DAVID S.

MCDONOUGH

The new triad of the Bush administration

Counterproliferation and escalation dominance in US nuclear strategy

I N T RO D U C T I O N

he administration of George W. Bush has brought about significant changes in the nuclear strategy of the United States. Traditionally, the US calculus of deterrence was based on a nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers. This concept was expanded and modified in the Bush administrations classified Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, completed on January 2002.1 This document outlined a new triad strategic concept, based on nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems, and a revitalized defence infrastructure.

David S. McDonough is the Communications and Programmes Officer at the Royal Canadian Military Institute, Toronto, Ontario. The author would like to thank Brian L. Job, Kevin Warrian, and Mike Schroeder for their stimulating discussions and insightful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 8 January 2002) (hereinafter the Nuclear Posture Review). This document was originally leaked to the Los Angeles Times. See William Arkin, Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable, Los Angeles Times (March 10, 2002), www.latimes.com. Portions of the NPR were later posted on the Globalsecurity website, www.globalsecurity.org.

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Following from the recommendations of that report, the US has placed a renewed emphasis on nuclear and non-nuclear targeting of rogue states armed with nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons. The development of smaller yield and more accurate nuclear weapons for hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs), alongside a significant ground- and sea-based ballistic missile defence capability, has also become a priority. While missile defence has typically been treated as an issue distinct from US nuclear strategy, the increasing incorporation of active defence systems in US nuclear policy indicates that such a casual distinction is becoming less appropriate or analytically useful. The new triad is the key strategic concept that guides the current administrations nuclear strategy. It is also, however, a concept that is heavily indebted to the policies of previous administrations. Many of its components were actually developed in the 1990s, as part of the growing postCold War American emphasis on rogue states and counterproliferation. Rather than a fundamentally new or revolutionary concept, the new triad should in fact be seen as the most recent and explicitly nuclear manifestation of US counterproliferation efforts. With its strong emphasis on offensive and defence capabilities, the new triad is meant to achieve escalation dominance over rogue states armed with NBC weapons. This form of nuclear primacy will have a definite impact on the nuclear deterrent capabilities of countries like Russia and China. This does not mean that an incipient arms race will take place. Nor does it mean the emergence of a Cold War era nuclear relationship with either country. But it does mean that changes in US nuclear strategy will be an important factor in their calculations of what is necessary for deterrence. In the short-term, a greater emphasis on secure and survivable second-strike capabilities should be expected. While this in itself will not automatically lead to strategic instability, the Bush administrations current emphasis on grand strategic primacy does provide a very uncertain and potentially unstable context for a renewed US interest in escalation dominance. This grand strategy may make US relations with both countries more adversarial. It may also create a situation where the new triad becomes that much more threatening.
T H E N E W T R I A D S T R AT E G I C C O N C E P T

The new triad is meant to be the new strategic concept for the uncertain postCold War security environment. A new mix of nuclear, non-

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nuclear and defensive capabilities is seen to be required for the unexpected and diverse threats facing the United States. The NPR outlines a new triad composed of offensive strike systems (nuclear and nonnuclear), defences (active and passive), and a revitalized defence infrastructure. These components are to be bound together by a sophisticated command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) system. Offensive strike systems Offensive strike systems are a key component of the new triad. In a postCold War era defined by American conventional dominance and potential asymmetrical threats, offensive strike systems are meant to provide a greater degree of flexibility in the design and conduct of military operations in the 21st century battlespace. One can discern three separate but interrelated aspects of this leg of the new triad: the planned nuclear force reductions, the emphasis on conventional strike options, and the potential development of new nuclear weapons. The NPR calls for a planned force structure of 1700-2200 deployed strategic warheads by 2012, which will be based on 14 Trident ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, 76 B-52H bombers, and 21 B-2 bombers. This would deactivate the Reagan-era MX Peacekeeper ICBM and remove four Trident SSBNs from strategic service. Initial movement to implement this planned force structure began 2 October 2002, with the removal of an MX missile warhead at Wyomings F. E. Warren Air Force Base. The D-5 SLBM, with its impressive hard-target kill capability, will take over many of the targets previously covered by the MX missile. In its incorporation of non-nuclear capabilities, the new triad acknowledges the potentially strategic impact of conventional weapons. The combat missions associated with these conventional strike options are based on two interrelated security developments. The first development is the growth of HDBTs, which range from deep tunnels to hardened surface bunker complexes. It is estimated that there are currently over 10,000 HDBTs worldwide, many of which protect important strategic assets (e.g. command and control facilities). This number is likely to increase in the near future. The second development is the threat posed by chemical and biological (CB) weapons, and the need to destroy and neutralize agents and their associated facilities. While these facilities are often housed in HDBTs, the physical

