Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2007) 10:195207 DOI 10.

1007/s10677-006-9050-6

Aristotle, Akrasia, and the Place of Desire in Moral Reasoning

Byron J. Stoyles

Accepted: 16 October 2006 / Published online: 24 January 2007 # Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007

Abstract This paper serves both as a discussion of Henrys (Ethical Theory Moral Practice, 5:255270, 2002) interpretation of Aristotle on the possibility of akrasia knowing something is wrong and doing it anyway and an indication of the importance of desire in Aristotles account of moral reasoning. As I will explain, Henrys interpretation is advantageous for the reason that it makes clear how Aristotle could have made good sense of genuine akrasia, a phenomenon that we seem to observe in the real world, while maintaining non-trivial distinctions between temperance (sphrosun), self-indulgence (akolasia), self-control (enkrateia) and akrasia. There are, however, some interpretive challenges that follow from Henrys account and this paper is intended to explain and resolve those.

Key words akrasia . Aristotle . desire . Devin Henry . practical reasoning

The akratic man is a man whom passion masters so that he does not act according to right rule, but does not master to the extent of making him ready to believe that he ought to pursue such pleasures without reserve. (Nicomachean Ethics, 1151a 2025)1 This paper serves both as a discussion of Devin Henrys interpretation of Aristotle on the possibility of akrasia knowing something is wrong and doing it anyway and an indication of the importance of desire in Aristotles account of moral reasoning.2 As I will explain, Henrys interpretation is advantageous for the reason that it makes clear how Aristotle could have made good sense of genuine akrasia, a phenomenon that we seem to observe in the real world, while maintaining non-trivial distinctions between temperance
1 2

All quotes from the Nicomachean Ethics are from Ross translation. Henry (2002).

B. J. Stoyles (*) Department of Philosophy, Trent University, 1600 West Bank Drive, Peterborough K9J 7B8 ON, Canada e-mail: byronstoyles@trentu.ca

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(sphrosun), self-indulgence (akolasia), self-control (enkrateia) and akrasia. There are, however, some interpretive challenges that follow from Henrys account and this paper is intended to explain and resolve those. My focus is on two specific challenges raised by Henrys account. The first of these arises from an apparent tension between Henrys interpretation and Aristotles claim that practical reasoning, expressed by practical syllogisms, must result in action unless the agent is restrained (1147a 2931).3 The other arises because Henrys interpretation seems to entail that reason is dragged around by desire on Aristotles account as it is on Humes, yet this possibility is precluded by Aristotles account of motivation and his ontology of desires. Before turning to these, I will begin by outlining Henrys interpretation and the motivation behind it. 1 Aristotle on Akrasia: Henrys Interpretation As have many, Henry distinguishes between two kinds of akrasia. They are distinguished from one another by the different senses in which an agent knows that what he is doing is wrong when he goes about doing it.4 On the one hand, a person can have knowledge but not be exercising that knowledge. That is, a person can know something (like a rule of morality), but fail to realize that his knowledge applies to his particular situation or, seem to realize that it applies, but fail to act accordingly.5 In book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle tells us that such a person has knowledge that what he is doing is wrong in a qualified sense only in the same way as a man who is asleep, mad, or drunk (1147a13). Following Henry, I will refer to this first sort of akrasia as drunken akrasia.6 On the other hand, a person can know that what he is doing is wrong in an unqualified sense. In such a case, the person knows that what he is doing is wrong and is exercising this knowledge.7 A person who acts while knowing in an unqualified sense that what he is doing is wrong exhibits genuine akrasia. If a person is genuinely akratic, he really knows both the right rule (orthos logos) that should be followed and that it applies to him in his present situation. Genuine akrasia, then, does not result from an intellectual error. Henry argues that Aristotle allowed for the possibility of genuine akrasia. One strength of his interpretation is that it does not involve any attempt to squeeze an account of this state of character out of what is said in NE 7.8 Aristotle makes it clear in NE 7.3 that his focus is on the possibility of having knowledge in the drunken sense and behaving contrary to that knowledge. That this possibility remains his focus throughout the remainder of NE 7
3

I dont mean to equate practical reasoning with what is represented by the practical syllogisms. The former is surely broader in its scope than the latter. This said, the latter is certainly part of the former in the picture of practical reasoning. (More on this below.).

The masculine pronoun is used throughout this paper to mirror Aristotles discussion. I do, of course, think that women can be moral (and akratic, for that matter).
4 5

In the former case, the knowledge of the rule could be referred to as knowledge which is non-occurrent or not being exercised. In Aristotelian terms it is the first grade actualization of knowledge (i.e. having knowledge) without using or applying the knowledge.

This is not to imply that drunkenness is thought to have the same effect on our knowledge in all instances. We might compare, for instance, passages at 1110b 25 ff. and 1113b 35 with the passages at 1147a 14, 1151a 7, and 1152a 15. In the sense that it is occurrent or in mind. Henrys interpretation also allows us to reconstruct an Aristotelian account of genuine akrasia without throwing up our hands and declaring the text in NE 7 to be corrupt in the fashion of Cook-Wilson (1871).

