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Tanada vs Tuvera 24 Apr 1985 J. Escolin Facts: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and en forceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Taada, et.al. seek a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamation, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. Issue: Whether the unpublished laws have binding force and effect. Held: No. Ruling: The publication in the Official Gazette is required to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make penalties binding on the person affected thereby. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is a mandated by law, and is a requirement of due process. Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures fall within this category. Before a person may be bound by law, he must be first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. When not published, such shall have no force and effect. Concept: NCC Article 2: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. E.O. 200 Section 2: Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (18 Jun 1987) RAC Section 18 (also E.O. 200 Sec. 1): Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided. (25 Jul 1987) Kasilag vs. Rodriguez 7 Dec 1939 J. Imperial Facts: 1. The children, private respondents, and heirs of the former owner of the land in question, Emiliana Ambrosio, filed a case against petitioner requesting that the land of their mother be returned to them. 2. Court of first instance ruled that Exhibit 1 contract is null and void because 3. Private respondents are the children and heirs of the former owner of the land in question, Emiliana Ambrosio. 4. Court of Appeals ruled against petitioner and claims that he acted in bath faith because he knew that the contract he made with Ambrosio was an absolute deed of sale and that the Ambrosio could not sell the land because it is prohibited by Sec. 116 Issue: Should the petitioner be deemed a possessor in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated? (230) Ruling: 1. When the original contract was altered by the verbal contract it instead converted the former into a contract of antichresis. 2. Antichresis is illegal under Sec 116 of Act 2874. 3. The verbal contract that allowed the petitioner to take possession of the land and its fruits are part of the antichresis thus also void. 4. ISSUE: In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. The court rules that the petitioners ignorance of the law is possible and excusable, thus it is said he acted in good faith. 5. Conclusion: a. Exhibit 1 is valid and binding

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b. Contract of antichresis which was agreed upon verbally is not. c. petitioner acted in good faith d. respondents have a right to the possession of the land and to enjoy the mortgaged improvements e. respondents may redeem the mortgage of the improvements by paying petitioner Php. 1,000.00 W/O interest. f. petitioner may sell the improvements for paying himself back. *Cardinal rule in interpreting contracts- the intention of the contracting parties should always prevail because their will has the force of law between them (225) *fundamental rule in interpreting contracts- the terms, clauses, and conditions contrary to law, morals, and public order should be sperated from the valid and legal contract (226) Concept: Bad Faith- Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in good faith. Good Faith- consists in his belief that the person from whom he received the things was the owner of the same and could transmit the title thereto. (230) A. Exhibit 1 Contract- mortgaged land in favor of petitioner for Php. 1,000.00 with interest at 12% per year. Should Ambrosio fail to pay within 4 and a half years, she must sell her land for the price of the said loan and the said intrest. B. Verbal Contract- Emiliana and petitioner modified exhibit 1 when she was unable to pay the interests and the tax on the land and its improvements, thus she gave petitioner control of the land, gathered all the products in the land and in exchange, did not collect the interest on the loan. Frivaldo vs Comelec 28 Jun 1996 J. Panganiban Facts: Juan Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but was twice declared to be disqualified due to his alien citizenship Raul Lee second placer in the canvass, incumbent governor 20 Mar 1995 Frivaldo files CoC for Governor of Sorsogon 23 Mar 1995 Lee files petition to disqualify on citizenship grounds 1 May 1995 Comelec 2 Division grants petition; disqualifies Frivaldo 8 May 1995 election day and Frivaldo wins; motion for reconsideration still unacted upon - Frivaldo: 73,440 vs Lee: 53,304 11 May 1995 Comelec en banc affirms Frivaldo disqualification 9 Jun 1995 Lee files petition for his proclamation with the Comelec 21 Jun 1995 Comelec en banc orders proclamation of Lee as winning governor - 30 Jun 1995, 8:30 PM Lee proclaimed 6 Jul 1995 Frivaldo files petition with the Comelec to annul Lees proclamation and for his own proclamation
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30 Jun 1995, 2 PM Frivaldo takes oath of allegiance as citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation was approved

19 Dec 1995 Comelec 1st Division rules that Lee proclamation was illegal because Frivaldo has reacquired his citizenship 23 Feb 1996 Comelec en banc upholds 1st Division ruling; denies Lees motion for reconsideration 26 Feb 1996 Lee files petition with SC 27 Feb 1996 SC issues TRO Issue: Who should be the rightful governor of Sorsogon? Held: Frivaldo. Ruling: 1. Frivaldos repatriation was valid and legal. a. Lees argument that P.D. 725 had been effectively repealed - Memo of Cory dated 27 Mar 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of PD 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or implied. - No express repeal was made. It did not categorically or impliedly state that PD 725 was being repealed. Repeals by implication are not favoured. - Cory did not repeal PD 725 but left it to Congress to deal with the matter. b. Lee argues that serious congenital irregularities flawed the re patriation proceedings when Frivaldos application was approved in just one day - Frivaldo filed on 17 Aug 1994 as confirmed by SolGen. Special Committee only reactivated on 8 Jun 1995. Frivaldo re-submitted the required form on 29 Jun 1995. It cannot be said that there was indecent haste in the processing. - Many others were processed, not only Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. - Any contest on the legality of Frivaldos repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself or in the OP if it fails, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion. c. Lee contends that citizenship must exist on the day of his election Sec 39 of Local Government Code: an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter in the province where he intends to be elected - The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship unlike that for residence and age. - An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Frivaldo was therefor qualified when he re-assumed citizenship on 30 Jun 1995. - This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life, and meaning to the law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Sec 39 speaks of qualifications of elective officials, not of candidates. - Vasquez vs Giap: the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. - The law intended the citizenship qualification to be a qualification distinct from being a voter. LGC requires an elective official to be a registered voter. Registration is the core of this qualification. It is clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province. d. Repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of filing his application on 17 Aug 1994 - PD 725 is a curative statute it undertakes to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. - It was the legislative intent to give the statue retroactive application (allowing Filipino woman to who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship). - Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be mooted by his repatriation. - Frivaldo became stateless having renounced his American citizenship. In case of doubt, it is presumed that the law-making body

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intended right and justice to prevail. Frivaldo consistently took oath of allegiance when he ran in 1988, 1992, and 1995. 2. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a persons future status with finality. Lack of citizenship is not a continuing disqualification. 3. Comelec has jurisdiction. The Constitution has given the Comelec ample power to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective provincial officials. Power to annul a proclamation must be done within 10 days following proclamation. Frivaldo filed in 6. 4. Lee proclamation is not valid. - Labo vs Comelec: the fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will - Aquino vs Comelec: Lee is a second placer, just that, a second placer. - No sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was fully aware in fact of Frivaldos alleged disqualification such that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots in knowing that he was ineligible. - Frivaldo has seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the elections, he should be proclaimed. 5. Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is merely directory as Sec 6 of RA 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections. - Sec 78: Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy shall be decided not later that fifteen days before the election. - Sec 6, RA 6646: If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for, the Comelec shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action and upon motion during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation. This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Frivaldo, at 81 years old, showed loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose. He sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. He demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to reacquire his nationality of birth despite several legal setbacks. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favour. Concept: NCC Article 4: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Curative statutes those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or the failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. (Tolentino) Peftok Integrated Services Inc. vs. NLRC July 31, 1998 J. Purisima Facts: 1. This case is about the claims of the security guards which they waived thru an execution of waiver or quitclaims, but subsequently being claimed by the guards. 2. Pertinent sheriffs return shows that the aforesaid decision was partly executed up to fifty percent (50%), Timber Industries of the Philippines (TIPI) having paid half of their solidary obligation to the security guards-employees, who quitclaimed and waived fifty percent (50%) of the benefits adjudged in their favor. October 13, 1989,Eduardo Abugho, Claro Mendez and Leonardo Daluperi executed a waiver of all their claims against PEFTOK for the period ending on June 30, 1989.

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May 29, 1992, Eduardo Abugho, Fidel Sabellina, Leonardo Daluperi, Claro Mendez and Reynaldo Maasin executed another waiver and quitclaim purportedly renouncing whatever claims they may have against PEFTOK for the period ending March 15, 1998 Eduardo Abugho, Fidel Sabellina, Leonardo Daluperi, Reynaldo Maasin and Claro Mendez subsequently executed affidavits stating a. that the quitclaims were prepared and readied for their signature by PEFTOK and b. they were forced to sign the same for fear that they would not be given their salary on pay day, and worse, t c. Fear that their services would be terminated if they did not sign the said quitclaims under controversy. d. Waivers of claims signed by them are contrary to public policy; e. the same being written in the English language which they do not understand and f. the contents thereof were not explained to them.

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Petitioner PEFTOK theorizes that the quitclaims executed by the security guards suffer no legal infirmity. Like any other right, the claims in dispute can be waived and waiver thereof is not prohibited by law. Issue: Are the rights or claims of the guards have been waived because of the execution of quitclaims? Held: No Ruling: 1. It is clear that guards affixed their signatures to subject waivers and/or quitclaims for fear that they would not be paid their salaries on pay day or worse, still, their services would be terminated if they did not sign those papers. 2. 3. 4. In short, there was no voluntariness in the execution of the quitclaim or waivers in question. It should be borne in mind that in this jurisdiction, quitclaims, waivers or releases are looked upon with disfavor .

They are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the workers legal rights. Concept: NCC Article 6: Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law LLedo vs. Lledo 9 Feb 2010 J. Nachura Facts: 1. Petitioner filed an admin case against respondent for abandonment and immorality, when she found out that he was living with another woman and had children with her. 2. Respondent was dismissed from service. 3. Son of petitioner then asked if the court could give a refund of what respondent gave GSIS, so as to help them financially. 4. GSIS denied this claiming that it would create a negative impact on the financial viability of the GSIS and that it wou ld be in conflict with CA 186, Section 9. Issue: May a dismissed govt. employee be allowed to recover the contributions he paid to the GSIS? Laws: 1. CA 186 (Sec 9) effect of dismissal from service- benefits under his membership policy shall be automatically forfeited to the system except one-half of the cash or surrender value which would be paid to the member or the beneficiary if he is dead. 2. RA 660 heavily amended CA 186 3. PD 1146 (Sec4) effect of separation from the service- A member shall continue to be a member unless the terms of his separation provide otherwise and shall be entitled to whatever benefits earned Ruling: 1. None of the laws repealed section 9 of CA 186. 2. In Pari Materia, statcon principle, states that all like laws should be read in harmony. None of the laws in question directly repeals section 9 of CA 186.

6 3. PD 1146 even goes so far to mention in its section 13 that: employees have the option to retire under this act or under CA 186 4. None of the other statutes also carry a specific prov ision that covers effect of dismissal from service.

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De Castro vs JBC 20 Apr 2010 J. Bersamin Facts: This is a Resolution denying the motions for reconsideration on the Courts earlier Decision allowing PGMA to appoint the nex t Chief Justice within the prohibition on midnight appointments. The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno falls on 17 May 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. On 18 Jan 2010, the JBC unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on 17 May 2010. Qualifying for appointment were Justices Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, and Sandoval. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees. Issue: Can PGMA appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement? Held: Yes. Ruling: Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them. Stare decisis does not hold in this case. The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after reexamination, to call for a rectification. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability. The Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division. The Constitutional Commission did not clearly extend the prohibition on presidential appointments to the Judiciary. Concept: NCC Article 8: Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant. J. Moreland December 27, 1910 Facts: 1. September 11, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata (Kalesa) on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila when a delivery wagon to which attached was a pair of horse coming at great speed. 2. The wagon hit the carromata and overturned it causing severe wounding to the plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it. Defendant presented that a. cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero b. delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable c. the cochero tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered

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d. while unloading the forage, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away e. horses then ran up and on which street they came into collision with the carromata Issue: Was the cochero negligent? Held: No Ruling: 1. Undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; 2. the cochero was experienced and capable; that 3. he had driven one of the horses several years and the other five or six months; 4. that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; 5. that they had never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; 6. that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers. 7. In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence 8. The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, cannot be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial. 9. It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. Concept: 1987 Constitution, Section 5: The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being. The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain. COURT RULES: RULE 129 What Need Not Be Proved Sec. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. (1a) Sec. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. 1. Basically, since the act of the cochero was a custom and a public knowledge during those times, therefore it cannot be said that he was negligent in doing his work.

Go It Bun vs. Dizon 18 Sep 1992 J. Nocon Facts: 1. Petitioner insured their buildings furniture. A fire transpired and the insurance companies dont want to pay them for the damages. 2. Petitioners then filed a case against the insurance companies but were having difficulty with their first lawyer.

8 3. Petitioners first counsel did not inform them that the respondent companies opted to dismiss the case, thus the time for filing an appeal had already lapsed. 4. Petitioners claim that: a. Respondent judge acted oppressively and arbitrarily in dismissing the appeal to the decision because of their lawyer. b. Their appeal has been perfect when they filed their notice of appeal (Sec 23) 5. Respondent insurance companies found out that petitioner had mortgaged his property in favor of Tan Hua. 6. Petitioner claims that the redemption period must be counted from Feb 24, 1982 when the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property was registered. Issue: Is the petitioner excused from filing late because their attorney did not inform them of the motion to dismiss? Laws: 1. Sec. 23 In cases where appeal is taken, the perfection of the appeal shall be upon expiration of the last day to appeal by any party. Ruling: 1. SC rules in favor of the Petitioner as regards to the first point that they should have been granted the original appeal because it was their lawyer who was negligent. 2. Respondent insurance companies filed a motion to dismiss which exceeded the time specified by law, thus the judge should have denied it. 3. Petitioners claim on the redemption period is erroneous. He forfeited all his rights to redeem the said insurance because Tan Hua became the successor of interest and that his date to redeem the property pursuant to Sec 30, rule 39 of the rules of court was March 18. But the fire transpired on March 19. 4. Petitioners should have been forewarned when Choi Ping Tai received a letter from their attorney stating that all was not well. 5. Petitioners should have taken steps to settle whatever misunderstanding they had with their lawyer or hire another lawyer to handle their appeal.

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Barreto vs Gonzalez 7 Mar 1933 J. Hull Facts: Manuela Barretto and Augusto Gonzalez are both citizens of the Philippines who were married in the City of Manila on 19 Jan 1919. They lived together until the Spring of 1926 and had 4 children. Upon separation, the parties agreed upon a 500-peso monthly support. After the agreement, Gonzalez went to Reno, Nevada and obtained an absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion on 28 Nov 1927. On the same day, he married another Filipino citizen and had 3 children. Before he left, he reduced the amount of support he had agreed to pay monthly. In August 1928, he returned to the Philippines. Shortly, Barretto instituted a case requesting that the Philippine courts confirm the divorce issued by the Nevada court. She also prays that the Court order Gonzalez to pay the monthly support. The CFI of Manila decided in favor of Barretto. Gonzalez appealed. Issue: Can the Reno divorce be applied in Philippine law? Held: No. The judgment is reversed. Ruling: The Philippine policy on divorce is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710. The conduct of the parties praying that the Reno divorce be ratified clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippines. At all times, the matrimonial domicile of the couple has been the Philippines and the residence obtained by Gonzalez in Nevada for the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction to the Nevada courts. Article 9 of the Civil Code: the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country. Article 11: the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to promote public order and

9 good morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country.

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Under these circumstances, it is doubtful that any foreign divorce will be recognized. The hardships of the existing divorce laws are well known to the Legislature but it is the duty of the Court to enforce the law. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or liberal. Concept: NCC Article 15: Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. FC Section 26 par 2: Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227) GERMANN & CO., plaintiff-appellees, vs. DONALDSON, SIM & CO., defendants-appellants. J Ladd November 11, 1901 Facts: 1. This is an action to recover a sum claimed to be due for freight under a charter party 2. The defendants claimed that the original power (obiter: I think this is referring to a general power of attorney) is invalid under article 1280 No. 5 of the Civil code which provides that powers for suits must be contained in a public instrument. No claim is made that the document was not executed with the formalities required by the German law in the case of such an instrument. 3. General power for suits, executed in Manila October 27, 1900, by Fernando Kammerzell, and purporting to be a substitution in favor of several attorneys of powers conferred upon Kammerzell in an instrument executed in Berlin, Germany, February 5, 1900, by Max Leonard Tornow, the sole owner of the business carried on in Berlin and Manila under the name of Gemann & Co. 4. The first-named instrument was authenticated by a notary with the formalities required by the domestic laws. The other was not so authenticated. 5. Both Tornow and Kammerzell are citizens of Germany. Tornow is a resident of Berlin and Kammerzell of Manila. Issue: Is the general power valid? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. We see no reason why the general principle that the formal validity of contracts is to be tested by the laws of the country where they are executed should not apply. (Civil Code, art. 11.) 2. We are clearly of opinion that the instrument contains an explicit grant of a power broad enough to authorize the bringing of the present action, even assuming the applicability of the domestic law as claimed by the defendants. 3. By this instrument Tornow constitutes Kammerzell his true and lawful attorney with full power to enter the firm name of Germann & Co. in the Commercial Registry of the city of Manila as a branch of the house of Germann & Co. in Berlin, it being the purpose of this power to invest said attorney will full legal powers and authorization to direct and administer in the city of Manila. 4. It appears to be expressly and specially authorized by the clause conferring the power to exact the payment of sums of money by legal means. This must mean the p ower to exact the payment of debts due the concern by means of the institution of suits for their recovery. Tomawis vs. Balindong 5 Mar 2010 J. Velasco Jr. Facts: 1. Private respondents filed with the SDC (Sharia District Court)a case claiming that they were the owners of the lot in question because they are the heirs of Acraman Radia. 2. They claim that petitioner took the land on the claim that he bought the land from Mangoda Radia. 3. Respondent judge ruled against petitioner, thus petitioner claimed that SDC lacked jurisdiction to try the case. 4. Case was moved to the SC because the Sharia Appelate Court has not yet been established. 5. Petitioner claims that Art. 143 of PD 1083 was repealed by BP 129. Issue: Does the SDC have jurisdiction over this case?

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Held: Yes. Laws: 1. Art 143 of PD 1083- SDC shall have jurisdiction over all actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims. 2. BP 129- vests the RTC the exclusive jurisdiction in all civil action that involve the title or possession of real property Ruling: 1. Pari Materia- general and special laws related on the same topic should be harmonized and read together. 2. PD 1083 is a special law that grants specific jurisdiction to the SDC, while BP 129 is a general law that grants jurisdiction to the RTC. 3. Rule of Statcon is that a general law does not repeal a special law unless they in a state of conflict that is not reconcilable. ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents. 20 Jul 1961 J. J.B.L. Reyes Facts: 1. Litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. 2. The trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages 3. Nita Villanueva came to know the Antonio Geluz, defendant, for the first time in 1948 4. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. 5. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent she had herself aborted by the defendant. 6. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. 7. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. 8. On February 21, 1955, for the THIRD TIME, Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus 9. Ntas husband, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. 10. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages against Geluz Note: Nita went into 3 abortion procedures Issue: 1. Whether or not an action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child. 2. Whether or not the unborn child acquires civil personality. Held: No. Ruling: 1. we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality 2. no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. 3. even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). 4. American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery cannot had for the death of an unborn child 5. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. 6. Therefore, the parents can still ask for damages. limited to moral damages on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations 7. But in this case no moral damages was awarded because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. Concept: 1. Unborn fetus does not have personality, therefore award for death of a person does not cover unborn fetus

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2. Parents of unborn fetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf

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Quimiging vs Icao 31 Jul 1970 J. J.B.L. Reyes Facts: a. Felix Icao, a married man, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Carmen Quimiging several times by force and intimidation. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite efforts to abort and had to stop studying. b. Carmen Quimiging filed a petition claiming support at 120 pesos per month. c. Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born. Court dismissed the complaint. d. Carmen moved to amend complaint to allege that she had given birth to a baby girl but the Court disallowed by saying that no amendment was allowable. Thus the appeal. Issue: Does Carmen have a valid cause of action for damages against Icao? Held: Yes. Dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action was in error. Ruling: 1. A conceived child, although yet as unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it. It may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the Civil Code. Art 742: Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who would legally represent them if they were already born. 2. The lower courts theory that support does not contemplate to children as yet unborn violates Article 40 of the Civil Code. Art 40: the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it provided that it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article (i.e. that the fetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mothers womb). 3. A married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Concept: NCC Art. 40: Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. NCC Art. 41: For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. De Jesus vs. Syquia 28 Nov 1933 J. Street Facts: 1. Petitioner had a relationship with a wealthy man (Respondent) who got her pregnant. 2. The respondent went on a trip to China and Japan and while there sent letters to her showing paternal interests with the use of the words junior and padre 3. After respondent came home, he lived with them in a house for a year but left and began living with another woman when petitioner started showing signs of a second pregnancy. 4. She is now filing for damages for the breach of his promise to marry her and to compel him to recognize Ismael and Pacita as Natural children begotten by him and to have him pay a regular 500 pesos per month for maintenance. Issue: Can the letters written by the father before the childs birth be the basis for the compulsory acknowledgment of the child by the defendant after its birth? Held: Yes (NOTE: Actions for compulsory recognition have been abolished under the New Family Code) Ruling: 1. Court rules that the word padre is sufficient to prove an acknowledgment of paternity. 2. It is a universal rule of jurispriduence that a child, upon being conceived becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being death with as a living person. The fact that it is as yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. 3. It is undeniable that the defendant had acknowledged this child in the writings and because he supplied a home for it and the mother in which they lived together in. 4. The law does not fix a period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child and the period in this case was long enough to evince the fathers resolution to concede to his status of being a father. 5. SC says that the trial court should not allow damages to the plaintiff because of the breach of a promise to marry.

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CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO 13 Oct 2009 J. Chico Nazario Facts: 1. Hortillano, an employee of Continental Steel filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union 2. The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. 3. According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency 4. Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance Respondent Union 1. Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. 2. CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality 3. Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs. 4. Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer. Petitioner Continental Steel 1. CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. 2. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case. 3. Relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42[16] of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. 4. The unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. 5. Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous 6. Similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies were irrelevant and incompetent evidence Procedural Facts 1. Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits. 2. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaos Resolution Issue: Whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to CBA Held: Yes. Ruling: I. Civil Personality not relevant 1. The issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. 2. Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. 3. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. 4. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. 5. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception II. 1. Meaning of dependent The unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else. Under said general definition, even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents . The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have

2.

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acquired civil personality. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense , which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb. III. 1. 2. 3. 4. Meaning of legitimate Legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in relation to his/her parents A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception

Interpretation of Labor Code We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. 2. It cannot be said that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of the ir unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently. 3. Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. 4. Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor Concept: 1. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die 1. Ang Ladlad vs COMELEC 8 Apr 2010 J. del Castillo Facts: 1. On 17 Aug 2009, Ang Ladlad, an organization of LGBTs, applied for registration with the Comelec to participate in the 2010 party-list elections. 2. After admitting the evidence, the Comelec 2nd Division dismissed the Petition on 11 Nov 2009. It was dismissed on moral grounds citing the Bible and the Koran. It was further stated that older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth and that the State must protect the youth from moral and spiritual degradation. 3. The Comelec en banc upheld the decision by a vote of 4-3 with Chairman Melo as the deciding vote. 4. On 4 Jan 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this petition in the SC. Issue: Can Ang Ladlad be accredited as a party-list organization for the 2010 elections? Held: Yes. It met the requirements under the party-list law. Ruling: 1. Comelec erred in ruling that the enumeration of sectors mentioned in Ang Bagong Bayani was exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. 2. It was a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Comelec to utilize the Bible and Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. 3. The Philippines has not seen it fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Therefore, the generally accepted public morals have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law. 4. Comelec has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. It did not justify its position that the petitioners admission into the party -list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. 5. Moral disapproval is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the partylist system. It amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. 6. Homosexuals are not a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. No violation of equal protection clause. 7. We recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation (Article 26 of ICCPR). It requires that the laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Concept: 1987 Constitution, Art. 2, Sec 12: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic

IV.

14 autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

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Limjoco vs. Intestate of Fragante 27 Apr 1948 J. Hilado Facts: 1. Pedro Fragrante is a Filipino who applied with the Public Service Commission to install an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. 2. Pedro died but his intestate estate is financially capable of managing the proposed service. 3. CA 146 sec. 15 allows this to happen by authorizing the Judicial Administrator of his estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. 4. Petitioner argues that the Public Service Commission was incorrect in granting the rights to such ice plant to the legal rep of the estate and not to him, thus this SC case. Issue: Is the estate of Pedro Fragante a juridicial person? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. Pedros application did not lapse because of his death, thus it makes up part of the assets of h is estate. Since the certificate equates to property, it would thus belong to the decedent in his lifetime and survived to his estate and judicial admin after his death. 2. Court of Indiana: The estate of a decent is a person in legal contemplation. The w ord person is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons (like corporations) 3. There would be a grave injustice for failure to recognize the said estate as person for the quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment 4. In the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise (estate has legal personality independent of the heirs) 5. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. 6. If Pedro Frangate had lived he would still have obtained the said certificate. (I think that is one of the injustices they wished to avoid) Concepts: A. The estate obtains a personality of its own which can also be sued (I imagine). The Judicial Administrator will thus take charge in representing the estate, as seen in the current case. DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Pedro Oria, plaintiffsappellants, vs. QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee. 30 Apr 1976 J. Aquino Facts: 1. On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958. 2. In case the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond 3. Defendants' failed to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria 4. PROBLEM: It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed. Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of Quality Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending. 5. On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land. 6. The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria Issue: Is the judgment of the lower court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria who, being already in the other world, was valid? Held: No, it is VOID.

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Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. 3. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death . 4. Lower court was wrong n ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria. 5. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void Concept: 1. Service of summons on dead persons is void 2. Voluntary appearance of person who was already dead when summoned cannot be implied appearance 3. Counsel cannot appear for a dead man Eugenio vs Velez 17 May 1990 J. Padilla Facts: 1. Vitaliana Vargas died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in the residence of Tomas Eugenio on 28 Aug 1988. 2. Unaware of her death, her brothers and sisters filed on 27 Sep 1988 a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. 3. The court granted petition on 28 Sep 1988 but was returned unsatisfied by Eugenios refusal to surrend er the body arguing that a corpse cannot be a subject of habeas corpus proceedings. As common law husband, Eugenio claimed legal custody. 4. Court issued two orders dated 29 and 30 Sep 1988 directing the delivery of the body to a funeral parlor and its autopsy. 5. Eugenio filed motion to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction. Before resolving the motion, the court allowed the Vargases to amend their petition claiming legal custody of the body instead. 6. On 17 Nov 1988, the court denied the motion to dismiss and proceeded as in ordinary civil cases. It rendered a decision on 17 Jan 1989 stating that it has jurisdiction on the case and that the Vargases had the rightful custody over the dead body. 7. Eugenio filed a new petition for review with the SC on 23 Jan 1989. It was consolidated with his earlier petition. Issue: Who has custody over the corpse of Vitaliana? Held: The Vargases. Ruling: 1. After the fact of Vitalianas death was made known to the petitioners on the habeas corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. 2. The writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the subject allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained. 3. Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not here. 4. Tomas Eugenio has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even marrying Vitaliana. The provisions of the Civil Code, when referring to a spouse, contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. He was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. 5. Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters under Sec. 1103 of the RAC. RAC Sec 1103: Persons charged with duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified: (b). If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, it hey be adults and within the Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses. Concept: NCC Art. 42: Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

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Marcos vs. Manglapus 27 Oct 1989 En Banc Facts: 1. In a prior case that was denied by the President and was not overruled by the SC, which involved barring the return of the petitioners (former President Marcos and his family). It was ruled in that case that it would be against national security to allow them to return. The President has the right to deny the rights of individuals if it would be for the betterment of the general welfare of the country she serves. 2. Petitioners are now requesting that they be allowed to return home in order to bury Former President Marcos. 3. The President claims that their return would still pose a threat to national interest and welfare. 4. Petitioners claim that the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country. Issue: Should the Petitioner be allowed to bring back the body of former President Marcos back to the Philippines? Held: No Ruling: 1. The petitioners have failed to show compelling reasons to change the decision of the court. 2.The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been show to have ceased. Dissenting: 1. Paras: A. Although already dead, he is still entitled to certain rights. It is not corret to say that a dead man, since he is no lo nger a human being, has ceased to have rights. For instance, our RPC prohibits the commission of libel against a deceased individual (766) 2 Padilla: A. It is the right of every Filipino to be buried in his country because it is a CONTINUING RIGHT that starts from birth and ends only on the day he is finally laid to rest in his country. Concepts: A. a corpse can no longer be considered as a person. It cannot be the subject of rights; because juridical capacity is extin guished by death The corpse becomes thing in the juridical sense RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent. 29 May 1953 J. Tuazon Facts: Feb. 6, 1945: battle of liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro, Sr., 70, wife Angela Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion, and Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club Building Building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting hitting the three daughters who fell. Navarro Sr. decided to leave building. His wife, Angela Joaquin didnt want to leave so he left with his son, his sons wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez As they came out, Navarro Jr. was hit and fell on the ground the rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets German Club collapsed trapping may people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Navarro Sr., Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for three days. Feb. 10, 1945: on their way to St. Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols, Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. Only Francisco Lopez survived and served as the witness in this proceedings Why need to know the order of death? The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage. Issue: Who died first Angela Joaquin de Navarro, the mother, or Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the son? Held: Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother

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Ruling: It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother. No evidence is available on the point. All we can decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left her aside, and that there is no proof when she died. This circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died latter than her son, and we are thus compelled to fall back upon the statutory presumption. Indeed, it could be said that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court). see revised rules on evidence rule 131 Sec 3 jj-kk Rule 123, Section 69, Revised Rules of Court: When two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it is not (a) shown who died first and there are no (b) particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes . Art. 33, Civil Code 1889: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or more persons who would inherit one from the other, the person who alleges prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place. (NCC Article 43, present) Both rule 123 and Art 33 CC (see new Rule 131 and NCC 43) will be substitute if there are no facts. Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for lacks and so are not to be available when there are facts . With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it present is one in which the facts are not only unknown but unknowable. But since there are facts in this case, they wont be applicable. Where there are facts known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, presumption does not step in. Facts are credible because witness was found disinterested, trustworthy and entitled to credence by courts. Fair and reasonable inference would suggest that Jr. died before his mother based on Lopez testimony and deduced from established facts and has strong probability. Opposite theory would be based on surmises, speculations and conjectures. The clubhouse where Mrs. Angela Joaquin was staying was relatively safer at the moment compared to her husband, son, and daughter-in-law who left her. Mr. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped dead. She could have perished within those five or fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote. True, people in the building were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who had tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape. Barlin vs Ramirez 24 Nov 1906 J. Willard Facts: 1. The church and convent at Lagonoy were burned on 13 Jan 1869. Upon the instructions of the provincial governor, they were rebuilt by the labor of the people because of polo y servicios and the materials were paid for by the parish priest from the church funds. 2. Fr. Vicente Ramirez was appointed parish priest and took possession of the church on 5 July 1901. 3. On 9 Nov 1902, the people of Lagonoy and Fr. Ramirez decided to separate from the Roman Catholic Church and join the Filipino National Church. They did so because the Pope continues to ignore the rights of the Filipino clergy. 4. On 14 Nov 1902, Fr. Agripino Pisino, his successor, was appointed and demanded the delivery of the church and other church possessions. Fr. Ramirez refused and cited the decision on 9 Nov 1902. 5. In Jan 1904, Rev. Jorge Barlin instituted this petition against Fr. Ramirez to recover the property of the Roman Catholic Church. On 1 Nov 1904, the municipality of Lagonoy intervened in the case, supported Fr. Ramirez, and claimed ownership of the said properties.

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Issue: Who owns the church? Held: The Roman Catholic Church had by law the exclusive right to the possession of the church and it had the legal right to administer the same for the purposes for which the building was consecrated. Ruling: 1. Fr. Ramirez took possession of the property only as servant of the Roman Catholic Church. The only right that he has to it was the one given to him by Rev. Barlin. Thus, he will not be allowed to say that the Roman Catholic Church is not the owner of the property when possession is demanded of him. 2. The municipality of Lagonoy never had possession of the property. Its claim of ownership principally lied on the belief that all church properties belong to the Spanish Government and were transferred to the US Government following the Treaty of Paris. Through Sec. 12 of the Philippine Bill of 1902, such ownership was transferred to the Philippine Government. 3. The Spanish Government was not the owner of the properties. Law 12 states that: No sacred, religious, or holy thing, devoted to the service of God, can be the subject of ownership by any man, nor can it be considered as included in his propert y holdings. Law 13 defined sacred things as those which are consecrated by the bishops, such as churches, the altars therein, crosses, chalices, censers, vestments, books, and all other things which are intended for the service of the church. 4. From the earliest times, churches and other consecrated objects were considered outside of the commerce of man. It was not mentioned in Article 339 (definition of public property) and Article 344 (definition of public use) of the Civil Code. Its mention in Article 25 of the Regulations for the Execution of the Mortgage Law proves that they do not belong to the State. 5. The possession, care, and custody of such properties were given by the Spanish law to the Roman Catholic Church. It is not necessary to show that the church as a juridical person was the owner of the buildings. Concept: 1. See Art. 44-47, 1767-1768 of the NCC 2. B.P. Blg. 68: The Corporation Code of the Philippines Section 2. Corporation defined. - A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence. Section 4. Corporations created by special laws or charters. - Corporations created by special laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating them or applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of this Code, insofar as they are applicable. 3. Spanish Civil Code, Art. 339: Property of public ownership is: (1) That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character; (2) That belonging exclusively to the State without being for public use and which is destined to some public service, or to the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until their concessions has been granted. Spanish Civil Code, Art. 344: Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by the said towns or provinces. Camid vs. Office of the President 17 Jan 2005 J. Tinga Facts: 1. An executive order gave way to the existence of the municipality of Andong. 2. This executive order alongside other executive orders were assailed in the case of Pelaez vs. Auditor General. 3. The conclusion of that case showed that the President has no right to create a municipality thus all executive orders and municipalities created by those orders are considered void. 4. Petitioners believe that because: a. Andong has a high school, a post office, barangay units with their own respected chairmen

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(ATTY. LEGARDA)

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b. complete set of officials appointed to handle essential service for the municipality c. in the case of Municpality of San Narcisco vs. Hon. Mendez (720) the court affirmed that municipality as a de facto municipal corporation. It was also created by an executive order that was later declared unconstitutional. Issue: Whether a municipality, more specifically Andong, whose creation by executive order which was void may attain recognition in the absence of any curative statute? Held: No. Ruling: 1. Petitioner does not assert the validity of a corporate act existing prior to its judicial dissolution. (This was present in the case that recognized Narcisco as a de facto municipality [also see concept]) 2. San Andres (another municipality created in a similar fashion) was in existence for nearly 30 years before its legality was challenged. 3. Pelaez limited its nullification to those EOs SPECIFICALLY CHALLENGED. 4. The San Andres subdivision was included in a legislative district, thus recognition from the legislature of its existence (creation of a political district can only be done by the legislature. 5. Those other municipalities exist because they are derived from legislative statutes which were enacted to revive them. Summary: Andong is not recognized because: 1. The EO that created it expressly annulled it. 2. Failure to appropriate funds for Andong for the last 4 decades shows that the state does not recognize it. 3. It is not recognized by the legislature as a political district, while the others mentioned in the void EOs are. Concept: 1. De facto Municipal Corp - have exercised their powers for a long period without objection on the part of the government that although no charter is in existence, it is presumed that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that their charters had been simply lost. Catalan vs. Basa July 31, 2007 Puno Facts: 1. October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was discharged from active military service. 2. He was unfit to render military service due to his schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which incapacitates him because of flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and sparce and pointless speech 3. September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo 4. June 16, 1951, executed an Absolute Deed of Donation wherein Feliciano donated to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the real property in Pangasinan 5. December 11, 1953, Peoples Bank and Trust Company filed Spec ial Proceedings No. 4563 before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to declare Feliciano incompetent. 6. December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order for Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. The following day, the trial court appointed Peoples Bank and Trust Company (BPI) as Felicianos guardian. 7. November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots to their son Eulogio Catalan 8. March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa 9. June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 to their children Alex Catalan, Librada Catalan and Zenaida Catalan 10. February 14, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 4 to Eulogio and Florida Catalan 11. In short, the spouse made several donations to their children from 1951 1983 12. April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against the respondents. - BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio , as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. - BPI averred the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. - Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa should likewise be nullified 13. On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away.

20 14. On December 7, 1999, trail court the court declared, the presumption of sanity or competency not having been duly impugned, the presumption of due execution of the donation in question must be upheld 15. CTA ruled that Mercedes Catalan acquired valid title of ownership over the property in dispute. By virtue of her ownership, the property is completely subjected to her will in everything not prohibited by law of the concurrence with the rights of others Issue: Whether or not Feliciano has the competence to enter into the a deed of donation with his sister Mercedes Held: Yes Ruling: 1. the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed 2. perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in question to Mercedes 3. A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable of attending to his property rights. 4. From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. 5. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties. 6. It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Felicianos capacity at the time he donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental competence when he entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of donation of his other properties in their favor. 7. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts, despite his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts. 8. It is sufficient for this Court to note that even if the present appeal had prospered, the Deed of Donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding. Concept: - A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property thus still has the civil capacity.