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destruction of HDBTs would be insufficient if CB weapons remain viable or are released in the environment. To neutralize both these targets, the Pentagon has been developing and deploying various advanced conventional weapon systems.2 The further development of US nuclear weapons capabilities is also featured prominently in the nuclear posture review. Problems exist in using conventional weapons for the defeat of both HDBTs and CB agents. Current conventional weapons, while able to deny or disrupt the functioning of HDBTs, are not seen to be effective for the long-term destruction of deep and hardened underground facilities. For that reason, the NPR advocates the substantial modification of existing nuclear warheads in order to develop an effective earth-penetrating capability for HDBT destruction and CB agent neutralization. These earth-penetrating weapons (EPWs) could consist of either a lowyield warhead to minimize fallout, or large-yield, penetrating warheads for more protected facilities.3 While the NPR has yet to become official policy, advanced concept teams have already been established at the three US nuclear weapons laboratories. The robust nuclear earth penetrator (RNEP), which is the Bush administrations EPW project, is currently receiving US$15.5 million funding under the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2003. An additional US$15 is being requested for the FY2004 budget. A related
2 For more on HDBTs, see Department of Energy and Department of Defense, Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hardened and Deeply Buried Targets (Washington, DC: Department of Energy and Defense, July 2001). For a thorough treatment of possible weapon systems, see Michael A. Levi, Fire in the Hole: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Options for Counter-Proliferation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper, 31 (November 2002). Weapon systems for HDBTs include kinetic penetrators, small diameter bombs, active kinetic penetrators, hard target smart fuses, precision-guided munitions, and microwave weapons. Weapon systems for NBC neutralization include the development of chemical neutralization, high-temperature incendiary weapons (i.e. fuel-air explosives and thermobaric weapons), and low-blast high-fragmentation weapons. 3 The technical feasibility of using nuclear earth-penetrating weapons for the destruction of HDBTs or CB agent neutralization has been questioned. The maximum depth penetration of the EPW would still be insufficient to contain the explosions deadly fallout. In addition, the high temperatures and radiation needed to destroy CB agents would only be present near the centre of the explosion. Unless the exact location of such facilities are known, the more likely result of using these agent defeat weapons would be the dispersal of CB agents. See Robert W. Nelson, LowYield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons, Science and Global Security 10, no. 1 (2002). 1-20; and Robert W. Nelson, Nuclear Bunker-Busters Would More Likely Disperse than Destroy Buried Stockpiles of Chemical and Biological Agents, Science and Global Security (forthcoming).

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development has been the growing interest in the development of new, low-yield nuclear weapons. It does appear that George W. Bush is successfully pushing for the House of Representatives and the Senate to repeal the decade-long amendment prohibiting research and development of mini-nuke weapons of less than five kilotons. While the NPR does not explicitly mention the need for mini-nukes, the movement towards modernizing the US nuclear infrastructure under the third-leg of the new triad points to the potential development of these smaller, more useable nuclear weapons. Active defences The new triad differs sharply from the nuclear triad by incorporating defences as an integral component. According to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, this signifies a recognition that offensive capabilities alone may not deter aggression in the new security environment of the 21st century.4 Active defences are the type of defence that is given the most weight in the new triad. Three ballistic missile defence options are currently under consideration: ! A single Airborne Laser for boost-phase intercepts against ballistic missiles of all ranges; ! A rudimentary ground-based midcourse system, consisting of a small number of interceptors taken from the test program and an upgraded Cobra Dane radar in Alaska against longer-range threats; ! A sea-based Aegis system to provide rudimentary midcourse capability against short- to medium-range threats. On 13 June 2002, the Bush administration effectively ended the ambiguity surrounding national missile defence by withdrawing from the ABM treaty under the supreme interests clause under Article 15(2). Other changes included merging the theatre missile defence (TMD) and national missile defence (NMD) systems into a single global program and, to prevent the perception of a strategic decoupling from Europe, increasing the role of allies in the creation of a global ballistic missile defence system.5 Rather than a fixed or final missile defence
4 Nuclear Posture Review, 2. 5 See James Fergusson, The Coupling Paradox: Nuclear Weapons, Ballistic Missile Defence, and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship, in NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism, Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen, and Allen G. Sens, eds., (Westport, CT: Praegar Publishers, 2003), 153-172.

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architecture, the Bush administration advocates fielding various BMD capabilities as they become available. To do so, the FY2003 budget has allocated US$7.8 billion for missile defence. With the FY2004 budget request including US$9.1 billion on missile defence, this figure will likely increase. The initial set of capabilities planned for 2004-2005 includes: up to 20 ground-based interceptors at Ft. Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California for midcourse interception under the groundbased midcourse defence (GMD) system; up to 20 sea-based interceptors for midcourse interception under the sea-based midcourse defence (SBM) system; the deployment of numerous PAC-3 tactical missile defence systems; and various land, sea, and space-based sensors. This should provide the foundation for a multi-layered hit-to-kill capability. Concepts, such as miniature kill vehicles on one interceptor or satellites armed with interceptors for boost-phase intercepts, with the objective of deployment of three to five satellites for testing purposes in 2008, are also being studied.6 While the development of missile defence has certainly advanced quite dramatically since the Sentinel and Safeguard programs and Reagans Strategic Defense Initiative, the technical hurdles facing this leg of the triad are significant. This assessment is based on the costs of the program, the lack of adequate testing, and the potential for far more cost-effective countermeasures. For these reason, active defences are the most uncertain leg of the new triad. Revitalized defence infrastructure A revitalized defence infrastructure is a key component of the new triad. In that regard, this strategic concept incorporates the long-standing US interest in maintaining overwhelming advantage in the revolution in military affairs (RMA). The NPR does, however, pay particular attention to the infrastructure of its nuclear platforms. Numerous problems with the current infrastructure are identified: solid rocket motor design, development and testing; technology for current and
6 See Department of Defense, Missile Defense Operations Announcement, Department of Defense News Release, No. 642-02 (December 17, 2002), available at www.defenselink.mil; Wade Boese, Missile Defense Post-ABM Treaty: No System, No Arms Race, Arms Control Today (June 2003); and Wade Boese, US Aims to Deploy Space-Based Missile Interceptors in Five Years, Arms Control Today (March 2003). Another highly controversial idea being studied is the use of nuclear-tipped interceptors instead of hit-to-kill vehicles.