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is made clear by his repeated and consistent assertions that the akratic person knows what he is doing is wrong in the sense of a man mad, asleep, or drunk.9 Henry is right, however, to point out that this does not entail that Aristotle denied the possibility of genuine akrasia altogether. Though the phenomenon is not explained in NE 7, neither is it ruled out.10 According to Henry, we must look beyond the famous passage in NE 7 to reconstruct Aristotles account of genuine akrasia. The best evidence that Aristotle thought genuine akrasia to be possible is found in the Eudemian Ethics (EE). In this text, the qualification that the akratic man has only knowledge in the drunken sense is conspicuously absent. Though not conclusively, this suggests Aristotle thought himself to be explaining genuine akrasia in the EE. Specific passages provide more conclusive evidence. In EE 7.13, Aristotle claims that Socrates was right to think that nothing is stronger than wisdom but wrong to think that nothing is stronger than knowledge (1246b 3335). In this passage, there is no qualification that Socrates was wrong only with regard to knowledge we possess but arent exercising.11 More concrete support for Henrys interpretation comes at 1224b 1521 where Aristotle asserts that the akratic man has a pain of expectation, thinking that he is doing ill (or acting badly kaks praxein).12 Unless the akratic man is actually thinking that what he is doing is bad, he would feel no pain of expectation. Knowing in the drunken sense would not produce such a pain. Henrys strategy for reconstructing Aristotles account of genuine akrasia is to focus on the way in which Aristotle could have explained the differences among akrasia, selfindulgence, self-control and temperance in a manner that is neither trivial nor ad hoc. Of these four states of character, only temperance is a virtue and only self-indulgence is a vice, though the others are part of the same genus insofar as they are related to the same thing (1145b 1): the desire for the pleasures associated with food, drink and sex. In terms of their behaviour, both the self-controlled man and the temperate man are alike in that they manage to pursue these pleasures in accordance with reason to the degree they promote health and well-being. Conversely, both the akratic man and the self-indulgent man pursue these pleasures excessively. In terms of their knowledge about what is best in their particular situations, the self-indulgent man is easily distinguished from the others. He is the one who is convinced that bodily pleasures should be pursued for their own sake (he chooses to pursue them and acts in accordance with this choice, 1150a 1620). As genuine akrasia cannot be the result of an intellectual error, the genuinely akratic man is no different, cognitively speaking, than the self-controlled man or, perhaps more tellingly, the man with the virtue of temperance all three have knowledge of what pleasures they

See, for instance, 1147a 14, 1151a 4, and 1152a 15.

10

At the very least, Book 7 lacks an explanation for this kind of character. It is tempting to read Aristotles text to have ruled this out completely, especially when we consider the conclusion that the position Socrates sought to establish actually seems to result (1147b 14) for Socrates, as we know, denied the possibility of akrasia altogether. That Socrates position seems to result from what is said in NE 7, however, doesnt entail that this is Aristotles final word on the matter, and it certainly doesnt entail that Aristotles view must be the same as Socrates in the end. Though Aristotle doesnt explicitly consider the possibility that appetite could be stronger than knowledge in this passage, it makes room for this possibility. That Aristotle makes the distinction between (practical) wisdom and knowledge is consistent with his claims that practical wisdom is needed for, and is only present with, virtue in NE 6. It is also consistent with the claim at 1146a 5 that it is absurd to think practical wisdom is consistent with akrasia and the possibility that knowledge is consistent with akratic behaviour. All quotes from the Eudemian Ethics are from J. Solomons translation.