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(ATTY. LEGARDA)

Mercado v. Espiritu December 1, 1917 Justice Torres Facts: 1. Margarita Espiritu and Luis Espiritu were siblings. Upon their fathers death, his 3 parcels of land were inherited by his 4 children, 47 and odd hectares of which was equally divided between Margarita and Luis. 2. Margarita married Wenceslao Mercado and had five children. 3. Proven by a notarial instrument, she conveyed her portion of the land to Luis by actual and absolute sale. 4. Margarita died in 1897, leaving behind the land. 6. On account of the loss of the original instrument, Wenceslao signed in his own name and those of his minor children another instrument, attesting the true sale of the land made by his wife to Luis. 7. In 1910, the children signed the deed before the notary public. Two of the children, Dominga and Josefa, were minors, but stated they were already of legal age. 8. 3 years after, Dominga and Josefa sued Luis. As the latter died, the complaint was became directed against the administrator of Luis estate. They prayed for the annulment of the sale and the restitution of 2/4s of that land left by their mother. Issue: Is it true that Dominga and Josefa were then minors and incapable of selling the land? Can a minor, who attested he is of legal age when the deed was executed, ask that the instrument be annulled? Held: They were minors (under the Old Civil Code), 19 and 18 respectively. However, they cannot seek the annulment of the instrument. The courts have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, effected by minors who have already passed the ages of puberty and adolescence and are near the adult age, when they pretend to have already reached their majority, while in fact they have not, is valid. This is in accord with the law on estoppel. Ruling: Judgment of the CA is affirmed. Concept: Law on estoppel an admission/representation is rendered conclusive upon the person executing it, and cannot be denied as against the person relying on it

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(ATTY. LEGARDA)

21

The effects of a contract entered into by a minor without the consent or assistance of a guardian: 1. Voidable one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract 2. Unenforceable both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract *21 is the age of majority in the Old Civil Code Bambalan vs. Maramba 1928 Romualdez, J. Facts: 1. This case involves a sale of land by a minor. 2. It is undisputed that plaintiff is the owner of the land in question. 3. The only question is whether the plaintiff sold the land to the defendants. 4. Respondents say that petitioners sold the land to them. Issue: Is the sale of land valid? Held: No. Ruling: 1. Document is void because the plaintiff was a minor when he signed the document regarding the sale of the land. 2. The defendants didnt acquire any right to the property sold by plaintiff (as a minor). 3. Doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu wherein the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be age, is not applicable in this case. 4. Here, the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age; his minority was well known to the purchaser-defendant. Suan and Chiao vs Alcantara 14 Mar 1950 J. Paras Facts: 1. On 3 Aug 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons Damaso and Ramon (17 yrs old) conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land. 2. On 27 Aug 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from the attorney of the Alcantaras that Ramon was a minor and disavowing the contract. 3. After being contacted by Gaw Chiao, Ramon executed an affidavit in the office of Chiaos attorney ratifying the deed of sale and received 500 pesos in return. 4. On 8 Aug 1940, Ramon instituted an action in the CFI of Laguna for the annulment of the deed of sale. The CFI denied the petition. 5. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court on the ground that the deed of sale was not binding against Ramon in view of his minority on the date of its execution. Issue: Can the deed of sale be nullified due to Ramons minority at the time of its execution? Held: No. Ruling: 1. It was undeniable that the deed of sale signed by Ramon showed that he was then of legal age. The ruling on Mercado and Mercado vs Espiritu should apply. 2. Under the doctrine, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the contract is supported by valid consideration. Ramons misrepresentation has already estopped him fr om disavowing the contract. 3. Sia Suan contracted the deed of sale upon good faith. The belated information of Ramons minority leads to the inference that Sia Suan did not know that Ramon was a minor and emphasized on the Alcantaras bad faith, when it was shown that Ramon ratified the deed of sale upon receiving the sum of 500 pesos. Concept: NCC Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract: (1) Unemancipated minors; (2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write. Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties: (1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;

22 Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: (3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(ATTY. LEGARDA)

Art. 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon these flaws of the contract. Art. 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the parties, the incapacitated person is not obliged to make any restitution except insofar as he has been benefited by the thing or price received by him. Art. 1489. All persons who are authorized in this Code to obligate themselves, may enter into a contract of sale, saving the modifications contained in the following articles. Where necessaries are those sold and delivered to a minor or other person without capacity to act, he must pay a reasonable price therefor. Necessaries are those referred to in Article 290. Art. 1426. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age who has entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, after the annulment of the contract voluntarily returns the whole thing or price received, notwithstanding the fact the he has not been benefited thereby, there is no right to demand the thing or price thus returned. Art. 1427. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age, who has entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of money or delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation, there shall be no right to recover the same from the obligee who has spent or consumed it in good faith. Braganza v. Villa-Abrille 13 Apr 1959 J. Bengzon Facts: 1. Petitioners received from respondent a loan in Japanese war notes. 2. The deal was that they would pay him Php. 10,000.00 + 2% interest in legal currency two years after the war or as soon as the international exchange had been established in the PH 3. Petitioners were not of legal age when they signed the said contract. 4. Petitioners did not pay thus respondent filed a case. 5. CA used the Mercado doctrine stating that minors who pretend to be of legal age cannot back away from the obligations of the contract they agreed upon, thus CA ruled against petitioners. 6. Respondents argue that Petitioners have reached the age of majority and that it was too late to invoke the protection of Article 1301 of the Civil Code. Issue: Is the Mercado doctrine binding in this case? Held: No. Ruling: 1. The facts are different. For one thing, the document the petitioners signed does NOT specifically state he was of legal age, while the document signed in Mercado stated that he was. 2. It has been held that mere silence when making a contract as to his age does not constitute fraud or basis for deceit. 3. It must be actual and not constructive (basically, one cannot simply assume) 4. Four years have not lapsed and it is negligible to invoke Art. 1301 because the minors in this case did not file for an action for annulment but merely from liability. 5. Petitioners should make restitution to the extent that they may have profited by the money they received. Law: 1. Art 1301 of Civil Code- An action to annul a contract by reason of minority must be filed within 4 years after the minor has reached majority age. (459) Concept: A. Minors have no juridical duty to disclose their inability to go through with a contract. B. Mere silence is not grounds to constitute fraud

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(ATTY. LEGARDA)

23

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EVARISTO VAQUILAR, Defendant-Appellant March 13, 1914 Trent Facts: 1. Evaristo Vaquilar, was charged in two separate informations with parricide, in one for the killing of his wife and in the other for the killing of his daughter. 2. The manner charged and to have wounded other persons with a bolo 3. Several witnesses accounts showed that the defendant - appellant had 'felt pains in his head and stomach." - eyes were very big and red and his sight penetrating" at the time he was killing his wife and daughter, and that - according to my own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy - he looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut everybody at random without paying any attention to who it was - headache and stomach trouble about five days prior to the commission of the crimes - looked very sad at the time - In jail: his head is not all right;" that "oftentimes since he came to the jail when he is sent for something he goes back he does without saying anything, even if he comes back he does not say anything at all - every other night he, the appellant, cries aloud, saying, "What kind of people are you to me, what are you doing to me, you are beasts." Issue: Can Evaristo Vaquilar be considered insane using the accounts of the witnesses? Held: No. Ruling: 1. There is vast different between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. 2. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of the word "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane," "non compos mentis," "unsound mind," "idiot," or "lunatic." 3. witness' conception of the word "crazy" evidently is the doing of some act by a person which an ordinarily rational person would not think of doing. 4. It is not at all unnatural for a murderer, caught in the act of killing his wife and child, to fly into a passion and strike promiscuously at those who attempt to capture him. 5. The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail as described by his fellow prisoner is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person. 6. The reflection and remorse which would follow the commission of such deeds as those committed by the appellant. 7. People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664), the court said: "The court very properly continued with an explanation to the jury that 'the heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge, is not insanity. 8. People vs. Mortimer (48 Mich., 37; 11 N. W., 776), But passion and insanity are very different things, and whatever indulgence the law may extend to persons under provocation, it does not treat them as freed from criminal responsibility. 9. Well settled that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity, so called, which results, not from any disease of mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system, where the person is mentally sense, does not exempt one from responsibility for crimes committed under its influence. Care must be taken to distinguish between mere moral insanity or mental depravity and irresistable impulse resulting from disease of the mind . People v. Rafanan September 29, 1962 Per Curiam Facts: 1. The Santellas: Venancio and his son Alfredo (lived in one house together with their wives), and Juan (lived 5m away with his wife) had just retired when they became captives to three men dressed in maong pants and fatigue shirt, each carrying a firearm, and to Dionisio Rafanan. 2. The Santellas were herded away in marching formation, the armed men following close behind with their guns aimed at them. 3. Juan, who was able to untie his hands, then jumped sideways. Immediately, the armed men fired at the same time. With the exception of Juan, the two were badly wounded. 4. After having sensed that the gunmen had left, Juan hurried to the barrio lieutenants house and reported the incident. 5. Dionisio came back, fetched Josefina (Juans wife) to her house and in Avelinas (Alfredos wife) ransacked the contents of a trunk: 3 blankets, a gold ring, and cash. 6. The incident was duly reported to the constabulary detachment, and it was not until after 5 days that a young boy, upon interrogation, revealed the hideout of Dionisio and his companions.

24 7. The Patrol proceeded there, a battle ensued, and Lt. Mencias recognized Dionisio as one of the persons at the top of the hill. When the firing subsided, the patrol rushed to the place, but it was already deserted. The outlaws left items, among which were those ransacked from Juans house. 8. The identity of Dionisio as one of the 3 who shot and killed the 2 Santellas has been established beyond doubt by the evidence for the prosecution. He was recognized by Josefina and Avelina. 9.In Juans testimony before the Justice of Peace: 1st Dionisio and his other companions shot his father and his brother. nd 2 He now fully recognized the companions. He also included 3 others, including Benjamin Rafanan because according to the Constabulary, they were with the group from which the items taken from his house had been recovered. He then said that these 3 were not among those who came to his house, but they stayed in the fields where his father and brother fell. Issue: Is the guilt of Benjamin Rafanan proven beyond reasonable doubt? Held: No. It is presumed that Juan read the statement or that it was read to him before he signed the same. The evidence for the defense shows that Benjamin joined Dionisio only after, the latter being then engaged in recruiting HUK members. Ruling: The judgment appealed from is affirmed with respect to appellant Dionisio. Benjamin is acquitted. Concept: There is a presumption that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(ATTY. LEGARDA)

Standard Oil vs. Arenas 25 Jul 1911 - Arellano, C.J. Facts: 1. 1908 Dec- Villanueva and Siy Ho, as sureties, assumed the obligation to pay, jointly and severally, to the corporation, The Standard Oil Company of New York, the sum of P3,305. 76, with interest. 2. Said sureties-debtors failed to pay their obligations so Standard Oil sued them. 3. 1909 Aug- CFI sentenced all the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff company the sum of P3,305.76, together with the interest 4. Then Villanuevas wife petitioned that his husband be relieved from the judgment/sentence because according to her: - on July 1909, the his husband Villanueva was declared to be insane by the CFI. So because of this insanity, she was appointed as husband Villanuevas guardian. - now as guardian, she wasnt aware of the proceedings (her husband giving the bond) and that when her husband gave the bond, he was already in the state of permanent insanity 5. Court granted petition but didnt relieve Vicente Villanueva from judgment because when he executed in December 1908 t he bond in question, he understood perfectly well the nature and consequences of the act performed by him and that the consent that was given by him for the purpose was entirely voluntary and, thus valid . 6. Wife appealed saying that the lower court erred in ruling that the monomania of great wealth, suffered by the defendant Villanueva, does not imply incapacity to execute a bond such as the one herein concerned. Issue: Does Villanuevas state of monomania imply incapacity on his part to execute the bond involved in this case? Held: No. Ruling: 1. Medico-legal doctrine which supports the conclusion that such monomania of wealth does not necessarily imply the result that the defendant Villanueva was not a person capable of executing a contract of bond. 2. There was no proof to the claim alleged by the wife. It wasnt shown whether monomania was habitual and constituted a truthful mental perturbation in the patient; that the bond executed by the defendant Villanueva was the result of such monomania, and not the effect of any other cause; and that the monomania existed on the date when the bond was executed. 3. Plus, the bond was executed December 1908, and his incapacity was not declared until July 24, 1909 (a year after executing the bond). 4. SC agrees with Trial Court in saying that that a person's believing himself to be what he is not is not a positive proof of insanity or incapacity to bind himself in a contract. 5. And there were testimonies given by physicians and even a judge testifying to the sanity of Villanueva particularly during the time of the execution of the bond. 6. Court said: Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved. And this has not been proved in this case. 7. It is very evident that on December 15, 1908, when Villanueva subscribed the obligation now contested, he possessed the necessary capacity to give efficient consent with respect to the bond which he freely executed.

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(ATTY. LEGARDA)

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Hernandez vs Santos 7 Aug 2009 J. Corona Facts: 1. Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (Lulu) was born on 14 Feb 1947 to spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan. Maria died during childbirth. After Marias death, Felix left Lulu to the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero San Juan. 2. On 16 Dec 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. They had 3 children: Cecilio, Ma. Victoria, and Teresa, the petitioners. 3. Lulu inherited valuable real properties from Maria and Sotero San Juan estimated at 50 million pesos. 4. In 1957, Lulu went to live with her father, Felix. She stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5 due to her violent personality. 5. Upon reaching the legal age, she was not given full control of her estate. Felix exercised actual administration of her properties. 6. In 1993, the Hernandez siblings took over the task of administering her properties due to the demise of Felix. During 1968 to 1993, Felix and the siblings squandered Lulus properties. 7. In Sep 1998, Lulu asked the assistance of her maternal first cousin, Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that the Hernandez siblings dissipated her estate. Upon seeing her sorry physical state, Jovita brought her to several doctors for medical examination and was found that she was suffering from tuberculosis, rheumatism, and diabetes. 8. Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory of Lulus estate but was ignored by the siblings. 9. On 2 Oct 1998, Jovita filed a petition for guardianship in the RTC of San Mateo. In a decision on 25 Sep 2001, the Court declared Lulu incompetent and appointed Jovita as guardian over the person and property of Lulu. 10. Upon appeal by the Hernandez siblings, the CA affirmed the RTCs ruling on 29 Dec 2004. The siblings appealed to the SC. 11. Meanwhile, Lulu moved to an apartment in Marikina but was abducted by the Hernandez siblings in Nov 2003. Jovita filed a habeas corpus petition in the CA on 15 Dec 2003 which was granted on 26 Apr 2005. The Hernandez siblings appealed with the SC which was consolidated with this petition. Issue: Does the declaration of Lulu as incompetent require the appointment of a guardian over her person and property? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. Where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary. The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the persons state of mental sanity will suffice. 2. Under Sec. 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, diseases, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may be properly place under guardianship. 3. Theres no compelling reason to reverse the CA. Jovita was validly appointed as guardian and as such, the habeas corpus in he r favor was in order. Concept: NCC Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract: (1) Unemancipated minors; (2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write. Cordora vs COMELEC 19 Feb 2009 J. Carpio Facts: 1. Petitioner claims that respondent has committed an election offense for violating the election code. Petitioner claims that he was untruth when he said that he was eligible to run for office. 2. Petitioner says that respondent acquired American Citizenship through naturalization. 3. Petitioners says that Respondent has come back from trips and claims at immigration that he is an American citizen. 4. Respondent (whose mother is Filipino) claims that he was not a naturalized American but obtained American citizenship when his father, an American, petitioned him to the U.S. 5. Respondent claims that he was educated as a Filipino and has lived in the Philippines since birth. Issue: Is Tambunting a naturalized American Citizen? Held: No. Ruling: 1. It is because that he has an American father and a Filipina mother which allows him to be BOTH Filipino and American BY BIRTH (Natural and not naturalized) 2. It was not necessary for respondent to acquire American citizenship through the naturalization process. 3. Other trips back to the Philippine show that he claimed to also be a Filipino.

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(ATTY. LEGARDA)

26

4. Dual citizenship is NOT a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position. Concept: 1. Dual Citizenship- is involuntary and is imposed because we have no control over the laws on citizenships of other countries (Bernas) a. those born of Filipino fathers / mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of Jus Soli b. those born in the PH of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citi zens of that country. c. those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced PH citizenship. 2. Dual Allegiance- a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states. This is voluntary. MIGUELA R. VILLANUEVA, RICHARD R. VILLANUEVA, and MERCEDITA VILLANUEVA-TIRADOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, ILDEFONSO C. ONG, and PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondents. May 26, 1995 Davide Jr. Facts: 1. The disputed lots were originally owned by the spouses Celestino Villanueva and Miguela Villanueva 2. Miguela Villanueva sought the help of one Jose Viudez, the then Officer-in-Charge of the PVB branch in Makati if she could obtain a loan from said bank. 3. Jose Viudez told Miguela Villanueva to surrender the titles of said lots as collaterals. 4. further facilitate a bigger loan, Viudez, in connivance with one Andres Sebastian, swayed Miguela Villanueva to execute a deed of sale covering the two (2) disputed lots, which she did but without the signature of her husband Celestino. 5. Miguela Villanueva, however, never got the loan she was expecting. 6. She found out that new titles over the two (2) lots were already issued in the name of the PVB. 7. First, the titles was issued for Jose Viudez, which in turn were again canceled and new titles issued in favor of Andres Sebastian, until finally new titles were issued in the name of PNB [should be PVB] after the lots were foreclosed for failure to pay the loan granted in the name of Andres Sebastian. 8. Miguela Villanueva sought to repurchase the lots from the PVB after being informed that the lots were about to be sold at auction. The PVB told her that she can redeem the lots for the price of P110,416.00. 9. On the other hand, Ildefonso Ong offered to purchase two pieces of Land that had been acquired by PVB through foreclosure. 10. 23 November 1984, while appellant was still abroad, PVB approved his subject offer under Board Resolution No. 10901-84 11. The PVB was placed under receivership pursuant to Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No. 334 dated 3 April 1985 12. 26 May 1987, Ong tendered the sum of P100,000.00 representing the balance of the purchase price of the litigated lots 13. Ong's demand for a deed of conveyance having gone unheeded, he filed on 23 October 1987 with the RTC of Manila an action for specific performance against the Central Bank. 14. PVB has been back in operation since 3 August 1992 Issue: Is the offer made by Ong and sale of property perfected during the receivership of PVB? Held: No, Ong's offer to purchase the subject lots became ineffective. Ruling: 1. There is no doubt that the approval of Ong's offer constitutes an acceptance, the effect of which is to perfect the contract of sale upon notice thereof to Ong. 2. Ong did not receive any notice of the approval of his offer . 3. PVB was placed under receivership pursuant to the MB Resolution of 3 April 1985 4. The PVB was then prohibited from doing business in the Philippines, and the receiver appointed was directed to "immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes." 5. Under Article 1323 of the Civil Code, an offer becomes ineffective upon the death, civil interdiction, insanity, or insolvency of either party before acceptance is conveyed. The reason for this is that: [T]he contract is not perfected except by the concurrence of two wills which exist and continue until the moment that they occur. The contract is not yet perfected at any time before acceptance is conveyed; hence, the disappearance of either party or his loss of capacity before perfection prevents the contractual tie from being formed.

27 6. It has been said that where upon the insolvency of a bank a receiver therefor is appointed, the assets of the bank pass beyond its control into the possession and control of the receiver whose duty it is to administer the assets for the benefit of the creditors of the bank. Thus, the appointment of a receiver operates to suspend the authority of the bank and of its directors and officers over its property and effects, such authority being reposed in the receiver, and in this respect, the receivership is equivalent to an injunction to restrain the bank officers from intermeddling with the property of the bank in any way 7. In a nutshell, the insolvency of a bank and the consequent appointment of a receiver restrict the bank's capacity to act, especially in relation to its property 8. Ong's offer to purchase the subject lots became ineffective because the PVB became insolvent before the bank's acceptance of the offer came to his knowledge. Purported contract of sale between them did not reach the stage of perfection Concept: - an offer becomes ineffective upon the death, civil interdiction, insanity, or insolvency of either party before acceptance is conveyed - the receivership is equivalent to an injunction to restrain the bank officers from intermeddling with the property of the bank in any way.

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(ATTY. LEGARDA)

Osmena vs. Osmena January 26, 2010 Justice Corona Facts: 1. Chiong Tan Sy and Quintin Osmena, Chinese nationals, had three children, including Bernarda and Ignacio. 2. Chiong Tan Sy bought two lots. Ignacio, being the only Filipino citizen in the family at that time, the lots were placed in his name. 3. Before Chiong Tan Sy died, she executed a will in which she enumerated her properties. The ancestral house was specifically mentioned, but the two parcels of land were not. 4. In addition, both Bernarda and Ignacio had a share in the ancestral house. But in 1982, Bernarda sold her share of the house to her brother. 5. When Ignacio died, his children (Nicasio and Jose) transferred the title to their own names. 6. Bernarda sued Ignacios sons, claiming that she was a co-owner of the lots and the ancestral house. Both the trial court and the CA recognized the validity of the deed of sale and the transfer of certificate title covering the lots issued in their father s name. However, the CA modified the decision by declaring Bernarda a co-owner of the ancestral house. Issue: Is the deed of sale worth given credence? Are Ignacios sons the owners of the lots? Held: Yes, it is a legal and binding document because it is a notarized document which was freely signed. Yes, through the documents presented, they are the owners of the lots. Ruling: The judgment of the lower court is sustained. The petition is denied. Concept: There is a need to implement policies that strengthen the family as a basic social institution. Lupo Atienza vs. Brillantes 1995 - Quiason Facts: 1. This involves a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., 2. Atienza alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, and they are living at a house in Bel-Air Subdivision (which he purchased) 3. One day, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. So he left the house and in effect left Yolanda and the children. Then this Judge later on prevented him from seeing his children. 4. Atienza claims respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children 5. Respondent Brillantes alleges that Atienza was not married to De Castro. He also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. st 6. Respondent alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony (for the 1 time) it was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Then they went through another marriage ceremony but again neither party applied for a marriage license. 7. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in LA, California, he believed in good faith that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.

28 8. Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code. Issue: What governs respondents case: the Civil Code of the Family Code? Held: Family Code. Ruling: 1. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, its given a retroactive effect in so far as it does not impair vested rights. 2. Respondent has not shown any vested right that could be impaired.

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(ATTY. LEGARDA)

Obiter: Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children. He passed the bar... etc etc... . Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith. 3. Court dismissed Brillantes from service.

Bernabe vs Alejo 21 Jan 2002 J. Panganiban Facts: 1. On 18 Sep 1981, Adrian Bernabe was born. He was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe and his secretary, Carolina Alejo. 2. Fiscal Bernabe died on 13 Aug 1993 and her wife also died the same year. Ernestina was thus left as the sole surviving heir. 3. On 16 May 1994, Carolina filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son. The RTC dismissed the complaint on 16 Jul 1995 ruling that under the Family Code, the complaint is now barred. 4. On 26 Jul 1995, RTC granted Ernestina Bernabes MR and ordered the dismissal of the complaint for recognition citing Art. 175 of the Family Code. In another Order issued on 6 Oct 1995, the RTC added that since the putative father had not acknowledged Adrian in writing, the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father. 5. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. The Decision ruled that since he was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Art. 285 of the Civil Code. Issue: Was Adrians petition for recognition already barred upon Fiscal Bernabes death? Held: No. Ruling: 1. A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. 2. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two may be synonymous. If the rule takes away substantive rights, then it is not procedural. 3. Art. 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. 4. The Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action for recognition because tha t right had already vested prior to its enactment. 5. Art. 285 refers to the action for recognition of natural children. A strict and literal interpretation of said article has already been frowned upon by the Court in Aruego. 6. In Divinagracia vs Rovira, the Court said that the prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural children applies to spurious children. 7. Illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition under Art. 285 of the Civil Code for a period of up to four years from attaining the majority age. Concept: NCC Art. 285: The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. In this case, the

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW


action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.

(ATTY. LEGARDA)

29

FC, Art. 256: This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Natural child one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by any legal impediment from marrying each other. Spurious or illegitimate child commonly known as bastards; include those adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. Estrada v Escritor 4 Aug 2003 J. Puno Facts: 1. Petitioner learned through a conversation that respondent was living with a man who was not her husband and begot a son by him. 2. Petitioner claims that she, a judge of the court, is tarnishing the image of the court by committing such an immoral act. 3. Respondent testified that she was living with him without the benefit of marriage for 20 years. 4. Respondent instead presents that both of them signed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness. A document that is recognized by their faith, the Jehovahs Witnesses. 5. Their faith claims that marriage should be presented: a. first and foremost to God b. secondly to society (if all legal means are exhausted then one may use a Declaration of Pledging faithfulness) 6. Although respondent is no longer married, the man she is living with still is, thus jurisprudence provides that a case of misconduct can still be filed against her. 7. Respondent invokes religious freedom, because her faith does not deem her act as immoral. 8. Petitioner makes a real good argument however that by allowing such an act to continue would constitute a dangerous case law that would encourage others to join said faith and use that religious as a defense against legal liability. Issue: Whether or not Respondents right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the prevailing jurisprudence for which govt. employees are held administratively liable. Held: Case undetermined because the State must have its say before the court can decide Ruling: 1. Only a compelling interest can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. (Compelling state interest test) 2. There is no doubt that choosing between keeping her job and abandoning her religion and family on the one hand and giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other puts a burden on her free exercise of religion. (very similar to Victoriano) 3. It is thus inappropriate for the complainant, a private person to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence must be discharged by the proper agency (the state). 4. The state should have the right to have its say on the matter, therefore the case is remanded to the office of the Court Admin and the Solicitor General will review the case. 5. There are some guiding principles however: a. Man does not live in isolation but in society. Society is kept together by the invisible bonds of common thought, thus society is justified in taking steps to preserve its moral code and the interests of the state. b. Free Exercise Clause (see below) c. Victoriano Doctrine (see below) d. Government entails concubinage as immoral because it is dangerous to the conditions of a progressing society. NOT because of a religious factor. Concept:

30 1. Free Exercise Clause- absolute protection to individual religious convictions and beliefs and prescribes gov. from questioning a persons beliefs or imposing penalties solely on just those beliefs (92) 2. Establishment of Religion Clause- state cannot pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions or prefer one over the other. (106) 3. Religious freedom doctrinea. Incumbent upon the court to determine whether a certain ritual is religious or not b. religious freedom will not be upheld if it clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law such that when a law of general applicability incidentally burdens the exercise of ones religion, ones right to religious freedom cannot justify exemption from compliance with the law. (138) 4. Victoriano Doctrine (141) a. test of immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community. b. Religious exercise may be indirectly burdened by a general law which has for its purpose and effect the advancement of the states secular goals provided that there is no other means by which the state can accomplish this purpose without imposing such burden. c. the court referred to the Compelling state interest test which grants exemptions when general laws conflict with religious exercise, unless a compelling state interest intervenes 5. Benevolent Neutrality (167) recognizes the religious nature of the Filipino people and the elevating influence of religion in society HOWEVER government might adopt laws or actions of general applicability which inadvertently burden religious exercise it gives room for accommo date religious exercised as required by the free exercise clause. -could allow accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests .

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(ATTY. LEGARDA)

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee November 2, 1916 Trent Facts: 1. Action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile 2. The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, 3. Campos Rueda, one month after the contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs 4. plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation 5. her refusals resulted to his maltreatments by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body 6. She was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. 7. first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant. Issue: Can the defendant be compelled to render support to his wife outside of the conjugal domicile? Held: Yes. Campos Rueda was held liable to support his wife. Ruling: 1. Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of November 3, 1905, that neither spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the conjugal abode, would not necessarily control in this jurisdiction 2. Article 149 of the Civil Code "is not absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a preexisting or preferential right in each of these cases which was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to support.

3.

The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on her part, may maintain an action for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy, notwithstanding Article 149 of the Civil Code (giving the person who is obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy either by paying fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining his own house). Concept: Concept of Marriage: - Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. - Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the

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-

(ATTY. LEGARDA)

31

parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make Marriage is something more than a contract, though founded upon the agreement of the parties. When once formed a relation is created between the parties which they cannot change by agreement, and the right and obligations of which depend not upon their agreement but upon the law. The spouses must be faithful to, assist support and live each other. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations .Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested.

Sermonia v. CA June 14, 1994 Justice Bellosillo Facts: 1. Jose Sermonia was married to Virginia Nievera. 2. While this marriage was valid and subsisting, he married Ma. Lourdes Unson. This 2 nd marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar. 3. Jose was charged with bigamy before the RTC. He moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy was extinguished by prescription. This was, however, denied, as well as his motion for reconsideration. 4. He challenged the orders before the CA, but his petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Issue: 1. Is the rule on constructive notice applicable in bigamy cases? 2. Did Jose conceal his bigamous marriage?

Held: No. This should not be applied because a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. It is also entered into a place where the offender is not known to be still a married person. *This is not contrary to the policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive period from registration would amount to almost absolving the offenders for liability. Yes. His marriage may have been recorded in the Civil Registry, but he indicated that he was single. He could have told his first wife about the subsequent marriage so that everything would be out in the open. Obviously, he knew no priest would knowingly perform/authorize a bigamous marriage as this would subject him to punishment under the Marriage Law. Ruling: Judgment of the CA is affirmed. Concept: The stability of marriage should be regarded as an inviolable social institution. Prescriptive Period for the crime of bigamy This should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party because its discovery is quite difficult and would take time. Perido v. Perido 1975 - Makalintal Facts: 1. Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. 2. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943. 3. the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves parcels of land in Occidental Negros. 4. Then the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio they filed a complaint against the children of the second marriage, praying for the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another partition of the

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW


5.

(ATTY. LEGARDA)

32

lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone. They alleged, that the lots belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, 6. RTC did not order the partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs because it held that the five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; 7. The plaintiffs appealed. They insist that said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or after their marriage. Issue: Are the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat legitimate? Held: Yes, they were born during their parents marriage therefore, legitimate. Ruling: 1. The petition cannot be sustained. 2. The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence to show that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. 3. So, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900. 4. the statement that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together husband and wife are married to each other. 5. (**here again is the rationale of the presumption) "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage." 6. SO: since the children were born during the marriage and, theyre legitimate. People vs Malabago 2 Dec 1996 J. Puno Facts: 1. Pedro Malabago was judged guilty of the crime of parricide and was sentenced to death. 2. During trial, Malabago admitted that he was legally married to Letecia Malabago by civil ceremony officiated by Mayor Barinaga. Issue: Did the prosecution prove that Pedro and Letecia were legally married? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to. 2. The testimony of Pedro that he was married to the deceased is an admission against his penal interest. It is a confirmation of the semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Concept: NCC Art. 220: In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression. Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3, par. (z): That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartnership; par. (aa): That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; RPC, Art. 246: Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW


death.

(ATTY. LEGARDA)

33

Go vs. Court of Appeals 29 May 1997 J. Romero Facts: 1. Newly weds got married and hired private respondents (the wife of the petitioner in this case) to video tape their wedding. 2. The newly weds wished to show the video off to their relatives in the States but were unable to do so because it was not yet ready. 3. The newly weds and the private respondents agreed that the newly weds would pick up the video after they come back from their honeymoon abroad. 4. When they came back to claim the video they found out that it had been erased. 5. The petitioners say that it is common practice for them to erase tapes after they have not been claimed past the thirty day mark. 6. Petitioners claim that the video coverage was made by a camera man who owned the video equipment and that the petitioners only received commission. 7. The husband (one of the petitioners) says that his wife entered into that contract on her own sole interest and he should not be held liable to pay for any damages. 8. The court ruled against the current petitioners in this case, thus this case to the SC. Issue: Is the Husband also liable for damages, even if he claims that it was an agreement between her and the newly weds? Held: No. Ruling: 1. It does not matter if the camera man owned the equipment. The contract entered between the petitioner and the newly weds was a SERVICE and it was not about the video equipment being used. 2. It was clear that the newly weds would come back to claim the video tapes, thus there is no reason for the petitioners to erase the tape after 30 days had lapsed. 3. The husband should not be held liable because the wife may exercise any profession, or engage in business without the consent of the husband. Only the wife entered into business thus she is solely liable to respondents for damages. Concept: A. The wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents. April 20, 1998- Panganiban Facts: 1. Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan. 2. On August 10, 1978, Arturio Trinidad filed an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land. 3. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. 4. In 1970, Arturio demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused. 5. Defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. 6. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiffs birth. 7. Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943. 8. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land. Issue: In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and filiation be proven? - Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by preponderant evidence the marriage of his parents. - Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad Ruling:

1.

34 Petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioners case.

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(ATTY. LEGARDA)

2.

Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union , petitioners failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place.

Other evidence presented: 1. In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: a. Isabel Meren, who testified that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and b. Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. c. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-teachers association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidads house twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away d. Gerardo dropped by Inocentes house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. e. She also attended petitioners baptismal party held at the same house 2. Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the childs father and mother Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws to show pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals 3. The first family picture shows petitioner carrying his second daughter and his wife together with the late Felix Trinidad carrying petitioners first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad. Another picture showing Lourdes Trinidad carrying petitioners first chil d 4. The totality of petitioners positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondents self-serving negations. 5. petitioner consistently used Inocentes surname (Trinidad) without objection from private respondents -- a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes legitimate child Defendants 1. Private respondents thesis is that Inocentes died unwed and without issue in March 1941. Private respondents witness, Pedro Briones, testified that Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried in the estate of the Trinidads, because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery in Kalibo, which was then occupied by the Japanese forces. His testimony, however, is far from credible because he stayed with the Trinidads for only three months , and his answers on direct examination were noncommittal and evasive 2. Beatriz Sayon, testified that, when the Japanese occupied Kalibo in 1941, her father brought Inocentes from Manila to Tigayon because he was sick. Inocentes stayed with their grandmother, Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died single and without issue in March 1941. 3. Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that Inocentes died in March 1941. Concept: I. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: a. the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, b. the couples public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, c. the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and d. the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents II. Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse party. - In determining where the preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court may consider a. all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the b. witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, c. the nature of the facts, d. the probability or improbability of their testimony, e. their interest or want thereof, and f. their personal credibility

De Jacob v. CA

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

(ATTY. LEGARDA)

35

August 19, 1999 Justice Panganiban Facts: 1. Dr. Alfredo Jacob died, leaving behind his estate, his spouse (Tomasa), who was also the Special Administrator for his various Estates, and a legally-adopted son (Pedro). 2. During the proceeding for the settlement of Dr. Jacobs estate, Pedro sought to intervene, claiming his share as the adopt ed son and sole surviving heir. He questioned the validity of the marriage between Tomasa and Alfredo. 3. Tomasa opposed the motion to intervene, questioning Pedros claim as the legal heir. 4. The trial court ruled in favor of Pedro, sustaining his claim and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as non-existent. 5. This decision was affirmed by the CA. Issue: Is the marriage between Tomasa and Alfredo valid? Held: Yes. 1. It was established that Dr. Jacob and Tomasa lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The proof is an affidavit executed by them. Clearly, the marriage was exceptional and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code. This code governs this case because the questioned marriage took place before the Family Code became effective. 2. A secondary evidence is allowed if the original has been lost or destroyed. The testimony of Msgr. Yllana, the solemnizing priest and the wedding photos should have been considered by the lower courts. Ruling: The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner's marriage is valid, (but respondents adoption has not been sufficiently established.) Concept: There is a presumption in favor of marriage. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any evidence, to be in fact married. WHY? If not, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. Silverio vs. Republic 2007 Corona, J. Facts 1. Rommel Jacinto Dante Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate 2. Petitioner alleged his name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." 3. He further alleged that he is a male transsexual; underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. Ultimately, he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok. 4. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. 5. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. RTC said that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. Court also believes that no harm or injury will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. 6. OSG, filed a petition alleging that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. CA ruled in favour of OSG. 7. On appeal to SC, Silverios petition hinges on under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. Issue: Can the entries in Silverios birth ceritificate be changed and thus alter his status and capacity to legally marry a person of same sex? Held: No, simply because theres no law. Ruling : 1. A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment a. Court said that just because he acquired physical features of a female, doesnt mean hes entitled to the changes he seeks b. Petitions like this are controlled by laws. Because its a privilege and not a right, the State has an interest. c. And theres a governing law. It provides for grounds for which change of first name may be allowed- this includes: 1) name is ridiculous, 2) new name has been continuously used, or he has been publicly known by that first name, and 3) change will avoid confusion d. Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name which was his sex reassignment is not contemplated by any of the governing laws. (**theres just really no law for sex reassignment as a ground for change of entries in the birth

e. f. 2.

36 certificate) PLUS, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status (**he still cant do same sex marriage even if his name be allowed to be changed-his name may be changed to MELY, but hes still MALE!). More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. As to the other law he invokes, RA 9048- same thing, it doesnt cover sex reassignment.

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW

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No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment a. Under RA 9048, a correction involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. b. (this might be long... )Now, Rule 108 (in relation to other laws) provides for entries correctablethis includes acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name) c. BUT Rule 108 doesnt really cover the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. d. More crucially, these acts, events, decrees, produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person e. (**now for its relevance to Marriage...) The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations... The comprehensive term status include such matters as as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, .... f. A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal capacity and civil status. Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity a. The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. b. The petition was but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. c. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female postoperative transsexual).

3.

People v De La Cruz 11 Feb 2010 J. Nachura Facts: 1. Victoriano dela Cruz was convicted of the crime of parricide when he killed his wife, Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. 2. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC but deleted the award of exemplary damages of 30,000 pesos. Issue: Did the CA err in deleting the exemplary damages? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was married to the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken as an admission against penal interest. 2. The CA erred when it deleted the award of exemplary damages. In line with current jurisprudence, it is but fitting that exemplary damages, in the sum of P30,000.00, be awarded, considering that the qualifying circumstance of relationship is present, this being a case of Parricide. Panganiban v. Borromeo 9 Sep 1933 J. Malcolm Facts: 1. Petitioners (husband and wife) went to respondent lawyer in order to create a contract that would allow the husband to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in an adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from either one of them. 2. The Respondent lawyer notarized this contract. Issue: Is the attorney guilty of misconduct?

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Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. Although crimes of adultery and concubinage are private crimes which can only be prosecuted with the consent of the offended party, they are still crimes. 2. The act of attempting to legalize the crimes by making a valid contract goes against the reality that they are considered by law to be unlawful and immoral. 3. SC holds that the contract is contrary to law, morals, and public order and as a consequence not judicially recognizable. 4. Respondent is guilty of misconduct: a member of the bar who performs an act a s a notary public of a disgraceful or immoral character may be held liable to account by the court even to the extent of disbarment. In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent June 21, 1940- LAUREL Facts: 1. Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad Colares for some nine consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a second marriage, sought the legal advice of the Atty Santiago 2. The respondent, after hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the latter that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again, and asked him to bring his wife on the afternoon of the same day, May 29, 1939. 3. There prepared the document in which it was stipulated, among other things, that the contracting parties, who are husband and wife authorized each other to marry again, at the same time renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying. 4. After the execution and acknowledgment of by the parties, the respondent asked the spouses to shake hands and assured them that they were single and as such could contract another and subsequent marriage. 5. Ernesto Baniquit, on June 11, 1939, contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. Issue: Is the contract between Baniquit and his wife valid? Held: No. Ruling: 1. There is no doubt that the contract executed by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. 2. The advice given by the respondent, the preparation and acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law. Selanova v. Mendoza May 19, 1975 Justice Aquino Facts: 1. Saturnino Selanova and Avelina Ceniza filed against each other a complaint for adultery/concubinage. 2. It is presumed that either spouse had withdrawn the complaint, and as a result, Judge Alejandro Mendoza liquidated the conjugal partnership of Saturnino and Avelina. 3. In that instrument, he allocated to the husband a 13-hectare Riceland and to the wife, the residential house and lot. 4. Selanova then charged Judge Mendoza with gross ignorance of the law. The judge alleged that he relied on the provision that the husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. 5. On Feb. 27, 1975, having reached 70, Judge Mendoza retired and asked for a compassionate view on his case. Issue: Is the agreement separating the conjugal property of the spouses void? Held: Yes. The judicial sanction for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during marriage should be secured beforehand. The provisions of Art. 221 of the Civil Code supports this as it mandates that 1) any contract for personal separation between husband and wife shall be void and unenforceable, and this has the same effect on 2) every extrajudicial agreement during marriage for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. A contract legalizing the commission of adultery and concubinage, as manifested in the liquidation of the conjugal partnership in after such withdrawal of complaints, is contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a consequence, not judicially recognizable. Ruling: The respondent is severely censured.

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Concept: Pre-nuptial Agreement the dissolution of the conjugal partnership in marriage is secured beforehand I would not necessarily own what is yours. *Another example of judicial discretion sympathy towards the respondent. Lichauco-de Leon vs. CA 1990 - Medialdea, J. Facts: 1. respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were united in wedlock 2. they had a child named Susana (legitimate) 3. Later on, a de facto separation between the spouses occured due to irreconcilable marital differences, with Sylvia leaving the conjugal home. Then Sylvia went to the United States where she obtained American citizenship. 4. Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California a petition for dissolution of marriage against Jose Vicente. She also filed claims for support and distribution of properties. 5. But since Jose was a Fil citizen and didnt have properties in the US, Sylvia decided to suspend divorce proceedings and instead concentrated on obtaining property settlements with Jose 6. So she succeeded in entering into a Letter-Agreement (this letter agreement was one helluva demand! She demanded, among other things, that one Ortigas condo unit,Wack Wack condo unit, parcels of land in Ayala Alabang... plus financial support ) with her mother-in-law, private respondent Macaria De Leon 7. In that Letter-Agreement, there was that important phrase saying its the stated objective of this agreement that said divorce proceedings will continue (this later on was found by the Court to be one of the fatal points against Sylvia) 8. Macaria made cash payments to Sylvia in compliance with her obligations as stipulated in the Letter-Agreement 9. Then- Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal partnership, which was granted by RTC. 10. Macaria filed with the trial court a motion for leave to intervene alleging that she is the owner of the properties involved in the case. The motion was granted. 11. She assailed the validity and legality of the Letter-Agreement which had for its purpose, according to her, the termination of marital relationship between Sylvia and Jose Vicente. 12. RTC ruled in favour of Macaria and declared the Letter-Agreement null and void; also declared conjugal partnership of the spouses and Sylvia DISSOLVED; and adjudicating to each of them his or her share of the properties and assets of said conjugal partnership in accordance with the agreement except the properties belonging to and owned by Intervenor Macaria. 13. Sylvia appealed raising that the cause or consideration of the Letter- Agreement is the termination of marital relations (here she was trying to make the Court believe that the Letter-Agreement was only about property relations and not marital relations); Issue: Is the Letter-Agreement valid? (in so far as it deals with termination of either marital or property relations- which is another question that the Court must resolve) Held: No. Ruling: 1. The Court said The third paragraph of the Letter-Agreement, reads: In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of relations between the Sylvia and Jose It is readily apparent that the use of the word "relations" is ambiguous and thus subject to interpretation. (Sylvia insists that the consideration for her execution of the Letter-Agreement was the termination of property relations with her husband; On the other hand, Macaria and Jose Vicente assert that the consideration was the termination of marital relationship. 2. We (Court) sustain the observations and conclusion made by the trial court, that the parties contemplated not only to agree to a judicial separation of property of the spouses but likewise to continue with divorce proceedings 3. SC also agrees with the Trial Court in reasoning that: - Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.; Also, - Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulations... 4. So termination of marital relationship (Letter-Agreement) is not only contrary to law but contrary to Filipino morals and public Policy, thus NULL and VOID. 5. Its all the more void because it contravenes Art 221, CC: The following shall be void and of no effect: (1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; (2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the

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conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife; ( discussion on vitiation of consent, its not relevant so wont include it. but basically its an issue between Sylvia and Mac aria that both acted in violation of laws so no party should be granted relief. Court simply said that this case is an exception to that in pari delicto rule and that should there be any possibly relief, it should be granted to Macaria, not Sylvia. So Court didnt grant Sylvias petition.

