ON WHAT IS SIGNIFIED, PART II.

Bart A. Mazzetti

1
 PART II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VI. What names signify in the acceptation of the grammarian.

VII. On ‘things said’ in the logic of the second act.

VIII. That pragmata legetai, or ‘things said’, are lekta, or ‘sayables’.

IX. St. Augustine, De Dialectica: The elements of speaking.

X. On what is signified taken according to the parts of speech.

Appendix I: On what words signify in relation to their modes of signifying.

Appendix II: Texts and translations.

2
VI. What names signify in the acceptation of the grammarian.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 22, q. 1, art. 1, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

To the third it must be said that He [God] can be signified by a noun, a pronoun, a verb,
and a participle. For when it is said that a noun signifies a substance with a quality,
‘quality’ and ‘substance’ are not understood properly, according as the logician in making
distinctions takes the predicaments. But the grammarian takes ‘substance’ with respect
to the mode of signifying, and likewise ‘quality’; and the reason is, because what is
signified by the name is signified as something subsisting according as something can
be predicated of it, although in reality it not be subsisting, as ‘whiteness’ bespeaks what
signifies a substance, in order to differentiate it from the verb, which does not signify as
something subsisting [but rather as something inhering].1 And because in any name there is
to consider that from which the name is imposed, which is, so to speak, a principle of
making known; therefore in this respect it has the mode of a quality, according as a
quality or form is the principle of knowing a thing. And so, according to the Philo-
sopher, in one way the substantial form is called a ‘quality’. Nor does it matter with
respect to the signification of the name whether the principle of making known be the same
thing as what is signified by the name, as in abstract [names, like ‘humanity’], or diverse, as
in the [concrete] name ‘man’.2

1. Additional note on the name in the acceptation of the grammarian.

In light of In III Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, art. 3, c., where St. Thomas teaches that

in any name there are two things to consider: namely, that from which a name is imposed,
which is called the quality of the name, and that upon which it is imposed, which is called
the substance3 of the name. And a name, properly speaking, is said to signify the form or
quality from which the name is imposed; but it is said to suppose for that upon which it is
imposed— 4

1
“For certain ones signify inherently, not signifying the substance with respect to the mode of signifying
which grammarians consider, saying that the noun signifies a substance with a quality, such as verbs and
participles” (quaedam enim significant ut inhaerenter, non significantes substantiam quantum ad modum
significandi quem grammatici considerant dicentes, nomen significare substantiam cum qualitate, sicut verba
et participia....). (St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 9, q. 1, art. 2, c., tr. B.A.M.)
2
ad tertium dicendum, quod potest significari et nomine et pronomine et verbo et participio. cum enim
dicitur, quod nomen significat substantiam cum qualitate, non intelligitur qualitas et substantia proprie,
secundum quod logicus accipit praedicamenta distinguens. sed grammaticus accipit substantiam quantum ad
modum significandi, et similiter qualitatem; et ideo, quia illud quod significatur per nomen significatur ut
aliquid subsistens, secundum quod de eo potest aliquid praedicari, quamvis secundum rem non sit subsistens,
sicut albedo dicit, quod significat substantiam, ad differentiam verbi, quod non significat ut aliquid
subsistens. et quia in quolibet nomine est considerare id a quo imponitur nomen, quod est quasi principium
innotescendi, ideo quantum ad hoc habet modum qualitatis, secundum quod qualitas vel forma est
principium cognoscendi rem. unde, secundum philosophum, uno modo forma substantialis qualitas dicitur.
nec refert quantum ad significationem nominis, utrum principium innotescendi sit idem re cum eo quod
nomine significatur, ut in abstractis, vel diversum, ut in hoc nomine homo.
3
Compare Summa Theol., Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c.: alio modo dicitur substantia subiectum vel suppositum quod
subsistit in genere substantiae, “In another way the subject or supposit which subsists in the genus of sub-
stance is called ‘substance’”. And note how ‘substance’ names the supposit and not the ‘what’ here.
4
in quolibet nomine est duo considerare: scilicet id a quo imponitur nomen, quod dicitur qualitas nominis; et
id cui imponitur, quod dicitur substantia nominis: et nomen, proprie loquendo, dicitur significare formam
sive qualitatem, a qua imponitur nomen; dicitur vero supponere pro eo cui imponitur—

3
it may also be said that to signify a substance with a quality is to signify a nature or deter-
minate form or quality as existing in a supposit, a description comparable to one given by
St. Thomas further below.

2. In sum:

The grammarian takes what is signified by the name as something subsisting accor-
ding as something can be predicated of it, for which reason he speaks of the ‘substance’ of
a name. But inasmuch as it includes a principle of making known, he speaks of its ‘qual-
ity’ “according as a quality or form is the principle of knowing a thing”. The name, then, is
taken as something in which something inheres, but, as St. Thomas goes on to explain, the
verb and participle, as that which inheres in something else.

3. On concrete and abstract names.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 13, art. 1, obj. 2, ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

obj. 2. Further, every name is said either in the abstract [or ‘abstractly’] or in the concrete
[or ‘concretely’]. But names signifying concretely do not belong to God, since He is simple,
nor do names signifying abstractly, because they do not signify some complete subsisting
thing. Therefore, no name can be said of God.5

<…>

ad 2. To the second it must be said that because we arrive at knowledge of God from
creatures, and we name Him from them, the names which we attribute to God signify in this
way, according as they belong to material creatures, the knowledge of which is connatural to
us, as has been said above. And because in creatures of this sort the things which are
complete and subsisting are composed—in them, however, the form is not some complete
subsisting thing, but rather that by which something is—from this it follows that all names
imposed by us in order to signify some complete subsisting thing signify in concretion, as is
appropriate to composed things; but those [names] which are imposed by us in order to
signify simple forms do not signify something as subsisting, but as that by which something
is, as ‘whiteness’ signifies as that by which something is white. Therefore, since God is sim-
ple, and He also subsists, in order to signify His simplicity we attribute abstract names to
Him; and in order to signify His subsistence and perfection [we attribute to Him] concrete
names, although both kinds of name fall short of His mode, just as our intellect cannot know
Him as He is, according to this life.6

5
praeterea, omne nomen aut dicitur in abstracto, aut in concreto. sed nomina significantia in concreto, non
competunt deo, cum simplex sit, neque nomina significantia in abstracto, quia non significant aliquid
perfectum subsistens. ergo nullum nomen potest dici de deo.
6
ad secundum dicendum quod, quia ex creaturis in dei cognitionem venimus, et ex ipsis eum nominamus,
nomina quae deo attribuimus, hoc modo significant, secundum quod competit creaturis materialibus, quarum
cognitio est nobis connaturalis, ut supra dictum est. et quia in huiusmodi creaturis, ea quae sunt perfecta et
subsistentia sunt composita; forma autem in eis non est aliquid completum subsistens, sed magis quo aliquid
est, inde est quod omnia nomina a nobis imposita ad significandum aliquid completum subsistens, significant
in concretione, prout competit compositis; quae autem imponuntur ad significandas formas simplices,
significant aliquid non ut subsistens, sed ut quo aliquid est, sicut albedo significat ut quo aliquid est album.
quia igitur et deus simplex est, et subsistens est, attribuimus ei et nomina abstracta, ad significandam
simplicitatem eius; et nomina concreta, ad significandum subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius, quamvis
utraque nomina deficiant a modo ipsius, sicut intellectus noster non cognoscit eum ut est, secundum hanc
vitam.

4
4. Concrete and abstract names in sum:

Concrete names are imposed in order to signify some complete subsisting thing—
namely, the material creature—but in such things the form is not some complete subsisting
thing (sc. a hoc aliquid, or ‘this something’), but rather that by which something is, from
which it follows that such names signify in concretion, as is appropriate to composed
things (for in them what is perfect and subsisting is composed). But those names which are
imposed by us in order to signify simple forms do not signify something as subsisting but
as that by which something is, as ‘whiteness’ signifies as that by which something is white,
for which reason such names signify abstractly.

It will be observed that when one speaks of a ‘name’ without qualification, it typic-
ally means something signifying in concretion. Moreover, as the foregoing considerations
have made clear, when one considers the quality of a concrete name as such, he sees that it
itself can be a name, in which case one must understand the name as signifying a quality
determining a substance.

5. That every mode of substance is reduced to two things: a quid est or ‘what it is’, and to a
hoc aliquid or ‘this something’.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Meta., lect. 1, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

First, he proposes what he intends, that being is said in many ways, as was stated in the
fifth book, in which he distinguished the many ways in which names of this sort are said; the
reason being that that some being signifies a ‘what it is’ and a ‘this something’; that is,
‘substance’, such that by ‘what’ the essence of substance is understood, by ‘this some-
thing’, the supposit, to which two every mode of substance is reduced, as is determined in
the fifth book. But another signifies ‘quality’ or ‘quantity’, or one of the other pre-
dicaments. And since ‘being’ is said in so many ways, it is clear that among all beings the
first is that which is; that is, the being which signifies ‘substance’.7

6. The two things ‘substance’ signifies:

• a ‘what it is’ (= the quality of a name, the form or nature; that from which it is
taken for the purpose of signifying)
• a ‘this something’ (= the substance of a name, the supposit; that upon which it is
placed for the purpose of signifying)

In the foregoing texts one may observe the logical underpinnings of Priscian’s
(grammatical) definition of the noun: “It is proper to the noun to signify substance and
quality”.8

7
primo proponit intentum quod ens dicitur multipliciter, ut dictum est in quinto libro, in quo diviserat quoties
dicuntur huiusmodi nomina, quia quoddam ens significat quid est et hoc aliquid, idest substantiam; ut per
quid, intelligatur essentia substantiae, per hoc aliquid suppositum, ad quae duo omnes modi substantiae
reducuntur, ut in quinto est habitum. illud vero significat qualitatem vel quantitatem, aut aliquid aliorum
praedicamentorum. et cum ens tot modis dicatur, palam est quod inter omnia entia, primum est quod quid
est, idest ens quod significat substantiam.
8
Inst. gramm. 2.4.18 (= GL II, 55, 6): Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare.

5
 But as St. Thomas explains, “to signify a substance with a quality is to signify a
supposit with a nature or determinate form in which it subsists”;9 the way in which the
foregoing account is to be understood having been expounded in his Sentences commen-
tary, which we have remarked on above. In agreement with this view, St. Thomas explains
the difference of substance (cf. S.Th., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art. 2, c.) as being a kind of quality,
while in a subsequent text (cf. In V Meta. lect. 16, n. 1) he instances them by giving spe-
cific differences. Similarly, Aristotle states that “genus and species determine a quality
with respect to substance, for they signify such a substance” (Cat. 5, 3b 21).

7. What a name signifies in sum:

• a substance, which is a supposit; but a supposit is what subsists in the genus of sub-
stance (cf. S.Th., Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c.), being a ‘this something’
• a quality, which is a nature or determinate form in which a thing subsists; that is, a
thing does not merely subsist: it subsists in some nature, being a ‘what it is’

8. The logician’s consideration of names as distinguished from that of the grammarian.

For the propria of the grammarian’s treatment, cf. the following:

Further, we see that the grammarian regards the sentence as a construction rather than as a
sign of some actual state of affairs. Though with the logician and the philosopher he sup-
poses that the sentence is significant vocal sound, and thus intended to conform to what it
signifies, he does not concern himself formally with that aspect. Rather, he looks to the parts
of the sentence—the “constructibles”—and in view of the kinds of words they are and their
particular accidents (such as number and case), he judges whether they have been rightly put
together…. Thus, the right way of putting together a sentence is not reduced to the signifi-
cation of the words, but to the mode in which they have been adapted to construction, how-
ever this may be related to their signification…. (Marcus Berquist, unpublished paper on
Speculative Grammar, “The Art and Science of Grammar”, p. 10)

In the light of the foregoing discussion, we may see how the logician’s consider-
ation of the name or noun differs from that of the grammarian. For, as St. Thomas Aquinas
explains, inasmuch as “....logic is ordered to taking knowledge of things, the signification
of vocal sounds, which is immediate to the very conceptions of the intellect....,”10 is its
concern, whereas the grammarian deals with words insofar as they are adapted to enter into
construction, in virtue of which relation he understands them as “parts of speech”, where
‘speech’ means the sentence. In fine, he is properly concerned not with their signification,
but with their modes of signifying. But to see how this difference affects their understand-
ing of names, we need to take some examples:

• ‘Socrates’, ‘Plato’ (first substances)

• ‘man’, ‘animal’ (second substances)
• ‘white’ (an accident, signified in the manner of an accident)
• ‘whiteness’ (an accident, but signified in the manner of a substance)

9
significare substantiam cum qualitate, est significare suppositum cum natura vel forma determinata in qua
subsistit. (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 1, ad 3) Cf. the formulation I have adduced from In III Sent. above.
10
...logica ordinatur ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam, significatio vocum, quae est immediata ipsis con-
ceptionibus intellectus....

6
 Now when the logician looks at names of first substances, he sees that they signify
a ‘this something’ subsisting in some nature, as Socrates or Plato are each individual and
one in number subsisting in human nature. But names like ‘man’ or ‘animal’ appear to sig-
nify in the same way: that is, the appearance of the word suggests that they signify a ‘this
something’ when, in fact, they signify a sort of something, with the underlying subject not
being one in number, but many; there being many subjects admitting the predicates ‘man’
or ‘animal’. Now when the logician looks at a name like ‘whiteness’, he observes that it
signifies in a manner similar to that of ‘man’—that is, in the manner of something that ex-
ists through itself and not in another. Yet it signifies an accident, the being of which is to
be in, in light of which distinction he recognizes the need to distinguish the mode or man-
ner in which a thing is signified from what it signifies. Hence ‘whiteness’ differs from
‘man’ in that the former signifies an accident, but the latter, a substance, whereas they both
agree in signifying in the manner of a substance. Likewise, as being the principle of
making known, in such things the form or nature is signified in the manner of a quality.
Hence, whereas the logician takes them as signifying members of categories, the grammar-
ian takes ‘substance’ and ‘quality’ modaliter, recognizing them as principles constituting a
part of speech, the realization of which brings home to the student of these scientias ser-
mocinales the related though distinct formalities of their respective considerations.

9. Supplement: On fallacies in the appearance of the words: Aristotle, Soph. Ref., ch. 22
(178b 37—178b 10) (tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge).

Again, there is the proof that there is a ‘third man’ distinct from Man and from individual
men. But that is a fallacy, for ‘Man’, and indeed every general predicate, denotes not an
individual substance, but a particular quality, or the being related to something in a
particular manner, or something of that sort. Likewise also in the case of ‘Coriscus’ and
‘Coriscus the musician’ there is [197a] the problem, ‘Are they the same or different?’ For
the one denotes an individual substance and the other a quality, so that it cannot be iso-
lated; though it is not the isolation which creates the ‘third man’, but the admission that it is
an individual substance. For ‘Man’ cannot be an individual substance, as Callias is. Nor
is the case improved one whit even if one were to call the element he has [5] isolated not an
individual substance but a quality: for there will still be the one beside the many [= the
universal], just as ‘Man’ was. It is evident then that one must not grant that what is a com-
mon predicate applying to a class [genus] universally is an individual substance, but
must say that it denotes either a quality, or a relation, or a quantity, or something of that
kind. [10]

10. In sum:

• ‘man’ is a general predicate and so does not denote an individual substance

• ‘Coriscus’ denotes an individual substance, but ‘man’ a quality
• ‘man’ is a “one beside the many”, and hence a universal, whereas ‘Coriscus’ is a
‘this something’ (this last point being presupposed here)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Fallaciis ad Quosdam Nobiles Artistas (On Fallacies: For the
Benefit of Some Gentlemen Students for an Arts Degree), from cap. 10 (tr. B.A.M.):

On the fallacy of the appearance of the words [figurae dictionis] follows.

7
 The appearance of the words, as it is taken here, is the likeness of one word to another, just
as something is called ‘made to the appearance of another’ which is made similar to it. And
so the fallacy of the appearance of the words is a deception arising from the fact that some
word similar to another appears to have the same mode of signifying when it does not
have it: as the word ‘man’ appears to signify a ‘this something’ by reason of the like-
ness it has to names signifying particular substances. And so in this fallacy there is not a
true manyness, but an illusory [phantasticum] one, because one word does not signify many
things according to the truth of the matter, but it has one mode of signifying and appears to
have another. The cause of the appearance is the likeness of one word to another word; but
the cause of its non-existence is a different mode of signifying.11

Cf. ibid., excerpt from cap. 10 (tr. B.A.M.):

But it must be understood that a change of predicaments with respect to the thing signified
does not produce the fallacy of the appearance of the words, but [a change] with respect to
the mode of signifying. For ‘whiteness’ signifies a quality, but it signifies it in the man-
ner of a substance because it does not signify it as inhering. But ‘white’ signifies it in
the manner of a quality because it does signify it as inhering. And so the following is not
the fallacy of the appearance of the words: ‘Whatever you saw yesterday, you see today.
You saw whiteness yesterday. Therefore you see whiteness today.’12

The third mode arises from the fact that some word which signifies a quale quid appears to
signify a hoc aliquid, and this happens when a quale quid is changed into a hoc aliquid. And
to signify a quale quid means what signifies a nature common to a genus or species,13
according as it pertains to the third mode. But to signify a hoc aliquid [means] what
signifies a particular substance.14

Now if a quale quid be taken according as it pertains to the genus of quality, thus to
change a quale quid to a hoc aliquid pertains to the second mode,15 as: ‘(The) white runs.
Socrates is white. Therefore Socrates runs.’16

11
sequitur de fallacia figurae dictionis. figura dictionis, prout hic sumitur, est similitudo unius dictionis ad
alteram, sicut aliquid dicitur ad figuram alterius factum quod ei assimilatur: unde fallacia figurae dictionis
est deceptio proveniens ex eo quod aliqua dictio similis alteri dictioni videtur habere eumdem modum
significandi, cum tamen non habeat: ut haec dictio homo videtur significare hoc aliquid propter simili-
tudinem quam habet cum nominibus significantibus substantias particulares; et sic in hac fallacia non est
multiplex verum, sed phantasticum, quia una dictio non significat plura secundum veritatem rei, sed habet
unum modum significandi, et videtur habere alium. causa apparentiae est similitudo unius dictionis cum alia
dictione; causa vero non existentiae est diversus modus significandi.
12
et est notandum quod non facit fallaciam figurae dictionis mutatio praedicamentorum quantum ad rem
significatam, sed quantum ad modum significandi. albedo enim significat qualitatem, sed significat eam per
modum substantiae, quia non significat eam ut inhaerentem; album autem significat eam per modum
qualitatis, quia significat eam ut inhaerentem. unde hic non est fallacia figurae dictionis: quicquid heri
vidisti, hodie vides. albedinem heri vidisti: igitur albedinem hodie vides.
13
But, as we have seen from Porphyry, inasmuch as the nature common to a genus or species is the ‘what it
is’, the quid est is observed to come together with the quale quid here, just as we have argued above.
14
tertius modus provenit ex eo quod aliqua dictio, quae significat quale quid, significare videtur hoc aliquid,
et contingit hoc quando quale quid mutatur in hoc aliquid. et dicitur significare, quale quid, quod significat
naturam communem generis vel speciei, secundum quod pertinet ad tertium modum; hoc aliquid vero
significat quod significat substantiam particularem.
15
“The second mode arises from the fact that some word which signifies in the manner of one predicament,
may appear to signify in the manner of another....” (secundus modus provenit ex eo quod aliqua dictio quae
significat per modum unius praedicamenti, potest videri significari per modum alterius....) (ibid.).
16
It seems to me that the example chosen exhibits rather a change from a hoc aliquid to a quale quid.