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should pursue. As Henry sees it, we must look to Aristotles account of proper and alien pleasures to fully explain the differences among these states of character. Throughout the Ethics, Aristotle insists that being virtuous is related to pleasures and pains. As he puts it, moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of pain that we abstain from noble ones (1104b 1011).13 In NE 10.5 Aristotle tells us that there is a proper pleasure (oikeiai hdonai) for each activity and that there is a proper pleasure related to the proper function of each kind of animal. In relation to food, drink and sex, Aristotle insists that some pleasures are necessary. The necessary pleasures are those which promote health and well-being (1114a 15). As Aristotle sees it, one experiences the proper pleasure of temperance when one takes pleasure or delights in pursuing only the kind and amount of bodily pleasures necessary for health and well-being. In contrast, he tells us that the the bad man is bad by virtue of pursuing the excess, not by virtue of pursuing the necessary pleasures (1154a 1516). Pleasures that one experiences when pursuing excessive pleasures or pleasures from inappropriate sources (like adultery) are alien (allotriai hdonai) and, thus, actually impede or destroy happiness (NE 7.13). The temperate man is the one who loves the pleasures associated with food, drink and sex for what theyre worth and not more than theyre worth. He is the one who delights in being temperate and is repulsed by pleasures of the sort pursued by the self-indulgent man (1119a 1214). The man with the virtue of temperance, we can infer, is not tempted by the alien pleasures he delights only in pursuing the amount and kind of food, drink and sex that reason deems necessary.14 In contrast to the temperate man, both the self-controlled man and the akratic man are tempted by the same alien pleasures as the self-indulgent man. The self-controlled man behaves like the temperate man insofar as he manages to keep his appetitive desires in check and acts in the manner determined by reason. The akratic man behaves like the selfindulgent man insofar as he follows his appetite. Since both the self-controlled man and the genuinely akratic man know in the unqualified sense what they ought to do, ignorance cannot be used to explain the difference between them. And, since both desire alien pleasures, the presence of this sort of desire cannot be used to explain the difference between them either. What is it then that accounts for the difference? The most obvious difference is that the self-controlled mans character routinely leads him to act in accordance with his choice for temperate action and the akratic mans character routinely leads him to act without regard for this kind of choice. As Henry correctly notes, however, this explanation makes the distinction trivial. The real challenge is to pick out Aristotles explanation for why each behaves differently from the other without merely circling back to the fact that they have different states of character. It is a significant advantage of Henrys interpretation is that it meets this challenge.15
13

This idea is repeated in the text immediately following the section quoted and again at 1152b 5. The same idea is presented at 1113a 35 in relation to the source of error in moral reasoning. It is also prevalent in the EE. See, for instance, 1221b 34 ff, 1222a 17, and 1227b 16.

In the EE, Aristotle presents the same idea in terms of absolute pleasures these are the pleasures one experiences when acting according to reason. They are those that are pleasurable by nature. This can be compared to the passage in the NE where Aristotle reports that some pleasures are desirable in themselves, differing only in kind or in their sources from all others (1174a 911) and the passage at 1154b 1920 where Aristotle states that things naturally pleasant are those that stimulate the action of the healthy nature. 15 Though often overlooked, this challenge should be met by all theories aimed at explaining genuine akrasia including those that are not Aristotelian. The way in which the challenge is met, of course, will depend on the specifics of each theory being defended.
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To identify the manner in which Aristotle distinguished between akrasia and self-control, Henrys strategy is to look for what it is that gives the self-controlled man the power to restrain his appetite. Consequently, Henry reasons, the mark of the akratic man will be the absence of whatever accounts for this ability in the self-controlled man (pp. 2645). In the end, Henry argues that genuine akrasia must be the result of an agents failure to desire the proper pleasure of being temperate. While the self-controlled man is drawn towards indulgence, he is disposed to follow reason and acts according to right rule. The akratic man, on Henrys interpretation, lacks the desire for the pleasures that should attend the pursuance of bodily pleasures in the manner directed by reason. One possible reason for this is that he has not (yet) successfully habituated the state of character that disposes him to take pleasure in acting temperately. In this respect, we would expect him to be no different from a child; and this is exactly what Aristotle tells us at 1095a 311. For the akratic man, as for the child, knowledge is of no use to him and he acts on the desire for bodily pleasures alone. Knowledge would be of use to him only if he desired to act in accordance with the rational principle (1095a 711). Henry argues for the strong view that the genuinely akratic man does not experience any inner-conflict between the desire that would move him to act temperately and the desire to indulge in food, drink or sex for the reason that he lacks the former (p 257). This entails that the akratic man does not find himself torn in any way between the desire to do what is right and the desire to enjoy the bodily pleasures as many recent accounts of moral weakness or weakness of will seem to suggest. Though the genuinely akratic man has knowledge of what he ought to do, he is moved to act by the desire for the bodily pleasures alone. On Henrys interpretation of Aristotle, the akratic man simply feels no desire moving him in the direction of reason. Henry has, perhaps, overstated his case here it is not clear that we need to assume the akratic man lacks all desire for the proper pleasures of temperance. It could be that his desire is simply outweighed by the desire for bodily pleasures. One of Henrys motivations for denying the possibility that the akratic man has any desire for the proper pleasures of temperance seems to be that this would make the distinction between the self-controlled man and the akratic man stark.16 If he is right, the difference is simply that the self-controlled man desires the proper pleasure of being temperate whereas the akratic man does not. And this, Henry thinks, is what Aristotle tells us at 1224b 1517 of the EE where he says, the self-controlled man feels pain now in acting against his appetite, but has the pleasure of hope, i.e. that he will be presently benefited, or even the pleasure of being actually at present benefited because he is in health; while the akratic man is pleased at getting through his akrasia what he desires, but has a pain at expectation, thinking that he is doing ill. Whereas the self-controlled man is moved by the hope of experiencing the pleasures associated with health and well-being, this passage suggests the akratic man does not anticipate this same sort of pleasure. Henry thinks this passage implies that the only thing that could move the akratic man to act in accordance with reason would be the desire to avoid pain. To act on this desire, however, would be a form of softness (malakia) rather than self-control (1150a 14). There are three reasons to question Henrys interpretation on this point. First, the stark distinction he draws between self-control and akrasia may not reflect reality (however tidy conceptually). It seems that people sometimes do feel a conflict between the desire to do
16

As I will argue below, this is not the only, or the most compelling, motivation for this view.

