief,
his
anger
it
against the
should
!)e
before
too
40.
They were
already
severely pressed
mercy; and
their nu-
merous
his first
ment
whole
fleet
The
Athenian
Sect.TII.
ratification
of treaty av I th PERSIA
REFUSED.
423
Athenian admiral meanwhile had actually sent a squadron under Charminus, but of twenty ships only, to Avatch the squadron coming from
Peloponnesus.
Missing
this,
Charminus
fell
in
fleet
and took three ships; but, when collecting, he found it necessary to fly for
in a fog,
Thuc^d.
^'
1.
8.
^''
Halicarnassus, and reached that place, not without losing six ships.
Intelligence of this being carried to the Athenian admirals, they went
c.
43.
who had
stir,
As soon
as the
Athenian
fleet
from Sparta began the more peculiar business of their mission, the conand Tissaphernes thought the occasideration of the Persian treaty
;
sion important
enough
The comtlicy
missioners, of
whom
of Agis
but,
con-
ducted themselves in
The
treaties
were certainly
verj'
exceptionable.
The
all
words of
the
tlie first,
commanded
allies
those of the
from carrvino-
the Asiatic
and Thracian
Thessaly,
cities,
and
all
Locris,
Attica: so that the Lacedemonians, instead of supporting their pretensions to be vindicators of Grecian liberty, thus admitted the subjection of near half the nation to the Persian dominion.
The
Lacedae-
to
put Persia
in possession
of
wily politicians, they might perhaps, after profiting from Pt isian assist-
ance to serve their own purposes against Athens, have easily prevented
Persia from
to militate
making any advantage of those articles, which seemed so But Lichas and his colwith the comm.on cause of Greece.
leg ucs
424
leo-ues
its
HISTORY OF GREECE.
would
not, for
Chap. XIX.
any tciDporaiy
interest
treaties,
honor.
satrap,
unless he
new
treaty
Tissaphernes, dis-
gusted with their authoritative tone and unbending manner, went away
How
far the
the troops, to
whom
be doubted
Thurvd
c. 4i.
1
P'csent dissatisfaction.
nianders from
fleet,
The
thither;
Cameirus, one
men
summoned
to an assembly,
and
all
the
to the
Peloponnesian interest.
fleet
being conveyed
VC
411
l^liotles,
Jiiiiuurj.
up their
fleet in
CT.IV.
PARTY
AT
SPARTA adverse
to ALCIBIADES.
425
SECTION
Alcibiades, persecuted
bij
;
IV.
the
communicates
Plot for changing the constitution of Athens : Synomosies, or Political Clubs at Athens : Breach between Alcibiades
and the managers of the plot. Neiv Treaty between Lacedxmon and Persia. Contitmation of the siege of Chios, and transactions
of the fleets.
While
an important acquisition was thus made to the Peloponnesiati confederacy, intrigue had been prosecuting, M'ith no inconsiderable
opposition to
it.
effect, in
Lacedjemon;
as before,
on
Thucyd.
'^''^^'
1.
8.
the coast of Asia, but his designs became more and more suspected in
What
knew not
in
the
list,
private instructions
This measure
whose bed
it
is
reported to
age.
it
to the reif
of Alcibiades,
he
made
it,
The cotemporary
;
historian
his expression
;
and,
may have
3 I
Vol.
II.
bear
46
bear
HISTORY OF GREECE.
much more
Chap.XIX.*
Alci-
the Lacedaemonians, from acquaintance ^uth their principles and consciousness of deserving their enmity, withdrew from their
armament
and took
his residence
with Tissaphernes.
He
Uneasy, notwithstanding
the favor he found and the attention paid him, in the dependent character of a stranger
and a
fugitive,
it
was
With
this
assi-
interest,
same
the Peloponnesian
first
confederacy.
An
for insinuations,
might
Tissa-
phernes, pressed for money, both by his court and by the expences of
government, and
at the
self,
his treasury.
'
The
Athenians,' he said,
long versed
in
naval
affairs,
and highly
attentiv^e to
them, gave no
more than half a drachma for daily pay to their seamen; not,' as he
'
pretended,
'
'
sum of money,
buted
was a
among the commanders, would quiet all outcry or, if there man among them not to be bought, it was only the Syracusan
Representations and remonstrances would probably
easily be refuted
: :
'
Hermocratcs.
be made
'
'
'
The
;
he
Sect.IV.
'
policy of ALCIBIADES.
tell
427
The
richest
'
'
dency
at the
'
Nor were
'
to
Delivered
service,
tribute, they
'
'
given them.'
viate
independency and immunity which had been freely Having thus persuaded the satrap that he could obclamor, Alcibiades undertook to conciliate favor to him, and
:
'
He would
assert,'
he
said,
hitherto given was from the private income of the satrapy; that
'
t!ie
royal
'
it
be granted, v/hatever
it
might
be,
the whole
'
reserve.'
Tissaphernes
ch. 19.
o*'
approved the proposal, and that reduction of pay, M'hich has been already noticed, with the insuing discontent, and at length, through
the dexterity of Alcibiades, the compromise, followed.
s.
3.
this Hist,
the satrap's
ear,
proceeded to
He
urged, that both the public interest of the Persian em- Thucyd.
interest of the satrap, required, not speedy nor
^'
pire,
*"*
'
'
'
ought not to be allowed to join the Peloponnesian fleet that, for the same reason, to incourage reinforcement from Greece, by holding out the lure of Persian pay, was impolitic: that the king's interest clearly required a partition
'
'
of power
among
the Greeks
the
same
state should
'
by
'
'
wonted superiority on one element, and the Laced a;monians on the other. Thus it would always be in the king's power to hold the balance between them, or to employ one against the other, as he
pleased.
'
These being the principles that should regulate the politics of Persia toAvard Greece, it followed that the Athenians were the
3 I 2
*
niore
428
*
HISTORY OF GREECE.
more commodious
of coping
allies for
Ciiap.XIX.
the king
'
'
'
'
At any
rate,
'
of Asia.
'
'
was the professed purpose, and the known policy, of the Lacedasmonians, to emancipate all Grecian states from subjection
tliey
'
rest
long, while
any
'
'
'
The conduct of
suggestions; for
that, M'hen
it
was, not indeed immediately stopped, but irregularly issued; and the Peloponnesian
armament when
fleet,
arrive,
ought
in
prudence to be waited
for.'
to have deferred to
him upon
all
occasions
and thus,
as the historian
fleet
8.
satrap,
47.
to splendor.
The Athenians,
and
it
in
their distress,
had
been making great and even wonderful exertions; but those very ex-'
was evident to
all
the more
informed
Sect. IV.
PROJECT OF ALCIBIADES.
that,
429
still
maintain themselves,
and perhaps even prosper, against the meer force of the Pcloponnesian
confederacy, wliich tliey
its
knew could not with its own means support exertions at sea, yet late against that confederacy, snpplied by the
it
wealth of Persia,
M'ould
be
impossible
for
them long
to
hold.
people,
knew
that nothino-
so
much importance
But tho he had risen by the populace, yet as he condemned been to death by the populace, he was unwillinohad again to trust himself under its unlimited authority; and he thought
with Tissaphernes.
things so
much
change of
as the condition
upon
own
and
at the
to
it
the advantage, in
The
but
it
was
in
cha-
Most
of the better sort of people, worn with the capricious tyranny of the
multitude, and dreading such other dictators as Cleon and Hyperbolus,
desired the change.
desire
it,
There
v/ere
few
who
did not
Thucyd.
Lys.''or.
1.
to
communicate.
Ari.stocrates,
8.
con.
names which
\vent from
Avill
among
those
who
i^'aLosth.
Samos
to confer with
him
lead the king himself to an alliance with Athens, were very gladly
who
suffered
the war,
tunes,
who
in
consequence ofthe
called-
upon
to supply the
The
them the
of the
waj-,
who only
ease.
Immediately therefore
on their return to
Samos,
430
HISTORY OF GREECE.
to the cause
for
all
Chap. XIX.
form of an oath
numerous and
zealous, they
settled the
common
bound
among
and the government changed to an oligarchy. Some alarm and indignation at first arose but the hope of profiting from Persian pay softened the murmur, and the multitude acquiesced under
Alcibiades M'ere restored,
;
the
ideii
known
was supposed
also zealous in the democratical interest, and the innovators had there-
fore avoided
But
be
intirely
which had been used to promote the projected change. Alcibiades,' he said, (and Thucydides affirms that he said truly,) cared no more
'
'
'
'
own
and to power.
prefer the
'
would
Athenian alhance to
'
the Peloponnesian
command
over so
many
cities
'
naval strengtli
now balanced
It
that
of
Athens,
formed no such
'
invidious pretension.
oligarchal
'
government would
which
still
which had
'
revolted, or those
remained
in obedience.
The purpose of
'
less
unfounded, that person and property would be more secure under the
rule of those called the better people
;
exercise
Sect.IV.
*
opposition of PHRYNICHUS.
commonly sought their own in preference to the Nowhere indeed were men in public service so liable
punishment without
trial,
4S1
exercise of power,
'
puhlic benefit.
'
as
'
where the power of the people, the refuge of the innocent, and the moderator of the excesses of the great, was done away. That such
well-founded o])inion, prevailing in most of the
satisfied
'
'
now
'
But
party,
affair,
The
associated
Thiicyd.
c.i'j.
1.
8,
in
Peisander
was appointed
first
Tho
taken
all
c.
50.
man who,
has
However he might be
his
he apprehended
vail at
Athens
more
unjustifiable.
Thucydides,
We can hardly
in the
He
armament under his command. Astyochus, who seems to have been a weak man, went to Magnesia, and communicated both to the Alcibiades satrap and to Alcibiades the intelligence he had received.
immediately sent information, to the principal Athenians
in
Samos, of
ought to be
ing,
'
inflicted for
Phrynichus, in high
that due secresy had not been observed about what he had before
:
communicated
by
'the
432
'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
the bands of his detested domestic foes
:
Chap. XIX.
*
'
command
to destruction.'
Nor was
this
fortifications;
and t6
it,
Astyochus communicated
s.
From
Having taken
his measures so as to
know
still
upon the point of arriving from Alcibiades, he called together the army, and told them he had learnt, by private intelligence, the intention of the enemy to The consideration that Samos M-as unfortified, and the attack them.
betraying him, and that fresh communication Mas
observation that part of the
said,
fleet
had before been intended to fortify Samos; preparations had been made in consequence and the business, so as to serve the present need, was
;
quickly accomplished.
letters arrived
from
armament was betrayed by its general, and that the enemy were preparing to attack it. The intelligence now only appeared to confirm that communicated by Phrynichus, and to justify his measures; so that the accusation accompanying it was
Alcibiades, indicating that the
Avholly ineffectual, being considered meerly as the
scheme of a man,
enough kno\vn
It
men of supe-
to tyrannize.
But apprehension of the prevalence of the Peloponnesian arms, sapported by the riches of Persia, and of the dreadful vengeance
commonly
to be expected in
made
Peisander
Sect.IV.
measures AT ATHENS.
^'
433
l."*.
Pei Sander therefore, incouraged by the visible effect of popular fear, Tlmcyd.
^^'
that they
king,
'
only delivered from their apprehensions, but assured of regainino- a decisive superiority over their enemies, upon two conditions; the
restoration of Alcibiades,
'
and a change
in the
form of government.'
Indignant clamor from some, sullen murmurs from others, were excited
by
this proposal.
Eumolpids and
who urged religion and divine wrath as obstacles to his return. Those who feared no personal ill from the restoration of Alcibiades
were
less violent.
all
and
when
' *
now
number and strength of their allies, were supported and he then put in the expences of the war by the wealth of Persia What were the means of the commonwealth to resist the question,
*
;' ' *
To
this question
no answer, or none
in
'
to the assembly,
*
not what form of government you would prefer, but under what
exist.
And
it
'
may
confide in
it,
so as to be induced to
become your
'
To soften the zealous partizans of democracy, he then added, Some among you, I know, think this a great evil. But can you
between certain
ruin,
hesitate to chuse
and what
will at
worst be a
'
passing evil?
since,
'
the
Thus exciting
at the
same time
fear
c.
54.
among
them, almost
to
Vol.
II,
434
to
HISTORY OF GREECE.
an abhorrence, of oligarchy, Peisander prevailed.
Chap. XIX.
By
a decree of
the
first,
to treat
full
power
common-
wealth.
Orders were then issued for the recall of Phrynichus and his
command
the armament.
societies called Synomosies,
to
and
life itself
were incomparably
The sanction of
whence
The
tical
two
power; and
most men of
Against
we
shall
more particularly
protection,
hereafter,
citizens
might give
single
when
on
his merits^
Syytiftoeriaj
B-oAii
imt^ irvyxatt)
tn
aerai
Im
Societates
which
&
&
qua;
judiciis
&
magistraiibus
prreerant.
Vers,
Dnktr.Juntos
formedin
offices
I-
and
the great
-.k
(f state.
Smith's TrausL
If the
word
my
notice,
anyway bearing
in
accomplices, for
authority in
the
various
authors
suit,
whom
in
and
whose authority
have con~
which
The
tidence.
ether, licwever,
far
from
salisf^iclory, and.
influence
Sect. IV.
434
Peisander addressed
himself severally to
in
all
and
8.
They proceeded
which was managed for him by Alcibiades. The conduct of that wily politician, upon this occasion, is not completely accounted for
by the cotemporary
oligarchy
historian,
it
may
be gathered.
Athens an unbalanced
to that
all
constitutions,
supremacy
purpose to
many
it
and M'hich
was certainly
by
so
managed by Peisander.
and
so Peisander
Hence apparently it became his purpose now to render the conference abortive, by making demands for the satrap, to which Finding them however tlie Athenian commissioners could not consent.
oligarchy.
all
Ionia,
with the
he raised new
diffi-
culties;
added the
times and in
any
456
HISTORY OF GREECE.
some anger, and returned
Samo".
Chap. XIX.-
any number. Such a demand convincing tlie commissioners tliat Alcibiades meant nothing friendly to them or their party, they broke
up the conference
Thncyd.
. 0,
,
in
to
1.8.
went to Caunus,
ation.
in Caria, a situation
commodious
for
communicating
whom
he renewed negoti-
He was now
their
fleet,
in
pay to
he foresaw
must
fight;
and thus the Athenians, without obligation to him and without risk to themselves, would become decisively superior; or, what he dreaded
more than either of these, to supply their pressing necessities they would plunder the territories under his command, and thus weakea
the sources of his
revenue.
aixd
issue of
i
'
the plain
'
allies
on one
'
on the other
concerning the
allies.
affairs
tlie
and the
will*
king
'
and
pleasure.
Tlie Lacedaemonians
and
'
'
allies
in
common
'
nians or their
fleet in
'
After that
it
shall
'
be
Sect. IV.
'
TRANSACTIONS OF THE
option of the Laccdtemonians and their
or to receive the pay
still
FLEETS.
437
be at
tlie
'
own
fleet,
shall
be concluded.
The
fleets,
'
on operations under the joint direction of Tissaphernes, and of the Lacedasmonians and their allies.
shall carry
'
when combhied,
No
parties.'
Thus
Satrap,
the alliance of Lacedsemon M'ith Persia^ or at least with the m as apparently confirmed.
During these negotiations, Leon and Diomedon, having taken the B G 4ir command of the Athenian armament from Phrynichus and Scironidas, Kndofjan.
had moved to Rhodes with hiteutlon to
arrival they
offer battle
;
but on their
After
c.
55."^
'
fleet laid
gratifying
crews therefore,
profit to
While
In an unsuccessful
sally, Pfedaritus,
was completed, and famine began to press the inhabitants and garrison.
In this situation of things opportunity was found to send an
officer to
Rhodes,
who urged
less
to the Pcloponnesian
its
and nothing
than strong
effort
left as
could save
it.
While
his approach,
by an attack upon the Athenian works. Thirty-two Athenian ships had been left as a guard upon Chios. With these an obstinate action insued, in which the Chians were so far successful as to conduct
the
4.13
tlie
HISTORY or GREECE.
twelve Peloponnesian ships into
tlieir
Chap. XIX.
ami
harbour,
Leon was
received as the person charged with the care of the interests, and with
tlie
the
room of
Predaritus.
it
inabled the
after
opportunity.
of Caria
did
not prevent
Hellespont.
Early in spring,
the
twenty-tirst
of the war,
He went by
Mar. 28.
^
yet,
on
Spartan
name
sufficed to
;
End of April.
8
the Athenians
Strombichides,
Thucvd
<:
who commanded
The
63.
The cautious Astyochus, receiving intelligence that a strong squadron of the enemy was thus called far from the Ionian coast, thought the
opportunity favorable for seeking an action with their principal
fleet.
to Chios,
there,
went to
stir
and indeed
commander than
Sect. V.
43
SECTION
V.
progress of the plot for a revolution at Athens : Violences of the oligarchal party : Proposed new form of government : Establishment of
Peisander and
./,.
returning to Samos from their unsuc- B.C. 411. cessful negotiation with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, had the gra- February.
his collegues,
tincation to find, not only that their cause had been gaining in
^,
111in
Thucyd.
tlie
c.