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future strategic systems; improved surveillance and assessment capabilities; command and control platforms and systems; and design, development, and production of radiation-hardened parts.7 Perhaps most controversially, the NPR sees the need for the nuclear infrastructure to have a revitalized capability to design, develop, and manufacture new warheads, alongside an improved 18-month readiness to resume nuclear testing. This has important implications for the new triads explicit emphasis on earth-penetrating warhead modifications and the potential development of new miniature nuclear weapons. While it is difficult to assess the changes underway in the US nuclear infrastructure, the Bush administrations FY2003 budget request for the stockpile stewardship program asks for US$5.9 billion, which is twice that of 1995 (US$2.9 billion), and nearly one and one-half times the US$4.1 billion spent on average during the Cold War. Plans are underway to refurbish and modify the various components of these weapons. Work on advanced nuclear weapons research and production facilities has already begun. On 22 April 2003, the Los Alamos national laboratory announced the creation of the first plutonium pit since 1989; this signifies the re-establishment of US capability to remake or produce new plutonium cores for nuclear weapons, a capability that was lost in 1989. This is only one component of a larger, more ambitious plan to obtain a significant pit production capability. The Bush administration, for example, plans to build the modern pit facility, which will be able to produce between 125 and 450 pits per year.8 While the NPR states that it supports the continued nuclear testing moratorium, and only seeks to move the readiness time down to a year or less, the reports emphasis on new nuclear capabilities indicates a

7 Nuclear Posture Review, 30. 8 This production range can be found in US Department of Energy, Draft Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on Stockpile Stewardship and Management for a Modern Pit Facility (Washington, DC: Department of Energy, May 2003). Other facilities under development include the National Ignition Facility (NIF), the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrotest Facility, and pulsed power technology facilities. These data, alongside data from subcritical tests, are planned to be integrated through the accelerated strategic computing initiative (ASCI), a multi-billion dollar supercomputing program involving the USs leading universities. See The Shape of Things to Come: The Nuclear Posture Review, Missile Defense, and the Dangers of a New Arms Race, Western States Legal Foundation Report (April 2002).

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strong potential for renewed nuclear testing. This view has been supported by comments from Dr. Dale Klein, assistant to the secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs. This emphasis on nuclear testing is reiterated in a two-page memorandum circulated to members of the nuclear weapons council (NWC) by E. C. Aldridge Jr., undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics. This memo recommends that US nuclear weapons laboratories assess the technical risks associated with maintaining the nuclear arsenal without testing. The memo was followed by a 10 January meeting of significant nuclear weapons managers to plan for an NWC stockpile stewardship conference. The notes of the meeting, which were obtained by the Los Alamos study group, indicates a desire to study the need to make testing modifications in order to build the new kinds of nuclear weapons advocated in the NPR.9
T H E I N C O R P O R AT I O N O F C O U N T E R P RO L I F E R AT I O N

The new triad places a heavy emphasis on NBC-armed states. Offensive strike systems, for example, have been justified by the need to neutralize HDBTs and NBC weapons and facilities associated with rogue states. One can also see the same association with the new triads focus on mobile and relocatable targets, something that was especially problematic against Iraqs mobile Scud missiles during the Gulf War. As the NPR states,
North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies. All have longstanding hostility toward the United States and its security partners; North Korea and Iraq in particular have been chronic military concerns. All sponsor or harbour terrorists, and all have active [weapons of mass destruction] WMD and missile programs.10

While the NPR does focus on this threat, it would be a mistake to consider this recent development in US nuclear policy a fundamental change. Throughout the 1990s, the United States has increasingly emphasized the threat posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons and
9 See Jace Radke, Defense Official: Nuke Tests at NTS Are Likely, Las Vegas Times (August 14, 2002), available at www.nukewatch.org; and Dan Stober and Jonathan Landay, US ponders resumption of nuclear weapons tests, The Mercury News (November 16, 2002), available at www.bayarea.com. The minutes of the meeting can be found at www.lasg.org. 10 Nuclear Posture Review, 16.
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their delivery systems. Indeed, when the Pentagon studied various threat scenarios in the early 1990s, with scenarios ranging form peacekeeping to large-scale regional conflicts, only those involving NBC weapons posed a direct threat to the US.11 Washingtons response was the development of a counterproliferation doctrine. It is this doctrine that provides the foundation for the new triad. The US interest in counterproliferation stems in large part from the process of threat redefinition triggered by the end of the Cold War. This process can be clearly seen in the January 1988 report of the US commission on integrated long-term strategy, entitled Discriminate Deterrence. This report, while certainly emphasizing the Soviet threat, also focused on the potential threat posed by emerging regional powers and their rapidly expanding conventional and non-conventional military capabilities. As the report goes on to note, The [expanding] arsenals of the lesser powers will make it riskier and more difficult for the superpowers to intervene in regional wars. The US ability to support its allies around the world will increasingly be called into question.12 Highly visible statements by senior US officials quickly followed. In December 1988, William H. Webster, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, spoke at length on the dangers posed by the proliferation of advanced weapons, particularly ballistic missiles and NBC weapons. This was soon followed by the comments of Pentagon officials, who emphasized the threat of regional military powers and the increased likelihood of expansionist tendencies in such states. Near the end of the 1980s, a series of Congressional committee hearings on the dangers of horizontal proliferation took place. Initially, this threat redefinition stressed the proliferation of conventional military capabilities and did not take into account the political character of the countries in question. An assortment of countries were considered possible threats, including Egypt, Israel, India, South Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and China. However, borrowing from the Reagan administrations growing concern for state-sponsored terrorism, the threat redefinition began to emphasize the political character
11 See Gilles Andreani, The Disarray of US Non-Proliferation Policy, Survival 41 (Winter 1999-2000). 12 US Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988), 9. Quoted in Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: Americas Search for a New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), 19.