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what is right and the desire to pursue some forbidden pleasure where these would lead to different courses of action. Accepting Henrys interpretation involves accepting that Aristotle would have believed that anyone who felt such conflicting desires would always exhibit self-control rather than akrasia. Second, the text Henry cites in support of this part of his interpretation is inconclusive. That Aristotle does not mention any inner-conflict arising in the akratic man does not entail that Aristotle ruled this possibility out completely. Third, this strong view is apparently inconsistent with Aristotles assertion that the akratic mans choice is good (1152a 17). Henry dismisses this comment by claiming that Aristotle means that the akratic mans choice of ends is good. In context, however, it seems more likely Aristotle meant to tell us that the akratic mans choice for a particular course of action is good.17 Aristotle states explicitly at 1150b 21 that some men after deliberation fail, owing to their passion, to stand by the conclusions of their deliberations. He is writing there of deliberation about specific courses of actions. Presumably, the weak mans choice being described in this passage is the result of deliberation (1113a 35 and 1227a 5). And, since choice is deliberative desire (1139a 24) desire for the objects or actions that we expect to promote or be a part of happiness it must be true that the akratic man is unable to formulate a choice (insofar as choice is deliberative desire) for the appropriate course of action in situations where he behaves akratically if Henry is right to think that the akratic man lacks the desire for the proper pleasures of temperance. I see two ways resolve this tension. The most obvious way to resolve this tension from Henrys perspective is to demonstrate that a man who is genuinely akratic does not choose what is right even though he reasons correctly. This possibility is suggested by Aristotles claim that for choice to be good, both the reasoning must be true and desire right (1139a 24). On Henrys view, the genuinely akratic man lacks the proper desire. It follows that he would not come to formulate a choice for what is best in his particular situation even if he reasoned well from an intellectual standpoint. He would know what he ought to do, but not choose it. This view is consistent with the claim at 1095a 35 that knowledge is of no use to the akratic man for he, like a child, tends to follow his passions rather than reason. To maintain consistency, we might then read the claim that the akratic mans choice is good at 1152a 17 to apply only to the man who is akratic in the drunken sense and not to the man who is genuinely akratic. Not only is this claim made in NE 7, but the akratic mans failure to stand behind his deliberation is easy to explain in terms of akrasia of the drunken sort he deliberates correctly and then is intoxicated by the promise of bodily pleasures. Indeed, this is exactly the explanation provided at 1151a 4 where Aristotle tells us that the failure is due to the fact that the akratic man is like people who get drunk quickly and on little wine. Though the deliberation might be made with knowledge in the strong sense, the knowledge is eclipsed when the agent acts. Thus, the situation being explained is at 1150b 21 is plausibly read as a case of drunken akrasia. The other way to resolve this tension is to reject Henrys strong claim that the genuinely akratic man lacks the desire for the proper pleasures of temperance completely. It could be, for instance, that both the genuinely akratic man and the self-controlled man have a desire moving them towards doing what they know is right and a desire moving them towards indulgence where the former is to be distinguished from the latter by the fact that his desire
Aristotles explicit description of choice in NE 6.2 presents choice as being related to actions with a view to an end. There are some passages in 3.1, 6.12, 6.13 and 7.9, however, in which Aristotle seems to indicate that we can also choose ends of actions. As I indicate, I think the context of the comment I am addressing here makes it clear that Aristotle had in mind the akratic mans choice of actions rather than ends.
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to act temperately is outweighed by his desire for indulgence whereas the opposite is true of the latter. On this reading, both the self-controlled man and the akratic man choose, or form deliberative desires for a temperate course of action, but the akratic mans choice is outweighed by his appetitive desires. The weaker view I am here suggesting, however, would be precluded if it is the case that no amount of desire for the alien pleasures could outweigh the desire for the proper pleasures when the latter is present. In other words, it would be precluded if choosing to avoid excessive or inappropriate consumption of food, drink or sex meant that one will or must necessarily act on that choice. This possibility is worth exploring further. On Henrys account, the self-controlled man has both a desire to act temperately and a desire to over-indulge or pursue pleasure from an inappropriate source (like adultery). The latter is an appetitive desire (epithumia). The former is based on, or directed by, reason. In the language of NE 6.2, the desire for the proper pleasures of temperance is a choice (proairesis) caused by desire and reasoning with a view to an end (1139a 32) and, in this sense, it is a desiderative thought or intellectual desire (dianotik orexis or orektikos nous, 1139b 45).18 This means that the two desires felt by the self-controlled man are of different kinds.19 On this reading, it is easy to make sense of the presence of conflicting desires. The selfcontrolled man has a desire of one kind moving him in one direction and a desire of a different kind moving him in the other (rather than two desires of the same sort pulling him in opposite directions). This reading, on Henrys view, also explains why it is that a person who desires the proper pleasures of temperance will always be moved to act by this desire. This would be the case if, in Aristotles moral psychology, intellectual desires or choices of particular courses of action formulated with a view to an end always override appetitive desires. (Thinking of proairesis in the strong sense of willing as many scholars do makes this way of reading Aristotle especially tempting for the reason that it would make room in Aristotles theory to justify a claim analogous in meaning to the idea we mean to express when we assert that the will can override lower desires20). With regards to the explanation of genuine akrasia, the implications of this reading are as follows. The akratic man does not desire the proper pleasures of temperance and, so, does not choose to act temperately. This is because he lacks what it is that would cause or give rise to such a choice. Remembering that the cause of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end, lacking the cause of the choice to act temperately could involve a failure to deliberate correctly about what bodily pleasures promote health and well-being (as this is the end of temperance). This, however, is ruled out in the case of genuine akrasia if we accept that this phenomenon involves knowledge about what one ought to do in an unqualified sense. Second, and by default the only real possibility in the case of genuine akrasia, is that the akratic man lacks the desire that would move him to act temperately. And this, of course, is exactly what Henry is arguing. To my mind, it is not obvious which of the stronger or the weaker views being considered is the best interpretation of Aristotles view. There are good reasons to support
18