8
 And a paralogism is formed as follows: ‘Socrates is other than man. And he is (a) man:
Therefore he is other than himself.’ It does not follow, because it goes from ‘man’ to
‘Socrates’, and thus a quale quid is changed into a hoc aliquid. And to this mode is reduced
every deception arising from a change of the supposition of the terms. Whence when one
says, ‘Man is a species. Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is a species’, this goes from a
simple supposition to a discrete one, which changes the quale quid to a hoc aliquid.17

11. On the grammarian’s consideration of the name or noun.

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm. GL II, 55, 6 (tr. B.A.M.):

It is proper to the noun to signify substance and quality.18

Cf. ibid., GL II, 18, 6.7 (tr. B.A.M.):

The noun is a part of speech which assigns a quality, either common or proper, to each of
the subjects of a body or thing.19

N.B. The ‘subject’ of a body or thing is, in the case of first substances, the supposit which
subsists in some nature, while the nature is the quality which is attributed to it. And note
that the separate mentions of ‘body’ and ‘thing’ here argue Stoic influence, as one may ob-
serve by consulting any competent discussion of their thought.

12. Note on the definition of the name or noun.

As both Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas make clear, the principles involved in
every name are (1) the substance upon which and (2) the form or nature from which a name is
imposed to signify, observing here a distinction between names of first and second sub-
stances: in the case of the former, the substance being the supposit which subsists in some
nature, which is something individual and one in number; but in the latter, the many subjects
underlying the name, which are one only insofar as they admit a common predicate. In the
light of these observations, one must recognize that, while Priscian’s general definition of the
nomen is clear, his second requires clarification. For one may think that the difference be-
tween the common and proper noun does not lie in a supposed difference between a common
and proper quality—for the quality of any name is the same whether it belongs to a first sub-
stance or a second, as humanity is the same in Socrates or Plato, on the one hand, and in man,
on the other—“for Socrates is truly that which man is”, as St. Thomas states, and the nature
absolutely considered is neither singular nor universal, as the Angelic Doctor explains in a
text to be cited next—but rather in the difference between a subject which is a ‘this some-
thing’ and one which is not, and so is due to a principle of individuation.

17
si autem sumatur quale quid secundum quod pertinet ad genus qualitatis, sic mutare quale quid in hoc
aliquid pertinet ad secundum modum, ut: album currit. socrates est albus. ergo socrates currit; et formatur
sic paralogismus: socrates est alter ab homine. et ipse est homo: igitur est alter a seipso. non sequitur: quia
proceditur ab homine ad socratem, et sic mutatur quale quid in hoc aliquid. et ad hunc modum reducitur
omnis deceptio proveniens ex mutata suppositione terminorum. unde cum dicitur: homo est species. socrates
est homo: igitur socrates est species; hic proceditur a simplici suppositione ad discretam, quae mutat quale
quid in hoc aliquid.
18
Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare.
19
Nomen est pars orationis, quae unicuique subiectorum corporum seu rerum communem vel propriam
qualitatem distribuit.

9
Relevant to this discussion is the following: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia,
cap. 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

So, having seen what the name ‘essence’ signifies in composed substances, we must see
how it relates to the notions of genus, species, and difference. But since that to which the
notion of genus or species or difference belongs is predicated of this designated singular, it is
impossible that the notion of a universal, namely, of genus or species, belong to an essence
insofar as it is signified in the manner of a part, as by the names ‘humanity’ or ‘animality’.
And so Avicenna says that rationality is not a difference, but the principle of a difference;
and for the same reason humanity is not a species, nor animality a genus.20
Likewise also, one cannot say that the notion of genus or species belongs to an essence
insofar as it is a certain thing existing outside singular things (as the Platonists held), since in
this way genus and species are not predicated of this individual; for one cannot say that So-
crates is what is separate from him; nor again would that separate thing be a help in the
knowledge of this singular.21
And so it remains that the notion of genus or species belong to an essence insofar as it
is signified in the manner of a whole, as by the names ‘man’ or ‘animal’, according as it
contain implicitly and indistinctly this whole that is in the individual.22
But nature or essence so taken can be considered in two ways: in one way, according to its
proper notion, and this is an absolute consideration of it. And in this way nothing is true of it
except what belong to it insofar as it is of this sort. Whence the attribution is false, whatever
else be attributed to it. For example, rational and animal and other things which fall in his
definition belong to man by the fact that he is man. But white or black or whatever else of
this sort that does not belong to the notion of humanity does not belong to man by the fact
that he is man.23
Whence, if it be asked whether this nature thus considered can be called one or many,
neither must be conceded, since either one is outside the understanding of humanity
and either one can befall it. For if plurality were of its understanding it could never be
one, although it is one insofar as it is in Socrates. Likewise, if unity were of its notion,
then it would be one and the same thing in Socrates and Plato, nor could it be multi-
plied in many things.24

20
viso igitur quid significetur nomine essentiae in substantiis compositis videndum est quomodo se habeat ad
rationem generis, speciei et differentiae. quia autem id, cui convenit ratio generis vel speciei vel differentiae,
praedicatur de hoc singulari signato, impossibile est quod ratio universalis, scilicet generis vel speciei, con-
veniat essentiae secundum quod per modum partis significatur, ut nomine humanitatis vel animalitatis. et
ideo dicit avicenna quod rationalitas non est differentia, sed differentiae principium; et eadem ratione hu-
manitas non est species nec animalitas genus.
21
Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae, secundum quod est
quaedam res exsistens extra singularia, ut platonici ponebant, quia sic genus et species non praedicarentur
de hoc individuo; non enim potest dici quod socrates sit hoc quod ab eo separatum est; nec iterum illud
separatum proficeret in cognitionem huius singularis.
22
et ideo relinquitur quod ratio generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae, secundum quod significatur per
modum totius, ut nomine hominis vel animalis, prout implicite et indistincte continet totum hoc, quod in
individuo est.
23
natura autem vel essentia sic accepta potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo, secundum rationem
propriam, et haec est absoluta consideratio ipsius. et hoc modo nihil est verum de ea nisi quod convenit sibi
secundum quod huiusmodi. unde quicquid aliorum attribuatur sibi, falsa est attributio. verbi gratia, homini
in eo quod est homo convenit rationale et animal et alia, quae in diffinitione eius cadunt. album vero aut
nigrum vel quicquid huiusmodi, quod non est de ratione humanitatis, non convenit homini in eo quod homo.
24
unde si quaeratur utrum ista natura sic considerata possit dici una vel plures, neutrum concedendum est,
quia utrumque est extra intellectum humanitatis et utrumque potest sibi accidere. si enim pluralitas esset de
intellectu eius, nunquam posset esse una, cum tamen una sit secundum quod est in socrate. similiter si unitas
esset de ratione eius, tunc esset una et eadem socratis et platonis nec posset in pluribus plurificari.

10
 It is considered in another way according to the being it has in this thing or in that, and
thus something is predicated of it accidentally by reason of that in which it is, just as it is
said that man is white since Socrates is white, although this does not belong to him by the
fact that he is a man.25
Now this nature has a twofold being, one in singulars and another in the soul, and
according to both [kinds of being] accidents follow on the nature spoken of. And in singulars
also it has a manifold being according to a diversity of singulars, and yet to the nature itself
according to its first consideration, namely, absolute, is due none of these things. For it is
false to say that the essence of man inasmuch as it is of this sort has being in this singular
thing, since if to be in this singular thing were to belong to man as man, there would be
nothing outside this singular. Likewise, if it were to belong to man as man not to be in this
singular thing, it would never be in him. But it is true to say that it does not belong to man as
man that it be in this singular thing or in that or in the soul.26
It is therefore clear that the nature of man absolutely considered abstracts from any being
whatsoever, yet not in such a way that [this abstraction] be made in precision from any of
them. And this nature so considered is what is predicated of every individual.27
Still, one cannot say that the notion of a universal belongs to the nature thus taken, since
unity and commonness belong to the notion of the universal. But according to its absolute
consideration neither of these things belongs to human nature. For if commonness were to
belong to the understanding of man, then in anything where humanity were found,
commonness would be found. And this is false, since no commonness is found in Socrates,
but whatever is in him is individuated.28
Likewise, one cannot say that the notion of a genus or a species befalls human nature inso-
far as it has being in an individual, since it is not found in individual human nature as some-
thing one, such that it be one thing belonging to all, which the notion of a universal de-
mands.29

It remains, then, that the notion of species befalls human nature according to the being it
has in the intellect. For in the intellect human nature itself has being apart from every
individuating thing, and so it has a notion uniform with respect to every individual outside
the soul, as it is equally the likeness of all and leading to knowledge of them all inasmuch as
they are men. And because it has such a relation to every individual the intellect discovers
the notion of species and attributes it to it. Whence the Commentator says in the beginning

25
alio modo consideratur secundum esse quod habet in hoc vel in illo, et sic de ipsa aliquid praedicatur per
accidens ratione eius, in quo est, sicut dicitur quod homo est albus, quia socrates est albus, quamvis hoc non
conveniat homini in eo quod homo.
26
haec autem natura duplex habet esse, unum in singularibus et aliud in anima, et secundum utrumque
consequuntur dictam naturam accidentia. et in singularibus etiam habet multiplex esse secundum
singularium diversitatem et tamen ipsi naturae secundum suam primam considerationem, scilicet absolutam,
nullum istorum esse debetur. falsum enim est dicere quod essentia hominis in quantum huiusmodi habeat
esse in hoc singulari, quia si esse in hoc singulari conveniret homini in quantum est homo, nunquam esset
extra hoc singulare. similiter etiam si conveniret homini in quantum est homo non esse in hoc singulari,
nunquam esset in eo. sed verum est dicere quod homo non in quantum est homo habet quod sit in hoc
singulari vel in illo aut in anima.
27
ergo patet quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod non fiat
praecisio alicuius eorum. et haec natura sic considerata est quae praedicatur de individuis omnibus.
28
non tamen potest dici quod ratio universalis conveniat naturae sic acceptae, quia de ratione universalis est
unitas et communitas. naturae autem humanae neutrum horum convenit secundum suam absolutam
considerationem. si enim communitas esset de intellectu hominis, tunc in quocumque inveniretur humanitas
inveniretur communitas. et hoc falsum est, quia in socrate non invenitur communitas aliqua, sed quicquid est
in eo est individuatum.
29
similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis vel speciei accidat naturae humanae secundum esse quod
habet in individuis, quia non invenitur in individuis natura humana secundum unitatem, ut sit unum quid
omnibus conveniens, quod ratio universalis exigit.

11
 of his De Anima that it is the intellect which makes universality in things. (Avicenna also
says this in his Metaphysics.) And although this nature in being understood has the notion of
a universal insofar as it is compared to the thing outside the soul (since it is one likeness of
all of them), still, insofar as it has being in this intellect or in that, in being understood it is a
certain particular species.30
And so the mistake made by the Commentator is clear, who, in the third book of his De
Anima wished to conclude to the unity of the intellect in all men from the universality of the
form in being understood, since universality does not belong to that form insofar as it has
this being in the intellect, but insofar as it is referred to things as a likeness of things, just as
also, if there were one bodily statue representing many men, it remains that that image or
species of the statue would have a singular and proper being insofar as it were in this matter,
but it would have the notion of commonness insofar as it were the common representative of
many.31
And since it belongs to human nature according to its absolute consideration that it be
predicated of Socrates, and the notion of species does not belong to it according to its
absolute consideration, but belongs to the accidents which follow on it according to the
being it has in the intellect, therefore, the name of species is not predicated of Socrates as
though one were to say, ‘Socrates is a species’, which would of necessity result if the notion
of a species were to belong to man according to the being it has in Socrates, or according to
its own absolute consideration, namely, inasmuch as it is man. For whatever belongs to man
inasmuch as it is man is predicated of Socrates. And yet to be predicated belongs to a genus
per se, since it is placed in its definition. For predication is something that is completed by
the action of the intellect in composing and dividing, having for a foundation in the thing the
very unity of those things of which one is said of another.32
Whence, the notion of predicability can be included in the notion of the intention that is
‘genus’, which likewise is completed by an act of the intellect. Nevertheless, that to which
the intellect attributes the intention of predicability, composing it with another, is not the

30
relinquitur ergo quod ratio speciei accidat naturae humanae secundum illud esse quod habet in intellectu.
ipsa enim natura humana in intellectu habet esse abstractum ab omnibus individuantibus, et ideo habet
rationem uniformem ad omnia individua, quae sunt extra animam, prout aequaliter est similitudo omnium et
ducens in omnium cognitionem in quantum sunt homines. et ex hoc quod talem relationem habet ad omnia
individua intellectus adinvenit rationem speciei et attribuit sibi. unde dicit commentator in principio de
anima quod intellectus est qui agit universalitatem in rebus. hoc etiam avicenna dicit in sua metaphysica. et
quamvis haec natura intellecta habeat rationem universalis secundum quod comparatur ad res extra
animam, quia est una similitudo omnium, tamen secundum quod habet esse in hoc intellectu vel in illo est
quaedam species intellecta particularis.
31
et ideo patet defectus commentatoris in iii de anima, qui voluit ex universalitate formae intellectae
unitatem intellectus in omnibus hominibus concludere, quia non est universalitas illius formae secundum hoc
esse quod habet in intellectu, sed secundum quod refertur ad res ut similitudo rerum, sicut etiam, si esset una
statua corporalis repraesentans multos homines, constat quod illa imago vel species statuae haberet esse
singulare et proprium secundum quod esset in hac materia, sed haberet rationem communitatis secundum
quod esset commune repraesentativum plurium.
32
et quia naturae humanae secundum suam absolutam considerationem convenit quod praedicetur de
socrate, et ratio speciei non convenit sibi secundum suam absolutam considerationem, sed est de
accidentibus, quae consequuntur eam secundum esse, quod habet in intellectu, ideo nomen speciei non
praedicatur de socrate, ut dicatur: socrates est species, quod de necessitate accideret, si ratio speciei
conveniret homini secundum esse, quod habet in socrate vel secundum suam considerationem absolutam,
scilicet in quantum est homo. quicquid enim convenit homini in quantum est homo praedicatur de socrate. et
tamen praedicari convenit generi per se, cum in eius diffinitione ponatur. praedicatio enim est quiddam,
quod completur per actionem intellectus componentis et dividentis, habens fundamentum in re ipsa unitatem
eorum, quorum unum de altero dicitur.

12
 very intention of a genus, but rather that to which it attributes the intention of a genus, as
what is signified by this name ‘animal’.33
Since, then, it is clear how essence or nature relates to the notion of species, since the
notion of species is not among the things which belong to it according to its absolute
consideration, nor is it among the accidents which follow on it according to the being it has
outside the soul, as whiteness and blackness, but it belongs to the accidents which follow on
it according to the being it has in the intellect, in this way also the notion of a genus or of a
difference belongs to it.34

13. In sum.

From the foregoing discussion we observe that a distinction such as that between
‘proper’ and ‘common’ in the case of a nature like ‘humanity’ clearly involves a nature
taken in abstraction from singulars and not just a principle on the side of the subject. Con-
sider in this regard the difference between your disc operating system and someone else’s:
Yours and his agree in nature, yet yours is clearly not his since it is not installed on your
computer. Likewise, human nature as it is found in this man both agrees and disagrees with
human nature in another or human nature in common. Hence we must understand the
quality of a proper name to differ from the common in the same way that this operating
system differs from that one, or from the operating system in general. As for the way in
which St. Thomas explicitly distinguishes the common or appellative name from the
proper or private, cf. the following texts:

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm. lect. 2, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):

And so by ‘passions of the soul’ here is to be understood the conceptions of the under-
standing, which names or nouns and verbs signify immediately, according to Aristotle’s un-
derstanding of the matter. For it cannot be that they immediately signify things themselves,
as is apparent from the very mode of signifying: for the name ‘man’ signifies human
nature in abstraction from singulars. And so it cannot be that it immediately signifies a
singular [or ‘individual’] man; for which reason the Platonists held that it signified the
separated idea itself of man.35

14. That the appellative name is that which signifies a nature as in the thing having it.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theol., q. 13, art. 9, obj. 2, ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

33
unde ratio praedicabilitatis potest claudi in ratione huius intentionis, quae est genus, quae similiter per
actum intellectus completur. nihilominus tamen id, cui intellectus intentionem praedicabilitatis attribuit,
componens illud cum altero, non est ipsa intentio generis, sed potius illud, cui intellectus intentionem generis
attribuit, sicut quod significatur hoc nomine animal.
34
Sic ergo patet qualiter essentia vel natura se habet ad rationem speciei, quia ratio speciei non est de his,
quae conveniunt ei secundum suam absolutam considerationem, neque est de accidentibus, quae consequ-
untur ipsam secundum esse, quod habet extra animam, ut albedo et nigredo, sed est de accidentibus, quae
consequuntur eam secundum esse, quod habet in intellectu, et per hunc modum convenit etiam sibi ratio
generis vel differentiae.
35
et ideo oportet passiones animae hic intelligere intellectus conceptiones, quas nomina et verba et orationes
significant immediate, secundum sententiam aristotelis. non enim potest esse quod significent immediate
ipsas res, ut ex ipso modo significandi apparet: significat enim hoc nomen homo naturam humanam in
abstractione a singularibus. unde non potest esse quod significet immediate hominem singularem; unde
platonici posuerunt quod significaret ipsam ideam hominis separatam.

13
 obj. 2. Further, only proper names are not communicable. But the name ‘God’ is not a pro-
per name, but an appellative one, which is clear from the fact that it has a plural, according
to the Psalm (lxxxi), I have said, you are gods. Therefore, the name ‘God’ is communi-
cable.36

<…>

ad 2. To the second it must be said that the name ‘God’ is an appellative name and not a
proper one because it signifies the divine nature as in the thing having it; although God Him-
self, in reality, is neither universal nor particular. For names do not follow the mode of being
which is in things, but the mode of being according as it is in our knowledge. And yet, ac-
cording to the truth of the thing, it is incommunicable in the way in which it has been ex-
plained about the name ‘sun’.37

15. The appellative name according to St. Thomas Aquinas.

An appellative is that which signifies the nature as in the thing having it. Ex.: Deus,
‘God’, which signifies the divine nature ut in habente, ‘as in the one having it’ (that is, it
signifies habens natura divina, ‘(the one) having the divine nature’). Appellatives are di-
vided against proper names. The appellative has a plural, whereas the proper name does
not. To be appellative, a name must be communicable at least in reason, if not in reality.

• Communicable in both reason and reality: ‘man’, ‘ox’

• Communicable in reason only: ‘God’, ‘sun’ (according to the ancient view)
• Communicable in neither in reason nor reality: ‘Socrates’, ‘Plato’

Note here that the subject is said to ‘have’ a nature. On this point, compare the following:

Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat. 13):

One other text that I’ve run across is from the Disputed Questions De Potentia, Question 2,
Article 1, Ad2. He says:

Having is twofold. In one way, matter is said to have its form, and a subject its accident, or
in whatever way the had is outside the nature of the one having it. In another way, the sup-
posit [the individual substance, the hoc aliquid] has a nature, as this man has humanity [or
has human nature], which is not outside the essence [the nature] of the one having it. Nay,
rather it is his very essence [it is his essence, it is his nature], for Socrates is truly that which
man is.

That’s a very interesting distinction. It’s by contradictories: sometimes what is had is outside the
nature of the haver, other times what is had is not outside the nature of the haver, but is the very
nature.

36
praeterea, sola nomina propria non sunt communicabilia. sed hoc nomen deus non est nomen proprium,
sed appellativum, quod patet ex hoc quod habet plurale, secundum illud psalmi lxxxi, ego dixi, dii estis. ergo
hoc nomen deus est communicabile.
37
ad secundum dicendum quod hoc nomen deus est nomen appellativum, et non proprium, quia significat
naturam divinam ut in habente; licet ipse deus, secundum rem, non sit nec universalis nec particularis.
nomina enim non sequuntur modum essendi qui est in rebus, sed modum essendi secundum quod in
cognitione nostra est. et tamen, secundum rei veritatem, est incommunicabile, secundum quod dictum est de
hoc nomine sol.

14
16. On the rationale of the proper or private name as seen in contradistinction to what is
communicable to many, whether according to account or in reality.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 13, art. 9, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

But in order to know which names are properly communicable, one must consider that
every form existing in a singular supposit by which it is individuated is common to
many things, either according to reality or at least according to account, just as human
nature is common to many things according to reality and account, but the nature of the sun
is not common to many according to reality, but only according to account; for the nature of
the sun can be understood as existing in many supposits. And this is because the intellect
understands the nature of any species by abstraction from the singular; and so to be in one
singular supposit or in many is outside the understanding [or ‘conception’] of the nature of
the species so that, the understanding of the nature of the species being preserved, it can be
understood as existing in many.