1.8.
63.
among
government of
atten-
to pay
no more
tion
to Alcibiades,
in the
change
Athenian constitution, to
upon
their
own
strength
commonwealth,
by the
Having
established this
groundwork
M'as c.6*.
five
five
ofThiace.
his
the
the
They maintained
remaining
in
Diotrephes did for them the most dilKcult part of their business,
much
better
440
HISTORY OF GREECE.
belter than they could have
Chap. XIX.
Oligarchy being
difficulty
;
done
it
for themselves.
of preferring the
the
1.
8.
confederacy.
who fccompanied
'^^*
found
desired, as Diotrcphes at
Thasus
64.
towns (so
Thucydides
says,
By
menon,
explained
what otherwise might appear a phenohow a few citizens of Athens, with self-assumed
many Grecian
republics.
principally depended?
But
the means by which the oligarchal party at Athens had advanced far in
its
purpose,
do no honor
government or the
;
Athenian character.
and
it
seems to
have been
managed by youths of the best families. Androcles, a man of mean origin, whose influence among the lower people had contributed much to the condemnation of Alcibiades, and who had
chiefly
among
the
first
taken
oflf.
at Athens, the
friends of
democracy became
afraid to
show themselves.
gj
The
make
in the
in
to be
still
y as to be confined to a body of
thousand,
to be chosen
among
those
Sect. V.
441
those most (inaliiied by property and personal ability to serve the com-
monwealth
torian,
to
Tlnicyd.
'^'^^^''
1.
,s.
modern
practice;
In
since so large a
number
as five
at the
same time
he would concur in the measures proposed, he mio-ht be a member of the soverein body.
Meanwhile the general assemblies were regularly held according to antient form, and the council of Five-hundred retained its functions.
But assassination was continued; and
tical opposition
and such
was deterred.
None
The
spoke,
previous com-
chiefs.
among
much
To
this depression
much
party,
among its
reputed friends
for,
some
in
whom
he might confide.
;
Thus
in
this situation,
to
c.
67.
remained yet
An
The
it
oligarchal party
had such a
in
in the
but
moment
Vol.
carried
in
own
future fate.
Not
442
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Not
great consideration must be had for that large portion of
Chap. XIX.
commonIt
an appointed day
effect.
The day being come, the people were summoned to assemble on the hill of Colonus, a little more than a mile from the city. The ten then came
forM'ard Mith the simple proposal of a law,
illegality
in the
Athenian should be
inflicted heav}-
by
This being carried, and what before Avould have been treason thus
made
legal,
service.
That
five
presidents
'
power to
'
'
Thucyd.
c 68."
1.
8.
manner it was endevored, by the ablest politician, in the judgement of Thucydides, at that time in Greece, to remedy the evils
In
this
of the Athenian democracy; for Peisander, tho himself able, Avas but
an instrument
*
''Ap;^i
in the
refctf.
Thucyd.
seem to have
and
been
fully
in
Sect.V.
443
in virtue inferior to
and
in
abilities,
whether
all.
exciting jealousy
among
uncommon among
the antient democracies, and which probably contributed to inliance the aversion of Antiphon to that form of government: but in any
private cause, whether in the inferior i.ourts of judicature, or before
man was
by
his advice or
by his eloquence.
The second
botii
place ariiong
son of Agnon
elocution,
man
of thought and
But,
beside those originally of the oligarchal party, there v.ere some eminent
it
and, of these,
Phrynichus, the late commander on the Asiatic coast, was the chief.
Of a
fearless temper,
com-
monwealth and
after the
to power.
As soon
A
it
is
number of
hundred years
above
after the
fifty
tyrants, during
of
which they had been accustomed, not only to obey none, but to com-
directing the
new
constitution,
Thucyd.
1.
3.
the party
whom
were
the old constitution vested the excutive power, had not been
:
in possession
in
Mhich a
and
it
was apprehended
it.
When
3 L 2
therefore the
new council
Avas
444
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Chap. XIX.
was to be introduced, measures were taken, with much forethought, Since the to obviate opposition, which might produce tumult.
establishment of a hostile garrison in Deceleia, constant readiness for
military duty had been required of the whole people.
Daily
all
appeared
among them
All
who conld be
spared were then tlismissed, with directions only to repair to the general
On
the
was provided that the citizens of the dcmocratical interest should be dismissed, and those only retained in arms for the duty of Among these were the day, in whom the party could best confide.
a
auxiliaries,
with some
neium, armed each with a concealed dagger, and attended by a hundred and twenty youths,
business equally
arrear of salary
called,
who had been accustomed to perform for of guards and assassins '. They carried with
due to the counsellors of the bean,
and making a tender of
it,
as the
all
Five-hundred were
withdraw.
requisition,
required
to
The
old council,
stir
obeyed the
and no
was made
to
The
which
elect prytanes
by
lot; and,
commenced
Thus
was
apparently
completed
this
extraordinary revolution.
Athens, and whatever of Attica was not held by the enemy, yielded
become the supreme power of the commonwealth, through a law made, with all due form, by the assembly of the people, which before held that power. In the general conduct
obedience to the
new
council,
'
This seems to
"or;
l)e
torian's phrase,
7iv.
l;^pS>To iTi
from the ordinary armed attendants of the Athenian magistracy, who were always barbarians, generally Scythians,
Thucydidcs
of
Sect. V.
445
Nowhere
else,
all
in
we
:
rliscover
yet,
such
a regard for
even in
I
we
find
must
None of
Grecian
^
all,
might have
but many,
fliglit
;
in the
for the
those
whom
the
formidable.
Of
many
actually
some the
leaders
of the revolution would gladly have restored; and probably they would
among
first
mover of the
was
Some, as Piiryall
would be
so longinterest.
who had
they
oligarchal
assistance,
were no
longer willing to admit that superiority, which must have been yielded
him J and therefore, to obviate opportunity for any measures in his favor, making a merit of supporting the decrees and judgements of the people, they resolved that none should be restored who had been
to
In other points they did not preserve the same respect for the decrees of the people, or the forms of the antient constitution, or even for
their
own
new
one.
The appointment of a
as a lure,
Tlmcyd.
<"
I.
s.
9'^-
to
446
HISTORY OFGREECE.
body would have been perhaps even more
Few,
difficult
Chap. XIX.
;
for such a
to manage,
by the
who
proposed to hold
all
power
in their
own
hands,
than the
But they declared, and they found no small advantage in so doing, not only that the supreme power in last resort was to be vested in such a select, yet numerous body of
assembly open to every
citizen.
citizens,
made;
man
and
in fear
of his neighbor.
The
After27Fek
city,
turned
them
to
make
warm hope of
and arrogant
success.
no longer have a
but
a
fickle, faithless
of Sparta,
government more resembling that But Agis, and which might deserve his confidence.
command
any
negotiation,
ith
marched
new
leaders
7.
hostile
difl^"erence
Nothing happened of
what Agis expected. The whole of the Athenian cavalry went out of the city, in good order, accompaniedby some light-armed and bowmen, with
a body of heavy-armed following to support them.
The Peloponnesian
A detach-
Sect. VI.
447
lately arrived
now
J
made no
of
to Laceda3mon.
March.
SECTION
Opposition of the
fleet
VI.
to the
new government of
the
Athens: Thrasyhulus.
ment with
its
general.
from
Peloponnesian
Pharnabaziis satrap of the Hellespont. The restoration of Alcibiades decreed by the Athenian armament : Alcibiades elected general by the armament. Fresh discontent of the Peloponnesian
to
armament
beneficial conduct
of Alcibiades.
Thus
\^
q
W.
-
^jj
21.
were
arisinc:
PAT
.Vi
before he left
Samos,
had
e.xerted
himself Thucyd.
J, s.
among
many
of the
^-
^'^
practice,
bound themselves
to oneanother
by solemn oaths
to support their
common
secure
measures.
among
after
M'as in the
armament.
:
But,
his
departure,
tumults arose
;
among
the
Samians
the
and,
oligarchal party had the advantage; they depended upon support from
the Athenians,
among M'hom
now
the prevailing interest; and they were proceeding to take farther measures against the supporters of democracy.
But
448
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Athens, some of the
there were always
first
Chap. XI!?.
at for of these
commonwealth:
readily rise to
;
power through
manner hereditary
The
m ith
present generals,
the leaders of the oligarchal party, yet having themselves great interest
among
to
in
younger
who by
principal consideration.
These
were
zealous
in
tl;e
democratical
among
;
whom
and
thus, w hile
in
tlie
armament
at
Samos.
death
in
'.
and the
r^st,
Greek
sedition, on submitting to
demo-
8.
The
unknown
son of Archestratus, a
man
was dispatched
actions
;
in
the
herald-ship Paralus
report
these
trans-
dinary change that had taken place meeting him on his arival, he
'"
'I'he
to be translated
Sr.niK^mnifnt'A
To^
yii>i?Ai; oi;/*>ti(rixaxo:/>l{,
scarcely
re^curs) ^vnTrotiiTtvor.
instantly
Sect. VI.
FLEET.
449
instantly secreted himself; and the event justified the suspicion which
prison
station
his
;
crew were moved into an ordinary trireme on the Eubcean and the sacred ship Avas committed to persons more devoted
Choreas, waiting only to acquire information, in
haste to Samos, and reported there, with the usual, or even more than
who
held the
of those serving
armament.
all
few assassinations,
omission of
we may judge from the this occasion by the historian, what would make much impression
:
little
esteemed
'
in it
without re-
'
it
against
'
'
that
it Avas
proposed to confine,
'
armament
at
Samos,
'
which Chtereas principally insisted. Such information, from a man of rank, just arrived from Athens, when the armament was already in a ferment, raised an instant flame. In the first moment of alarm and passion, the zealots for democracy
were going to turn their swords against those of their comrades who
to favor oligarchy;
as
for
of the com-
VoL.
II.
monwealth,
450
HISTORY OF GREECE.
monwealth, vhicli
it
Chap. XIX.
The
first
measure
M'as to
all,
with particular
most solemn manner, to support democracy, to persevere in the war against the Peloponnesians, to maintain concord among themselves,
to hold the Four-hundred for enemies, and to admit
no
treaty with
them:
took
all
it
universally.
Hence-
councils, as
men ingaged
same cause
Avith the
8,
70.
armament would no longer consider the commonwealth as existing at Athens, but took upon themThe generals Leon and Diomedon, selves to be the commonwealth.
JMatters being thus far settled, the
sufficient!}' zealous
in the cause.
As the general
armament assumed authority to depose them, together with every commander of a trireme whom they thought adverse to democracy; and Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were, by the same authority, raised to the command-in-chief
assembly of Athenian
citizens, therefore, the
These measures,
ment and
in a
torian,
most perilous
commonwealth
possession of the city, were comparatively weak: that, the whole fleet
being
theirs,
that,
even
who
upon
them than they upon those who were masters of Athens for not only they could more command the sea, but they could even more command
2
the
Sect. VI.
DISCONTENT
in the
PELOPONNESIAN FLEET.
With regard
to a
-iSi
Peirs2iis.
home, Sanios,
fine iland
Such
then being their means, not only of subsistence and security, but even
of wealth and power,
treated as he had been
interest with theirs;
it
was
little
to be
ill-
by the oligarchal
his
and
becoming
their ally,
there M'as no kind or degree of success which they might not reason-
ably hope.
finally
be deceived, in any or in
still,
all
their
M'hile
such a
find,
fleet
was
theirs,
which
The
!.
8.
Immediately therefore B.C. 411. Soon alter the appointment of the council of Four-hundred, ten commissi-
oners had been dispatched for Samos, with instructions, in giving infor-
The com-
Thucyd.
'^'
1.8.
however,
command,
feared to proceed.
7S.
Fortunately for Athens at this time, there was neither able conduct c
at the head of the Peloponnesian armament,
nor union
among
the
;
members. and
'
Bpgin[)i,,
of
in this the
'
It
said,
meant no good
to their cause.
Not
'
l^eg.oiApnl.
'
issued.
Under pretence of
'
'
which he did not intend should ever join them, he had prevented action with the enemy when weak in
numbers.
'
He now
continued to prevent
it,
'
own commander-in-chief,
people, while he was invited Tbucyd.
8.
him
his
own
among
3
mined
452
HISTORY OF GREECE.
mined to lead the
fleet
Chap. XIX.
arrived off
But,
when he
Samos, things were aheady composed in the Athenian armament under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, M'ho were equal to their new command.
All
who
arrived
quickly
fleet,
eight triremes,
oftered battle,
moved toward
the Peloponnesians,
who
declined the
Such,
to render
Tliucyd.
'^'
'
after all
it
the naval
1.
8.
power of Athens
with their own strength, to support the contest in naval war, that a
immediately to
distress.
officers
commanding-
Pharnabazus pro-
He
'
that if they
would bring
liis,
and connect
'
he would furnish faithfully and regularly that pay and those supplies,
'
to give.'
At
the same time there arrived from the Byzantines a proposal to revolt, if support could be obtained from the Peloponnesian fleet. These overtures were deemed by the Peloponnesian commanders to require
immediate attention.
But
to
make
their
fleet,
way
must probably
Aniil
fight
the Athenian
Forty ships therefore were sent under Clewith direction to take a circuitous course
sea,
rest,
command,
Sect. VI.
453
command, and on
a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy. With this disposition among the dependencies of Athens to revolt^ Thrasybukis and ThrasyUus were aware that they had undertaken
what, with their
own
to a good conclusion.
intelli-
not said by the historian, but appears progeneral assembly of the commonwealth.
An
summoned,
of Alcibiades:
punishment or
trial.
it
was,
went himself
communicate mformation of
it
to Alcibiades, then to
Samos
the
After shortly
fair
'
take an active part in their favor, but sufficient assurance of steddiness in the government,
'
to
ingagements made.
Nor was
it
for he
had repeatedly
not
'
declared, that he
would
'
In that
case,
'
only his revenue should supply the wants of Athens, but the Phenician
fleet,
now
'
The assembly
I.
g.
made such
^^'
4J-1
HISTORY OF GREECE.
the chief direction
Chap. XIX.
of
affairs,
with the
approbation apparently of
Things being so
far settled,
Revenge against the Four-hundred was their favorite in contempt. they considered the means as in their hands, and they would object
;
sail
directly to Peira;us.
The
nearer enemy,'
he
'
said,
'
must not be so
would be
first
left,
luable possessions
of the commonwealth.
moreover,
it
'
without going
to
Their
M'hicli
'
'
'
was dismissed,
show Tissaphernes
power
among
and, as he could
now
that of
tlie
Athenians.
S.
83.
The
irregularity
of,
of pay, before
fleet
complained
man of most
influence
with the
satrap,
was
of the enemy.
officers,
Not
their
openly
thought
but
Weak and mean, they declared, they had always they now pronounced it treacherous and unless a
;
to procure
the crews, they said, would, and indeed must dtsert, to fiud
subsistence.
The
Skct. VI.
4:5
was now no ionger guided by the wisdom, the energy, and the influence of Hermocrates, who, in consequence of a change in the Syracusan administration, had been superseded in his comSicilian force
The
mand.
of the armament canvassed matters amono- Thucyd. ^^' themselves, the Syracusan and Thurian seamen, with the licentiousness
rest
'^'
1.
s.
a democratical
body
demanded the
holding authority, reproved them with Spartan haughtiness; and not only threatened Dorieus the Thurian commander" (who, improperly
enough, accompanied his people, and even spoke for them) but lifted his stick as if to strike him. It is from Thucydides that we have this
testimony to the rough manners of a Spartan general; to which the democratical Thurians made the rough return that might be expected.
With
commanding
and he
dispersed.
wound which
the Lacedaemonian
commandsuf-
in Miletus
tlie
garrison there.
revolting
from Athens,
vengeance,
it
" The
iuterprets
sclioliast, hastily
to
mean Hermocrates.
In
incouragcd
It
conduct of the
Sicilians.
were
so.
Spartan
In
may be
of by Thucydides,
a preceding passage
the
(c.
35.
1.
8.)
Thucydides
phon, (Hellen.
1,
1.
commander
the Peloponnesian
Within a few
fol-
taken as the
or
45^5
HISTORY OF GREECE.
or complaint.
Bui,
Chap.XIX.
established
mem-
armed
force,
withdraw.
this
The Lacedsemonian
commissioner,
condemned
violence.
more complaisant
*
when they
its
Miletus,' he said,
'
became
and the
'
required that
it
should be
so.'
in
rest,
vehemently
tion
and
their approba-
persisted
garrison,
and
all
asserting
their
independency,
and
they manifested,
upon
occasions,
without
comfrom
8.
Things were
when
INIindarus arrived
Lacedirmon
change
to supersede
Astyochus
in the
command-in-chief.
Meanwould not
He would
Lacedcemonians, than
superiorit}'.
On
the
had rendered that general obnoxious to many of those under his command, had been gratifying to the satrap. When therefore Astyochus
returned home, Tissaphernes sent with
him
Gauleites, a Carian,
who
spoke both the Greek and Persian languages, in quality of his minister
to Sparta.
upon
their affronting
and
injurious
conduct in expelling
the
Sect.VL
4-^7
B C
4-11
and Ilermocrates, reduced to the situation of an individual without office, accompanied them to Sparta.
to vindicate themselves;
commonwealth
in Attica
1.