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of these regimes. The US began to characterize hostile (or seemingly hostile) Third World States with large military forces and nascent WMD capabilities as rogue states or nuclear outlaws bent on sabotaging the prevailing world order.13 This rogue states doctrine would go on to guide US international security policy for the postCold War era. Following from this threat redefinition, the US counterproliferation doctrine was unveiled in Secretary of Defense Les Aspins speech to the National Academy of Sciences on 7 December 1993. He outlined a Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI) as a supplement to the traditional emphasis on non-proliferation. Counterproliferation was the Defense Departments new initiative to apply US military capabilities to address the threat posed by NBC weapons and their delivery systems. According to Barry R. Schneider, the CPI introduced a new mission and new requirements, including improved active and passive defences; the development of large area decontamination capabilities; improved deterrence against regional adversaries armed with small but growing NBC arsenals; and improved counterforce capabilities to destroy NBC weapons and delivery systems.14 Active defences like BMD are central to US counterproliferation efforts. Passive measures are meant to mitigate the impact of an NBCcontaminated environment on units, personnel and civilians. Active defences play an integral and complementary role in the reduction of missiles, aircraft, and other NBC delivery systems from successfully arriving at their targets; this lessens the degree of NBC-contamination and, therefore, passive defence requirements. This would allow the US to more freely undertake counterproliferation missions against NBCarmed rogue states, while reducing the probability of successful NBC retaliation by those adversaries. While the Cold War emphasized a multi-tiered BMD system in order to limit the impact of a Soviet nuclear strike, the Clinton administration placed particular emphasis on theatre missile defence programs. A TMD system would use a hit-to-kill interceptor to protect a small area from a small number of ballistic missiles. The impetus for TMD can be attributed to the threat that short- and medium-range missiles armed with NBC weapons pose to US forward-deployed forces, bases, and
13 Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws, 26. 14 Barry R. Schneider Future war and counterproliferation: US military responses to NBC proliferation threats (Westport, Conn., London: Praeger, 1999), 46.

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regional allies. To counter this growing proliferation threat, theatre missile defence programs proliferated in the 1990s. The Clinton administration also oversaw the gradual if reluctant movement towards NMD, which would be designed to protect the continental United States from a small number of ballistic missiles. Possible scenarios include an accidental or inadvertent attack by Russia or an intentional attack by a rogue state. Significant pressure for a national missile defence capability came in July of 1998, with the release of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, which stated that new ballistic missileequipped nations like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would be able to inflict major destruction on the US within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq).15 This dire warning, alongside the Iranian testing of a Shahab-3 missile and the North Korean testing of a Taepo Dong-1 missile, created the impetus for the further developing of a NMD system. Not surprisingly, the Clinton administration quickly signed the 1999 National Missile Defense Act. Counterproliferation was originally conceived as a conventional doctrine. However, counterproliferation missions were increasingly (and often secretly) incorporated into the nuclear targeting policy of the United States. In March of 1990, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) published a military net assessment that cited the increasingly capable Third World threats as a new justification for maintaining nuclear weapons. Three months later, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney provided testimony to the Senate Appropriations Committee. This was the first instance when a high-level official specifically used the dangers of NBC weapons proliferation as a rationale for maintaining the US nuclear deterrent.16 This planning received a significant impetus in the aftermath of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. As Operation Desert Storm came to a close, the Bush administration released a nuclear weapons employment policy
15 This report departed sharply from the traditional intelligence communitys assessment of the ballistic missile threat. For instance, the November 1995 national intelligence estimate (NIE) predicted that a threat to the US would not take place for at least 15 years. The executive summary of the report can be found at www.house.gov. 16 Hans Kristensen and Joshua Handler, The USA and Counterproliferation: A New and Dubious Role for US Nuclear Weapons, Security Dialogue 27, no. 4 (1996), 387399.

