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A Theory of the Comic as Insight Author(s): Kenneth Lash Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 45, No. 5 (Feb. 26, 1948), pp. 113-121 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2019682 . Accessed: 13/01/2012 11:26
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VOLUME XLV, No. 5

FEBRUARY26, 1948

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

A THEORY OF THE COMIC AS INSIGHT 1

is reflected the mental companyhe keeps. Every laugh is a comment,conscious or unconscious. It is, moreover,a comment upon living, for, as Bergson pointed out, laughter does not exist outside the boundaries of the human. Therefore,being a comment-a comment on living-it must have to do with what we call " hence knowledge. "ideas " or " relational concepts, Henri Bergson,in Laughter, An Essay on the Meaning of the and validate the comic as comment. Comic,attemptsto systematize For Bergson,the appeal of the comicis to the mind; humorcan not coexist with emotion. In a world withoutideas, there would be no humor. But there is a special field of ideas upon which the comic flourishes, namely,the mosaic of thoughtpatterns and instinctsthat go to make up our social norms. Society,as an organism, must remain fluid and flexibleto survive; its greatestenemy is automatism. And, in turn,the enemyof automatismis humor. The core of Bergson's theorycan be found in the followingquotation fromLaughter:
The rigid, the ready-made, the mechanical, in contrast with the supple, the ever-changing,and the living, absentmindednessin contrast with attention, in a word, automatism in contrast with free activity, such are the defects that laughter singles out and would fain correct.2

he laughsat,forin hislaughter yOUcantella manbythethings

The word that pricksthe ears is "correct." At once, laughter ceases to be an aimless pleasure and becomes, instead, a social comment-indeed,more weapon than comment, since it is used by societyto keep individuals in harmonywith social norms. As a weapon, however,humor is not discreet. It lays about lustily,hardlyable to distinguish friendfromfoe. Such being the case, a questionof value arises,forif the comicis to be semperidem an animadversionupon mechanism,with no line of demarcation drawn betweenthat mechanicalbehavior which is beneficialto society and that which is harmful,then the validity of the comic as
1 Read at the Southwestern Philosophical Conference, Dallas, Texas, December 23, 1946. 2 Henri Bergson, Lautghter,trans. by C. Brereton and F. Rothwell (New York, Macmillan, 1928), p. 130.

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commentis thrownto the hounds of chance, rather than to the watchdogof knowledge. In the last few pages of his essay,Bergson admitsthis,remarking that laughter,like disease, oftenstrikesdown the innocentand spares the guilty. He thus assigns the validityor "justice" of the comicto the law of averages. Immediately the comicis withdrawn fromthe zone of moral reflection, handed over to a kind of social instinct,and becomes,of course,a mechanism. It is at this point that I would dismountfromthe Bergsonian merry-go-round, carryingwith me, however,the brass ring that binds the comicto comment. DeWitt H. Parker, in that sectiondealing withthe comicin his book The Principles of Aesthetics, gives back to the comic its eyes. I quote:
The problem of evil in aesthetics may finallybe solved by the use of the comic. For in comedy we take pleasure in an object which, in the broadest sense, is evil. In order for an object to be comical there must be a standard or norm, an accepted system, within which the object pretends but fails to fit, and with reference to which, therefore,it is evil. . . . If we never had any definiteexpectations with reference to things; never made any demands upon them: if instead of judging them by our preconceived ideas, we took them just as they came and changed our ideas to meet them-there would be nothing comical.3

Mr. Parker, then,sees the comic as morallydiscriminative. It results fromperceptionof incongruity between the norm or preconceivedidea, and the actual. In this sense Mr. Parker is agreeing with Bergson's thesisthat the comiccould not exist in a world withoutideas, but he is enlargingthe fieldof the comic,rightfully I believe, by removingthe qualifying word "social" from the Bergsonian "social evil." (In both cases, the word "evil" is applied looselyto any person or action whichis out of line with preconceivedstandards,which does not "fit.") Mr. Parker then goes on to removeBergson's restriction of the comicto the mechanical,pointingout, trulyenough,that the spontaneous is an equal source of humor. The rebellious, the mischievous,the capriciousmomentary abandonmentof standards and the tensionsthey create-this is the other side of the Bergsonian coin. We can, by identifying ourselveswith the normal,laugh at the extreme; but we may also, by identifying ourselves with the rebellious, laugh at the standard. This latter course, he states, leads us to the higher functionof comedy,namely, sympathetic insight. Whereas satire has eyes only for rebuke, humor has a
3 DeWitt H. Parker, The Principles of Aesthetics (New York, F. S. Crofts & Co., 1946), p. 94.