8,
manned with
^'
In
passing the Argolic coast, the crew mutinied, carried the vessel into
No
in the
schism
of the
Athenian commonwealth
It
great alarm.
throughout Greece.
was
it
Avas the
them
ministers,
com-
and support
c. S(>.
from Delos,
and arrived at Samos about the same time with the ministers from
Argos.
Alcibiades was already returned
;
citizens in the
'
it
was exclaimed,
punishment.'
The
Their
generals
ditficulty succeeded.
first
solicitude
Vol.
II.
replete
458
replete with
HISTORY OP GREECE.
falsehood, which
Chap. XIX.
hundred by Chxreas.
'
They
that
least
their friends
Thus
far
they
were heard with patience; but when they proceeded to vindicate the
change made
'
in the constitution,
calling
it
'
still
a democracy,
modi-
fied
sary,'
restored,
others would
speak;
and
at length
resolution,
first
man
moment,
and every remaining dependency of the commonwealth in Ionia and on the Hellespont would have passed almost instantaneously into the
hands of the enemy.
No man
but
it.
He
reproved
shown
his reproof:
dency of what was proposed, and they were alarmed with their own measure he procured acknowlegement that what had been advised by
:
others was wrong; and, taking upon himself to dictate the answer
which
did
He
not object,' he
five
said,
'
'
of Five-hundred.
If the
super-
'
might be more
treaty with the
*
'
certainly and plentifully subsisted, they should have his applause for
it.
'
He
make any
enemy.
Sf.ct.VI.
*
4..y
enemy.
accommodation:
cut
now
'
now
prevailing in Athens, to be
left for
commonwealth
an enemy to
having thus answered the commissioners, then addressed the Argian ministers; thanking them in the name of tlie
*
assembly for the zeal their commonwealth had manifested, and desiring
they \vould only hold themselves in readiness to give that assistance,
in the
moment
it
r\\
4,,
21.
8.
became necessary
Avith
taken xhuUfl
^
^''-
command
of Philippus,
the harmost of
No
less
88.
character and his designs, either to fear that he would afford any very
effectual support to the
wearing
also that
out both
it
parties, M'hile
Alcibiades
knew
was
much an
object,
its
his
end
He
gained the
credit,
fleet Avith
and he disturbed the councils and measures of the Peloponnesians, by giving new force to the jealousy and mistrust they had for some time
entertained of Tissaphcrnes.
*J
y 2
460
HISTORYOFGREECE.
Chap. XIX.
SECTION
Schism in the
weti"
VII.
government of Athens:
revolution.
Theramenes
second
decided
man
&q'
'
'
'
many men of great abilities, but of various tempers, vicMS and interests, who directed the aftliirs of the oligarchal party at Athens. Aristocrates
son of Sicelius, Theramenes one of the generals of the establibhnient,
in
high
offices,
dissatisfied
affairs
On
the con-
left
no means of
retreating,
vehement of all the enemies of the democracy, together with many other men of considerable weight, remained firm in their purpose of maintaining the oligarchy.
Alcibiades,
own
party,
gave
much
rather
Their proposed
resource was to
make peace witli Lacedo?mon and upon any terms, than not make peace. With an oligarchal government they
not peace only, but alliance and
with Lacedffimonias their only ground of hope, even for personal safety.
Their former embassy having been stopped, by the mutiny of the crew
of the vessel in which
the negotiation.
it
sailed,
home, were in
With
this
Sect.VII.
this
contention AT ATHENS.
It
461
view
a fort,
was judged of much importance to forward the completion of some time since begun, on a spot called Eetioneia, commanding the
it
was already so
far
advanced that
they established the public magazine of corn there; and they not only caused all corn imported to be there deposited, but compelled all individuals in the city,
who
it
thither.
1.
g.
^^'
That answer offered them a clear overture for an accommodation. Even in Athens the body of the people was still inclined to democracy and, to restore superiority to
;
whom
the
body
To
became the object of Theramenes and Aristocrates. This would give them importance with the chiefs of the armament at Samos, and ground on which to open a treaty.
Other circumstances followed,
still
Presently after,
that,
was intended
to
was intended
much
The
could
Nor was
first
unfounded.
to have the
command
if this
not
be,
Attica, deprived of the subject-states, yet preserving the fleet and the.
to the restoration of
have
J^^^^^.^^
c. os,"
j^
be secure,
The construction of
the
46
HISTORY OF GREECE.
it
Chap. XIX,
the foil was therefore prosecuted with the utmost dihgence; and, as
arose,
vhich Thucydides, no
first
friend in general to
in opposition,
signal
blow was by
all justice,
and too
subversive of
it
all order,
to produce
in
whatever cause
may
be practised.
and not
far
from
an Argian, was taken, and being put to the torture by the Four-
of the
commander of
the city-guard.
No
:
information
inquiry con-
con.
cerning the murder dropped, the deed being evidently popular; and
not,
1
i.
Those of their
<7
]{dske
council,
and Theramenes
Things were
in this situation
intelligence arrived,
now
at
anchor
in the
harbour of
threatening Athens
itself.
From
he took occasion
Antiphon.
' '
If preventive measures,'
h6
said,
" The
thus
little
firms,
what
is
some
facts of
consequence
as that
it
was committed
a fountain near
was
city, at
Eetioncia,
Sect. VII.
'
CONTENTION AT ATHENS.
Lacedemonian would command
in Peiisus.'
4G3
It
Ectoineia, and a
armed were already gained, the taxis commanded by Aristocrates, a body nearly correspondent to our battalion, was on duty at the works of Eetioneia, and Hermon, an officer warm in their
interest,
stances,
Under these favorino- circumwhen measures m ere not yet completely concerted, the soldiers,
in
commanded
Munychia.
commandino-
Pciia:us,
man
and Tiitramenes
present.
party,
Theramenes, with ready coolness, replied to the charge, and proposed to go himself and release his collegne.
as instigators of sedition.
political
sentiments he knew to
rapidly,
taken possession of
a small
body of
the ecjuestrian
order,
all
whom
The
he could collect
in the instant,
commonwealth, particidarly distinguished himself in appeasing the commotion Quiet thus was so far restored that,
a public guest of the
who accompanied
Aristarchus, none
marched
in
arms
The
latter
his
Aristarchus,
with
4G1
HISTORY OF GREECE.
with those of the oligarchal party about him, with
interfered in vain.
'
Chap.XIX.
much
indignation
'
The
it
soldiers, addressing
Theramcnes, asked,
If
pubhc good that the fort should be completed, or if the interest of the commonwealth did not rather Having had time then to look require that it should be destroyed ?' about him, and seeing that he should have sufficient support, he If they were of opinion that it ought to be demolished, answered,
he
reiilly
thought
for the
'
'
'
'
the whole
body
not
among
*
'
Whoever
is
for the
him assist in demolishing the fort.' To have named democracy, or the government of the people at large, as treason against the existing government, would have rendered the
of the Four-hundred,
Five-thousand was
themselves.
legal,
Numbers of
fort
proceeded rapidU'.
1.8.
Ncxt
The
result
of
the debate was a resolution to march into Athens, and take possession
Pollux, as
The
among
any
five
more than
if
greater violences
at
themselves more to individuals, and to small parties, than to the assembled body, the committee endevored to conciliate the more moderate,
more violent:
the
Sect. VII.
*
CONTENTION S AT ATHENS.
now
in office should lay
46i
the Four-hundred
down
their authority in
'
it
'
'
of rotation, ^nd the mode of election, by which their successors should be appointed. Meanwhile every dearest interest ought to warn the
soldiers not,
'
by any
violences, to afford
'
enemy
at their gates,
'
the commonwealth.'
those opportunities to an which might superinduce the destruction of These arguments, urged in a conciliating
and
it
was
at length
agreed that, on a
The day appointed being come, the people were already moving toward the temple of Bacchus, when intelligence was communicated,
that the Peloponnesian fleet under Hegesandridas, consisting of forty-
Thucyd.
*^'
1.8.
^*'
two
triremes,
moment by
;
for orders
eacli did
him
to require:
c.
95,
some took post upon the walb, and some at the mouth of the harbour. The Peloponnesians however made no attempt upon the Attic coast,
but, doubling the headland of Sunium, proceeded to Oropus.
New
The
disposition in Euboea
to revolt wa's
known.
the garrison of Deceleia, the added loss of Euboea would nearly deprive
them of means
principally
to subsist.
from Euboea.
manned some
for
triremes
moment
made
is
offered, and,
some
the
number thirty-six.
Among
numerous
Vol.
II.
466
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Chap. XIX.
landed his crews to get refreshment. The Eretrians, prepared for revolt,
had concerted measures with Hegesandridas. No provisions were to be found in the pubhc market; the Athenians could supply themselves
only from private houses far from the port, and the crews in consequence
dispensed over the town,
by the Eretrians
all
the
Spartan admiral
made
fleet
was
could be got
fly.
aboard.
it
was compelled to
;
Some of the
fled
by land.
Those -who
Eretria,
Two and
twenty triremes
all
fell
and presently
Euboea, except
8.
The consternation
at Athens,
was greater than even from the defeat in Sicily. Attica itself was less valuable to Athens than Euboea; not only as the soil was less fertile,
but
as the appropriation
first
less certain,
its
to a power,
hitherto the
upon earth by
but inferior to
;
enemies by land.
Nor was
pushed
this the
for,
with
their victorious
might have possessed themselves of the harbour. What precisely might have been the consequence was beyond human foresight but this,
;
says the
cotemporar}^
less
historian,
may
fleet
be esteemed
certain,
that
nothing
whole
It
upon
the misfortune, which threatened the ruin of the commonwealth, prx)ved the prelude to
its restoration.
still
Twenty
Avere
triremes remained
and they
June.
immediately manned.
the direction
of public measures,
or
who
could
Sect. VII.
CONTENTIONS AT ATHENS.
it
4G7
Probably
could undertake
notliing
affairs
with
effect,
were to be debated.
summoning them
to the
Pnyx,
M'here,
been most commonly held, met with general \pprobation and no avowed
opposition.
tical chiefs
In the
Pnyx
the democra-
hands
passed, with
'
'
that
all,
'
thousand
that no
man
in
any
office
under the
commonwealth
in Thucvd.
'^-
'
I.
s.
^^'
many
others
oli-
Aristar-
office
the Attic border against Boeotia, the ineffectual siege of which, by the
first
by an Athe
The
The Corinthian government, thus instigated, had inand the siege vited the Boeotians to join them in reducing the place was formed. When Aristarchus determined to fly, he commanded the
;
bowmen
in the
Athenian service
and selecting
most
barbarian, he
went
to CEnoe.
Lacedeemon, according to
rendered to the Boeotians.
mation, gave credit to a
Having quickly concerted matters the garrison, that a treaty M'as made with which CEnoe must be immediately surgarrison, excluded
The
man known
to be in the office
commonwealth
465
HISTORY OF GREECE.
evacuated the place. Antiphon, with a few ohgarchal leaders of
less
Chap. XIX.
remain in Athens
eloquence, his
served
;
personal
to be the ostensible
Upon
the flight
however of the more active leaders, opposition to Theramenes and his ]\fany assemblies of the people were succesassociates had ceased. sively held, according to the antient forms of the commonwealth, in
the
Pnyx
all
cause,
had absented themselves from their country, was decreed and the constitution was settled, says the cotemporary historian, upon a better
my
memory'';
mixed government
jNIany.
eulogy
is
by Tluicydides, of the form of government established by Theramenes; and upon no occasion does he leave us so much to regret the want of
explanation and
historian
detail.
Upon no
occasion, however, do
as the true
patriot.
we
see
the
Frequently
we find him reprobating the extravagancies of an unbalanced democracy so strongly, that we might suspect him of some partiality for
oligarchy.
But
here,
as
oli-
garchy established by Peisander, he shows himself a decided enemy to tyranny in every shape, and the warm partizan only of whatever
"
'Etti yt l/iov.
In
my
quidan mcmorid.
have no doubt
in
pre-
W)
yi
lnoS
non male
vertit
mcd
\
Sect. VIII.
TRANSACTIONS IN LESSER
ASIA.
499
SECTION
Trathsaciions of
VIII.
under Mindarus, and the Athenian under Thrasyllus and Thra^ybulus. Naval action near
Jl'ily atid
Abydus.
near the
Naval
action
Trojan shore.
Naval
and capture of the Peloponnesianfeet. Laconic Liberality of Pharnabazus to the Pelopomiesians. official letter. Able conduct and popularity of Hennocrates, the Syracusan
action near Cyzicus,
general.
During
these
on the Asiatic
distresses, to
'
^^^^,
1^;
Thucyd.
c.
1.8.
their own,
and the
failure of
99.
reduced them.
One
at Phaselis.
All in-
and of
his
Meanwhile
bazus
;
the
which Tissaphernes
Avhich for a long time had passed to Athens, showed himself disposed
to treat
his
more honorable
character,
might
be inviting.
the Hcflespont,
and surer communication with the Bithynian satrap. But the Athenian fleet at Samos was in the most favorable situation to intercept his passage ; and tho his numbers were
superior, he desired to avoid a general
action.
however,
lie
upon him
him
During
470
Tliucyd. 1. c. 100. Beginning of
July.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
During
syllus,
Chap. XIX.
Thra-
ncsian fleet had quitted the port of Miletus for the northward.
with whom,
chief
command
moved
M'ith
but,
in
his
Peloponnesian
tention.
fleet,
Some men of
on ac-
interest,
had
armament being at hand, the two and Athens distracted by sedition. Having accordingly
;
the Peloponnesian
common
Bceotians
tlie
being esteemed the parent people of the ^Eolian race, and particularly of the Lesbians'*.
first
Methymnc
itself:
"*
Aicc^ccfp^ov
Jioaiou,
xara
to
irvyyi>U,
(t
Af'^ioj)
fcTE civt)fr,vxti
vWauQafG>i:^r uvToT^
r.-y^vfiin^v.
Hoc
&
To
ol
SYrrENHN
rxr
Afiff'ttiui'.
alibi
&
consan-
ONT12N
Itt*
jjLotovi
Qunenam autera sit ThebanoMethymnceoium, vel Cyaiajorum, si quis hoc ad eos perlmere putabit, e-jyyttua, Dunc non scio, nee vacat quaerere. Duker.
guineis dicit.
ya^ KXTct TO
Aio?Ay.ci'
rum,
&
The
reader,
who
I
own
am
much on
for
confession, than
when
thofe
who undertake
difficult
wo here
find
from Tliu-
to be commentators,
sages, often of
pass
bj'
pas-
much more
historical
impor-
tance, as
if
account given
One
second section
History.
It is
little
difficulty
chapter of
mentioned byThucydides
liast,
it
wherever
among
Kai
a-a^ arxtta^oTai
we members
of
Sect. VIII.
itself:
TRANSACTIONS IN LESSER
ASIA.
471
commander in Mitylene disappointing them, they hastened across the lieights which divide the
iland,
Intelligence of these
five triremes to
Lesbos; he
and
Ifve
]\Iethymna3an,
and
now joined him with fifty-five. The heavy-armed were and preparation was made to attack Eresus by sea and debarked^
land.
INIeanwhile Mindarus,
fleet,
still
l.s.
^^'"
his
Methymna^an
for notice,
and made
enough
it
marks, more strongly than anything that of the marine of that age.
imperfection
Mindarus,
Speed was the object of both for avoiding the Athenians in the passage, and for
:
motion, intervals of rest were necessary for his crews; and, as Ave have
already had occasion to observe, the construction of a trireme was such,
Phoca^an
territory,
and to
sup,
at
Arginuste in the
fleet,
Cumtean
territory,
Moving
with
midnight
at Rhostcium,
its
c.
mouth.
Sestos.
Fire-
102.
announced
sea.
to
them
their danger,
and they
one,
Of
four intercepted,"'
forced
of early Grecian history; to detect the supposititious
is
re-
monizing whole.
''
lated by
tain
to ascer-
lation,
Smith gives to suppose, by his transthe Latin that eight were tai<en
;
version
more happily
is
dubious
472
HISTORY OF GREECE.
forced ashore near a temple
dcdicatetl
Chap. XIX.
to
its
crew
Re-
immediately, and in their passage took two Peloponnesian triremes, which had incautiously pushed too far, in pursuing theAthenian squadron
from
Sestos.
On
making an unsuccessful attempt. His fleet, with a squadron which he found at Abydus, consisted of
him
battle '^
Ibucyd.
c.
].s,
battle
105.
The Peloponnesians came out of the harbour of Abydus, and formed for action. The Athenians extending their line,
formed ahead.
to prevent being taken in flank by the
their
center,
which the Peloponnesians in consequence broke; and, This driving fifteen triremes ashore, debarked and destroyed them. advantage, however, produced disorder in the Peloponnesian line, from
fleet,
they
''put
one ships
through heralds, for the restoration of the dead, and the Athenians
erected their trophy on the headland of Cynos-sema.