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(NUWEP) which directed the military to plan for nuclear operations against states developing NBC weapons. In March 1991, the joint military net assessment identified the utility of non-strategic weapons for 3 these postCold War roles, and recommended upgrades for the US C capabilities. Los Alamos analysts like Thomas Dowler and Josoph Howard even argued for the development of tinynukes for counterproliferation missions, with potential yields ranging from 10 tons to one kiloton. These developments led General Lee Butler, the commander of Strategic Command (STRATCOM), to establish a strategic deterrence study group, chaired by former Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Reed and organized by the joint strategic targeting planning staff (the organization that develops the SIOPs). The Reed panel, as it became known, began a process of new threat monitoring that led eventually to the conclusion that nuclear targeting was needed against every reasonable adversary, even non-nuclear weapon states (NNWSs). While certain officials were alarmed with this notion, since it would effectively negate the critical negative security assurances given to the NNWSs, nuclear war planning for contingences in the third world continued. This planning was codified on 1 June 1992 with SIOP-93, the first nuclear war plan to formally incorporate NBC targets in third world states. While the Bush and Yeltsin unilateral disarmament initiatives complicated this process, an updated NUWEP-82 and joint strategic capabilities plan (JSCP), which directed the military objectives of nuclear targeting, continued to emphasize these targeting options. While the Clinton administration was publicly ambiguous on the utility of nuclear weapons serving as a deterrent against CB capabilities, military planners were under no such illusion. By April of 1993, the JCS published its first version of Joint Nuclear Doctrine 3-12. This document formally incorporated third world NBC targets into US nuclear planning. This was quickly followed by SIOP-94, which reduced the absolute number of targets but continued to emphasize the importance of counterproliferation missions in US nuclear plans. A joint intelligence centre was established by General Butler for the assessment of the dangers of NBC proliferation from STRATCOMs perspective. It was also at this time that STRATCOM established the strategic planning study group to develop a flexible, adaptive, and global strategic war planning system (SWPS) to replace the archaic Cold War-era guidance planning system. The SWPS refers to the facilities used to analyze

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targets and assign and deliver nuclear weapons. In the process of SWPS modernization, the traditional distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear planning would be erased. Even weapon systems would be modernized, as shown by the development of the navy SLBM retargeting system (SRS) and the air force rapid execution and combat targeting (REACT) system. The eventual goal of SWPS modernization was to create a revolutionary Living SIOP, where the US would be able to generate SIOPs in less than 24 hours (rather than the standard 14-18 months), retarget close to 1,000 targets per day, and be able to produce regional nuclear contingency plans involving only a few tactical weapons.17 The Clinton administration did attempt a major nuclear policy review in its 1994 nuclear posture review. Despite the best efforts of Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, the 1994 NPR codified STRATCOMs growing interest in using nuclear weapons for counterproliferation (to deter NBC acquisition or use, for example).18 In its silver books project, classified plans were developed for nuclear strikes against a range of suspected NBC facilities situated in rogue states. These plans contained specific targets, weapons assigned against them, timelines for attack (hours, days, weeks), rules of engagement, expected collateral damage, and associated risks.19 Buoyed by its success, STRATCOM even attempted to expand its mandate by obtaining the responsibility for nuclear planning in regional theatres, which was under the purview of the regional commands.
17 For more on many of these nuclear developments, see British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy, BASIC Research Report (February 1998); Hans M. Kristensen, US Nuclear Strategy Reform in the 1990s, Working Paper (Berkeley, CA: The Nautilus Institute, March 2000); and Hans Kristensen, The Matrix of Deterrence: US Strategic Command Force Structure Studies (Berkeley, CA: The Nautilus Institute, May 2001). 18 The 1994 NPR Working Group #5 discussed the relationship between nuclear policy and counterproliferation. This working group reached a close consensus on many issues, including the need to maintain a full range of nuclear options against proliferant nations; the need to more forcefully state the nuclear contribution to counterproliferation; the negligible impact of the nuclear posture on terrorism; the limitations of deterring NBC acquisition; and the importance of forward-deployed nuclear forces. The role of STRATCOM in this particular working group was also highly significant. Further information on the 1994 NPR can be found at the Nautilus Institute website, available at www.nautilus.org. 19 William M. Arkin, Iran in the crosshairs, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51, (July/August 1995), 80. Silver books stands for silver or strategic installation list of vulnerability effects and results.

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In the end, this controversial project was terminated in 1995, and

STRATCOMs ambition to centralize counterproliferation under its com-

mand was stymied; it would be forced to share nuclear planning responsibility in coordination with the regional commands. But further planning for third world nuclear contingencies soon followed. STRATCOMs strategic advisory group (SAG), for example, undertook a review of nuclear deterrence in regional conflicts, and even did studies in which it tested its conclusions against adversaries like Iran. Regional nuclear planning for counterproliferation was enshrined in the JCSs 1996 Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations. The Clinton administration accepted this new counterproliferation role for nuclear weapons in Presidential Decision Directive 60 (PDD-60).20 The administration of George W. Bush has placed counterproliferation squarely at the forefront of US national security. In its 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, the administration acknowledged the need for proactive counterproliferation measures to be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies.21 The emphasis is on a continued US ability to prevail in conflicts with NBC-armed adversaries in any future wars of counterproliferation. Counterproliferation was further elaborated in National Security Presidential Directive 17 (NSPD-17, or the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction).22 The most significant aspect of the current administrations doctrine has been the clarification of what has always been left unstated: whether these options were confined to wartime measuresor whether they also included the pre-emptive use of force.23 The concept
20 Another notable aspect of PDD-60 was its strong emphasis on China. This too was largely due to STRATCOMs growing interest in targeting Chinese nuclear forces, evident in the numerous China scenarios in its Sun City Extended study. In 1998, China was formally incorporated as a target into SIOP-99. See Kristensen, US Nuclear Strategy Reform in the 1990s; and Kristensen, The Matrix of Deterrence: US Strategic Command Force Structure Studies. 21 The National Security Strategy of the United States (September 2002), 14, www.whitehouse.gov. 22 NSPD-17 has also been codified under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 4 (HSPD-4). While the classified document has yet to be released, the public version (National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction) can be found at www.fas.org. Three interrelated components were identified: interdiction, deterrence, and defence and mitigation. 23 Thomas G. Mahnken, A Critical Appraisal of the Defense Counterproliferation Iniative, National Security Studies Quarterly (Summer 1999), 93.