But the singular, by the very fact that it is singular, is divided off from all the others.
For this reason, a name imposed to signify something singular is incommunicable both
in reality and in account, for plurality cannot fall in the apprehension of this indi-
vidual.

For this reason, no name signifying an individual is communicable to many things properly,
but only according to a likeness, just as someone can be called “an Achilles” metaphorically,
inasmuch as he has something of what is proper to Achilles, namely, courage.38

17. The proper or private name in sum.

• The proper or private name is divided against the appellative or common name.
• Proper or private names are imposed in order to signify something singular,
namely, the individual, which is incommunicable both in reality and in reason, such
as Plato or Socrates, or, according to the ancient view, the sun, which was thought
to be unique (the singular being understood as that which, by the very fact that it is
singular, is divided off from all other things).
• Proper or private names do not have a plural, while the common or appellative
does: i.e. one can say ‘man, men’, not ‘Plato, Platos’. Ex.: Plato, Socrates

18. Note.

38
ad sciendum autem quae nomina proprie sunt communicabilia, considerandum est quod omnis forma in
supposito singulari existens, per quod individuatur, communis est multis, vel secundum rem vel secundum
rationem saltem, sicut natura humana communis est multis secundum rem et rationem, natura autem solis
non est communis multis secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum; potest enim natura solis intelligi ut
in pluribus suppositis existens. et hoc ideo, quia intellectus intelligit naturam cuiuslibet speciei per
abstractionem a singulari, unde esse in uno supposito singulari vel in pluribus, est praeter intellectum
naturae speciei, unde, servato intellectu naturae speciei, potest intelligi ut in pluribus existens. sed singulare,
ex hoc ipso quod est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus aliis. unde omne nomen impositum ad significandum
aliquod singulare, est incommunicabile et re et ratione, non enim potest nec in apprehensione cadere
pluralitas huius individui. unde nullum nomen significans aliquod individuum, est communicabile multis
proprie, sed solum secundum similitudinem; sicut aliquis metaphorice potest dici achilles, inquantum habet
aliquid de proprietatibus achillis, scilicet fortitudinem.

15
 As with the text from the De Ente cited above, the foregoing furnishes a concise
explanation as to why a nature can be considered to be common or proper in a name.

19. The principles in the light of which names are imposed according to St. Thomas
Aquinas.

According to St. Thomas Aquinas, in any name we can speak of that from which
(id a quo), that with respect to which (id ad quod), and that upon which (id cui) a name
is imposed in order to signify. As we have seen, that upon which the name is imposed in
order to signify is called the substance of the name (In III Sent. dist. 6, q. 1, art. 3, c.),
where ‘substance’ is understood as the subject or supposit which subsists in the genus of
substance (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c.); that is, the supposit, insofar as it is con-
sidered as a hoc aliquid, or ‘this something’, is that upon which a name is imposed in order
to signify (cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 9, c.); and this is that on behalf of which it
supposes or stands (In III Sent. dist. 6, q. 1, art. 3, c.). In this regard, it must be understood
that that to which a name is attributed, if it be taken directly under the thing signified by
the name, as the determined under the undetermined, is said to be supposed by the name
(dicitur supponi per nomen). Hence, the supposition of a name is that to which a name is
attributed when it is taken directly under the thing signified by the name, as the determined
under the undetermined. But that to which a name is attributed, if it not be taken directly
under the thing of the name, is said to be coupled by the name (dicitur copulari per
nomen). Hence, the copulatio (or ‘coupling’) of a name is that to which a name is at-
tributed when it is not taken directly under the thing signified by the name (Qu. Disp. de
Pot., q. 9, art. 4, c.). (On these definitions, see Part I of this paper.)
That from which a name is imposed, on the other hand, is called the quality of
the name (In III Sent. dist. 6, q. 1, art. 3, c.); a name or noun, properly speaking, being said
to signify the form or quality from which it is imposed (ibid.). But as St. Thomas ex-
plains, “a name is said to be imposed from something [ab aliquo] in two ways: either on
the part of the one who imposes the name, or on the part of the thing upon which [cui] it is
imposed.” (Qu. Disp. de Ver. q. 14, art. 1, ad 8) He goes on to say that “on the part of the
thing a name is said to be imposed from that [ab illo] by which the account of the thing
which the name signifies is completed—and this is the specific difference of that thing.
And this is what is principally signified by the name [principaliter significatur per nomen].
But because essential differences are unknown to us, we sometimes use accidents or effects
in their place…39; and we name the thing according to this”. And this is what is
principally signified by the name (Qu. Disp. de Ver. q. 14, art. 1, ad 8), namely, the
essence or nature, as the name ‘stone’ signifies the very nature of a stone as it is in itself;
for it signifies the definition of a stone, by virtue of which we know what a stone is. For
the ratio which the name signifies is the definition, as is said in the fourth book of the
Metaphysics (Summa Theol. Ia, q. 13, art. 8). Then, on the part of the one who imposes the
name, he gives his example of lapis as taken from laedere pedem.
In this argument St. Thomas states without qualification that essential differences
are unknown to us. But is it not the case that we do know the specific differences of some
things, such as geometrical figures? And even in the genus of substance, is it not known,
for instance, that the generic part of ‘animal’, namely, ‘animated substance’, is contracted
to its species by the difference ‘sensible’, inasmuch as animals differ from plants, which
are also animated substances, by possessing ‘sensibility’, which is the power of sensation?
39
Which things St. Thomas calls the etymology of the name (cf. Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 92, art. 1, ad 2).

16
On the other hand, such things are clearly not named from their specific differences, nor
could they be, inasmuch as we name things as we know them; but we know a thing before
knowing its specific difference, at least qua specific difference. For instance, the triangle
was so named before anyone proved that its specific difference consists in having its exter-
ior angle equal to its two opposite and interior angles. Hence it remains true that such
things must be named by names taken from their properties or operations, or their effects
or accidents. But since there cannot be an infinite regress in that from which names are
taken in order to signify, there must be some things which are not named from other
things; and this, as we have seen, is St. Thomas’ position: “But if there are things which
are known to us according to themselves [secundum se], like heat, cold, whiteness, and the
like, they are not named from other things. And so in such things what the name signifies
[quod nomen significat] and that from which it is imposed in order to signify are the same
thing” (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 8, c.). It follows from this that all other names must
ultimately derive from names which were first placed upon things known to us according
to themselves, which things, it is clear from St. Thomas’ examples, are per se sensibles: the
first two, heat and cold, being proper objects of touch, the third, whiteness, of sight.

But it should also be noted that, according to the common teaching of Aristotle and
St. Thomas, the choice of vocal sound signifying such things is at the pleasure (ad placi-
tum) of the one who imposes the name. That is to say, the relation between the vocal sound
and the thing signified is, for all words except onomatopoetic ones, arbitrary; for which
reason the name and the verb, the principal parts of speech, are said to signify kata thesin,
by ‘institution’ or ‘convention’.

As for that with respect to which the name is imposed in order to signify (or,
more simply, that which it is imposed in order to signify, In I Peri Herm., lect. 4, n. 9),
this is the thing signified in the name (In I Sent. dist. 22, q. 1, art. 2, c.), which is also the
thing signified by the name (Qu. Disp. de Ver. q. 14, art. 1, ad 8 and passim in St.
Thomas) or what the name signifies (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 8, c.), or simply the
signification of the name (Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 92, art. 1, ad 2).

20. On that with respect to which (id ad quod) and that upon which (id cui) a name is
imposed in order to signify.

It should also be understood that sometimes that with respect to which a name is
imposed in order to signify is also that upon which it is so imposed, as may be the case of
‘Tetragrammaton’ among the Hebrews, as St. Thomas says (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 9,
c.).

21. Summary of St. Thomas’ teaching on that from which and that with respect to which
names are imposed in order to signify.

Things are either known to us according to themselves (secundum se) or not. If not,
then, because we know the substance of a thing from its properties or operations (or from
its properties or effects, as St. Thomas also says), we sometimes use accidents or effects in
their place. For because the specific differences of things are unknown to us, they are
named from things taken in place of those differences (which is to say that it sometimes
happens that the substance of some thing is named by some accident which does not follow
upon the whole nature of which that name is said).

17
 But such things should not be the principal thing signified by the name; rather, this
should be the specific difference or nature of the thing; for the specific difference is com-
pletive of the definition, and the definition is the ratio which the name signifies. Things
which are known to us according to themselves, like heat, cold, whiteness, and the like
(which are things sensible per se), are not named from other things; but all other things
will be named in this way. For example, lapis or ‘stone’ is named from its operation or
effect, which is laedere pedem, ‘hurting the foot’. Likewise, to take an example of our
own, ‘blackbird’ is named from an accident of it, namely, the blackness of the bird’s
feathers.

23. On the translation of id a quo and id ad quod.

Since id ad quod is opposed to id a quo, and since the latter means ‘that from
which’, one would expect the former to mean ‘that to which’, especially when it is con-
sidered that ad first of all means ‘to’ or ‘toward’, and that ‘to’ and ‘from’ are immediately
opposed. But this presents a problem when the formula is taken as whole: ‘that to (or
toward) which a name is imposed in order to signify’: for in English, we do not speak of
imposing names ‘to’ or ‘toward’ something. For this reason, I have used an equivalent
expression, ‘that with respect to which a name is imposed in order to signify’. Of course
we do say that we give a name to something. Hence we could speak of ‘that to which a
name is given’; but that to which a name is given is the same as that upon which a name is
imposed. And since ad can also mean ‘on’ or ‘upon’, one might wonder if the formula
should not be translated by one or the other of these prepositions. It is, however, quite evi-
dent from the texts cited that the formula id cui imponitur must be translated in this way,
and that it is an entirely distinct principle from id ad quod imponitur. Hence, in order to
avoid confusion, the latter should be translated by a different expression. But that id cui
means ‘that upon which’ is clear from St. Thomas’s explanations: for it is undeniable that
names are placed upon something; but that something can only be the substance under-
stood as the supposit. To see that this is so, consider the grammarian’s definition of the
nomen: the name [or ‘noun’] is that which signifies a substance with a quality. But as St.
Thomas says, “to signify a substance with a quality is to signify a supposit with a nature or
determinate form in which it subsists” (significare substantiam cum qualitate, est signifi-
care suppositum cum natura vel forma determinata in qua subsistit. Summa Theol., Ia, q.
13, art. 1, ad 3). But the nature or determinate form is not that upon which a name is
imposed; rather, it is that from which it is imposed, as is clear from the following text from
the third book of St. Thomas’s Sentences commentary:

DS6QU1 AR3- CO

respondeo dicendum, quod in quolibet nomine
est duo considerare: scilicet id a quo imponitur
nomen, quod dicitur qualitas nominis; et id cui
imponitur, quod dicitur substantia nominis:
I reply that it must be said that in any name
there are two things to consider: namely, that
from which a name is imposed, which is called
the quality of the name, and that upon which it
is imposed, which is called the substance of the
name.

et nomen, proprie loquendo, dicitur significare And a name, properly speaking, is said to
formam sive qualitatem, a qua imponitur no- signify the form or quality from which the name
men; dicitur vero supponere pro eo cui imponi- is imposed; but it is said to suppose on behalf of
tur. that upon which it is imposed.

18
 Now it is quite obvious that ‘the form or quality from which the name is imposed’
corresponds to ‘the nature or determinate form’ which is the ‘quality’ of a name as stated
in the grammarian’s definition. Since, then, ‘that from which’ the name is imposed is ac-
counted for by this part of a name, that leaves the substance or supposit as the only thing to
be considered in any name ‘upon which’ a name could be imposed.

The three principles of naming arrived at in the foregoing account are conveniently
illustrated in the following text from the Prima Pars:

QU13 AR11 RA1

ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc nomen qui
est est magis proprium nomen dei quam hoc
nomen deus, quantum ad id a quo imponitur,
scilicet ab esse, et quantum ad modum signifi-
candi et consignificandi, ut dictum est.
To the first therefore it must be said that the
name Qui est, ‘He who is’ is a more proper
name of God than the name Deus, ‘God’, with
respect to that from which it is imposed,
namely, from esse, ‘being’ or ‘existing’, and
with respect to both the mode of signifying and
of consignifying, as has been said.

sed quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad But with respect to that with respect to which
significandum, est magis proprium hoc nomen the name is imposed in order to signify, the
deus, quod imponitur ad significandum naturam name ‘God’ is more proper because it is im-
divinam. posed in order to signify the divine nature.

et adhuc magis proprium nomen est tetra-
grammaton, quod est impositum ad signifi-
candam ipsam dei substantiam incommunica-
bilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem.
And a name more proper still is ‘Tetragram-
maton’, which has been imposed in order to
signify the very substance of God, incommuni-
cable, and, if one may be allowed to speak so,
singular.

The three principles in naming found here are: (1) id a quo imponitur, ‘that from
which [a name] is imposed’; (2) id ad quod imponitur, ‘that with respect to which [a name]
is imposed’, and (3) the principle which St. Thomas indicates by his example of a name
imposed in order to signify the substance of God. What he means by this statement is clari-
fied by a text from the body of Article 9 of the same question:

si vero esset aliquod nomen impositum ad
significandum deum non ex parte naturae, sed
ex parte suppositi, secundum quod consideratur
ut hoc aliquid, illud nomen esset omnibus modis
incommunicabile, sicut forte est nomen tetra-
grammaton apud hebraeos.
But if there were some name imposed in order
to signify God not on the part of the nature, but
on the part of the supposit, insofar as it is con-
sidered as a ‘this something’, that name would
be incommunicable in every way, as perhaps
the name ‘Tetragrammaton’ is among the He-
brews.

So a name imposed in order to signify the substance of God is to be taken on the part of the
supposit insofar as it is considered as a ‘this something’, and this, as we have seen, is the
third principle in naming, id cui imponitur nomen imponitur ad significandum, “that upon
which a name is imposed in order to signify”.

19
VI. ON ‘THINGS SAID’ IN THE LOGIC OF THE SECOND ACT.

As Aristotle teaches in the Categories ch. 2 (1a 17), ‘things said’ (ton legomenon)
without any intertwining whatsoever are substance, quantity, quality, and the rest of the
predicaments. But inasmuch as the latter are signified by vocal sounds, in his work devoted
to the logic of the second act he calls them pragmata, or ‘things’. Cf. the following:

Cf. Aristotle, De Int. I. 1 (16a 1-8) (tr. B.A.M.):

First what a name is and what a verb is should be determined, then what a denial is and
what an affirmation is, and enunciation, and speech. Accordingly, those40 that are in vocal
sound are indications of the passions that are in the soul; and those that are written of those
that are in vocal sound. And just as the written marks are not the same for all, so neither are
the vocal sounds the same. But the passions of the soul, of which these are the first signs, are
the same for all. Also the same are the things of which these passions are the likenesses. But
these things have been discussed in the book on the soul, since they pertain to another
investigation.41

1. The order of signification according to Aristotle.

The principles with which we are concerned here, then, are these: (1) first there are
things; then (2) there are the passions of the soul, which are likenesses of things; then (3)
there are vocal sounds signifying things (doing so by means of the passions of the soul,
which are the likenesses of things); and finally (4) there are written signs signifying vocal
sounds. For our present purposes we must carefully distinguish the following:

• pragmata or ‘states of affairs’ (that is, things understood, insofar as they are under-
stood, which things therefore become the objects of thought)
• pathemata or ‘passions’ (which are also noemata or ‘thoughts’ about things, being
their likenesses)
• semeia or ‘signs’ (which are in the first place vocal sounds imposed on things)

Notice here how ‘things’ (= pragmata), inasmuch as they are signified by certain
vocal sounds, thereby underly the meanings of those sounds, being additionally described
as that of which the passions of the soul are likenesses—that is to say, the passions of the
soul are likenesses of things (pragmata); but pragmata are the significata of vocal sounds
established kata thesin for the purpose of signifying, which vocal sounds are names.
Consequently, if one asks, ‘What is the signification of such-and-such a vocal sound?’, the
answer is that it is some pragma or thing insofar as it has been apprehended, and so has be-
come the object of a noema or ‘thought’, and upon which some vocal sound has been im-
posed by agreement for the purpose of signifying, thereby establishing it as a name.

40
‘Those’—that is, names, and verbs, and speech, etc.
41
1. [1] Primum oportet, ponere quid sit nomen et quid verbum, deinde quid sit negatio et affirmatio, et
nuntiatio, et oratio. 2. Quae igitur sunt in voce, sunt notae passionum, quae sunt in anima; et quae
scribuntur, sunt notae eorum quae sunt in voce. Atque ut literae non sunt apud omnes eaedem, ita nec voces
sunt eadem. Sed passiones animi, quarum haec primum sunt signa, eaedem sunt apud omnes. Eadem sunt
etiam res, quarum hae passiones sunt simulacra. Ac de his quidem dictum est in libris de Anima, quia
pertinent ad alium tractum. (tr. ed. Sylvester Maurus)

20
2. On what is signified by a vocal sound.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm. lect. 2, nn. 5-6 (tr. B.A.M.):

But with respect to his statement, But of those passions which are in the soul, it must
considered that the affections of the sensible appetite commonly are customarily called
‘passions of the soul’, for instance anger, joy and the like, as is said in the second book of
the Ethics. And it is true that certain vocal sounds of men naturally signify passions of this
sort, like the groans of the sick, and of the other animals, as is said in the first book of the
Politics. But at present the discussion concerns vocal sounds significative by human
convention; and so by ‘passions of the soul’ here is to be understood the conceptions of
the understanding, which names and verbs signify immediately, according to the view
of Aristotle. For it cannot be that they immediately signify things themselves, as is apparent
from the very mode of signifying: for the name ‘man’ signifies human nature in abstraction
from singulars. And so it cannot be that it immediately signifies a singular (or individual)
man; and so the Platonists held that it signified the separated idea itself of man. But because
according to Aristotle’s view this (idea) according to its abstraction does not subsist in
reality, it was necessary for Aristotle to say that vocal sounds signify the conceptions of
the understanding immediately, and things with them mediating.42
But because it is unusual for Aristotle to call the conceptions of the understanding
‘passions’, Andronicus took the position that this book was not by Aristotle. But it is clearly
found in the first book of the De Anima that he calls all the operations of the soul ‘passions’.
And so the very conception of the understanding may be called a ‘passion’. Or because our
understanding does not take place without a phantasm, which is not without a bodily
passion. And so in the third book of the De Anima the Philosopher calls the imaginative
power the ‘passive intellect’. Or because the name ‘passion’ has been extended to every
reception, even the very act of the possible intellect is a certain ‘undergoing’, as is said in the
third book the De Anima. But he uses the name ‘passion’ rather than ‘thing understood’
both because it arises from some passion of the soul, for instance from love or hate, as a man
wishes to signify to another an interior concept by a vocal sound—as well as because the
signification of a vocal sound is referred to a conception of the understanding,
according as it arises from things in the manner of a certain impression or passion.43

42
circa id autem quod dicit, earum quae sunt in anima passionum, considerandum est quod passiones
animae communiter dici solent appetitus sensibilis affectiones, sicut ira, gaudium et alia huiusmodi, ut
dicitur in ii ethicorum. et verum est quod huiusmodi passiones significant naturaliter quaedam voces
hominum, ut gemitus infirmorum, et aliorum animalium, ut dicitur in i politicae. sed nunc sermo est de
vocibus significativis ex institutione humana; et ideo oportet passiones animae hic intelligere intellectus
conceptiones, quas nomina et verba et orationes significant immediate, secundum sententiam aristotelis. non
enim potest esse quod significent immediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso modo significandi apparet: significat enim
hoc nomen homo naturam humanam in abstractione a singularibus. unde non potest esse quod significet
immediate hominem singularem; unde platonici posuerunt quod significaret ipsam ideam hominis
separatam. sed quia hoc secundum suam abstractionem non subsistit realiter secundum sententiam
aristotelis, sed est in solo intellectu; ideo necesse fuit aristoteli dicere quod voces significant intellectus
conceptiones immediate et eis mediantibus res.
43
sed quia non est consuetum quod conceptiones intellectus aristoteles nominet passiones; ideo andronicus
posuit hunc librum non esse aristotelis. sed manifeste invenitur in 1 de anima quod passiones animae vocat
omnes animae operationes. unde et ipsa conceptio intellectus passio dici potest. vel quia intelligere nostrum
non est sine phantasmate: quod non est sine corporali passione; unde et imaginativam philosophus in iii de
anima vocat passivum intellectum. vel quia extenso nomine passionis ad omnem receptionem, etiam ipsum
intelligere intellectus possibilis quoddam pati est, ut dicitur in iii de anima. utitur autem potius nomine
passionum, quam intellectuum: tum quia ex aliqua animae passione provenit, puta ex amore vel odio, ut
homo interiorem conceptum per vocem alteri significare velit: tum etiam quia significatio vocum refertur ad
conceptionem intellectus, secundum quod oritur a rebus per modum cuiusdam impressionis vel passionis.