This victory,
dubious
meant
matter
The
ob-
not important
but
it
may be
and indeed
places, of
much
some
sup-
uncorrected phrase.
own
unfinished work,
for
Sect. VIII.
SEA-FIGHT OF CYNOS-SEMA.
The
depression of the spirits of the seamen, proat Syracuse,
473
triren;e,
common
joy.
It
was
as the first
more
welcome
especially,
the urgency
of the
moment
by the
s.
The advantages,
to be expected
:
from a successful
1.
the
allies
who had
revolted were
new
enteiprizc.
The
fleet
sailed
for Cyzicus;
triremes,
returning from
Byzantium,
were taken
the way
its
and
change of
by a heavy contribution.
sea,
fleet to
He seems, To procure
little
means therefore
for subsisting
which
or
no
upon the
Cos
as a
command
the Carian
and shores, he
and
left a
garrison there.
own
interest,
fleet
from Miletus.
He
not only
apprehended the
loss
Vol.
II.
but
474
but
lie
HISTORY OF GREECE.
nabazus.
Chap. XIX.
into Ionia,
From Aspeudus,
therefore, he hastened
dissatisfaction.
back
and
Tliiicvd.'
1.
8.
OB his
arrival
The
Cnidians, after
'"
Uie example of the Milesians, had expelled his garrison from their
citadel.
Nor
the Persian
liable,
decay of the
command.
less disposition,
assassinating
Ch. i6. s. 5. their iland of this Hist,
some of
established
Atramyttcium.
The Antandrians,
had applied
oppressed by this
man,
at
to the Pcloponnesians
Abydus; and
whom
they
109.
Alarmed by
^Q
^]jp
all
go himself
Beg, ot Aug.
commanders.
to Diana.
Such
compliment
from
and
whether superstition or policy produced it, appears strong proof that decay, in various ways, had been making rapid progress in the Persian
empire.
Vv'ith
literature,
another cotem-
us a
as abruptly as
is
not complete
'^
The
first
'^ It lias
off.
to
me
Sect. VIIL
first
SIIOIlE.
is,
475
that Xen.
g"
fact
mentioned by Xenoplion,
the Atlienian
v,
Grecian annals,
the
llel.
^' ''
Thymochares,
"with the
commander
unfortunate action
^'
ith
defeated.
coast,
on the Euboean
or whether Hegesandridas
we
are not
Soon
after this,
and a
little after
commander,
g q 4, j_ 21. coming from Rhodes to the ^'End otSept, ^ notice or his approach was com- Xen. Hel.
^^',
.
*^" J,'
^*
The Peloponnesian
fleet
s.
a.
lay at
in
at the
time
The
;
situation
commanded
a view of the
strait,
The
upon
this
Through the
greatest
of the line;
was maintained with various success in different parts but toward evening eighteen Athenian triremes were seen
satisfactorily that riiere
me
is
to
have proved
mention are
tive.
I
The
fust paragraph.
Mera
i.
is
rcivlx
made by Xenophon
of the
bears
all
the
completion of the journey of Tissapherncs, (the beginning of which is related by 'i'hucydides,) stating the time of his arrival at the
Mitu.
relate
'Hellespont.
nals, are
The
Hellenics, or Grecian
An-
however, evidently enough, a work which has not received the finishing touches of the author: in the very beginning of it he
with the mention of which the History of Thucydides ends, but rather to sOmeChmg in the course of relating whicli, had the
seems rather
his
to
action,
of Tliucydides, or to
own, and left them for future correction, which was never given; and thus, tho all
between the Athenian squadron under Thymocharcs and the Lacedremonian under Hegesandridas, would have been siaied.
3 p 2
coming-
47G
HISTORY or GREECE.
cominp; into the strait from the soutinvard.
TIel.
Chap. XIX.
Xen.
j^'
'^'
'
They were the squaclroa of Alcibiadcs returning from the Carian coast. Then the PeloponBut Abydus had no harbour that could nesians fled toward Abydiis.
protect them
:
Of
from the
deceitful
and timid
Tissaphernes,
Pharnabazus
inta-
rode at the head of his cavalry, as far as his horse would carry him,
s_5^
the
sea,
Through
announce-
now
of the
diate need.
g_g^
Nothing
when Tissaphernes
in
ar^
proportion as his
as
he had
injure.
less
need of persona'l
did not however
He
and such
The
faithless
satrap,
caused him to be arrested and sent prisoner to Sardis. After a conC. 410. Ol. 92. 2. finement of about a month, hoM'ever, he escaped to Clazomenae, a citv ' I P. W. 22. of the Athenian alliance; whence, with six ships*", which he found March.
'
'J
there,
he returned to his
-was
fleet in
the Hellespont.
fleet scattered,
While Alcibiades
E?
E^^l)7r(llrTcl>.
I
suppose the l/n* ts xaJ JSpa of Xenophou may be interpreted, the former word relating to Grecian customs, the latter
to Persian.
* Yvt
iritlt
" Thus
Xenophon seems afterward to reckon the fTza-xipU among the taSf. I do not recollect
that Thucydides ever gives the title of ,ctSt to any but ships of war, except once to a
merchant-ship
rftifici
of
very
large
size,
mii,
1.
esraxlfifi.
Cum
/nvpopo^o;,
c.
iu the
harbour of Syracuse,
7.
quiiique
actuaria.
24.
!Mindarus
Sect. VIII.
477
sixty
which lay
to
at Sestos
but timely
intelligence
of
his
intention
Cardia,
coming
at
Mithdrew by
the other side
night to
the
of the Chersonese.
Alcibiades
joined them
th.ere
but he joined
them with
both
the expectakinol)at
which he had
through the
Avas
still
Phenician
and, m
more
be incomparably more
never
cities,
fail,
were at an end.
and
retaining but
commonwealth had
hitherto
been
powerful,
promised by Alcibiades,
at
was
de-
home had
and
to support
even a
tlie
common-fleet
at Xen.
1
by
its retreat
to Cardia,
his
and, Pharna-
Ile.t C 1
g"_
compelled
again
to
receive
its
law
from
enemies of Athens.
to Sestos
made
ceeding up the Propontis, when Theramenes arrived from Macedonia, and Thrasybulus from Thasus, each with twenty triremes. This fortunate reinforcement
portant to
s.
made new consideration necessary it was imconceal from the enemy the increased numbers of the fleet,
:
s.
lo^
On arriving
issued,
denouncing capital punishment against any who should be The soldiers and taken in the attempt to cross to the Asiatic shore. seamen
478
HISTORY OF GREECE.
seamen
biades,
M'ere then
Chap. XIX.
and Alci-
summoned,
as to a
popular assembly;
addressing them,
necessities
'
of their situation.
Supplies,' he
said,
'
to the
amount
their
that the prosecution of the v/ar would require, were not within
'
'
the eneni}-,
knew no want.
:
'
therefore indispensable
'
land
and
in
'
tions.'
of their general's
Xen.
1!pI.
'^''is
were
1.1. c.i.
May.
heavy rain presently came on, which favored the purjjose of sur-
As the
fleet,
fleet
The
so
much
stronger
thiin they
of success
port.
naval action,
They had no hope and the enemy was between them and their
in great consternation.
The
resource,
afforded,
assistance
of
12.
A'.cibiades,
line,
seeing
this,
also
debarked,
met
loponnesian
s.
fleet
then
fled
13.
by
its
own
was carried
arfd
left
the enemy in a
moment without
would of course go
But
was
Sect. Vlir.
^vas
still
VICTORY OF ALCIBIADES.
The government
at
47y
of extreme difficult3\
first
own
people.
remarks that
severity
as if he
Cyzicenes experienced no other xen thought another general might not have been so '
the
'
llel
^'i" -
13
h:r\-e
avoided
contending with the united force of the Peloponnesians and the satrap, it should seem, could not very reasonably be imputed to them as a
crime.
bution's
The
fleet
s.
n.
were also
in
the
Chalcedonian
territory, fiear
fortified,
strait.
This
mode of
collecting a
ships
rest
beside a
garrison,
thirty
there,
Theramenes
and
Eubulus to command.
Hellespont.
With the
of the
he returned to the
s.
ij.
the letter M'ritten to the Spartan government by Hippocrates, to wliom the command-in-chief devolved on the death of Mindarus.
It
was in-
by Xenopiion,
Laconic
nearly thus
*
'
is
among
M'riting.
:
must
sufler,
is
but
it
:
ran
Mindarus
slain
the
$. iff.
the satrap Pharnabazus, M'ho not only relieved their wants but soothed
:
Their
loss in
men,' he said,
'
great,
and
fleet.'
MiO
'
II
fleet.'
ST O R Y O
G R E E C E.
ir.an
Chat.
XIX
Xen. Hol.
ami subiistence
of trircn.es
'^'^'
to Antandrus,
southern foot of
Mount
fleet
Ida,
;
where
directing,
that as
as
many
had been
by each
in the late
action.
mi<>ht'
not
in the m.can
useless,
vith
licavy armour,
which was
a gratification,
inasmuch
an idea of supe-
them to the guard of the maritime territory. While the Pelcponnesians were employed in building
defence of their toMn.
fleet at
An-
tandrus, the Antandrians themselves were busied in raising walls for the
armament,
in this
Mould be
likely to
abuse
among
who composed
discipline was
and
this
much
less
inforced by law
among them
than
among any
firr less
21.
B.C. 410. squadron; and he not only himself possessed the confidence of
under him, but he taught the superior
of the
inferior,
officers to acquire the
confidence
Thus a gradation of influence supplied the place of subordination inforced by penalty, and a strict discipline was founded upon reverence and afiecTo effect this requires the most capacious mind united with the tion.
and these that of the multitude.
most
refined temper,
and
is
indeed
were
among
command
tinct titles
and
tieiice
we
are without a
among
the
antients,
united in
word
title
two
The term
services.
The complete separation of the two commands, with us, has produced dis-
General here
is
none more
so.
human
Sect. VIII.
INFLUENCE OF
in assisting the
II
ER
M O C RATES.
led tbe
481
human
under
genius.
way
for those
his
command
was employed
fortifications.
Meanwhile Syracuse,
led
by
faction,
Hermocrates and
his collegues,
'J'^'^'
for he had not been intrusted alone Avith the chief conmiand, were not
trial,
citizens, in their
them just
indeed
as their
fellowcountrymen
a privilege
to be very
army
it
was given.
The
were called
collegues.
and
himself
and
his
'
against them,'
he
said,
had been,
as the
'
'
would be proper
for the
'
armament
to elect their
own commanders
and seamen,
o.
19.
in the
name of
the
new
admonished
'
to
sedition.
*
'
'
The time will come,' they said, when, in a constitutional manner, we shall desire your honest support to us against a malicious You will then declare how many battles you have prosecution. fought, how many ships you have taken, what general success has
attended you under our
'
testimony
'
Vol.
II.
of
482
'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
of the whole confVcleratc armament
in the post
all
Chap. XIK,
ours, manifested
ns,
to
'
upon
Xcn.Hel.
1.
<
The
ad-.nouition
had the
full eflect
1.
,.1.
"
.
.
s.
cu.
proposed from
it.
.Nothing
disorderl}- insuecL
tion onl}- was made, that the generals were without blame, and the request
was persisted
in,
command
till
successors arrived.
l^.Iyscon,
and Potames
came from Syracuse, and the command passed into their hands Avithout any commotion. The armament however showed that they would not and liave suffered any violence to the persons of their former generals most of the trierarcs entered into an agreement, upon oath, to exert
;
warm an attachment,
in
aa
armament, to the persons of their generals, united with so just a consideration of the welfare of the country, and
of the constitutional
Hermo-
from
his
command, was
still
common
*
~~-
cause,
He went
to
where he
M'as
Lacedsmon, government
of
there the state of things in Asia; particularly the conduct, the character,
tl'.e
Persian
satraps,
the
frank
generosity
Having
interest
thus confirmed the resolution to carry on the war, and opened views
to the means, and at the
his
awn
among
the principal
men
Not
Laceda;mon
is
here intended, or
the narrative of
Xenophou
it
tbat of 1 hucydides,
his
Sect. IX.
liis
4S3
especially giving-
money unasked.
hired
seamen, to
assist the
common
cause
in
much
the
zeal
assist afterward,
in
occasion should
be,
he was connected
his
own
country, and
promote
SECTION
m
IX.
F.ffects
of the
:
tiaval successes
Thrasi/llus
of the Athenians. Reinforcement under His transactions on the Ionian coast. Winter campain
JFeakness of the Lacedae-
The
xvhile
affairs
of
so
Laceda^mon were
lately
at
this
time
ill
administered; n
r ,
2.
Athens,
supposed ruined
in Sicily,
<>! J/i-
Ihe point of bringing destruction upon herself, was again raised toward
The
effects
of Xen.Hel.
'g"
^^J^'"'
who
command-
from Tissaphernes.
What
promote, does not appear; but the accusation so far had credit at Sparta,
that Pasippidas was recalled and banished, and Cratesippidas was sent
to
succeed him
in
the
command.
little
s. 2-t.
among them,
that they
a general of the establishment, led out the whole force of the city, and
S
Q 2
formed
484
HISTORY OF GREECE.
formed
for battle
Chap. XIX.
Agis had
the M'liole
near the
Being pro-
bably
now
made some
for his
conduct on
The reinforcement
his
;
for the
armament
in the Hellespont,
wliich
it
v.as
principal
business in Athens to
and
fifty
triremes
To
give
more security then to the communication by sea from Athens eastward, particularly with Eubaa, and perhaps to afford some protection to the silvefmines of Laureium, Thoiicum, near the Suniad promontory, was
fortified,
and a garrison
established, there.
tlie
merit of
diligence in his
command.
with
On
it;
his first
been highly
in favor
satisfied
fortune of war,,
less
agreeable.
Hitherto
all
the Persian
to
money
to inable
fleet,
the
Lacedemonians
powerful
to be obtained
them
Xen.
s!
to maintain
llel.
'
25.^^
Urged by these considerations, he sent a remonstrance to the government at home. It was to little purpose, he observed, that he and the army vith him,
risk even to be without means to defend himself
which,
before
his
was. cont.iniilly
passing
into
the
harbour
Sect. IX.
TRA'NSACTIONS
He
it
ON THE
ASIATIC COAST.
to
485
harbour of PoiriEus.
the Euxine (for
vessels
fertile
shores of
sea that
its
sup'ply the
deficiency of
Ilerod. 1.7.
^'*''-
command.
approved
fifteen
ships
allied states,
;
from Megara,
none
in the ports of
Laconia
and,
under
In passino-
the Hellespont, three were taken by the nine Athenian guardshijis always
stationed there: with the remaining twelve, Clearchus v.as fortunate
enough
to reach Byzantium.
It
Xen. Tld.
'
'
',-
should be undertaken
in
H. C. 400.
p'v?'ot""
some
might be recovered
to the
Athenian
dominion.
But
;
if
might be
levied
to be expected
from that
satrap's friendship.
to
light armor;
make them
regular
middle-armed.
"
far
Having touched
Xeiiophon
at
This date
is
Dodwell's.
is
Cut,
from being equally accurate with Thut-ytUdes in marking times and seasons but
;
doing
so,
am
yeai',
here intended, as
may perhups
suflice for
my
aposus-
Olympiad; which, according to the chronologers was the year 408 before the
third
logy: Intelliget
Christian a;ra.
am
I
maximi
tentariut
primis
Xenophontis
Dod'.vt'H's correction, in
which he has
fol-
lowed Diodorus
t<i
much
nostram supervacuam
Iccerinl.
Xenophou
for
Xen.
in
ann. Bel.
I'el.
21.
coa5t
486
cn:i>t,
HISTORY or GREECE.
and, (l(.baiking near Pyg:da, ravaged ihe country.
Chap. XIX.
body of
Miicsians
perly, fell
coming
upon
tlie
in
quest of booty,
and put them to flight. But the numerous targelecrs of the Athenian armament were at hand; and supported by only two lochi of heavyarmed, tlcy attacked the pursuing Milesians, and routed them with
considerable slaughter.
success was
Two
trophy
'^.
strength of Aliletus
Xeii. He).
too great,
him
to
On
'^"
s
an Athenian colony
and
marching thence
to the
alliance.
On
many
villages,
money
and
slaves.
Stages, a Persian
who commanded
but with
in
the neighborhood,
interfered with a
s.
body of
horse,
little effect.
4.
Thus
enterprize
paration.
against Grecian
we have
seen,
He
July.
threatened,
defence.
and it behooved all Greeks to exert themselves in her It was not till the seventeenth day after the invasion of
off Ephesus.
He debarked
;
his forces in
two
divisions
mount Coressus
the horse,
Mho
would be but few, with the targeteers and light-armed, on the other
side of the city, near the marsh.
'
The SHIELD,
icrir)f,
always implies a
targets,
heavy-armed
wiXiaitj
soldier.
Two hundred
armed
slain
would
scarcely
have
been
taken, would by no
Tissaphernes
Sect. IX.
4S7
nniiv at Epliesus.
^
The
^'en- Hel.