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of pre-emption was codified in the 2002 national security strategy document, and clearly demonstrated in the 2003 counterproliferation war in Iraq. But pre-emption is based on notions of necessity and of an imminent danger of attack. By emphasizing the unique capabilities and objectives of its adversaries, the Bush administration has redefined what constitutes an imminent danger. The potential attainment of dangerous capabilities may now necessitate the use of military force. This is much more closely associated with ideas of preventive war, and harkens back to the 1940s and 1950s, when the US contemplated preventive action to forestall the Soviet acquisition of nuclear capabilities. In the postCold War period, the US has emphasized unilaterally countering NBC proliferation through the research and development of active defences and offensive weapon systems (conventional and nuclear). The purpose of counterproliferation is to eliminate the perceived asymmetrical advantage enjoyed by rogue states. Many of the sophisticated weapons systems emphasized in the new triad are the latest manifestation of weaponry designed for counterproliferation missions. Rather than a dramatic departure from existing policy, the Bush administrations changes should be seen as the latest manifestation of a postCold War trend towards counterproliferation.
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While the NPR has yet to become an official government policy, many of its key components are currently in the process of funding and development. In fact, much of the new triadincluding missile defence and conventional and nuclear strike systemshas been under development for many years as part of ongoing US efforts at counterproliferation. Given the continuity that is evident in US nuclear weapons policy, it is highly likely that the new triad will remain an important strategic concept for future administrations. This concept is not, however, limited to matters of nuclear weapons, or even the counterproliferation of rogue states. The new triad is also an integral component of the emerging US grand strategy of primacy. According to Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, this refers to a situation in which US capabilities are sufficient, operating on their own, to cow all potential challengers and to comfort all coalition partners.24 With its
24 See Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy, International Security 21, (Winter 1996/1997), 32.
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emphasis on the development of even more versatile and effective strategic capabilities, the new triad is premised on the idea of nuclear primacya nuclear corollary to current Pentagon efforts to achieve full spectrum dominance. The US has consistently sought to achieve some form of nuclear primacy. During the Cold War, despite popular preconceptions, the United States only grudgingly accepted mutually assured destruction (MAD) with the Soviet Union, and spent much of the 1970s and 1980s attempting to escape from it. Counterforce and damage limitation capabilities were the little-acknowledged foundation for US nuclear deterrence. The result was the Reagan administrations emphasis on counterleadership decapitation strikes and its desire to achieve a modicum of superiority in the form of escalation dominancethe development of military capabilities that can contain or defeat the adversary at all levels of violence with the possible exception of the highest.25 The search for escalation dominance over possible adversaries did not dissipate with the collapse of the Soviet Union but its focus was transferred to the postCold War threat of NBC-armed rogue states. While still unable to fully threaten US territory directly, rogue states will increasingly be able to launch devastating, unconventional attacks on US regional allies and basing areas. This could lead to the deterrence of any US regional intervention or, at the very least, intra-war deterrence in the midst of a US intervention. In consequence, the US began to accelerate its counterproliferation efforts as a means to mitigate this asymmetrical advantage and to ensure continued US escalation dominance over these potential challengers. As a strategic concept, the new triad embodies this long-standing need for escalation dominance. In this most recent manifestation, the explicit emphasis is on rogue states. But these capabilities are also a concern for established nuclear powers. Escalation dominance over rogue states, at least as envisioned by the Bush administration, implies escalation dominance over countries like Russia and China. This brings out questions of strategic stability. What impact will this have

25 Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 131. For more on the consistent US desire to maintain some form of nuclear primacy, see Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd Edition (New York: St. Martins Press, 1989); and Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

