"The purpose of this book is to make sense of the most salient general patterns of how terrorist campaigns end

- to determine how they work, when they work, and why" (Cronin p. 8). Cronin's definition of terrorism includes four components: (1) a fundamentally political nature, (2) the symbolic use of violence, (3) purposeful targeting of noncombatants, (4) conducted by non-state entities Her arguments:

Terrorist campaigns always end, typically in a combination of the following six patterns: o decapitation - capture / killing of the group's leadership o negotiation - entry of the group into a legitimate political process o success - achievement of the group's aims o failure - implosion or loss of the group's public support o repression - defeat and elimination by brute force o reorientation - transition from terrorism into other forms of violence By understanding the way historical terrorist campaigns have ended, we can hasten the termination of current or future campaigns; understanding the strategies of terrorism is the only way to avoid being manipulated by them (p. 120).

Her key findings:

Decapitation o "Decapitation" refers to the arrest or assassination of the group's leader. Whether the state decides to capture or kill the terrorist leader reflects the law enforcement vs. war paradigms of counterterrorism efforts (p. 16). o "Arresting a leader damages a campaign more than killing him does, especially when the jailed leader can be cut off from communicating with his subordinates yet also paraded in humiliation before the public" (p. 14). o "Killing the leader of a group that has widespread popular support either has no measurable effect or is counterproductive" (p. 14). If a leader is killed, he might become a martyr and generate publicity for his cause. o The leaders who formulate the narrative of violence have a crucial role in sustaining the terrorist campaign because their narrative mobilizes followers. The narrative "must overshadow moral qualms about targeting civilians," convince supporters there is no alternative to violence, convince followers the targets/victims are 'the enemy,' and persuades supporters that they are innocent of any wrongdoing and/or justified in conducting violence (p. 15). Negotiation o After a terrorist group survives past the 5 or 6 year mark, refusing to negotiate does not appear to shorten the terrorist campaign, nor does entering into negotiations appear to prolong the terrorist campaign (p. 35) o "Negotiations can facilitate a process of decline, but have rarely been the single factor driving an outcome" (p. 35). Data suggests negotiations are best used as a

strategy to manage terrorist violence, but the group ceases to exist for other reasons (p. 36). Negotiations rarely end terrorist campaigns in the short term (p 71). It is best to use negotiations to redirect competition into a less violence channel while talks proceed and allow the campaign to end due to other factors (p. 72). Patterns: There is a direct correlation between the age of the groups and the probability of talks, but only one in five groups have entered into talks on strategic issues (p. 36). Most negotiations produce neither resolution nor cessation of the conflict (p. 36). Many groups negotiating in recent years have continued to conduct violence during the talks, although often at a lower level of intensity and frequency (p. 36). Why Governments Negotiate Terrorist attacks and government countermeasures typically continue during negotiations; to assume the cessation of violence is counterproductive because it is actually a means to find an exit strategy from the violence (p. 37). Tactical motivations: short-term pause in violence while terrorists focus efforts on negotiations rather than attacks, access to intelligence on group structure or hierarchy, provide insight into motivations of terrorist leadership and highlight differences among members, cause divisions or factions among followers (p. 37) Negotiations can provide an alternative narrative for passive supporters or neutral observers; contradicts terrorists claim there is no alternative to violence (p. 38). If a government refuses to negotiate with terrorists and later decides to negotiate, it loses credibility. Inflexibility on the part of the government makes it appear terrorists can bomb their way to the negotiating table (p. 38). If the government maintains a hardline that it refuses to negotiate with terrorists, it might encourage the terrorist group to conduct increasingly violent attacks. From the governments perspective, the secret seems to be to negotiate officially only when it becomes clear that the cause is gaining popular support or legitimacy, either through the actions of the group or clumsy counteractions by the government (p. 39). Why Groups Negotiate Do not mistakenly assume terrorist organizations behave as states or factions in a civil war. For example, while many states would want a conflict to end, groups that engage in terrorism do not necessarily share that desire. Because violence is their last resort, without violence, they may feel they have no voice (p. 39). Very few terrorist groups choose to enter negotiations; when they do engage in talks, terrorist groups tend to have a longer-than-average life span. Groups that negotiate almost always pursue issues related to control