1. 1
The
'^
s\
destroyed near Cyzicus, and from five lately arrived from Syracuse,
ships,
five
thouthis
The
to
all
Sucli a force
would
Taking
j^
likely
this
make
effectual
and
tluee lunuhcd.
For
ujjon
indi-
who had
spirit
distino'uibhed themselves.
still
The
of Hermocrates seemed
to
forces.
was granted to
reside in
(for
all
who might
at
any time
home
his
defeat,
toward
tlie
Hellespont,
s.
s.
While he stopped
Methymne
four with their crews: the rest escaped back to the port whence they
came.
cousin
Among
first-
He had
for
accompanied
kinsman
in
his
flight,
when persecuted
tlie
the
Lacedaemonian, had
satisfied
with
it,
under the admirable regularity which Hermocrates had established, he Thrasj-Jlus nevertheless gave continued to fight against his country.
him
his liberty.
The
ASS
Xeii.IUl.
'^^
HISTORY OF GREECE.
*
Chap.XIX.
They
were,
!)
however,
less carefully
less
secure; for, in
the following
-winter,
hy
night,
all
escaped,
some finding
their
way
to Deceleia,
and the
rest to
Megara.
successes of Thrasyll us seem to have heen very inferior to the
;
The
the junction
general from
active
Thirty
Tire
summer was
He
appears however to
He conducted
to
shore.
Lnd
of Sept. 'pjjg
tifications.
those
Alcibiades
command, and from which, on the contrary, abilities might derive advantage. He quartered them separately, and employed them separately on the fortifications.
but, in the
by
Alcibiades
led his*
The
satrap
body of Athenian
this action, in
cavalry, led
by Alcibiades, was
savcil
only by the
After
which the
soldiers
the rest of
tlie
army
saluted
them
from dishonor,
and no
longer
Sect.X;
affairs
made
of
LACED^MON.
field,
489
or associate with
them
incursions were
Meanwhile the Lacedaemonian e;overnment was distracted by domestic disturbance. A rebellion had taken place among the Helots
Xen. Hel.
1.
1.
C.2.
g.
12.
at
length
Lacedaemonian
territory.
at
home,
The
pride of
com-
their prerogative
among
the Lacedaimonians.
it
from utter
ruin.
They
sent thither
in
led the
.
perpe-
tual enemies.
their allies,
the governor
was
its
his people,
SECTION
Imp07'tant successes of Alcibiades,
X.
Ambassies
to
Return of Alcibiades
to
Athens.
The
object,
was
war,
to restore to the
to the expences of a
Vol.
II.
490
HISTORY OF GREECE.
war, M'hicli, long as
it
Chap.XIX.
be soon con-
had
lasted,
likely to
cluded.
taken,
something accrued
must be constantly employed at great expence, and yet the enemy, from Byzantium and Chalcedon, could interrupt the collectors and
but, to secure this, a large force
They being recovered, the whole the trade of the Euxine from would accrue to Athens, and her revenue
measures against those two towns.
dominion, on the shores of the Propontis and Hellespont, would be
restored to nearly
its
former extent.
decisive
superiority
;
on the
Tissaphernes
racy to maintain
its fleet.
With
ni' 9z
'
war
**,
Alcibi-
A,
The Chalce'
.
P. \v. 24.
After 25th
donians had suspected that attack would soon approach them, and this ^
March.
j^^j^'^gl"
1-
movement confirmed
the suspicion.
,.
committed
all
Thracian hord.
body of heavy-armed infantry to follow, and and, going to the the fleet at the same time to attend his motions Bithynian frontier, he threatened fire and sword to the country, if all
cavalry, directed a select
;
hostages and pledges to insure peaceful conduct from the Bithynians His demands were complied wnth, and he then directly themselves.
Or
the twenty-fifth
as
observed in a
the
in the
twenty-third
marginal reading of
Leunclavius, in
Hippocrates,
SectX.
491
Hippocrates, a Lacedaemonian,
He had
Xen.Hel.
'
,'
J^'
^q
where a
approach,
river.
Thrasyllus
fierce conflict
between them.
retire,
and then
body of heavy-armed,
to
Meanwhile
commanding
the siege.
had attempted
several
which acknowleged his dominion and their alliance, were already taken the fate of Chalcedon was sure, if not prevented by a treaty if the
;
maritime towns of iEolis should next be attacked, he was unable to protect them ; and to judge of the future by the past, the Lacedtemonians were equally unable.
His overtures
Athenian generals, and an accommodation was shortly concluded on that Pharnabzus should pay twenty talents, the following terms ;
'
about four thousand pounds, as ransom for Chalcedon that the Chalcedonians should in future pay tribute to Athens as formerly, and
:
'
all
that
till
the return of
'
commit no
hostilities against
still
'
the Chalcedonians.'
within
482
HISTORY OF GREECE.
ve
liave seen Potidcea tributary to Athens, M'hile
Chap. XIX.
;
as formerly
of Corinth.
Xen. Hel.
*
g".
8.
with between
Chersonese,
there)
interest
he made himself master of Selymbria, on the northern coast of the Propontis, and was taking measures to form the siege of B^'zantium.
ratification of the
That agreement
;
but he
refused
into
to
it
by
his
oath,
would enter
reciprocal
same ceremony
Pharna-
claim to
equal rank.
where two
him, while Euryptolemus and Diotimus waited upon the satrap for the
same purpose
in
Chalcedon.
private compliments
9.
The next
Persian court.
communicated
Susa
jealousy there.
An embassy
at
but ap-
made
might go
at the
readily granted.
sition, averse to
Of no
brother, Proxenus,
still
exUe
Sect. X.
exiles
45^
common
conductor.
Matters being thus settled for the country on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, so that his satrapy was in peace, Pharnabazus appears not to have concerned himself about Byzantium. The Lacedcemonian
In addition to the inhabitants, he had i.T'cs.' some troops from old Greece, a small body of LacedEemonians of those ^" '' ^*' ^^
there.
Clearchus,
commanded
and Neodamodcs, some Megarians under Helixus, under Cyratadas. some Boeotians and The Athenians attempted ail
called Perioscians
known
in that age,
without success
but they
the place
Thus reduced
should have
who
endevored
him,
were passive,
Clearchus
formed the bold project of going himself to infuse vigor into their counsels, and collect a fleet with which to make a diversion, such as
which
some were just completed at Antandrus Hegesippidas commanded a squadron on the Thracian coast. All these he proposed to assemble, and to promote the building of more. But Clearchus, tho an able
man, wanted the policy of Brasidas. fame of the conciliating and
sively serviceable to the
liberal
Thucydides informs
in
us,
that the
Lacedsmon;
who
allied
them-
less
des-
When
provisions began to
still
Byzantium, his
party had
disregarded.
an Athenian
s.
rs.
it
now gained
strength,
494
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Clearchus added incouragement.
pressing,
Ghap.XIX.
a gate was
communication
;
M'as
and Cyratadas, to
whom
the
The
services which,
completed for
by the union of
in an extensive
When
the forces
tory than
walls inclosed;
depended
pirited
for existence
upon
its fleet,
same time
;
dis-
and mutinous.
He had
restored
;
he had
restored
fleet
;
commanded
among
c. 4.
*"
in the war.
In
this state
cf things he
s- *.
and he proposed
at
These being
affairs
of Byzan-
led the
,^
the cities
which had
lately revolted
were
quickly recovered.
hundred
talents,
5.
On his return to
Samos,
Sect. X.
495
he sent the
rest,
Athens so in-
of the returning
his
under pretence of gaining intelligence of the enemy's designs, and of observing what was going forward in the port of Gythium.
Information from his confidential friends reached him at
sea,
had been
g'^^
who was
It
absent,
present,
were
Upon
this
5.
Plynteria, a kind of
mourning
;
religious ceremony,
when
transact any
important business.
Many
ill
people, as the
cotemporary
to the commonwealth.
city,
g'
g_
that Alcibiades
citizens
'
'
his
unbounded
'
As
for
'
temptation to innovate
him had no the favor of the people gave him all the
'
'
Accordingly he had power and preeminence he could wish for. never oppressed any whereas his opponents had destroyed by assas:
sination the
most deserving
'
men
left
tions
496
'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
tions in the
Chap. XIX.
loudly,
commonwealth '^'
the past'misfortunes,
'
and
it
was
to
be feared he would
still
He was not
He
his
till
his
cousin-german
relations
son
of
with others
of
and
friends.
Nor
did even they trust intirely in the protection which the etablished
They came
the city.
Xen. Hel.
*
prepared to
;
resist
any attempt
that might
be
made
to
and,
surrounded by them,
he
proceeded
His
first
business,
;
in regular course,
6. 8.
Five-hundred
he took occasion to assert his innocence of the sacrilegious profanations, of which he had been accused, to apologize for his conduct
during his banishment, and to criminate his prosecutors.
;
Many
after
him spoke strongly to the same purposes and the current of popular favor became so evident, that not a word was heard in opposition to him; for the people, says Xenophon, would not have borne it. He
was chosen, with a
title
comSo
we commonly
find
s. s.
and Soon
he was vested
with
high dignity,
opportunity
it,
who
conferred
and to
acquire
''
'Avrcli
01
among
<iyan-aaSai una
Sux
iX-^Qt
y/>?<r9ai.
jjofhon strongly
nyii^ui
K\;Teit^aTup.
The
titlt
of
Sect. X.
RENOWN
OF ALCIBIADES.
497
by a Lacedaemonian garrison, the Athenians had never dared to make the mysterious procession of Ceres to Eleusis, according to the customarv
forms, along that called the Sacred
sea,
passed
by
necessarily omitted,
or imperfectly executed.
by
land,
and protect
it
of every accustomed
rite.
He
enemy
to give
any
disturbance.
With
tary
the
mixture of
and
1.
C.4.
8.9.
ment of the
fleet,
Sr/iaTriyo?.
commonwealth
in
communication with
authority in
adthe 'Hye^wt
all
What was
committed
'HyiiJiut
command,
ivloxfo-Tuf,
some
board
of general
officers,
Vol.
II.
3S
493
CHAPTER
Affairs
XX.
Athens,
ofGREECE, from
till
Peloponxesian War.
SECTION
in-chief of the Peloponncsian feet
I.
State of the Persian empire: Cyrus, younger son ofDariits II. appointed
viceroy of the provinces zrat ofthe river Halys.
:
Lysaiidcr commander*
Notitnii,
Seafght of
and
its.
consequences.
w
ries.
HILE
had succeeded
M'hich
We
have
among
by
assistance
The
rich
kingdom of Media, we
find, liad
12
but
in the
Apparently, in the idea that his empire was too extensive and unwieldy to
it.
Detaching a portion,
leave, for his
as an appanage for Cyrus, his younger son, which, under able conduct,
still
inasmuch
as
Sect.
I.
499
maiuled.
recovery of
J.Iedia,
tlie
his attention.
repugnance to undertake the troidilesomc task of regulating matters duly in regard to that nation of
in years,
little
advancetl
he found
therefore resolved
to
commit
youth of great hopes; who seems to have wanted only a better education to have made him a great prince; but whose active and ambitious
temper, never duly either restrained or directed, gave disturbance and.
when a
circum-
Xen. Hel.
1.
Lacedaemonian enibassy arrived there; having made the journey apparently through the assistance of Tissaphernes.
1.
1.
c. 2.
s.
The
as
political
good reception
assertions,
for them.
Being
without compe-
and success-
young
prince
assume the
command
of
monarch
in opposition
set
out on their
Meanwhile Pharnabazus, with those ambassadors, Athenian and Peloponnesian, whom he had undertaken to conduct to Susa, had proceeded
in
B.
*"
C
^^"
408.
''^'
autumn
as far as
Gordium
in Phrygia,
In spring he was proposing to prosecute the journey, vhen the other ambassadors arrived on their return, accompanied by Persian officers
commissioned
to
to take the
comCyrus
mand
the favor of that prince, and ingage him to their country's cause; but finding him immoveably attached to the Peloponnesians, they desired
to prosecute their journey to the Persian court.
still
Pharnabazus would
refusing
have
assisted
to
them
per-
ir.isfiion
either
required
ioo
HISTORY OF GREECE.
required that they should be delivered to him.
Chap. XX.
satrajK
The upright
up
Xen. Hel.
j"
but
'.
it
home
It
-
was a
rule,
bj*
beyond a
year;:
and perhaps
the
fleet
it
princii)le,
that the
command of
now coming
give
new
vigor
to
new energy
command of
when
its
its
former esteem,
former efficacy.
he passed to Rhodes;
1.
c. 5.
'i"<^^>
taking the
command
* ^-
to Cos and Miletus, and thence to Ephesus; where, Mith the ships
he
of
fleet
Xen. Hel.
1 1
As soon as he heard that Cyrus was arrived at Sardis, he hastened, in company with the ambassadors newly returned from Susa, to pay his court there and he found a most favorable reception. The prince
;
c 5
'
s_
2.
'
told him,
'
'
that
it
hundred
sterling,
'
'
'
warmth of youthful
'
zeal,
and
in
the hyperbolical
that he would cut up the throne manner of the east, rather than on which he sat,' (which was of solid silver and gold,)
for prosecuting the M-ar should
fail.'
s.
3 &*.
'
means
'
Our
copies of
Xenophon say
tliree
to
have been
put for
months by the
carelessness of transcribers.
with
Sect.
I.
LYSANDER
LACED.T.I\IONrAN
it
COMMANDER.
king should allow
daily \
501
was
man
Incou-
raged by the prince's free promise, and not yet accustomed to the
extravagance of oriental diction, Lysander proposed, that an Attic drachma, which was eight oboli, nearly tenpence sterling, should be
allowed for daily pay toevcr}- seaman.
saici,
'
'
'
The
increase of expence,' he
tho
it
jjrofuse,
would
in the
end be
'
things, accelerate a
'
would be taken of
Avith
'
warmth of
much
politeness,
on a just view of things, but he could not exceed the king's command.'
assented; and the prince, satisfied altogether with his behavior^
Wine
were eleva-ted
Ilel..
he asked
'
'
what he could do
mosit satis-
faction
?'
Lysander answered,
'
augmented accordingly.
whether
his influence
gratified; and,
mon
seemed
The
when
Alcibiades,
'"
^^
'
month
from
Peirjeus.
His
and
* This, if all were paid alike, would give two hundred and sixty-six men to every
privates
the
same,
ar.d
that
of superior
trireme.
Commonly we
find,
in
the Gre-
armament
boi
HISTORY OF GREECE.
anv.ament consisted of
fift}'
Chap. XX.
handled and
directed his
fifteen
hundred lieaw-armed
foot, a
horse,
and a hundred
to Andros,
triremes.
He
llil.
c. 4.
course
small
field.
first
which had
revolted.
The
ilandfrs, assisted
by a
1.
e,
10.
body of Lacedaemonians, were rash enough to meet him in the but Alcibiades, finding They were defeated with some loss
;
the
present, with erecting a trophy for the. little success obtained, and pro-
O.
S. 9.
The
intelligence,
which greeted
Iran
on
of^the whole
force,
lPeloi)onnesian confederacy'
wealth was
now
The active mind of Alcibiades was immediately turned to counterwork the effect of the Lacediemonian negotiation, and circumstances
affording hope occurred.
According
iinder the
command
still
a share of
Nevertheless Tissaphernes, in a
manner
eclipsed
by the
prince's
fell
and the
Hence, notwithstanding
was thought interest might
jiow possibly reunite him with the Athenians, and through him means
might be obtained
be drawn. with Cyrus, and
for negotiation,
but he was
in
no favor
This turn of things greatly injured Alcibiades both with the arma-
ment
at
at
home.
assistance,
which
he,
and principally
Sect.I.
SEAFIGHT of NOTIUM.
had said, and his had always maintained, could save the commonNot only these promises had totally failed, but that important
alone, he
509
That assistance
confidential friends
wealth.
assistance
and
felt
in a greater
degree than he
to Athens.
He
own
situation in
command,
his
or avert im-
He
led
Notium,
Lysander
on
lay.
the
Asiatic
shore,
within
view of
Ephesus,
-where
i'
-*
^'
wintered wilh his squadron in the Hellespont, was employed in fortifying Phocasa on the iE'olian coast.
it
might be advantageous
to
withdraw himself,
his fleet,
the
moment
offered
He
left
command
to Antiochus, but
During
judicious
aspire,
his absence,
zeal,
or
a
went with
as if to exfleet, as if
plore
to
provoice
L3^sander,
ninety triremes,
his
was
fleet,
yet employed
without meaning
an action.
in-
duced h'm
there,
to order a
few galleys
to be hastily launched
and manned,
seen
and to pursue.
Notium was
movement could be
to relieve Antiochus.
whole
fleet.
line,
manner, but
Samos.
:
a few were
made
prisoners;
Antiochus
504
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Antiochus was among the
Chap. XX.
X"n.. Hcl.
1.
killed. Lysander erected his trophy upon and carried his prizes to Ephesus. the headland of Notium, This was a most mortifying event for Alcibiades. He hastened back
I.
C. 0.
S.9.
to his
fleet,
its
disgrace, he
went
to the
offered battle.