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heart as well, and unites us, throughsympathy, with the object of our laughter. Humor is more contemplative, hence more esthetic. Mr. Parker presumablyfeels that sympathywith people is a higher value than sympathywith norms,for is not satire of the kind he mentionsmerely that other point of view by which we identifyourselves with standards? That humor is more contemplative, hence more esthetic,than satire we should have to agree, but that sympathywith norms can not be as high a functionas sympathywith individuals, or that the two sympathiesneed be mutually exclusive,is certainlyopen to question. For continued identification with the spontaneous,whichcan have no patternbut that dictatedby chance,mustimplyeventuallythe shelvingof even social or value system. It is more likely that the difa semi-fixed ferencein "sympathy" betweenhumorand satire is one of awareness and degreeratherthan of kind. The satiristsympathizes with the individual who is harmedby the willfuland the false. In any case, implicit in Mr. Parker's theoryis a hypothesisof the comic as one strand of the "bond that binds us to our fellows" as opposed to Bergson's assumptionof it as a bond that binds our fellowsto us. Aside fromthe insightimplied in sympathy, Mr. Parker notes two explicit functionsof the comic as insight. One of these we have already noticed: the unmaskingaspect of the comic,whereby throughcontrastis illuminatedthe discrepancybetweeni the pretended and the actual, the normsand the conduct. The otheraspect, partly overlapping,is the approach of caricature in which prominent traits,oftenobscured by the whole,are singled out and exaggerated by the comic in a process which results in a clearer understandingof the object's essential nature. Mr. Parker says:
Following the method of the experimentalist,he [the caricaturist] selects certain aspects from the total complexity of a phenomenon and shows how they work when isolated from the rest. And, like the man of science, he provides insight into the normal, because we can accept his results as at least partially or approximately true.4

Mr. Parker, then, sees the comic as insight,both sympathetic in approach, insightnot only into value and valueand scientific but into the essentialdisharmony relationships, of existence. to compare the theoryof Bergson and Parker It is interesting with that containedin B. A. G. Fuller's article "Is Reality Really Comic?" (this JOURNAL, Vol. XLII, 1946, pp. 589-598). Mr. Fuller suggests that reality is unintelligible,is in fact a mass of spontaneous,tychisticevents the essence of which is best understoodand reflected by the comic.
4

Ibid., p. 98.

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He begins with the premisethat the comicis incompatiblewith an orderlyand intelligibleuniverse,for to understandwhy a thing occurs deprivesit of the elementof surpriseand, hence,of humor. I am forced to take exception immediatelybecause surprise, thoughit may be one factor in humor,is not the only one, nor is surprise in itself humorous. It is not the swrprise of the spontaneous that makes us laugh, but rather its incongruousrelationship with the moreor less static patternit interrupts. Mr. Fuller goes on to state that determinism, in its triple form and finalcausation,has been takingsomesevere of efficient, formal, body blows of late. Science is abandoning formal causation for the theory of relativity,the quantum theory,for, in short, the "principle of uncertainty." Freud has shown that the rational organizationof the mind has no roots in the mental subsoil. And betweenevents. earlier,Hume had denied any necessaryconnection that the ultimate irrationality Is it not possible, therefore, of the referredonly to initial cause, actually "peppers universe,hitherto and salts its entire surface with a constant occurrenceof sponand purposelessevents . . . I In taneous,uncaused,unmotivated, that case . . . not only has the real all the makings of the comic value, but . . . the comicvalue is morerepresentative of its essence than any otherhuman evaluation of its nature,and . . . the sense of humor is perhaps the most clairvoyantof our reactionsto its " conduct. Not one to stop short of his full conclusions,Mr. Fuller goes a non-omnipotent on to formulate God with a sense of humor,who laughs with us at the chance and accidentwhich continuallyupset both the cosmicand earthlyapplecarts. It is not my part in this paper to enterthe determinism versus chance argument except insofaras it bears directlyupon the comic. In this respect,however,it seems to me that pushing Mr. Fuller's theorytoo far would result eventuallyin total eliminationof the comic. Implied in any acceptance of the theory of a universe completelydominatedby chance is, of course, the correlated acceptance of the designlessdesign,the patternless pattern. In such a universe,any fixityor semi-fixity of expectationwould be nonexistent; therefore, since we have found humorto result fromthe between preconceivedideas and actuality, the comic incongruity would, of necessity, disappear. I would agree with Mr. Fuller, however,that knowable reality is somewhatuncertain,and that an elementof chaos does exist as at least a part of reality. Since this chaotic elementis reflected in the comic, then to that extent the comic does partake of reality, and part of the pleasure we derivefromit is pleasure of the realiza-