of territory (p. 40-41). [Note: Cronin includes an appendix showing the correlation between a groups lifespan and its participation in negotiations] Terrorist groups might not express tangible demands at the outset of their campaign, preferring broad ideological aims to rally support. It is important for the government to assess the groups motivations over time to determine exactly what the organization wants out of negotiations (p. 41). Most groups that negotiate either cease to exist for other reasons or are still in periodic talks. [] The predominant pattern is for talks to drag on, with interruptions, with setbacks, and without resolution, but also without outright failure (p. 41). Terrorist organizations may use the talks as a period to re-arm, retrain, or reorganize themselves. Seven factors influencing whether negotiations are likely to succeed Stalemate negotiations more likely to be initiated when both sides sense a stalemate; future violence will be counterproductive (p. 63). The political context within which talks occur is more important than the substance of the talks (p. 64). Strong leadership strong, hierarchical leadership ensures compliance by followers. Weak leadership may engender fractionalization, thus undermining negotiations when the organization is unable to control all of its adherents (p. 65). Sponsors international, religious, or private sponsors act as mediators or safety nets. Particularly in the early stages of negotiation, governments might be unable to contact terrorist leaders directly due to domestic political costs or the clandestine nature of terrorist organizations; third parties might have better luck as intermediaries (p. 66). Clarity in the negotiation process is not necessarily a desirable goal, and can indeed undermine long-term prospects for peace because more ambiguous language allows for flexibility and continued interaction between the government and terrorists (p.66). Suicide Campaigns inclusion of suicide attacks/campaigns reduces willingness or ability of factions to coexist; negotiations in the wake of suicide attack campaigns are hard to conclude successfully (p. 66). Splintering a common effect of negotiations is the splintering of groups into factions that support negotiations and those that do not (p. 67). Splintering may be advantageous and strategic by allowing the government to break an increasingly large or threatening group into smaller factions addressed piecemeal, thus the importance of understanding the terrorist groups dynamics (p. 68). The long-term goal (a viable political outcome) and the shortterm goal (a reduction in violence) may be at odds (p. 68). Spoilers factions may attempt to spoil negotiations by conducting additional terrorist attacks In the presence of a foundation of popular support for the talks, strong outside guarantors, and identification of the negotiators with

the process itself, terrorist spoiler attacks actually strengthened the commitment to the negotiations rather than undermined it (p. 69). In other cases, the existence of negotiations is a source of vulnerability to spoilers and terrorism; attacks hurt the process, not just the victims (p. 70). Setting and Story whether or not the terrorists have correctly understood the broader historical context in which they are operating is important. Every group whose campaign has recently ended in a negotiated arrangement espoused a cause that was no longer in the ascendancy on the international stage (p. 70).

Success o Terrorist groups that achieve their political aims may disband or cease violent attacks (p. 73). The definition of success is subjective; we must consider not only the remarks of the leaders, but also whether the violence has produced gains on behalf of the population the terrorists claim to represent (p. 74). o Non-political Metrics of Success Survival how long does the group actually exist? Achievement of objectives many terrorist groups have trouble translating violence into attainment of political ends; it helps to disaggregate between tactical and strategic goals (p. 77) Tactical success perpetuates terrorism (p. 77) Strategic success ends terrorism (p. 78) o Conditions under which terrorist campaigns are most likely to successfully obtain their political objectives: the objectives are clearly defined and obtainable (p. 91) their goals comport with broader international/economic/political trends in the international system, such as decolonization and self-determination (p. 91) terrorist violence is one factor in a broader campaign of efforts to achieve the objectives groups must transition to non-terrorist forms of violence (p. 91) terrorists convince more powerful actors in the legitimacy of their cause, thus leading to political pressure/sanctions against the government opposition, or direct support for the terrorist organization (p. 92) o Terrorist groups rarely end because they have achieved their stated political goals, but they can contribute to bringing about political change when they support global political/historical trends, or they acquire more powerful state sponsors (p. 93). o It is impossible for terrorism alone to lead to political success; it succeeds only in combination with other tools of political coercion and military force (p. 93). o Terrorism succeeds strategically only when the state overplays or bungles its response and hands the group derivative power, or when the group has gained sufficient popular strength to transition to another form of violence (p. 94). Failure o Most terrorism ends because the group employing the tactics fails and eventually disintegrates (p. 94).