Lysander liow-
vit.
Pausan.
1.
government seems to have met the vanity of Lysander, in the endevor to give more than its due splendor Nine statues M'ere dedicated at Delphi on to the victory of Notium.
The
10. c, 9.
^jig
master
Pollux,
be-
That
victory,
little
its
in
itself,
as
Plutarch justly
observes, by
political con-
credit of Alcibiades
They
held
have
110
his powerful
portance so
object,
to the
him
but
it
persuade the
communication was
:
disrespectful,
and
is
it
may
more
prudence would
justify.
:
But, as
the people
resist
the
man
to
When
it,
in-
they
it
-s.io.'
and
When
force
therefore the
fleet
had
tied
before an inferior
Sect.I.
accusation OF ALCIBIADES.
Athens was
in
505
Intelli-
uproar.
Lacedcemon, communicated
impression.
at the
'
The enemies of Alcibiades took immediate advantage of the popular temper; and those in the city were assisted by some who came from the fleet for the purpose. Of these Thrasybulus son of
Thrason, mentioned on this occasion only
tinguished himself
in history, principally
tli is-
Plut. vit.
Alcib/
An
His pride,' he
said,
'
indeed
'
and while he
'
'
among
'
In a station
in
'fleet,
'
commonwealth,
'
'
in
consequence of
cease,
'
'
command,
his attention
''
'
castle,
which he had
second banish-
in that
and malignity of
There seems to
Indeed some
this accusation,
etHcacy.
in the character
their eftect.
In
3
his
conduct since
liis
restoration,
Vol.
II.
whether
506
whether
HISTORY OF GREECE.
in military or political business, neither rashness
Chap. XX.
shows
itself,
nor dishonesty.
On
the contrary,
all his
whom
he intrusted the command of the fleet, during that short absence which proved so unfortunate, in every other instance his choice of assistants and deputies in command was judicious, liberal, and
happy.
to give to Thra-
and
reflected honor.
Athenian
people;
called
upon,
moment of
M'hile
M'as
the information
necessary
for
Without waiting
or what
it,
know how
their general
might apologize
will decided,
necessity, or
the
multitude, whose
momentary
who were by
wealth, in
their
commonand
employmenis.
list
Ten
the long
Pericles,
.syllus,
requires
notice:
Protomachus, Thra-
How
when comin
Xcnophon
related
gives no
direct
information
it
but,
the circumstances
by both
first
writers,
ren^ains
suggested,
dinary
Sect.
I.
FACTION AT ATHENS.
through the
evils
507
When
on
it,
we have seen. which he principally broucrht was prepared to make terms with him, he preferred an aristohis country,
cratical
or
oligarchal
party for
his
future
support.
But,
finding
himself presently deceived by the persons actually leading those interests in Athens, so that democracy was his only resource, it was
an unbalanced democracy only that could answer his purpose; because an unbalanced democracy only would give hhii that plenitude
of authority, which could inable him to overbear the aristocratical
and oligarchal
reestablished
warmly disposed to oppose him. himself then on the ground of the democratical
parties,
so
Having
interest,
on command abroad,
his
power
failed
for
controlling
How
parties there
Mere at
movements of faction at home. the time divided, and how little, notwiththe
is
superiority,
new
board of generals.
kinsman of Alcibiades;
of the
ten,
man of
his friend.
Meanwhile Epigenes, Diophanes and Cleisthenes, men of Lys. a?/ high birth, but in no office, led the mob, and led it to the most de- apoIcV on the vague accusation of being unfriendly to the P/fi ' spotic measures
:
multitude', some,
condemned without
and executed
;
many
suffered
some
Hel.
an account of his conduct, if he appeared, and probably to defend himself against impeachment, not unreasonably avoided, to trust his fate
to such a judicature as the assembled Athenian people.
Thrasybulus,
3 T 2
less
508
less
HISTORY OF GREECE.
the
fleet,
Chap. XX.
command
of his trireme,
Alcibiades retired to
Thracian Chersonese.
SECTION
Pcloponnesian.
II.
Mitylene
ArginuscE.
B. C. 407.
CoxoN,
in-chief,
new
gencrals-
Xen
1. 1.
llei
c. 5.
in the siege
of Andros, M'here he
to
commanded.
him
go immediately,
with the squadron of twenty ships under his orders, and take the com-
mand
of the
fleet at
Samos.
on
found
to great undertakings.
His
first
had been
so objected to Alcibiades, as to be
made
ground of his
impeachment.
Selecting seventy
triremes,
and
strengthening the
crews by drafts from above thirty moie, Conon divided them into
squadrons, which were sent various ways
;
which acknow-
alliance of
LacecUcmon.
In the insuing winter, CaUicratidas was sent from Sparta, to take the
fleet.
CaUicratidas,
widely
from Lysander, was one of the purest models of the old Spartan
character; a zealous
and sincere
On
Barthelemi has not scrupled
p. 103, vol.4, ed. 8vo.)
(e. 4i!.
on
ilie
authority of
all
bcrn iu
was
Sect.
II.
509
On
*
victorious fleet
Pass
to the westward
'
command
to
me
in the
Samos, and passing to the westward of that iland would put a general
action in the choice of the Athenian admiral.
self
by alledging, that
in so
Callicratidas,
fleet
his first
business to increase
He
triremes,
which made
his
number
all
a battle.
The condescending
terestedness,
from what
commanders,
his
apparent disin-
attention to the
together with the ability he had shown in every kind of business, had
Callicratidas
in his
command,
before he
officers,
the
armament and among the allies. The Lacedaemonian system,' they was most impolitic. Such continual change of the person at said,
'
'
A
is
was of acknowltged
adds,
'
'
servile origin;
wliose authority
at
good
as .Elian's,
who
But Herodotus, Thutydides and Xenophon, all make it sufficiently evident that, in their time, no men of servile, or any other neodamode families, as they were
Greece.
called,
and that
a
it
wliich, according to
fit
could reach those liigh siuiations, under the Spartan government, which Gylip-
pus,
niosi
510
*
HISTORY OF GREECE.
most important naval command thus
unversed
in
fell
'
Chap. XX.
'
among the allies, were to preside over the The consequences would be ruinous, both
fleet.'
of the
allies.
'
by the cotemporary
marks bis
could
character.
home
and
if cither
Lysander, or
notgainsaj'
'
any
it.
other, pretends to
more
skill in
naval command,
I shall
'
my
my
ability.
I,
therefore
now
Will
it
know,
as well as
'
You am me to
I
in
I
me your
zealous coopera?'
'
or shall
go home and
and
This speech
s.
6.
All
all
meant no
resistance to the
legal
admiral, and
no backwardness
His
The
rough manners,
accommodated
to relieve,
on the contrary
;
irritated
and
his
simple and unsuspicious honesty did not conceive any political necessity for
whom
he came
any pleasure of
his
country.
Noway
de-
over to him,
by a display of
economy, returned
found
of
Callicratidas immediately
He
made, however, no
Sect.II.
5u
of Saidis, to ask for a supply, which he supposed was to be issued of course: but to provide for a favorable reception by any previous intrigue or any ceremonious compliment, or to obviate any ill impression
that Lysander or the friends of Lysander might have made, did not come within liis imagination. On arriving at Sardis, he applied
for
an audience.
He was
on
M'ait
two days.
feel
virtue,
and and
he did
to
not immediately
the
But,
going
;
according
appointment,
he
met
with procrastination
in the
tendance
antichambers,
everything he
saw, the
pomp, the
faith-
which struck
and the
all
and
venality
which soon
in
became evident,
in
excited his
indignation.
At
length,
who would
;
to barbarians for
money! He
saw,'
he
said,
'
'
among oneanother
if
he lived to
'
'
Athens.'
On
first
care was to
move
his
fleet
from a
He conducted
it
to Miletus,
money. For
mediate need he obtained a loan from the Milesians and Chians, and
he then proceeded to employ the force he had
consisting of a hundred and seventy triremes.
collected, his fleet
in
'l'^'
S. {
'
,0,
Methymne
by
assault.
Lesbos
All the
s.
was
his
first
object,
city
9-
effects
were given
up
to
for plunder,
and
collected
in the market-place,
be
of the armament.
The
allies
licratidas,
rare in
*
Grecian history,
where
he commanded, no
Greek should be made a slave.' While Callicratidas had been so increasing his fleet, Couon adhered to the different system which, on first taking the command, he had
12
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Chap. XX.
had adopted, reducing the number of his triremes, to have more select If we may guess at tlie purpose, of which we are not posicrews. tively informed, he was urged by the same deficiency of supplies from'
home, which had not a
little
made every attention to the With select ships, and select collection of contributions necessary. crews, he could be quicker in his motions, make sudden attacks
places,
upon defenceless
Xen.
s'
pursue
strong
Ilel.
be opposed
Vo'^
Callicratidas,
was
not by a
Cononhad appeared in some degree to command that element. The Peloponnesian fleet was lying at Methymne, when Conon was
seen passing with seventy triremes.
s.
11.
Conon
fled
for
IMitylene;
s-
with
12.
Comlost
numbers so
superior, the
Athenians
men however
escaping.
The
they secured by hauling them under the town-wall, so as to be protected from the battlements.
Callicratidas, stationing his fleet in the
hafbour, and sending for infantry from ^lethymne and Chios, formed
the siege of Mitylene by sea and land.
supplies
came
to
The
S.
situation
The
13.
city
means even
to send
To
For
tlie
moved
crews of his
This was
1.
best rowers,
'
who gave
Jti irailri
Kotun
Je
s~s-,
fnoi^utTa
1.
C. 0. S. 14.
Til SaXatrcai'.
repeated
Sect. II.
5 13
Hel.
the enemy, while their crews were ashore at their dinner, seemed to
afford the wished-for opportunity
:
13.
This
be;
In some confusion,
in
pursuit;
15.
and one of the Athenian triremes was taken about sunset the same day
:
lo-
The
still
able to
make, after
internal troubles,
shows extraordinary
vigor in the system, which owed its origin to the daring genius of Themistocles,
and
its
to the
wisdom of
Pericles
yet which perhaps could never have existed, or could not havelasted, but
for the well-constructed foundation,
pared.
The circumstances
A hundred
and ten
tri-
s.
17.
citizen, within age for forein service, of the two lower orders, but
many
all
common
all
not be so few
as
twenty thousand.
for sea
:
merous
fleet
was ready
command
(for,
in
speaking of the
chuse between
at
Greek naval
these
titles),
it
service,
we have continual
difficulty
to
the time
it s. is,
in Athens,
Ten Samian
triremes reinforced
there
and, requisition being sent to the other allied and subject states,
for the utmost naval force that they could furnish, allowing
no
able-
*,
hundred and
its
course was
time of Conon's defeat, Diomedon, another of the ten generals, was cruizing with a separate squadron of twelve ships. Receiving
At
the
s.
16.
Vol.
II.
informalioii
5M
more
Xen
1.1.
s.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
information of his coUegue's distress, he
zeal than
Chap. XX.
apparently with
made an
effort,
judgement, to relieve
it.
ships:
Hel. C.6
his
whole force at
jNIitylene,
when
19
intelligence reached him, that a powerful fleet from Attica was arrived
Leaving then
fifty triremes,
the hlockade, he went with a hundred and twenty to meet the enemy.
20.
lice,
night
of a naval
camp on
:
the
little
ilands of
and,
soon
after,
informa-
him that
but, a
lum to wait for day. Early in the morning the approach of the enemy became known ta the Athenian commanders, who immediately imbarked their crews,
steered southward for the open sea,
and formed
their order
of
battle.. fleet.
Xenophon
it,
nesian ships were at this time generally swifter than the Athenian
that, since the first )ears
sa
guard against
line.
The
The
lines,,
;
manded
-*.25.
two
The
formerly
commanded
The
was
which seems
less to
Xenophon, deserves
it
notice, as
it
with which the Athenian military service was conducted, while, in some
of the Grecian democracies, subordination was very defective.
23'
Xenophon seems
Sect.II.
fleet judicious,
SEAFIGHT OF ARGINUS^.
5i5
and the master of the Spartan admiral's ship, Ilcrnon, a Megarian, apparently saw that it was. More experienced probably,
in naval affairs, than his
battle,
commander, he augured ill of the approaching and advised retreat from superior numbers. Callicratidas anthe
that
dis-
judgement which the great command his death would be a small loss to
'
intrusted to
him
required,
'
would be
graceful.'
The
fleets
line.
much
equality.
At length
who commanded
in the right
wing of
the beak,
shock of his
galley striking an
enemy m ith
About the same time the Athenian right, commanded by Protomachus, jnade an impression upon the Peloponnesian left confusion spred to
:
fled.
Above seventy
When
8.25.
&c. 7,
To
collect the
wreck and
who might be
after
on the ruins of
galleys,
or
by swimming, was commonly an important Diomedon proposed that this should be action.
the whole
fleet.
naval
the
first
concern of
Erasinides,
for
proceeding im-
fleet
The enemy's
said, were due diligence used, might be taken intirej the destruction
*
twenty-five
the
number
of ships nienti-
no eriur
in
transcription,
oned as
lost,
In
Unable more
as
a following passage (c. 7. s. 10.) twelve have been lost and the
;
sunk or disabled.
3
U 2
of
^16
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Chap.XX.
of their navy would thus be nearly complete; and the exigencies of th commonwealth required that such an opportunity should not be lost,
in the endevor to save the wrecked, -which the groM ing roughness of
both
fleet
neither
Conon
it
ships should remain to collect the wreck, while the rest of the fleet
proceeded to Mitylene.
There
is
in this affair,
Xen.
1.
1^.
llel.
C.6.
may have caused the reserve, it may be suspected that Xenophon knew more than he has chosen to unfold. None of the generals took the command of the large squadron appointed to the relief of the -wrecked it was committed to Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who both
ever
:
in the situation
To make
some of the taxiarcs were ordered upon the duty with them. All the generals were in the mean time to go, with the main body of the
fleet,
to Mitylene.
The
which the Arginusan Hands afforded; and the unfortunate crews of twelve ships, wrecked in the battle, were thus left to perish.
In the night, nevertheless, one of those small light vessels called keletes, which had attended the Peloponnesian fleet for the purpose of
carrying intelligence or orders, reached Mitylene with news of its disaster.
Eteonicus,
who commanded
most careful secrecy, and to return into the harbour by broad daylight, with his crcAV wearing chaplets, as was usual for the messengers of victory, and proclaiming
to
go immediately
fleet.
7.
ally executed.
the thanks-
ceremony, ordered
Sect.III.
dered that
all
SEAFIGHT OF ARGINUS^.
should immediately take their supper.
517
lie
Meantime
all sailed
These unexpected motions of the besieging armament, which were so ably conducted as to give no opportunity for advantage against it,
first
intimated to
Conon
Hastening to
already approaching
his
The
fleet
no opportunity offering
SECTION
The
sand
victory
III.
lost
procure
superior men, she never had morexitizens equal to the conduct of the
greatest affairs than at this time.
bulus,
At
least three,
Alcibiades, Thrasyin
great
commands,
and yet
annals.
mad
with jealousy
of superior men, were more than ever dupes to the arts of designing and, like a weak and fickle tyrant, whose passion is his only orators
:
law,
thono
moment
Hence
5i
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Hence followed one of the most extraordinary, most
most
fatal strokes
Chai'.
disgraceful,
XX.
and
Of the
eight generals
Xen. Hel
1.
1.
C.7.
s.
who commanded
togenes
c.
7.
I.
Conon
there.
at
Samos: Diomedon;
Pericles,
h'ttle
went home;
ex-
which
are
known
all
to us only
by
their effects.
decree of
Philocles were
new
As soon
was arrested.
as
Archc-
demus,
then
orator,
and considered
head of the
for
democratical
embeziling
lespont,
and
misconduct
in his
command; and
five to give,
before which the charge was exhibited, ordered the victorious general
to prison.
It remained
before the
clusion
it
all
should be put
The council
came forward
accordingly ordered
all
When
when
in
as the principal
intrusted the
command
of a
fleet
in the battle
now
Xe-
alledgcd against the generals was the neglect of that very duty.
for
this
apparent contradiction
".
The
council, however, was evidently guilty of the grossest and most tyranoppression.
to
conduct their
defence in the usual form: advantages which the law positively pre-
To Aixa?fie.
'"
some of
the persons
indeed
little
explain
but
it
scribed
Sect. III.
S19
Thus
restricted,
made
nearly the
'
same apology.
'
After a most
they had taken upon themselves a very important and urgent duty, the pursuit of the enemy, and the relief
been intrusted to
depended on them, had not been omitted or slighted it had officers whom none would deny to be competent
who had
enterprizes.
had been a
failure,
whom
injurious
none any
For
the
failure in
geneXen. Hel.
s.
by each of
party,
4.
But the
tlie
their destruction,
presidents
the presidents,
That
in the
dusk of evening,
'
must be
Ac-
to
move,
'
That,
in the
in-
'
To move any
had been already decided that the assembly could not proceed to a division, seems a strange incongruity; but the motion made shows that they depended upon the passions, and not upon the
question,
it
when
It
was no
less
520
HISTORY OF GREECE.
party was strong,
tient
:
Chap. XX.