21
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

I reply that it must be said that, according to the Philosopher, vocal sounds are signs of
thoughts, and thoughts are likenesses of things; and so it is clear that vocal sounds are
referred to the things signified, with the conception of thoughts mediating. Therefore,
according as something can be known by our understanding, so it can be named by us. Now
it was shown above that, in this life, God cannot be seen by us through His essence; but He
is known by us from creatures, according to the relatedness of a principle, and by way of
excellence and removal. In this way, then, He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so
that the name signifying Him expresses the divine essence as it is, as this name ‘man’ ex-
presses by its signification the essence of man as it is, for it signifies his definition, by
declaring his essence; for the notion which the name signifies is its definition.44

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Resp. ad Lect. Vercell. De Art. 108, q. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

First one must consider that the ratio [or logos] of anything is what its name signifies, just
as the ratio [logos] of a stone is what its name signifies. But names are signs of intellectual
conceptions: and so the ratio [logos] of each thing signified by the name is the con-
ception of the intellect which the name signifies. But this conception of the intellect is
indeed in the intellect as in a subject, but in the thing understood45 as in a thing represented:
for the conceptions of the intellect are certain likenesses of things that have been under-
stood. But if the conception of the intellect were not made into a likeness of the thing, the
conception of that thing would be false, as if one were to understand a stone to be what is not
a stone. Therefore the ratio [logos] of a stone is indeed in the intellect as in a subject, but in
the stone as in that which causes truth in the conception of the intellect of the one under-
standing the stone to be such. Therefore when the intellect comprehends a thing, it represents
that thing perfectly by one conception. And thus there happens to be diverse conceptions of
diverse things.46

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 2, q. 1, art. 3, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

I reply that it must be said that, as was said above in the body of the preceding article,
wisdom and goodness and everything of the sort are in every way one thing in God, but they

44
respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, voces sunt signa intellectuum, et intellectus sunt rerum
similitudines. et sic patet quod voces referuntur ad res significandas, mediante conceptione intellectus.
secundum igitur quod aliquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest, sic a nobis potest nominari. ostensum est
autem supra quod deus in hac vita non potest a nobis videri per suam essentiam; sed cognoscitur a nobis ex
creaturis, secundum habitudinem principii, et per modum excellentiae et remotionis. sic igitur potest
nominari a nobis ex creaturis, non tamen ita quod nomen significans ipsum, exprimat divinam essentiam
secundum quod est, sicut hoc nomen homo exprimit sua significatione essentiam hominis secundum quod est,
significat enim eius definitionem, declarantem eius essentiam; ratio enim quam significat nomen, est
definitio.
45
Notice that ‘the thing understood’ is an extrinsic denomination, like “the wall that is seen’.
46
primo considerandum est, quod ratio cuiuslibet est quam significat nomen eius, sicut ratio lapidis est quam
significat nomen eius. nomina autem sunt signa intellectualium conceptionum: unde ratio uniuscuiusque rei
significata per nomen, est conceptio intellectus, quam significat nomen. haec autem conceptio intellectus est
quidem in intellectu sicut in subiecto, in re autem intellecta sicut in repraesentato: nam conceptiones
intellectuum sunt similitudines quaedam rerum intellectarum. si autem conceptio intellectus non
assimilaretur rei, falsa esset conceptio de re illa, sicut si intelligeret esse lapidem quod non est lapis. ratio
igitur lapidis est quidem in intellectu sicut in subiecto, in lapide autem sicut in eo quod causat veritatem in
conceptione intellectus intelligentis lapidem talem esse. cum igitur intellectus rem aliquam comprehendit,
una conceptione perfecte illam rem repraesentat; et sic diversas conceptiones contingit esse diversarum
rerum.

22
 differ in ratio. And this ratio is due not only to the one reasoning himself, but also to a pro-
perty of the thing itself.

For the clarification of this matter, in order that it be diligently explained, since the whole
understanding of the things which are said in the first book depend on this, one must see four
things.47 First, what a ratio is insofar as we say ‘things attributed differ in ratio’. Second, in
what way a ratio is said to be or not to be in a thing.…48

Regarding what pertains to the first point, it must be understood that ratio, as it is taken
here, is nothing other than that which the intellect apprehends from the signification of
a name: and this—in those things which have a definition—is the definition itself of the
thing, according to what the Philosopher says: ‘the ratio which the name signifies is the
definition’. But some things are said to have a ratio in the way mentioned which are not
defined, such as quantity and quality and the like, which, since they are the most general
genera, are not defined. And nevertheless the ratio of quality is what is signified by the name
of ‘quality’; and this is that from which quality has what quality is [illud ex quo qualitas
habet quod sit qualitas]. For this reason, he does not refer to whether those things which are
said to have a ratio either have or do not have a definition. And so it is clear that the ratio of
wisdom which is said about God is what is conceived from the signification of this name,
although the divine wisdom itself cannot be defined. Nor yet does this name ratio signify the
conception itself because this is signified by the name of ‘wisdom’ or by another name of the
thing; but it signifies the intention of this conception, just as the name ‘definition’ and other
names of second imposition do.49
And from this the second point is clear, namely, how a ratio is said to be in a thing. For
this is not said as if the intention itself which the name of ratio signifies is in the thing; nor
as if the conception itself to which such an intention belongs is in the thing outside the soul,
since it is in the soul as in a subject—but it is said to be in the thing inasmuch as in the
thing outside the soul there is something which corresponds to the conception of the
soul, as the thing signified (corresponding) to the sign.50 For this reason, it must be
understood that the conception itself of the intellect is related to the thing outside the soul in
three ways.51

47
Inasmuch as only the first two are relevant to the present consideration, the third and fourth are omitted.
48
respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, art. praeced., in corp., sapientia et bonitas et omnia
hujusmodi sunt omnino unum re in deo, sed differunt ratione: et haec ratio non est tantum ex parte ipsius
ratiocinantis, sed ex proprietate ipsius rei. ad cujus rei evidentiam, ut diligenter explicetur, quia ex hoc
pendet totus intellectus eorum quae in 1 libro dicuntur, quatuor oportet videre. primo quid sit ratio
secundum quam dicimus attributa ratione differre. secundo quomodo dicatur aliqua ratio in aliqua re esse
vel non esse….
49
quantum ad primum pertinet, sciendum est, quod ratio, prout hic sumitur, nihil aliud est quam id quod
apprehendit intellectus de significatione alicujus nominis: et hoc in his quae habent definitionem, est ipsa rei
definitio, secundum quod philosophus dicit: ratio quam significat nomen est definitio. sed quaedam dicuntur
habere rationem sic dictam, quae non definiuntur, sicut quantitas et qualitas et hujusmodi, quae non
definiuntur, quia sunt genera generalissima. et tamen ratio qualitatis est id quod significatur nomine
qualitatis; et hoc est illud ex quo qualitas habet quod sit qualitas. unde non refert, utrum illa quae dicuntur
habere rationem, habeant vel non habeant definitionem. et sic patet quod ratio sapientiae quae de deo
dicitur, est id quod concipitur de significatione hujus nominis, quamvis ipsa sapientia divina definiri non
possit. nec tamen hoc nomen ratio significat ipsam conceptionem, quia hoc significatur per nomen sapientiae
vel per aliud nomen rei; sed significat intentionem hujus conceptionis, sicut et hoc nomen definitio, et alia
nomina secundae impositionis.
50
Compare the Stoic formulation on a thing signified (whether pragma or lekta) corresponding to a ‘rational
impression’, for which, see the next section.
51
et ex hoc patet secundum, scilicet qualiter ratio dicatur esse in re. non enim hoc dicitur, quasi ipsa intentio
quam significat nomen rationis, sit in re; aut etiam ipsa conceptio, cui convenit talis intentio, sit in re extra
animam, cum sit in anima sicut in subjecto: sed dicitur esse in re, inquantum in re extra animam est aliquid

23
 For sometimes what the intellect conceives is the likeness of a thing existing outside the
soul, just as what is conceived from the name ‘man’; and such a conception has a foundation
in the thing immediately, inasmuch as the thing itself from its conformity to the intellect
makes it that the intellect be true, and so the name signifying that intellect is said properly of
the thing.52
Sometimes, however, what this name [ratio] signifies is not a likeness of the thing existing
outside the soul, but is something that follows from the mode of understanding the thing
which is outside the soul. And of this sort are the intentions which our intellect discovers, as
the thing signified by the name of ‘genus’ is not the likeness of something existing outside
the soul; but from the fact that our intellect understands animal as [being] in many species, it
attributes to it the intention of a genus; and for intentions of this sort, although there is no
proximate foundation in the thing, but rather in the intellect—nevertheless, there is a remote
foundation in the thing itself. For this reason, the intellect which discovers these intentions is
not false. And the case is similar in all other things which follow from the mode of under-
standing, as in the abstraction of mathematicals and the like.53
But sometimes what is signified by the name does not have a foundation in the thing,
either proximate or remote, as the conception of a chimera: since it is neither the likeness of
something outside the soul, nor does it follow from the mode of understanding some thing of
nature: and so such a conception is false.
For this reason, the second point is clear, namely, that a ratio is said to be in a thing insofar
as the thing signified by the name, to which to be a ratio happens, is in the thing: and this
happens properly when the conception of the intellect is a likeness of a thing.... 54

3. On the two meanings of ratio most relevant to our investigation:

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 2, q. 1, art. 3, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

Regarding what pertains to the first point, it must be understood that ratio, as it is taken
here, is nothing other than that which the intellect apprehends from the signification of
a name: and this—in those things which have a definition—is the definition itself of the
thing, according to what the Philosopher says: ‘the ratio which the name signifies is the
definition’. But some things are said to have a ratio in the way mentioned which are not
defined, such as quantity and quality and the like, which, since they are the most general
genera, are not defined…. And so it is clear that the ratio of wisdom which is said about God

quod respondet conceptioni animae, sicut significatum signo. unde sciendum, quod ipsa conceptio intellectus
tripliciter se habet ad rem quae est extra animam. Notice that ‘the thing signified’ is a thing outside the soul.
52
aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit, est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod
concipitur de hoc nomine homo; et talis conceptio intellectus habet fundamentum in re immediate, inquantum
res ipsa, ex sua conformitate ad intellectum, facit quod intellectus sit verus, et quod nomen significans illum
intellectum, proprie de re dicatur.
53
aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid
quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam: et hujusmodi sunt intentiones quas
intellectus noster adinvenit; sicut significatum hujus nominis genus non est similitudo alicujus rei extra
animam existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei
intentionem generis; et hujusmodi intentionis licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re sed in intellectu,
tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa. unde intellectus non est falsus, qui has intentiones adinvenit. Et
simile est de omnibus aliis qui consequuntur ex modo intelligendi, sicut est abstractio mathematicorum et
hujusmodi.
54
aliquando vero id quod significatur per nomen, non habet fundamentum in re, neque proximum neque
remotum, sicut conceptio chimerae: quia neque est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam, neque consequitur
ex modo intelligendi rem aliquam naturae: et ideo ista conceptio est falsa. unde patet secundum, scilicet
quod ratio dicitur esse in re, inquantum significatum nominis, cui accidit esse rationem, est in re: et hoc
contingit proprie, quando conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei….

24
 is what is conceived from the signification of this name, although the divine wisdom itself
cannot be defined. Nor yet does this name ratio signify the conception itself because this is
signified by the name of ‘wisdom’ or by another name of the thing; but it signifies the in-
tention of this conception, just as the name ‘definition’ and other names of second impo-
sition do.55

4. The two meanings of ratio in sum:

• “that which the intellect apprehends from the signification of a name”, which is
either a definition or something similar to a definition
• what “signifies the intention” of such a conception, “just as the name ‘definition’
and other names of second imposition do”, and so is the name of a second intention

Taken in the first way, then, one has what ratio is; but taken in the second, one says
what ratio means (in a certain sense of ratio).

Cf. Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei. On the Power of God by Thomas Aquinas,
translated by the English Dominican Fathers (1952):

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The reality corresponds to the concept in two ways. First,
immediately, that is to say, when the intellect conceives the idea of a thing existing outside
the mind, for instance, a man or a stone. Secondly, mediately, when, namely, something
follows the act of the intellect, and the intellect considers it by reflecting on itself. So that the
reality corresponds to that consideration of the intellect mediately, that is to say, through the
medium of the intellect’s concept of the thing. For instance, the intellect understands animal
nature in a man, a horse, and many other species: and consequently it understands that nature
as a genus: to this act, however, whereby the intellect understands a genus, there does not
correspond immediately outside the mind a thing that is a genus; and yet there is something
that corresponds to the thought that is the foundation of this mental process.
It is the same with the relation of principle that power adds to essence: since something
corresponds to it in reality, not however immediately, but mediately. For our mind conceives
the creature as bearing a relation to and dependent on its Creator: and for this very reason,
being unable to conceive one thing related to another, without on the other hand conceiving
that relation to be reciprocal, it conceives in God a certain relation of principle, consequent
to its mode of understanding, which relation is referred to the thing mediately.56

55
quantum ad primum pertinet, sciendum est, quod ratio, prout hic sumitur, nihil aliud est quam id quod
apprehendit intellectus de significatione alicujus nominis: et hoc in his quae habent definitionem, est ipsa rei
definitio, secundum quod philosophus dicit: ratio quam significat nomen est definitio. sed quaedam dicuntur
habere rationem sic dictam, quae non definiuntur…. et sic patet quod ratio sapientiae quae de deo dicitur,
est id quod concipitur de significatione hujus nominis, quamvis ipsa sapientia divina definiri non possit. nec
tamen hoc nomen ratio significat ipsam conceptionem, quia hoc significatur per nomen sapientiae vel per
aliud nomen rei; sed significat intentionem hujus conceptionis, sicut et hoc nomen definitio, et alia nomina
secundae impositionis.
56
Ad decimum dicendum, quod intellectui respondet aliquid in re dupliciter. Uno modo immediate, quando
videlicet intellectus concipit formam rei alicuius extra animam existentis, ut hominis vel lapidis. Alio modo
mediate, quando videlicet aliquid sequitur actum intelligendi, et intellectus reflexus supra ipsum considerat
illud. Unde res respondet illi considerationi intellectus mediate, id est mediante intelligentia rei: verbi gratia,
intellectus intelligit naturam animalis in homine, in equo, et multis aliis speciebus: ex hoc sequitur quod
intelligit eam ut genus. Huic intellectui quo intellectus intelligit genus, non respondet aliqua res extra
immediate quae sit genus; sed intelligentiae, ex qua consequitur ista intentio, respondet aliqua res. Et
similiter est de relatione principii quam addit potentia supra essentiam: nam ei respondet aliquid in re
mediate, et non immediate. Intellectus enim noster intelligit creaturam cum aliqua relatione et dependentia

25
6. Note on the signification of vocal sounds according to the first two parts logic.

As we remarked above with respect to the logic of the second act, “if one asks,
‘What is the signification of such-and-such a vocal sound?’, the answer is that it is some
pragma or thing insofar as it has been apprehended, and so has become the object of a
noema or ‘thought’, and upon which some vocal sound has been imposed by agreement for
the purpose of signifying, thereby establishing it as a name”, whereas in the logic of the
first act, as I expressed it in Part I of this paper, “we see that the signification of such
names consists in the account of the ‘what it is’ of the things they mean, in accordance
with which observation it is commonly said that the logos or ratio which a name signifies
is the definition,” in which case the signification of a vocal sound is taken with reference to
the account of the substance or ‘what it is’ of a thing. Now inasmuch as the thing under-
stood is a likeness of the thing outside, we observe the signification of a vocal sound to
coincide with the nature of a thing, and hence, as St. Thomas makes clear above, with the
way things are.

ad creatorem: et ex hoc ipso quia non potest intelligere aliquid relatum alteri, nisi e contrario reintelligat
relationem ex opposito, ideo intelligit in Deo quamdam relationem principii, quae consequitur modum
intelligendi, et sic refertur ad rem mediate.

26
VIII. THAT PRAGMATA LEGETAI, OR ‘THINGS SAID’, ARE LEKTA, OR
‘SAYABLES’.

Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 7.57 (tr. A. A. Long & D. N.
Sedley; rev. in part by B.A.M.; Gr. added from ed. R. D. Hicks):

Vocal sound [fwnh\] and language [le/cij] differ, because vocal sound [fwnh\] may be
merely noise [h)=xo/j], but only language is articulate [e)/narqron mo/non]. And language is
different from speech, because speech is always significant, but language can lack
significance [a)/shmoj], such as blituri, whereas speech is not so at all. Furthermore, saying
[le/gein] is different from uttering [or ‘pronouncing’, profe/resqai]. For vocal sounds are
uttered [or ‘pronounced’], but it is things [pra/gmata] which are said [le/getai] – they, after
all, are actually sayables [lekta\].57

Cf. The Suda, Lambda 658, s.v. Logos [‘speech’] (ed. The Suda On Line; tr. B.A.M., based
on that of Marcelo Boeri):

Speech [lo/goj] is significative vocal sound [fwnh\ shmantikh/], derived from thought [a)po
dianoi/aj e)kpempome/nh]. It has two hundred meanings. But language [le/cij] differs from
speech. For language can be meaningless, such as ‘blituri’, while speech cannot in any way
be meaningless. Saying [le/gein], too, differs from uttering [or ‘pronouncing’, profe/resqai];
for vocal sounds are uttered, but things [pra/gmata], which are sayable [lekta\], are spoken
[le/getai].

N.B. As Schenkenveld and Barnes note in their discussion of this passage in D.L. (cf. Hel-
lenistic Philosophy, p. 197, n. 39), “the force of a\( dh\ kai\ lekta\ tugxa/nei - is obscure”.
However it should be translated, the word tunchanei clearly is related to the Stoic terminus
technichus tunchanon. But for the basis of these notices in Aristotle, cf. the following:

Cf. Aristotle, Hist. Animal., IV. 9 (534b 29-33) (tr. D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson):

Voice [fonh=] and sound [yofoj] are different from one another; and language [dia/lektoj]
differs from voice and sound. The fact is that no animal can give utterance to voice except
[30] by the action of the pharynx, and consequently such animals as are devoid of lung have
no voice; and language is the articulation of vocal sounds by the tongue. Thus, the voice and
larynx can emit vowel sounds; consonantal sounds are made by the tongue and the lips; and
out of these language is composed.

Cf. Boethius, In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Sex Editio Secunda, Seu
Majora Commentaria (ed. Migne, PL, tr. B.A.M.):

For when the voice is emitted, it is uttered for the sake of some signification [or
‘meaning’]. But a cough, though it is a sound, [is not emitted] for the sake of any signi-
fication; it just comes out rather than is uttered.
So when our breath so has itself that if it is struck and formed in such a way that the tongue
strikes it, it is voice [or ‘vocal sound’]. For if the tongue so strikes it that the voice comes

57
diafe/rei de\ kai\ to\ le/gein tou= profe/resqai: profe/rontai me\n ga\r ai( fwnai/, le/getai de ta\
pra/gmata, a\( dh\ kai\ lekta\ tugxa/nei. As I argue below, apart from the term lekta, the substance of this
report is in its entirety taken out of Aristotle or else his followers, who are handing on his own teaching.