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on US strategic relations with both countries? How will Russia and China react to these developments? Will their reactions lead to the destabilization of their respective relationships with the United States? Are we seeing the beginnings of a new arms race? The established nuclear relationship between the US and Russia remains a matter of great strategic importance. Both sides still maintain thousands of deployed nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, alongside further thousands of reserve weapons that are easily redeployable. It is also clear that the capabilities envisioned in the new triad will have an impact on the survivability of the Russian nuclear arsenal. The current emphasis on smaller, more accurate and useable nuclear weapons against HDBTs will give the United States an increased capability for counterforce targeting and decapitation strikes against the Russian deterrent. Advanced EPWs will, for example, be necessary for the destruction of key facilities in the Yamantau and Kosvinsky mountains in central and southern Russia. The Yamantau facility is a leadership relocation facility that is expected to be operating soon. The Kosvinsky facility houses the Russian nuclear command system and is a critical link to Russias dead hand communications network for semi-automatic retaliation in the event of a decapitating strike.26 The development of long-range conventional strike options, and their incorporation in US nuclear war planning, will only increase the counterforce capabilities of the United States. The new triads emphasis on a multi-tiered BMD system is also a point of concern. Of course, the eventual system will not provide a shield against Russian nuclear forces. Active defences designed for one or even a handful of nuclear weapons will have a negligible impact on the vast Russian arsenal. And unlike rogue states, Russia has substantial capabilities in and experience with countermeasures for such a defensive capability. But the interplay between counterforce weapons and active defences is not an issue that should be dismissed lightly. Together, this will substantially increase US first-strike capabilities. The US will have the capacity to shift the ratio of warheads to its own advantage following a cycle of counterforce nuclear exchanges. The end result will be escalation dominance over Russian nuclear forces. As
26 See Bruce Blair, We keep buiding nukes for all the wrong reasons, The Washington Post (May 25, 2003), available at www.cdi.org. For more on the Russian dead hand system, see Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces.

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noted by Douglas A. Ross, a government possessing this capacity is thought better able to resort to nuclear threats in a crisis situation, as well as to impose satisfactory war termination conditions on the adversary.27 This situation will likely trigger modifications of Russias nuclear policy as the Russians address the growing qualitative gap between their respective nuclear arsenals and attempt to secure the survivability of the countrys second-strike capabilities. There are some signs of this occurring, as witnessed by Russias decision to withdraw from the START II Treaty; to maintain its remaining inventory of MIRVed ICBMs; to deploy a new ICBM (the SS-27); and to develop a fifth-generation submarine, new SLBMs, and a nuclear variant of a new cruise missile. But these developments should be placed in their proper context. Many of these weapon platforms have been under development for many years, often for reasons more to do with a desire for national prestige than with a desire for a secure and survivable nuclear deterrent. It would be easy to overestimate the importance of the new triad as a causal factor. But as the United States increases its counterforce and missile defence capabilities, the need to maintain a survivable nuclear deterrent will become an even more salient issue. A growing emphasis on modernizing the Russian nuclear arsenalby hardening missile silos or by developing countermeasures or active defences should be expected. Russia may also emphasis on its hair-triggered launch on warning nuclear posture in order to protect the deterrent from a hypothetical US first-strike.28 However, an arms race between Russia and the United States is not on the immediate horizon. The gradual modernization of Russias
27 Douglas A. Ross, Coping with Star Wars: Issues for Canada and the Alliance, Aurora Papers 2 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1985), 20. Escalation dominance can also refer to conventional as well as nuclear dominance. For a good recent example of this, see Robert S. Ross, Navigating the Taiwan Straits: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and US-China Relations, International Security 27, (Fall 2002), 48-85. 28 This posture has its roots in the Soviet Unions highly centralized command and control arrangement, which was particularly vulnerable to US decapitation capabilities. To offset this vulnerability, the Soviet Union began emphasizing the early release of its nuclear command authority and the launching of its nuclear weapons in the event that its early warning systems detect a US missile strike. This launch on warning posture survived the collapse of the Soviet Union. See Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993) and Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces.

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nuclear forces, partly as a response to the new triad, does not mean that an incipient arms race is underway. The nuclear developments of both countries are only partly being driven by calculations of each others capabilities; other considerations, by and large, play much more prominent roles. Of course, there is a possibility that small adjustments to their respective nuclear arsenal may lead to some possibly dangerous policy options. A case in point is the Russian reliance of a launch on warning posture, where a mistaken warning may lead to an inadvertent nuclear strike. But the likelihood that this nuclear relationship will be severely destabilized in the near-term is negligible. It is simply too well established, and lacks the aggressive, adversarial characteristics apparent during the Cold War. The nuclear relationship between China and the United States has its own unique characteristics. It is, for instance, a much more asymmetrical relationship. The Chinese nuclear arsenal is premised on the idea of minimum deterrence, and will likely remain only a fraction of the US arsenals size. This makes the new triads emphasis on counterforce and damage limitation capabilities much more problematic than in the Russian case. A splendid first-strike by the nuclear and conventional forces of the United States, alongside some missile defence capability for further damage limitation, is a real possibility against Chinas small number of liquid-fuelled ICBMs. In this case, escalation dominance is less demanding. It is, however, difficult to gauge the impact of this situation on the emerging strategic relationship between the two countries. This stems largely from Chinas ongoing work to modernize and secure its nuclear deterrent. For Chinese leaders, the definition of what constitutes minimum deterrence is evolving: the need to have a limited secondstrike capability has now become a priority.29 A good example of this modernization process can be seen in Chinas development of the three-stage, land-mobile, solid-fuelled DF-31 ICBM, with a range of 8,000 km, and the possible use of MIRV technology. Other missiles in development include the JL-2 (a submarine-launched version of the DF-31) and the still tentative DF-41. This emphasis on nuclear modernization appears to support the notion that China is reacting directly to developments in the United
29 For a good examination of Chinas changing nuclear deterrence posture, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Chinas New Old Thinking: The Concept of Limited Deterrence, International Security 20, (Winter 1995/96), 5-42.