Domalagan vs Bolifer 8 Feb 1916 J. Johnson Facts: 1. In Nov 1909, Jorge Domalagan and Carlos Bolifer entered into a contract where he was to pay Bolifer the sum of 500 pesos upon the marriage of his son Cipriano with the daughter of Carlos, Bonifacia Bolifer. 2. In Aug 1910, Domalagan has completed his obligation by paying 500 pesos plus 16 pesos as hansel or token of future marriage. 3. In the same month, Bonifacia Bolifer was married to Laureano Sisi. 4. Thus, he demanded the return of the 516 pesos with interest and damages. Damages resulting from the fact that he was obliged to sell a property in Bohol to meet the obligation. 5. After hearing, Judge Vicente Nepomuceno rendered judgment in favor of Domalagan and ordered the return of the 516 pesos plus interest of 6 percent. Issue: Is the verbal contract valid? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. Art. 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions does not render oral contracts invalid. Said section simply provides the method by which the contracts mentioned therein may be proved. 2. A contract may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. A failure to except to evidence presented in order to prove the contract, because it does not conform to the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the law. 3. If the parties to an action, during trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing. Concept: NCC, Art. 1403: The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: (2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents: (c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry; Cabague v. Auxilio 26 Nov 1952 J. Bengzon Facts: 1. There was a contract that the defendant and the plaintiff would get married if: a. plaintiff paid for the improvement of the defendants house. b. spend for the wedding and needs of the bride 2. The promise was not honored by the defendant thus the case. Issue: Can the plaintiff recover damages for the promise of marriage that was not honored? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. This case involves 2 kinds of agreements: a. Father of the Plaintiff made a deal with the defendants in consideration of the marriage. b. Son (plaintiff) made a deal with the lover or made a mutual promise to marry 2. The first agreement cannot prosper because it is to enforce an agreement in consideration of marriage. Evidently this action could not be maintained on the theory of mutual promise to marry. 3. The second prospers because Geronimo may continue his action against Socorro for such damages as may have resulted from her

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failure to carry out their mutual matrimonial promises. Concept: *Exception that the father cant file for damages (but why???)

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FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner, -versus- THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents. September 30, 1960 - CONCEPCION Facts: 1. Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. 2. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. 3. July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954. 4. On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, as complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. 5. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Issue: Whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry Held: No. Ruling: 1. Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are not enforced in the Philippines. 2. Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". 3. It is the clear and manifest intent of the Congress not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry. 4. Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code. Wassmer v. Velez December 26, 1964 Justice J.P. Bengzon Facts: 1. Paquing Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for license to contract marriage, which was then issued. 2. The wedding was formally set, due preparation and publicity were made. 3. However, 2 days before the big day, Paquing left a note for his bride-to-be, stating that the wedding will have to be postponed due to his mothers opposition. 4. The next day, he sent another letter saying that he will return very soon. However, he did not appear nor was heard from again. 5. Beatriz sued Paquing for damages. Paquing failed to show up and answer the complaint numerous times. The court gave the parties chances to amicably settle. He was declared in default, but he moved for a new trial asserting that there is no Civil Code provision authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. 6. The decisions of the lower courts were not favorable to him, and so the last remedy lies with the Supreme Court. Issue: Is this case a mere breach of promise to marry? Held: No. Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through the preparation and publicity, only to postpone it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is different. There is cause to hold the defendant answerable in damages because this is contrary to good customs. Ruling: The lower courts judgment is affirmed. Concept: Freedom of consent in marriage This entitles either party to withdraw from his or her promise. But the exercise of that right to withdraw must not be unjustified and abusive.

Tanjanco v. CA

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1966 Reyes, J.B.L. Facts: 1. Tanjanco courted Santos both being of legal age; hed express and profess his undying love and affection fo r her; then he promised to marry her so she acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge;and it happened regularly 2. as a result, Santos conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., 3. then because of her losing her job, became unable to support herself and her baby; 4. Tanjanco refused to marry her, as promised; because of this, she suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. 5. She filed a case to compel Tanjanco to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her for her support and that of her baby, moral and exemplary damages 6. Case went to CA; CA said no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but said that there was cause of action for damages, as under Article 21 of CC: ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. 7. Tanjanco says that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not permissible Issue: Can Santos action for damages for breach of a promise to marry succeed? Held: No. Ruling: 1. Case of petitioner is meritorious 2. In citing Art 21 of CC (to grant Santos prayer for damages), there should idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abus e of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded . in this case, there was none (no deceit, etc). The essential feature is seduction, not just mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; 3. Buenaventura case: To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement . 4. American Jurisprudence: in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover. 5. Facts show that there is voluntariness and mutual passion on acts of both parties especially Santos; cause if she was just seduced or deceived, she wouldnt again yield to Tanjancos embraces, much less for one year, and would have cut chart a ll sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. 6. So theres no cause of action here; Art 21 of the CC cant be invoked. Baksh v. CA 19 Feb 1993 J. Davide Facts: 1. Before 20 Aug 1987, Gashem Baksh, an Iranian medical student at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges, courted and proposed to marry Marilou Gonzales. She accepted his love on the condition that they get married and both agreed to get married on October of that year. 2. On 20 Aug 1987, Baksh forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments where he was staying. There, Marilou lost her virginity. 3. A week before 27 Oct 1987, Baksh attitude towards Marilou started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her. He also repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and said that he is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. 4. On 27 Oct 1987, Marilou filed a complaint for damages against Baksh for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. 5. After trial, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered a decision on 16 Oct 1989 favoring Marilou and ordered Baksh to pay 20,000 pesos as moral damages. 6. Baksh appealed to CA but the same was denied on 18 Feb 1991. He then appealed to the SC. Issue: Does Article 21 of the Civil Code apply to a breach of promise to marry? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. But the Code Commission expanded the concept of quasi-delict in Article 21 by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 2. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana (quasi-delict) because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well as such assault and battery, false imprisonment, and deceit.

42 3. Prior decisions of the Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction (Hermosisima vs CA). Marilou surrendered her virginity because of moral seduction. 4. Baksh clearly violated the Filipinos concept of morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for t heir women. It can even be said that he committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Concept: NCC, Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

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Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. 58. Mariategui v. CA 24 Jan 1992 J. Bidin Facts: 1. Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953. 2. Lupo had 3 marriages. 3. The third of which transpired in front of a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal. 4. Descendants from the first and second marriage executed a deed of extrajudicial partition over a lot formerly owned by Lupo. 5. Descendants from the third marriage contest this and claim that they also have the right to the respective lots. 6. RTC ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the plaintiffs mother was married to Lupo. 7. CA ruled that ALL of Lupos descendants are entitled to equal shares in the estate: and that the adjudicates shall reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and directing all the parties to submit to the lower court a project of partition in the net estate of Lupo (342) 8. defendants (current petitioners) are thus appealing. rd Issue: Are the children of the 3 wife entitled to the inheritance of property left by their late father even if they cannot present any evidence of the marriage of their mother and the said father? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. Although no marriage certificate was introduced, there was also no evidence to say that the marriage was not valid. 2. The mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. (See Fact 3) 3. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa [1941] (3 rd wife), the private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupos deat (1953) 4. Petition is denied. Concepts: A. The Laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and habits of life COURTS LOOK UPON THE PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE WITH GREAT FAVOR B. Once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact (Alavado vs. City Gov. of Tacloban) 59. PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant, vs. JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent

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June 19, 1997- REGALADO Facts: 1. January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding before Judge Myrna Lim Verano 2. They met sometime in 1977, when respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, Metro Manila, was trying a murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares. Since then, respondent became a close family friend of complainant 3. After the wedding, they received their guests at a German restaurant in Makati. With the reception over, the newlywed(s) resumed their usual work and activities 4. At 6:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, respondent fetched complainant from her house in Project 8, Quezon City, and reached the condominium unit of respondent two hours later at which time, she answered the phone. 5. At the other end of the line was a woman offending her with insulting remarks. 6. Complainant confronted respondent on the identity of such caller but respondent simply remarked it would have been just a call at the wrong number 7. What followed was a heated exchange of harsh words, one word led to another, to a point when respondent called complainant a nagger, saying Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae, yong sumusunod sa bawat gusto ko 8. Since then, the complainant and respondent have been living separately 9. Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study session, the complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the Bible Group, that he solemnized the marriage between former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez 10. Infuriated and impelled by the disheartening news, complainant lost no time in gathering evidence against respondent Defendant 1. Respondent gave a different version. According to him, what he inked with the complainant on January 7, 1994 was merely but a sham marriage. He explained that he agreed as, in fact, he voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract in an effort to help Judge Mijares in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993. 2. Respondent theorized that when his marriage with complainant took place before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, his marriage with Librada Pea, his first wife, was subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not yet become final and executory, for the reason that said Decision was not yet published as required by the Rules, the service of summons upon Librada Pea having been made by publication, and subject Decision was not yet published. Issue: Is the marriage between De Mijares and Villaluz valid? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by law and the evidence . To be sure, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code, i.e., a. legal capacity of the contracting parties, b. who must be a male and a female; c. consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer; d. authority of the solemnizing officer; e. a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of Title I on marriage, Family Code; and f. a marriage ceremony with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer, g. and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife, in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age, were satisfied and complied with. 2. 3. Regardless of the intention of respondent in saying I do with complainant before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage were present. His consent thereto was freely given. Being a lawyer, the respondent is surely conversant with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong. If he never had any immoral love affair with Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares and therefore, he felt duty bound to help her in ventilating the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent could have testified in her favor in said administrative case, to assure all and sundry that what Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr. complained of in said administrative case was without any factual and legal basis. It is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for continued membership in the legal profession.

4.

60. Mallion v. Alcantara

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October 31, 2006 Justice Azcuna Facts: 1. Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the RTC seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Editha Alcantara, citing t he latters alleged psychological incapacity. 2. The RTC denied the petition due to the lack of essential evidence to warrant the grant of relief. 3. The appeal with the CA was likewise dismissed 4. He filed another petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC, but this time alleging that his marriage with Editha was without a valid marriage license. For her part, Editha filed an answer with a motion to dismiss. 5. Her motion to dismiss was granted, while his motion for reconsideration was denied. 6. The decisions of the lower courts were not favorable to him, and so the last remedy lies with the Supreme Court. He maintains that there was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action. Issue: Is the petitioner justified in filing another action for the declaration of nullity of marriage, but this time on the ground of absence of a marriage license? Held: No. The statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause. In both petitions, he sought to have his marriage nullified. The same facts and evidence would sustain both, and so the two actions are just the same. Furthermore, the case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid celebration took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In the earlier civil case, however, he impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Ruling: The petition is denied. Concept: The absence of essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void. The formal requisites of marriage are: 1. Authority of the solemnizing officer 2. A valid marriage license 3. A marriage ceremony: contracting parties before the solemnizing officer, their personal declaration (husband and Wife), and 2 witnesses of legal age. 61. Madsali, Lajim v. People 2010 Peralta, J. Facts: 1. Accused are convicted of special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention 2. Sajiron Lajim (Lajim), with the aid of his father, abducted and sexually abused AAA; as for Madsali, it was his place where AAA (16 yrs old) was detained for more than 5 months 3. 9 days after abduction, Sajiron and AAA were married by a certain Imaam. It was done against AAAs will and without the presence of her parents (and she was 16 y.o.! does Muslim law on marriage allow that??) ; then she got pregnant later on (yikes) 4. In defense, accused Lajim claimed: a. that he and AAA were engaged for 3 yrs prior to their elopement b. that AAA consented to the marriage c. that AAAs mother was present during their marriage (this was alleged by AAAs long lost father but was refuted by Imaam who said that AAAs parents were not present) d. that theres that criminal charge against him only because he failed to give dowry to AAAs family Issue: relevant issue- Was the marriage between AAA and Lajim valid? Held: No. Ruling: 1. As to the elopement defense Court said that if that were true, her normal reaction would be to cover up Lajim, but that wasnt the case, AAA immediately reported to the NBI the incident 2. As to the failure of giving of dowry Court said that no young Filipina of decent nature would publicly admit that shes been raped unless its the truth (remember Justice Callejo on this? ) 3. As to AAAs consent Court said that this was just asserted by Lajim to legitimize AAAs detention BUT such marriage was

45 irregular under Muslim Laws (Art 15 and Art 32 see concept section below) because there was no consent on AAAs part. And Muslim Laws require mutual consent as an essential requisite to the validity of the marriage. 4. In this case, there was no consent because the marriage was solemnized only upon instruction of Egap. AAA was forced to signed the marriage contract, plus here parents were not present. The Imam didnt even ask for the parties consent during th e celebration of marriage, because he was also just compelled to solemnize it. 5. Clearly, the marriage ceremony was a farce done in an attempt to free themselves (the accused) form criminal responsibility. Concept: Art 15 mutual consent is an essential requisite Art 32 If consent is vitiated by violence, intimidation, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, its considered IRREGULAR from the time of its celebration

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62. Garcia vs. Recio 2 Oct 2001 J. Panganiban Facts: 1. On 1 Mar 1987, Roderick Recio (Filipino) was married to Editha Samson (Australian). They lived together in Australia. 2. On 18 May 1989, an Australian family court issued a decree of divorce. 3. On 26 Jun 1992, Roderick Recio obtained Australian citizenship. 4. On 12 Jan 1994, Recio and Grace Garcia (Filipino) got married. They lived together in Australia. 5. Starting 22 Oct 1995, they lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. 6. On 16 May 1996, their conjugal assets were divided in accordance with the Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. 7. On 3 Mar 1998, Garcia filed a Complaint for Nullity of Marriage on the grounds of bigamy. She claimed that Recio was incapacitated to marry her because of his prior marriage to Editha Samson. 8. On 7 July 1998, Recio obtained a divorce decree from a Sydney family court. He then filed a motion to dismiss. OSG agreed. 9. RTC decided that the marriage was dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. Issue: 1. Was the divorce between Recio and Editha Samson proven? 2. Was Recio legally capacitated when he married Garcia? Held: No decision. Case remanded to RTC to determine his legal capacity to marry Garcia. Ruling: 1. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the Filipino to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 2. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. 3. To be admitted as evidence, the divorce decree must be proven as a public record of a foreign country by (1) an official publication, or (2) a certified true copy (attestation). If the record is not kept in the Philippines, it must be authenticated and certified by a diplomatic or consular officer in a Philippine embassy/consulate in the foreign country. 4. The divorce decree between Recio and Samson appeared authentic but compliance with the rules on evidence was not demonstrated. Fortunately, Garcias counsel did not object to it when it was presented as evidence. Hence, it was admissible. 5. The divorce obtained by Recio to Samson was restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry. 6. The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. Recio did not submit a certificate of legal capacity as required in Article 21 of the Family Code. Thus based on the records, it did not show that Recio, an Australian citizen during the marriage, was legally capacitated to marry Garcia. Concept: Divorce the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. Two types: 1. absolute divorce (a vinculo matrimonii) terminates the marriage 2. limited divorce (a mensa et thoro) suspends the marriage and leaves the bond in full force 63. Te vs. CA November 29, 2000- Kapunan Facts: 1. Petitioner and private respondent got married. 2. Petitioner left private respondent when he noticed that she was pregnant. 3. Petitioner married another woman and private respondent filed a case of bigamy against him. 4. Petitioner claims that he was forced into marriage because private respondent concealed her pregnancy begot by another man

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thus making her psychologically incapacitated. 5. Petitioner argues that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue because a declaration that their marriage was void would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability. He claims it is a prejudicial question. Issue: Does a prejudicial question actually exist, thus requiring the civil action to be accomplished before the criminal action? Held: No Ruling: 1. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. 2. Neither does the filing of the civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings. There is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil. 64. AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant, -versus- FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-appellee. November 26, 1970- REYES, J.B.L Facts: 1. Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953; 2. defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation, 3. judgment was rendered therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's counterclaim 4. Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his 5. Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.

Defendant 1. Defendant Fernando denied the allegation having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative; 2. he averred that under no circumstance would he live with Aurora, as he had escaped from her and from her relatives the day following their marriage on 4 December 1953; 3. that he denied having committed any fraud against her Issue: whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage Held: No. Non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship is not a fraud. Ruling: 1. For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides: ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be; 2. ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article: (1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties; (2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more; (3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband. No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. 3. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that

47 would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.

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While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested The fraud is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of fraud enumerated in Article 86.

5.

65. Villanueva vs. CA October 27, 2006 Justice Ynares-Santiago Facts: 1. April 13, 1988 - Orlando and Lilia Villanueva got married in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. 2. November 17, 1992 - Orlando filed a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that he was only forced to marry Lilia who was already pregnant; however, according to him, he did not impregnate her because though they had a sexual relation, he did not have an erection. Furthermore, he claims that he did not have sex with her after they got married. 3. His petition was dismissed in both of the lower courts. Issue: 1. May the marriage be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent? 2. May lack of cohabitation be a ground to annul a marriage? 3. Should Orlando be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees and costs? Ruling: 1. The court is not convinced that he married under duress. a. It was only after 4 years and 8 months when he took serious steps to have the marriage annulled. The prolonged inaction finds basis in Lilias allegation that this suit was filed solely to bring about his acquittal in the criminal case of bigamy which was then already pending against him. b. He cited incidents of harassing phone calls, from Lilia, from unwanted visits from men at the premises of UE after his classes and, he was already working the threatening presence of Ka Celso, a supposed NPA member, claimed to be hired by Lilia. However, at this time as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment, it is reasonable to assume that he knew, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harms way. He should have informed th e police, the security personnel of his school, and even to the judge prior to their marriage. c. He was not tricked into marrying his wife. First, his excuse that he could not have impregnated her because he did not have an erection is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. Second, the court is not prepared to through Lilias entire testimony simply on account of her confusion as the exact date of the death of her fetus, especially when she herself presented documentary evidence, August 29, 2988, as the date her fetus died. Also, whether her impression that she had delivered prematurely is correct or not will not affect that she had delivered a fetus. He had admitted he had sex with her and that his failure to attribute her pregnancy to any other man implies that he was not deceived. d. He sent her letters, which contained expressions of love and concern for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under duress. 2. Lack of cohabitation, per se, is not a ground to annul a marriage. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of such grounds: lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation or undue influence. 3. We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides that attorneys may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under the circumstances, as in the instant case. We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal basis. There is nothing in the records or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral damages. 66. Jimenez v. Caizares 1960 Padilla, J.: Facts: 1. Petitioner wants to annul his marriage to defendant on the ground of impotency (office of her genitals was to small to allow the penetration of a male organ for copulation); that such condition existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist 2. Defendant doesnt send any response; Judge conducts an inquiry to determine whether theres collusion between petitioner and respondent, requiring defendant to submit to a medical examination, but to no avail (defendant refuses) 3. Judge rules in favor of petitioner, annulling their marriage 4. City atty files petition saying defendants impotency has not been satisfactorily proven because respondent wouldnt submit to

48 medical examination; that the judgment that the Judge shouldve rendered was just to cite respondent in contempt but not to annul the marriage because in doing so, it would open the door to married couples who want to end their marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them. Issue: Whether the marriage between the petitioner and respondent may be annulled based on the sole testimony of one of the parties in this case the husband (saying that his wife is impotent)? Held: No, this case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Ruling: 1. Marriage is of public interest 2. Law specifically enumerates legal grounds on which it may be annulled 3. Annulment may not be decreed based on ONE partys testimony 4. Wifes refusal to submit to medical examination does not satisfactorily establish impotency 5. In sum, husbands testimony/allegation is NOT sufficient to break the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife

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67. Alcazar vs. Alcazar 13 Oct 2009 J. Chico-Nazario Facts: 1. On 11 Oct 2000, Rey Alcazar got married to Veronica Alcazar. After the wedding, they lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro at the home of Reys parents. There they had sex. 2. Upon return to Manila, Rey did not live with Veronica at her residence in Tondo. 3. On 23 Oct 2000, Rey left for Riyadh, KSA where he worked as an upholsterer. While there, he did not communicate with Veronica. 4. After a year and a half or in Mar 2002, Rey returned to the country but did not go home to Tondo. Instead, he lived in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Since his return, he did not contact Veronica. 5. Veronica then filed a complaint for nullity of marriage due to Reys physical incapability to consummate his marriage with her under Article 45 par. 5 of the Family Code. 6. The Complaint was served to Rey on 30 Sep 2002. He did not file an Answer. 7. On 27 Nov 2002, RTC ordered the prosecutor to conduct an investigation to ensure that no collusion existed. On 4 Mar 2003, Prosecutrix Veronica de Guzman submitted her report that no collusion took place. Trial then ensued. 8. During trial, Veronica presented Nedy Tayag as clinical psychologist where she claimed that Rey is suffering from Narcissist ic Personality Disorder and recommended the declaration of nullity of marriage between Rey and Veronica. 9. On 4 Jun 2004, RTC denied Veronicas Complaint holding that Reys acts of not living with her does not lead to psychological incapacity. There was no showing that his alleged defects were already present at the inception of their marriage. 10. Upon appeal, CA affirmed the RTC decision. Issue: Was Rey psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations? Held: No. Reys failures to communicate and to live with Veronica are not grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Ruling: 1. Complaint filed by Veronica on Article 45 par. 5 of the Family Code refers to the lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse. Veronica even admitted that they had sex; hence there was no ground for annulment. 2. From the evidence presented, she was actually seeking the declaration for nullity of marriage based on Reys psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. 3. Article 36 was not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. Psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. The Court laid down 7 guidelines in Republic vs. CA. 4. Based on the guidelines, the evidence presented was not enough to find that Rey was psychologically incapacitated. Tayag was not able to examine Rey and merely relied on the information provided by Veronica, which was hardly impartial. 5. The Court was actually sympathetic to Veronica but stated that no remedy is available under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. 6. In Marcos vs. Marcos, the Court stressed that Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest. Article 36 refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. Concept: Narcissistic Personality Disorder a pervasive pattern of grandiosity, need for admiration, and lack of empathy.

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Family Code, Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; Family Code, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227) 68. Republic v. CA September 2, 1994 Puno Facts: 1. Angelina and Edwin got married without the knowledge of Castros parents. 2. They only started living together when it was found out that Angelina was pregnant. 3. Four months later, the relationship is not working and Angelinas brother takes adopts the baby. 4. Wishing to follow her baby to the U.S., Angelina fixes her marital status and discovers that no marriage license was issued to Edwin prior to the celebration of the marriage. 5. Angelina presented for proof of evidence a certificate from the Civil Register stating that the said license # did not appear on their records. 6. RTC denied the petition and held that the inability for the certifying official to locate the marriage license does not show that there was no marriage license issued. Issue: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the civil registrar. Held: Yes Ruling: The certificate of due search and inability to find is sufficient evidence to deduce that no such license number was issued to the contracting parties. Concept: 1. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void. 2. A certificate (from the civil registrar) of due search and inability to find sufficiently proves the non existence of an y questionable marriage license number. 69. JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants, vs. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents September 30, 1994- PER CURIAM Facts: 1. Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage license. 2. Thus, several couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, despite the absence of a marriage license. 3. As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage license. 4. In addition, respondent Judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. 5. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed w/ the local civil registrar. marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte - shown to have been solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage license. - as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allow himself to be photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he did not even know for the alleged reasons given marriage of Abellano and Edralin - Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. - The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6)

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years already marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage license This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion

marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga - Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was no marriage license marriage of Terrobias and Gaor - Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the contracting parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he already required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. - This alleged practice and procedure is highly improper and irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting parties are supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare that they take each other as husband and wife before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code). Summary: - Respondent judge contends that one of the marriages was exempted for a marriage for the couple had been living for 6 years under Art.34 of F.C. but still there is a failure to submit the necessary requirements to the civil registrar by Sambo. - The other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. Issue: Is there a ground for charging illegal solemnization of marriage? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. The Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. 2. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, 3. the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 4. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." 70. Sy vs. CA April 12, 2000 Justice Quisumbing Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. November 15, 1973 - Filipina and Fernando Sy, both 22 got married (under the NCC) in Church. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978,respectively. September 15, 1983 - Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. May 15,1988 - Their son Frederick transferred to his father's residence at Tondo, then lived with his father. February 11, 1987 - Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property: a) her husband abandoned her without just cause b) they have been living separately for more than one year c) they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership

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Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the MOA executed by the spouses. The trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina. 6. 7. May 1988 - Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. (She suffered hematoma as a result of the blows inflicted by him.) However, he was only convicted of slight physical injuries. August 4, 1992 She filed a declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She also cited as manifestations of her husbands psychological incapacity the following: a) Habitual alcoholism b) Refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead c) Refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. She alleged that these existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifested thereafter. 8. November 21, 1996 (Fast forward) The CA ruled with finality: a)

The testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law. b) Petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage. c) Prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Issue: 1. Is the marriage between petitioner and private respondent void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony? 2. Is the private respondent psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity? Ruling: 1. We have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, in a number of instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. The case at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Fillipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract. The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent. This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, during her direct examination. November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and daughter's birth certificates. These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.

2.

71. Alcantara vs. Alcantara 28 Aug 2007 Chico-Nazario, J.: FACTS: 1. Petitioner seeks to annul his marriage to respondent Rosita Alcantara saying that when they married on Dec 8, 1982, they had no marriage license; they just went to Manila City Hall to look for a person who could arrange a marriage for them, which they did. And they got married before a certain priest on that same day. 2. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo on March 1983 (a year after), but still without marriage license.

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In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives Petitioner says that the alleged marriage license (as being asserted by his wife), obtained in Carmona, Cavite is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license; - and, assuming they were issued a marriage license, petitioner says that it cant be given weight because the certification states that Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of some other couple but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number. 5. Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied; she asserts that: a. there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite b. Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children and that he only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage 6. CAs ruling: marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Plus, the parties marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage ISSUE: Is their marriage valid? Held: Yes. RULING: 1. Since the marriage was celebrated in 1982, Civil Code applies in this case 2. And under Article 53 of the CC, a marriage celebrated without a marriage license is void ab ignition. 3. Petitioner cant insist that there was no marriage license because the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties 4. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. There was also a certification to this effect which was issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Plus, this certification specifically identified them as the parties, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to them. 5. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business (meaning, its no sham). 6. Even if theyre not residents of Carmona, Cavite, such doesnt make their marriage void; its only considered as an irregularity which doesnt affect the validity of their marriage 7. As to the difference in the marriage license number between the certification and the marriage license, Court said its proba bly just typographical error, and it likewise doesnt affect their marriages validity 8. As to the fixer issue, that they got a fixer who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a priest Court didnt give any weight to it, saying that the authority of the solemnizing officer is presumed. Moreover, solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued. 9. Lastly, circumstances show that he was a willing participant to his marriage: they hes an educated person, he should know what hes doing, that they even wedded twice, the second time being done in a church. These facts all the more tipped the scale in favour of respondent. 10. So there. Petitioners petition is denied. 72. De Castro vs. De Castro 13 Feb 2008 J. Tinga Facts: 1. Reinel Anthony de Castro and Annabelle Assidao met and became sweethearts in 1991. 2. In Sep 1994, they applied for a marriage license in Pasig City. But when they went back, it had already expired. 3. In Oct 1994, they had their first intercourse. They regularly had sex thereafter. 4. On 13 Mar 1995, in order to push through with the wedding, they executed an affidavit stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. They got married on the same day but did not live together after. 5. On 13 Nov 1995, Annabelle gave birth to Reinna Tricia de Castro. Since birth, Annabelles been the one supporting her. 6. On 4 Jun 1998, Annabelle filed a complaint for support claiming that Reinel has reneged in his responsibility. 7. As a defense, Reinel denied getting married since they did not obtain a marriage license and has never acknowledged the child. 8. On 16 Oct 2000, RTC ruled that the marriage is not valid because it was solemnized without a license and declared that Reinel is the natural father of the child and thus obliged to give her support. 9. Reinel appealed arguing that the RTC erred in ordering him to provide support. CA denied the appeal holding that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of their marriage. Also, on 17 Apr 1998, Reinel admitted, thru an affidavit, that he is the legitimate father of the child. 10. CA also ruled that since this is an action for support, the RTC erred in declaring the marriage as null and void. Thus the appeal. Issue:

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1. Does the RTC have jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage? 2. Is the child Reinels daughter? Held: The RTC had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage. The child is Reinels illegitimate daug hter. Ruling: 1. RTC had jurisdiction. In Ninal vs Badayog, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. The court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same as long as it is essential to the determination of the case. 2. Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio. It is clear that they did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. 3. The law that dispenses with the marriage license for a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years aims to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame, and embarrassment with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant s name for a marriage license. 4. In this case, there was no scandalous cohabitation at all. The false affidavit so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. 5. On the second issue, the birth certificate of the child lists Reinel as the father. Also, he claimed in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of Annabelle that he is the legitimate father of the child. The wedding pictures also show that he was not forced to undergo the wedding ceremony. He smiled and kissed the bride! 73. Republic vs. Dayot March 28, 2008 Chico-Nazario Facts: 1. Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit instead of a marriage certificate claiming that both of them had reached the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years. (November 24, 1986) 2. Jose claims that his marriage was a lie because his consent was secured through fraud when Felisa tricked him into signing a paper when she accompanied her to receive a package from her brother. He did not know what he was signing. 3. Felisa claims however that they have been living with each other since 1980, yet did not get married legally because of their age difference. 4. Felisa filed a bigamy case against Jose on August 31, 1990. 5. Jose filed a case to annul the marriage, but the RTC ruled against him and said that they found his testimony incredible. The RTC claimed that he acknowledged her as his wife when he wrote her as his wife in a notarized document one year after he discovered the marriage contract he claims to be false. 6. Felisa claims that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 7. The Republic claims that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit do not affect the validity of the marriage (even if obtained illegally) Issue: Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabilitiation where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum 5 year requirement, makes the marriage void. Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. They executed an affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of maturity and that they had been living with each other for 5 years. 2. The facts derived from the CA show that the2 of them met each other in Feb or March of 1986, therefore they could not have started living with each other since 1980. They also do not meet the 5 year requirement. 3. The insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements will not affect the validity of the marriage is not permissible. It cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without a marriage license (as required by law) Concept: 1. The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. (Art 87 NCC) 2. No marriage license needed when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years (Art 76) Note: This 5 year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusively meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years (449) 3. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. 74. JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent. July 31, 2006- CHICO-NAZARIO

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Facts: Petitioner 1. Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, 2. He and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. 3. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. 4. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. 5. Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. 6. Marriage License No. 2770792 7. Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, and testified that their office failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered Respondent 1. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12 for some traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take endless pictures of. 2. on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had lunch and later each went home separately. 3. On May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged. Issue: Whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio Held: No. Ruling: I. Marriage License 1. The certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court 2. Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that they " failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired ." 3. We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." 4. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty 5. In this case, utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 II. 1. Presumption of Marriage the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. 2. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. 3. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. 4. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony . 5. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. 6. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage The difference of this case with Republic vs. CA was that there was no due search in locating the marriage license.

75. Leda vs. Tabang

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Feb 21, 1992 Per Curiam Facts: 6. October 3, 1976 Mr. Tabang and Ms. Leda were married, solemnized by Judge Tavarro. It was performed under Art. 76 of the NCC as one of exceptional character. They were both 20 years old. 7. They agreed to keep it a secret until Mr. Tabang had finished his law studies. They got married, but did not live together. 8. When he applied to take the bar, he declared that he was single. After passing, Ms. Leda blocked him from taking his oath, claiming that he acted fraudulently. She also alleged that after his law studies, he became aloof and abandoned her. 9. The court deferred his oath-taking and required him to answer the complaint. 10. In his explanation: he admitted that he was "legally married, but it "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his law studies. He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" because to his honest belief, he still has to declare himself single since the marriage was not yet made and declared public." He further averred that he and Ms. Leda had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed. 11. The Court dismissed the complaint and allowed him to take his oath in 1982. 12. But the following year, she filed this administrative case for his disbarment: a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with her, assuming that the marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of their marriage b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his application to take the bar c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the SC d. For being guilty of having deceived her into signing the affidavit of desistance and the conformity to his explanation. He only introduced her as his wife to his family and friends so that she would withdraw the complaint 8. Attached to the complainants petition for disbarment is a letter addressed to her, allegedly written by him stating that while he was grateful for her help, he could not force myself to be yours, did not love her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites, among them: the minimum cohabitation for 5 years before the marriage, and that the parties must at least be 21 yrs old. 9. In 1990, the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation recommended that he be indefinitely suspended until the status of his marriage is settled. Issue: Was Atty. Tabangs lack of good moral character sufficiently established? Held: YES. Ruling: 6. Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character. 7. He adopted conflicting positions in the various pleadings. He admitted having been legally married, but denies its legality, and instead harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage contract. 8. He denies having sent the letter, but its very tenor coincides with the reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning. 9. The factual scenario gathered from the records shows that he had reconciled with her and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to the complaint to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-pledged lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant. 10. SUSPENDED from the practice of law (Buti nga sayo. Hehehehe =p) Concept: FC 34 No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together for at least five years and without any legal impediments to marry each other. 76. Nial vs. Bayadog 2000 Ynares-Santiago, J.: Facts: 1. Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. 2. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months after or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. 3. Instead, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years 4. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license (The case was

56 filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights) 5. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family 6. The lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. Issue: 1. Was the marriage of Pepito and Norma valid? 2. What is the nature of cohabitation contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code? Held: 1. No, its void

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2. That which has no legal impediment; cohabitation as "husband and wife"; it should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract (meaning there shouldnt be any third party involved. Ruling: 1. Civil Code governs this case (FC not yet enacted) 2. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio 7. There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years 3. Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. 4. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. 5. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent , only about twenty months had elapsed. 6. In this case, Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. 7. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife". 8. Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. 77. Manzano vs. Judge Sanchez 8 Mar 2001 J. Davide Facts: 1. On 21 May 1966, Herminia Borja-Manzano and David Manzano were married in Caloocan City. Four children were born. 2. On 22 Mar 1993, David Manzano contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Judge Sanchez. 3. Judge Sanchez claims that he did not know that Manzano was married. He showed evidence that Manzano and Payao noted in their separate affidavits executed on the same day that they were both separated. 4. On 12 May 1999, Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the law against Judge Sachez. 5. After evaluation, the Court Administrator recommended that the Judge be found guilty and fined 2,000 pesos. Issue: Is Manzanos second marriage valid? Held: No. Judge Sanchez is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. OCA recommendation affirmed. Ruling: 1. Not all the requirements for a valid exemption from marriage license based on Article 36 of the Family Code were present in the second marriage. The parties both had legal impediments to marry each other. 2. Judge ought to know that a subsisting marriage is an impediment which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. He cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting marriages because it was clearly stated in their affidavits. Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie; much less authorize the parties to remarry. Free and voluntary cohabitation

3.

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with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting marriage. It merely exempts them from marriage license requirement. In this case, it was merely de facto since there was no judicial declaration of the separation. 4. Judge clearly demonstrated ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

78. Aranes vs. Occiano April 11, 2002 Puno Facts: 1. Petitioner and her husband wanted respondent judge to solemnize the marriage at their home in Nabua, Camarines Sur because her husband had difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travel. 2. Respondent judge agreed but discovered when he was there that the parties did not have a marriage license. He declined to solemnize the marriage, yet conceded to them when they pressed him to do so because there was an influx of visitors and because a reset of the wedding may aggravate the condition of petitioners husband who had just recovered from a stroke. 3. Petitioners husband died and she was unable to claim the property and his pension from the Philippine Navy because the marriage was void at the very beginning. 4. Petitioner charges respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law because he wed the couple outside his territorial jurisdiction and because a valid marriage license was not presented at the time of the solemnization. 5. Petitioner wishes to withdraw from the case after she read respondent judges reply that he warned them from the beginning and that petitioner was negligent in not giving the marriage license. Issue: Was there grave misconduct on the part of respondent judge? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in th e formal requisite laid down in Art 3, which will not affect the validity of the marriage. 2. His act amounted to gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized the marriage without the valid marriage license. It is the marriage license which gives him authority to do so. 79. NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY July 19, 1996 Romero Facts: 1. Complainant Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed this case to the Supreme Court against respondent Judge Henando Domagtoy of MCTC of Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte, for gross misconduct as well as inefficiency and ignorance of the law. 2. First, On Sept. 24, 1994, Judge Domagtoy solemnized the marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja despite his knowledge that Tagadan was merely separated from his wife. 3. Second, her performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario in October 1994 at respondent judges residence in Dapa, Surigao del Norte. Defendant: 4. As to the first, Domagtoy contended that he merely relied on the affidavit issued by the RTC Judge of Bassey, Samar, which stated that Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. However, the certified true copy of the marriage contract between Tagadan and Borja showed that his civil status was separated. 5. Second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question. Issue: (1) Whether or not a court may solemnize another marriage of a husband who was merely separated from his wife for almost seven years. (2) Whether or not a Judge may solemnize a marriage at his residence. Held: Both erroneous.

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Ruling: I. First Charge 1. Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that a marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void. 2. To contract the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of presumptive death . 3. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains to be married to Pearanda. 4. It was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joind affidavit submitted by Tagadan. 5. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous and therefore void marriage. II. 1. Second Charge Article 7 of the Family Code A marriage may be solemnized by (1) any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction xxx . 2. Article 8 of the Family Code, however, states that marriages shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Art. 29 of the Family Code, or where both parties in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. 3. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. 4. The written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario 5. Under Art. 8, which is only a discretionary provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. 6. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may officiate in marriages only within said areas and not beyond. 7. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3 which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, 8. May subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Concept: 1. A marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect 2. Where can the solemnizing officer conduct the ceremony? a. A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. b. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. c. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.

80. Vilar vs. Paraiso March 14, 1955 J. Bautista Facts: 1. Paraiso was proclaimed mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija; however, Vilar, his opponent, contended that Paraiso, who was then a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, was ineligible to hold office. 2. In his answer, he denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned, that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting, and that even if he was not eligible to the office, Vilar could not be declared elected to take his place. Issue: Is Paraiso ineligible to hold office and did he actually resign as minister (and was it duly accepted) before the date of the elections? Held: He is ineligible, and he did not resign. Ruling: 1. The evidence for petitioner tends to show that respondent was ordained as minister of the Evangelical Church of the Philippines

59 in 1944 and as such was given license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries; that since 1944 up to 1950 he acted as minister in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, continuously and without interruption and has been renewing his license to solemnize marriages. 2. He then transferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, having been assigned to work in the same place and chapel during the years 1944-1950. Then he applied for, and was issued, a license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries as minister of the new church up to the end of April, 1952; that said license has never been cancelled, as neither the head of the united church nor has he requested for its cancellation. 3. The court did not find any reason for deviating from the finding of the trial court that respondent never ceased as minister of the order to which he belonged and that the resignation he claims to have filed months before the date of the elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office. Indeed, if respondent really and sincerely intended to resign as minister of the religious organization to which he belonged for the purpose of launching his candidacy, why did he not resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries? Concept: Regulations for the enforcement of the Marriage Law issued by the Director of Public Libraries and approved by the Secretary of Education on February 26, 1951, in connection with Article 95, new Civil Code.