In context, Aristotle seems to mean the efficient cause of the proairesis is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. He could, however, mean the formal cause. The latter would account for the characterization of choice as desiderative intellect or intellectual desire. The former would add force to what I say below about the practical syllogisms. (See note 42). In correspondence, Henry confirms that what I report here does reflect his view though not all of the details were included in his original paper.

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See Kenny (1979) and Irwin (1992) on the possibility that Aristotles work contains a conception of the will.

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each reading and there is no textual evidence that is definitive either way. Aristotle makes no explicit statements claiming or denying that a deliberate desire always trumps competing appetitive desires. In the context of this paper, it is significant to notice that there remains good reason to adopt Henrys explanatory strategy whatever way this tension is resolved. As Henry observes, both the genuinely akratic man and the self-controlled man desire to pursue pleasures that are not necessary for, and are detrimental to, health and well-being and both know in the unqualified sense that they should not act on these desires. Henrys strategy of exploring the implications of Aristotles distinction between proper and alien pleasures succeeds in generating an interpretation of Aristotle that makes sense of genuine akrasia and allows us to distinguish between it and self-control in a non-trivial way.21 Even if we dont accept all of the details of this interpretation, it is a promising alternative to the ever-growing number of attempts to pick out Aristotles explanation of genuine akrasia by pulling apart the practical syllogisms found in NE 7. To summarize, the key points of Henrys interpretation are as follows: (1) Aristotle did allow for genuine akrasia, and (2) the genuinely akratic man is one who knows in an unqualified sense that what he is doing is wrong he knows both the right rule and that it applies to him in his situation but (3) lacks all (or, on the weaker version I have considered, sufficient,) desire for the proper pleasure of acting temperately.