27
 forth in a certain finite and distinct sound, it becomes ‘locution’ [or ‘an utterance’], which is
called le/xij in Greek. For locution is articulate vocal sound; for we do not call this word
le/xij a dictio [‘word’], because we translate fa/sin by dictio, but le/xij by locutio. The parts
of locution are the ‘letters’ which, when they have been conjoined, effect one conjoint and
composite vocal sound, which is called ‘locution’.58
Now whether a vocal sound signify something, as this word ‘man’, or nothing at all, or can
signify if given as a name to something, as does ‘blictiri’—for this vocal sound, although it
does not signify anything by itself, given as a name to something will signify—or whether it
signify nothing by itself, but might designate [something] when joined with other [words],
like conjunctions, they are all called ‘locutions’, as if the proper form of locution [were to
be] composite vocal sound which can be written out in letters.59

Cf. Ineke Sluiter, Ancient Grammar in Context. Contributions to the Study of Ancient Lin-
guistic Thought. Amsterdam, 1990, pp. 22-23:

The theory comprises the following: The Stoics distinguish the form of a word, i.e. the
expression (fwnh/, shmai=non), its meaning (shmaino/menon, dhlou/menon, pra=gma), and that to
which it refers in reality (tugxa/non).88
88
Cf. S.E. AM VIII 11f.; SVF II 168. The word tugxa/non is explained by Frede 1978, 32, and
74f.60 as meaning “that which has the quality signified (by a noun)”, i.e. it is derived from
tugxa/nw ‘to obtain’. LSJ put it s.v. A II 2 b (under the general caption of “to express a
coincidence”). Although the connotation of “res fortuito obiecta” (Schmidt 1839, 55 n. 78)
cannot be excluded, I prefer Frede’s view. SVF II 236 (ou(=toi [sc. oi( Stwikoi/] . . .ta\ pragmata
[22-23] tugxa/nonta kalou=si: te/loj ga\r to\ tuxei=n tou/twn) [“But (the Stoics) call pragmata
tunchanonta:61 for the end of these things is to obtain.” (tr. B.A.M.)] cannot support LSJ’s
interpretation; it is a banal etymology.

fwnh is a physical entity, it is the sound we emit when we say something. Therefore, it is
corporeal, a sw=ma. The same holds good for the tugxa/non.89 If there is a man Dion to whom
we refer in using the expression Di/wn, this Dion is corporeal as well. The meaning, on the
other hand, is something which can only be thought, it is an asômaton, a rare phe-nomenon
in the materialistic philosophy of the Stoa. It shares this characteristic of being in-corporeal
with the void, time and space only.
There is a hierarchical order running from inarticulate sound through articulate sound
irrespective of meaning, to articulate meaningful sound.90 The latter two stages are called

58
Vox namque cum emittitur, significationis alicujus causa profertur. Tussus vero cum sonus sit, nullius
significationis causa, surrepit potius quam profertur. Quare quoniam flatus noster ita sese habet, ut si ita
percutiatur atque formetur, ut eum lingua percutiat, vox sit. Si enim lingua ita percutiat, ut terminato
quodam et circumscriptio sono vox exeat, locutio fit quae Graece dicitur le/xij. Locutio enim est articulata
vox, neque enim hunc sermonem, id est le/xin, dictionem dicemus, idcirco quid fa/sin dictionem interpret-
tamur, lex / in, locutionem. Cujus locutionis partes sunt litterae, quae cum conjunctae fuerint, unam efficiunt
vocem conjunctam compositamque, quae locutio praedicatur.
59
Sive autem aliquid quaecunque vox significet, ut est hic sermo, homo, sive omnino nihil, sive positum alicui
nomen significare possit, ut est blictiri; haec enim vox cum per se nihil significet, posita tamen ut alicui
nomen sit, significabit, sive per se quidem nihil significet, cum aliis vero juncta designet, ut sunt,
conjunctiones, haec omnia locutiones vocantur, ut si propria locutionis forma vox composita quae litteris
describatur. Note that one also finds similar remarks in Ammonius’ Commentary on the Peri Hermeneias,
showing the Peripatetic provenance of these observations.
60
For Frede’s text, see below.
61
But to call ‘things’ ‘what obtains’ implies a resolution from the object of thought to its foundation
‘outside’.

28
 le/cijand lo/goj respectively. le/cij may be either one word or a string of words, which is
looked upon from its non-semantic side, lo/goj in principle may also be one word or a com-
bination of words, but it is always meaningful – it is a combination of form and meaning.91
89
We should realize that even “abstract nouns” as we call them, such as dikaiosu/nh, to the
Stoics correspond with (material) mind in a certain disposition – its tugxa/non would
therefore be corporeal.
90
D.L. VII 57. [But these distinctions were Peripatetic before they were Stoic, as we have
seen. (B.A.M.)]
91
[footnote omitted]

Cf. A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 1. Translations of the
Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge, 1987), p. 198:

O Clement, Miscellanies 8.9.26.5

Case is agreed to be incorporeal; and hence the famous sophism is solved as follows: ‘What
you say passes through your mouth.’ This is true. ‘But you say: A house. Therefore the
house passes through your mouth.’ This is false. For what we say is not a house, which is a
body, but the case, which is incorporeal and which a house bears.

Cf. Michael Frede, Principles of Stoic Grammar. [In: John M. Rist, ed. The Stoics. Ber-
keley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1978, pp. 31-32]:

(...Clement of Alexandria [Strom. 8, 9, p. 97, 6-7] operates on the assumption that a case is
incorporeal, but this is due to the fact that he is not a Stoic [31-32] and hence naturally thinks
of properties as something incorporeal.) The qualities signified by nouns, including proper
names, have to be distinguished from the external objects that have the qualities signified
and which are hence called tynchanonta. [footnote 1 omitted]

1. On ptosis or ‘case’.

Cf. A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, op.cit., pp. 197-198.

K Ammonius, On Aristotle’s De interpretatione 43.9-15

The Stoics reply that the nominative case itself has fallen from the thought which is in the
soul. For when we wish to exhibit the thought of Socrates which we have within ourselves,
we utter the name Socrates [i.e. Socrates in the nominative case]. Just as a pen is said both to
have fallen and to have its fall upright if it is released from above and sticks upright, so we
claim that the nominative case [literally ‘the direct case’] [197-198] falls from the thought, but
is upright because it is the archetype of linguistic utterance.

L Scholia on Dionysius Thrax, 230,24-8

If the nominative is upright, why is it a case? Because it has fallen from what is incorporeal
and generic into what is specific. But it is upright because it has not yet been altered into an
oblique [case], or because it is the foundation of what the Stoics call upright, that is active,
verbs, e.g. ‘Socrates strikes’.

M Diogenes Laertius 7.58 (SVF 3 Diogenes 22 part)

29
 According to Diogenes [of Babylon] an appellative is a part of language which signifies a
common quality, e.g. ‘man’, ‘horse’; a name is a part of language which indicates a peculiar
quality, e.g. ‘Diogenes’, ‘Socrates’; a verb is a part which, according to Diogenes, signifies a
non-compound predicate, or, as some say, a case-less constituent of a sentence which
signifies something attachable to something or some things, e.g. ‘I write’, ‘I speak’.

2. Notes by Long and Sedley.

p. 199:

Lekta are explained in various ways. Linguistically, they are the meanings of ‘finished’
sentences like ‘Socrates writes’ (F3), or of verbs without a specified subject (and/or object,
in the case of transitive verbs), e.g. ‘writes’ with no indication of whom. The former type is
called ‘complete’, the latter ‘incomplete’. What completes a sayable is its being attached to
‘a nominative case’ (G) (or a dative of the person, with impersonal verbs) and, in the usage
of transitive verbs, the further addition of the oblique case (cf. q in vol. 2). ‘Case’ (ptôsis)
picks out the syntactical relation of a noun to the other constituents of a sentence. In the
‘complete sayable’ this syntactical relation seems to have been regarded as a component of
the sentence’s meaning.

p. 201:

A word of warning must added about ‘case’. Its most familiar modern meaning is the
inflection of a noun or other substantival form, e.g. nominative, genitive. In its standard
usage, however, it designates not the inflection itself but the inflected word. A ‘nominative
case’ is a word inflected in the nominative. A consequence of this is that, when not specified
as e.g. nominative, ‘a case’ simply means ‘a word in some case’, or ‘a substantival form’ – a
generic term for those grammatical items, such as nouns (O; 30A e; 37Q 4), pronouns, and
even noun-clauses (55C), which in Greek decline through the cases. When subjects are
called ‘name-bearers’ (B), the Greek word thus translated (tunchanonta) strictly stands for
‘case-bearers’, indicating that they are the items standardly designated by nouns and
pronouns.

Aristotle had excluded the nominative from the ‘cases’ of nouns (De interpretatione 1632
ff.). In his usage all the cases are oblique, inflections of the nominative form. The Stoics
extended the term ‘case’ (literally ‘falling’) to the nominative, and fanciful explanations
were given to justify this terminology (K, L). Behind them probably lies the notion that
predication is most fundamentally exemplified by attributing an activity to a subject, e.g.
‘Socrates writes’.62

3. Supplement: Clement of Alexandria, Stromata V. 9. On the Different Kinds of Cause

(excerpt) [In: The Ante-Nicene Fathers].

The cause of things is predicated in a threefold manner. One, What the cause is, as the
statuary; a second, Of what it is the cause of becoming, a statue; and a third, To what it is the
cause, as, for example, the material: for he is the cause to the [page 47] brass of becoming a
statue. The being produced, and the being cut, which are causes to what they belong,
being actions, are incorporeal. According to which principle, causes belong to the class
of predicates (kathgorhmatwn), or, as others say, of dicta (lektwn) (for Cleanthes and
Archedemus call predicates dicta); or rather, some causes will be assigned to the class

62
N.B. For more on ‘case’ in Aristotle, see my separate discussion.

30
 of predicates, as that which is cut, whose case is to be cut; and some to that of axioms,—
as, for example, that of a ship being made, whose case again is, that a ship is
constructing.

Now Aristotle denominates the name of such things as a house, a ship, burning, cutting,
an appellative. But the case is allowed to be incorporeal.

Therefore that sophism is solved thus: What you say passes through your mouth.
Which is true. You name a house. Therefore a house passes through your mouth.
Which is false. For we do not speak the house, which is a body, but the case, in which
the house is, which is incorporeal.

And we say that the house-builder builds the house, in reference to that which is to be pro-
duced. So we say that the cloak is woven; for that which [page 48] makes is the indication of
the operation. That which makes is not the attribute of one, and the cause that of another, but
of the same, both in the case of the cloak and of the house. For, in as far as one is the cause
of anything being produced, in so far is he also the maker of it. Consequently, the cause, and
that which makes, and that through which (dio), are the same.63

4. In sum:

Note here the division Clement introduces: there are (1) appellatives, and (2) cases,
which are incorporeal, arguably implying that appellatives are understood to be corporeal,
the distinction between which allows him to solve the foregoing sophism. With respect to
this distinction, cf. Seneca, Letters 117.13 (cited more fully below): “(3) So when we say
‘wisdom’, we understand something corporeal [i.e. the physical word]; when we say, ‘He
is wise’, we are speaking about a body. There’s a very great difference between naming it
and speaking about it.” With this statement in mind, cf. the following from Schenkenveld
and Barnes (Hellenistic Philosophy, pp. 197-198):

First, then, the Stoics distinguished between what is uttered and what is said:

Saying and uttering are different; for what we utter are utterance ( fwnai/), whereas what we
say are objects (pra/gmata), which in fact are sayables (lekta/).139

Secondly, they distinguished between what is said and what is spoken about:140 you
may speak about Chrysippus, but you cannot say Chrysippus. [197-198]
139
D.L. VII.57 (the force of a\( dh\ kai\ lekta\ tugxa/nei - is obscure)....
140
plurimum interest utrum illud dicas an de illo: Sen. Ep. 117-13.

Chrysippus is not an ‘object’; for objects lie ‘between’ words and the world.141
The Stoics called these objects le/kta: the word was used by Chrysippus, and by
Cleanthes before him;142 but it was not a Stoic neologism. It occurs several times in fifth-
century drama: there, something is lekto/n (for someone) if it can be said or is the sort of
thing to be said (by him);143 and the word did not change its sense when the neuter adjective
hardened into a noun – a lekto/n is a ‘sayable’.144

63
N.B. I have continued this excerpt beyond what was strictly necessary to show its indebtedness to
Aristotle.

31
 141
For the metaphor see e.g. Plut. Col. 1119f.; Ammon. Int. 17.25-8. For the word pra/gma
see e.g. Nuchelmans 1973, 47-9; P. Hadot 1980.
142
[note omitted]
143
[note omitted]
144
[note omitted]

Now to say “you may speak about Chrysippus, but you cannot say Chrysippus”
shows that there is something incorporeal involved in speaking, which thing, as we have
seen above, is variously called a lekton or ptosis. Hence, Clement may intend to hand on a
distinction between a vocable, which is bodily—citing Aristotle for its designation ‘appel-
lative’—and what such a name signifies, which is an incorporeal ‘case’. But to say “Chry-
sippus is not an ‘object’ [= pragma]; for objects lie ‘between’ words and the world” is to
distinguish between ‘the thing outside’ as such, and the thing apprehended as an object of
thought: for most assursedly it is only the former which cannot be ‘said’.
As for its provenance, it goes without saying that the thoroughly Peripatetic content
of this chapter of the Miscellanies unmistakably points to Aristotle as its source, as one
may see by reading it in its entirety. But to return to the argument, unlike Augustine who,
in his De Dialectica (for which, see below), speaks of dicibilia, our author understands
lekta to be dicta, which means “things said”, thereby establishing continuity with Aris-
totle’s concern in the Categories, as I have argued above. But understanding the term thus
is consistent with the meaning ‘sayable’, as one may see by considering that, whether one
speaks of ‘things said’ or of ‘sayables’, the immaterial significations of vocal sounds are
nevertheless intended; for just as a ‘thing done’ is not other than a ‘thing doable’ before it
is done, so neither is there any substantive difference in the present case.

5. Note on pragma.

As I argue in my commentaries on the Poetics, a pragma may be defined as “a

thing of interest or concern or a thing done”;64 or again, as that which is dealt with, a fin-
ished act, a deed that is done, that which has been done or accomplished, an accomplished
fact (fait accompli); or again, as what is factual or real; or again, as a ‘thing’, understood as
that which exists outside its causes. In sum, it is a “state of affairs” which is seen “to ob-
tain”.

64
Cf. Joe Sachs, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Introduction: “One way that ancient Greek differs from English is
in having no word for thing, in the emphatic sense of the English word. There is a word (chrema) that means
a thing used up or consumed, another (pragma) that means a thing of interest or concern or a thing done, and
a third (hekaston) that refers to each instance of a general kind, but most often things in any sense are
signified by the neuter ending on an adjective or article.”

32
6. The principles of language according to the Stoics, with special reference to lekta:
Sextus Empiricus, Adv math. 8.11ff.; LCL 2:245, 247, frag. 166 von Arnim SVF2:

(tr. Giovanni Reale) (tr. Long & Sedley)

(1) There was another disagreement among

philosophers [concerning what is true]: some
took the sphere of what is true and false to be
‘the signification’, others ‘utterance’, and others
‘the process that constitutes thought’.

The Stoics maintained that “three things are (2) The Stoics defended the first opinion, saying
linked together, the thing signified, the thing that three things are linked together, ‘the signifi-
signifying and the thing existing,” cation’ [pragma], ‘the signifier’ [phone], and
‘the name-bearer’ [tunchanon].

and of these the thing signifying is the sound The signifier is an utterance, for instance
(Dion, for instance), ‘Dion’;

and the thing signified is the actual thing
indicated thereby, and which we apprehend as
existing in dependence on our intellect, whereas
the barbarians, although hearing the sound, do
not understand it;
the signification is the actual state of affairs re-
vealed by an utterance, and which we apprehend
as it subsists in accordance with our thought,
whereas it is not understood by those whose
language is different although they hear the
utterance;

and the thing existing is the external real object, the name-bearer is the external object, for
such as Dion himself. instance, Dion himself.

And of these things two are bodies, that is, the (3) Of these, two are bodies – the utterance and
sound and the existing thing, the name-bearer;

and one is incorporeal, namely, the thing but one incorporeal – the state of affairs signi-
signified and expressible [lekton = expressed, fied and sayable, which is true or false.
said, signified] and this too is true or false.

But this is not all alike true or false, it being

partly incomplete and partly self-complete. And
of the self-complete that part is true or false
which is termed “judgment” and which they
describe by saying “a judgment which is true or
false”.

Parallel translations:

(tr. Giovanni Reale) (tr. Long & Sedley)

...the thing signified is the actual thing indicated ...the signification is the actual state of affairs
thereby, and which we apprehend as existing in revealed by an utterance, and which we appre-
dependence on our intellect.... hend as it subsists in accordance with our
thought....

33
Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adv math. 8.70; LCL 2:273, frag. 187 von Arnim SVF2:

(tr. Giovanni Reale) (tr. Long & Sedley)

And they [the Stoics] say that the expressible
[lekton = expressed, said, signified] is that
which subsists in conformity with a rational
presentation and that a rational presentation is
one in which the object represented is estab-
lished by reason.
They [the Stoics] say that a ‘sayable’ is what
subsists in accordance with a rational impress-
sion, and a rational impression is one in which
the content of the impression can be exhibited in
language.

Whatever it may mean to say that lekta are tunchanonta insofar as the latter are
“apprehended as existing in dependence on our intellect”, as Reale translates it, they are
clearly ‘second intentions’ and hence ‘beings of reason’, as St. Thomas Aquinas explains.65

Cf. Dirk Baltzly, “Stoicism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2008
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.):

With respect to language, the Stoics distinguish between the signification, the signifier and
the name-bearer. Two of these are bodies: the signifier which is the utterance and the name-
bearer which gets signified. The signification, however, is an incorporeal thing called a
lekton, or ‘sayable,’ and it, and neither of the other two, is what is true or false (Sextus
Empiricus, 33B). They define a sayable as “that which subsists in accordance with a rational
impression.”66 Rational impressions are those alterations of the commanding faculty whose
content can be exhibited in language. Presumably ‘graphei Sôkratês’ and ‘Socrates writes’
exhibit the contents of one and the same rational impression in different languages. At first
glance, this looks very like a modern theory of propositions. But propositions (axiômata) are
only one subspecies of sayables. Sayables also include questions and commands on the one
hand, and, in a category of sayables called ‘incomplete,’ the Stoics include predicates and
incomplete expressions like ‘graphei’ (he or she writes) (Diog. Laert., 33F). An incomplete
sayable like ‘writes’ gets transformed into a proposition by being attached to a nominative
case (ptôsis, Diog. Laert., 33G). Here a ‘nominative case’ seems to mean the signification
of the inflected word, Sôkratês’ or ‘ho anthrôpos’—the latter being the nominative case
(as we would say) of the Greek word ‘man’—not that inflected word itself. The Stoic
doctrine of case is one of those areas where there is as yet little consensus. Stoic propositions
are unlike propositions in contemporary theories in another way too: Stoic sayables are not
timelessly true or false. If it is now daytime, the lekton corresponding to an utterance of ‘it is
day’ is true. Tonight, however, it will be false (cf. Alex. Aph. in Simplicius, 37K). Finally,
the Stoic theory gives a certain kind of priority to propositions involving demonstratives.
‘This one is writing’ is definite, while ‘someone is writing’ is indefinite. Strikingly, ‘So-
crates is writing’ is said to be intermediate between these two.
When there is a failure of reference, the Stoics say that the lekton is destroyed and this is
supposed to provide the reason why ‘this one is dead’ (spoken in relation to poor deceased
Dion) is impossible (necessarily false).

65
Cf. In IV Meta., lect. 4, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.): “Now ‘being of reason’ is said properly of those intentions which
reason discovers [or ‘comes upon’, adinvenit] in the things it considers, like the intentions of ‘genus’,
‘species’ and similar things which are not found in the nature of things, but follow upon the consideration of
reason”. Inasmuch as the things underlying names like ‘substance’ and the like are what the mind first
intends, the others in comparison are called second intentions.
66
But if so, it is consistent with this observation to say that “the ratio of each thing signified by the name [= a
pragma] is the conception of the intellect [= a thought] which the name signifies” (St. Thomas Aquinas,
Resp. ad Lect. Vercell. De Art. 108, q. 1, tr. B.A.M.).