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81. Tenchavez v. Escao 1965 Reyes, J.B.L.: Facts: 1. In February 1948 , Vicenta Escao, 27 y.o., exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 y.o., without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain; but later on she admitted to her parents that she did get married 2. The Escao spouses sought priestly advice. A certain priest suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority of the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage; but it didnt happen because there was rumor that Pastor Tenchavez was flirting around with their common friend and matchmaker- Pacita Noel; 3. Because of that (Pastor-Pacita thing), Vicenta didnt want to remarry Pastor 4. Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila; but theyd write letters to each other as Vicenta was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor, but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. 5. As of June 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (after 4 months!!) 6. Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society, There, a lawyer filed for her a petition to annul her marriage (thus Vicenta impliedly admits that marriage was valid ). She did not sign the petition. The case was dismissed. 7. She left for the US. In Aug 1950, she filed for divorce against Pastor in Nevada, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." It was granted. 8. In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor 9. In September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage 10. In September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. 11. In 1955 Tenchavez filed a case which was led to THIS petition; he asked for legal separation 12. acquire American citizenship. 13. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Issue: Whats the effect of the divorce decree obtained by Vicenta in Nevada on her marriage to Pastor? Held: Nothing, her marriage to Pastor is still valid; the divorce decree is void (or at least not recognized in the Philippines) Ruling: 1. Theres no question that the two were validly married to each other. 2. As for the chaplain, Court said the chaplain's alleged lack of authorization from the parish priest, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law; thus he has authority Vicenta acquired American citizenship only in 1955; she obtained the divorce decree in 1950 when she was still a Filipino citizen

3.

4.

60 It is equally clear that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, despite the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought in Nevada

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82. Martinez vs. Tan 5 Feb 1909 J. Willard Facts: 1. On 25 Sep 1907, an expediente de matrimonio civil was signed by the Justice of the Peace. It contained: (1) a petition signed by Martinez and Tan stating that they mutually agree to be married and asked the Justice of the Peace to solemnize it; (2) a document stating the presentation and reiteration of the previous petition, their presence in the office of the Justice, and the presence of two witnesses (Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori); and (3) a certificate of marriage signed by both parties, the witnesses, and the Justice of the Peace. 2. Martinez brought an action before the CFI of Leyte to cancel the certificate of marriage. The Justice of the Peace died after the ceremony and before the trial. 3. CFI, in deciding in favor of Tan and upholding the marriage, took note of the following pieces of evidence: (1) the signed document (2) Tans testimony (3) testimonies of the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori attesting to their appearance before the Justice of the Peace (4) testimony of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the court of the justice of the peace Issue: Were Martinez and Tan validly married? Held: Yes. What took place before the justice of the peace amounted to a legal marriage. Ruling: 1. Written evidence showed that Martinez was not telling the truth when she said that she did not appear before the justice of the peace, to wit: Letter No. 6 written on the morning of 25 Sep 1909 which asked Tan to arrange the marriage at about 5 or 6 in the evening and she will go there for the purpose of signing Letter No. 7 written after the marriage which asked Tan to go to their house and talk to her mother about getting married but concealing their civil marriage which happened the previous day Letter No. 8 written after the marriage which asked Tan to go to Ormoc, aboard the steamer Rosa, to ask for her fathers consent Letter No. 9 which said that shes afraid that her father will turn her out of the house when informed of their marriage 2. General Order No. 68, sec. 6 states that No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife. 3. Martinez admitted to the effect that she signed the documents contained in the expediente. Admission can only mean that the parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the documents before the justice of the peace. 83. Madridejo vs. De Leon October 6, 1930Villa-Real Facts: 1. A previous case decided that the appellants must give ownership and possession of the property of Domingo De Leon because current petitioner Madridejo is the next of kin. 2. Current appellants claim that the court made an error in holding that the marriage of Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana was valid. It should not be valid because the couple failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary. Family: 1. Eulogio de Leoon (Died 1915) and Flaviana Perez (Died 1920) had a son, Domingo de Leon (Died 1928) 2. Flaviana Perez married Pedro Madridejo (July 8 1920) and had a son prior to their marriage, Melecio Madridejo. Issue: Was the marriage valid? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. Failing to send the copy of the marriage certificate is not a ground to invalidate the marriage because it is not an ESSENTIAL REQUISITE required by law.

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84. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant. October 31, 1984 Relova Facts: 1. High noon of July 3, 1981, the four-year old niece of Elias and Susana Borromeo reported to Matilde Taborada, mother of Susana, that Susana was shouting frantically for help because Elias was killing her. 2. Susana's father called for the Mabolo police 3. The peace officers shouted and ordered Elias to open the door. 4. Elias answered calmly that he would smoke first before he would open the door. 5. When he did, the peace officers found Susana already dead, her intestine having spilled out of her abdomen. 6. A small kitchen bolo was at her side. Issue: Whether or not he and Susana were legally married and therefore the crime committed is not parricide, but homicide Held: Legally Married Ruling: 1. Accused Elias Borromeo himself admitted that the deceased-victim was his legitimate wife. 2. The mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. Concept: 1. Better proof of marriage is the admission of the accused of the existence of the marriage 2. Presumption that persons living together as husband and wife are married to each other 85. Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales November 24, 1988 J. Cortes Facts: 1. Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died intestate in 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less. 2. The children of the deceased Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina and with whom Sy Kiat has lived with for 25 years, filed a petition to be the administrator of their fathers estate. This petition was opposed by Yao Kee, the alleged wife, and her children.

3. 4.

Yao Kee claims that they got married in China in 1931. They dont have a marriage certificate because the practice during tha t time was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who contracted with the parents of Sy Kiat. During their wedding day, there is no solemnizing officer, but there is a document signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as well as the parents of the bride. 5. RTC: In favor of Yao Kee Asuncions children are the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat and Asuncion. Sze Sook Wah, Yao Kees offspring, was appointed as the administratix of the estate. 6. CA: Asuncions children were acknowledged natural children of Sy Kiat and Asuncion, while Yao Kees children were acknowledged as the natural children, the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven valid to the laws of China. It also affirmed the appointment of Sze Sook Wah as judicial administratix. 7. Both moved for partial reconsideration, which was denied. Issue: Was the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and custom conclusively proven? Held: NO Ruling: 1. The Court has interpreted section 25, Rule 132 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law. 2. In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao Kee and Gan Ching, her younger brother, cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. Concept: Lex Loci Celebrationis (FC 26) Marriages solemnized abroad, if valid in that country where celebrated, are also valid in the Philipines.

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86. Republic vs. Orbecido II 2005 Quisumbing, J.: Facts: 1. On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva 2. In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States (bringing their son) 3. Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a foreigner 4. Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. It was granted. 5. As usual, OSG comes into the picture and files this petition. 6. OSG asks: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE. Pls see Art 26 below 7. OSG answers its question and contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. 8. Orbecido admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated Issue: Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law? (Under Par 2, Art 26 of the Family Code) Held: YES! Ruling: 1. SC said, and I quote (=p): We hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involvi ng parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. 2. The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 3. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. 4. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. 5. But! We learned that a foreign judgment should be proved here in the Philippine courts; since Orbecido wasnt able to show evidence that there was such divorce decree obtained by his wife abroad, Court is unable to declare that hes capacitated to remarry; so his remedy is to give evidence. That simple. Once he does that, hes free Concept: ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. 87. Dacasin vs. Dacasin 5 Feb 2010 J. Carpio Facts: 1. Herald Dacasin and Sharon del Mundo were married in Apr 1994. They have a daughter, Stephanie, who was born on 21 Sep 1995. 2. In Jun 1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree from the Illinois Court. In its ruling, the Court dissolved the marriage, granted to Sharon the sole custody of Stephanie, and retained jurisdiction of the case for enforcement purposes. 3. On 28 Jan 2002, both parties executed in Manila an Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie. Sharon then obtained an order from the Illinoi Court relinquishing jurisdiction to the Philippines. 4. In 2004, Herald sued Sharon for the enforcement of the Agreement. Sharon sought its dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 5. In 1 Mar 2005, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It noted the Illinois Courts jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree including the order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to Sharon. It also said that the divorce decree is binding on Herald following the nationality rule. 6. Herald moved for reconsideration on the grounds that the divorce decree was void. The court denied reconsideration.

CONEJOS HAULO AMPONG LAYLO CHAVEZ Pilapil CELLES LAW


Issue: 1. Is the divorce decree valid? 2. Does the RTC have jurisdiction? Is the Agreement valid?

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Held: Yes, the decree is valid and the RTC has jurisdiction. The Agreement is void for being contrary to Philippine law. Ruling: On the validity of the divorce 1. Herald cannot rely on the divorce decrees alleged invalidity because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse. The decree is binding on him as an American citizen. He is bound by the decision of his own countrys Court pursuant to his national law. 2. A foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the aliens nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce. On the validity of the Agreement 1. The RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Heralds suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void. The Illinois Court only retained jurisdiction as to the enforcement of its Judgment of Dissolution. 2. The Agreements object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law. Under the law, the awarding of sole parental custody to the mother of children below 7 years is mandatory. Any agreement to the contrary is void. 3. Even supposing that Herald and Sharon are not barred from entering into the Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie, Sharon repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole custody over Stephanie. 4. The imposed custodial regime lasts only until the childs seventh year. From the eighth year until the childs emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. 5. Since Stephanie is now 15 years old, the case is remanded to the RTC to settle the question of custody consistent with the settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the childs best interest. 88. Lesaca vs. Lesaca 21 Apr 1952 J. Reyes Facts: The Family: rd a. 3 Natural children from 3 wife b. 2 minor children from 2nd wife c. 2 kids that were made co-executrices (Juana and Consuelo) from the 1st wife to their fathers will d. Baldomero is the father These are three appeals: Appeal 1: a. The court ruled because of the widow that the 2 minor children should be granted each a monthly allowance of Php.100.00 for living expenses, plus an extra sum ofPhp.300 for their matriculation and uniforms. b. the court ordered the co-executrices to deposit in court all the allowances. c. co-executrices refused and claimed that the same should be charged against their share of the inheritance. d. they invoke Art 1041, which states that allowances for support, education are not subject to collation. Appeal2: a. Appeal by the co-executrices declaring that the sum of 2,500 received by them as repurchase price of land bought by the deceased before the marriage is conjugal property and directing that one half of that sum be paid to the widow. b. The widow and the deceased married in 1945 but the three parcels of land were bought in 1930.

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Appeal3: a. The deceased did not cultivate his own land. b. Instead a person cultivated it for him for a certain percentage of the crop every year by way of rent. c. The 1040 cavans of play in dispute was the rent or the decedents share of the harvest from Palay planted in June or July 1946. d. This is after his marriage to Juana Felix. Issue: 1. Whether the allowances for support granted by the court to the legitimate minor children of the deceased are subject to collation and deductible from their share of the inheritance. Held: Yes 2. Whether money received after marriage, as purchase price of land sold before such marriage to one of the consorts constitutes conjugal property. Held: No 3. Whether 1,040 cavans of palay of the value of 20,800 received as rent on decedents land for the years of 1946 -1947 should be considered conjugal property so that one-half should go to the widow? Held: Yes Ruling: Appeal 1: a. Article 1430 stated that the surviving spouse and his or her children shall be given an allowance for their support out o f the general estate but it shall be deducted from their portion in so far as it exceeds what they may have been entitled to. b. Art 1041 does not float in this case because Art 1041 only refers to property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. Appeal2: a. There is no showing that the sum paid to Garcia was earned by the joint efforts of the deceased and the widow. b. In the absence of such proof the sum must be deemed to have been the property o the deceased to whom the land for which it was given in payment was sold. c. Thus, of the money should not be given to the widow. Appeal3: 1. It should belong to the conjugal partnership. 2. It is immaterial that the rent was actually received after the dissolution of the marriage through the death of the spouses. It is the date of accrual that is important. 89. TERESITA C. YAPTINCHAY, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES June 9, 1969 - SANCHEZ Facts: 1. On July 13, 1965, herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay sought in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, her appointment first as Special Administratrix and then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in Hongkong on July 7, 1965 2. Petitioner there alleged that the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay had lived with her continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for nineteen (19) years 3. The deceased who died without a will left an estate consisting of personal and real properties situated in the Philippines, Hongkong and other places with an estimated value of about P500,000 4. On July 17, 1965 an order appointing herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay special administratrix of the state of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay upon a P25,000-bond. 5. Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, - upon the ground that said Teresita C. Yaptinchay, not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement of the latter's estate. 6. Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, daughter of the deceased, as special administratrix and of Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged surviving spouse, as regular administratrix. Petitioners Defense: - Petitioner's stance before us is this: As she was occupying the Forbes Park property at the time of the death of Isidro Yaptinchay - Petitioner avers "that the construction of said North Forbes Park property was undertaken jointly by petitioner and the

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deceased, petitioner even contributing her own exclusive funds therefor." Respondents Argument - private respondents maintain that the construction of that house was undertaken by the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay without her (petitioner's) intervention and the deceased paid with his own personal funds all expenses incurred in connection with the construction thereof. Issue: Whether or not this Court issued in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the respondent judge's order of June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873 (Court of First Instance of Rizal) directing petitioner to deliver to Special Administratrix Virginia Y. Yaptinchay of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the North Forbes Park property hereinafter described, and to refrain from disturbing or interfering in any manner whatsoever with the latter's possession Held: Petitioner herein is not entitled to the injunction she prayed for. Ruling: 1. It is quite true that, in support of the allegation that the house in North Forbes Park was her exclusive property, petitioner presented proof in the form of loans that she had contracted during the period when said house was under construction 2. On the contrary, there is much to the documentary proof presented by petitioner which would tend to indicate that the loans she obtained from the Republic Bank were for purposes other than the construction of the North Forbes Park home. 3. Not one of the promissory notes mentioned reveals use of the proceeds for the construction of the North Forbes Park house. 4. Unsupported assertion that the North Forbes Park house is petitioner's exclusive property may not be permitted to override the prima facie presumption that house, having been constructed on the lot of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay (or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during the existence of his marriage with respondent Josefina Y. Yaptinchay , is part of the estate that should be under the control of the special administratrix. 5. Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code be decisive. 6. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction Concept: - Property Regimes of Unions without Marriage - Article 144 says that: "When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership 90. Alcantara vs. Mallion FREE PASS; Case not found 91. So v. Valera 2009 Brion, J.: Facts: 1. This case deals with a 19-year common-law relationship (starting 1973) which finally concluded (and became a civil marriage) in the exchange of marital vows on December 10, 1991. 2. May 14, 1996, So (husband) filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage; 3. He alleged that their marriage was null and void for want of the essential and formal requisites. He also claimed that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated, shown by the ff circumstances: - respondent did not want to practice her profession after passing the dental board exam; - respondent disagreed with many of his business decisions; - respondent did not care for their children - petitioner narrated that he often slept in the car because the she locked him out of the house when he came home late 4. He likewise related that respondent asked him to sign a blank marriage application form and marriage contract sometime in 1986. He signed these documents on the condition that these documents would only be used if they decide to get married; 5. He maintained that no marriage ceremony took place in 1991, but submitted a certified true copy of their marriage contract 6. Petitioner had a psychologist, Dr. Gates, to testify. Gates said that respondent Lorna Valera is plagued with an Adjustment Disorder as manifested in her impulsiveness, lack of restraint, lack of civility and a sense of decency in the conduct of her life. 7. RTC granted Sos petition but its ruling was only based on the issue on psychological incapacity, it didnt discuss the lack of essential and formal requisites; CA reversed RTCs decision, it ruled that the petitioner failed to prove the respondents psychological incapacity. CA COULD NOT rule on the requisites since it wasnt dealt with by RTC. CA didnt have a choice (I think). Issue: Is there sufficient ground to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent null and void Held: No. Psychological incapacity not sufficiently established.

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Ruling: 1. No sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. 2. As for the lack of essential and formal requisites of marriage, due to RTCs lack of ruling on it, SC same as CA, cant discu ssed it. 3. That Dr. Gates report wasnt enough. More on this later. 4. The issue on the lengthy 19-yr cohabitation - SC said that this factor sure doesnt alter the requirements for psychological incapacity. However, there arises a question on this because such lengthy cohabitation affects the claim of psychological incapacity, particularly considering that marriage came near or at the end of the parties relationship. Gets? What SC said was kinda confusing but I think I kinda understood it. I just cant rephrase it. Ask me Thursday if yer confuzzed =p 5. SC said that the answer to this confusing question can be uncovered thru examination on Valera. But Valera wouldnt cooperate. So Court is left with no choice but to rely on testimonies, specially that of Dr. Gates. 6. Now, upon examination of Gates report, SC said its not satisfied. Aside from being kinda biased because its So who procured Gates, its also not convincing. Why? Here: a. Reports appear to be exaggerated extrapolations, derived as they are from isolated incidents, rather than from continuing patterns b. It failed to show that the respondents behavioral disorder was medically or clinically permanent or incurable c. It also failed to show that the disorder was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage d. Statements merely testify to the respondents impulsiveness, lack of restraint, and lack of civility and decency in the conduct of her life (and those impulsiveness etc etc are not what psychological incapacity contemplates) The above reasons were based on the Molina case where the Court laid down basic elements of psychological incapacity. For a more complete discussion on it, see concept section below 7. SC said: In light of the wide gaps in the facts the psychologist considered and of the patent deficiencies of her testimony tested under the standards of established jurisprudence, we cannot accord full credence and accept the psychologists Report as basi s for the declaration of annulment of the parties marriage under Article 36. 8. While she appears to be less than ideal mother to her children and loving wife to her husband, herein petitioner-appellee, the same are not physical manifestations of a psychological illness as described in Molina. 9. One last: Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule. Concept: In Molina, we ruled that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, the root cause should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 91. Apiag vs. Cantero 12 Feb 1997 J. Panganiban Facts: 1. On 11 Aug 1947, Maria Apiag and Esmeraldo Cantero were married. They had 2 children: Teresita (born before the marriage) and Glicerio. After a while, Esmeraldo left the conjugal home leaving Maria to raise the two children. 2. On 21 Sep 1993, after seeing Esmeraldo at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, they wrote him, through a lawyer, to formally ask for support. He did not reply. 3. They then learned that he has another wife by the name of Nieves Ygay and also has their own children. In all of his public documents, he represented himself as being married to Nieves. 4. On 19 Nov 1993, they filed a complaint charging Esmeraldo (now a judge) with gross misconduct for allegedly having committed bigamy and falsification of public documents. 5. In his Comment, Esmeraldo explained that he was just forced by his parents to marry Maria thus believing that the marriage was void. He also cited his 32 years untarnished record in government service. 6. In Mar 1994, a compromise agreement was signed between Esmeraldo and his daughter Teresita for a 4,000-peso monthly allowance provided they withdraw the complaint. Also in line with the agreement, he designated Teresita and Glicerio as additional beneficiaries in his GSIS life insurance policy.

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On 26 Jul 1996, investigating Judge Delgado recommended a one-year suspension for Judge Cantero. The OCA likewise submitted its report recommending dismissal. 8. On 27 Sep 1996, Judge Cantero died while the case was still being deliberated upon. Issue: Was the second marriage to Nieves bigamous? Held: No. The New Civil Code applies. Ruling: 1. The doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante applies where under the New Civil Code, no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. Thus, there is no bigamy. 2. The marriage of Judge Cantero and Nieves Ygay took place before the promulgation of Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code requires a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage before any party can remarry. 3. Gross misconduct does not apply. Misconduct must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties. 4. Similarly, the charge of falsification will not prosper either because it is based on a finding of guilt in the bigamy charge. The Court earlier ruled that there is no bigamy. 5. Because of the Judges death, the case is dismissed. 92. Mercado vs. Tan August 1, 2000 Panganiban Facts: 1. Vincent Mercado married Ma. Thelma Olivia(1st wife) on April 10, 1976. 2. Vincent married Ma. Consuelo Tan (2nd wife), the complainant in 1991. 3. Ma. Consuleo filed a bigamy case against Vincent on October 1992. 4. Vincent then filed an action to nullify his marriage with Olivia (1st wife) on November 13, 1992. (almost right after the bigamy case was filed against him. st 5. The court granted Vincent the nullification of his 1 marriage. 6. Vincent now uses in his defense that he cannot be charged for bigamy precisely because his first marriage was already considered void. 7. Vincent even has the audacity to quote the commentary of Reyes wherein it says it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense. Issue: Should the charges of bigamy be dropped? Held: No Ruling: 1. The Family Code REQUIRES: A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground of defense. 2. 3. When Vincent contracted the 2nd marriage, his first marriage was still considered valid. Although past jurisprudence states that such a declaration is not needed, the Family code is explicit that current law states that a declaration is needed in order to get into another marriage.

93. Ty vs. CA 27 Nov 2000 J. Quisumbing Facts: 1. The petitioner seeks for the reversal of the decision, declaring the marriage contract between private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. 2. Private respondent (Edgardo Reyes) seeks for the nullity of his marriage with herein petitioner on the ground that they had no marriage license when they got married. 3. He also averred that at the time he married Ofelia P. Ty, he has a subsisting marriage with Anna Maria Regina Villanueva. 4. Reyes contracted two marriages. 5. His first marriage Anna Maria Villanueva was on March 29, 1977 thru a civil ceremony and they had their church wedding on August 27 of the same year. 6. Prior to the grant for declaration of nullity for his first marriage, respondent Reyes contracted a subsequent marriage with herein petitioner, Ofelia P. Ty, on April 4, 1979 in a civil ceremony and a church wedding on April 4, 1982. 7. It was only on August 4, 1980 wherein the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared the marriage of Reyes and Villanueva as null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. Likewise, their church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.

68 8. On the other hand, petitioner in her defense, submitted their marriage license 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979 so as to disprove the contention of Reyes that their marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. 9. She likewise presented the court decision rendering private respondent and Villanuevas marriage as null and void. Issue: Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly. Held: Marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING Ruling: 1. We must note that private respondents first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. 2. As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting. (Article 83 of CC) People v. Mendoza, and People v. Aragon, this Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Gomez v. Lipana, and Consuegra v. Consuegra, however, still there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity Odayat v. Amante The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage 3. At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. 4. Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage 5. the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage . 6. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid. Retroactivity of Family Code 7. We find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children Concept: - Where the second marriage of a person was entered in 1979, before Wiegel v Sempio-diy, during the prevailing rule, there was no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage for a lack of license and consent before such person may contract a second marriage - That a marriage license was used legally in the celebration of civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use in the church wedding for the latter served only to ratify but also to fortify the first. - Our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of marriage obligation there are other remedies.

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94. Morigo vs. People February 6, 2004 J. Quisumbing Facts: 1. Lucio Morig and Lucia Barrete were boardmates, who lost contact with each other, but later on became lovers. They maintained a long distance relationship, since Lucia was working in Canada. 2. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition him to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married in the same year. 3. In 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce, which was granted by the court in 1992. 4. In 1992 Lucio married Maria Jececha Lumbag. 5. In 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. 6. However in the same year, he was charged with bigamy, and subsequently convicted and appealed. 7. the trial court rendered a decision in the civil case declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory. 8. In 1999, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of bigamy. The court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia could not acquit Lucio. 9. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, contending that jurisprudence allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith. 10. However, this was denied. The denial was by a split vote. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void abinitio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. Issue: Did he commit bigamy and if so, was his defense of good faith valid?

69 Held: There is no need to tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic. He is ACQUITTED because his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty. Ruling: In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy: 1. the offender has been legally married; In this case involving Morigo, the trial court found that there was no actual marriage. What transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. 2. the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. 3. he contracts a subsequent marriage; and 4. the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha.

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95. Tenebro v. CA 2004 - Ynares-Santiago, J.: Facts: 1. Petitioner Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990 2.Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986 3. Petitioner Tenebro thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes 4. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas 5. Ancajas verified this from Villareyes and the latter confirmed that Tenebro was really her husband 6. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner 7. Tenebro was convicted of bigamy. During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, but denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union. Also accdg to him their marriage has no record in the civil registrar. 8. On appeal to SC, Tenebro: (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed. Issue: 1. Was Tenebro's marriage to Villareyes valid? Held: Yes 2. Does the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage (to Ancajas)? Held: No Ruling: 1. 1ST ISSUE a. There was sufficient evidence to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes: 1. marriage contract, 2. Villareyes' letter to Ancajas saying that Villareyes and Tenebro were married 2. 2ND ISSUE a. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. b. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy c. A plain reading of the law on bigamy would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage (regardless whether 2nd marriage was void or whatever). d. Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. e. there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. f. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. g. Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is

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SEPARATE OPINION: Vitug (I didn't dare leave some which I thought to still be relevant because Vitug's opinion was really goodbetter than the majority) Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy? 1. I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the marriage, the answer must be in the affirmative. BECAUSE Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity. 2. in People vs. Aragon: this Court has underscored the fact that the RPC does not require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal statutes. 3. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of annulment) the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy. 4. Vitug doesn't agree that by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage. 5. He says that It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked "on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." 6. in Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-Diy, it was held that a subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. (Although this pronouncement has been abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals, the Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to say that the subsequent marriage shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the Family Code has amended or intended to amend the Revised penal Code or to abandon the settled and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter) 7. (this is getting really long but Vitug's opinion is The Opinion) he goes on saying... A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself (remember Atty Kat saying this also?). Why? The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. 8. The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a marriage license, or the like. 9. The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. 10. Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a "void" marriage due to psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy. 11. There are cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, under such, there's no crime of bigamy. 12. The Court has explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union. (so if 2nd marriage is VOID, there's no bigamy) 13. SO Since psychological incapacity does not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy 14. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. 96. Abunado vs. Republic 30 Mar 2004 J. Ynares-Santiago

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Facts: 1. On 18 Sep 1967, Salvador Abunado married Narcisa Arceno. In 1988, Narcisa left for Japan. 2. Narcisa returned to the country in 1992. She then found out that Salvador is cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato and has left the conjugal home. She also discovered that Salvador contracted a second marriage with Zenaida Bias on 10 Jan 1989. 3. On 19 Jan 1995, Salvador filed an annulment case against Narcisa. He obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on 29 Oct 1999. 4. On 18 May 1995, Narcisa filed a case for bigamy against Salvador. 5. Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida in 1955 and was separated in 1966. Since there was no evidence of their marriage, they got re-married in 1989 upon the request of their son. 6. On 18 May 2001, the trial court convicted Salvador of bigamy. The CA affirmed with modification (on penalty) the decision. Issue: Was the second marriage to Zenaida bigamous? Held: Yes. The marriage with Narcisa was still subsisting when he married Zenaida. Ruling: 1. A marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if Salvador eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, both the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. 2. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. All that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. 3. Pardon by the offended party does not extinguish the criminal action considering that a crime is committed against the state and the crime of bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not only by the person affected thereby but even by a civicspirited citizen who may come to know the same. Carpio Concurring Opinion: 1. Under the Family Code, before one can contract a second marriage on the ground of nullity of the first marriage, one must secure a final judgment declaring the first marriage void. 2. Prior to the Family code, one could contract a subsequent marriage without first securing a judicial annulment of the previous marriage. The person remarrying assumed the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy should the court uphold the validity of the first marriage. 3. Article 40 of the Family Code considers the marital bond or vinculum of the previous marriage to subsist for purposes of remarriage, unless the previous marriage is judicially declared void by final judgment. 4. For purposes other than remarriage, marriages that are void ab initio are void even without a judicial declaration of nullity as held in Cario vs. Cario. Thus, the general rule is if the marriage is void ab initio, it is ipso facto void without need of any judicial declaration of nullity. The only exception is Article 40. 97. Victoria Jarillo vs. People September 29, 2009--- Del Castillo Facts: 1. Victoria Jarillo (accussed) was married to Rafael Alocillo (1st husband) 2. Rafael Alocillo however was already married to Loretta Tillman when Jarillo got married to him. 3. Victoria then married Emmanuel Uy (2nd husband) on Nov 26, 1979 but it was only discovered on Jan 12, 1999. 4. Emmanuel (2nd husband) filed a case of bigamy against Victoriano. 5. Victoria then filed a case of nullity against Rafael Alocillo (1st husband) because he also committed bigamy. 6. Her main defense is that she cannot be charged for bigamy because her first marriage with Rafael (1 st husband) was void to begin with because he committed bigamy. 7. Regardless of it all, the lower courts still found Victoria guilty of bigamy. Issue: Is Victoria guilty of bigamy? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. Judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner's assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the prejudicial question. 2. Both the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. 3. For humanitarian purposes, the court recognizes that the petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse from Alocillo, thus a deduction of jail time is in order. Concept: 1. Landicho vs. Relova- He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes

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the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. (cannot invoke the prejudicial question. Void / Voidable Marriage- is considered valid unless otherwise declared in a judicial proceeding.

98. Puse vs. Puse Facts: 1. Rene Puse a registered Professional Teacher while Ligaya Delos Santos is a Barangay Rural Health Midwife assigned at the Municipal Health Office. 2. 10 January 1992, petitioner married respondent Ligaya Delos Santos-Puse at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Daet, Camarines Norte 3. He had two (2) children with her, and had a church wedding before respondent found out that petitioner was already married. 4. Lagaya discovered that petitioner had already gotten married to Cristina Pablo Puse at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Laoag City, Ilocos Norte on 27 December 1986. Respondent likewise learned that he has two (2) children with his first wife. 5. Respondent filed a letter-complaint with the Director of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), National Capital Region, Manila, through the Director, PRC, Lucena City, seeking assistance regarding her husband against whom she had filed a criminal case for "Bigamy" and "Abandonment." She alleged that her husband has not been giving her and their children support Issue: Was there substantial evidence to sustain the complaint and to hold petitioner liable for bigamy? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. Petitioner claims good faith and maintains that he married respondent with the erroneous belief that his first wife was already deceased. 2. He insists that such act of entering into the second marriage did not qualify as an immoral act, and asserts that he committed the act even before he became a teacher. 3. He said that for thirteen (13) years, he was a good husband and loving father to his children with respondent. 4. The Board and the appellate court found untenable petitioners belief that his first wife was already dead and that his former marriage was no longer subsisting. 5. Petitioners first wife, declared that "Sometime in 1993, complainant decided to work in Hongkong x x x. Since then up to the present, she has regularly sent financial support to her children and husband. 6. From time to time, the first wife would visit her family in the Philippines at least once a year every year." 7. Petitioner cannot claim that he had no knowledge of the whereabouts of his first wife or that she was already dead given that she regularly sent her family financial support and visited them in the Philippines at least once a year. 8. Teachers must adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency. 9. From the foregoing, it seems obvious that when a teacher engages in extra-marital relationship, especially when the parties are both married, such behaviour amounts to immorality, justifying his termination from employment 99. Jones vs. Hortiguela March 6, 1937 J. Concepcion Facts: 1. In 1914, Marciana Escao married Arthur W. Jones. They had a daughter, Angelita. Arthur went abroad, then nothing was ever heard of him. 2. 5 years after, proceedings were instituted to have her husband judicially declared an absentee. In the same year, the court issued an order declaring him an absentee from the Philippines. In 1921, the court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence, publication thereof having been made. 3. In 1927, Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao were married before the justice of the peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the certificate of marriage. 4. As Marciana Escao had died intestate, her widower Felix Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator of her entire estate. Angelita and Felix were declared her only heirs. 5. Angelita, who was a minor, was represented in the partition proceedings by her guardian Paz Escao de Corominas. In 1933, the final account was approved, and the properties were turned over to the respective grantees. 6. In 1934, Angelita Jones, then married, filed a motion alleging that she was the only heir of her mother, that there never was a valid marriage between her mother and Felix Hortiguela or that had such marriage been celebrated, it was null and void; and even granting that it were valid, Felix Hortiguela was not entitled to a share in usufruct of one-third of the inheritance; that the petitioner was a minor and that during the hearing of the intestate proceedings she had not been assisted by counsel but was represented by the same attorney of Felix Hortiguela; that during said proceedings there had been committed many errors and inaccuracies which impaired her rights. 7. Among those that she prayed for was that her mother's alleged marriage to Felix Hortiguela be declared null and void. She

73 contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made not in 1919, but in that of 1921, and that from 1921 to the date of the celebration of the marriage, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed. Issue: Should the marriage of Marciana and Felix be declared null and void? Held: NO. Ruling: 1. For the celebration of civil marriage, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage. 2. The absence of Marciana Escao's former husband should be counted from 1918, the year on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, to May 6, 1927. More than nine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful. 3. However, for some reason, the marriage contracted does not appear recorded in the marriage register of the municipality of Malitbog. But, the mere fact that the parish priest who married them failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage. 4. According to section 334, No. 24, of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to be dead. 5. Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to Marciana Escao and was divorced from her at the time of her death there is no doubt that he is entitled to inherit in usufruct, not only in testate but also in intestate succession.

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100. Republic v. Nolasco 1993 - Feliciano, J.: Facts: 1. 1988- respondent Nolasco filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. 2. Republic opposed the petition. It argued that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead" 3. Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England 4. in 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in Antique 5. in 1983, while working overseas, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. 6. Nolasco's efforts: he'd look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England, but it proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica. Issue: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead? Held: No Ruling: 1. Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead (he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached Antique) 2. instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. 3. The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. 4. Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. 5. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one 101. Bienvenido vs. Court of Appeals 24 Oct 1994 J. Mendoza Facts: 1. On 3 Oct 1942, Aurelio Camacho married Consejo Velasco. 2. Without getting his marriage being dissolved, he contracted another marriage to Luisita Camacho on 6 Feb 1962 and had one child, Chito. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo where they had been living since 1958. Because of their quarrels, one or the other usually leaves the dwelling place for long periods of time. 3. In 1967, Aurelio met Nenita Bienvenido. From June 1968 to May 1988, they had lived together in 84 Scout Delgado St., QC. Nenitas daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Chito, who stayed for about a year in 1976. 4. On 30 Apr 1982, Aurelio bought the house in Scout Delgado. In the deed of sale, he described himself as single. 5. On 26 Nov 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale in favor of Nenita in consideration of 250,000 pesos.

74 6. On 28 May 1988, Aurelio died. Initially, the body was with Nenita. Having returned from the US upon being informed of his death, Luisita took the body of Aurelio. 7. Luisita was granted death benefits by the AFP as the spouse. She also claimed ownership of the house in Scout Delgado. 8. On 7 Sep 1988, Luisita and Chito brought a case in the QC RTC to seek the annulment of the sale of the house to Nenita. 9. On 29 Aug 1989, the RTC rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property to Nenita. 10. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision on 4 Jun 1993. It ruled that in the absence of proof to the contrary, Consejo must be presumed to have been absent for seven years without Aurelio having news of her being alive when he married Luisita. It declared the house as their conjugal property. Issue: Was Aurelios marriage to Luisita valid? Held: No. Aurelios second marriage was bigamous and therefore void. Ruling: 1. The CA presumed the validity of Aurelios marriage to Luisita from Nenitas failure to prove that at the time of the marriage, Consejo had been absent for at least seven years and that Aurelio did not know whether she was still alive. 2. It was the burden of Luisita to prove that at the time of their marriage, Consejo had been absent for at least seven years. She failed to discharge this burden. 3. The general rule (Article 83 of the Civil Code) is that any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance. 4. The first exception in Article 80 that the first marriage was annulled or dissolved refers to the subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse. In this case, it was Aurelio who deserted Consejo. 5. Since Aurelio still had a valid marriage with Consejo, his marriage to Luisita was bigamous and therefore void. 6. Therefore, there is no basis for holding that the property in question was the conjugal property of Aurelio and Luisita.

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102. Armas vs. Calisterio April 6, 2000 - Vitug Facts: 1. Teodorico Calisterio died intestate (without a legal will) leaving several parcels of land. 2. Teodorico was survived by his wife Marietta (Respondent) 3. Teodorico is the second husband of Marietta 4. Marietta was originally married to James William Bounds on Jan 1946. 5. James disappeared without a trace on February 11, 1947. 6. Teodorico and Marietta were married 11 years later (May 8, 1958), without Marietta securing a court declaration that James was presumed dead. 7. Antonio Armas (P), a surviving sister of the deceased filed a case against Marietta claiming that her marriage with the deceased was bigamous and thus null and void. 8. Marietta claims that the marriage with James had been dissolved when his whereabouts were unknown for more than 11 years before she contracted her second marriage. Issue: Was the marriage between Marietta and Teodorico valid? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. The law in force at the time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on August 3 1988. 2. The applicable provision in this case is Article 83 of the New Civil Code (see below). 3. It is clear that because James has been absent for more than 11 years, the respondent's marriage with him is considered void and her latest marriage with Teodorico valid. 4. The property should be divided equally between the petitioner and the respondent. Laws/ Concepts 1. Art 83 of the Civil Code- Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other that such spouse shall be illegal and void unless... a. The first spouse had been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the second marriage or if the absentee, though has been absent for less than 7 years is considered dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time contracting such marriage... 2. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases in Art 83 of the Civil Code to be valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith. 3. Judicial Declaration of Absence- not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. The burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage. 103. Republic of the Philippines VS. Bermudez-Lorino January 19, 2005 J. Garcia

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Facts: 1. H&W: Gloria Bermudez and Francisco Lorino were married in June 1987. 2. The wife was unaware that her husband was a habitual drinker with violent attitude and character and had the propensity to go out with his friends to the point of being unable to work. 3. In 1991 she left him and returned to her parents together with her three children. 4. She went abroad to work for her support her children. 5. From the time she left him, she had no communication with him or his relatives. 6. In 2000, 9 years after leaving her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition with the RTC under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law. The lower court issued an order for the publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation. 7. In November 7, 2001, the RTC granted the summary petition. 8. Although the judgment was final and executors under the provisions of Act. 247 of the Family Code, the OSG for the Republic of the Philippines filed a notice of appeal. Issue: (1) WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS DULY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL ON A FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; (2) WHETHER OR NOT THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES FOR A JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE WERE DULY ESTABLISHED IN THIS CASE. Held: No Jurisdiction. Ruling: (1) An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are immediately final and executory, the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. (2) Although the result of the Court of Appeals denial of the appeal would apparently be the same, there is a big difference between having the supposed appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the RTC decision sought to be appealed is immediately final and executory, and the denial of the appeal for lack of merit. In the former, the supposed appellee can immediately ask for the issuance of an Entry of Judgment in the RTC , whereas, in the latter, the appellant can still raise the matter to this Court on petition for review and the RTC judgment cannot be executed until this Court makes the final pronouncement. (3) The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals. 104. Republic vs. CA May 6, 2005 J. Carpio-Morales Facts: 1. Judge Madrona of the RTC granted Apolinaria Jomocs application for her husbands (Clemente) presumptive death, on the basis of his nine year absence. 2. The judge cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse. 3. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial courts order, but the court disapprove d it, the present case being a special proceeding. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. 4. It filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal. However, this was denied by the CA on procedural lapses and on substantial grounds. Issue: Is the petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person in the nature of a special proceeding? Held: YES. Ruling: 1. As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, a civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong while a special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999). 2. Considering the distinction, this Court finds that the instant petition a special proceeding. The petition merely seeks for a

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declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored its grant of the petition for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides: Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouses was already dead For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of the absent spouse. Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following provision, inter alia : Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows: Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed. This seals the case in petitioners favour: CAs decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED.

105. Manuel v. People 2005 - Callejo, Sr.: Facts: 1. in 1975, Eduardo married Rubylus Gaa 2. He met the private complainant Tina Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996 (Tina was 21, Eduardo was 39) 3. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single. 4. Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo in April 1996 5. in January 2001, Eduardo left Tina and did not return. 6. Tina made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. 7. Eduardo in defense said that He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him 8. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. 9. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years. 10. Eduardo was charged of bigamy but alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. Issue: Must there be a judicial declaration of death first before the rule on presumptive death would apply? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, it must be proved that: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent (valid) marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. 2. Eduardo is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. 3. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part. But he failed to do this. 4. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. 5. The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive de ath under

77 Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy.