2 Two Interpretive Challenges If Henry has correctly identified Aristotles position on the possibility of genuine akrasia, we find ourselves faced with two additional interpretive challenges. First, it seems that Aristotle cannot consistently allow for genuine akrasia if he held that the conclusions of practical syllogisms are actions (rather than prescriptions or statements). Second, Henrys interpretation suggests that reason is no less the slave of the passions for Aristotle as for Hume. I will explain each of these problems in turn and then suggest how both might be resolved in a consistent manner. 2.1 Practical Syllogisms and Genuine Akrasia Aristotles views about drunken akrasia in NE 7 are explained using what are commonly read as practical syllogisms.22 Simplifying the account of moral reasoning, Aristotle tells us that the akratic man knows the universal premise of the syllogism. This is the premise containing a universal rule of morality.23 Removing the details, the universal premise
Of course, to say Henrys strategy succeeds in generating a useful interpretation of Aristotle is to say nothing about the plausibility of Aristotles theory when compared to others aimed at explaining genuine akrasia. I leave this task for another project. 22 Grogi (2002) argues that the text in NE 7.3 does not give examples of practical syllogisms, but that these are syllogisms to reflect the epistemic state of the akratic man. As I will argue, I think that these are practical syllogisms, but that they provide an incomplete representation of moral reasoning and choice. This is likely, as many such as Burnyeat (1999) argue, because the focus in this text is on the sort of knowledge involved in akrasia. 23 Here, I follow Thornton (1982) in reading the syllogisms in NE 7 to specify a rule in the universal premise and a case or situation that follows under the rule in the particular premise. This form, as Thornton notes, differs from the form of the practical syllogisms Aristotle presents elsewhere. This said, I am not convinced that the form is significantly different than the good/possible model found, for instance, in the Movement of Animals (see 701a 25). In any case, what I say does not hang on my reading these syllogisms as having a rule/case form.
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specifies that such and such a man ought to do such and such. Drunken akrasia occurs when the agent is so overcome by desire that he fails to realize that this rule applies to him in his present situation (an error in moral perception) or realizes it only as a drunken man or as an actor who says something without really knowing what is being said. As Sparshott (1996) puts it, the knowledge of this rule is bypassed for the reason that the drunken akratic man does not really recognize that the rule should be exercised in his particular case.24 Though there is much debate about how it is that we should understand the nature and application of Aristotles practical syllogisms, there is little doubt that Aristotle thought that the conclusion of the sort of reasoning represented by these syllogisms is action unless the agent is restrained.25 The Aristotelian corpus contains many clear statements of this idea. The most explicit of these comes to us in the seventh chapter of the Movements of Animals,26 but the idea is also present in the NE. There, Aristotle provides examples of syllogisms and tells us that if the universal and the particular premises are recognized, then the man who can act and is not restrained must (necessarily) at the same time actually act accordingly (1147a 2931).27 He just means the person will act. On first glance, Henrys thesis that Aristotle allowed for genuine akrasia flies directly in the face of Aristotles assertion that practical reasoning results in action. Just like the temperate man, the genuinely akratic man knows a universal rule of morality and knows that it applies to him in his particular case. In this sense, knowing means that he recognizes the major and minor premises of the practical syllogism, has put the syllogism together in the right way and has concluded that he ought to act in a certain way. For example, a man who knows that temperance requires avoiding excessive indulgence and that eating the entire party-sized pizza before him would be a form of excessive indulgence must also know that he ought to avoid eating the entire pizza. The problem is that, if the conclusion of practical reasoning is action (in this case an avoidance) and not simply a normative judgment or moral prescription (I ought to avoid...), then there is no room for genuinely akratic behaviour: putting the major and minor premises together will simply result in right action. This, however, does not mean that we must give up the idea that Aristotle allowed for genuine akrasia. Instead, I think we should be led to the realization that there is more going on in practical reasoning than indicated by the simple syllogisms offered in NE 7.3. Most significantly, the presentation of these syllogisms excludes any mention of desires. As Aristotle presents them in NE 7, each syllogism composed of a rule indicating a moral obligation (all men ought to...) and knowledge of the persons particular situation (I am in a situation to...). If this were all there is to practical reasoning, however, none of us would ever be moved to act, for intellect itself, Aristotle tells us, moves nothing (1139a 37).
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Sparshott (1996, p 245).

We express the conclusion as a prescription. See, for instance, Hintikka (1973). For the opposing interpretation, see Kenny (1979). Kenny argues that the conclusions of practical syllogisms are prescriptions rather than actions. If he is correct, his way of reading Aristotle would effectively obviate the need to address what I have identified as this first interpretive challenge. The challenge only exists if practical reasoning, as expressed by the practical syllogisms, has action as its conclusion. As indicated by what follows, I think there is sufficient textual evidence to reject Kennys view. ...that the action is the conclusion is clear (701a 23).

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It is this passage that leads me to reject Grogis insistence that NE 7.3 does not give examples of practical syllogisms. These must be practical syllogisms since the conclusion is said to be an action (short of the agent being restrained) though, as I will argue below, they cannot be taken to be complete representations of practical reasoning.

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On Aristotles view, only desire moves us to act.28 With this, he must have thought that practical reasoning only results in action when desire is somehow involved or attached to the process of reasoning represented by the practical syllogisms.29 This is just to say that desire is a necessary part or condition of practical reasoning. And, if desire is that which ultimately moves us to action, then simply knowing what you are doing is wrong even in an unqualified sense will not be sufficient to preclude your doing it anyway. As Thornton (1982) states the issue, Aristotle must grant that desires can prevent us from acting on our practical syllogisms or his account of akrasia becomes incoherent.30 This, however, suggests that Aristotle held reason to be the slave of desire in the same way as Hume. In order to spell out the details of how Thorntons observation helps us avoid the first interpretive challenge being considered in this paper, it is instructive to remind ourselves of the ways in which Aristotles views differ from Humes. 2.2 Is Reason the Slave of Desire? As outlined above, the genuinely akratic man and the self-controlled man have appetitive desires that are excessive or directed at the wrong objects. The self-controlled mans desire for the proper pleasure of temperance moves him to do what is right. The genuinely akratic man, however, is moved in the opposite direction. Since both of these men know (in the unqualified sense) what is right for them to do in their particular situations, Aristotle seems committed to the view that it is really desire, and desire alone, that leads us to act whatever process of reasoning occurs before our desires move us. All of this suggests Aristotle was committed to the view that we only act according to desire and even, perhaps, that the role of practical reason is merely calculative or probabilistic (i.e., meansend reasoning) in the manner advocated by Hume.31 This, however, cannot be Aristotles view. As is well known, Hume denied the possibility that reason and passion can conflict. Noting that [n]othing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, Hume thought the whole debate about akrasia is nonsense (Treatise, III.iii.3). This is because he believed that only passion or desire moves us to act for the reason that only passion or desire determines which ends we pursue. On Humes account, reason can serve to determine how to reach our desired ends, but reason does not determine or prescribe which ends should be pursued or which means to achieve our ends are adopted (it is in this sense that reason is a slave or subservient to desire on Humes account). Thus, according to Hume, it makes no sense to consider actions which are done in accordance with, or from, reason. Though Aristotle held that intellect alone cannot move us to action, he cannot have shared Humes view. For one thing, Aristotle explicitly states that reason and appetites can