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tion of this kind of knowledge. But what Mr. Fuller fails to take into account is that side of the comic which gives insufficiently sight into norms. He sees the comic only as the spontaneousand the tychistic-the breaker of norms-and never as the establisher of newer and more adequate standards. It is this latter function of the comicwithwhichI am mostconcernedin this paper. The aspect of the comicas insightand as a vehicleof knowledge, made indiscriminate by Bergson, bound tightlyto sympathyby Parker,and half-stated by Fuller, is the pointI should like to dwell upon. What typeof insightis conveyedin the play of humor? To which componentof reality does the comic have reference? Perhaps if we can synthesize the source of the comic,we may be in a betterpositionto answerthese questions. The physiologicalsource of the comic, connectedwith our requirementsfor tensionrelease, need not concernus here. In any case, to understandthe existenceof a requirement is not necessarily to understandhow it is met. We have seen thus far that active emotiontowards the comic object precludes laughter. Of course, it is to be observed that, for the laugher,laughing is in itselfthe expressionof an emotion, related psychologically to his urge toward pleasure. While this does not alter the spiritof this argument, it may be best observation to bow somewhatto the letter and restatemy position as follows: on the part of the observer,any emotionotherthan one expressive of pleasure will obviate laughter. If viewed sympathetically, the clown's pratfalls can be painful; his terriblystrenuousefforts to arouse laughter,piteous. A minor misfortune is not funnyuntil its effects are dissipated,until timehas detachedus fromour angry emotionalreactionsto the incident. To perceivethe comic element at any givenmoment, towardsthe comicobject emotional neutrality is demanded. The next requisite is the given factor,omnipresent in us all: a set of semi-crystallized formrealizations,pattern concepts. We have seen these termed"preconceived ideas." To obviate the noconnotations often given to the word tional and hyper-subjective "ideas," and to emphasizethe desired importof the archetypal,I "norms" and "standards." preferto employas terminology These norms may have referenceto the nature of the real, to of behavior,to the meaning of a word, to the proper consistency bubble gum-to, in short,any concept which has been reaffirmed to evolve as archein its original formby experiencesufficiently typal. Such norms may be personal-that is, adopted by us as moreor less "good" or "true"-or theymay be merelyknowledge in whichcase we are aware of their existenceand of their content,