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106. Republic vs. Court of Appeals 9 Dec 2005 J. Callejo Sr. Facts: 1. On 20 Jan 1995, Alan Alegro married Rosalia (Lea) Julaton. 2. On 6 Feb 1995, he berated her for coming home late in the evening. The next day, Lea left without the knowledge of Alan and never returned. 3. On 14 Feb 1995, Alan went to his in-laws to see if Lea was there and was told that she wasnt. He also went to Leas friend, Janeth, but was informed by the brother-in-law that Janeth had left for Manila. He went back to the in-laws and was told that Lea had been their but left without notice. He also sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat. 4. On 27 Aug 1995, Alan left for Manila. He went to Janeths place but was told that she hasnt seen his wife. He then worked as a part-time taxi driver and looked for his wife in the malls on his free time. He returned to Catbalogan thereafter. 5. On 29 Mar 2001, he filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Lea. 6. On 16 Apr 2001, the court set a hearing on 30 May 2001 and ordered that a copy of the Order be made public. Alan complied with all the jurisdictional requirements. OSG filed a motion to dismiss but was denied. 7. At the hearing, Alan presented Barangay Captain Magat as the only witness. After resting his case, neither the Prosecutor nor the OSG opposed. 8. On 20 Jun 2001, Alan reported the disappearance to the local police station. The police issued an Alarm Notice on 4 Jul 2001. He also reported the same to the NBI on 9 Jul 2001. 9. On 8 Jan 2002, the court granted the petition. CA affirmed the decision citing the ruling in Republic vs. Nolasco. Issue: Did Alan prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead? Held: No. The decision is reversed. Ruling: 1. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the present spouse is burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may re-marry. 2. Belief is a state of mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is alive or already dead. 3. Alan failed to present other witnesses than the Barangay Captain. Also, when he returned to the house of the in-laws, he was informed by his father-in-law that Lea had just been there but left without notice. He even failed to make inquiries from his inlaws regarding Leas whereabouts before filing the petition. 4. His act of reporting to the police and the NBI was a mere afterthought after the OSGs motion to dismiss. 5. Alan failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead. 107. Repulic vs. Tango July 31, 2009 --- Quisumbing Facts: 1. Ferventino and Maria were married on March 9, 1987. 2. They had only been intimate once when Maria told Ferventino that she and her family would be leaving to the USA. 3. Maria assured Ferventino that she will file a petition so he can live with her in the USA, if that was denied, then she promised to go back to the PH and live with him 4. Maria kept in touch with Ferventino for a year by mail. After she stopped replying, he burned her letters out of resentment and claims to have forgotten her address. 5. Ferventino learned from her uncle that even her relatives were also unaware of her whereabouts. 6. He asked his friend Captain Luis Aris of the U.S. Air Force but even he was unsuccessful to locate her. 7. 14 years passed and there was still no news about Maria. 8. Thus, he filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Maria under Article 41 of the Fam Code on October 1, 2001. 9. The Court of Appeals and the RTC ruled in favor of the Ferventino. 10. The Petitioner (Republic) had appealed in all 3 courts. 11. The Republic contests the CA's ruling that there was enough evidence to prove that she was in fact dead. 12. OSG discounts respondent's testimony, on the steps he looked to find Maria, as hearsay because none of the persons who helped in his search testified in court. Also, that it was only Capt. Aris who gave a detailed account of his efforts to track down Maria (checked the phone directory, inquired about her from the registrar's office in Seattle) Issue: Has Ferventino established a well-founded belief that his absent spouse is already dead? Held: Yes

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Ruling: 1. Petitioner committed a serious procedural lapse when it filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals instead of a petition for certiorari. The RTC equally erred in giving due course to said appeal and ordering the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court. 2. The CA never had jurisdiction to review the judgment of the RTC, which by express provision of law, was immediately final and executory.

3. Petition is denied. Concept: Doctrine of Finality of Judgment- is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable. 108. Lim vs. CA September 25, 1992 Davide Facts: 1. Focus on the rule on confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship 2. A petition to annul the order of the trial court allowing a Psychiatrist of the National Mental Hospital to testify as an expert witness and not as an attending physician of the petitioner 3. Nelly Lim and Juan Sim are married 4. Filed a case for annulment of such marriage on the ground of schizophrenia 5. On January 11, 1989, private respondents counsel announced that he would present as his next witness the Chief of Female Services of the Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado to testify. 6. Petitioners counsel opposed on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited is privileged since the Doctor had examined the petitioner ion a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia 7. Dr. Acampado is barred from testifying under the confidentiality of a physician- patient relationship 8. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness for respondent as an expert witness and was asked hypothetical questions on her field. Issue: Can a witness be disqualified by reason of privileged communication between physician and patient relationship? Held: No. Ruling: 1. The mere fact of making a communication as well as the date of consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated. 2. She did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner; 3. The facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the patient 4. No showing that Dr. Acampados answer were influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner. Concept: 1. Requisites for a privilege may be successfully claimed (pg282) 2. 4 fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment of a privilege against disclosure (pg 282)

109. Salita vs. Magtolis June 13, 1994 J. Bellosillo Facts: 1. Erwin Espinosa, a newly qualified Doctor and Joselita Salita were married in 1986. 2. A year later, their union turned sour, and they separated in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselitas psychological incapacity. 3. It is alleged that sometime in 1987 he came to realize that she was psychologically incapacitated comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession, that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job. (As stated in his Bill of Particulars) 4. Joselita, after having moved for bills of particulars was not convinced. She filed a petition for certiorari with us. However, we referred her petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution. However, this was denied, finding the Bill of Particulars filed by private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action. 5. Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of facts, and fail to

79 point out the specific essential marital obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husbands cause of action. Issue: Are the allegations in the petition for annulment of marriage sufficient to properly prepare her responsive pleading for trial? Held: YES. Ruling: 1. It is evident that petitioner can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already alleged that "she (petitioner) was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession . . . upon his time and efforts . . . " Certainly, she can respond to this. To demand for more details would indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. 2. There is no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the petition (delayed for more than two years now) and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who after coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed blissful life either alone or in the company of each other. 3. Besides, it appears that petitioner in her memorandum has demonstrated a good grasp of what Art. 36 actually covers. Suffice it to say that Mme. Justice Sempio-Diy, formerly of the Court of Appeals and a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family code, explains The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.

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110. Krohn v. CA 1994 - Bellosillo, J.: Facts: 1. in 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez got married 2. the relationship between the couple developed into a stormy one. In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing in an effort to ease the marital strain. The effort however proved futile. In 1973, they finally separated in fact. 3. In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz 4. On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz In November 1978, presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree nullifying his marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of psychological incapacity. It was granted 1979. 5. In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant." 6. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient. 7. Ma. Paz said that "there is no factual or legal basis whatsoever for petitioner (Edgar) to claim 'psychological incapacity' to annul their marriage, such ground being completely false, fabricated and merely an afterthought." 8. On appeal to SC, Petitioner seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the contents of the psychiatric report and prays for the admission of her Statement 9. Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the rules are very explicit: the prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case at bar where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged communication is the husband and not the physician of the petitioner." Issue: Can the psychiatric report as obtained by Edgar Krohn admissible as evidence? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of the communication between physician and patient is not doubted. This prevents the physician from making public information that will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient. 2. Petitioner's discourse is however misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient. 3. In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. 4. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report.

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111. Santos vs. Court of Appeals 4 Jan 1995 J. Vitug Facts: 1. On 20 Sep 1986, Leouel Santos, a member of the Philippine Army, married Julia Rosario Bedia. She gave birth to a boy on 18 Jul 1987. 2. Not long after, the couple started to frequently quarrel because of the interference of Julias parents into their family. 3. On 18 May 1998, Julia left for the US to work as a nurse. Six months after or on 1 Jan 1989, she called Leouel for the first time and promised him that she will come back after her contract expires in July 1989. She never did. 4. When Leouel went to the US for a training program from 10 Apr to 25 Aug 1990, he desperately tried but failed to locate her. 5. Upon his return, Leouel filed a complaint for nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 6. On 31 May 1991, Julia opposed the complaint claiming that it was Leouel who had been irresponsible and incompetent. 7. On 25 Oct 1991, Julia filed a manifestation that she would neither appear nor submit evidence. 8. On 6 Nov 1991, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the dismissal. Issue: Should Leouels petition for nullity of marriage under Article 36 prosper? Held: No. Ruling: 1. The factual settings in this case, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. 2. The Family Code did not define the term psychological incapacity. It could be shown through the deliberations that the law was so designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The Committee feared that the giving of examples of what constitutes psychological incapacity would limit its applicability under the principle of ejusdem generis. 3. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability . The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. 4. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. 5. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. 112. Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA January 16, 1997-- Torres, Jr Facts: 1. Plaintiff (case prior to this) filed a case of annulment based on psychological incapacity on the part of her husband (petitioner here). 2. She claims (among many things apparenlty) that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. 3. She claims that the defendant married her in order to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the apperance of a normal man. 4. Defendand however claims that it is the plaintiff who does not want to have sex with her and that she always avoided him and that the one time he forced to himself on his wife to have sex he stopped because she was shaking and did not like it. 5. Defendant insists that the marriage remain valid because they are young and there is still a chance of it working out (bait talaga ng mga lalaki) 6. The defendant submited himself to a physical exam and there is no evidence of impotency. Its only that the defendant has a soft erection which is why is penis snot in its full length, but it is still capable of further erection and capable of having sexua l intercourse. 7. The RTC and CA annulled the marriage because... (look at ruling) 8. Present Case: Petitioner does not want his marriage to be annulled and says that there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, thus no basis for the courts to rule in annulling their marriage. Issue: 1. Should the marriage remain valid? Held: No 2. Is not wishing to have sex a vital ground in establishing psychological incapacity? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. The mere fact that it is the husband who is fighting to keep the marriage valid proves that there is no collusion between the parties. (obviously because his wife wants it annulled while he wants to keep the marriage) 2. Also, he admitted that he and his wife never had sex. 3. The Physical exam showed that he did not carry a physical defect. 4. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage (not wanting to have sex) is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give

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meaning to marriage. The Family code provides that it is an essential martital obligation [to]... procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. (333) Concept: 1. The Family code provides that it is an essential marital obligation [to]... procreate children based on the universal princi ple that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. (333) [QUESTION: does this apply to civil code as well?] 2. There needs to be a shared feeling between husband and wife. Marital union is a two-way process. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution. (334) [QUESTION: is this an obiter?]

113. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, Molina 13 February 1997 Panganiban *irreconcilable differences not psychological incapacity Facts: 1. H&W: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. 2. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage, 3. observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them , 4. from his dependency from his parents, and 5. his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. 6. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. 7. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. 8. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. 9. The couple are separated-in-fact for more than three years. 10. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. 11. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. 12. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse. Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity Held: No. Ruling: 1. In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." 2. Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." 3. In present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations . 4. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. 5. The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and

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Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State. 114. Hernandez vs. CA December 8, 1999 J. Mendoza *habitual drinking is not psychological incapacity Facts: 1. Lucita was in her first year of teaching zoology and botany, when Mario became her student for two consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts when he was no longer his teacher. In 1981, they got married (and had 3 children). 2. For two more years, his parents paid for his tuition fees, while she provided his allowances and other financial needs. 3. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, she discovered his extra-marital affair. Subsequently, he left the conjugal home and abandoned her and their child. When he came back, however, she accepted him. 4. From 1983 up to 1986, as he could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would help in her businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift (had smoking and drinking sprees, plus betted on cock fights) and had other women, her business (buy and sell) suffered. 5. Upon the recommendation of a family friend, he was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. While employed, his smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing became worse. He even had a daughter with one of the women. When she confronted him about his relationship with a certain Tess, he beat her up, as a result, she was confined in the hospital. He was employed only for 5 years because he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by the company. Instead of spending the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself. 6. As a result of his extreme promiscuity, he contracted gonorrhea and infected her. They, then, received treatment. 7. The he abandoned them. 8. She sent him a letter expressing her frustration, that her efforts to save their marriage proved futile. Also, she stated her intention to file a petition for the annulment of their marriage. 9. She then learned that he left for the Middle East, and since then, his whereabouts had been unknown. 10. She filed a petition for annulment, and in 1993, the trial court dismissed it. The circumstances she mentioned by in support of her claim that he was psychologically incapacitated to marry her are among the grounds cited a s valid reasons for the grant of legal separation (FC 55), not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment. Also, the court did grant relief under FC 46(3), as there is no dispute that the gonorrhea transmitted to her by respondent occurred 5 years after their marriage. 11. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Should their marriage be annulled on the ground of his psychological incapacity? Held: NO. Ruling: 1. The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. 2. She failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, he was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical. Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

3.

115. Marcos v. Marcos 2000 - Panganiban, J.:

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Facts: 1. The parties were married twice: in 1982 and 1983 2. They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. 3. And then he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work 4. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. 5. In 1992, they were already living separately 6. Then one time the wife submitted herself to psychologist for psychological evaluation; but husband did not 7. lower court found the husband to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children. CA reversed this finding because accdg to it findings were based only on the interviews conducted with the wife Issue: Whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated. Held: No Ruling: 1. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. 2. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. 3. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. 4. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina. 5. Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration. 6. In Republic v. CA and Molina, the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code were laid down by this Court as follows: 1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,

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there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095." 7. The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." 8. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. 116. Republic vs. Dagdag 9 Feb 2001 J. Quisumbing *emotional immaturity not psychological incapacity Facts: 1. On 7 Sep 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Dagdag, 20 years old. They begot two children. 2. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear, and then disappear again. During the times when he was present, he indulged on drinking sprees, force his wife to submit to sex, and when she refused, inflict physical injuries on her. 3. On Oct 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. She later found out that he was imprisoned and escaped on 22 Oct 1985. 4. On 3 Jul 1990, Erlinda filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Summons was served by publication. 5. During the hearing on 17 Dec 1990, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. She then presented her sister-in-law as the lone witness. She testified that the couple always quarreled and that Avelino never stayed for long at their house. 6. After Erlinda rested her case, the court gave the investigating prosecutor until 2 Jan 1991 to submit his manifestation. 7. On 27 Dec 1990, without waiting for the prosecutors manifestation, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the ma rriage void. It denied the motion for reconsideration of the OSG. 8. On 22 Apr 1993, the CA affirmed the decision. Issue: Was the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino as being emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice sufficiently proven? Held: No. Ruling: 1. Taking into consideration the guidelines in Molina, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the evidentiary requirements to prove psychological incapacity. a) No psychiatrist or doctor testified to the alleged psychological incapacity. b) The allegation that Avelino was a fugitive from justice was not proven. c) The investigating prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered. 2. Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case depends crucially on the facts of the case, more than in any field of the law. No case is on all fours with another case. 117. Florence Malcampo Sin vs. Sin March 26, 2001 Pardo Facts: 1. After a two year courtship and engagement, Florence and respondent Philip, a Portuguese, got married. (Jan 4, 1987) 2. Florence filed a complaint for declaration of nullity on Sep 20, 1994. 3. This was dismissed by the RTC.

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4. This was dismissed also by the CA. 5. It is to be noted that the State did not participate in the proceedings. Issue: Should the appeal be given due course? Held: No, it should be remanded back to RTC. Ruling: 1. The trial court MUST order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the SG to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the SG issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision. 2. The records are bereft of any evidence that the state participated in the prosecution of the case at hand not only the RTC but in the CA as well. 3. The case should be remanded back to the RTC because the State never had its say. Concept: Family Code Art 48: In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the court shall order the pr osecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. 118. LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent April 17, 2001 Vitug *WRONG! Facts: 1. H&W: Lorna G. Pesca and Zosimo A. Pesca 2. They first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. 3. They got married on 03 March 1975. 4. the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, 5. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. 6. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay together when respondent was on vacation. 7. It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of psychological incapacity to perform his marital covenant. 8. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. 9. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence 10. 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City 11. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change 12. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite. 13. Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 14. Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal. Issue: Should the Molina and Santos doctrine be retroactively applied to this present case? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. Santos: `psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. 2. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled , and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith[5] under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit. 3. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided

86 procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.

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My obiter: The court is basically saying that since this is a new doctrine and not an overruling of an existing doctrine, then the case law can be applied retroactively 119. Choa vs. Choa November 26, 2002 J. Panganiban Facts: 1. Leni and Alfonso were married in 1981, and had two children. 2. In 1993, Alfonso filed a Complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. 3. In the same year, he filed an Amended Complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage base d on Lenis alleged psychological incapacity. 4. The case went to trial with respondent presenting several witnesses. The RTC denied Lenis Demurrer to Evidence. It held that he established a quantum of evidence that the she must controvert. 5. Her Motion for Reconsideration was denied, and he elevated the case to the CA by way of Certiorari. 6. The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence, certiorari was not available. The proper remedy was for the defense to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision was handed down later, to take an appeal. 7. The CA also ruled that the trial has the discretion to grant or deny a demurrer to evidence. Further, he failed to show that the issues in the court below had been resolved arbitrarily or without basis. Issue: 1. Is certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to evidence? Held: No. 2. Is she psychologically incapacitated? Held: No. Ruling: 1. In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings. However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People, this Court declared that appeal, not certiorari, in due time was indeed the proper remedy, provided there was no grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive exercise of judicial authority. 2. A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue. The court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. 3. First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of cha rges against him are proof of the latters psychological incapacity. These charges included Complaints for perjury, false testimony, concubinage and deportation. The filing and the prosecution of these cases clearly showed that his wife wanted to put him behind bars, and to banish him from the country. This is very abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of her husband as the father of her children, had acted to the contrary. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. 4. Second. He testified, complaining about three aspects of her personality: her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an intention of procreative sexuality. None of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Far from it. Also, lacked the intention of procreative sexuality is easily belied by the fact that tw o children were born during their union. Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged defect was already existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. 5. Third. His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. His testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage: They are normal, but they cannot mix together. Also, the assessment of by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions communicated to him by respondent. He never conducted any psychological examination of her. 120. Barcelona v. CA 2003 - Carpio, J.: Facts: 1. On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. Then On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court granted 2. On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana on the ground of psychological incapacity 3. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Diana, coming from a rich family, was a

87 disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house or would play tennis the wh ole day. 4. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by Diana and the sickness of a child, she withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband. 5. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to lea ve their conjugal dwelling 6. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the respondent. The separation in fact between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present time. 7. Petitioner Diana contends that the second petition is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The second petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state the marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity. Issue: Was the evidence sufficient to prove psychological incapacity? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (new Rules). 2. Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides: A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration. 3. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. 4. Since new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. 5. What the new Rules require the petition to allege are the physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity 6. Respondent Tadeos second petition complies with this requirement. 7. Petition denied.

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121. Dedel vs. Court of Appeals 29 Jan 2004 J. Ynares-Santiago *courts have no jurisdiction to dissolve church marriage Facts: 1. On 28 Sep 1966, David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married in a civil ceremony. Church wedding followed on 20 May 1967. The union produced four children. 2. According to David, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men and was once confined in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. 3. Despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with a Jordanian national (Mustafa Ibrahim) whom she married and had two children. When Mustafa left, she went back to him together with the two children. 4. On 9 Dec 1995, Sharon abandoned her first family and left for Jordan with her two children from Mustafa. Since then, she would only return to the country on special occasions. 5. On 1 Apr 1997, David filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage. Summons was published in the Pilipino Star Ngayon considering that Sharon did not reside or could be found in the country. 6. David presented Dr. Natividad Dayan who declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder. 7. After trial, the court declared the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity. 8. Upon appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the trial courts decision. Issue: Does the aberrant sexual behavior of Sharon fall within the term psychological incapacity? Held: No. Ruling: 1. A personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. 2. Sharons sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill to such an extent that she could not have k nown the obligations she was assuming. It appears that her promiscuity did not exist prior to or at inception of the marriage. 3. Her sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. 4. It must be shown that the acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make Sharon completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. 5. The evidence presented refers only to grounds for legal separation.

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122. Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano May 20, 2004 --- Corona *abandonment not psychological incapacity Facts: 1. Lolita Quintero-Hamano (Respondent) got married to Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national on January 14, 1988. 2. They started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. 3. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan with the promise to return. 4. He stopped giving financial support and never saw the Respondent again, even if at one point he had visited the Philippines. 5. Respondent filed a case of an annulment against Toshio because of abandonment. 6. This was upheld by the lower courts, thus the Republic intervened, current petitioner. Issue: Is abandonment a ground that proves psychological incapacity? Held: No Ruling: 1. Abandonment is only a ground for legal separation. 2. The evidence falls short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacity to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio's act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. 3. It would have helped if respondent had gotten him to undergo a psychiatric evaluation, but did not do so (although this is not requirement, it merely gives greater weight to the evidence presented). 4. The petition to keep the marriage valid is granted Concept: Santos Case Guidelines: Psychological Incapacity must be characterized by: 1. gravity 2. juridical antecedence 3. incurability The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically identified. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. 123. JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO October 27, 2004 Chico Nazario Facts: 1. H&W: Juanita Carating-Siayngco and Manuel Siayngco 2. Married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. 3. After discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy. 4. after 24 years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita 5. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, that she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents since childhood 6. petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour ; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint. Issue: Can the court annul the marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity? Held: No.

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Ruling: 1. We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution 2. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 3. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for him , etc. 4. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. 5. In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage. 6. Nothing in there supports the doctors conclusion that petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated. 7. On the contrary, the report clearly shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanitas beha vior is traceable not from the inception of their marriage as required by law but from her experiences during the marriage 8. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity 124. Antonio vs. Reyes *reversed Pesca March 10, 2006 J. Tinga *stop using inviolable institution as defense; promoting wedlock upon people incapable of marriage Facts: 1. Leonilo (26) and Marie (36) met in August 1989. 2. Barely a year after, they got married at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding in 1990. 3. Out of their union, a child was born in 1991, who died 5 months later. 4. In 1993, he filed a petition to have his marriage declared null and void, grounded on FC 36, alleging that she was psychologically incapacitated, which existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and up to the present. 5. He claimed that she persistently lied: (1) She concealed that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and instead introduced him as the familys adopted child. She only told the truth when Leonilo learned about it from other sources after their marriage. (2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her. (3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology. (4) She claimed to be a singer with Blackgold Recording Company, yet not a single member of her family ever witnessed her singing activities. She claimed that a show was held in her honor and even presented an invitation, but Leonilo discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place. (5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million. She admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. (6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, altering her payslip to make it appear that she earned more. She bought a sala set from a public market but claimed that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from others on false pretexts. (7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. 6. In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that she was essentially a normal person; however, they observed that her persistent and constant lying abnormal or pathological. 7. In reply, she presented her version and presented Dr. Reyes, a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations. 8. The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. 9. The trail court gave credence to petitioners evidence. The marriage was declared null and void. 10. While the case was pending before the CA, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (but only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion), then upheld by the Vatican. 11. Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed. Issue: Are the facts presented sufficient to meet the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage? Held: YES. Ruling: The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines operate as the general rules: The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. ** Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife s behavior, and

90 certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims. He also presented 2 expert witnesses from the field of psychology. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. ** The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of perenially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inve nting personalities and situations. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. ** She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations. ** The root cause of her psychological incapacity has been medically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the courts decision. The persistent lying undermines that basic relationsh ip that should be based on love, trust and respect. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then, but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal. Also, he pointed out that after having initially separated, he returned to her. However, she continued to lie and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws that it is incurable. Such illness must be grave enough. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. ** It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before he left his wife. It was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced FC 68-71 as regards the husband and wife as well as FC 220, 221 and 225 in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. ** Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983. ** Such deliberate ignorance of the church annulment is in contravention of Molina. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondents version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value.

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125. Republic v. Iyoy 2005 - Chico-Nazario, J.: Facts: 1. respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 2. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot -tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the US, leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. 3. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. 4. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American 5. Fely returned to the Philippines several times 6. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A 7. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. 8. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to p erform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing. 9. Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint 10. She said that she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons

91 11. Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. 12. She also said that after securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, she married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal 13. Fely also prayed that her marriage to respondent Crasus be declared null and void 14. RTC granted the petition on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Fely. 15. RP opposed this saying that Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per se constitute psychological incapacity Issue: Was the evidence presented sufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely? Held: No Ruling: 1. The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely. 2. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus . . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated The psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 3. More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. 4. A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial. 5. Under those guidelines, this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely ; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void 6. The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, 7. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage. 8. The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. 9. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. 10. It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. 11. As to the divorce issue -Art 36 can't apply. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen so the divorce can't be recognized.

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126. Yu vs. Yu 10 Mar 2006 J. Carpio-Morales Facts: 1. On 11 Jan 2002, Eric Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for the custody of his minor child Bianca. 2. On 3 Mar 2002, Caroline Tanchay, his estranged wife, filed a petition for nullity of marriage with prayer to award to her the sole custody of Bianca before the Pasig RTC.

92 3. On 21 Mar 2002, the CA awarded full custody of Bianca to Eric while the habeas corpus case is still pending. Likewise on 24 Apr 2002, the CA approved the Interim Visitation Agreement of Eric and Caroline. 4. In Dec 2002, Caroline moved to dismiss her petition for nullity of marriage which the Pasig RTC granted on 28 Mar 2003. 5. On 12 Jun 2003, Eric filed his own petition for nullity of marriage with prayer to award to him the sole custody of Bianca before the Pasig RTC. In her Answer, Sharon also prayed for sole custody of Bianca. 6. On 3 Jul 2003, the CA dismissed Erics habeas corpus petition for having become moot and academic. 7. On 24 Jul 2003, Caroline filed a habeas corpus petition before the Pasay RTC for the sole custody of Bianca. 8. On 12 Aug 2003, the Pasay RTC ordered that pending the disposition of Sharons habeas co rpus petition, Bianca should stay with Eric from Sunday afternoon to Saturday morning, and with Sharon from Saturday 1p.m. to Sunday 1p.m. Eric moved for reconsideration questioning the Pasay RTCs jurisdiction to issue the order. 9. On 30 Oct 2003, Pasig RTC asserted its jurisdiction over the custody of Bianca. It granted custody of Bianca to Eric for the duration of the case. 10. On 27 Nov 2003, Pasay RTC denied Erics motion to dismiss Sharons habeas corpus petition. It also said that Eric committed forum shopping and that there was no litis pendentia in the case. 11. Eric appealed the Pasay RTCs denial of his motion to dismiss to the CA which it denied on 10 Aug 2004. Issue: Who has jurisdiction over the question of custody of Bianca, Pasay or Pasig RTC? Held: The Pasig RTC. Ruling: 1. The filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC automatically submitted the issue of custody of Bianca as an incident thereof. 2. Since the ground invoked in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is Sharons alleged psychological incapacity, the evidence to support this action necessarily involves evidence of Sharons fitness to take custody of Bianca.

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3.

The elements of litis pendentia are present: a) Identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions. b) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts. c) The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment may be rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. Judgment on the issue of custody in the nullity of marriage case before the Pasig RTC, regardless of which party would prevail, would constitute res judicata on the habeas corpus petition before the Pasay RTC since the Pasig RTC has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.

4.

5.

The petition field by Eric for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC is the more appropriate action to determine the issue of who has custody over Bianca. Concept: Family Code, Art. 49: During the pendency of the action [for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage] and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. Family Code, Art. 50: The final judgment in such cases [for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage] shall provide for the custody and support of the common children, unless such other matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. 127. Perez- Ferraris vs. Ferraris July 17, 2006 --- Ynares- Santiago Facts: 1. Perez Ferraris executed a petition to have her marriage annulled due to the psychological incapacity of her partner. 2. The RTC ruled that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity. 3. The RTC also ruled that there was no evidence that respondent (her husband) is mentally ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption. 4. This case is a motion for reconsideration. Issue: Should the marriage be annulled based on the facts that the other partner shows signs of violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, sexual infidelity, abandonment and lack of support? Held: No Ruling: 1. These signs are not rooted on a psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of

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marriage. (Please refer to concepts) Concept: Not psychological conditions: (there is an exception to this if you can prove that these conditions were made manifest in some way prior to the marriage) 1. sexual infidelity 2. abandonment 3. providing no financial support 4. providing no moral support 5. quarrelling 6. violent tendencies during epileptic attacks 7. habitual alcoholism *it is not enough that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological and not physical illness. (403) 128. Catalan vs. Court of Appeals 6 Feb 2007 J. Ynares-Santiago Facts: 1. H&W: Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. 2. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. 3. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. 4. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan 5. Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol , petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope. 6. Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address her grievances and to protect her family from further embarrassment and humiliation Issue: WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT TO QUESTION THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree. Held: No Standing. Ruling: 1. However, after a careful review of the records, we note that other than the allegations in the complaint and the testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce . 2. Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. 3. She may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute 4. if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of Orlando , does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage Concept: - Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. - The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. - The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. - A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. - However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws 129. Republic vs. Tanyag- San Jose February 6, 2007 J. Carpio-Morales

*expert testimony based on hearsay

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Facts: 1. Lailas (19) and Manolitos (20) association started with the game of basketball, he as one of the cagers, and her as an avid spectator. They were married in 1988, and begot two children. 2. For nine years, the couple stayed with Manolitos parents. Manolito was jobless and was hooked to gambling, drin king and drugs. As for Laila, she sold fish at the wet market of Taguig. 3. She decided to separate from him. He, however pursued her and pleaded for another chance. He promised that he would change, if only petitioner would give him a son. Petitioner agreed to the compromise. 4. They reconciled and she did gave birth to a son. He was happy but his show of good nature was superficial. 5. He went out of their dwelling for his usual late night stints but he never came back the following morning. They never lived together since. She then transferred to her parents house. 6. In 1999, she filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. 7. Testifying for Laila is Dr. Tayag, a clinical psychologist at the National Center for Mental Health, declared that from the psychological test and clinical interview she conducted on Laila, she found Manolito, whom she did not personally examine, to be psychologically incapacitated. He found him to have Anti-Social Personality Disorder. 8. In 2005, the appellate court, finding Manolito psychologically incapacitated after considering "the totality of the evidence," reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between him and Laila void ab initio. Issue: Should the marriage be annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity? Held: NO. Ruling: 1. Petitioners portrayal of respondent as jobless and irresponsible is not enough. As said in the Molina case, "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness." 2. Although the body of the report mentions that the respondent is affected with "Anti-Social Personality Disorder", the same cannot sway this Court from its above disposition. There is no showing that [Dr.] Tayag was able to interview the respondent or any of his relatives in order to arrive at the above conclusion. Obviously, the data upon which the finding or conclusion was based is inadequate. 3. While We may not have strictly adhered to the ruling in the Molina case in arriving at Our present conclusion We have reason to deviate from the same. Note that the "committee did not give any example of psychological incapacity for the fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to apply the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decision of Church tribunals which although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." 4. Parenthetically, Dr. Tayags Psychological Report does not even show that the alleged anti-social personality disorder of Manolito was already present at the inception of the marriage or that it is incurable. Neither does it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder nor identify its root cause. It merely states that "[s]uch disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply [immersed] within the system [and] continues to influence the individual until the later stage of life." 5. Petition is granted. 130. Zamora v. CA, Norma Zamora 2007 - Azcuna, J.: Facts: 1. Petitioner husband and private respondent wife were married on June 4, 1970. They didn't have a child. 2. in 1972, Wife left for the United States to work as a nurse. She made periodic visits to the Phils. until 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen. 3. Husband filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity 4. Husband alleged that his wife was horrified by the mere thought of having children as eviden ced by the fact that she had not borne petitioner a child. Furthermore, he also alleged that private respondent abandoned him by living in the United States and had in fact become an American citizen; and that throughout their marriage they lived together for not more than three years. 5. On the other hand, wife denied that she refused to have a child. She also faulted her husband for the breakup of their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful to her. Issue: Was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife sufficiently established? Held: No Ruling: 1. In the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,[] the High Court ruled that, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

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2. Also, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[] it was held that mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet the ir responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness." 3. This appeal does not fall in the category of psychological incapacity as defined in the aforementioned cases. The mere r efusal of the appellee to bear a child is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, since even if such allegation is true, it is not shown or proven that this is due to psychological illness. 4. The husband even failed to present any psychologist or other medical expert to prove the psychological incapacity of defendantappellee. This WE feel is a fatal omission on the part of the appellant, considering the doctrine laid down in the Santos and Molina cases 131. Navarro vs. Navarro 13 Apr 2007 J. Quisumbing Facts: 1. Narciso Navarro Jr. and Cynthia Cecilio got married while awaiting their first child. They were college sweethearts. Since they were still students (Narciso a medical student, Cynthia a student of pharmacy), they lived with Narcisos parents on whom they were financially dependent. Their union bore four children. 2. Cynthia constantly complained that Narciso didnt have time for her and constantly quarreled with him when he couldnt give her what she wants. They had marriage counseling but it didnt work. 3. Narciso filed the petition for nullification of marriage when he found out that their eldest daughter had been made pregnant by a man whom Cynthia hired to follow Narciso. 4. Abdona de Castro, a DSWD-accredited marriage counselor opined that Cynthia was psychologically incapacitated. She even mentioned that professionals are per se incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage because they spend a lot of time in the pursuit of their profession and they have very little time to spend with their families! 5. Cynthia refused to submit to the psychiatric examination. She claims that she had no marital problems until Narciso had an affair with Dr. Lucila Posadas which she caught in Harana Motel in early 1984. 6. On 21 Aug 1998, the trial court ruled that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to perform their marital obligations. 7. On 8 Jan 2003, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. It held that the constant arguments, bickerings and conflicts between the spouses did not constitute psychological incapacity. Issue: Was the marriage void on the grounds of their psychological incapacity? Held: No. Ruling: 1. The spouses frequent squabbles and Cynthias refusal to sleep with Narciso and be supportive to him do not constitute psychological incapacity. 2. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. It is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. 3. De Castros diagnosis is based on hearsay and has no probative value. Cynthia did not undergo psychological tests. 4. Narciso failed to show that grave and incurable capacity existed at the time of their marriage. Immaturity does not constitute psychological incapacity. 132. Republic vs. Cabuntug- Bagio June 30, 2008 --- Carpio Morales Facts: 1. Lynnette and Martini contacted each other by pen pal on 1995. 2. They met in person during one of Martini's vacations after the expiration of his contract (he is a sea man) 3. They got married on August 12, 1997. 4. Less than 3 years later, Lynette filed a case to annul her marriage because Martini always seemed to mention his mother and his family, and she realized that he was a mama's boy. 5. Lynette also says that Martini stopped receiving her share of the allotment from Martini and that his salary all goes to his mother. 6. Lynette also found out that he declared on his employment record as single and named his mother as principal allottee. 7. Lynette got the aid of a clinical psychologist (Dr. Andres Gerong) to report on what Martini is like through the observations of Lynnette and Lynette's sister. 8. The report disclosed that Martini remained immature, never really lived with wife, and had no direction to establish their home

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and only needed Lynette to fulfill his sexual desires. 9. The lower courts ruled in favor of Lynette, thus the petition from the Republic. Issue: 1. Is the mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities a ground for psychological incapacity? Held: No 2. Is the Report of the doctor valid? Held: No Ruling: 1. The mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalites do not constitute pshychological incapacity. 2. The report cannot be valid because the conclusion was arrived at through the testimony of Lynette and her sister. Of course their testimonies are prejudiced towards the husband. 3. Lynette's claim that such personality disorder has existed since his adolescent years has also not been explained. 4. The Seafarers Info Sheet which said that he wrote single had no date, thus he could have written it even before they had contracted marriage. Concept: Same as Perez- Ferraris vs. Ferraris July 17, 2006 --- (refer to this case) 133. MANUEL G. ALMELOR, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIAS CITY, BRANCH 254, AND LEONIDA T. ALMELOR, RESPONDENT. August 26, 2008 Reyes, RT Facts: 1. H&W: Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral. 2. Their union bore three children 3. Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively. 4. After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pinas City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations . 5. Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical student clerks. 6. Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. 7. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple. 8. Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother . Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida 9. Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips - Dr. Nogales. 10. Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He, however, maintained that their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him. Issue: Is the marriage null and void on the grounds of psychological incapacity? Held: No. Ruling: 1. No sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. 2. Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. 3. The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality. 4. Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. 5. It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. 6. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances [61] constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment. 7. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage. 8. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. 134. Laurena vs. CA September 22, 1988 J. Carpio

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Facts: 1. Darlene and Jesse Lauro Laurena met in January 1983, and were married in the same year. They have two children. 2. In 1993, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, alleging that he was psychologically incapacitated, which existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage although she discovered it only after the marriage. 3. She alleged that after their wedding, they went to Baguio City for their honeymoon. They were accompanied by a 15-year old boy, the son of one of his house helpers, who he invited to sleep in their hotel suite. 4. After their honeymoon, they settled in his house. 5. She became pregnant in 1984, but suffered a miscarriage. According to her, she almost bled to death while he continued watching a television show at the foot of their matrimonial bed. 6. He gave priority to the needs of his parents; would come home past midnight; and even tried to convert her to his religion. 7. In addition, he was a womanizer. She lived in Batangas for three years, tending to their gasoline station while he remained in Paranaque City. She discovered that he had been living a bachelor's life while she was away. 8. She also noticed that he had feminine tendencies. 9. They would frequently quarrel and one time, he hit her face. 10. She alleged that in September 1990, he abandoned their conjugal home and stopped supporting their children. 11. She further alleged that during their marriage, she and respondent acquired several properties which were all part of their conjugal partnership of gains. She prayed for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, for custody of their children, and for monthly support of P25,000. 12. He denied petitioner's allegations, asserting that she was emotionally immature and extremely jealous. He alleged that some of the properties were not part of their conjugal partnership of gains. He prayed for the dismissal of the petition. 13. The trial court denied the petition for declaration of nullity, the conjugal partnership of gains dissolved, the children being over 7 years of age can choose whose custody theyd be, and support of said minors shall be borne by the parents in proportion to their respective incomes. 14. Petitioner appealed insofar as the trial court denied her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. 15. The Court of Appeals ruled that she failed to prove that the root cause of his psychological incapacity, noting that Dr. Lapuz, the psychiatrist that she presented, was not able to talk to him and simply based her conclusions and impressions of him from her two-hour session with Darlene. It further ruled that she was not able to prove that his alleged psychological incapacity was existing at the time of the celebration of their marriage. Also, in her complaint, petitioner's bases were his irresponsibility, insensitivity, and infidelity, but during the trial, she claimed that it was his homosexuality. Her allegations lacked factual and evidentiary bases. It could not lead to the conclusion that it was incurable. 16. The Court of Appeals excluded also some properties, which belonged to the parents of Jesse. Issue: 1. Is he psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations? Held: NO. 2. Were the properties excluded by the Court of Appeals form part of the conjugal partnership of gains? Held: NO. Court of Appeals' Decision sustained. Ruling: 1. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. Finally, the "psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." 2. Also, in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina case), the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. 3. Sexual infidelity, repeated physical violence, homosexuality, physical violence or moral pressure to compel petitioner to change religious affiliation, and abandonment are grounds for legal separation, but not for declaring a marriage void. 4. In Marcos v. Marcos, the Court ruled that if the totalities of the evidence presented are enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, there is no need to resort to the actual medical examination of the person concerned. An expert witness would have strengthened her claim of his psychological incapacity. In this case, the testimony of Dr. Lapuz on his psychological incapacity was based only on her two-hour session with petitioner. She failed to prove psychological incapacity or identify its root cause. She failed to establish that respondent's psychological incapacity is incurable. 5. Petitioner also failed to prove that respondent's psychological incapacity was existing at the time of the celebration of their marriage. Petitioner only cited that during their honeymoon, she found it strange that respondent allowed their 15-year old companion, the son of one of respondent's house helpers, to sleep in their room. However, respondent explained that he and petitioner already stayed in a hotel for one night before they went to Baguio City and that they had sexual relations even before their marriage. Respondent explained that the boy was with them to take pictures and videos of their stay in Baguio City and had to stay with them in the room due to monetary constraints. In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated and that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of their marriage. 135. Te v. Te, Republic

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2009 - Nachura, J.: Facts: 1. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu 2. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. They stayed at Rowena's uncle's place. 3. On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20. The t wo then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treat ed like a prisoner 4. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family 5. They finally parted ways 6. After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. 7. The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature (dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent) 8. CA ruled that psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven. 9. On appeal to SC, He insists on both he and his wife are psychologically incapacitated. He also points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent. 10. While OSG contends that the root cause of the psychological incapacity was not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina were not satisfied. Issue: Was psychological incapacity on both parties sufficiently established? Held: Yes Ruling: 1. The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties psychological incapacity. 2. the psychological assessment, which the Court considers as adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. 3. Indeed, petitioner (husband), who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decision without advice from others. As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. 4. the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide. 5. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void. --HERE GOES THE SUPER LONG OBITER-- Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the ma rriage. - And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. - Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. *Then there's this super long part, which in part says: a) The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Baviera, considered the inclusion of the phrase and is incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

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For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.: 1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract; 2. reasons of public policy; 3. special cases and special situations.