28

At De Anima 3.9 (433a), we are told that mind is never found producing movement without some desire. (This desire, of course, could be boulsis as I will argue below.)

29

We could also consider giving up the idea that Aristotle held the conclusion of practical syllogisms to be actions. Since there is textual evidence that Aristotle did think that practical reasoning results in action, rejecting this view seems like the less responsible move. In any case, I dont think we have to give up either as I will argue below. Thornton (1982, p 65). In conversation, Devin Henry tells me that this very objection has been raised against his view. This, of course, would only be true if Aristotles desires were passions in the Humean sense. As the text that follows indicates, I dont think Aristotle was Humean in this way because he distinguishes between two sorts of desire in a manner that Hume did not.

30 31

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move us in different directions.32 This is supported by his ontology of desires specifically the distinction between deliberative and appetitive desires. As outlined above, Aristotle tells us that choice is deliberate desire (1139a 24). Relevant to the present discussion, we learn two things from this comment. First, we learn that choice is, at once deliberate (rational) and a desire, though the details of how this could be are not clearly worked out.33 Second, and following this, we learn that Aristotle identifies at least two kinds of desire.34 The one, which I have outlined here, is deliberate desire presented here as an orexis or, more specifically, as a boulsis. The other, which we are told in Movement of Animals and elsewhere is that which moves the lower animals, is appetitive desire. This is often referred to as appetite or desire epithumia. Where, then, does the genuinely akratic man go wrong? The stronger version of Henrys interpretation entails that, in at least one respect, the akratic man is little different from animals who are moved by appetite: neither acts as a result of choice. Whereas animals lack the cognitive ability for choice,35 the akratic man lacks deliberative desires for acting temperately: he is, therefore, not capable of choosing what is right and, for this reason, does not act according to reason. On a strict reading, this would entail that the akratic mans behaviour does not count as action (praxis) at all. On the weaker version of Henrys thesis considered above, the akratic man does choose correctly, but his choice, in the form of a deliberative desire, lacks sufficient force to overcome his appetite for pleasure.36 Where does this leave us? We should conclude from what has been said that the picture in which reason is dragged around as the slave of desire in the Humean sense is too simplistic to capture Aristotles more sophisticated model of practical reasoning. Given Aristotles insistence that there are intellectual or deliberate desires that can initiate action, he would not have accepted Humes view reason plays no role in determining our course of action beyond that of identifying the means for achieving our desired ends. Further, it is not the case, as it might first appear, that the possibility of genuine akrasia entails that we reason about what we ought to do in the manner reflected by the syllogisms Aristotle presents in 7.3 and then act according to our desires. This would entail that the conclusions of the practical syllogisms are prescriptions rather than actions. But, if the conclusion of the process of reasoning represented by the practical syllogisms is action (as Aristotle insists) and, if we are only moved to act by desire (as Aristotle insists), then it must be true that desires are either prior to or a part of our practical reasoning. It might be the case that a practical syllogism specifying a rule that ought to be followed in a persons particular case will only move a man to act if he already desires to do what is right. Anscombe (1963), for one, suggests that the syllogisms that move us to act are those which start by identifying something we want. For example, the major premise stating that we ought to eat dry food would only lead to action if we first desire dry food because we

32 33

See, for instance, 1102b 1328.

As Hursthouse (1999) notes, Aristotle did not seem concerned with working out these details. Though it is a worthy challenge to see how this could be worked out, I leave it for another project. Nothing I say here depends on these details.

34 Cf. EE 2.7 where Aristotle lists three kinds of desire (orexis): appetite (epithumia), wish (boulsis), and passion (thumon). 35

This follows from the text in Movement of Animals where it is said that desire (appetitive is implied, for this is all animals can have) takes the place of questioning or thinking for the animals. As Henry notes in correspondence, this would have the consequence that the content of these desires does not matter at all in determining which affects our behaviour. In addition, this possibility would entail that desires of different kinds (intellectual and appetitive) can be weighed against one another.