Indiscriminate killing of civilians engenders opposition and undermines political viability (p. 94). o Implosion Failing to pass the cause to the next generation (p. 95) Infighting and factionalization (p. 100) Especially problematic if leadership uses revenge killings to maintain control (p. 101) Disagreements may be over the nature or the purpose of the violence (p. 101) Loss of operational control can lead different parts of an organization to work against each other, carrying out activities that are counterproductive to their strategic aims (p. 103) Accepting an exist the state offers terrorists a way out with amnesty, incentives, or threats (p. 103) o Marginalization diminishing popular support (p. 104) Ideology becomes irrelevant like left-wing groups after fall of Soviet Union (p. 105) Loss of contact with the people group must represent the population it wants to mobilize, cannot become a small elite (p. 107) Targeting errors and backlash if group selects a target the majority of its constituents consider illegitimate, it decreases its legitimacy (p. 108) o Terrorist organizations derive their legitimacy from claims of altruism on behalf of a larger cause; if a group miscalculates, thus alienating its supporters, the decrease in popular support is more damaging than a similar miscalculation by a state because governments are expected to be hypocritical [but] terrorist organizations cannot afford it (p. 110). o Governments should not wait passively for terrorist groups to fail, but by understanding or nudging self-defeating dynamics along through counterterrorism measures, the state may end the terrorist campaign sooner (p. 114) Repression crushing terrorism through military force (p. 115) o There is a long historical precedent of states using brute force to crush terrorist opposition (p. 115). o Terrorist organizations seek to draw the state into an irregular and unwinnable war with methods paralleling archetypes of nation-state conflict of attrition and annihilation. Attrition = undermining states contract with citizens. Annihilation = draw state into actions counterproductive to the states own interests (p. 119). o Strategies of leverage adopted by terrorist organizations: Provocation tries to force a state to do something (p. 118) Polarization divide and delegitimize the state (p. 119) Mobilization recruit and rally the masses within a state (p. 119) Alternatively: terrorist groups engage in compellence when trying to coerce a state into behavior (or not behaving) a particular way (p. 118). o Repression alone seldom ends terrorism because terrorist groups resort to strategies designed to turn a states strength against itself (p. 141).

If the ideas that are the source of popular mobilization persist, repression will be temporary, even counterproductive (p. 141). Related, if the nature of the state changes in order to defeat terrorism i.e. a democracy adopting authoritarian, police-state measures the victory is hollow (p. 142). o States and terrorist groups are competing for the capacity to mobilize popular support; it is the success or failure in that dimension that determines whether repression ends terrorism (p. 145). Reorientation violence continues but takes a new form (p. 146) o Terrorism can instigate or escalate into other forms of violence; the end of terrorism is not necessarily the beginning of peace (p. 146). o Terrorist groups may shift their violence into either criminal acts (favorable to the state experienced in combating crime) or irregular warfare (unfavorable to the state as this form of violence might be more effective (p. 146). o Forms of Reorientation Criminality Engage in similar behavior but for different purpose; primary driver in criminal behavior is profit and personal gain. Criminal organizations, unlike terrorists, typically shun publicity (p. 148) Insurgency Insurgencies form as an alternative to the status quo government they employ pseudo-armies and hold a degree of sovereignty over people and territory; insurgencies may use terrorist tactics but are numerically larger, operate as military units, target military forces, and seize/hold territory (p. 154). Terrorism is a pejorative term but insurgency imparts some degree of legitimacy (p. 154). Catalyst for interstate war as with Kashmir and the Pakistani terrorist groups (p. 158)
o

Her Conclusions: It is important for states to understand and envision how terrorist campaigns end so that the state can avoid counterproductive overreactions and pursue an effective strategy to achieve that end (p. 197). Terrorist campaigns siphon popular/political energy from their state adversaries. To end terrorism, we must understand how terrorist campaigns derive their strength, momentum, and legitimacy (p. 198). On the six patterns: o Governments typically responds to terrorism by trying to kill the terrorist leader, despite this being less effective than arresting him (p. 201). The second- and third-tier effects of removing the leader might be unpredictable, so it is important for the state to understand the relationship between the leader and his followers, thus more accurately predicting the effect of his removal (p. 201).

o Negotiations rarely end terrorism quickly or single-handedly. But they provide a means to manage the violence and facilitate the longer-term decline of a group (p. 203). o Terrorist organizations rarely end because they successfully achieve their goals; success if more likely in terms of tactical aims rather than strategic. However, it is possible to achieve strategic goals when the goals are clearly defined and obtainable, the use of terrorism is complemented with more legitimate uses of violence, campaigns coincide with larger historical/political trends (p. 203). o Repression has difficulty ending terrorism because terrorist groups resort to strategies of leverage to turn a states strength against itself (p. 204). o Groups the re-orientate their violence to criminal activity are manageable by the state; groups that shift to insurgencies or conventional wars are more difficult because their violence is more effective, they have increased legitimacy, and increase their ability to challenge the state directly (p. 205). A successful state counterterrorism policy must focus on countermobilizing popular support by using leverage rather than compellence to prevent a terrorist campaign from detracting from the states response (p. 206).