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The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special cases and special situations, hence, its special treatmen t in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted. b) Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. The law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application. c) Yet, as held in Santos, the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. Yet, as held in Santos, the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. -Court mentioned Molina again. (not pasting it anymore! pasted it too many times already. refer to other cases =p sayang sa ink) (sorry, this case is so fond of obiter, but might as well include some of it since it really discusses psych incapacity) -Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards (Molina), without too much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as courts should interpret the provision on a case -tocase basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. --In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. -The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. - Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. - At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. 136. Ting vs. Velez-Ting 31 Mar 2009 J. Nachura Facts: 1. Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez were married on 26 Jul 1975. They had six children. 2. Upon passing the medical board and residency program, Benjamin worked as an anesthesiologist at Velez Hospital owned by Carmens family. Here, Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer. 3. On 21 Oct 1993, Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity due to: a) Alcoholism which affected his family relationship and profession b) Violent nature due to excessive drinking c) Compulsive gambling habit d) Irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give financial support 4. In support of her petition, she presented Dr. Oate who evaluated Benjamin from the TSN taken during his deposition. Benjamin has already gone to South Africa to work as an anesthesiologist. Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamin suffers from a personality disorder.

100 5. In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He presented Dr. Obra who evaluated him based on the TSN and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Pentz, a psychiatrist from South Africa who personally examined Benjamin. Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with Benjamins personality. 6. On 9 Jan 1998, the trial court declared the marriage null and void due to Benjamins psychological in capacity. 7. On 19 Oct 2000, the CA reversed the ruling upon Benjamins appeal. It said that Dr. Oates conclusion was based only on theories and not on established facts contrary to the guidelines in Santos and Molina. 8. On 17 Nov 2003, upon Carmens motion for reconsideration, the CA reconsidered its previous ruling and sustained the trial courts decision. It cited the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages issued by the SC on 15 Mar 2003 . Issue: Was the marriage void due to Benjamins psychological incapacity? Held: No. Ruling: 1. The totality of evidence presented by Carmen was insufficient to prove that Benjamin is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such at the date of the marriage. 2. The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations. The balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obras find ings since it was based on Dr. Pentzs psychological evaluation report who personally examined B enjamin. 3. The Court has not abandoned the Molina doctrine. The new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages only relaxed the stringent requirement enunciated in Molina. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference. 4. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

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137. Azcueta vs. Republic [important case] May 26, 2009 - Leonardo- De Castro Facts: 1. Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met and got married on 1993, after only 2 months from their first meeting. 2. Marietta (petitioner) wishes to have her husband deemed psychologically incapacitated in order to have her marriage annuled because he is emotionally immature, irresponsible and fails to adapt himself to marriage life and to perform the essential responsibilities of a husband. 3. At one point, her husband had lied to her that he had gotten a job, when in fact he was merely just getting money from his parents. He cried like a child when he admitted to Marietta that his job was fake. 4. Also, she claims that they only had sex once a month and that she never enjoyed it. 5. His response to the statement of her not enjoying sex is that sex is sacred thus it should not be enjoyed or abused. 6. Her husband also does not wish to have a child yet because he is not yet ready. 7. Marietta, as well as the cousin of Rodolfo testified in support of this petition. 8. A psychiatrist deduced from the petitioner's testimonies that the husband is suffering from DEPENDENT PERSONALITY DISORDER with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings. 9. The psychiatrist adds that the root cause of Dependent Personality disorder was because his mother was the dominant figure in the family, and that this made him ineffectual and inept, characterized loss of self-confidence, and constant self-doubt. 10. The psychiatrist also reported on the maturity and independent character of the petitioner in this case. Issue: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is adequate to deem Rodolfo psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations. Held: Yes Ruling: 1. Petitioner testified in court on the facts upon which the psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified under oath before the lower court and was cross examined, she thereby presented evidence in the form of a testimony. Significantly, petitioner's narration of facts was corroborated in material points by the testimony of a close relative of Rodolfo. 2. It was proven that Rodolfo, ever since childhood, always makes himself available to his mother's needs, and thus made him an easy prey, [and was] easily engulfed into her system. 3. The Supreme Court upholds the deduction of the reputable psychiatrist who has worked in his/her field for 40 years (refer to the concepts area to know more about the disorder) 4. It is clear that Rodolfo had been psychologically incapacitated during the time of marriage and perhaps even before the marriage. This is rooted in his upbringing and family life. 5. SC cannot agree that Rodolfo's irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother can be attributed to immaturity or youth. He was already 29 years old when he went into marriage. 6. The dependent personality disorder is incurable in nature, and the fact that it started so early in Rodolfo's life makes it even more difficult to say that it could ever be cured.

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Concept: 1. Dependent Personality Disorder- it is considered a permanent and incurable in nature. It cripples psychological functions related to sex, self-confidence, independence, responsibility and maturity. (NOTE: this does not mean that if one has this it is an instant sign to say he or she is psychologically incapacitated. It always depends on the severity of the condition.) 2. We realize that psychology is by no means an exact science and the medical cases of patients, even though suffering from the same disorder, may be different in their symptoms or manifestations and in the degree of severity. 138. LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, Petitioner, VS. CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, April 16, 2008- CORONA Facts: 1. H&W: Lester Benjamin S. Halili and respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili 2. They were only 21 and 19 years of age, respectively, when they got married on July 4, 1995 at the City Hall of Manila. 3. After the wedding, they continued to live with their respective parents and never lived together but maintained the relationship nonetheless. 4. A year after, the couple started bickering constantly. Petitioner stopped seeing respondent and went on dates with other women. 5. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that he was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations to respondent. 6. He claimed that he thought that the wedding performed at the City Hall of Manila was a "joke" and that the marriage certificate he signed was "fake." He also pointed out that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife and never consummated the marriage. 7. The RTC granted the petition and declared petitioner psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Issue: whether or not the totality of evidence presented is sufficient to prove that petitioner suffered from psychological incapacity which effectively prevented him from complying with his essential marital obligations Held: No. Ruling: 1. The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own testimony and a psychological report written by Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., a clinical psychologist, who also testified on the matters contained therein. 2. According to Dr. Dayan, petitioner was suffering from a personality disorder characterized as "a mixed personality disorder from self-defeating personality to dependent personality disorder brought about by a dysfunctional family background." Petitioner's father was very abusive and domineering. Although petitioner and his siblings were adequately supported by their father, a very wealthy man, they lacked affirmation. petitioner grew up without self-confidence and very immature. He never really understood what it meant to have a family, much less to be a husband. 3. Both petitioner and respondent were psychologically incapacitated to perform their essential marital obligations as they never lived together as husband and wife. They also never consummated their marriage. 4. In this case, although petitioner was able to establish his immaturity, as evidenced by the psychological report and as testified to by him and Dr. Dayan, the same hardly constituted sufficient cause for declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity. It had to be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. 5. The evidence adduced by petitioner merely showed that he and respondent had difficulty getting along with each other as they constantly fought over petty things. 6. However, there was no showing of the gravity and incurability of the psychological disorder supposedly inherent in petitioner, except for the mere statement or conclusion to that effect in the psychological report. 139. Najera vs. Najera July 3, 2009 J. Peralta Facts: 1. On January 31, 1988, Digna and Eduarda got married, solemnized by Rev. Father Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the Saint Andrew the Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan. They are childless. 2. She was already employed with the Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan, while he was jobless. He did not exert enough effort to find a job and was dependent on petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioners elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to land a job as a seaman in 1988. 3. While employed as a seaman, he did not give her sufficient financial support and she had to rely on her own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live. 4. In May 1989, when he came home from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused her of having an affair with another man. He took to smoking marijuana and tried to force her into it. When she refused, he insulted her and

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uttered unprintable words against her. He would go out of the house and when he arrived home, he was always drunk. On July 1994, while he was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo. She was able to parry his attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical injuries on different parts of her body. She was treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident was reported at the Bugallon Police Station. 6. He left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings. He lived with his mother and he abandoned her. Eduardo is presently living in the U.S.A. 7. In 1997, Digna filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains. 8. He filed his Answer. He denied the material allegations in the petition and averred that petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very low morality, and guilty of infidelity. He claimed that the subject house and lot were acquired through his sole effort and money. 9. On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance. 10. On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order terminating the pre-trial conference after the parties signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and divide equally their conjugal properties. 11. She testified in court and presented as witnesses the following: her mother, Celedonia Aldana; psychologist Cristina R. Gates; and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Bugallon, Pangasinan. 12. Among her testimonies were that her parents were happily married, while respondents parents were separated. Respondents brothers were also separated from their respective wives. Also, that she filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal of the Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on the ground of psychological incapacity of respondent. 13. Psychological Conclusions: He is afflicted with psychological hang-ups which are rooted in his mother who had an extramarital affair and separated from his father. From this, he gauged in alcohol and marijuana. In time, he seemed steep in a kind of a double bind where he both deeply loved and resented his mother. His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior towards her appears to be an offshoot of deep-seated feelings and recurrent thoughts towards his own mother. He is afflicted with a Borderline Personality Disorder as marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and marijuana), known to cause irreparable damage organically, and the manifest worsening of his violent and abusive behavior across time render his impairment grave and irreversible. The chances of curability of respondents psychological disorder were nil. 14. RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal separation of the petitioner and respondent, but not the annulment of their marriage. 15. The Court of Appeals did not take into consideration the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial. Issue: Was the totality of petitioners evidence able to prove that he is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage? Held: NO. Ruling: 1. Republic v. Court of Appeals laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code 2. The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals. 3. As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates conclusion that respondent was psychologically incapacitated w as based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and unreliable. Moreover, the trial court correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable as may be gleaned from Psychol ogist Cristina Gates testimony. 4. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and respondents abandonment of petitioner without justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation. 5. In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunals decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that petitioners motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. 6. True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows: Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed

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as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.

140. Rumbaua v. Rumbaua 2009 - Brion, J.: Facts: 1. The present petition traces its roots to the petitioners (wife) complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage agai nst the respondent (husband) on the ground of psychological incapacity: the respondent (husband) reneged on his promise to live with her under one roof after finding work; he failed to extend financial support to her; he blamed her for his mothers death; he rep resented himself as single in his transactions; and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he was cohabiting with another woman in Novaliches, QC 2. Husband and wife got married (secretly) in Manila in Feb 1993. They never lived together; wife stayed with her sister in Fairview, Quezon City, while husband lived with his parents in Novaliches. (husband refused to live with the her for fear that public knowledge of their marriage would affect his application for a PAL scholarship) 3. In 1994, the parties respective families discovered their secret marriage. To appease his mother, he continued living se parately from the petitioner. Then husband's mom died; he blamed this on his wife; they separated temporarily but got back together; 4. In 1998, wife (from davao- she got a work there) and her mother went to the respondents house in Novaliches and found h im cohabiting with one Cynthia. 5. Wife submitted psychological report of clinical psychologist Dr. Tayag 6. Dr. Tayag's findings on husband: he is revealed to operate in a very self-centered manner as he believes that the world revolves around him. His egocentrism made it so easy for him to deceitfully use others for his own advancement with an extreme air of confidence and dominance. He would do actions without any remorse or guilt feelings towards others especially to that of petitioner. 7. RTC declared their marriage void. CA reversed saying the cause of the psychological incapacity was not alleged; it said: "Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain why she came to the conclusion that the respondents incapacity was deep -seated and incurable. 8. On appeal to SC, Petitioner wife says that Molina should be applied and not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (which is geared towards the relaxation of the OSG certification that Molina required) 9. Wife argues that the RTC decision should be vacated for prematurity, as it was rendered despite the absence of the required OSG certification specified in Molina. According to the petitioner, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which took effect only on March 15, 2003, cannot overturn the requirements of Molina that was promulgated as early as February 13, 1997. Issue: 1. Is there a need for OSG certification as specified in Molina? Held: No 2. Was psychological incapacity established? Held: No Ruling: **1ST ISSUE 1. the OSG certification that Molina required is this: (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. Now, under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC: SEC. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda. 2. The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is procedural or remedial in character; so it retroacts 3. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be applied retroactively to pending matters. 4. what is important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that he be certified to be present.

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From this perspective, the petitioners objection regarding the Molina guideline on certification lacks merit. **2ND ISSUE: 1. Petitioner wife failed to establish the respondents psychological incapacity 2. Santos and Molina guidelines were mentioned again. 3. These standards were not met in this case. a. wifes testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of respondents condition (her evidence merely showed that the respondent: (a) reneged on his promise to cohabit with her; (b) visited her occasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her birthday in 1992, and did not send her greeting cards during special occasions; (d) represented himself as single in his visa application; (e) blamed her for the death of his mother; and (f) told her he was working in Davao when in fact he was cohabiting with another woman in 1997. ) 4. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations that characteriz e some marriages. 5. To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some character flaws. The presence of these imperfections, however, does not necessarily warrant a conclusion that he had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that rendered him incapable of fulfilling his duties and obligations. 6. Dr Tayag's report was biased. Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the wifes narrations, and on this basis charact erized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who believes that the worlds around him etc etc 7. Dr. Tayags subsequent testimony in court did not cure whatever deficiencies attended her psychological report. She failed to establish the fact that at the time the parties were married, husband was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that husbands condition was grave and incurable. 141. Aspillaga vs. Aspillaga 26 Oct 2009 J. Quisumbing Facts: 1. Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977. They became sweethearts and even when Aurora left for Japan to study, they maintained the love. 2. Upon Auroras return in 1980, they got married and begot two children. 3. On 7 Mar 1995, Rodolfo filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora. 4. During trial, Dr. Maaba explained his psychological examination of both parties and recommended that the petition be granted. 5. On 31 May 2000, the RTC found both parties psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage. 6. On 9 Sep 2005, the CA reversed the RTC decision. Issue: Was the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity? Held: No. Ruling: 1. Dr. Maaba failed to reveal that their personality traits or psychological conditions were grave or serious enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. He failed to link the parties psychological dis orders to his conclusion that they are psychologically incapacitated to perform marital obligations. 2. The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper the performance of their marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36. There is no evidence that claimed the incapacity is incurable and permanent. 3. It can be inferred that they were able to faithfully comply with their obligations to each other and to their children. It was only when Rodolfos acts of infidelity were discovered that the marriage started to fail. 4. At the most, the psychiatric evaluation of the parties proved only incompatibility and irreconcilable differences, which cannot be equated with psychological incapacity as understood juristically. 5. In Santos, the Court said that psychological incapacity required by Article 36 must be characterized by: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. 142. Lim vs. Lim Feb 4, 2010 Nachura *psychiatrist not allowed to give psychological tests Facts: 1. Cheryl and Edward got married on December 8, 1979 after only a year of courtship. 2. They lived in Edward's grandparent's home in Forbes Park, where Cheryl and their children were supported by their father's family business. 3. Cheryl caught Edward in a compromising situation with the stay -in caregiver of his grandmother. She filed a complaint of

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concubinage but it was dismissed by the courts. The court granted Cheryl a monthly support requiring Edward or his family to pay regularly. Edward is now filing a case to sever the marital bond by having his marriage nullified. Edward presents into evidence the Psychiatric report of Dr. Villegas, which concluded that BOTH parties were suffering from personality disorders. Issue: Is the psychiatric report good enough evidence to support the nullification of the marriage? Held: No Ruling: 1. The report said that both have Dependent Personality Disorder, which render both of them psychologically incapacitated. 2. The expert opinion of this doctor who arrived at a report due to a 7 hour interview and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual findings. 3. SC wonders why psychology tests were not administered by trained physicians. The reports of which could have been used to establish what was written in her own report. Concept: 1. Psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking or personality gives more weight to a psychiatric evaluation report. (Note: remember, psychiatric reports are not a MUST requirement all the time. They just give more weight to the argument.) 143. Paz vs. Paz February 18, 2010 Carpio Facts: 1. H&W: Jordan and Jeanice 2. Jeanice was only 19 years old while Jordan was 27 years old. 3. had their civil wedding on 3 July 1997, and their church wedding on 21 September 1997. They have one son, 4. On 15 September 1999, Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan . 5. Jeanice alleged that Jordan was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage. by his uncontrollable tendency to be self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his predisposition to become violent and abusive whenever his whims and caprices were not satisfied. Jeanice alleged that Jordan had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts and had the habit of hanging out and spending a great deal of time with his friends. Jordan would allegedly just stay home, tinker with the Play Station , and ask Jeanice to lie to his brothers about his whereabouts. Jeanice further alleged that Jordan was heavily dependent on and attached to his mother. 6. Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted with "Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his impulsive behavior, delinquency and instability ." 7. Jordan said that Jeanice has her own personal insecurities and that her actions showed her lack of maturity, childishness and emotional inability to cope with the struggles and challenges of maintaining a married life. Issue: Whether Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations . Held: No. Ruling: 1. Jeanice Failed to Prove Jordans Psychological Incapacity 2. Gates declared that Jordan was suffering from "Borderline Personality Disorder" as manifested by his being a "mamas boy" and that such was "grave and incurable," "rooted in his family background, [and] antedates the marriage." 3. Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there is nevertheless a need to prove the psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said disorder 4. Court notes that the report and testimony of Gates on Jordans psychological incapacity were based exclusively on her interviews with Jeanice -> hearsay evidence 5. Jeanice failed to show that Jordan was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations and that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of their marriage. Concept: In Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained: (a) Gravity It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) Judicial Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

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(c) Incurability It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 144. Suazo vs. Suazo March 10, 2010 J. Brion Facts: 1. Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met. They were residents of Laguna at that time. The courtship took months. 2. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian. 3. Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelitos parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as household help. Ang elito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels (resulting to physical injuries on Jocelyn) often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts. 4. Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived. They now have children. 5. Ten years after their separation, October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. 6. Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a psychological examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by Jocelyn). 7. The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the trial. 8. In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the alleged incidents of physical beating she received from Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm on these declarations but significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her violently before they were married. 9. Psychologist on cross: Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable? A. Yes, sir. Q. Why did you know? A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the respondent is not aware that this kind of personality affects the other party. 10. Brief History of Angelito by the Psychologist, based on Jocelyns testimony: Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high school, a part time tricycle driver, eldest among 4 siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to be an alcoholic, womanizer and a heavy gambler. While mother is a sales agent. It was a common knowledge within their vicinity that she was also involved in an illicit relationship. Familial relationship was described to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering and squabbles were part and parcel of their day to day living. 11. RTC: She was able to prove that right from the start of her married life, she already suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her. She is a battered wife and she served as a servant in his husbands family. This is because at the time of their marriage, they are still young and were forced only to marry. The petitioner and the respondent had never developed the feeling of love and respect, instead, he blamed her family for said early marriage. The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented. She is entitled to the relief prayed for. 12. CA Ruling: There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof, the married life of the petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this reason be extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a reminder of the inviolability of the marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the family that the law seeks to protect. The concept of psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce. Issue: Is there basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code? Held: NO. Ruling: The Law and the Precedents: Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Santos v. Court of Appeals declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.

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The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina). A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Pesca v. Pesca clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending, under the reasoning that the courts interpretation or construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit." All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that came to us were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines. Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its application. Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying th at its interpretation is consistent with that of the Canon Law. Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, i n Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfil the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. The Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting follows Tes lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting. The SC on the Case: Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos alleged psychological condition. The psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological condition only in an indirect manner she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Unfortunately, we find Jocelyns testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelitos habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she received from him all of which occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with him. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness. 145. Ligeralde v. Patalinghud 2010 - Mendoza, J.:

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Facts: 1. Silvino (petitioner/husband) and May (respondent/wife) got married on October 3, 1984. 2. Husband described wife as immature, irresponsible and carefree. Her infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities, he claimed, characterized their marital relations. 3. Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 oclock in the morning. Her excuse was that she had watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. 4. The couple started a new life. A few months after, however, he realized that their marriage was hopeless. May was back again to her old ways. 5. Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately. 6. The psychologist certified that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable. 7. RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA reversed. Issue: Was evidence presented sufficient to prove psychological incapacity? Held: No Ruling: 1. husbands evidence failed to establish respondent Mays psychological incapacity 2. husband's testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mays condition. Even Dr. Nicdao -Basilio failed to show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. 3. More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not even rise to the level of the psychological incapacity that the law requires. 4. May's act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. 5. Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. 146. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals 30 Oct 1997 J. Torres Jr. Facts: 1. On 3 Jan 1992, Torcuato Reyes executed his last will and testament where he left to his wife Asuncion Reyes: a) All of his shares of their personal properties b) All of his shares consisting of 50% of all the real estates owned by him in common with his brother Jose The will consisted of two pages and was signed in the presence of three witnesses. Julio Vivares was designated as the executor. 2. On 12 May 1992, Reyes died. Thereafter on 21 May 1992, Vivares filed a petition for probate of the will. 3. On 21 Jul 1992, the recognized natural children of Reyes to earlier spouses filed an opposition alleging that Asuncion was never married to and could not marry Torcuato since she was already married to Lupo Ebarle. 4. On 23 Apr 1993, the trial court declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It also ruled that Asuncion Reyes was never married to Torcuato and their relationship was an adulterous one. 5. Julio Vivares then filed an appeal before the CA alleging that the oppositors failed to present any evidence that Asuncion Reyes was legally married to another person. 6. On 29 Nov1995, the CA affirmed the trial courts decision with modification that the provisions leaving properties to Asuncion were valid. It said that the oppositors never showed any competent, documentary or otherwise during the trial to show that Asuncions marriage to Torcuato was inexistent or void. 7. Hence, oppositors filed this petition for review. They raised new allegations that Torcuato and Asuncion were collateral relatives up to the fourth civil degree thereby making it void ab initio as it was against public policy. They also attached a copy of Asuncion and Lupo Ebarles marriage certificate. Issue: Was the invalidity of Torcuatos marriage to Asuncion sufficiently proven? Held: No. Ruling: 1. The trial court relied on uncorroborated testimonial evidence that Asuncion was still married to another. The testimonies were merely hearsay and even uncertain as to the whereabouts of Lupo Ebarle. 2. The testimonies cannot go against the declaration of Torcuato that Asuncion is his wife. A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. 3. The failure to present the marriage certificate before the probate court constituted a waiver and the same evidence can no longer be entertained on appeal.

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As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass upon only the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. The lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity of the will. As a result, the declaration of Torcuato that Asuncion was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings.

147. Ninal vs. Bayadog March 14, 2000 - Ynares Santiago Facts: 1. Pepito was married to Teodulfa (1974). He shot and killed her. (April 24 1985) 2. Pepito married Norma Badayog (respondent) by executing an affidavit dated Dec 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for 5 years and thus exempt from securing a marriage license. 3. Pepito died in a car crash (Feb 19, 1997) 4. Petitioners are the children of Pepito who filed a petition to declare the marriage between Badayog and their father void for lack of a marriage license. 5. Respondent says that the petitioners have no cause of action because they are not among the persons under who could file an action for annulment of marriage. (Art 47 of Fam Code) Issue: Do the petitioners have standing to question the said marriage? Held: (I don't know) [please help] Ruling: 1. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had lapsed. 2. Although they had been living with each other for 5 years, the law provides that those 5 years must be in a nature of perfect union that is valid under the law (without any third party involved, in his case, he was still married, thus the clock only started ticking the moment his first marriage ended). 3. The code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Concept: 1. A marriage, though void, still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party thereto can marry again, otherwise, the second marriage will also be void. 2. Voidable Marriage- can be assailed only during the life time of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. (Thus there is a prescriptive period) 3. Void Marriage- can be questioned even after the death of either party. (Thus there is no prescriptive period) - have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contributions. 148. Enrico vs. Heirs of Sps. Eugelio B. Madenaceli September 28, 2007- Chico Nazario Facts: 1. H&W: Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli 2. Eugelio and Trinidad marred on June 14, 1962. They had 7 children. 3. On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died. 4. On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan. 5. Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away. 6. Respondent, as heirs of Eulogio, filed a declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita on two grounds: a. That the marriage license was lacking b. Lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness 7. petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. 8. More importantly, she asserted that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides: Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. 9. (a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. 10. The heirs invoked that the ruling in the case of Ninal vs. Bayadog which was on the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. Issue: (1) Whether or not the marriage between Eulogio and Enrico is exempted from securing marriage license (2) Whether or not the heirs can assail the validity of the marriage. Held: Petition Granted.

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Ruling: 1. We cannot, however, apply Ninal ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 2. What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004. 3. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. 4. There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. 5. Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo 149. Carlos vs. Sandoval December 16, 2008 J. R.T. Reyes Facts: 1. Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. 2. During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. 3. Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. 4. Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of Juan. 5. In 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, son of Teofilo with another woman. Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. 6. In 1994, petitioner Juan instituted a suit against respondents. The parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement, of which the parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land. 7. Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land. 8. In the same year, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first parcel between them. 9. In August 1995, Juan filed a complaint. Aside from seeking the avoidance of contracts he entered with Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties, he asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II. 10. The respondents denied the material averments of petitioners complaint. They contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman. 11. But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents. 12. Juan opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. He also lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II. 13. RTC: Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license; Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos; Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of a parcel of land 14. CA reversed. Issue: Can a marriage be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial? Held: NO. Ruling: 1. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed. With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of

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nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle is found in Section 17. Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan. In that case, we excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments. 2. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. But this does not mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license. It is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy. Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate in pursuit of NCC 1001 and 1003. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives. Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio , petitioner succeeds to the entire estate. 150. Marietta Ancheta v. Rodolfo Ancheta 2004 - CALLEJO, SR., J.: Facts: 1. Wife (Marietta) and husband (Rodolfo) got married March 5, 1959 2. in 1992 husband left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their children. 3. in 1994 petitioner Marietta filed a petition for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property 4. Rodolfo intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity 5. Although Rodolfo knew where Marietta was residing, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition a different address "where she may be served with summons." The clerk of court issued summons to the petitioner at the address stated in the petition. 6. Sheriff submitted a Return of Service to the court stating that the summons and a copy of the petition were served on the Marietta through her son 7. Marietta "failed" answer. RTC declared marriage null and void. 8. On February 14, 1998, Valentines Day, Rodolfo and Teresita H. Rodil were married 9. Marietta filed a petition opposing RTC's jugment; she was attacking Rodolfo's misrepresentations; she said that husband did it to

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112 deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case, and ultimately secure a favorable judgment without any opposition; She further contended that there was no factual basis for the trial courts finding that she was suffering from psychological incapacity. Issue: Was the RTC Decision valid? Held: No Ruling: 1. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads: Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. 2. The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides: Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. 3. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State: (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. 4. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.

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151. Salmingo vs. Rubica 9 Jul 2007 J. Carpio-Morales Facts: 1. On 9 Jan 2003, Atty. Rodney Rubica filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Liza Jane Estao. Summons was served by publication in the Visayan Post, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in Negros Occidental, since Liza was not found at her given address. 2. On 23 May 2003, the trial court declared the marriage null and void as the evidence showed that Liza had a previous valid and existing marriage. 3. On 27 Sep 2004, Ignacio Salmingo filed a disbarment case against Atty. Rubica. He alleged that Atty. Rubica deliberately concealed Lizas address so that summons may not be served and that Atty. Rubica failed to follow the procedural requirements in the declaration of nullity case i.e. to serve copies of the petition on the OSG or the City or Provincial Prosecutor. 4. The Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation. The IBP investigating commissioner recommended that Atty. Rubica be suspended for three months for gross misconduct. 5. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to dismiss the case for lack of sufficient evidence. Issue: Should the declaration of nullity of marriage be reversed due to the failure of the City Prosecutor to participate? Held: No. Ruling: 1. The requirement that the trial court order the prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists is addressed to the court, not to the parties to the case nor to their counsel. Atty. Rubica cannot be faulted therefor. 2. The requirements in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages took effect only on 15 Mar 2003 after Atty. Rubica filed the case on 9 Jan 2003. 3. At the time of his petition, what applied was the Rules of Court. Atty. Rubica complied with the procedure in the Rules of Court. He was not required to serve copies of the petition to the OSG. 4. Salmingo was not even a real party in interest to the case. By law, it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal or the Solicitor General who represents the interest of the State in proceedings for the annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage.

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For lack of evidence, the Court upheld the decision of the IBP Board of Governors and dismissed the case.

152. Jocson vs. Robles February 10, 1968 - Reyes J.B.L. Facts: 1. Ricardo Reyes was married to Josefina Fausto (his first wife) on May 27, 1958. 2. Gloria G Jocson (his second wife) is the current petitioner filing a case of bigamy against Robles. 3. Robles assails the validity of his marriage with Jocson on the grounds that he was compelled to marry her because of threat and intimidation from her parents, even if they knew he was a married man. 4. The lower court denied the plea Robles' plea of force and intimidation because the court found indications of collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the nullification of their marriage. Issue: 1. Did the CA make a mistake in denying the motion for summary judgment? Held: No 2. Did Robles file his appeal notice within the reglamentary period? Held: No Ruling: 1. There is no indication or certification or proof that the filing of the appeal notice, bond and record on appeal were made within the reglamentary period as required by the rules of court. 2. The record on appeal must contain the full names of all the parties to the proceedings, as well as the pleadings, petitions, motions, and orders related to the order or judgment subject of the appeal and which are necessary for the proper understanding of the issue, [AND] such date as will show that the appeal was perfected on time. 3. Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in view of Articles 88 and 1011 of the Civil Code of the Philippines that expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the civil code. 153. Tolentino vs. Villanueva March 15, 1974 - MAKASIAR Facts: 1. H&W: Romulo Tolentino and Helen Villanueva 2. On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to private respondent Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent was obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he discovered that private respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as husband and wife as immediately after the marriage celebration, 3. Helen Villanueva left his house and her whereabouts remained unknown to him until January, 1962 when he discovered that she is residing in San Francisco, Cebu. 4. Helen failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the presentation of his evidence. 5. In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private respondent in default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation to determine whether collusion exists between the parties 6. Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case of nonappearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff. Issue: Can the petition to annul the marriage prosper? Held: No. Investigation by fiscal is a prerequisite to annulment of marriage where defendant has defaulted. Ruling: - The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds 154. Salcedo-Ortanez vs. CA

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August 4, 1994 J. Padilla Facts: 1. On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. 2. Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between Petitioner Teresita and unidentified persons. The trial court admitted all of the evidence. 3. When motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied, she then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals assailing the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes. However, this was dismissed since 1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se, and 2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. Issue: Is the remedy of certiorari properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals? Held: NO. Ruling: 1. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress. 2. In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wiretap his home telephone. 3. Respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the provisions of the law in RA 4200 in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under the RA. Chan-Tan vs. Tan February 25, 2010 Carpio Facts: 1. In 2001, twelve years after their marriage, Susie Chan-Tan petitioned her marriage with Jesse Tan to be annulled for mutual psychological incapacity and submitted a compromise agreement in court. 2. On July 2003, the court issued a partial judgment on the compromise agreement and in March 2004, the court declared their marriage void incorporating the compromise agreement on custody, support, visitation and property relations. 3. Susie then after brought her children with her abroad without the consent of the party and the trial court. Also she did not purchase the land specified in the agreement and authorized Megaworld Corp. to sell it. 4. Upon Jesse Tans petition the trial court issued a resolution dated March 2004 awarding him the custody of the children and ordering Susie to return titles and documents to his name, as well as allowing him to stay in their family dwelling. 5. Susie appeal was denied by the court in October 2004, as they are unconvinced and as it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. It also declared her in contempt for non-compliance and denied her prayer for increase in monthly support. 6. She then filed a motion for reconsideration and motion to dismiss the October resolution and to vacate all prior ruling putting parties in status quo ante the filing of suit. 7. On December 2004 this was both denied as the resolutions have become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period. 8. Undeterred she filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the court. The court then issued a Certificate of Finality. Issue: Does the March and May resolutions attain finality despite the alleged denial of due process? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. The issue her has been settled in the case Tuason v. CA, wherein court the decided the case based only on the one side presenting evidence as the husband who have failed to attend prior hearings is deemed to have waived his right to present evidence. 2. She also could not claim that she was denied due process as the records show that her attorney and her wife tried to contact her to no avail proved her disinterest of the proceedings. 3. Section 7 on the Rules on Nullity of Marriage only applies to the respondent and not the petitioner to enable the respondent to ventilate all possible answers. Therefore Susies petition that it is against the preservation of family is without basis. 4. Rule 17, section 1 of the rules of court is suppletory to the Rule on Nullity of Marriage as it allows dismissal of an action upon

115 notice of the plaintiff. Her filing on November 2004 could not be accepted as it is beyond the 15-day reglementary period. The March and May resolution may no longer be disturbed. A judgment that is final and executory is immutable and unalterable based on public policy and sound practice that a decision must be final at some date fixed by law. Concept: Rule on Nullity of Marriage SEC. 7. Motion to dismiss. No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as anaffirmative defense in an answer. (Emphasis supplied)

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Rule 17 Rules of Court Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff . A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment . Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. x xx Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff . Except as provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper .x x x (Emphasis supplied) 155. Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 1986 Paras, J.: Facts: 1. 1978 Wiegel couple got married 2. respondent Karl Wiegel (petitioner) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with wife Lilia Wiegel, on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, in 1972 3. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. 4. She wanted for the Court to allow her to present evidence to prove that her marriage to Eduardo was really void Issue: 1. Was Lilias prior marriage to Eduardo valid? 2. Was Lilias subsequent marriage to Karl void or was it merely voidable Held: 1. VOID bec no annulment yet; regardless of whether it was void or voidable, since she hasnt secured judicial declaration yet, its VALID 2. VOID when she married Karl, her valid marriage to Eduardo was still subsisting Ruling: 1. There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. 2. Such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel 3. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID 4. accordingly, the marriage of the Wiegel couple would be regarded VOID under the law. 156. Terre vs. Terre 3 Jul 1992 Per Curiam *lawyer evading service of summons and disbarred for grossly immoral conduct Facts: 1. Dorothy was previously married to her first cousin, Merlito Bercenilla. Upon advice of Jordan that her first marriage was null and void ab initio, she agreed to marry him. 2. In their marriage license, Jordan placed Dorothys status as single despite her objections. 3. On 14 Jun 1977, Dorothy Terre married Jordan Terre and had a son. She supported him while he was still studying law at Lyceum. In 1981, Jordan disappeared. 4. On 3 May 1981, Jordan married Vilma Malicdem . 5. Thereafter, Dorothy filed cases against Jordan for abandonment of minor and bigamy. She also filed an administrative case against Jordan with the Commission on Audit but was considered closed for being moot because of Jordans separation from the service for having gone on absence without official leave.

116 6. On 24 Dec 1981, Dorothy filed this disbarment case for gross immoral conduct. He successfully evaded five attempts to serve a copy of the Courts resolution requiring him to comment. 7. After three years and a half, the Supreme Court decided to suspend him indefinitely until he appears or files his answer. 8. On 28 Sep 1985, he filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside the Suspension Order. He claimed that he believed in good faith that his prior marriage with Dorothy was void ab initio and that no action for judicial declaration of nullity was necessary. 9. The Court denied the motion on 6 Jan 1986. Solicitor Pio Guerrero was then appointed as investigator and on 26 Feb 1990, submitted his report. Issue: Was Jordans marriage to Vilma bigamous? Held: Yes. Jordan was disbarred. Ruling: 1. Jordans marriage with Dorothy was still subsisting when he married Vilma . No judicial action had been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of the marriage. 2. His defense that he believed in good faith that his marriage with Dorothy was void ab initio and that no judicial action was necessary was spurious. The defense was the same argument he used to Dorothy. 3. Being a lawyer, he should have known that the argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of the Court that in order to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio was essential . 4. The moral character of Jordan was deeply flawed as shown by the other circumstances. He convinced Dorothy that her previous marriage was void, abandoning his son upon passing finishing his law course after being supported by Dorothy. 5. The Court held that Jordan eloquently displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the process and responsibility of his gender. His acts constituted grossly immoral conduct and he was thus disbarred.

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157. Domingo vs. CA Facts: 4. Petitioner and Respondent were married on Nov 29, 1976 5. Respondent was already married to Emerlinda on April, 1969. This marriage was still valid and existing. 6. Emerlinda sued Respondent for bigamy, thats when respondent found out about the marriage. 7. Respondent filed a declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property against petitioner (May, 1991.) 8. Respondent had been working in Saudi Arabia and when she came back in June 1989, she discovered that Petitioner was living with another woman and that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her consent. 9. She appointed her brother as Atty-in-Fact to take care of her property, but petitioner refused to turn over the possession and admin of said property to the brother. 10. Petitioner submits that the marriage is void ab initio, thus the petition for nullity is unnecessary. He added that respondent has no property which is in his possession. 11. Respondent insists that there is a necessity for a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage but to provide a basis for separation and distribution of property. Issue: Whether nor not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary and if so, should it be filed only for purposes of remarriage? Held: Yes and Yes Ruling: 13. No question that their marriage is bigamous and void from the beginning because of his prior marriage that existed with Emerlina. 14. When a marriage is void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation, partiti on and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. 15. Petitioner's assertion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be started is baseless. 158. Carino vs. Carino February 2, 2001- Ynares-Santiago * 2 Susans of Santiago fighting over the death benefits of the deceased police Facts: 1. Santiago S. Cario (1) Susan Nicdao - on June 20, 1969; two offsprings; (2) Susan Yee - on November 10, 1992; no children; almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982 2. SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis 3. He passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses 4. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from

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various government agencies Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against Susan Nicdao to return to her at least one-half of P146,000.00 collectively denominated as death benefits Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the s ubsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. 7. she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased 8. Yee contended that the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license a. the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number b. a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads Issue: Can Susan Yee have the half on the death benefit? Held: No. Ruling: I. Validity of the First Marriage (Nicdao) - VOID - In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. - A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. - the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license II. Validity of Second Marriage (Yee) - VOID Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Property Regime One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage. In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the coownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime A. Yee Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage thenpresumed to be valid (Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order. The disputed P146,000.00 from AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc., NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits . Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them. B. Nicdao As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. In contrast to Article 148, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto

III. -

118 even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs

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159. Bobis vs. Bobis 31 July 2000 J. Ynares-Santiago *He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Facts: 1. IsaganiBobis married: 1985 1st Maria Dulce Javier 1996 2nd - Imelda Marbella-Bobis (1st not yet nullified/annulled/terminated) 1998 3rd Julia Sally Hernandez 2. Based on Imeldas complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy case filed against Isagani in 1998. 3. Sometime after, he Isagani initiated a civil action for the declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage (GROUND: lack of marriage license). 4. He then filed a motion to suspend the bigamy case proceeding invoking the pending civil case, of which it was granted. 5. This is now Imeldas petition for review on certiorari after her motion for reconsideration was denied. Issue: Can the bigamy case be suspended? Held: NO Ruling: 1. FC 40, which was effective at the time of celebration of the 2nd marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of marriage before a party may remarry. It is not for the parties to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. 2. Bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided that all elements concur: previous marriage and subsequent marriage which st would have been valid if not been for the existence at the material time of the 1 marriage. 3. Isaganis intent is clearly to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and then to invoke the very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. 4. Otherwise, all that needs to be done is to disregard FC 40, contract a subsequent marriage and escape bigamy by claiming that the first is void and the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first . 5. Not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain suspension of the criminal action. 160. Garrido v. Garrido 2010 Per curiam: Facts: 1. MaelotiseaGarrido (Maelitosea) filed a complaint for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. RomanaP.Valencia (Atty. Romana) 2. Maelotisea contended she and Atty. Garrido were married in 1962 3. Then it was in 1990 when she found out that her husband Atty. Garrido was having an affair with another woman, even another child; she went to NSO and was able to secure Birth Cert of the child which stated that Atty. Garrido and Atty. Romana were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978. 4. Atty. Garrido in his defense alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constanciawhen he married Maelotisea. 5. Atty. Garrido said that the third marriage (with Atty. Romana) was contracted after the death of Constanciain Dec 1977. 6. Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. 7. Atty. Valencia also claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. 8. Then suddenly Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, (but this wasnt appreciated by the Court-they still went on to decide the case on the gross misconduct of those 2 lawyers) Issue: Whats the effect of the decree on declaration of nullity Atty. Garrido obtained AFTER marrying Maelotisea? Held: It made him liable for bigamybec he married Maelotisea WITHOUT (yet) the judicial declaration of nullity , thus his marriage to Constancia was still subsisting when me married Maelotisea

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Ruling: 1. Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years. 2. Then Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. This was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed against him. 3. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. 161. Complaint of Mrs. Corazon Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico 15 Mar 2010 Per Curiam *Supreme Court employees found immoral for bigamous marriages Facts: 1. On 17 Feb 1987, Noel Serafico married Rosemarie Jimeno. 2. On 20 Feb 1991, Amelia Serafico married Marc Michael A. Nacianceno. 3. With their previous marriages still subsisting, Noel and Amelia married each other on 3 Feb 1994. 4. On 20 Dec 1996, Amelia a judicial declaration of nullity of her first marriage in Paraaque City RTC. 5. In Jan 2006, Corazon Salvador met Amelia and Noel, both employees of the Supreme Court. They became close business partners. 6. After several botched business deals, Corazon filed a complaint against the Spouses on 20 Aug 2008 charging them with immorality and violation of the Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. She admitted though that the complaints were retaliatory; the Spouses having filed harassment and unsubstantiated cases against her. 7. For her defense, Amelia claimed that she did not know that Noel was previously married. On his part, Noel asserted that his first marriage was null and void ab initio. 8. On 17 Mar 2009, a RTC declared the first marriage of Noel null and void ab initio. 9. On 3 Aug 2009, Amelia resigned from the Supreme Court. 10. Upon investigation, the OAS-SC found them guilty of immorality when they got married in 1994 both with subsisting previous marriages. It recommended dismissal for Noel and forfeiture of all the benefits of Amelia. Issue: Was the marriage of Noel and Amelia bigamous thereby making them liable for immorality? Held: Yes. For their immoral conduct, they were liable for a six-month suspension. Ruling: 1. Both parties were not capacitated to marry each other in 1994. 2. The Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. 3. While the trial court is the proper forum to rule their subsequent marriage as bigamous, Noel and Amelia are nonetheless liable for immorality by the mere fact of living together and contracting a subsequent marriage before their respective first marriages were judicially dissolved. 4. Noel and Amelia made a mockery of marriage, which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. Their act of contracting a second marriage while their respective first marriages were still in place is contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and morality. 5. Absent a finding of criminal liability for bigamy, the Court cannot rule that their subsequent marriage and co-habitation is grossly immoral. But for marrying each other despite their subsisting prior marriages, Noel and Amelia acted reprehensibly and are guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct. They are, thus, liable to suspension for at least six months.