But the and the body of the people thoughtless and impaand unwary
the question was carried
Having thus obviated the acquittal of the unfortunate generals, Avhich, according to Xenophon, a majority of the assembly had
actually pronounced, and which wanted only the declaration of the
presidents to give
it
effect;
to substitute,
mode of
trial
instead of that
still
of their purpose
an
Xen.
l.l.
Ilel.
effort
Recourse was
C.7
8.5.
therefore
had
which would favor their views. It was the season of the Apaturia, a festival derived from patriarchal times, in Avhich families assembled,
its
members.
in black,
themselves about the city, as relations of those lost in the storm, after
the battle of Arginusse.
artifice
effect
among
to the
When
'
resolution, as it stands
the generals
in the
'
council hath decreed, " That the people shall proceed immediately
:
that proclamation
people,
be
made by
the herald,
informing the
'*
criminal, in neglecting to
in the battle,
must
" put
Sect.
*
III.
i2i
jnit his die into the first vase; whoever deems them innocent, into " the second: that the punishment, in case of condemnation, shall he
*'
some
accused was so flagrant, and the violation of the constitution of so dangerous a kind, that the party thought something might be still
wanting, to inflame passion sufficiently
just consideration.
among
stifle
cording to the account of Xenophon, such that we cannot but wonder ^nat their success.
'
7.
that,
having been
flour-barrel
;
ships,
on a
if
and that
'
he should escape that fate which for them was inevitable, not to
'
unknown to the Athenian people, how abandoned those who had deserved so well of their
let it pass
itself,
The
A^'as
s.
8.
Nor
body among
according to law,
still
The
in popular
passion.
They
'
demo-
cracy:
'
It
was
they said,
'
for an individual to
;'
presume
multitude vociferated,
'
that
it
prescribe
bounds to the
will of the
'
presume to check the authority of the assembly, he would move that generals. liis fate should be decided by the same ballot with that of the
Vol.
II.
sX
'Hie
522
HISTORY OF GREECE.
The assembly upon
this
Chap. XX.
feared,
Euryptolemus
by
Iltjl.
still
opposition
'"
The
to declare, that they \vould not put the question for a decree subversive
Callixenus, imboldened
by the support he had already found, and dreading the consequences of defeat in his measure, again mounted the bema, and, addressing the
people, accused the prytanes of refusing their duty.
The multitude,
rights,
Mho
The
9,
command.
Socrates,
but
to
That
his intention
was partly
and
'
Diomedon
and
at the
'
'
misdemeanor
ought
and
to
in their
command, inasmuch
'
'
to
the council
'
com
'
This
Sect.
*
III.
IMPEACHMENT OF THE
:
GE'NERALS.
523
'
This was their crime only, yet their collegues are involved in the accusation a crime against the public it must be confessed, tho not ofa very hainous nature; it was an act of benevolence toward those very
tion,
officers,
'
Avho are
in a
conducted
charity
by
a capital prosecu-
their benefactors.'
Having
the time.
his defence,
he proceeded to his
government
at
Frequent experience of being misled by designing men, into measures which they found occasion severely to repent, made the
antient democracies generally jealous of advice given by their orators,
unless
it
'
flattered
some
I
mind.
'
In what
in the moment swayed the popular have to recommend,' said therefore Euryptolemus,
passion,
which
man can
in
lead
you
into
any dangerous
error.
For
must always be
offenders, equally
whether
many
be involved in one
trial,
common judgement,
or each be
I ihere-
allowed a separate
fore
'
most earnestly wish and recommend, that you would allow each
one day for his separate defence
:
and
'
to those
who
'
may produce
it is
own
'
authority,
well
known
found
you
all".
It declares,
'
That
if
any
his
Athenian people, he
is
shall
he
'
body
shall
'
be forfeited
I desire
'
no
'
and, if
you think
proper, let
'
my
first
"
To Ka>wMt.
4,iipirft.
If there
is
any-
it
I think
it is
not noticed
where any fartheraccuuiitof this remarkable law, than what we have here from Xenophou,
by either
Petit or Potter,
'
The
52;
*
HISTORY OF GREECE.
The crimes held most
if
Chap. XX.
and
none such.
atrocious,
among men,
you
are sacrilege,
'
high-treason.
are accused of
But
each
the decree of
Canonus
is,
in
'
let the
Even
so,
'
will
have
:
Mill
be divided into
tliere
three parts
is
in the first
you
will inquire
'
trial
'
to the accusation
Let
it
be recollected
how
lately Aristarchus,
who overthrew
'
who
'
formed the signal treachery of betraying CEnoe to the Thebans, even Aristarchus was allowed his day, and even to chuse hib day, for his
defence.
to one
who were
so scrupulously just
'
'
injurious, will
who
down
the bar-
'
*
'
safe,
to the executioner
glory of the most important victory that has been gained in a war of
twenty-six years
If
the safety of the commonwealth, you will rather reward them with
'
'
To what
therefore
it
is,
I
'
trust
you cannot
tried,
Xen. Hel.
1. ].
hut assent:
c. 7.
'
Callixenus.
but,
up of hands being
repeated
was declared
The
resolution of
The
fatal
of
Sect. III.
525
of death against the eight generals, and the six present were exe-
cuted
".
recall
from
Sicily,
'
country?
life,
'
he
replied,
'
Yes;
but in a
trial
for
not
my
mother
lest
ball
'
Whatever authority
and death, by a
may have
ballot
;
anecdote,
judgement on
covers shame.
secret
which,
without
But
causes
while,
at to
wonder
whom we
find so
many
admire,
it
is
not a
little
among
make
may not
be digressing
may
hij^lory,
form a juster
enormities,
late
compared only
\\ilh
what has
at
in
our
own
and
to
countiy, might
in France,
among
aj)])ears itself
and
to the nation, Grecian history, and the extant writings of the ablest
Gncian
For,
as in
'
so
many men
turneil
Greece
Lvsias mentions this transaction in his oration against Eratostheiies, (p. 123. vel4C(J.)
lub account, as far as
it
and
Xenophon,
subject
5-G
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Chap. XX.
been able even to imagine a form of government which might, in a o-veat nation, reconcile the jarring pretensions arising from that variety
of rank
among men, without which even small societies cannot subsist. Our own writers, through meer familiarity with the object, as foreiners
it,
have very
much
overlooked what, in
sinscular constitution
till
in situations inabling
him
Lettrc aa Roi par M.
cle
'
to see
that
nowhcre
harmony
,
subsists,
Ciiionne.
t>
This harmony
is
Ranks
upon
its
vary,
elsewhere.
it
next
bottom
great
is
nection intimate.
Each
rank, moreover,
its
next superior
and, of all
all.
most
We
the most natural, as well as the most beneficial, never subsisted in any
by speculative
revolution,
that,
among
the
republics,
after,
no such order of
the
first
citizens
Paris,
assumed,
power; and, while the representatives of the nation were deliberating on the rights of man, trampled under foot
of
tliat
The functions
in
to modern times.
Those
writers,
who would
free,
Sect.
III.
5^7
Athens,
Laceda-mon,
or
distinguished,
citizens.
the
in
and
tho,
under the
first
Norman
power,
kings, law
of accidental
of administering the law, never were otherwise than highly, and even singularly, favorable to the freedom and property of even the lowest
citizens
'*.
Montesquieu, evidently,
amalgamation of ranks
if it
in
all coiilesce;
may
be so expressed, to
is.
as firmly
Through
and
it
this
may
advantageous constitution, England has always avoided, well be hoped will continue to avoid, that violence
been inabled to
resist
in.
'*
It
think
cords
that
of
the
Parhament,
constitution
not
only
proving
most indebted, Alfred, Henry II. and Edward I. were conquerors. It is certainly a most unworthy slander upon those uncommon great men, as well as upon the parliaments, from Edward tiie first, till the time when Fortescue wrote under Henry the sixth, to
narchs to
otir constitution
is
whom
Henry the
fourth
and
Heniy the
tliis
sixih, as at
most
and delicate ci.cumstaiices, such as the wisest, ol any age, might rejoice
dillicult
to find established by
forefalherb.
the
wisdom of
their
had no valuable
freedom,
till
the
late
important
to,
our
historians,
the
European
5S
HISTORY or GREECE.
European government, whose mildness would allow could, without foreln assistance, have withstood.
it
Chap. XX.
equal admission,
Nor
Tio
is it,
country
beyond the
war
in
first.
But, toward
a clear
dation on which
rests;
toward a just
judgement how
any of
how
far injurious,
and when
alteration
remedy may be wanting, and ^vhat, in any given circumstances, wail be the probable effect of any alteration or remedy proposed; toward
all
earliest times,
of great importance.
If then
stitution
it
to ourselves important to
earliest times,
it
know
from
will also
be not a
important to
a constitution
on the model of
possess, after
Avho,
who would improve the constitution they our example. Nor will it be less important to those
ours, or
own
country, would
raise,
with the
airy materials of theory, a constitution more perfect than the most For Maut of attention to the perfect that has yet existed upon earth.
breadth and antique firmness of the basis on which our envied and truly
enviable government
rests,
how
stems to threaten
nations united.
1
Sect.
III.
529
sufferings
will
others,
probably
readiest
The extraordinary
within reasonable
of
its
character, then
far,
less
expectation.
And,
in
digressing thus
I trust I
may
common
right.
As M. de Calonne's
it
letter, referred to
may
meme
de
nuanmoins
here, in
its
commence
cette
niier corps
de
I'Etat.
Leur prerogative
n'est
jamais
Com-
puis qae je
situation oil
I'ai les"
Vu
la
il
munes, qui ont parmi leurs Membres les fils, les freres, les parens, de ces mumes Lords, et des plus grandes maisons du royaume.
C'est ce melange, cette transfusion,
si
je le
se
et qui res-
n'a
moyen
que
les
se
empeche
la
I'autre
Grands
en
a,
qu'il n'y
egalement au maintien de
prerogative
nation
nulle part
n'est aussi
I'interet n'a
Or
il
est constant
davantage que
I'institution
d'une Charabre
le
de Calonne, le 9 Fevrier, 1/89) P-67, 68. The very great advantage, to a free constitution, of having a hereditary first magistrate, the depositary of the
Haute
et
d'une
ainsi
Par-
lement;
tive
power, so
distinguished
ks
rank as
tion, has
Plus on etudie
Lolme; but the benefit of that singular amalgamation of various rank among the
Vol.
II.
PP'<^'
530
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Chap. XX.
SECTION
Sedii'ion
IV.
Lysander reappointed commander-in-chief of the Peloponnesian feet ; in favor xcith Cyrus. Unsfeddiness of the Athenian government. Measures of the fleets : Battle of Aigosat Chios.
potami.
B.C. 407.
P.
While
justice,
W.
25.
how
Greece Mas prepared to reeeive a constitution, that could estathroughout her confines, and give security to
I
blish peace
all,
or to any.
of
all
In no
court of Europe,
actly regulated,
in
believe,
is
rank so ex-
among the
highest orders, as
is
commoners, while in ceremonial rank they may be above man}' of the peers, in legal rank they are only peers with the commoners.
1'his
England
with
no rank perimpli-
the
some way
them.
cated
'
To
begin
lias
Mr.
even with the heir apparent; as a subject, he communicates in rank with all other
subjects.
But there
another thing
less strongly
marks the
The
:
king's
liable to
we owe. the
tinction,
No
dis-
their
elder
brother's younger
he succeeds lo the
crown,
will
rank before them. The Archbishops and the Chancellor, and the great officers of
state,
more essential than the being or not being members of the legislative body ; yet the
rank of a
member
of parliament
is
known
rank
;
above
Dukes
is
not
of
royal
blood
tlie
the country.
there
is
Among
untitled
commoners
no distinction of rank, that can be very exactly defined ; and yet a distinction always subsists, in public opinion
;
de-
peculiar to oirrselves.
The
peers,
-^
The
above the peers themselves of the lower orders; but, superior thus in ceremonial rank,
of
Sect. IV.
of her people.
SEDITION AT CHIOS.
After the defeat of the Peloponnesian
fleet, in
,531
the battle
of Arginusffi, the Peloponnesian cause seems to haVe been neglected by Cyrus. The squadron, which had escaped from Mitylcne, remained at
Xen. Hel.
1.2.
s. 1.
Chios
where
its
commander Eteonicus-joined
pay
it.
it
c.l.
Avithout
money
to
Accu-stomed
as the
on
military service
by
their
own means,
this
no great
uneasiness.
or those- cheaply-
handy
or
more
the wants
in
But when,
out,
wants of
stormy
means of earning
season approached, the hope 'of relief grew fainter, reflection began
own
wealthy
Chians, was obvious to remark; and the transition M-as ready to the
observation, that, having arms in their hands,
it
formed,
that,
for
for
making themselves masters of the iland; and distinction, every associate should cany a reed.
till
the
number of
s.
2.
If
occp.sion,
show how widely it was held, among the Greeks, that might made right, and that the useful was the measure of the honest, Eteonicus would not much have regarded tlie robbery of his allies, even with the massacre that must probably have attended, if
and other
writers, whicii
commonwealth, and
The
fear of a
Xeno-
and rather an
him
to
oppose
it
with
effect.
s.3.
CJ
and
532
HISTORY OF GREECE.
and arming them
Avith daggers,
Chap. XX.
with disordered
The
eves,
first
man
coming out of a surgeon's shop, and he was instantly put to death. A crowd presently assembled about the bod}' and, inquiry
:
that the
man was
The
conspirators,
themselves unprepared,
were ignorant
vliat preparation
as the report
Xen. Hel.
).
^^.j^^
\\
atclied the event, M-ithout oiving time for recovery from sur-
2.
c. 1.
s.
4,
pri^e,
ordered
all
aboard.
of the conspirators
The mark of distinction was gone; none any longer knew M'hom to trust; all became anxious
would be the
first
...
proof of inno-
cence
forces,
remained
ashore.
informed them
supply M'as
and distributed
and spoke to
all
and particularly of the probable business of the insuing campain, as if he had known nothing of the conspiracy. All M'ere happy to receive
this tacit assurance that
all
became anxious
the death of one man, not the most guilty perhaps, but certainly con-
It
this
settled,
was held at
Ephesus.
probalily
all
mostly
Sect. IV.
533
unknown,
which had
or imperfectly
known
in
commonwealth from
to continue.
It
agony
was
how
the war
Much would
The
allies,
depend on the good-will and ready assistance of the Persian prince, and with him
it
dsmon,
Avith
in
might be reappointed
No
allied
as
how
to
render
able,
and
Athenian
fleet
at
fame.
At another
the great defeat they had received, and of their utter inability to
allies,
or to dispute the
command
still
by a subterfuge, they
:
gratified the
and their
Grecian confederates
fleet,
Aracus was appointed navarc, admiral of the but Lysander was sent to command in Asia, Mith
'*,
the
title
of epistoleus
vice-admiral.
Lysander, arriving atEphesus when winter was not yet far advanced,
Q. 407.
made
'*
it
might have a
fleet
^- ^^' 25.
to
origi-
command
exactly
gatus.
in
the
1.1.
Lacedasmonian
c.l. s.l5.
It
is
service,
nally
sent
;
by a superior
but
title
it
officer to
pretty
command
become
for
him
appears to have
rendered by the
Roman
title
Le-
the usual
for the
second
in
able
.534
HISTORY OF GREECE.
able to meet that of Athens.
^"'' ^^^
.
Chap. XX.
at Chios,
Xen. Hel.
Q 1 S.J Si 9.
J
'
when
this business
He had
the
had
ilot
that as the
countr}^,
command,
afforded a great
'
s.
'
an ample
armament
;
before establislied
B. C. 405.
*
'
ranks,
l>e
was proceeding to
"
'
make arrangements
Condescendingly
for
as
among
his
own
The
Ilel.
'
Ion's:
.
that,
2. c. 1.
0'.
s.
'J
Two
mark of
pursuance of an arbitrary
command from
"
little,
and
is
the Manialiikes.
the whole
It
it
seems,
'
'
The
bcneesh,' says
'
which
it is
intelligent
'
'
is
Susa,
Sect. IV.
Susa,
MEASURES OF LYSANDER.
unhappy
parents,
535
by
their
The Spartan
-"^pn-
Cyrus
s.9.
anxiously
sea,
remarked
such a superiority
might
certainly be acquired;
own command
and, directing a
very large sum to be put into the hands of the Spartan general, for the
cxpences of the war, parted with this kind exhortation,
'
'
be mindful
of
my
new
tion,
was already
equal in strength to
He
upon
offensive operation
less
fleet,
than against
which the
fleet
was supported..
Accordingly he led
his
armament
first
assault.
plunder;
among which
and barbarian,
mixed
race,
Greek
were
sold
In every one of the towns on the Hellespont and Propontis, which the successes of Alcibiades and Thrasybulus had restored to the dominion of Alliens, a Lacedaemonian party remained.
to the efforts,
In giving efficacy
which
sucli
two very
important objects might be at once accomplished, the checking of the revenue which supported the Athenian fleet, and the recovery of the
trade
.536
HISTORY OF GREECE.
trade with the Euxnie,
Chap. XX.
which furnished the best supplies of corn. The Hellespont was therefore the point, to which Lysander proposed to direct his principal attention; having apparently no immediate
view beyond the objects abovementioned.