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but have not, ourselves,adopted them. Either way, use by others, of these normsas standards we must assume the ex'istence however, of value into whichwe have a greateror lesser insight,and towards which we feel a greater or lesser devotion. It is to the increased awareness of these normsthat the comic can, and does, contribute. comic. As we In any case, the norms are not, of themselves, have seen, it is ratherout of the incongruousrelationshipbetween a given norm and an object (let "object" include person,action, situation,and concept) that laughter springs. This relationship in the sense that the comic object, intentionmust be incongruous, goes wide of, or falls short of, overshoots, ally or unintentionally, The comic object pretendsto it has reference. to which the norm fitthe norm,or in humorousnaivete believes that it does, but the intellectperceivesthe discrepancybetweenthe posited and the acand laughs. Though we may reduce a tual, findsit incongruous, to the basic ore of norms,life continuesto measure of experience and different alloys. Forms tend to become presentus with new fixed,but matter is always creating its own aberrations. In a is ever the same, deriving always fromthe sense, the incongruity discrepancybetweenthe archetypaland the aberrational. One has but to strikethe flintof normson the roughedge of actualityto get the spark of humor. It is obvious that these norms,both objective and personalized, are manifoldand multifarious. One is aware of a greateror lesser but to his knowledgeand sensitivity, fractionof themin proportion unto takes or unconsciously, himself consciously each of us, whether a certain number of more or less compatible norms for his own. When this selection approximates a state of stability, a pattern called a "point of view." This is accuwhichis commonly emerges for one's "view" of so-called objective reality is rate terminology, highlycolored by one's norm contextwhich provides,so to speak, of the the vantage point from which we view the manifestations "real." Norms,then,thoughtheyhave their basis in objectivity, becomesomewhatpersonalizedboth by the individual's interpretation of them,and by the relationshipshe sets up for them with othernormsin the processof building his point of view. And it is with regard to this point of view that he makes value judgments actuality; it is this point of view with which the comic concerning fails to square. object incongruously Now this failure of the comic object may be, as we have said, eitherintentionalor unintentional. Where the failure is unintenthe humorderivesfromour view tional, as in farcical blunderings, of man's being a good deal less prescientthan he usually is or ideally should be. In otherwords,he falls shortof our norm for

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him. Some defectof mind or body betrayshim so that,instead of masteringthe situationas befitsthis image of God twice-removed, the situationmastershim. It may be because he is too mechanical or too spontaneous,too tall or too short,too smart or too dumb, too rich or too poor-in any case, too "something" and not enough "something else." He may be unaware of his inadequacy or merelyhelpless in the face of it; eitherway, he is but a poor, befuddled part of that whole whichwe conceiveman oughtto be. It is our perceptionof the discrepancy betweenour ideal or "totality" normgoverning the nature of man (or a man) and the incomplete or "partial" aspects of him in the example set before us which gives rise here to the comic. This norm of the "total" man, whetherapplied to ourselves,to others,or to mankindin general, sets up a kind of goal which,thoughoftendepicted in chiaroscuro, manifestly implies a value scale. Hence, insofar as the comic is a comment upon man in relation to his goals, it constitutes, per se, a value judgment. Does this same conclusion hold true in that other situation, previouslypostulated,in which the deviation of the comic object fromthe norm is intentionalf I believe it does, though in a differentand, epistemologically speaking, more interestingmanner. Where the deviation from the norm is unintentional,in the mannerof Tartuffe, the incongruity is perceivedby the intellectof the observer as affirming that point of view he already holds, namely,that his normis "truer" than this isolated piece of actuality. But wherethe failureof the object to fitits archetype is intenthe incontional,as in the case of wit turninga value upside-down, gruity is presented for the purpose of edificationthrough the agency of the imagination. A new norm,to supplant or to modify the original, is suggested; a new point of view is invited. This sword of wit, cuttingas the occasion demands eitherat twin-edged the standards or at the controverters, is patentlydependentfor its very existenceupon a general knowledge,and/or acceptance,of a commonbody of norms. Wit may often turn traditional norms but in so doing does it not turn up to our vision the topsy-turvy, underside,perhaps hitherto unseen or else forgotten ? If, as is frequently held, every thesis has its antithesis,and if he knows best who knowsboth,then does not wit transmitknowledge? For any given situation,thereexists a myriadof possible normsrangingin degree all the way fromthat traditionallyposited to its opposite. One of themmay seemmoretrue than others, but it does not follow that the othersare completely false. Normstend to be static; reality fluid. To selectone of a givennumberof relatednorms, though it may seemthe truestor best,is to exclude others. Yet the totality