6.

Eventually finding the Spouses guilty of the other charges, Noel was dismissed from the service while Amelias benefits were forfeited. Both were barred from reemployment in government service. Concept: Immoral conduct is conduct that is "willful, flagrant or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." What is grossly immoral must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

162. Valdes v. QC-RTC

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Facts: 1. Consuelo and Antonio were married on Jan 1971 and had 5 children. 2. Antonio sought the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity and RTC granted it. 3. Consuelo was then ordered to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art. 147 of the Fam code and comply with Art 50, 51, and 52. 4. Consuelo asserted that the Fam Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage, and questions Articles 50, 51, and 52. 5. Antonio submits that the Articles above are controlling. Issue: Do Art 147 and Art 148 of the family code apply to the case at hand? Held: Yes Ruling: 9. Antonio and Consuelo own equal shares in the family home as well as in concluding that in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil code, not Articles 50, 51, and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code should prevail. 10. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. 163. Albano Sales vs. Sales July 13, 2009- Quisumbing * Wife sold houses of his husband, rents collected without proper accounting Facts: 1. Present controversy stemmed from Civil Case No. Q-94-19236 filed by Marywin Albano Salesagainst her husband, Mayor Reynolan T. Sales, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and separation of properties , and Civil Case No. Q-97-32303 filed by Mayor Reynolan T. Sales for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. 2. On June 16, 2003, after the decision became final, Marywin filed a motion for execution and a manifestation listing her assets with Reynolan for the purpose of having them partitioned . 3. Reynolan opposed the motion arguing that the RTC Decision had ordered the distribution of their common properties without specifying what they were. He also claimed that Marywin has no share in the properties she specified because said properties were the fruits solely of his industry. 4. He added that their property relations should not be governed by the rules of co-ownership because they did not live together as husband and wife. 5. He also alleged that Marywin appropriated the rentals of his properties and even disposed one of them without his consent , in violation of Article 1477 of the Family Code. 6. Marywin opposed Reynolans motion and argued that the issues of alleged fraudulent sale and non-accounting of rentals were already waived by Reynolan when he failed to set them up as compulsory counterclaims in the case. RTC: On April 12, 2004, the RTC denied Reynolans motion for reconsideration. It ruled that reception of evidence is no longer necessary because the parties were legally married prior to its nullification and the fact that they begot a son whom they raised together proved that their connubial relations were more than merely transient. CA: Favored Reynolan. The Court of Appeals held that the RTCs recall of its previous order for further reception of e vidence deprives and violates Reynolans constitutional right to property. While the RTC is not prohibited from setting aside an interlocutory order, the Court of Appeals said that due process must still be observed. Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err when it entertained respondents appeal from an order granting the issuance of a writ of execution? Held: We reject petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred Ruling: 1. what is being questioned by respondent was not really the January 4, 2000 Decision of the RTC declaring their marriage void ab initio on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity, but the Orders of the trial courtdividing their common properties in accordance with the proposed project of partition without the benefit of a hearing. 2. genuine concern that had to be addressed prior to the dissolution of the property relations of the parties as a result of the

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declaration of nullity of their marriage Allegations regarding the collection of rentals without proper accounting , sale of common properties without the husbands consent and misappropriation of the proceeds thereof, are factual issues which have to be addressed in order to determine with certainty the fair and reasonable division and distribution of properties due to each party.

164. Buenaventura vs. CA 31 March 2005 J. Azcuna RTC: July 31, 1995 1. Marriage between plaintiff Noel and defendant Isabel on July 4, 1979 is null and void ab initio on pysch incapacity of both 2. Pay defendant moral damages, P2.5M and exemplary damages, P1M with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus attorney's fees ofP100,000.00; 3. Pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs; 4. liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership: plaintiff's separation /retirement benefits from the Far East Bank and Trust Company, paying to her 50% of it or P1, 837,667.89 with 12% interest per annum

CA (it was Noel who filed psych inc of his wife, but they were both declared; she alleged that in truth, he was only pressured by his parents to marry) Certiorari ground; alleged: without any legal and moral basis

Both incapacitated, marriage null, properties divided SC The CA and the trial court considered the acts of Noel after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and so a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. (FC36) Approved: Since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis that he purposely deceived her. If the she was deceived, it was not due to a wilful act on Noels part. Approved: Since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis. Since the properties ordered to be distributed were found to have been acquired during their marriage, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties ordered by the court a quo should, should be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

Certiorari ground; alleged: without factual and legal basis

Certiorari ground; alleged: acquired before his marriage Certiorari ground; alleged: acquired before his marriage

and one-half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies; 5. Regular support to his increasing the support pendente Moot: 25 years old son Javy, P15,000.00 lite to P20,000; Motion for monthly, subject to reconsideration denied modification 6. custody of the minor Certiorari ground; child already 13 Moot: 25 years old Javy to his mother years old 7. Revert back her maiden family name Singh Concept: When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings.

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165. Yasin v. The Honorable Judge Shari'a District Court 1995 Bidin, J.: Facts: 1. Yasin alleged that shes a divorcee. They were granted a divorce decree March 1984. 2. She claims that the petition she filed (use of maiden name) is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolutionof her marriageby divorce under the Code of Muslim Issue: Whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of name? Held: NO, Rules of Court shouldnt apply, but NCC Ruling: 1. Petitioner does not seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage 2. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. 3. The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register 4. Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. 370, Civil Code), after annulment of the marriage (Art. 371, Civil Code) and after the death of the husband (Art. 373, Civil Code) is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code). 5. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). 6. Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory 7. Shes not even required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it. 8. Onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname. Concept: Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 370. A married woman may use: (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs." Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless: (1) The court decrees otherwise, or (2) She or the former husband is married again to another person. 166. Bar Matter No. 1625 Petition to Use Maiden Name in Petition to Take the 2006 Bar Examinations, JOSEPHINE P. UY-TIMOSA 18 Jul 2006 Per Curiam *women allowed to use their maiden name even upon marriage Facts: 1. Josephine Uy got married but has continuously used her maiden name in all her transactions except in her school records. However, her records in UST show her maiden name. 2. In May 2000, she and her husband got separated. A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage has since been instituted and is about to be submitted for decision on 1 Aug 2006. 3. On 14 Jun 2006, she wrote a letter requesting that she be allowed to use her maiden name in the 2006 Bar Examinations. Issue: Can Josephine use her maiden name in the 2006 Bar Exam? Held: Yes. Ruling: 1. Marriage does not change a woman's name, it merely changes her civil status. Her true and real name is that given to her and entered in the Civil Registry which she may continue to use despite her marriage or cessation of marriage for whatever reason

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she may have. Article 370 of the Civil Code indicates that the wife's use of her husband's surname is optional, not obligatory . According to Tolentino, may as used in the Code is permissive. We have no law that requires the woman to adopt the surname of her husband upon marriage. The same argument was used by the Court in Yasin v. Judge, Shari'a District Court. In her concurring opinion, Justice Romero said that Article 2 section 14 of the Constitution signifies that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights accorded by law and this includes the freedom of choice in the use of names upon marriage.

167. Remo vs. DFA Facts: 1. Petitioner wishes to renew her passport but change her name on it from her married name to her former name (or maiden name). 2. The Sec. Foreign Affairs denied the change of name because of RA 8239, which sets clear standards as to when one is allowed to change his or her name in a passport. 3. Petitioner on the other hand cites the Civil Code provision of Article 370 and the case of Yasin vs. Honorable judge Sahri' a District Court. Issue: Should petitioner have the right to change her name for a RENEWAL of passport? Held: No Ruling: 5. RA 8239 is controlling in this area because it is acts as a special law, while the civil code is general. 6. The two laws are not in conflict however because petitioner is not compelled to utilize her married name (as stated in the civil code) when she first applies for a passport. She could have used her maiden name when she FIRST applied. 7. Once she acquires a passport however, she can no longer change the name UNLESS the ff exist: a. death of husband b. divorce c. annulment d. nullity of marriage Or simply when her marriage no longer exists. As her marriage was subsisting at the time of the petition, she does not meet any of the requirements stated under RA 8239. Yasin case is different because it involves the resumption of a maiden name in the view of a marriage that was already dissolved.

2. 3.

168. ISABELITA SEVILLA CASTRO, petitioner, vs. LAMBERTO RAMOS CASTRO respondents January 28, 2008- Azcuna *Respondent died, the effect of which to the judgment Facts: 1. A petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was filed by private respondent Lamberto R. Castro against petitioner Isabelita S. Castro on July 1, 1998. 2. Summons, along with a copy of the petition for annulment, was allegedly received by petitioners nephew on her behalf at her residence 3. Petitioner failed to answer. 4. For failure of petitioner to appear and to file any responsive pleading to contest the petition, the trial court allowed private respondent to present his evidenceex parte in the presence of the state prosecutor. 5. Lamberto alleged that their relationship did not last because petitioner was irresponsible, violent, and had failed to show love and affection towards him and their children, and had an illicit affair with the family driver which prompted him (private respondent) to file an adultery case against her. He added that petitioner had neurotic and psychotic tendencies, and was always mad at him for no apparent reason. 6. RegineMarmee C. Cosico, a clinical psychologist, was presented to testify on petitioners psychological incapacity based on the psychological tests 7. According to her, the tests revealed that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated 8. RTC - declared ANNULLED 9. On September 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside/Declare Judgment Null and Void a. on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person for failure to serve summons and a copy of

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b. c. d. the petition. sheriffs return was invalid because she had no nephew res iding with her no earnest effort was shown by the sheriff to serve the summons real reason for filing the petition for annulment was so that he can marry his concubine.

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NOTE: Private respondents death on January 14, 2004 SC - Petitioner argues as follows: 1. no valid service of summons 2. trial court that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity is devoid of merit 3. trial court erred in not setting the case for pre-trial and trial which is a mandatory requirement under Section 2, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. rendered a decision without any evidence presented by petitioner 4. the notice of appeal filed by petitioner on July 19, 1999 was an appeal from the Order dated July 1, 1999, which was an interlocutory order Issue: Held: The petition fails Ruling: 1. Court finds no reason to set aside the findings of the trial court 2. The records show that petitioner was personally informed of the petitionfor annulment , and as stated by the trial court, petitioner received the summons and the petition on July 15, 1998. She "acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing her signature on the original copy of said summons dated July 13, 1998 3. Petitioner was afforded due process and the trial court acquired jurisdiction over her person 4. Even assuming that petitioner did not receive the summons, she was deemed to have submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when she filed a motion to set aside/declare judgment null and void 5. Finally, the trial courts decision had already become final and executory, and judgment was entered on October 29, 1999. 6. For this reason and on account of private respondents death on January 14, 2004 , the judgment is binding on both parties Concept: - In connection to our topic: Section 24 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage and Annulment of Voidable Marriage provides that if the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the judgment shall be binding upon the parties and their successors in the interest in the settlement of the estate in the regular court. 169. Buccat vs. Buccat April 25, 1941 M. Horrilleno Facts: 9. Marriage to Luida: November 26, 1938, Baguio City (met in March of the same year, committed in September) 10. After living martially, she abandoned him and did not return with her marital life. 11. She moved to annul her marriage. Ground: She assured him that she was still a virgin. (She was already pregnant) 12. He failed to appear, despite having been duly summoned. Therefore, she was allowed to present evidence. However, the lower court did not rule on her favor. Issue: Is this concealment of her pregnancy a ground for annulment? Held: No. Ruling: 1. If, at the time of the marriage, the groom was aware (or could have been aware) of the brides pregnancy, there can be no fraud. 2. Her allegation that he had not even suspected her condition was unlikely as it is proven that she was already in her highlyadvanced stage of pregnancy. Marriage is a most sacred institution. It is the foundation on which society rests. Clear and irrefutable evidence is necessary to cancel it. In this case, there was none.

3.

170: Aquino vs. Delizo July 27, 1960 Gutierrez-David Facts:

125 1. Fernando Aquino and Conchita Delizo married on December 1954. Unknown to the husband, his wife was already pregnant and gave birth four months after on April 1955. 2. This child he alleged is by another man hence he filed a case to annul their marriage but because the defendant failed to show up, due to lack of evidence to prove that the child was born w/in 180 days of marriage and that concealment of pregnancy is not a ground for annulment the petition was denied. 3. He appealed asking for presentation of additional evidence which was denied but the court but was granted by the CA which held that it was an excusable negligence not to have obtained and presented the evidence in the trial court but nonetheless denied the petition because it was impossible for the husband to not have noticed his wife being pregnant for 4 months when they married. 4. Upon another motion for reconsideration and presentation of more evidences including testimony and documentary evidence (birth cert. and pics) and despite fiscal and defendant failing to file an answer, the petition was still denied as the court did not believe the veracity of the evidences. Thus the petition for certiorari. Issues: Can the marriage be annulled because of the wife concealing her pregnancy? Held: Yes. Concealment of a wife constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment under the Civil Code. Ruling: 1. The ruling in Bucat v Bucat couldnt be applied because the concealed pregnancy is already in its later stages (past 7 mos.). While in this case it is only around 4 months and the defendant was naturally plump/fat. 2. According to medical authorities pregnancy up to the 5th month is still below the umbilicus and is therefore hardly noticeable . As even physician and surgeons even with the womans aid could only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy at 33% at 4 months and 50% at 5 months. 3. The court believes that justice can be best served with a new trial given the new evidences presented which was sufficient allegation that there was fraud and that collusion should not be taken against the husband for the failure of the wife to answer since there was the provincial fiscal who represented the Govt.

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171. Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo 27 Feb 2004 Per Curiam Facts: Florence and Edmund got married in 1991 while Edmund was still married to Helen Esparza. Florence knew about it all along but she claimed that Edmund made her believe that the first marriage was null and void. In 2000, Florence filed a complaint for disbarment against Edmund for his alleged deception and abandonment. She even included in the complaint that Edmund was already in fact married to another woman named Josephine Constantino. Edmund was not able to respond right away because efforts to serve him notice of the complaint proved futile. When he did get to reply, he claimed that: first, that the deception was not by him but actually by Florence who dragged him into a sham marriage to save her from embarrassment (she was pregnant that time); and second, that the marriage to Helen was already declared null and void by a decision made in 1998. He further claimed that Florence employed fraud, deceit, force, and intimidation in order to have him agree to their marriage. A few other efforts were made by Edmund to show that he was not a bad boy; he showed proof that the marriage with Florence was indeed a sham one because it was made despite a legal impediment, and proof that he did not abandon his family with Florence. He finally argued that the disbarment case was improper because his annulment to Florence would amount to res judicata. Issue: (1) Was the marriage voidable for employment of fraud? (2) If it is, would it bar the administrative case based on res judicata? Held: DISBARRED. Ruling: (1) No. The marriage was shown not to be voidable for fraud because Edmund was obviously not deprived of his intelligent and willful consent to the marriage. The kind of intimidation and force he claimed in his testimony to have been used by Florence did not amount to the kind of force that would constitute fraud. The fact that he sired two children meant that the intimidation wa s not really intimidating. The pictures of their family having a good time further proved the fact that he was in it for real. (2) No. Even if it was voidable for fraud, it would still not amount to res judicata because disbarment procedures are a class of their own. They are sui generis and as long it can be proven that he did something to deserve disbarment, it doesnt matter if the case would be res judicata or not. He was a very bad boy and he deserves to get disbarred . 172. Emilio TUASON v. CA, Ma. Victoria Tuason 1996 Puno, J.:

*the usual boring case, begging for prosec officers intervention.

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Facts: 1. Victoria filed for declaration of nullity with her marriage to Emilio and powers of administration of their conjugal properties. Emilio filed for opposition. 2. Proceedings started. Emilio failed to attend hearings and appealed during the reglementary period. 3. RTC rendered judgment in favor or Victoria. Emilio opposed this and filed for relief from judgment. Denied. 4. Emilios another defense, citing Family Code (art 48), is that when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his non-appearance and not declare him in default. Issue: Can the Court entertain Manuels petition for relief from judgment? Held: No more. RTCs ruling has become final and thus binding on the SC. Ruling: 1. Manuel wasnt declared in default in the first place, because he actively participated in the proceedings. Hed answer Victorias complaints. 2. His insisting on the intervening of the prosecuting officer is weak because the function of the latter is to make sure that no collusion exists. Manuels vehemently opposing Victorias petition shows that theres no collusion. 3. Its his same act which dispensed with the need for prosec officers presence. And this absence is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings. 173. Lukban vs. RP 29 Feb 1956 J. Bautista Angelo *judicial declaration of presumptive death not necessary before FC Facts: 1. Husband: Francisco Chuidian and Wife: Lourdes Lukban were married: 10 Dec 1933 2. On 27 Dec 1933, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and has never been heard since. 3. After twenty years, Lourdes believes he is already dead and she wants to remarry. 4. She filed a petition for a declaration that Francisco Chuidian is presumptively dead. 5. OSG opposed the petition on the ground that no law allows it. CFI sustained the opposition. Issue: Can a declaration of presumptive death be issued against Francisco? Held: No. No law allows such. Ruling: 1. A petition for judicial declaration that Francisco is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law (Nicolai Szartraw decision). 2. A judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. 3. For purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee . The law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage (Jones vs. Hortiguela). 4. The proper proceedings used in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code [bigamy] refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person, not this petition. 174. Gue vs. Republic March 24, 1960--- Montemayor Facts: 4. Angelina was married to William on Oct 11, 1944 and had a kid (Anthony) 5. William left Manila to go to Shanghai, China on Jan 5, 1946. 6. He has not been heard of since then and that despite her best efforts to find him he has not been found. (she went to the Bureau of Immigration daw and they weren't able to help either) 7. She now asks the court for a declaration of presumption of death pursuant to Art. 390 of the Civil Code. Issue: Does petitioner have to file a case of presumptive death for her husband? Held: No. Ruling: 8. This declaration would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. NOTE it is a presumption juristantum only, subject to contrary proof cannot reach the state of finality or become fi nal. 9. A presumption of death cannot become final and executor even after the lapse of the reglementary period. 10. This petition is thus unnecessary.

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175. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, vs TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON March 24, 2006- Carpio-Morales *Quarrel over the SSS death benefit of a man with three wives Facts: 1. Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage. 2. More than 15 years later, a Petition for his wifes (Alice) Declaration of Presumptive Death has been filed before the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, which has been granted. 3. Bailon, subsequently, contracted marriage with respondent Teresita Jarque and designated her the Social Security System (SSS) beneficiary of the former. 4. Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System and a retiree pensioner thereof, died. 5. Respondent filed a claim for funeral benefits. 6. Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. 7. Cecilia claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive 8. SSS cancelled the claim of respondent Teresita Jarque of her monthly pension for death benefits on the basis of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted during the subsistence of Bai lons marriage with Alice. 9. Teresita protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful. Hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes. Note: The two marriages is under the Civil Code Issue: Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and respondent TeresitaJarque may terminate by mere reappearance of the absent spouse of Bailon Held: No. There should be steps to be taken according to the law. Ruling: 1. The second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. 2. It is only the competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. 3. Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage. 4. Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof provides the subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. 5. If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentees mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage. 6. Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouses physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law. THIS CASE : 7. In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons and Teresitas marriage prior to the formers death in 1998, Teresita is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon. Concept: - Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved. 176. Valdez vs. Republic September 8, 2009 Nachura Facts: 1. Marriage of Angelita and Sofio: January 11, 1971, and they had a child (Nancy). 2. They argued constantly because he was unemployed and did not bring home money. 3. In 1972, he left their conjugal dwelling. She decided to go back to her parents home in Tarlac. Three years passed without any word from him. 4. In 1975, Sofio showed up in Tarlac. Angelita and Sofio talked for several hours and they agreed to separate, executing a

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document to that effect. That was the last time she saw him. She didn t hear any news of him Marriage of Angelita and Virgilio: June 20, 1985 (As she believed he was already dead). Virgilios application for naturalization, filed with the US Department of Homeland Security was denied because of Angelitassubsiting marriage. 7. Hence, on March 29, 2007, she filed a petition seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. 8. Dismissed: The RTC found that, by her own admission, that she did not try to find her husband anymore in light of their mutual agreement to live separately. Nancy, the daughter, also testified that her mother prevented her from looking for her father. 9. The RTC also said there is a strong possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering that he would have been only 61 years old by then, and people who have reached their 60s have not become increasingly low in health and spirits, and, even assuming as true petitioners testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a drunkard, there is no evidence that he continues to drink and smok e until now. 10. She filed a motion for reconsideration. She argued that it is the Civil Code that applies in this case and not the Family Code since her marriage to Sofio was celebrated on January 11, 1971, long before the Family Code took effect. She further argued that she had acquired a vested right under the provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of the Family Code should not be applied. Issue: Is the RTC Ruling Correct? Held: No. Ruling: 1. The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding tha t petitioner needed to prove a well-founded belief that Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family Code. It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code. Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. 2. Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of well -founded belief is not required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states: Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit well -founded belief will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve. 177. Benedicto vs. Dela Rama Dec. 8, 1903 Willard Facts: 1. Agueda Benedicto and Esteban De la Rama were happily married for about a year until 1982 until the plaintiff suddenly left her wife at his parents house for no reason. 2. The wife alleged that the husband committed adultery and abandonment. The husband accused the wife of adultery also, which she denied. 3. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff-wife, granting her divorce and share of the conjugal partnership. 4. The husband objected the judgment filing a motion for new trial because the facts were not justified by evidence which was denied, thus this appeal. Issues: Could they avail of divorce a mensa et thoro under the existing laws? Held: No, both are guilty of adultery. Ruling:

1. 2.

3.

129 The Court of First instance erred in basing judgment on the provisions of the Civil Code relating to divorce, contained in title 4 of book 1, thinking it still to be in force. By Royal Decree the civil code was extended to the Philippines on July 31, 1889. The part of the Code referred to by the CFI was suspended by the Governor-General by cumplase as published in the Gaceta de Manila on November 15, 1876. On the other hand, General Orders, No. 68, promulgated by the Military Government on December 18, 1899, treats of marriage and nullity of marriage, it says nothing about divorce. And lastly the canon which is administered both in Spain and in the Philippines any part of the thereof which by proper action of the civil authorities had become a civil law stood upon the same footing as any other law of Spain need not necessarily be used. The fourth partida should be controlling which indicates that divorce may be obtained by two reasons, first by religion and the second by an impediment between them. The partidas took effect by virtue of the promulgation of the law which appears as Law 2, title 1, book 2, of the Recopilacion de las Leyes Indias, the last part thereof reads:

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And as to all matters not provided for by the laws of this compilation, the laws of the compilations and the partidas of these Kingdom of Castile shall be followed in the decision of causes in accordance with the following law. (Law 1.) 4. The provisions of the substantive civil law were not repealed by the change of the sovereignty of the Philippines to the Americans. The Courts of First Instance now have jurisdiction, by virtue of Act No. 136. Section 56, of suit for divorce, wherein only adultery can be the ground and does not dissolve the marriage bond but only separates the spouses by operation of law. Considering that the husbands adultery was proven, the wife upon proper investigation of facts, especially her letter which shows her remorse for her guilt of committing adultery, is also found guilty. Law 8, title 2, partida 4 provides that: For the sin of each one of them is of itself a bar to an accusation against the other. Thus neither is entitled to a divorce. Concept: divorce a mensa et thoro - is rather a separation of the parties by act of law, than a dissolution of the marriage. It may be granted for the causes of extreme cruelty or desertion of the wife by the husband. This kind of divorce does not affect the legitimacy of children, nor authorize a second marriage. Cumplase or cmplase - was a privilege held by the Governor-general in the Philippines during Spanisn rule that gave him the power to suspend royal degrees. The word means "permit" in Spanish. Siete Partidas (Seven-Part Code) or simply Partidas - was a Castilian statutory code first compiled during the reign of Alfonso X of Castile (1252-1284), with the intent of establishing a uniform body of normative rules for the kingdom. 178. Arca v Javier 31 Jul 1954 Bautista Angelo Facts: Alfredo and Salud got married in 1954. Their son, born out of wedlock, was legitimated after this marriage. Soon after, Alfredo left for the US because he had to work in the Navy. Salud lived with Alfredos parents in the meantime. After a few years, things between Salud and Alfredos folks got sour, and Salud was forced to leave the house. After that, Al fredo filed a complaint for divorce in an Alabama court, which served a notice to Salud. Salud replied to it questioning the jurisdiction of the court (and claiming the divorce is without basis because she wasnt the one who left), and that Alfredo was not a residen t of Alabama anyway. But Alfredo (and the foreign court) paid no heed and soon enough the decree was made. Alfredo married a second time in NY with a certain Thelma Francis, who divorced HIM soon after (Alfredo mustve been really l ousy in bed). He then went home and got married AGAIN, this time with Maria Odvina. Salud filed a bigamy complaint. The CFI ruled in Alfredos favor, hence the petition. Issue: Is the divorce decree valid here? Held: AFFIRMED. Ruling: No. At that time, the court has already decided cases of this kind. The most notable would be Barreto-Gonzales v Gonzales (which we already discussed), where the divorce was no honored here because the residence of the person who acquired it in the US was

5.

130 not sufficiently established in the case. The same reason applies here. Alfredo is still a resident of the Philippines and thus the decree issued by the Mobile County court has no effect here. He couldnt have acquired residence there (at least not in time before he obtained the divorce) because he was working the US Navy and merely rented a room there. Concept: The principle that foreign laws, judgments, or other decrees contrary to our laws are not valid here was well-known even during that time. It was valid enough that the legislature adopted it and included it in the Civil Code.

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(ATTY. LEGARDA)

179. Alice VAN DORN v. Hon. ROMILLO, Richard Upton 1985 Melencio-Herrera, J.: *Desperate American divorcee who wants to do business in Ermita Facts: 1. Alice is Fil, private respondent Richard is American. In 1972, they got married. In 1982, they were divorced (secured the decree in Nevada). 2. In 1983, Richard filed a suit against Alice asserting that the latters business in Ermita belonged to their conjugal property. He prayed that he be granted the right to manage the business. 3. Alice opposed this saying that Richard is barred from his admission in the divorce proceedings that he and Alice had no community property 4. Richard said that the divorce decree shouldnt prevail over Philippine laws, hes in effect saying that it shouldnt be valid and binding in this country Issue: Can Richard sue Alice as her husband in the Phil jurisdiction after their divorce? Held: Of course not! Hes bound by the decision of his own countrys Court when they secured the divorce decree, according to the US laws, hes no longer Alices husband. Ruling: 1. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law 2. Thus, because of the divorce decree, Richard isnt Alices husband anymore, accdg to HIS national law 3. Because of this divorce, Richard has no standing to sue as Alices husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets 4. And being bound by his countrys Court decision, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 180. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 30 Jun 1989 J. Regalado *marriage should still be subsisting in adultery cases Facts: 1. Husband: Erich Ekkehard Geiling (German) and Wife: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino) were married: 7 Sep 1979 in Germany and had one daughter. 2. Since Apr 1982, they had been living apart. In Jan 1983, three and a half years after the marriage, Erich initiated a divorce proceeding in Germany. 3. On 23 Jan 1983, Imelda filed a petition for legal separation , support separation of property before the Manila RTC. Pending. 4. On 15 Jan 1986, Schoneberg Local Court in Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. Custody of the child was granted to Imelda. 5. On 27 Jun 1986, five months after the issuance of the divorce, Erich filed two complaints for adultery against Imelda. One with William Chia in 1982, and the other with Jesus Chua in 1983. 6. Assistant Fiscal recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Upon review, city fiscal reversed and directed the filing of the complaints. The complaints were then raffled to two branches of the RTC. 7. On 14 Mar 1987, Imelda filed a petition with the DOJ to reverse the resolution of the city fiscal. 8. Imelda then filed a motion to suspend proceedings in both criminal cases. Judge Cruz suspended proceedings but Judge Somera merely reset the date of the arraignment. 9. Before the date of arraignment, she filed a motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but was denied. 10. On the date of arraignment, Imelda refused to be arraigned. She was then cited for contempt and detained. Later, a plea of not guilty was entered. 11. On 27 Oct 1987, Imelda filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC. SC issued TRO. 12. On 23 Mar 1988, DOJ issued a resolution directing the city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints. Issue: Is it necessary that the marriage still be existing upon the filing of the complaint for adultery? Held: Yes. They were already divorced when the complaints were filed. The criminal cases are ordered dismissed. Ruling: 1. The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint

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should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. It is a jurisdictional matter. It necessarily follows that the initiator has the status, capacity, or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Article 344 of the RPC [adultery] presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. American jurisprudence yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statue provides that the innocent spouse shall gave the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. In adultery, the status of the complainant vis--vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed . Since Erich obtained a divorce decree in Germany and thus no longer the husband of Imelda, he had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the pretense that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect the other.

Paras Concurring Opinion: 1. The fact that Erich, by the very act of obtaining an absolute divorce decree in Germany, he can no longer be considered as the offended party in case Imelda has sex with another. 2. In divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized Imelda to have sex with others. 181. Quita vs. CA December 22, 1998--- Bellosillo Facts: 4. Fe and Arturo (1st husband), both Filipinos were married on May 18, 1941. 5. Fe sued for divorce in California. 6. Divorce was final on July 23, 1954 7. Fe married Felix (2nd husband), which also ended in divorce. 8. Fe married Wernimont (3rd husband). 9. Arturo (1st husband) died in 1972 and left no will. 10. The surviving spouse of Arturo named her children as the appointed heirs of Arturo's estate. 11. RTC ruled in favor of Fe and had Fe and Ruperto (brother of Arturo) split the intestate. 12. Petitioner does not believe it should be remanded back to the lower court because: a. no more legal issues need to be resolved b. issue of who between petitioner and respondent is the proper heir can be decided in the current case. Issue: Should the case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Held: Yes Ruling: 12. A divorce between two Filipinos is not valid, yet the burden of proof is on Fe to show that she was not an American citizen when she executed the divorce. 13. There is no proof that private respondent was not actually married to Arturo nor were the respondent children acknowledged by Arturo to be his heirs. 14. The current controversy as to who the legitimate heirs are has not been fully established. 15. On the face level, the divorce obtained by Fe and Arturo should have prompted the trial court to determine her citizenship before taking her word for it. 16. She told the CA however that she was an American citizen since 1954, the same year that the divorce was obtained, yet she did not specify to reply with a memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted at the trial court. 182. LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS November 23, 2000- Pardo Facts: 1. Lorenzo Llorente and Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. 2. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. 3. Lorenzo departed for the US, leaving his wife in the conjugal home. 4. He was then admitted to the US citizenship. 5. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother and she was pregnant .

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132

Lorenzo then filed a divorce in California, which later on became final. Returning to the Philippines, He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Lorenzos estate. She contended that (1) she was the surviving spouse; (2) the va rious properties were acquired during their marriage; (3) that Lorenzos will encroached her legitime. Issue: Who are entitled to the inheritance of Lorenzo Llorente? - Is the divorce decree filed in California and became final and executor here in the Philippines Held: The divorce decree was valid, therefore Alice is the legitimate heir. Ruling: 1. Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. 2. Such was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. 3. In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces , the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. 4. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. 5. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court. 6. The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. Concept: - The court rules that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided they are valid according to their national law - Only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce - Foreign laws must be alleged and proved - Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them 183. Diego vs. Castillo August 11, 2004 Azcuna Facts: 1. January 9, 1965 - contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr., solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were both Filipinos. In the marriage contract, she used and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil status of single. 2. In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a Decree of Divorce and purportedly issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas (247thJudicial District), he is granted a divorce. 3. Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with Manuel P. Diego. The marriage contract shows that this time, she used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of single. 4. She was charged of bigamy. However, the court acquitted her due to good faith. 5. Lucena Escoto had sufficient grounds to believe that her previous marriage to Jorge de Perio had been validly dissolved by the divorce decree and that she was legally free to contract the second marriage. 6. Eduardo, Manuels brother, filed an administrative complaint against Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the law. Issue: Should the Judge be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law? Held: Yes for gross ignorance of the law. FINE: P10, 000 and Stern Warning Ruling: Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment: NO BASIS 1. The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust. (Art. 204, RPC) 2. Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in rendering an unjust decision must still be proved and failure on the part of the complainant to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint. Gross Ignorance of the Law: SUFFICIENT FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION

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133 As a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. It does not mean, however, that a judge, given the leeway he is accorded in such cases, should not evince due care in the performance of his adjudicatory prerogatives. the error committed by respondent Judge being gross and patent, the same constitutes ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action.

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(ATTY. LEGARDA)

184. San Luis vs. San Luis Feb.6, 2007 - Ynares-Santiago Facts: 1. This is a settlement dispute of the 30M worth of estate of Felicisimo San Luis, a former governor of Laguna, who contracted three marriages prior to his death. The first with Virginia Sulit resulting to 6 children. The second with Merry Lee Corwin an American citizen, to whom he begot a son but they divorced issued by the Family Court is State of Hawaii, USA. Third, with respondent Felicidad San Luis in the L.A., California, USA (no children) with whom he lived with for 18 years until his death. Thereafter, she sought for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and estate. 2. Then several children from the first marriage now contests on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state cause of action as well as lack of legal personality to the case and filed a motion to dismiss. Linda asserted that Felicisimo has legal capacity to marry according to (2) Art. 26 of the Family Code, which the children of the first marriage impugn as cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights i n derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code. Also that being then the governor of Laguna resided there and the case shouldve been filed in Sta. Cruz. 3. All these motions were dismissed on resolution dated February and October 1994 which ruled that respondent Linda possessed legal standing and proper venue was laid . 4. Not content, petitioners flied motion for inhibition and motion for reconsideration, until the case landed on Judge Arcanghel which ruled in their favor on September 1995 dismissing the petition for letters for administration, that the venue was wrong and respondent had no legal capacity because their marriage was void ab initio since the divorce of Felicisimo and Merry Lee is not valid in the Philippines. Her motion for reconsideration and disqualification of judge was likewise denied. 5. An appeal to the CA which reversed the September 1995 ruling and reinstated the Orders dated February and October 2004. Also, remanding it for further proceedings. They ruled that residence according to Sec.1 of Rule 73 of the Rules of court defines residence of decedent as personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode or a person, distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It also held by virtue of the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillio Jr. and Pilapi l v. IbaySomera that the divorce validly dissolved the mixed marriage of Merry and Felicisimo as provided by (2) of Art.26 FC. And under Art. 130, Linda as the surviving spouse, can institute judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate. 6. Thus the petition of the children of the first family for certiorari. Issues: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration Held: Petition has no Merit. Ruling: 1. The Court find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code. 2. It is incorrect to for petitioners to argue that residence should be used synonymous to domicile and upheld the lower courts ruling consistent with Sec.1, Rule 73 of Rules of Court. Although it was established that he was domiciled in Laguna, respondent proved that he maintained residence with her in Alabang, Muntinlupa. 3. The court ruled that it need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, as there is enough jurisprudential basis allowing them to rule that a Filipino spouse divorce by his alien spouse abroad may validly marry. Again, citing Van Dom v. Romillio Jr., wherein the Filipino wife divorced his alien spouse abroad. The alien spouse alleging that divorce is not recognized here seeks the protection of his interest in their conjugal properties was denied by t he courts. Pursuant to the aliens national law severing their marriage ties also estops him from asserting his right. And in effect, the divorce frees the Filipino spouse from their marriage and marital duties and obligations as in the interest if justice she should not be discriminated in her own country. 4. In support are the rulings held during the reign of the Civil Code in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera and Quita v. CA wherein it was held that divorce obtained abroad is valid and the alien spouse cannot be a party to the adultery suit against his Filipina wife. 5. The ruling in Van Dorn case served as judicial precedent for the enactment of (2) Art.26 of the Family Code. Marriage being mutual and shared commitment cannot be productively good to the society wherein one party is released from the marital bond and the other remains bound by it.

134 6. The court ordered that the case be remanded for further reception of evidence to prove the respondents marriage in the USA and the divorce of Felicisimo and Merry because mere presentation of divorce document is not enough. As held in Garcia vs Recio, that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 7. Linda qualifies as an interested person who has direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation which is not denied by the petitioner. 8. The court further held that if she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry , but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code which govern parties who live together without benefit of marriage or marriage void ab initio. 9. But if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. Concepts: On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

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(ATTY. LEGARDA)

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. "interested person" - defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. 185. Bayot vs. CA 7 Nov 2008 Velasco Jr. Facts: Rebecca and Vicente got married in 1979 in Mandaluyong. In the marriage certificate, Rebeccas c itizenship was listed as American. Rebecca gave birth in 1982, soon after that, things became sour between the couple. Rebecca eventually filed for divorce in 1996 in the Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo CFI). The proceedings held in that foreign court led to two separate orders; one for the dissolution of their marriage, and another for the settlement of their property. Less than a month after the decree, Rebecca filed a petition for declaration of nullity, which she also later withdrew. What she was able to secure in that same year instead was an affidavit of acknowledgement saying that she was an American. FIVE years after the foreign divorce, Rebecca filed another declaration of nullity case based on psychological incapacity, with the Muntinlupa RTC. What was notable in that petition was the emphasis on the request for support pendente lite that Rebecca wanted from Vicente. Vicente opposed the petition, claiming that the divorce constitutes res judicata with the requested declaration of nullity. Rebecca then tried to counter the opposition by saying that there is no valid divorce because shes a Filipino. Instead of working th ings out, the two eventually filed all sorts of criminal complaints against each other. The RTC decided in favor of Rebecca. Vicente appealed to the CA, the CA granted the preliminary injunction. Rebecca elevates to the SC. Issue: Is the divorce valid here? Held: AFFIRMED Ruling: The reason why this question is the most important is because it will result to res judicata if applied to the petition for declaration of nullity and request for support.