Desirous to avoid the
close along the friendly
Xen. Hel.
1.
Athenian
fleet in
the passage, he
made
his
way
11, 12.
shore of Asia,
Of
all
the towns on the shores of the Hellespont and Propontis, which the
d^efeat in Sicilj^
alone
therefore
;
its
force
all
the armament,
and
command
The
of Thorax, a Lacedaemonian.
The neighsea,
was
Lampsacus
M'ere
was
rich,
former consistency.
It
Xenophon
says,
''
s.
without mentioning
how
who had
deed; and Callixcnus, and four others, were compelled to find sureties
for their appearance before the
same tremendous
tribunal,
Aw.
opportunity was taken to procure the recall of the banished, and the
restoration
senses,
KiciccX. uttq'K,
of the dishonored
is
while
the
people,
brought to
(such
who had
ruled in the
Xenophon proceeds, with evident satisfaction, to relate, that Callixenus, who found opportunity to fly, and afterward found means to make his peace and return, lived nevertheless universally hated and avoided, and, among those public distresses which will
hereafter occur to notice, was starved to death.
It
StCT.
It
IV'.
'53:7
was however vainly attemj)ted, by an oath of concord, taken by the whole people, to put an end to the ferment of party. Administration was weak, and democratical jealousy interfered in every measure.
&
Lvs
'^''"
was already divided between three oflicers, Conon, Adeimantus, and Philocles. Three more M'ere now added, with equal powers, Menandcr, Tydeus, and Cephisodotus. For
fleet
Xen.
=
Ilel.
subsistence,
the
armament depended upon itself. It was indeed able assessed upon the subject-states of Asia and
business unavoidably ingaged the attention of the
Vi
Thrace, and
it
country
generals,
but
tliis
toward
having
their pecuniary
Persia,
The
fleet,
maintain in energy, far greater than had ever formerly been seen in
wars between the Greeks, made
it
avoid,
and
his fleet,
at
s.
15,
a hundred and
eighty
triremes,
in the proportion
of practised seamen
of the supreme
among
the division
authority.
Samos
and
s.
11.
plundered
tlie
They
the
enemy
but, in tlieir
way, they received intelligence that Lysander had already passed northward. In alarm for the dependencies of the commonwealth on
the Hellespont, they hastened after him.
Arriving at Eleus, they were
i-'-
informed that Lampsacus was aheady taken, and the enemy's fleet Stopping therefore only while they took refreshment, they there.
proceeded to Sestos, where they procured provisions for the night,
Vol.
II.
Lampsacus.
538
Lampsaciis.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
The
historian,
it
Chap. XX.
The
strait
scarce!}'
two
to
known
his
On
All
the same
crews
had
Cy
Athenian
fleet
was
ofi^"
Tlie Peloponnesiaus
remained motionless
till
As
On
the
morrow
these
days.
and
Xen. Hel.
1.1,
s.
so for the
two following
c. 5.
Thracian Chersonese.
10.
c. 1.
The two
fleets
in
his
neiohbourhood of ="
Aigospo-
1.2.
tami had neither town nor defensible harbour, but only a beach on
which the galleys might be hauled, or near which, in the shelter of the strait, they might safely ride at anchor. The ground was commodious for incamping; but, in the defective military system of that
age, the
seamen and
soldiers
vent to
Sestos,
two
miles
off,
for a
The enemy meanwhile, at Lampsacus, had the security of a barbour for their fleet, with a town for their people, where, always in
market.
readiness for every duty, they could procure necessaries.
>^
Alcibiades
generals on
these
Lysandf
ent to
tlie
tlie
Sect. IV.
BATTLE OF
and equally,
;
GO
P O T A
I.
y^^f
moved only
to
Sestos,
equally v/itb the enemy, would have the benefit of a town with
as
a harbour,
from
might
light
This
disdain,
and
ne{>li2;ence '^
of the Athenians.'3.
'
17.
Not
them.
in
on pretence of seeking
day, he directed the
On
if
the
fifth
commanders of
exploring ships,
moved
Conon
ration.
alone, of the
as he
Athenian generals,
in
any
state
of prcpacall
s.
is.
As soon
in motion,
:
he ordered the
to arms,
go aboard
Conou's trireme,
Avith
from the
shore.
No
effort,
effect than
adding the
s.
iQ.
While therefore
tlie
enemy were
still
upon
their
made
to be secured against
Conon
fled
might accomplish.
in
Sails
were an
action.
Within so narrow a
left
and with
Lysander had
those of
his
3 z 2
540
his fleet ashore.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
Conon had
he carried off
the walls of Lampsacus, but at the point of Abarmis.
landing- there,
to the
all
Chap. XX.
Accordins^ly
month of
to the
the Hellespont,
escaped to
sea.
number of
his attention
tiif
and troops.
'':
Some of
made
prisoners.
A Milesian privateer
.
*'
vo*^^
third
s.
21.
The prisoners in the mean time being conveyed to Lampsacus, jt became matter of very serious consideration how to dispose of numbers, so beyond all common example of battles among the Greeks. The
allies
!Many accusations were urged against the Athenians, of what they had
done, and what they had proposed to do.
Of two
triremes, a Corinthian
and an Andrian,
Philocles,
It
by order of the Athenian general had been put to death by being thrown down a precipice.
lately taken, the crews
it
as a truth, that
made
were
seeking.
.s.
Adeimantus
said to
have opposed
;
22.
this
inhuman
resolution.
and
the prisoners
citizens,
example,
most
in
the
" Ta niya}.u. iri. '" Ta Tiix"'^?'* alx'^f"'' " So I think Xenophon must be understood; and the expression of-Plutarch, in
his
to
Ml^i^lB Anrif.
course
Sect. IV.
B A TT LE O F A I G O
we have had
too
first
OT A
:\I I.
541
much
much
the expression of
liis
assert,
by killing
citizens,
in
who
fell
and perliaps
some measure
I''"'- vit.
three thousand.
^^'
this
Ilel,
that, being corrupted by Lysander with Persian gold, he had betrayed the fleet. The charge, however, was never proved nor does it appear how Adeimantus could have commanded the circumstances which put the fleet into the enemy's
;
was asserted
'*"'''
generals,
who
indeed seem
Not
we might commanders altogether seems to have been totally inexcusable; tho in what degree any one was separately blameworthy does not appear. While the command of gold, which Lysander possessed, excites one kind of suspicion, the
gives
all
Xenophon
the information
the Athenian
little
scru-
pulousness usual
among
the Greeks,
may
excite another.
At
the same
time
it is
may To
would
fear
it;
not for
Athens, the trap and grave of her victorious generals, would not be
the place where,
in the
Conon would
" We
a
fiixl,
to
his
manyy
day
1.
in turn
6. c.
10. ct
Thucyd.
6. c. 91.)
any
542
Xen. Hel.
^'
HISTORY OF GREECE.
anv impoitaiit service to the public.
l)e3'ontl
la,
Chap. XX.
as lie
As soon therefore
was
'^I'g'^
Diod.].
to bear the
news of a
commonwealth.
who
SECTION
V.
Cpnsequences of the battle of A'igospotami. Siege of Athens. elusion of the Pcloponncsian war.
Con-
The
all
the
enemy
Xen. Hel.
6.
and take
^\^q
strait,
communicating with
he appeared between
Euxine
was
As soon
as
1.
The Athenian
uncommon strength
city,
As
his
therefore
would promote
purpose, he permitted
Athenian citizens to go
Meanwhile the
^
Paralus, arriving
as
by night
at PeiriEus,
communicated
licet,
p' VV "?
intelligence,
such
not
carrj*.
,
communicated through the town of from mouth to mouth, by the long Mails, up
rapidly
Peirajus,
12
Sect. V.
tion
MEASURES
;
AT ATHEN
S.
540
historian,
became universal
no person
friend to
slept in Athens.
whom everyone had some relation or mourn, was not the prevailing passion it v,as overborne by the dread, which pervaded all, of that fate to themselves, whicli, howof the Athenian youth, among
;
many bloody
massacres perpetrated at
command.
many
(it
is
still
the
of the Melians,
Athens was not even now without able men, capable of directing
public
affairs in
strength of the
coherence
in
the
who
Avas
The
many
jsocr. do
pa^e, p. vits.
de Ugat.
l'-"-^'
Such was
his confidence
in
his
To have
a residence
suited to his
new
ment of Andocides,
families, to
occupy
fear inforced,
'>^'-
for the
fittest
moment, sober conduct, and a disposition to listen to those Oi> the morrow after tiie arrival of the fatal news, a to advise.
general assembly being held, such measures were resolved on as the exigency of the moment most required. Immediate siege by land and
sea was expected.
To
was no longer
possible.
It
the
^44
HISTORY OF GREECE.
pare every
Chap. XX.
the ports except one, to repair the walls, to appoint guards, and pre-
-,
Xen.
3.
,,
iiei.
pontine
s.
cities,
sailed to
dered to him.
coast,
He
and
all
the Athenian dependencies there acceded to the LaceAll the ilands hastened to follow the example,
dasmonian terms.
alone excepted.
Samos
answered the
citizens,
The Samians, in the savage fury of democracy, summons by a massacre of the men of rank'' among their
for defence.
and prepared
Means
wanting
8.
:
to punish this
to be
He
sent infor-
ready to
The Lacedemo-
lasted,
The Peloponnesian
all
Mere
summoned
:
to arms,
now
of
The
the king,
With the
battle of Plata^a,
commanded
Attica
from Deceleia
gymnasium of Academia,
close to Athens.
The interval of leisure for the fleet, during the preparation for the march of the army, was employed by Lysander in an act of justice
and charity,
the
s.
and popularity to
5.
Lacedimonian name. There were, wandering about Greece, some, ]\Ielians and ^Eginetans, who, by accidental absence, or some other
These Lysander collected and reinstated
took
in tlieir ilands.
;
lucky chance, had escaped the general massacre of their people by the
Athenians,
l-'rom
and then,
v\ith a
hundred and
fifty triremes,
liis
station at tlie
sea.
mouth of the
AVithout
Sect. V.
S
ally,
EG E
OF ATHEN
fleet,
S.
545
Xen. Hel.
*^"^*
without stores, and blockaded by and land, the Athenians made no proposal to their victorious enemies in sullen despondency they prepared, to the best of their
sea
:
Without an
without a
"
g
ability,
their final
ation,
for
Not
of Athens.
On
Lys. odv.
j/f^tosth.
was
still
considerable,
rather as M'hat
relief,
their advantage.
But
hence the democratical party had only the more jealousy, not wholly
an unreasonable jealousy, of any treaty to be managed under their
direction
;
and, between the two, the moderate and worthy had difficulty
all in
to interfere at
public
affairs.
make the
effect of
famine
it
was severely
felt
by the Athenians.
Not
'^'~'
g"
j,"
however
till
At
remained alone to
command
language of Grecian
that
'
he had no power
nistratiou at
:
to treat; proposals
must be addressed
to the admis.
'
Lacedsmon.'
s.
iiesus but at Sellasia, on the border of Laconia, a haughty message from the ephors commanded their immediate return informing them,
;
Vol.
II.
that
5i6
*
HISTORY OF GREECE.
that the terms they brought were
Chap. XX.
;
known
at
Lacedosmon
and, if they
desired peace, they must come better instructed.' This answer, communicated at Athens, filled the city with despair. Condemnation of the Athenian people to slavery was the least evil now expected from the revenge of a conquering enemy and, before
' ;
many must
Lys. adv.
Eratostli.
p. i28.
^.j^^
perish of hunger.
In
.
this
nearly-threatening M'reck of
still
holding a dignified.
.
between
to enter into with one party, and the people pertinaciously refused to
commit
measure.
1.2.
T
c. 2.
to
the other.
join
The Many were taught to fear that the oligarchal party, and make terms for
It
advanthinars,
taoe.
Eiatostb,
required the demolition of the long walls for the space of ten furlongs.
A:adv.Acor. Archcstratus, a member of the council, only declaring his opinion, in p.4ji,453. ]^jg pi;^ce, ous;ht not to prevent a treaty, M'hich that such a requisition ^ '^ ' ' Xeu. ut sup.
.
to consult
about
made
an exigency.
command
Examples of
critical emergencies,
abounded in
of the Athenian
government.
;
ostracism:
Lys. in.Ni-
If
com.
p. 84-9.
'
of most
cd. Reiske.
dangerous tendency,
M'as
the real
Sect. V.
SIEGE OF ATHENS.
made an
interpolation in the code of
to
5 17
may
by
Lysias,
no information on the subject remaining from the cotemseems not easy now to judiie.
evidently the removal of a
ibid
porar}' historian,
Therameues, becoming more Xen a leading man, ventured to undertake that, if he might be commis- Lys.
sioned to go to Lysandcr, as well as to Lacedasmon,
lie
&
'
adv.
''^'
would bring
'
The
people in assembly
it
gave
their approbation,
seems implied,
good
faith.
He
What
when the
total failure
among
by which
their
obviated.
How the
among
them,
the historian
has
omitted to mention
cir-
cumstances of the
sians,
siege,
in
The Pcloponneand
commanding
could starve the city into submission, without the great labor
expence of a contravallation, such as the circuit of Athens and Peirasus, and the walls connecting them, would require; and, more completely
to deter the introduction of provisions, tliey denounced,
by procla-
"wlio
should
ije
taken in the
But the pressure of want, and the dread of captivity, coinciding with the passion for distinction, strong in Athenian breasts, excited to daring action; and the Peloponnesian army could not
4
completely
548
HISTORY OF GREECE.
perfectly block the harbours.
Chap. XX.
fleet,
ia
In these circumstances
sent
264.
t.
3.
by Conon
His name
is
unknown
we
learn
that they were rewarded with crowns, and with the public thanks of
from
whom
Xen. Hel.
1.2. c. 2
3.
11
But notwithstanding these occasional supplies, want, and the apprehension of want, grew more and more pressing in Athens. Theramenes
therefore,
in
the fourth
month
might be
To
to Lysander;
'
who
with a declaration,
what the
'
'
It
was no longer
Au
embassy,
Theramenes
at the head,
they could.
5
jj.
The
sacred
character
Theramenes and
permit them to proceed, until they had given satisfactory assurance of the fulness of their powers.
On
their arrival at
Sect. V.
in
S
fate
GE
O F AT H E N
'
S.
<49
which the
Tlie Corinthian
and
Xen.
pTce."
ibk).
p'!
Theban deputies contended vehemently that no terms should be granted: the Athenian commonwealth, the enemy of the common
'
2-20.
'
of Greece, so nearly successful in the horrid attempt to inslave or exterminate the Avhole nation, ought to be annihilated
liberties
:
'S&i'iataic.
'
the people should be sold for slaves, and the site of the city should
'
be
made
a sheepwalk,
Many
of the other
administration was
sion,
little
Deprived of
its
navy
and of the revenue and power derived from transmarine dependencies, Athens, under oligarchal government, they thought might be 3. valuable
dependency of Lacedsemon
happened but a
been united in
\'e\v
Peloponnesus had
to apprehend that, at
some future
period,
They
common
would
of
all
whom
was beholden
for the
most important
it.
danger
was
re-
per-
mitted
'
to exist in civil
That
all
ships of
walls,
and and
that
all
;
exiles
'
that the
other people, as
'
should go wherever
and
sea.'
With
Athens.
these terms Theramcnes and his collegues hastened back to xen. Hel.
to
hold
^^3*^'
~*
many days
The
arrival of the
ambassadors
all
parts of
the
550
tlie
HISTORY OF GREECE.
city
Chap. XX.
lest an and no choice
in the
irresistible
enemy should
still
have refused to
from
whom
Information,
relief.
On
Theramenes declared
the terms, which, he said, were the best that himself and his coUegues
to obtain,
and such
as,
in his
larae
The acceptance of
INIay.
^
'
-^vas
a principal circumstance of
begun by the army, with much parade, to the sound of military iTiusic, and with an alacrity, says the cotemporary Athenian historian, natural to ih.ose who considered that day as the era of restored freedom
^^^s
to Greece.
men of
it,
whom
Ilel.
government to an
rji^d
oligarchj-.
2. c. 3.
J,
of thirty,
They were
directed
to consider of a
political administration,
such as Lace-,
(liumon should approve, preserving the antient laws and civil govern-
ment of
,
the
commonMcalth,
as far as
oligarch}-.
Things being so
sian
far settled in
aimy,
Attica,
but
Lysander conducted
1
j^tlic
fiCct
The people of
that
ilaiul,
after
Sect. V.
551
after sustaining a
some
time,
them
to expect:
safety,
The
Lacedemonian squadron
so Lacedeemon,
in
its
twenty-seventh year
and
now
in alliance
and the
aristocratical, or
rather the
commonwealth of
the nation.
EN'D OF
S30
stamped below
SOUTHPRw
AT LOS ANGKLES
214
M69h v72