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States. China has frequently voiced concern over the US fixation on active defences. This was initially confined to the development of TMD, which was seen as a possible shield for US and Japanese military forces. But it became more vocal with the signing of the 1996 joint declaration on the alliance for the 21st century and the 1997 new guidelines for US-Japan defence co-operation, and by the eventual US decision to develop an NMD system. It is therefore tempting to assume that the new triads very explicit emphasis on offensive strike capabilities, active defences, and other tools for escalation dominance will lead to a strategically destabilizing Chinese reaction, and perhaps even an arms race. The new triad will, to some degree, affect Chinas nuclear deterrent. The perceived need for a survivable nuclear deterrentin the face of growing American emphasis on counterforce and damage limitation capabilitieswill become an even more important priority. The unequal nature of their respective capabilities, and the more uncertain long-term relationship between the two countries, does make strategic instability a possibility. But it is very easy to overestimate the new triads impact on this strategic relationship. First, like Russia, the security threat posed by the United States is only one factor, among many other considerations: Chinas concerns over prestige vis--vis established nuclear powers and its rivalry with India may be more significant. Second, the need to make modifications on a nuclear deterrent, to make it more secure and survivable, does not mean that a destabilizing arms race is in the midst of formation. While relations between the two countries may contain some latent tension, this does not constitute a significant adversarial relationship by any means. Third, unlike Russia, China has had a long history of living under US nuclear superiority and first-strike capability; minimum deterrence has never been comparable, in any realistic way, to a survivable second-strike capability. This may have led China to undertake its current nuclear modernization program, but one should recall that it has been a gradual affair (much like Chinas military modernization in general) that does not foresee reaching any measure of real parity with the United States. In the end, the new triad will likely create an incentive for both Russia and China to modernize their nuclear forces. Survivability of the nuclear deterrent has certainly become an issue. But these technical and policy adjustments do not mean that strategic stability between the US and either country is in immediate risk, nor that an arms race

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dynamic will take hold. While the new triad and US escalation dominance may look destabilizing from a simple numbers perspective, one should recall that strategic stability is founded on relationships, not numbers.30 And US relations with both countries are much more co-operative than adversarial. There are, however, significant long-term dangers associated with the current emphasis on nuclear primacy. Strategic stability may be based on relationships, and this certainly mitigates the new triads immediate impact on Russian and Chinese threat perception. But one should recall that nuclear primacy is only one aspect of grand strategic primacy, a goal that the administration of George W. Bush appears intent on pursuing. Many have noted the limits of, and dangers associated with, this grand strategy, particularly to US relations with peer competitors like Russia and China.31 If these relationships become more adversarial, the new triad and nuclear primacy will have a much greater impact on the threat perception of these nuclear powers. With that in mind, the new triads impact on strategic stability between these relatively established nuclear powers is ambiguous and, in the longterm, uncertain.
CONCLUSION

The 2002 NPR proposed a new triad strategic conceptbased on offensive strike systems, active defences, and a revitalized defence infrastructureto guide US nuclear strategy. This concept is heavily indebted to the changing US threat perception in the postCold War period, namely its recognition of the threat posed by NBC weapons in the hands of irresponsible rogue states. The result has been the significant US emphasis on the conventional and unconventional counterproliferation capabilities that are integral components of the new triad. The new triad is also founded on the long-standing US desire to maintain nuclear primacy over other nuclear powers. This may leave countries like Russia and China little choice but to make modifications to their own nuclear arsenals. This in itself will not lead to an arms

30 See Frank P. Harvey, The future of strategic stability and nuclear deterrence, International Journal 58 (Spring 2003), 321-346. 31 For a good example, see Douglas A. Ross, Foreign policy challenges for Paul Martin: Canadas international security policy in an era of American hyperpower and continental vulnerability, International Journal 58 (Autumn 2003), 533-569.

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race. Modifications for a secure and survivable second-strike capability are necessary to ensure strategic stability. But the Bush administrations emphasis on grand strategic primacy does not auger well for future strategic stability. One of the most important conditions for a destabilizing arms race is the presence of an adversarial relationship. The current US relationships with both Russia and China, while periodically tense, are based much more on cooperation than conflict. This may change, however, in the face of an overt attempt by the United States to prevent the rise of a peer competitor. Much depends on further US action, often in areas that are not directly related to US nuclear strategy. For instance, the manner in which Washington deals with continued proliferation problems in the Middle East and northeast Asia will have important repercussions for the threat perception of Moscow and Beijing. If the US focuses more explicitly on maintaining escalation dominance over peer competitors, rather than simply rogue states, further balancing by these countries will also take place. Grand strategic primacy may make the capabilities envisioned in the new triad appear much more threatening. The new triad is a strategic concept that is heavily informed by the past. The postCold War US emphasis on counterproliferation is embedded in the new triad. The rationale for this strategic concept is founded in the long-standing US desire to maintain nuclear primacy and escalation dominance. But it is important to remember that this concept has its origins in the present day administration of George W. Bush. Nuclear primacy and escalation dominance must be placed in the context of a grand strategy founded on continued and unrivalled US predominance. In that context, the new triad does have destabilizing but dormant characteristics, which may be triggered in the future.

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