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YES. The divorce is valid here. The court mentioned the previous rulings on the validity of foreign divorce, citing the more important prudence like Garcia v Recio and Republic v Orbecido III. The requirements have all been fulfilled by the present case. Although Rebecca would have wanted to claim that she was Filipino at the time of their marriage, the truth is that in all her representations (in certificates and IDs, etc.), she was said to be an American. So even the first requisite laid down by Orbecido was fulfilled (there is a marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino). Nothing could have (and in fact nothing DID) stopped Rebecca from securing a divorce, because the laws of her other nationalities allowed for it. The affidavit of acknowledgment that she was a Filipino is not a renunciation of her American citizenship, much less an overturning of the divorce decree. Since the divorce is effective, the declaration for nullity is unnece ssary, and the request for support is improper. Vicente cant be made to support a woman who is technically not his wife. Concept: For the girls: make sure you milk him dry first before you file for divorce. Once you get that tie severed, hes untouchab le. 186. People v. De Guzman 2010 Nachura, J.: *rapist-groom Facts: 1. De Guzman was convicted of 2 counts of rape. He raped this poor woman (private complainant) whom he later on married (awkward or not). 2. After being convicted, he appealed to be absolved of the crime because of his valid marriage to private complainant (the victimwife). He presented wedding pictures and marriage certificate as evidence. Issue: Does De Guzmans marriage to the offended party absolve him of the crime of rape? Held: Yes. Yiiiikes. Ruling: 1. Article 266-C and Art 89 of the RPC deal with extinguishment of criminal liability. We learned this already. Wont quote the provisions anymore. 2. So based on this- legal and valid marriage, contracted in good faith, De Guzman is absolved. 187. Villanueva vs. Chiong () June 5, 2008 Quisumbing *Husband sold the land without the approval of his wife. Facts: 6. January 1960- H (Florentino Chiong) /W (Elisera Chiong) were married but separated on 1975. 7. During their marriage they acquired the talked about lot. 8. Florentino sold one-half of the lot to petitioners for Php. 8,000.00, which was to be paid in installments. 9. Florentino allowed petitioner to occupy the lot and build a store and a house. 10. December 13, 1986, shortly after their last installment payment, petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera refused to sign the deed of sale. 11. May 13, 1992- Florentino executed the deed of absolute sale without his wife's consent. 12. July 19, 2000- RTC annulled the deed of absolute sale and ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all improvements. 13. Petitioners claim the lot belongs only to Florentino because he split up with Elisera. Issues: 3. Is the lot conjugal property? Held: Yes 4. Can the husband sell the land without his wife's consent? Held: No Ruling: 7. The separation did not dissolve the conjugal nature of the property. 8. All property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or wife. 9. A tax declaration acknowledges the two as owners of the lot. 10. The memorandum of agreement they executed states that the lot is conjugal property. 11. Without the wife's consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivitity of the Famil Code on August 3, 1988 is NOT VOID but merely VOIDABLE. 12. Petitioners should return to respondents the land with its fruits and Florentino should return the sum of Php. 8,000.00 which received as the price of the land together with interest.

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188. Albano vs. Gapusan () May 07, 1976- Aquino *Judge notarizing a document for extrajudicial liquidation Facts: 1. Redentor Albano in a verified complaint dated August 18, 1975 charged Municipal Judge Patrocinio C. Gapusan 2. With incompetence and Ignorance of the law for having prepared and notarized a document providing for personal separation of husband and wife and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership 3. Gapusan notarized a document for the personal separation of the spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta 4. It was stipulated in that document that if either spouse should commit adultery or concubinage, as the case may be, then the other should refrain from filing an action against the other. Defense: 1. Gapusan denied that he drafted the agreement. 2. He explained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they signed the separation agreement and that the wife had begotten children with her paramour. 3. He said that there was a stipulation in the agreement that the spouses would live together in case of reconciliation. 4. His belief was that the separation agreement forestalled the occurrence of violent incidents between the spouses Issue: Can the judge be liable for notarizing such document? Held: Yes. The contract was void. Ruling: 1. There is no question that the covenants contained in the said separation agreement are contrary to law, morals and good customs 2. 3. Those stipulations undermine the institutions of marriage and the family

To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as void "any contract for personal separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership" Concept: - Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial sanction was void

189. In Re: Atty: Rufilo Bucana () July 6, 1976 Antonio *Notarized agreement to separate and commit bigamy Facts: 1. November 10, 1975 - Notary Public Rufillo Bucana notarized an Agreement between Gonzalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon, that in case anyone of them will remarry, both do not object & waive all civil and criminal actions against them. 2. The Court, acting upon the letter of Mrs. Angela Baltazar, Barangay Captain of Victories, Dumangas, Iloilo, required Atty. Bucana in 1976 to show cause within 10 days from notice, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with. 3. Atty. Bucana submitted his explanation, admitting that he notarized the document, it is "immoral and against public policy", but he asserted that it was prepared by his clerk, Lucia Doctolero. Issue: Is this agreement to separate and waive all actions against remarriage against public policy? Held: YES Ruling: 1. It induces each party to commit bigamy. 2. A notary public, by nature of his office, is required to exercise his duties with due care and due regard to the existing laws. 3. Atty. Bucana was suspended for 6 months, having been found guilty of malpractice. 190: People vs. Zapata () May 16, 1951 Padilla *itchy wife never learned Facts: 1. On March 14 1947, Andres Bondoc filed a case for adultery against his wife, Guadalupe Zapata and her paramour, Dalmacio Bondoc (same last name with hubby).

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She pleaded guilty and suffered four months of arresto mayor. On September 1948, Andres filed another adultery case for acts committed from March 15, 1947. The accused filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy which the trial court held in her favor as being the same offense. Issue: Could the wife be held a second time for adultery with the same person? Held: Yes. It does not constitute double jeopardy because its another offense not covered by the first. Ruling: 1. Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency each act sexual intercourse is a crime. There is no constitutional bar against filing as many adulterous acts as committed. 2. It couldnt be held as a continuous crime because unity of criminal intent does not exist because they perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and need not do another adulterous act to consummate it. 3. The Supreme court of Spain further held that another crime of adultery is committed when defendants upon their provisional release have sexual intercourse again up to the time they were sent to prison for the crimes they were charged. 4. Also, if a male defendant is acquitted on the first complaint, in his defense that he didnt know that the co -defendant was married, it would no longer be available to him in the second complaint since he already knew that she was married and continued to have carnal knowledge of her. 5. Even if the husband pardons the wife, it does not exempt her and her paramour from adulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted. 191. Gandionco v Pearanda () November 27, 1987 Padilla Facts: 1. Teresita Gandionco filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against her hubby, Froilan Gandionco, on May 1986. The complaint was based on the ground of concubinage, and was accompanied with a petition for support and damages. 2. On October 13, 1986, she filed another concubinage case (this time a criminal case) with the GenSan RTC. 3. A few months after, she filed an application for provisional remedy of support pendente lite while the civil Leg-Sep case was pending. 4. Judge Pearanda granted the pendente lite support on December 10, 1986. 5. The present case immediately followed when Froilan made this recourse to the SC. He contended that the civil action for legal separation (and all the other consequent actions that can follow from it, like pendente lite, alimony, etc.) should be suspended in view of the pending criminal case. He relies on Art 111, Sec 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and the Jerusalem case in making this claim. Froilan also contends that since the legal separation case is grounded on the basis of concubinage, it follows that the judgment in the criminal case for concubinage filed against him would have to be made before the civil action can continue. Issue: Should the civil action for legal separation be suspended to give room for the criminal action for concubinage? Held: NO. The petition was DISMISSED. Ruling: The contention made by Froilan is a misapplication of the goal of Art 111, Sec 3 of the 1985 ROCP. That provision is meant to cover only civil actions made during the pendency of a criminal case , when the victim realizes that civil liability has also been incurred and would like to go after the culprit for the said liability. That kind of civil action, which is to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, must be suspended because the criminal case has not been decided yet. Most of the time it is used when the victim wants to invoke the right to live separately from the offender, and to enforce all the other legal consequences. Art 111, Sec 3 was very explicit in the kind of civil action to be suspended and no confusion must result from its application. The present case is different from the one mentioned in Art 111, Sec 3. The case was filed not to recover civil liability, but to dissolve the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other. The petitioner also cannot say that since the basis for the civil action is being determined in the criminal action, the conviction for the criminal action must be first obtained. This is because a decree of legal separation on the ground of concubinage may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation, and no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. The court also dismissed the claim that the judge was manifestly partial to his wife. Just because there is divergence of opinion between his lawyer and the judge does not mean that there is foul play. Concept: Legal separation, given the many consequences that can follow from it, can be done through a separate civil action which is quite different from most actions.

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192. William ONG v. Lucita ONG () 2006 Austria-Martinez, J.: *Abusive ONG who doesnt know the difference between leaving (for a cause) and abandoning Facts: 1. Lucita filed for legal separation; accdg to her ,William would verbally and physically abuse her; this physical abuse was supported by a physicians testimony, and also by her sister and friends 2. Dec 14 incident: Lucita left their conjugal home bec maybe she couldnt take it anymore; (later, in Williams defense: he referred to this Dec 14 incident saying that Lucita abandoned them/him, thus she cant avail of legal separation cause she herself is guilty. Whut!) 3. This legal separation was granted at first; of course William appealed 4. William said that, yun nga, Lucitas abandonment bars her from availing of the legal separation; and also that she wouldnt return unless the conjugal properties were placed in the administration of petitioners in -laws (the latter which the court finds absurd) Issue: Does Lucitas abandonment bar her from obtaining legal separation from her husband? Held: hell to the no; her act of leaving was spurred by Ong- thus it was for a cause! Ruling: 1. First, William didnt even oppose the frequent quarreling issue (mostly caused by him), he would just give a general opposition to it, which SC didnt consider; 2. Second, as to the leaving/abandonment: Lucitas abandonment is not what FC refers to; Lucitas act was with a justifiable cause; Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the Family Code 3. As to the conjugal properties to be placed in the admin the in-laws, Court said its plainly absurd, as it cant see any benefit that Lucita would get if that were true or if that were to happen. Absurd. 193. Lapuz vs. Eufemio () 31 Jan 1972 J. JBL Reyes *Daddy wants to continue legal separation with daughters hubby Facts: 1. Husband: Eufemio Eufemio and (second) Wife: Carmen Lapuz Sy were married: 21 Sep 1934 Alleged first wife: Go Hiok (married according to Chinese law) 2. In 1943, Eufemio abandoned Carmen. No child but acquired properties. 3. In Mar 1949, Eufemio cohabited with Go Hiok 4. On 18 Aug 1953, Carmen filed petition for legal separation. Ground: adultery. This will deprive Eufemio of his share in the profits of the conjugal properties. 5. Eufemio counterclaimed for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with Carmen. Ground: prior marriage to Go Hiok. 6. On 31 May 1969, Carmen died (before the trial could be completed). 16 years after! 7. On 9 Jun 1969, Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on two grounds: 1) prescription (petition filed beyond the one-year period), and 2) death of Carmen 8. On 26 Jun 1969, Carmens counsel moved for substitution by her father, Macario Lapuz. Eufemio opposed. 9. On 29 Jul 1969, the court dismissed the case. Carmens counsel appealed. Issue: Will Carmens petition prosper despite her death? Held: No. The death extinguished the action. Ruling: 1. The death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself - actio personalis moritur cum persona. 2. Article 100 of the Civil Code (old) allows only the innocent spouse and no one else to claim legal separation. On Eufemios petition for absolute nullity: 1. It became moot and academic. Carmens death automatically dissolved the questioned marriage. 2. The liquidation of any conjugal partnership must be carried out in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. 194. Matubis vs. Praxedes () October 25, 1960 Paredes Facts: 13. January 10, 1943- H/W were married but decided to live separately later on.

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April 3, 1948, H/W entered into an agreement that allowed them: To freely get any mate and live with them without the interference of the other. To be protected from any suit against them that may include one of them from filing a case of support of benefits. April 24, 1956- Socorro Matubis claims her husband abandoned her and has a concubine. She thus, filed a complaint for Legal separation and change of surname against her husband, Zoilo Praxedes. 16. January 1955, Praxedes cohabited with someone, and that someone gave birth to a child. The two of them were recognized as H/W in their community. Issue: Should the case of concubinage and abandonment continue? Held: No. Ruling: 11. Condonation and consent on the part of the plaintiff are clearly expressed in the agreement they made. 12. The law (Art 100 Civil Code) provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no consent ot the adultery or concubinage. 13. Having condoned and or consented to it in writing, the plaintiff can no longer bring such case forward 195. LUIS MA. ARANETA, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION () July 31, 1956- Labrador * Cooling off period Facts: 1. Luis filed legal separation against Emma (his wife) 2. Ground: adultery 3. Emma therein filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her passport 4. Luis opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging that Defendant had abandoned the children; alleging that conjugal properties were worth only P80,000, not one million pesos as alleged by Defendant; denying the taking of her passport or the supposed vexation, and contesting her right to attorneys fees. 5. Luis filed the present petition for certiorari against said order and for mandamus to compel the Respondent judge to require the parties to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition. Issue: Whether or not the judge is correct for not proceeding on the question of custody and support pendente lite because of Article 103. Held: No, judge is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and support pendente lite Ruling: 1. It may be noted that since more than six months have elapsed since the filing of the petition the question offered may not be allowed. It is, however, believed that the reasons for granting the preliminary injunction should be given that the scope of the article cited may be explained. Cooling-off period: 2. It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. 3. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances . If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank in justice may be caused.

4.

5.

196. De Ocampo vs. Florenciano () February 23, 1960 Bengzon *Double adultery, Double Jose, No collusion Facts: 1. April 5, 1938: Jose de Ocampo (Jose I) and Serafina Florenciano got married in Nueva Ecija, and had children. 2. Serafino committed adultery twice: (1951) with Jose Arcalas (Jose II), and (1955) with Nelson Orzame.

140 3. First adultery: Having discovered this, he sent her to Manila to study beauty care. While in the city, he went out with several other men, aside from Jose II. 4. When she had finished studying her course, she left her husband and since then they had lived separately. 5. Second adultery: Jose I caught Serafina in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson. Jose I signified his intention of filing legal separation, to which she manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery . 6. July 5, 1955: Jose I filed a complaint for legal separation on the ground of adultery. Issue: Will this complaint prosper? (Procedural) Held: YES. Ruling: I. CA did not find collusion. SC Agrees.

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Collusion, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. In this case, if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds. Here, the offense of adultery had really taken place, according to the evidence. Also, collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it. (related to minor point number 2) II. There was no condonation or consent.

Just because he failed to search for her and take her home, does not constitute condonation or consent. It was not his duty. Hers was the obligation to return. She was the one who abandoned him. MINOR: / CA held that Legal Separation could not be decreed because Serafina agreed readily to such filing when Jose I expressed his wish to file a petition for legal separation (2nd adultery). The court expressed this as confession of judgment. Art. 101 prohibits a decree of separation upon confession of judgment. SC does not agree. Confession of judgment happens: 1. Defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment. 2. Defendant files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintif fs demand. This did not occur. / CA held that the Jose Is right to legal separation on account of Serafinas adultery with Jose II had prescribed, because his action was not filed within one year when plaintiff discovered her infidelity . (Art. 102, New Civil Code) SC Agrees. Concept: Condonation the conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife, of a matrimonial offense, which the other has committed. Consent the agreement or conformity in advance of the commission of the act Collusion agreement to commit, to appear to commit, to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence as a valid defense to obtain legal separation 197: Somosa-Ramos vs. Vamenta, Jr. () May 16, 1951 Padilla *cool-off exempt property management Facts: 1. Petitioner, Lucy Somosa, filed for legal separation against Clemente Ramos for concubinage and and attempt against her life. 2. By virtue of Art. 103 of the Civil Code, the motion for preliminary mandatory injunction by the petitioner on her property was

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denied. Issue: Is Art.103 an absolute bar to any actions/motions before the lapse of the six-month from filing of petition? Held: No, management of property can be resolved during the six-month period. Ruling: 1. The healing balm of time is expected to enable the parties to settle their differences, but the parties may be heard in determining management of property. 2. Therefore her petition is justified considering that the accused-husband would continue to manage her property, an assertion which the husband himself didnt specifically deny. 3. As held in Araneta vs. Concepcion, the six-month cool off does not preclude of overriding other provisions such as determination of custody of children, alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances because if these are ignored by the court it may bring injustice. 198. Pacete vs. Cariaga () March 17, 1994 Vitug *no default in legal separation Facts: 1. Concepcion Alanis and Enrico Pacete were married on April 30, 1938 in Cotabato, Cotabato (their child was born in 1943). 2. Enrico then married Clarita Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato, 1948. 3. Concepcion learned about the second marriage in 1979. She then filed a complaint with the Cotabato RTC to declare it null and void. She also filed a legal separation case between her and Enrico as well as accounting and separation of property. 4. After numerous motions by the defendants to extend the period to file their response, they were declared in default by the RTC. 5. The lower court eventually issued its decision. It ruled in favor of the plaintiff, through and through (pretty much everything she requested was granted). 6. The defendants then elevated the case by certiorari to the SC claiming that there was grave abuse because they were denied the chance to present evidence properly. Issue: Should the SC grant the certiorari petition and set aside the decision by the RTC? Held: YES. The petition was GRANTED and the decision was nullified and set aside. Ruling: 1. The petitioners here could have just appealed from the decision or filed a petition for relief from judgment instead of filing a certiorari case with the SC, but the court still gave due course because of the possible grave abuse of discretion (which was actually found here). 2. Despite the multiple actions filed by Concepcion, the primary and specific request was for legal separation. The respondent court thereby made a grave boo-boo because it went against three pertinent provisions of law (on this matter). 3. Art 101 of the Civil Code, which was reproduced by Article 60 of the Family Code, states very clearly that the decision in a legal separation case cannot be made upon only a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. It also calls on the state to actively intervene in order to make sure there is no collusion between the parties, especially when one seems to be in default. The assailed decision goes against this provision because it showed a blatant disregard for the caution that must be observed in cases like these. 4. Furthermore, it goes against Art 103 of the Civil Code (now Art 58 of the Family Code), which discusses the cool-off period. 5. Further still, it also ignores Rule 18, Sec 6 of the ROC, which says that in actions for annulments or legal separation, there can be no default. Concept: Special rules on actions are definitely strict in their application especially in cases like these. 199. Diego DE LA VIA v. Antonio VILLAREAL () 1920 Johnson, J.: *wife ejected so husband can freely toy w/ new found (love) lust = prelim injunction Facts: 1. Narcisa (Diego de la Vinas wife) filed for divorce (with a Court in ILOILO) and also of course the partition of the conjugal property. 2. She filed again an amended complaint: she prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued against the defendant restraining and prohibiting him in the premises of their conjugal properties because she learned that since her filing of the complaint, Diego was trying to alienate or encumber the property which belonged to the conjugal partnership 3. Diego answered the complaint, saying that: a) Iloilo courts dont have jurisdiction over this case because his residence was Negros Oriental, and the rule is that wifes

142 domicile follows that of the husband (Narcisa was actually forced to leave their conjugal home because Diego evicted her so he could freely toy with his other girl) b) He cant be issued that injunction because his acts dont fall under the conditions on which preliminary injunction can be issued (Act 190); and also because under the laws (CC) husband is the manager of the conjugal partnership and so he is empowered to alienate and encumber and conjugal property without the consent of the wife (wife has no right daw to intervene accdg to him, so since she has no right, his acts of encumbering the conjugal properties did not deprive any of her non-existent rights, so again, that injunction accdg to him isnt justified. Paikot-ikot ba? ) Issue: 1. Can Iloilo, and not Negros Oriental, be Narcisas domicile and thus grant the Iloilo court jurisdiction? 2. Can Diego be issued preliminary injunction? Held: 1. Yes, because Narcisas case is an exception to the rule 2. Yes, because Diego falls under the conditions on which preliminary injunction can be issued Ruling: 1. Issue on domicile: 1 XCPN to the rule - wife may acquire another and separate domicile where the husband has given cause for divorce; In one case it was held that if the wife is justified in leaving the husband because his conduct has been such as to entitle her to a divorce, and she really does leave him and go into another state for the purpose of there permanently residing, she acquires a domicile in the latter state. Plus, Diegos unlawful act of evicting her is tantamount to consenting (ACQUIESCENCE!!!) to Narcisas leaving; therefore her acquiring of a new domicile is really justified and an exception 2. Issue on preliminary injunction: the right of the husband under the law which makes him the sole administrator of the property of the conjugal partnership is CURTAILED during the pendency of the action, insofar as alienating or encumbering the conjugal property is concerned; which is only just and proper, in order to protect the interests of the wife The explanation of the SC goes something like this: if the husband would be allowed to encumber the conjugal properties during the pendency of the action, definitely the rights and interests of the wife would be prejudiced. And accdg to the rules on preliminary injunction (Act 190), one of the conditions on which it can be issued is that the act would probably be "in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual." So, the preliminary injunction is in order. Diego is wrong in saying that wife has no right re conjugal properties. She has a right to share in the conjugal property upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership; its that right that this injunction is trying to protect, not her (non -existent) right to administer the property. 3. CONCLUSION: The wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband, prohibiting the latter from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action

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200. Sabalones vs. Court of Appeals () 14 Feb 1994 J. Cruz *Ambassador wants to sell conjugal properties Facts: 1. Husband: Samson Sabalones and First Wife: Remedios Gaviola Second wife (paramour): Thelma Curameng on 5 Oct 1981 2. Samson was a diplomat and left the administration of the conjugal properties to Remedios. 3. In 1985, Samson retired and returned to the country but not to Remedios and their children. 4. In 1989, Samson filed for an action for judicial authorization to sell their Greenhills property. 5. Remedios opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. Ground: bigamy. She also prayed for liquidation of the conjugal properties with forfeiture of Samsons share because of adultery. 6. After trial, the court issued legal separation and forfeiture of Samsons share in the conjugal properties. Samson appealed. 7. At the Court of Appeals, Remedios filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Samson from interfering with the administration of their properties. 8. On 7 Apr 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the preliminary injunction. Samson appealed. Issue: Can Remedios act as administrator of the conjugal properties? Held: Yes. In the absence of a court-appointed administrator, she may continue administering the properties. Ruling: 1. Pending the appointment of an administrator of the conjugal assets under Art. 61 of the Family Code, the CA was justified in allowing Remedios to continue with her administration .

143 2. The trial court implicitly designated Remedios as its decision denied Samson of his share in the conjugal properties. This was in effect approved by the CA in the issuance of the preliminary injunction. 3. The injunction is necessary to protect the interests of Remedios and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets. Samson transferred the US property to Thelma, sold their Cebu properties to his brothers, and harassed the Forbes Park tenant. 4. The injunction has not permanently installed Remedios as administrator. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from Samson, pending the express designation of an administrator. Concept: Family Code, Art. 61 (2): The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property.

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Injunction a preventive remedy; to afford relief against future acts which are against equity and good conscience; to keep and preserve the thing in the status quo; to prevent future wrongs although no right has yet been violated 201. Yangco vs. Rohde () October 13, 1902 - Arellano *Wife wants allowance but has no proof that she is married to the man. Facts: 1. A complaint filed Victorina Obin against petitioner which prayed that she be declared the lawful wife of Luis R. Yangco and that she be granted a divorce, an allowance for alimony, and attorneys fees. 2. Petitioner is now filing a case of prohibition against the said order because he claims she is not his wife and that there is insufficient evidence to prove it. 3. Respondent says that the SC has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter and that the petition does not state facts sufficient to create a cause of action. 4. Respondent claims that Victorina, as a married woman, by reason of divorce pending litigation, she should be granted the said allowance. Issue: Should the alimony be granted to the person who claims to be his wife? Held: No Ruling: 1. Respondent judge was in error when he enacted judgment for alimony because of lack of evidence. 2. There is no law or reason that allows the granting of alimony to a person who merely claims to be a spouse, without supporting such a claim with evidence. 202. Lerma vs. CA () December 20, 1974 Makalintal *Double Teodoro, Double Grounds, Pendente lite Facts: 1. May 19, 1951 Teodoro Lerma and Concepcion Diaz got married, and had children (Gregory, being the youngest). 2. August 22, 1969 Teodoro filed a complaint for adultery against his wife and a certain Teodoro Ramirez. 3. November 18, 1969 Concepcion filed with the lower court, a complaint against the Teodoro for legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their children and support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and Gregory, who was then and until now is in her custody. 4. Her complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life. 5. He filed his opposition to the application for support pendente lite, setting up as defense the adultery charge he had filed. 6. The application for support pendente lite was granted, amended to the following effect: (1) He was declared entitled to support pendente lite from the date of the filing of the complaint; and (2) the amount of such monthly support was reduced from P2,250.00 to P1,820.00. 7. Teodoro opposed the amendment, filing an appeal for grave abuse of discretion, and an injunction to stop the enforcement. The CA granted it, but then it decided to dismiss the petition after Concepcion moved for reconsideration. 8. With the SC: It granted the TRO to stop the enforcement pendente lite. This was addressed to the judge and her representatives. 9. Among those that he alleged in his appeal with the SC were: 1) that new adultery charges were filed against her and her 2 nd paramour that made him seek custody of their son, 2) that in connection with the first adultery charge, she and her co-accused, Teodoro Teddy Ramirez, had been convicted, and was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. 10. The respondent filed an opposition. One of her arguments was: Article 292 of the New Civil Code - "during the proceedings for legal separation, or for annulment of marriage, the spouses and children shall be supported from the conjugal partnership

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property ...," such support is mandatory even if there be a showing that the wife is guilty of adultery . 11. The SC then denied the urgent motion for TRO. Issue: Is adultery is a good defense against the respondent's claim for support pendente lite? Held: Ruling: 6. In Quintana v. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285, which was an action by the wife against the husband for support, based upon a written contract, this Court held that adultery is a good defense. This ruling was reiterated in subsequent cases. 7. Article 292, which was cited by Concepcion, is not in itself the source of the legal right to receive support. It merely states that the support, not only of the spouses but also of the children, shall be taken from the conjugal property during the pendency of the legal separation proceeding. Also, the said article contemplates the pendency of a court action and, a prima facie showing that the action will prosper. For if the action is shown to be groundless the mere filing thereof will not necessarily set Article 292 in operation. 8. Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that "the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse , provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage ... (and) where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them ..." It is true that the judgment of conviction is on appeal in the Court of Appeals, but the same satisfies the standard of provisional showing. If legal separation cannot be claimed by the guilty spouse in the first place, the fact that an action for that purpose is filed anyway should not be permitted to be used as a means to obtain support pendente lite. 9. This is not meant to be a prejudgment of either the legal separation proceeding pending in the lower court or the criminal case for adultery pending in the Court of Appeals. It is to be understood only in the light of Rule 61, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, which specifically governs the subject of support pendente lite. 203. People vs. Sansano () March 7, 1933 Butte *the desperate housewife Facts: 1. Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura married on April 29, 1919 and had a child. The husband left for Cagayan and remained there for three years without a word or support to his wife and child. 2. Ursula struggled to survive until the accused Marcelo took her and her child to live with him. 3. Upon the husbands return he filed adultery charges to which they were convicted and served 4months and 1day of arresto mayor. After serving her sentence she went to plead for her husband to take him back but instead he sent her away to do whatever she wanted. 4. She then returned to live with Marcelo while her husband left for Hawaii and stayed there for seven years. Upon his return he filed another adultery case in order to obtain a divorce under Act no. 2710. 5. They were again convicted for adultery to which they appeal. Issue: Could they be liable for another case of adultery to be used obtain a divorce decree by Mariano? Held: No. The conduct of the husband warrants the inference of consent. Ruling: 1. Art.344 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crimes of adultery shall not be prosecuted when the offended party consented to the act. The conduct of the husband warrants that he consented to the adulterous relationship and is not authorized to institute the criminal proceeding. 2. The husband knew even before he left for Hawaii that his wife is living again with Marcelo after he sent her off and he kept silent for seven years only instituting a case of ad ultery posing that he was an offended spouse and to obtain a divorce cannot be appreciated because he could have taken an action anytime during that period. Notes: Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce, but divorce was available in certain periods in Philippine history. Divorce was allowed under the Divorce Law of 1917 (Act No. 2710) and during the Japanese occupation, pursuant to Executive Order No. 141 (1943). 204. People v Schneckenbuger et al. () November 10, 1941 Moran Facts: 1. Rodolfo Schneckenburger and Elena Cartagena got married on March 16, 1926. 2. After seven years, they agreed to live separately. 3. On May 25, 1935 they executed a document that says (and I quote): Both appearing to live conveniently separated from each

145 other for the rest of their lives and commit and bind themselves not to bother or interfere or mix under any concept in their public or private lives, each, granting leave of giving complete freedom of action in any event and in every respect, which pretty much means they are separating already. 4. The same year (mabilis pa sa alas-kuwatro), Schneckenplayer secured a divorce decree from, of all places, Chihuahua, Mexico. He then married Julia Medel in Rizal and lived with her since then. 5. Elena then filed two actions against The Schneckenator, bigamy in the CFI of Rizal, and concubinage in the CFI of Manila. 6. He was convicted in the bigamy case but moved to dismiss the concubinage case because he claimed that it would constitute double jeopardy. The CFI granted it at first but the Provincial fiscal appealed to the SC. The SC remanded the case to the CFI and the CFI denied the motion to dismiss. HENCE! Issue: (1) Would a concubinage case filed at the same time with a bigamy case (and based on the same act) constitute double jeopardy? (2) Should Mr. Schneckenhymen be convicted for concubinage? Held: NO and NO. The judgment for concubinage was REVERSED. Ruling: 1. The two cases are based on two different offenses. Bigamy is a crime which is done by contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting. Concubinage is done even when a husband merely cohabits with a woman who is not his wife (when he already HAS a wife, that is). The first is an offense against civil status and may be brought on by the state, while the second is against chastity and may only be brought on by the offended party. Since double jeopardy only applies when the person is being tried for the same offense, his claim to dismiss the concubinage case in this manner would have to be denied.

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HOWEVER 2. He should NOT be convicted of concubinage anyway. This is because the document they executed, while illegal for its purpose of extrajudicially separating them, nevertheless constitutes valid consent given by Elena to Mr. Schneckenshagger to play around and cohabit with other women. Concept: Consent, given before the act, and pardon, given after the act, both work as a defense for the crime of concubinage. 205. Benjamin BUGAYONG v. Leonila GINEZ () 1956 Felix, J.: *sex for 2 nights and 1 day is CONDONATION. Yowza! Facts: 1. 1949 - Couple got married 2. 1951 Leonila (Ginez) left Bugayong (and went to Pangasinan then Dagupan.) 3. Bugayong would receive letters about infidelity acts of Leonila 4. Finally he decided to look for his wife; he found her and for 2 nights and 1 day they made love. 5. He asked her about these unfaithful acts but she didnt answer, she just left again! Poor guy. 6. He finally filed for legal separation. 7. As for Leonilas answer, of course she vehemently denied the allegations. Issue: Can Bugayong file for legal separation despite his making love to Leonila which constitutes CONDONATION? Held: No, he cant. Condonation bars him. Ruling: 1. The husband's attitude of looking for his wife and sleeping with her for 2 nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to a condonation 2. Under the Civil Code, one cant file for legal separation when there has been condonation or consent to the adultery or concubinage

206. Brown vs. Yambao () 18 Oct 1957 J. JBL Reyes *adulterer wants legal separation from adulterer wife Facts: 1. Husband: William Brown and Wife: Juanita Yambao. Williams paramour: Lilia Deito Juanitas paramour: Carlos Field 2. During the Japanese occupation, William was interred at the UST from 1942-1945. 3. Upon his release, he learned that Juanita was cohabiting with Carlos and begot a baby girl. They then executed a document

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liquidating their conjugal partnership. In 14 Jul 1955, William filed for legal separation. Ground: adultery. For failure to answer, Juanita was declared in default. The court then directed the City Fiscal to investigate for collusion. Assistant City Fiscal appeared at the trial and cross-examined William. There, it was found that William too has a paramour. The court then denied the issuance of the legal separation on two grounds: 1) recrimination [both were in adulterous relationships], and 2) prescription [petition filed 10 years after discovery] 8. William appealed and argued that the Assistant Fiscal counseled for Juanita when what he should have done was only to determine if there was collusion. Issue: Should the legal separation be issued? Held: No. Article 100 of the New Civil Code barred the issuance of legal separation when both spouses committed adultery. Ruling: 1. There were two grounds to deny the legal separation: 1) recrimination or the commission of the similar offense charged [adultery], and 2) prescription of the action On Fiscals duty: 1. It was legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference that Juanitas default was calculated or agreed upon to obtain legal separation that he sought without regard to the legal merits of his case. 2. The inquiry by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation are fully justified or not. On prescription: 1. The action was already barred because he did not petition for legal separation until ten years after he learned of Juanitas adultery. 2. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause, and within five years after the date when such cause occurred. 3. To illustrate, William discovered in 1945. He shouldve filed in 1946 (or one year upon discovery) or around 1950 (five years after the occurrence of Juanitas adultery). He filed only in 1955. Concept: New Civil Code, Art. 100: The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them [recrimination]. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. New Civil Code, Art. 102: An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred. 207. Arroyo vs. CA () November 19, 1991 Feliciano *Photographs with intimate bedroom poses Facts: 8. November 2 1982- Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri and Eduardo Arroyo met at the condominium of the Neri spouses in Baguio. 9. December 1982- Dr. Neri found negatives that showed intimate bedroom poses of his wife with another man. 10. The witness (Jabunan) opened the door for Eduardo. Eduardo and Ruby were later left alone in the masters bedroom fo r 45 minutes. 11. Dr. Jorge Neri filed a criminal complaint of adultery against his wife and Neri. 12. The accused plead not guilty and are now petitioning that Dr. Neri had actually pardoned them and that he is now co-habiting with another woman. 13. August 26 1991- Dr. Neri prayed that the case against petitioners be dismissed as he had tacitly consented to his wifes infidelity. Issue: Should the charges against petitioners be dropped because of Dr.Neris affidavit of desistance? Held: No Ruling: 11. February 16 1989, was when the compromise agreement was executed, yet it came after the court decision on December 17, 1987.

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12. Crimes of adultery, which although needs the initial complaint from the offended spouse , it is not solely based on the vindication for the offended parties honor but focuses on the states necessity to protect the family and marriage. 13. Petitioners defense of the use of the Guinucud case cannot work because that refers not to pari delicto but to consent as a bar to the institution of the criminal proceedings. 14. No such acquiescence can be implied: the accused did not enter into any agreement with Dr. Neri allowing each other to marry or cohabit with another person, furthermore, Dr. Neri filed his complaint promptly after discovery of the affair. Concept: 6. Pari-delicto- is a valid defense to a prosecution for adultery and concubinage and that in such a case it would be only a hypocritical pretense for such spouse to appear in court as the offended spouse. 7. Consent- granted prior to the adulterous act 8. Pardon- given after the illicit affair 9. Crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouses complaint, once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. ENFORCEMENT of our law on adultery is not EXCLUSIVELY, nor even principally, a matter of vindication for private honor of the offended spouse. This enforcement is more for the protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family. 208. Matute vs. Macadaeg () May 30, 1956 Concepcion *Custody Battle, Adulterous Wife, Poverty Facts: 1. November 6, 1952 Armando Medel filed an action for legal separation against Rosario Matute on the ground of adultery committed with his brother and brother-in-law, of which Rosario was found guilty, legal separation was decreed and Armando was awarded the custody of their 4 minor children: (Florencia-12, Manuel-10, Carmelita-8 and Benito-4). 2. Armando went to the United States, leaving the children in the Davao under the care of his sister, in whose house Rosario subsequently lived in order to be with her offspring. 3. Armando returned to the Philippines late in 1954. At the close of the then current school year, during which the children were enrolled in a school in Davao, they joined their father in Cebu. 4. With his permission, Rosario brought the children to Manila in April, 1955, to attend the funeral of her father. Armando alleges that he consented thereto on condition that she would return the children to him within two (2) weeks. However, Rosario did not do so. 5. Instead, on June 10, 1955, she filed a motion: custody of the children and support for the children (school fees and monthly allowance of P200/month. 6. Said motion was based upon the ground that the children three (3) of whom do not want to go back to their father, because he is living with a woman other than their mother. 7. Armando opposed this motion and countered with a petition to declare and punish Rosario for contempt of court, in view of her failure and alleged refusal to restore the custody of their children to him. However, she was absolved from the charge. 8. The motion for the custody of the minor children was denied. She was ordered to deliver to Armando the said minor children, within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the copy of the order. Issue: Can she obtain the custody of her children? Held: NO. Ruling: 1. She merely obtained his permission to bring them to Manila, for the purpose of attending the funeral of their maternal grandfather. She obtained and has the physical possession of the minors in a precarious manner. He may, therefore, demand their return at any time, and she is bound to comply immediately with such demand. 2. Again, it is conceded that children over ten (10) years of age, whose parents are divorced or living separately, may choose which parent they prefer to live with, unless the parent chosen is unfit to take charge of their care by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity or poverty (Rule 100, section 6, Rules of Court). The fact remains that she is without means of livelihood and, according to her own admission, she lives on the charity of her brothers. She has no home of her own to offer to her children, but only she would shelter them under the roof of her brothers . Poverty, among other causes, rendered her unfit to take charge of her children or made it unwise to place them under her care. 3. The court did not decide whether the adultery she committed with her own brother-in-law involves moral depravity.

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209. Laperal vs. Republic () October 30 1962- Barrera *change of surname due to legal separation Facts: 1. Elisea obtained legal separation decree from husband Enrique Santamaria, 2. Now she wants to revert to her maiden name: Elisa Laperal 3. She is a businesswoman and afraid that confusion as to the name will lead her finances to the dissolution of conjugal property. 4. ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. Issue: Can she be allowed to change her surname? Held: No. Ruling: 1. Note that the language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. 2. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum 3. The fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the petition at bar is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372. Concept: - Legal separation alone not ground for wifes change of name 210: Macadangdang vs. CA () October 23, 1981 Makasiar *accounting of properties is mere incident Facts: 1. Filomena (respondent) and Antonio Macadangdang married in 1946 and started with a humble buy-and-sell business and due to hard work established their own business. Their accumulated wealth made their lives complicated and both accused each other of extra marital affairs which led to their separation. 2. On April 28, 1971, she filed a case for legal separation on the ground of concubinage and another on Feb.9, 1972 for appointment as administrator of the estate of conjugal partnership. 3. On January 4, 1973 the court granted the legal separation but the appointment as administrator has not been acted upon. 4. November 30, 1979, the petitioner Antonio Macarandang died and rendered the civil case for legal separation has become moot and academic. 5. Petitioner contends that the case is not final because supplemental issue of division of conjugal properties has not been resolved. Issues: Does the death of the petitioner render the case moot and academic? Held: Yes. The law explicitly provides for the dissolution and liquidation of conjugal property of gains (CPG) as a final decree of legal separation. Ruling: 1. Art. 106 provides for the dissolution of the CPG upon final decree of the legal separation with the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets. 2. Even American courts have made pronouncements as to the purpose of a decree in divorce as to the disposition of property is fix and make certain the property rights and interests the party. As one U.S. court held: the part of a divorce suit regarding property is a part of the divorce action itself. 3. The ruling in Miranda vs. Court of Appeals is controlling in this case: due to the imperative consideration and public policy and of sound practice in the courts and adherence to constitutional mandate of simplified, just and speedy and inexpensive determination of every action call for considering of such judgments for recovery of property with accounting as final judgments which are duly appealable (and would therefore become final and executory if not appealed within the reglementary period) with the accounting as a mere incident of the judgment. 4. Therefore as provided for by Art.106 and the ruling in Miranda, the legal separation has become moot and academic and the division of the properties a mere incident of the decree of legal separation. 5. The effect of the death of the guilty spouse can be easily resolved by applying the rules on intestate succession with respect to the properties of the deceased partner and would be applied on January 4, 1973, when the decree for legal separation became final.

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