34
7. Certain principles of language according to the Stoics:

• lekton: a pragma understood as something able to be said (hence, a ‘sayable’,

which is possible only if it is first a res intellecta)
• pragma: an object of thought understood as a ‘state of affairs’ signified by a vocal
sound
• tunchanon: what ‘obtains’ or ‘is the case’ in rerum natura to which a state of
affairs conforms

8. The foregoing in reverse order, ordering three meanings of ‘thing’:

• a thing ‘outside’ corresponding to a ‘rational impression’ or thought: tunchanon67

• a thing understood and hence signifiable by a vocal sound: pragma
• a thing understood and signified, and hence sayable insofar as a vocal sound has
been imposed on it for the purpose of signifying: lekton

9. The place of lekta in the account of speaking.

As Diogenes Laertius reports, “vocal sounds are uttered [or ‘pronounced’], but it is
things [pra/gmata] which are said [le/getai] – they, after all, are actually sayables [lek-
ta\]”. But the sophism instanced by Clement demonstrates the need for making such a
distinction: what is ‘uttered’ being one thing, but what is ‘said’ being quite another, from
which exigency it follows that the name lekta here functions as a technical term for things
which have not only been understood and signified but are able to be said as well. Hence,
in the perspective of the act of speaking, ‘things’ are seen under a determinate rationale,
namely, ‘(being) able to be spoken’.68 Now the occurrence of this term in an otherwise
thoroughly Aristotelian notice strongly suggests the Philosopher himself as its source.
Whatever the case may be, we understand the remark concerning lekta to convey the
notion that things are said insofar as they are sayable, but they are sayable insofar as they
have been apprehended; it being the case that a thing as thing, or as such, cannot be ‘said’,
as one does not ‘say’ the man or ox, but rather the thing as apprehended, and consequent-
ly, as signified; the ‘thing outside’ being called (1) a tunchanon (presumably) because it is
understood to ‘obtain’—that is, because it ‘has’ the quality signified by the name, as Frede
suggests, but (2) a ptosis, a ‘fall’ or ‘case’, insofar as the thing said has ‘fallen’ from
thought. In sum, the term lekta appears to be the name of a ‘second intention’, which is to
say, a name of second imposition, the necessity for which arises from the fact that to claim
that ‘things’ are ‘said’ could invite a sophistical refutation of the sort Clement outlines
above: You concede that whatever one says passes through the mouth; but one says a
‘house’; therefore a house passes through the mouth.

10. Long & Sedley en bloc.

67
By now it should be clear that a tunchanon or ‘name-bearer’ is the supposit which subsists in some nature.
68
Cf. Long & Sedley, op. cit., p. 196: “For the impression arises first, and then thought, which has the power
of talking, expresses in language what it experiences by the agency of the impression”. [= D Diogenes
Laertius 7.49 (SVF 2.52, part; = 39A 2)] Cf. our remark above on Aristotle’s account of the order of
signification, where we described pragmata as “‘states of affairs’ which, being understood, become the
objects of thought”. But as able to be ‘expressed’ they are lekta.

35
Cf. A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 1. Translations of the
Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 195-197:

33 Sayables (lekta)

A Diogenes Laertius 7.57 (SVF 3 Diogenes 20, part)

[text given above, but with the translation revised]

B Sextus Empiricus, Against the professors 8.11 (SVF 2.166, part)

(1) There was another disagreement among philosophers [concerning what is true]: some
took the sphere of what is true and false to be ‘the signification’, others ‘utterance’, and
others ‘the process that constitutes thought’. (2) The Stoics defended the first opinion, saying
that three things are linked together, ‘the signification’, ‘the signifier’, and ‘the name-
bearer’. The signifier is an utterance, for instance ‘Dion’; the signification is the actual state
of affairs revealed by an utterance, and [195-196] which we apprehend as it subsists in accor-
dance with our thought, whereas it is not understood by those whose language is different al-
though they hear the utterance; the name-bearer is the external object, for instance, Dion
himself. (3) Of these, two are bodies – the utterance and the name-bearer; but one incorpor-
eal – the state of affairs signified and sayable, which is true or false.

C Sextus Empiricus, Against the professors 8.70 (SVF 2.187, part)

They [the Stoics] say that a ‘sayable’ is what subsists in accordance with a rational im-
pression, and a rational impression is one in which the content of the impression can be
exhibited in language.

D Diogenes Laertius 7.49 (SVF 2.52, part; = 39A 2)

For the impression arises first, and then thought, which has the power of talking, expresses
in language what it experiences by the agency of the impression.

E Seneca, Letters 117.13

(1) There are [the Stoics say] bodily substances: for instance, this is a man, and this is a
horse. These are accompanied by movements of thought which can make enunciations about
bodies. (2) These movements have a property peculiar to themselves, which is separate from
bodies. For example, I see Cato walking: sense-perception has revealed this, and my mind
has believed it. What I see is a body, and it is to a body that I directed my eyes and my mind.
Then I say, ‘Cato is walking.’ What I now utter (he says) is not a body, but a certain enun-
ciation about a body, which some call a proposition, others a thing enunciated, and others a
thing said [= a dictum (B.A.M.)]. (3) So when we say ‘wisdom’, we understand something
corporeal [i.e. the physical word (B.A.M.)]; when we say, ‘He is wise’, we are speaking
about a body. There’s a very great difference between naming it and speaking about it.

F Diogenes Laertius 7.63

(1) The topic which deals with states of affairs and significations includes that of sayables,
both those that are complete and propositions and syllogisms, and those which are in-com-
plete, and active and passive predicates. (2) They say that a sayable is what subsists in accor-
dance with a rational impression. (3) Sayables, the Stoics say, are divided into complete and
in-complete, the latter being ones whose linguistic expression is unfinished, e.g. ‘[Someone]

36
 writes’, for we ask, ‘Who?’ In complete sayables the linguistic expression is finished, e.g.,
‘Socrates writes.’ So incomplete sayables include predicates, whereas ones that are complete
include propositions, syllogisms, questions, and enquiries. [196-197]69

G Diogenes Laertius 7.64 (SVF 2.183, part)

A predicate is what is asserted of something, or a state of affairs attachable to something or

some things, as Apollodorus says, or an incomplete sayable attachable to a nominative case
for generating a proposition.

H Diogenes Laertius 7.55-6

An animal’s utterance is air that has been struck by an impulse, but that of a man is articu-
lated and issues from thought, as Diogenes [of Babylon] says, and is perfected at the age of
fourteen. Also, according to the Stoics, utterance is a body. . . for everything that acts is a
body; and utterance acts when it travels from those who utter it to those who hear it.

11. A Peripatetic objection to the existence of lekta and the grounds for a reply.

Cf. Long & Sedley, op. cit., p. 198:

N Ammonius, On Aristotle’s De interpretatione 17.24-8

Here Aristotle tells us what it is that they [nouns and verbs] primarily and immediately
signify: his answer is ‘thoughts’, but through these as intermediates ‘things’, and it is not
necessary to conceive of anything else additional to them, intermediate between the thought
and the thing, which the Stoics postulated and decided to name a ‘sayable’.

Cf. Long & Sedley, op. cit., p. 100:

K Plutarch, Against Colotes 1119F (Usener 259, part)

Who is more in error than you [Epicureans] about language? You completely abolish the
class of sayables, to which discourse owes its existence, leaving only words and name-
bearers, and denying the very existence of the intermediate states of affairs signified, by
means of which learning, teaching, preconceptions, thoughts, impulses and assents come
about.

12. Note on the foregoing.

While it is quite true that names and verbs primo et per se signify thoughts about
things, it does not follow that lekta are some unnecessary intermediate between thought
and thing—rather, as Plutarch relates, lekta are themselves ‘things’, but understood as
apprehended and signified by words, and hence ‘sayable’—that is, they are pragmata or
‘states of affairs’ not simply or as such, but as ‘sayable’ by the act of speaking, and hence
are themselves the pragmata understood as intermediate between vocal sound and thing
outside, differing tantum ratione. The reader will note that much of the difficulty con-

69
On these matters, cf. St. Augustine, De Dialectica, excerpted below. This work, while taken verbatim from
a no-longer extant section of Marcus Varro’s De Lingua Latina, is itself indebted to Aristotle, as Darrell F.
Jackson’s learned discussion appended to his translation (cf. Dordrecht, 1975) amply demonstrates.

37
cerning this question revolves around the polysemy of the word ‘thing’; it being necessary
to distinguish several meanings of the word, as I have done above. Of course, my purpose
here is not to vindicate certain propria of Stoic logic, but to explain what I take to be a ter-
minus technicus introduced by Aristotle; an inference supported by the occurrence of the
word as part of a thoroughly Aristotelic explanation of sound and voice in the passages
cited from Diogenes and the Suda above. That is to say, not only are the definitions and di-
visions comprising the earlier parts of their several reports ‘genuine Aristotle’, as one may
see from the passages we have excerpted in confirmation, but so also is their introduction
of lekta, a term explainable as Aristotelian in the way I have outlined above. Similar argu-
ments may be made for its occurrence in Clement.

38
IX. ST. AUGUSTINE, DE DIALECTICA: THE ELEMENTS OF SPEAKING.

Cf. S. Aurelii Augustini, De Dialectica Liber, § I (tr. J. Marchand):

S. Aurelii Augustini de Dialectica Liber The Book of St. Augustine on Dialectic

I. Dialectica est bene disputandi scientia. I. Dialectic is the science of arguing well. As
Disputamus autem utique verbis. you know, we use words when we argue.

Verba igitur aut simplicia sunt aut coniuncta. Words, you see, are either simple or complex.
[or “conjoined” (B.A.M.)]

Simplicia sunt quae unum quiddam significant Simples are those which signify one thing, as
ut cum dicimus ‘homo equus disputat currit’. when we say `man, horse, argues, runs’.

Nec mireris, quod ‘disputat’, quamvis ex You should not be surprised that `argues’,
duobus conpositum sit, tamen inter simplicia though it is composed of two things {argue + s,
numeratum est; nam res definitione inlustratur. trans.}, nevertheless is numbered among the
simples; for this is clear from the definition.

Dictum est enim id esse simplex quod unum We said that a word was simple when it signi-
quiddam significet. fied one thing.

Itaque hoc includitur hac definitione, qua non
includitur cum dicimus ‘loquor’. Quamvis enim
unum verbum sit, non habet tamen simplicem
significationem, siquidem significat etiam per-
sonam quae loquitur.
Thus it (argues) is covered by the definition, but
it is not covered when I say ‘loquor’ (I speak),
for though this is one word, it does not have a
simple meaning, since it also designates the
person who speaks.

Ideo iam obnoxium est veritati aut falsitati, nam Hence it is from the first subject to being either
et negari et affirmari potest. true or false, since it can be affirmed or denied.

Omnis itaque prima et secunda persona verbi Thus, all the verbs of the first and second per-
quamvis singillatim enuntietur tamen inter son, although pronounced as one word, never-
coniuncta verba numerabitur, quia simplicem theless must be counted among the complex
non habet significationem. words, since they do not have a simple meaning.

Siquidem quisquis dicit ‘ambulo’ et ambula-
tionem facit intellegi et se ipsum qui ambulat, et
quisquis dicit ‘ambulas’ similiter et rem quae fit
et eum qui facit significat.
Thus, whoever says ‘ambulo’ (I walk) makes
understood both the action of walking (ambu-
lation) and that he himself does it, and anyone
who says ‘ambulas’ (you walk) likewise signi-
fies both the action performed and the person
performing it.

At vero qui dicit ‘ambulat’ nihil aliud quam
ipsam significat ambulationem, quamobrem ter-
tia persona verbi semper inter simplicia numer-
atur et nondum aut affirmari aut negari potest,
nisi cum talia verba sunt, quibus necessario co-
haeret personae significatio consuetudine
loquendi, ut cum dicimus ‘pluit’ vel ‘ninguit’,
etiamsi non addatur quis pluat aut ninguat,
tamen quia intellegitur non potest inter simplicia
But when a person says ‘ambulat’ (walking is
going on), he signifies only the action of walk-
ing, whence third person verbs are always num-
bered among the simples and can never be
affirmed or denied, except when they are verbs
such that there is of necessity attached to them
the signification of person by usage, as when we
say ‘pluit’ (it rains) or ‘ninguit’ (it snows), even
when we do not add what rains or snows; since

39
numerari. it (the subject) is understood, they cannot be put
under the simples.

II. Coniuncta verba sunt quae sibi conexa res
plures significant, ut cum dicimus ‘homo
ambulat’ aut ‘homo festinans in montem
ambulat’ et siquid tale.
II. Complex words (coniuncta) are those which
signify several things when put together, e.g.
when we say `homo ambulat’ (a/the/0 man
walks) or `homo festinans in montem ambulat’
(a/the/0 man walks, hurrying to the mountain),
etc.

Sed coniunctorum verborum alia sunt quae
sententian conpraehendunt, ut ea quae dicta
sunt, alia quae non conpraehendunt sed expec-
tant aliquid ut eadem ipsa quae nunc diximus, si
subtrahas verbum quod positum est ‘ambulat’.
There are some complex utterances which form
sentences [lit. “which comprehend a thought’
(B.A.M.)], like those which have been cited,
and others which do not form sentences, but
require something, like those we have just cited
when you subtract the verb ‘ambulat’ (walks)
which we put there.

Quamvis enim verba coniuncta sint ‘homo fes- Although ‘homo festinans in montem’ forms a
tinans in montem’, tamen adhuc pendet oratio. complex expression, the sentence is left dang-
ling from it.

Separatis igitur his coniunctis verbis quae non Leaving aside, then, those complex expressions
implent sententiam restant ea verba coniuncta which do not form sentences, we are left with
quae sententiam conpraehendunt. those which do.

Horum item duae species sunt: Aut enim sic
sententia conpraehenditur, ut vero aut falso
teneatur obnoxia, ut est ‘omnis homo ambulat’
aut ‘omnis homo non ambulat’ et siquid huius-
modi est.
There are two species of these: 1. either they are
made into sentences subject to affirmation or
denial, e.g. ‘omnis homo ambulat’ (all men
walk/any man walks) or ‘omnis homo non
ambulat’ (no man walks),

Aut ita inpletur sententia, ut licet perficiat pro- or 2. a sentence is formed which, though it
positum animi affirmari tamen negarive non presents a proposal to the mind, can neither be
possit, ut cum imperamus, cum optamus, cum affirmed nor denied, as when we command,
execramur et similia. wish, curse, etc.

Nam quisquis dicit ‘perge ad villam’ vel
‘utinam pergat ad villam’ vel ‘dii illum per-
duint’, non potest argui quod mentiatur aut credi
quod verum dicat.
E. g., if someone says ‘perge ad villam’ (go to
the town) or ‘utinam pergat ad villam’ (I wish
he would go to the town) or ‘Dii illum perduint’
(may the gods damn him), it cannot be argued
that he is lying or believed that he is telling the
truth.

Nihil enim affirmavit aut negavit. For he is affirming or denying nothing.

Ergo nec tales sententiae in quaestionem veni- Thus these sentences are not brought into ques-
unt, ut disputatorem requirant. tion and do not require disputants.

III. Sed illae quae requirunt aut simplices sunt III. Those which are subject to disputation are
aut coniunctae. either simple or complex.

Simplices sunt, quae sine ulla copulatione sen- Those are simple which are pronounced without

40
tentiae alterius enuntiantur, ut est illud quod any connection [or coupling (B.A.M.)] with
dicimus ‘omnis homo ambulat’. another sentence, e.g. ‘omnis homo ambulat’
(every man walks).

Coniunctae sunt, de quarum copulatione indi- They are complex when judgment is made
catur, ut est ‘si ambulat, movetur’. concerning their conjunction (Tr. when the truth
or falsity of the connective is the question), e.g.
‘si ambulat, movetur’ (if he is walking, he is
moving / if walking is going on, movement is
going on).

Sed cum de coniunctione sententiarum iudicium But when judgment is given concerning the
fit, tamdiu est, donec perveniatur ad summam. conjunction of sentences, it must wait until we
come to the culmination (of the syllogism; a
Stoic commonplace, tr.).

Summa est autem quae conficitur ex concessis. The ‘summa’ (conclusion) is that which is made
up of concessions (results from ...)

Quod dico tale est: qui dicit ‘si ambulat,
movetur’, probare vult aliquid, ut cum hoc con-
cessero verum esse restet illi docere quod
ambulet et summa consequatur, quae iam negari
non potest, id est quod moveatur–aut restet illi
docere quod non moveatur, ut consequatur sum-
ma, quae item non potest non concedi, id est
quod non ambulet.
What I am saying is this: Whoever says ‘si am-
bulat, movetur’ (if he is walking, he is moving)
wants to prove something, so that when I
concede that this is true, he needs only to say
what walks and the conclusion will follow and
now cannot be denied, that is, that he moves –
or he simply has to say that it does not move, so
that the conclusion again follows and cannot be
denied (not not be conceded), namely that he
does not walk.

Rursus si hoc modo velit dicere ‘homo iste
ambulat’, simplex sententia est: quam si con-
cessero et adiunxerit aliam ‘quisquis autem
ambulat movetur’ et hanc etiam concessero, ex
hac coniunctione sententiarum quamvis singilla-
tim enuntiatarum et concessarum illa summa
sequitur, quae iam neccessario concedatur, id
est ‘homo iste igitur movetur’.
And again in like manner if someone says ‘this
man walks’, it is a simple sentence; if I concede
this one and he adds another, ‘Whoever walks,
moves’, and I likewise grant this one, from the
conjunction of sentences, though uttered singly
and conceded singly, the conclusion follows,
which is now of necessity conceded, namely
‘Therefore, this man moves’.

IV. His breviter constitutis singulas partes IV. Now that these have briefly been set up, let
consideremus. us consider the individual parts.

Nam sunt primae duae: una de his quae sim- There are two first ones. 1. simple, as it were the
pliciter dicuntur, ubi est quasi materia dialec- material (building blocks) of dialectic; 2. those
ticae, altera de his quae coniuncta dicuntur, ubi which are called conjuncts, where the finished
iam quasi opus apparet. product, as it were, appears.

Quae de simplicibus est vocatur ‘de loquendo’. The section on the simplexes is called ‘De Lo-
quendo’ (on the utterance).

Illa vero quae de coniunctis est in tres partes The section on the complexes is divided into
dividitur: separata enim coniunctione verborum three parts: 1. those collocations of words being
quae non inplet sententiam illa, quae sic inplet set aside which do not make a complete sen-

41
sententiam, ut nondum faciat quaestionem vel tence, those which complete a sentence, so that
disputatorem requirat, vocatur ‘de eloquendo’. a question is not raised or disputation is not
called for is called ‘De Eloquendo’ (on speak-
ing).

Illa, quae sic inplet sententiam, ut de sententiis 2. When a sentence is completed so that it is
simplicibus iudicetur, vocatur ‘de proloquendo’. judged (evaluated) as a simple sentence, that
section is called ‘De Proloquendo’ (on the
sentence, on the statement).

Illa, quae sic conpraehendit sententiam, ut de
ipsa etiam copulatione iudicetur donec per-
veniatur ad summam, vocatur ‘de proloquiorum
summa’.
3. That section in which a sentence is made in
such a way that we judge concerning the con-
nective itself until we come to the conclusion is
called ‘De Proloquiorum Summa’ (on the con-
clusion; on the syllogism).

Has ergo singulas partes diligentius explicemus. Let us more closely examine the various parts.

Cf. S. Aurelii Augustini, De Dialectica Liber, § V (tr. J. Marchand; rev. B.A.M.):

Verbum est uniuscuiusque rei signum, quod ab A word is the sign of anything which can be un-
audiente possit intellegi, a loquente prolatum. derstood by the hearer when (it is) pronounced
by the speaker.

Res est quidquid vel sentitur vel intellegitur vel A thing is whatever is sensed, or understood, or
latet. hidden.