36

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recognize this to be good in relation to our proper end. When the major premise of the syllogism specifies a good that ought to be pursued and the person knows this thing in front of him is just such a good (as the genuinely akratic person is said to know), the person would be disposed to pursue that good.37 If Anscombes reading is correct, we would be left to explain how a deliberate desire could come to outweigh an appetitive desire which might be done by comparing their relative forces or by arguing that the deliberate desire simply trumps the appetitive desire in the manner considered above. Alternatively, it might be the case that the first premise of a practical syllogism is meant to reflect that we desire a certain kind of thing and the second premise indicates that what lies before us is a thing of that sort.38 For a relevant example from NE 7.3, the first premise might reflect that we desire dry food because it is healthy and the second might indicate that such and such a food (bread, for example) is dry. If this were the case, then it is easy to imagine how the process of reasoning represented by the practical syllogisms would give rise to choice in the form of a deliberative or intellectual desire (1139b 4 ff). In the example, this choice would be to consume bread. Neither of these is a new way to interpret the Aristotelian texts. In various forms, both of these interpretations are found in previous commentaries about Aristotles use of the practical syllogisms.39 Relevant to my present discussion, it is important to note that we do not have to think that Aristotle held reason to be the slave of desire in the Humean sense to accept Henrys view that Aristotle allowed for genuine akrasia. And that, if practical reasoning is to result in action, then the complete formulation of practical reasoning must include mention of ones deliberative desires.40 What, then, are we to make of the syllogisms in 7.3? At the very least, they must be understood as incomplete statements of the kind of reasoning or process that leads to a choice for certain courses of action. As McDowell puts it, the practical syllogisms must be read as mere argument-like schemata to represent the cognitive aspect of practical reasoning.41 The presentation of these syllogisms is incomplete insofar as it includes no mention of desire. Since the syllogisms are most plausibly read as representations of the process of reasoning that initiates certain actions, desire must be involved too. This conclusion is supported by Aristotles claim that choice, which is that which initiates action (praxis), is caused by a combination desire and reasoning in NE 6.2.42 The syllogisms in 7.3 were likely intended to reflect the akratic mans cognitive state only. That is, it is likely they were intended to show only what sort of knowledge a man has
37

This line of thought is consistent with Aristotles view that we desire good things because they are good at Metaphysics 1072a 2829. Though, if genuine akrasia is possible, then it cannot be the case that simply knowing something is good or right is sufficient for us to desire that thing over the promise of bodily pleasures. For this view, see Wiggins (1975) or McDowell (1979).

38 39

See Thornton (1982) for a fuller discussion of the various ways people have understood Aristotles practical syllogisms. 40 As the literature indicates, there is no obvious way to decide which is the best way to identify the place Aristotle gives to desire in practical reasoning as it is represented by the practical syllogisms. I have presented what I take to be two plausible alternatives. Noting that each of them would help us overcome the interpretive challenges posed by Henrys thesis, it suffices for my present purposes to conclude that some story needs to be told, but leave the difficult task of figuring out just how this story is supposed to go for another project.
41 42

McDowell (1979). Here, he claims to be following Wiggins (1975) presentation.

Here I am reading Aristotles claim at 1139a 33 to be about the efficient cause of choice. (See note 18.) That choice is the cause of action (as per 1139a 32), makes it easy to see how this process results in action unless the agent is restrained.

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when he knows what he is doing is wrong and does it anyway. As Henry asserts, a full explanation of how this is possible as it is manifest in the form of genuine akrasia is not to be found in this famous bit of text. 3 Summary In this paper I have worked to explain and resolve some interpretive challenges raised by Devin Henrys interpretation of Aristotle on the possibility of genuine akrasia. As I have argued, the challenges that arise from Henrys interpretation can be resolved by recognizing that knowing something is good or right is insufficient for moving us to do what is good or right. Even if we know in an unqualified sense that what we are doing is wrong, only desire to do what is right could move us to act correctly. The upshot is this: what have traditionally been read as practical syllogisms are, at best, incomplete representations of the process of deliberation that results in action. Recognizing this, future consideration of Aristotles view about the possibility of genuine akrasia should focus less on these syllogisms and more on the role of desire in moral reasoning. If genuine akrasia is possible, it cannot be the result of an error in reasoning or a lack of knowledge. To explain this phenomenon, then, we need to look somewhere other than the cognitive states of the akratic man. This is the lesson to be learned from sorting out the details of Henrys interpretation in a manner that allows us to meet the interpretive challenges it presents.
Acknowledgements An early version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Western Canadian Philosophical Association in 2004. I am indebted to those in attendance for their insightful comments, criticisms, and suggestions. I am also indebted to John Thorp, Devin Henry and the members of the Greek Gang at the University of Western Ontario for their feedback and guidance. I wish to extend my thanks to all of these people, this paper is much better as a result of their shared knowledge. The paper is also better for the input provided by the two anonymous reviewers for Ethical Theory and Moral Practicethe number and quality of their comments about earlier drafts have been instrumental in helping me clarify many of the ideas being presented.

References
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