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is greaterthan any of its parts! The actual is not so much determined by the incidence of agreementas it is by the sum total of or inconsistent. Hence whenthe consistent historicalfact,whether comedian invitesyou to laugh at that pompous part of life which considersitself the whole, when the laughing child invites you to and join him in his equally of maturity throwaside the conventions real world,whenthe wit invitesyou to lay aside your pet certainty you withthe claim and ponderthe antipodal,is not each presenting of totalityupon its parts? Does nioteach one convey,as it were, an insightinto that sector of life which,though it be not yours, is ? nevertheless Thus we findthe comicleading us to a keenerperceptionof the totalityof the actual. This larger vision, once induced, can have than to instill a desire for total understanding. It no othereffect us a greaterknowledgeof is in this mannerthat the comicproffers upon conceptual values. Having foundthe comicto be a comment mode. it mustbe in its veryessencean epistemological relationships, One must exclude, of course, certain types of laughter. This the discussion. There is, for has been tacitlyassumed throughout by the mechanicallaughterof nervous instance, no insightconveyed defenseor by the laughterwhich springs solely froma feeling of joy and well being; nor is laughteroftenthe source of highervalue when it is employedas an antidote to sympathy. Also suspect is that condescending laughterwhichdoes not stop to questionits own scale of values; yet, should this scale be higher than that of the person being laughed at, this unhappy fellow, in attemptingto detecthis comicflaw,may be led to a greaterknowledge. Even in its defects,the comic is connected with knowledge. or distortedvalue systemcan and does Any knowledgedeficiency give rise to bitteror malicious laughter,in much the same manner that it gives rise to unfeelingor malevolentaction. and thereinlies its virtue. The But the comicis contemplative, chaotic elementof reality often prostratesone's hopes and plans, to leak. Faced useless,causes categories rendersnormstemporarily with this, one may get angry or one may laugh. Anger implies, however,an egocentricconceptof the uiliversewhereinone would scourge that part of life which can not be bent to one's will. accepts misfortune Humor,on the otherhand, being contemplative, as an intrinsicfactorof experienceand allows no undue emphasis. Hence humor has the greater value from the esthetic,as well as fromthe epistemological, point of view. as Mr. Parker has But the comic is more than contemplative, noted. It is moral,in that it is companionable. A smile is always welcomebecause it clearlystates a willingnessto abandon personal

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for the sake of a communalviewpoint dogma,at least momentarily, in whichwe will see the world in any or everypossible light. In a sense,the comicis Everyman's art though,like all art, its worthas insightincreases in direct proportionto the value of the concept presentedand the keennessof its presentation. But there is humanity and there is knowledgein the purple cow drawn by the child. Smile as you will at the mostpointed epigram,you are but claiming as your cousin the spewer of popcorn at the Chaplin the comic,are realizing,are knowing. movie; and you both,through
UNIvLasITy Or NEw Mzxico KENNETH LASH

BOOK REVIEW
WILLIAM T. HARRIS-PRAGMATic HEGELIAN1 When Nicholas Murray Butler makes a pronouncement like this: "I measure my words when I say that in my judgment Dr. Harris had the one truly great philosophicalmind which has yet [1929] appeared on the westerncontinent,"one must at least regard the statementwith considerableseriousness. But when it is concurredin by Peircee, Royce,James,and Dewey it demandsvery serious consideration. In fact it seems to require that Harris be re-appraised as a philosophical thinkerquite apart from his remarkable educational career and contributions.2 It is morethan sixtyyears since the presentwriterfirst saw and heard Dr. Harris speak. He was addressing a group of students in the PolytechnicHigh School in St. Louis and this is my recollectionof what he said, at least as to the impression his remarks left on my mind. Said he, "You must striveto bring out all the best that is in you and keep in mind that how much or how important that best is, only time can tell. Even your failures have a significance in this effort, for both failure and success will contributeto your fulfillment." Nobody could have dreamedat that time,other than a few of the abler membersof the Philosophical Club of St. Louis, that he was speaking of the Hegelian ImmanentDialectic, pushing through the personalityto a high and effective result.
1 I have written this reminiseencein lieu of a review of a most informative biography of William T. Harris, Yankee Teacher, the Life of WiZliam Torrey Harris, by Kurt F. Leidecker. New York, Philosophical Library. 1946. xx+648 pp. $7.50. 2 See page 471, Philosophy in America by P. R. Anderson and M. H. Company, 1939. Piseh, New York, D. Appleton-Century