Signum est quod et se ipsum sensui et praeter se A sign is something which presents itself to the
aliquid animo ostendit. senses and something besides itself to the mind.

Loqui est articulata voce signum dare. To speak is to give a sign in articulate voice.

Articulatam autem dico quae conpraehendi I call that ‘articulate’ which is capable of being
litteris potest. comprised in letters.

Haec omnia quae definita sunt, utrum recte
definita sint et utrum hactenus verba definitionis
aliis definitionibus persequenda fuerint, ille in-
dicabit locus, quo definiendi disciplina tractatur.
Now all these which have been defined, whether
they be rightly defined and whether up till now
the words of the definition are to be followed by
other definitions, he will indicate in the place
where the discipline of defining is treated.

Nunc quod instat accipe intentus. Omne verbum Now take what is coming attentively. Every
sonat. Cum enim est in scripto, non verbum sed word sounds. Therefore, when it is written it is
verbi signum est; not a word, but the sign of a word.

quippe inspectis a legente litteris occurrit animo, When they are seen by the reader, the letters
quid voce prorumpat. occur to the mind, which breaks out in the
voice.

Quid enim aliud litterae scriptae quam se ipsas For what else do written letters do but present
oculis et praeter se voces animo ostendunt, themselves to the eyes and beyond themselves
vocal sounds to the mind?

42
et paulo ante diximus signum esse quod se ip- And we said a little earlier that a sign was
sum sensui et praeter se aliquid animo ostendit. something that presented itself to the senses and
something besides itself to the mind.

Quae legimus igitur non verba sunt sed signa What we read, therefore, are not the words but
verborum. the signs of words.

Sed ut, ipsa littera cum sit pars minima vocis But also, since a letter itself is the least part of
articulatae, abutimur tamen hoc vocabulo, ut ap- articulate voice, we misuse this designation
pellemus litteram etiam cum scriptam videmus, when we name ‘letter’ even what we see writ-
quamvis omnino tacita sit ten, although it is in every way silent,

neque ulla pars vocis sed signum partis vocis nor is it a part of vocal sound, but appears as a
appareat. sign of a part of vocal sound

Ita etiam verbum appellatur cum scriptum est, Likewise, we also name something written a
quamvis verbi signum, id est signum signifi- word, although it is a sign of a word, that is,
cantis vocis, eluceat. (even though it) appears as the sign of signi-
ficant vocal sound.

Ergo ut coeperam dicere omne verbum sonat. Thus, as we had just begun to say, every word
sounds.

Sed quod sonat nihil ad dialecticam. But what sounds has nothing to do with dia-
lectic.

De sono enim verbi agitur, cum quaeritur vel For the sound of a word is treated when we seek
animadvertitur, quanta vocalium vel dispositi- to learn or pay heed to how vowels are softened
one leniatur vel concursione dehiscat, in their disposition, or how they lose hiatus
when they come together,

item consonantium vel interpositione nodetur likewise, how consonants cluster by interpo-
vel congestione asperetur sition, or are made harsh by clustering,

et quot vel qualibus syllabis constet, ubi poet- and how many or what kind of syllables it
icus rhythmus accentusque a grammaticis solar- consists of, where poetic rhythm and accent, a
um aurium tractantur negotia. matter for the ears of the grammarian alone, are
treated.

Et tamen cum de his disputatur, praeter dialec- But when there is dispute concerning these
ticam non est. Haec enim scientia disputandi est. things, that is not beyond dialectic. For it is the
science of disputing.*

Sed cum verba sint rerum, quando de ipsis obit- But although words are of things, [nevertheless]
nent, verborum autem, quibus de his disputatur. when they hold about themselves, there is
dispute about these things, but [I mean] of the
words [themselves].**

Nam cum de verbis loqui nisi verbis nequeamus
et cum loquimur nonnisi de aliquibus rebus
loquamur, occurrit animo ita esse verba signa
rerum, ut res esse non desinant.
Since we cannot speak of words unless with
words, and when we speak we necessarily speak
about certain things, these words that occur to
the mind are signs of things, but things are not
what they end in.***

43
* For further specifications relevant to this matter, see the first chapter of St. Thomas’ De Fallaciis. (B.A.M.)
** I.e. they have material supposition. (B.A.M.)
*** I.e. when we speak about words, since they are signs of things, then signs of things ‘occur’ to the mind–
yet the things they signify are not what the mind rests in, rather it is the words themselves as subject for a
dispute. (B.A.M.)

Cum ergo verbum ore procedit, si propter se
procedit id est ut de ipso verbo aliquid quaeratur
aut disputetur, res est utique disputationi
quaestionique subiecta, sed ipsa res ‘verbum’
vocatur.
For when a word goes out of the mouth, if it
goes out on account of itself, that is, for exam-
ple, when it disputes or asks something about
itself, it is a thing undoubtedly subject to dispu-
tation and question, and then the thing is called
a word.

Quidquid autem ex verbo non aures sed animus But all [that part] of a word which is not
sentit et ipso animo tenetur inclusum, ‘dicibile’ sensed by the ears but by the mind and is
vocatur. held enclosed in the mind is called a ‘sayable’
[cf. the Stoic lekton (B.A.M.)].

Cum vero verbum procedit non propter se sed But when a word goes out not for its own
propter aliud aliquid significandum, ‘dictio’ sake, but for the sake of signifying something
vocatur. about another thing, it is called a dictio.

Res autem ipsa, quae iam verbum non est neque
verbi in mente conceptio, sive habeat verbum
quo significari possit, sive non habeat, nihil
aliud quam ‘res’ vocatur proprio iam nomine.
That thing which is neither a word nor a
conception of a word in the mind, whether it
has a word with which it may be signified or
not, is called by its proper name nothing
other than ‘thing’.

Haec ergo quattuor distincta teneantur, ‘verbum We then have four distinct things: ‘word’,
dicibile dictio res’. ‘sayable’, dictio, ‘thing’.

Quod dixi ‘verbum’ et verbum est et ‘verbum’ What I have called ‘word’ is both a word and
significat. signifies ‘word’.

Quod dixi ‘dicibile’ verbum est, nec tamen What I have called a ‘sayable’ is a word, but
‘verbum’, sed quod in verbo intellegitur et it does not signify ‘word’, but that which is
animo continetur, significat. understood in the word and contained in the
mind.
Quod dixi ‘dictionem’ verbum est, sed quod iam What I have called a dictio is a word, but it
illa duo simul id est et ipsum verbum et quod fit signifies in fact those two at once, that is, the
in animo per verbum significat. word itself, and what comes about in the mind
through the word.

Quod dixi ‘rem’, verbum est, quod praeter illa When I say ‘thing’ it is a word which signifies
tria quae dicta sunt quidquid restat significat. that which is left over after those three which
have just been mentioned.
Sed exemplis haec inlustranda esse perspicio. Let us see if we can illustrate this by examples:

Fac igitur a quoquam grammatico puerum Let a boy be questioned by a schoolteacher in

interrogatum hoc modo: this manner:

"‘arma’ quae pars orationis est?" “What part of speech is ‘arma/ (arms)’?”

44
Quod dictum est ‘arma’, propter se dictum est, ‘arma’ is here said concerning itself (for its own
id est verbum propter ipsum verbum. sake), i.e. is a word concerning a word.

Cetera vero, quod ait ‘quae pars orationis’, non The other parts, however, when he says ‘What
propter se, sed propter verbum, quod ‘arma’ dic- part of speech ...’ are either felt in the mind or
tum est, vel animo sensa vel voce prolata sunt. pronounced by the voice, not for their own sake,
but for the sake of ‘arma’.

Sed cum animo sensa sunt, ante vocem dicibilia But since they were felt in the mind, ‘dici-
erunt; bilia’ (sayables) came before voice;

cum autem propter id quod dixi proruperunt in when they break out in voice concerning what I
vocem, dictiones factae sunt. said, then they are ‘dictiones’ (things said).

Ipsum vero ‘arma’ quod hic verbum est, cum a ‘arma’ itself, since it is a word, when it was
Vergilio pronuntiatum est, dictio fuit; pronounced by Virgil, became a ‘dictio’,

non enim propter se prolatum est, sed ut eo for it was not pronounced for its own sake, but
significarentur vel bella quae gessit Aeneas vel that it might signify either the wars which
scutum et cetera arma quae Vulcanus heroi Aeneas carried on, or the shield, or other arms
fabricatus est. which Vulcan made for the hero.

Ipsa vero bella vel arma, quae gesta aut These very wars or arms which were carried on
ingestata sunt ab Aenea— or worn by Aeneas—

ipsa inquam quae cum gererentur adque essent the same, I say, which were either carried on or
videbantur, quaeque si nunc adessent vel digito existed, if they were now present could either be
monstrare possemus aut tangere, quae etiamsi pointed out or touched with the finger, if they
non cogitentur non eo tamen fit ut non fuerint— were not thought nor made for him,

ipsa ergo per se nec verba sunt nec dicibilia nec they are neither words nor `dicibilia’ nor
dictiones, sed res quae iam proprio nomine ‘res’ ‘dictiones’, but things which are properly called
vocantur. ‘res’ (thing) by name.

Tractandum est igitur nobis in hac parte dia- We must thus in this part of dialectic treat
lecticae de ‘verbis’, de ‘dicibilibus’, ‘dictioni- words, ‘dicibilia’, ‘dictiones’, things.
bus’, de ‘rebus’.

In quibus omnibus cum partim verba signifi- In all these things, where words are partly signi-
centur partim non verba, nihil est tamen, de quo fied and partly things which are not words, there
non verbis disputare necesse sit. is nothing concerning which it is not necessary
to dispute using words.

Itaque de his primo disputetur per quae de Thus, we must first discuss these, since it is
ceteris disputare conceditur. conceded that we must dispute concerning the
others by use of them.

45
1. Definitions.

VERBUM. 1. A word is the sign of anything which can be understood by the hearer
when pronounced by the speaker. 2. Every word sounds [sonat]. 3. What I have called
‘word’ is both a word and signifies ‘word’.

DICTIO. 1. But when a word goes out [i.e. is uttered] not for its own sake, but for
the sake of signifying something about another thing, it is called a dictio [i.e. a ‘thing said’,
or word that has been spoken; an expression]. 2. What I have called a dictio is a word, but
it signifies in fact those two at once, that is, the word itself, and what comes about in the
mind through the word [i.e. it embraces both verbum and dicibile].

DICIBILE. 1. That part of a word which is not sensed by the ears but by the mind
and is held enclosed in the mind is called a sayable [= the Stoic lekton].70 2. A ‘sayable’ is
a word, but it does not signify ‘word’, but that which is understood in the word and con-
tained in the mind. 3. ‘Sayables’ are first ‘felt in the mind’ and so ‘come before the voice’.

RES. A thing is whatever is sensed [or felt] or understood or hidden [e.g. when it is
not understood by the hearer (?)].

SIGNUM. A sign is something which presents itself to the senses and something
besides itself to the mind.

LOQUI. To speak is to give a sign in articulate voice.

ARTICULATA. I call that articulate which is capable of being comprised in letters.

LITERA. The least part of articulate voice [e.g. an elementary vocal sound, not the
written sign of this, though both are called ‘letter’].

2. The definition of ‘word’ in St. Augustine compared with Aristotle on the verb:

Augustine Aristotle

A word is the sign of anything which can be But in themselves, said by themselves, verbs are
understood by a hearer when (it is) pronounced names and signify something;
by a speaker.

for the one who speaks71 [20] establishes the

understanding [sc. of the hearer] and he who
hears [sc. what is said] rests [sc. in what is
said].
a. name (cf. De Int. I. 2):

70
Cf. John Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture, p. 89: “...dicibile is Augustine’s
equivalent for the Stoic lekton....”
71
That is, the one who utters a verb by itself ‘says something’; in the present case, a name.

46
“A name, therefore, is a vocal sound significative by convention without time, no part of
which is significative separately....” (it being proper to a name to signify something as
existing per se)

b. verb as a kind of name (cf. De Int. I. 3):

“But in themselves, said by themselves, verbs are names and signify something; for the
one who speaks establishes the understanding [sc. of the hearer] and he who hears [sc.
what is said] rests [sc. in what is said].”

a verb (rhema; verbum)

when spoken by itself is a name and hence (an instance of speaking; a speaker)
when heard by another (something heard by a hearer so as to be understood)
signifies something (a pragma or res)

c. verb and name in common (cf. De Dialectica V):

“A word [verbum] is the sign of anything which can be understood by a hearer when (it is)
pronounced by a speaker.”

a word (verbum)
when spoken by someone (an instance of speaking; a speaker)
and understood by another (something heard by a hearer so as to be understood)
signifies something (a pragma or res)

3. The elements common to the foregoing accounts:

a vocal sound which

when spoken by one person and heard by another
is significative of something
and so is understood (first by the one, and then by the other)

Note the continuity exhibited by the foregoing definitions: First, Aristotle defines
onoma, the nomen or ‘name’, then, having defined rhema, the verbum or ‘verb’, in dis-
tinction from the name,72 he points out that, looked at in a certain way, even verbs are
names. But the definition of verbum handed on by St. Augustine follows immediately upon
Aristotle’s account of the communia of onoma and rhema: that is to say, inasmuch as “in
themselves, said by themselves, verbs are names and signify something; for the one who
speaks establishes the understanding [sc. of the hearer] and he who hears [sc. what is said]
rests [sc. in what is said],” names and verbs are seen to agree in St. Augustine’s definition
of verbum or ‘word’, it being true to say of either one that it is “the sign of anything which
can be understood by a hearer when (it is) pronounced by a speaker”. Of course, many
accounts of speaking will agree in the foregoing principles, but the continuity of the
preceding definitions strongly suggests to me that they derive from a common source.

72
That is, as a vocal sound significative with time, which is always the sign of something said of something
else.

47
4. On the nature of a ‘word’ according to St. Augustine.

Cf. St. Augustine of Hippo, cited in the Catena Aurea on John 1, by St. Thomas Aquinas
(tr. J. H. Newman et. al.):

1a. In the beginning was the Word.

AUG. As our knowledge differs from God’s, so does our word, which arises from our
knowledge, differ from that Word of God, which is born of the Father’s essence; we might
say, from the Father’s knowledge, the Father’s wisdom, or, more correctly, the Father Who
is Knowledge, the Father Who is Wisdom. The Word of God then, the Only-Begotten Son of
the Father, is in all things like and equal to the Father; being altogether what the Father is,
yet not the Father; because the one is the Son, the other the Father. And thereby He knows
all things which the Father knows; yet His knowledge is from the Father, even as is His
being: for knowing and being are the same with Him; and so as the Father’s being is not
from the Son, so neither is His knowing. Wherefore the Father begat the Word equal to
Himself in all things as uttering forth Himself. For had there been more or less in His Word
than in Himself, He would not have uttered Himself fully and perfectly. With respect
however to our own inner word, which we find, in whatever sense, to be like the Word, let
us not object to see how very unlike it is also. A word is a formation of our mind going to
take place, but not yet made, and something in our mind which we toss to and fro in a
slippery circuitous way, as one thing and another is discovered, or occurs to our thoughts.
When this, which we toss to and fro, has reached the subject of our knowledge, and been
formed therefrom, when it has assumed the most exact likeness to it, and the conception has
quite answered to the thing; then we have a true word. Who may not see how great the
difference is here from that Word of God, which exists in the Form of God in such wise, that
It could not have been first going to be formed, and afterwards formed, nor can ever have
been unformed, being a Form absolute, and absolutely equal to Him from Whom It is.
Wherefore; in speaking of the Word of God here nothing is said about thought in God; lest
we should think there was any thing revolving in God, which might first receive form in
order to be a Word, and afterwards lose it, and be canted round and round again in an
unformed state.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Evangelium Johannis (= Commentary on the Gospel of St.
John I, cap. 1, lect. 1, nn. 23-29, tr. James A. Weisheipl & Fabian R. Larcher, pp. ?-34):

LECTURE I

1 In the beginning was the Word;

and the Word was with God;
and the Word was God.
2 He was in the beginning with God.

23 John the Evangelist, as already indicated, makes it his principal object to show the
divinity of the Incarnate Word. Accordingly, his Gospel is divided into two parts. In the first
he states the divinity of Christ; in the second he shows it by the things Christ did in the flesh
(2:1). In regard to the first, he does two things. First he shows the divinity of Christ;
secondly he sets forth the manner in which Christ’s divinity is made known to us (1:14).
Concerning the first he does two things. First he treats of the divinity of Christ; secondly of
the incarnation of the Word of God (1:6).

48
Because there are two items to be considered in each thing, namely, its existence and its
operation or power, first he treats the existence of the Word as to his divine nature; secondly
of his power or operation (1:3). In regard to the first he does four things. First he shows
when the Word was: In the beginning was the Word; secondly where he was: and the
Word was with God; thirdly what he was: and the Word was God; fourthly, in what way
he was: He was in the beginning with God. The first two pertain to the inquiry “whether
something exists”; the second two pertain to the inquiry “what something is.”

24 With respect to the first of these four we must examine the meaning of the statement, In
the beginning was the Word. And here three things present themselves for careful study
according to the three parts of this statement. First it is necessary to investigate the name
Word; secondly the phrase in the beginning; thirdly the meaning of the Word was in the
beginning.

25 To understand the name Word we should note that according to the Philosopher [On
Interpretation 16a3] vocal sounds are signs of the affections that exist in our soul. It is
customary in Scripture for the things signified to be themselves called by the names of their
signs, as in the statement, “And the rock was Christ” ( 1 Cor 10:4). It is fitting that what is
within our soul, and which is signified by our external word, be called a “word.” But
whether the name “word” belongs first to the exterior vocal sound or to the conception in our
mind, is not our concern at present. However, it is obvious that what is signified by the vocal
sound, as existing interiorly in the soul, exists prior to the vocal expression inasmuch as it is
its actual cause. Therefore if we wish to grasp the meaning of the interior word, we must first
look at the meaning of that which is exteriorly expressed in words.

Now there are three things in our intellect: the intellectual power itself, the species of the
thing understood (and this species is its form, being to the intellect what the species of a
color is to the eye), and thirdly the very activity of the intellect, which is to understand. But
none of these is what is signified by the exterior vocal word: for the name “stone” does not
signify the substance of the intellect because this is not what the one naming intends; nor
does it signify the species, which is that by which the intellect understands, since this also is
not the intention of the one naming; nor does it signify the act itself of understanding since to
understand is not an action proceeding to the exterior from the one understanding, but an
action remaining within. Therefore, that is properly called an interior word which the one
understanding forms when understanding.

Now the intellect forms two things, according to its two operations. According to its
operation which is called “the understanding of indivisibles,” it forms a definition; while
according to its operation by which it unites and separates, it forms an enunciation or
something of that sort. Hence, what is thus formed and expressed by the operation of the
intellect, whether by defining or enunciating, is what the exterior vocal sound signifies. So
the Philosopher says that the notion (ratio) which a name signifies is a definition. Hence,
what is thus expressed, i.e., formed in the soul, is called an interior word. Consequently it is
compared to the intellect, not as that by which the intellect understands, but as that in which
it understands, because it is in what is thus expressed and formed that it sees the nature of the
thing understood. Thus we have the meaning of the name “word.”

Secondly, from what has been said we are able to understand that a word is always
something that proceeds from an intellect existing in act; and furthermore, that a word is
always a notion (ratio) and likeness of the thing understood. So if the one understanding and
the thing understood are the same, then the word is a notion and likeness of the intellect from
which it proceeds. On the other hand, if the one understanding is other than the thing
understood, then the word is not a likeness and notion of the one understanding but of the

49
thing understood, as the conception which one has of a stone is a likeness of only the stone.
But when the intellect understands itself, its word is a likeness and notion of the intellect.
And so Augustine (On the Trinity IX, 5) sees a likeness of the Trinity in the Soul insofar as
the mind understands itself, but not insofar as it understands other things.

It is clear then that it is necessary to have a word in any intellectual nature, for it is of the
very nature of understanding that the intellect in understanding should form something. Now
what is formed is called a word, and so it follows that in every being which understands
there must be a word.

However, intellectual natures are of three kinds: human, angelic and divine; and so there are
three kinds of words. The human word, about which it is said in the Psalm (13:1): “The fool
said in his heart, ‘There is no God.’ “ The angelic word, about which it is said in Zechariah
(1:9), and in many places in Sacred Scripture, “And the angel said to me.” The third is the
divine word, of which Genesis (1:3) says, “And God said, ‘Let there be light.’ “ So when the
Evangelist says, In the beginning was the Word, we cannot understand this as a human or
angelic word, because both these words have been made since man and angel have a cause
and principle of their existence and operation, and the word of a man or an angel cannot
exist before they do. The word the Evangelist had in mind he shows by saying that this word
was not made, since all things were made by it. Therefore, the word about which John
speaks here is the Word of God.

26 We should note that this Word differs from our own word in three ways. The first
difference, according to Augustine, is that our word is formable before being formed, for
when I wish to conceive the notion of a stone, I must arrive at it by reasoning. And so it is in
all other things that are understood by us, with the sole possible exception of the first
principles which, since they are known in a simple manner, are known at once without any
discourse of reason. So as long as the intellect, in so reasoning, casts about this way and that,
the formation is not yet complete. It is only when it has conceived the notion of the thing
perfectly that for the first time it has the notion of the complete thing and a word. Thus in
our mind there is both a “cogitation,” meaning the discourse involved in an investigation,
and a word, which is formed according to a perfect contemplation of the truth. So our word
is first in potency before it is in act. But the Word of God is always in act. In consequence,
the term “cogitation” does not properly speaking apply to the Word of God. For Augustine
says (On the Trinity XV): “The Word of God is spoken of in such a way that cogitation is
not included, lest anything changeable be supposed in God.” Anselm was speaking
improperly when he said: “For the supreme Spirit to speak is for him to look at something
while cogitating.”

27 The second difference is that our word is imperfect, but the divine Word is most perfect.
For since we cannot express all our conceptions in one word, we must form many imperfect
words through which we separately express all that is in our knowledge. But it is not that
way with God. For since he understands both himself and everything else through his
essence, by one act, the single divine Word is expressive of all that is in God, not only of the
Persons but also of creatures; otherwise it would be imperfect. So Augustine says: “If there
were less in the Word than is contained in the knowledge of the One speaking it, the Word
would be imperfect; but it is obvious that it is most perfect; therefore, it is only one.” “God
speaks once” (Jb 33:14).

28 The third difference is that our word is not of the same nature as we; but the divine Word
is of the same nature as God. And therefore it is something that subsists in the divine nature.
For the understood notion which the intellect is seen to fonn about some thing has only an
intelligible existence in our soul. Now in our soul, to understand is not the same as the nature

50
of the soul, because our soul is not its own operation. Consequently, the word which our
intellect forms is not of the essence of our soul, but is an accident of it. But in God, to
understand and to be are the same; and so the Word of the divine intellect is not an accident
but belongs to its nature. Thus it must be subsistent, because whatever is in the nature of God
is God. Thus Damascene says that God is a substantial Word, and a hypostasis, but our
words are concepts in our mind.

29 From the above it is clear that the Word, properly speaking, is always understood as a
Person in the Divinity, since it implies only something expressed, by the one understanding;
also, that in the Divinity the Word is the likeness of that from which it issues; and that it is
co-eternal with that from which it issues, since it was not first formable before being formed,
but was always in act; and that it is equal to the Father, since it is perfect and expressive of
the whole being of the Father; and that it is co-essential and consubstantial with the Father,
since it is his substance.

It is also clear that since in every nature that which issues forth and has a likeness to the
nature from which it issues is called a son, and since this Word issues forth in a likeness and
identity to the nature from which it issues, it is suitably and appropriately called a “Son,” and
its production is called a generation.

So now the first point is clear, the meaning of the term Word.

51
5. The order of meanings of the word ‘word’ according to St. Thomas Aquinas.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., q. 34, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

The most manifest and common way that ‘word’ [verbum] is said with respect to us is that
which is brought forth [profertur] in the voice, which, in fact, proceeds from within us with
respect to two things found in the exterior word, namely, the vocal sound itself, and the
signification of the voice. For the vocal sound signifies the concept of the intellect,
according to the Philosopher (cf. De Int. I. 1, 16a 5), and, again, the vocal sound proceeds
from the imagination, as is said in the De Anima (cf. II. 8, 420b 31 ff.). Therefore, the
exterior vocal sound is called a ‘word’ from this, that it signifies the interior concept of the
mind. Thus, then, first and principally the interior concept of the mind is called a ‘word’, but
secondly, the vocal sound itself that signifies the interior concept; but thirdly, the very
imagination of the vocal sound is called a ‘word’. And these three ways Damascene lays
down in the first book (ch. xiii), saying that a ‘word’ is called the natural motion of the
intellect, according to which it moves and understands and thinks, just as light and splendor,
with respect to the first; and further, a word is what is not brought forth by a word, but is
pronounced in the heart, with respect to the third; and further a word is also the ‘angel’—
that is, the messenger—of the intelligence, with respect to the second; but in a fourth way
that is called a ‘word’ figuratively which is signified or effected by a word, as we are wont to
say, this is the word I have spoken to you, or (this is the word) which the king has
commanded, when some deed which is signified by ‘word’ has been pointed out either by
simply announcing it or even commanding it.73

6. The four meanings of verbum in sum.

1. first and principally the interior concept of the mind is called a word (but this is
what a vocal sound signifies according to Aristotle)
2. but secondly, the vocal sound itself that signifies the interior concept (but this is
“the most manifest and common way that ‘word’ [verbum] is said with respect to
us”—namely, “that which is brought forth [profertur] in the voice”)
3. thirdly, the imagination itself of the vocal sound is called a word (but this is “what
is not brought forth by a word, but is pronounced in the heart”, which is the image
of the word brought forth in the voice—for which see below—and not the verbum
cordis, which is the same as the first meaning above)
4. in a fourth way that is called ‘word’ figuratively which is signified or effected by a
word

73
manifestius autem et communius in nobis dicitur verbum quod voce profertur. quod quidem ab interiori
procedit quantum ad duo quae in verbo exteriori inveniuntur, scilicet vox ipsa, et significatio vocis. vox enim
significat intellectus conceptum, secundum philosophum, in libro i periherm., et iterum vox ex imaginatione
procedit, ut in libro de anima dicitur. vox autem quae non est significativa, verbum dici non potest. ex hoc
ergo dicitur verbum vox exterior, quia significat interiorem mentis conceptum. sic igitur primo et
principaliter interior mentis conceptus verbum dicitur, secundario vero, ipsa vox interioris conceptus
significativa, tertio vero, ipsa imaginatio vocis verbum dicitur. et hos tres modos verbi ponit damascenus, in i
libro, cap. xiii, dicens quod verbum dicitur naturalis intellectus motus, secundum quem movetur et intelligit
et cogitat, velut lux et splendor, quantum ad primum, rursus verbum est quod non verbo profertur, sed in
corde pronuntiatur, quantum ad tertium,. rursus etiam verbum est angelus, idest nuntius, intelligentiae,
quantum ad secundum. dicitur autem figurative quarto modo verbum, id quod verbo significatur vel efficitur,
sicut consuevimus dicere, hoc est verbum quod dixi tibi, vel quod mandavit rex, demonstrato aliquo facto
quod verbo significatum est vel simpliciter enuntiantis, vel etiam imperantis.

52
7. On the role of the word in understanding.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Evang. Johan., cap. 1, lect. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

If, therefore, we wish to know what the interior word of the mind is, let us see what that
which is uttered by the exterior vocal sound signifies.74

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Rationibus Fidei cap. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

Now our intellect sometimes is understanding in potency, sometimes in act. But whenever
it understands in act, it forms something intelligible, which is a sort of ‘offspring’ of it, for
which reason it is also called a ‘conception’ of the mind. And this is, in fact, what is
signified by the exterior vocal sound; and so, just as the vocal sound doing the signifying is
called the exterior ‘word’, so the interior conception of the mind signified by the exterior
word is called the ‘word’ of the intellect, or of the mind.75

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Evang. Johan., cap. 1, lect. 1 (tr. Weisheipl & Larcher):

Therefore, that is properly called an interior word which the one understanding forms
when understanding.76
Now the intellect forms two things, according to its two operations. According to its
operation which is called “the understanding of indivisibles,”77 it forms a definition; while
according to its operation by which it unites and separates, it forms an enunciation or
something of that sort. Hence, what is thus formed and expressed by the operation of the
intellect, whether by defining or enunciating, is what the exterior vocal sound signifies. So
the Philosopher says that the notion (ratio) which a name signifies is a definition.78
Therefore that thing so expressed—that is, formed in the soul—is called the interior word,
and is therefore compared to the intellect not as that by which the intellect understands,79 but
as that in which it understands, the reason being in the very thing expressed and formed it
sees the nature of the thing understood.80 Thus, then, we have the meaning of the name
‘word’.81

74
si ergo volumus scire quid est interius verbum mentis, videamus quid significat quod exteriori voce
profertur.
75
est autem intellectus noster aliquando quidem in potentia intelligens, aliquando vero in actu.
quandocumque autem actu intelligit, quoddam intelligibile format, quod est quasi quaedam proles ipsius,
unde et mentis conceptus nominatur. et hoc quidem est quod exteriori voce significatur: unde sicut vox
significans, verbum exterius dicitur, ita interior mentis conceptus verbo exteriori significatus, dicitur verbum
intellectus, seu mentis.
76
illud ergo proprie dicitur verbum interius, quod intelligens intelligendo format.
77
More simply, ‘the understanding of indivisibles’ means understanding what a thing is.
78
intellectus autem duo format, secundum duas eius operationes. nam secundum operationem suam, quae
dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia, format definitionem; secundum vero operationem suam, qua componit et
dividit, format enunciationem, vel aliquid huiusmodi. et ideo, illud sic formatum et expressum per
operationem intellectus, vel definientis vel enunciantis, exteriori voce significatur. unde dicit philosophus
quod ratio, quam significat nomen, est definitio.
79
Which is the intelligible species.
80
Which, when it has been understood perfectly, would be expressed by its real definition, though it may be
preceded by a nominal definition, inasmuch as we know things vaguely before we know them perfectly.
81
istud ergo sic expressum, scilicet formatum in anima, dicitur verbum interius; et ideo comparatur ad
intellectum, non sicut quo intellectus intelligit, sed sicut in quo intelligit; quia in ipso expresso et formato
videt naturam rei intellectae. sic ergo habemus significationem huius nominis verbum.

53
N.B. With respect to knowledge, one must distinguish between the medium sub quo, which
is a light, whether sensible or intelligible, under which a thing is seen; (2) the medium quo,
which is the form, whether visible or intelligible, by which it is seen, and (3) the medium in
quo or a quo, or that in which it is seen, which is the nature of the thing understood, or else
a means to seeing such a nature, as with a mirror or other effect which leads to knowledge
of its cause. See further below, as well as my separate discussion here.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. disp. de Veritate, q. 4, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

[Now] the word of the intellect in us involves two things in its notion, namely, that it is
understood, and that it is expressed by another thing.82

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 27, art. 1, c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers,
rev. B.A.M.):

For whenever one understands, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds something
within himself, which is a conception of the thing understood, issuing from the intellective
power and proceeding from the knowledge of it. This conception a vocal sound signifies;
and it is called the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice [verbo vocis].83

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 27, q. 2, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

If, therefore, ‘locution’ be taken according as it is in the intellective part [of the soul]
alone, thus it is ‘the word of the heart’, which is also called by some ‘the word of the thing’,
since it is the immediate likeness of the thing itself....84

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Job, cap. I (tr. B.A.M.):

Now it must be understood that to speak is taken in two ways. For sometimes it refers to
the concept of the heart, whereas at other times it refers to the signification [i.e. the
conveying of meaning] by which such a concept is expressed to another.85

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., q. 34, art. 1 ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

For to speak is nothing other than to bring forth a word.86

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 2, art. 4, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

For when we understand a stone, that which the intellect conceives from the thing under-
stood [ex re intellecta] is called a word.87

82
verbum intellectus in nobis duo habet de sua ratione; scilicet quod est intellectum, et quod est ab alio
expressum.
83
quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei
intellectae, ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex eius notitia procedens. quam quidem conceptionem vox
significat, et dicitur verbum cordis, significatum verbo vocis.
84
si ergo accipiatur locutio secundum quod est in parte intellectiva tantum, sic est verbum cordis, quod
etiam ab aliis dicitur verbum rei, quia est immediata similitudo ipsius rei....
85
...sciendum autem est quod dicere dupliciter accipitur, nam quandoque refertur ad conceptum cordis,
quandoque autem ad significationem qua huiusmodi conceptus alteri exprimitur.
86
nihil enim est aliud dicere quam proferre verbum.
87
cum enim intelligimus lapidem, id quod ex re intellecta concipit intellectus, vocatur verbum.

54
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 107, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

Now when the mind turns itself to the actual consideration of any habitual knowledge,
then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called ‘the interior word’.
And by the fact that the concept of the mind of one angel is ordered to be manifested to
another by the will of the angel himself, in this way one angel speaks to another. For to
speak to another is nothing other than to manifest the concept of the mind to another.88

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. disp. de Veritate, q. 4, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

And so, just as in things made by art we consider three things, namely, the end of the work
of art, its exemplar, and the work already produced, so also in speaking a threefold word is
found: namely, (1) that which is conceived by the intellect, with respect to which the exterior
word is uttered in order for it to be signified: and this is the word of the heart without being
uttered by the voice; again (2) the exemplar of the exterior word, and this is called the
interior word which involves an image of the voice; and (3) the exterior word expressed,
which is called the word of the voice. And just as in a work of art the intention of the end
precedes, and then follows the thinking out of the form of the work, and lastly the work is
produced in being—so the word of the heart in the one speaking is prior to the word which
involves the image of the voice, and in the last place is the word of the voice.89

8. The principal meanings of verbum in sum:

• the exterior word which is uttered by the voice in order that what the mind con-
ceives be manifested to another
• the interior word which involves an image of the voice which is the exemplar of the
exterior word—that is, the word of the voice as grasped by the imagination, sc. an
‘auditory image’, being what one ‘hears’ when he ‘talks to himself’, what we might
call ‘the blueprint’ of a word, as having been ‘thought out’ in advance
• the word of the heart, which is also the word of the thing, and the word of the mind,
as well as the word of the intellect, the conceptus mentis understood as the likeness
of the thing outside90

9. Supplement: On the two ways in which anything named by us can be taken.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super ad Ephes., c. 3, lect. 4 (tr. B.A.M.):

88
Quando autem mens convertit se ad actu considerandum quod habet in habitu, loquitur aliquis sibi ipsi,
nam ipse conceptus mentis interius verbum vocatur. Ex hoc vero quod conceptus mentis angelicae ordinatur
ad manifestandum alteri, per voluntatem ipsius Angeli, conceptus mentis unius Angeli innotescit alteri, et sic
loquitur unus Angelus alteri. Nihil est enim aliud loqui ad alterum, quam conceptum mentis alteri
manifestare.
89
et ideo, sicut in artifice tria consideramus, scilicet finem artificii, et exemplar ipsius, et ipsum artificium
iam productum, ita et in loquente triplex verbum invenitur: scilicet id quod per intellectum concipitur, ad
quod significandum verbum exterius profertur: et hoc est verbum cordis sine voce prolatum; item exemplar
exterioris verbi, et hoc dicitur verbum interius quod habet imaginem vocis; et verbum exterius expressum,
quod dicitur verbum vocis. et sicut in artifice praecedit intentio finis, et deinde sequitur excogitatio formae
artificiati, et ultimo artificiatum in esse producitur; ita verbum cordis in loquente est prius verbo quod habet
imaginem vocis, et postremum est verbum vocis.
90
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Resp. ad Lect. Vercell. De Art. 108, q. 1 (tr. B.A.M.): “But this conception of the
intellect is indeed in the intellect as in a subject, but in the thing understood as in a thing represented: for the
conceptions of the intellect are certain likenesses of things that have been understood”.

55
 But there is a difficulty about whether the fatherhood that is in heaven and on earth is
derived from the fatherhood that is in the divine. And it seems that it is not, since we impose
names to the extent that we know the things named; but whatever we know is by way of
creatures so that names imposed by us on things themselves belong to creatures more so and
before they belong to God.91 I reply and say that the name of anything named by us can
be taken in two ways, since it either expresses or signifies the concept of the under-
standing, seeing that vocal sounds are the marks or signs of the passions or concepts in
the soul, and in this way the name is in creatures before it is in God. Or [it can be taken]
insofar as it manifests the whatness of the exterior thing named, and in this way it is in
God before [it is in the creature]. Hence, the name ‘fatherhood’, insofar as it signifies the
conception of the intellect naming the thing, is found in this way per prius in creatures rather
than in God, since the creature becomes known to us before God does; but insofar as it
signifies the very thing named, in this way it is in God per prius rather than in us, since
without a doubt every generative power in us comes from God. And so he says, from which
every fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named, as if he were to say: The fatherhood that
is in the creatures themselves is, in a manner of speaking, ‘nominal’ or ‘vocal’, but that
divine fatherhood by which the Father gives His whole nature to the Son apart from every
imperfection, is true fatherhood.92

10. In sum:

According to St. Thomas Aquinas, the name of anything named by us can be taken
in two ways: in one way, insofar as it signifies the concept of the understanding; in another
way, insofar as it manifests the whatness of the exterior thing named, which is to signify
the very thing named.

We see, then, how the principles we have identified in the foregoing consideration
are made manifest by the preceding argument: for the signification of a vocal sound in-
volves both a ‘what it is’, which is the substance of the name, and an exterior thing which
‘has’ the whatness, which is its ‘quality’, as with a ‘this something’ subsisting in some
nature as signified by the name of a first substance. But the ‘what it is’ is expressed by a
logos or ratio, and this is the concept of the understanding, as we have seen.

91
utrum autem paternitas, quae est in caelis et in terra, derivetur a paternitate, quae est in divinis, dubitatur.
et videtur quod non; quia nomina sic imponimus secundum quod res nominatas cognoscimus; quidquid
autem cognoscimus, est per creaturas, ergo nomina imposita a nobis rebus ipsis, plus et prius conveniunt
creaturis quam ipsi deo.
92
respondeo et dico quod nomen alicuius rei nominatae a nobis dupliciter potest accipi, quia vel est
expressivum, aut significativum conceptus intellectus, quia voces sunt notae, vel signa passionum, vel
conceptuum qui sunt in anima, et sic nomen prius est in creaturis, quam in deo. aut inquantum est
manifestativum quidditatis rei nominatae exterius, et sic est prius in deo. unde hoc nomen paternitas,
secundum quod significat conceptionem intellectus nominantis rem, sic per prius invenitur in creaturis quam
in deo, quia per prius creatura innotescit nobis, quam deus; secundum autem quod significat ipsam rem
nominatam, sic per prius est in deo quam in nobis, quia certe omnis virtus generativa in nobis est a deo. et
ideo dicit: ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur, quasi dicat: paternitas quae est in ipsis
creaturis, est quasi nominalis seu vocalis, sed illa paternitas divina, qua pater dat totam naturam filio,
absque omni imperfectione, est vera paternitas.

56
11. Supplement: On the ways in which something can be known.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In Lib. Boetii de Trin., I, q. 1, art. 2, c. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

I reply that it must be said that something is known in two ways. In one way, through its
own form, as the eye sees a stone through the species of the stone. In another way, through
the form of another thing similar to itself, as a cause is known through the likeness of its
effect and a man through the form of his own image.93

But something is seen through its own form in two ways. In one way through the form
which is the thing itself, as God knows Himself through His own essence and also as an
angel knows itself. In another way through the form which is from another, whether it has
been abstracted from it, when, namely, the form is more immaterial than the reality, as the
form of a stone abstracted from a stone; or whether it has been impressed in the intelligence
by it, as when a reality is simpler than the likeness through which it is known, as Avicenna
says that we know intelligences through the impressions they make in us. Therefore, because
our intellect according to the state of the way has a determinate habitude to forms which are
abstracted from sense, since it is compared to the phantasms as sight to colors, as is said in
the third book of the De Anima, God Himself cannot be known in this state through the form
which is His own essence, but in this way He will be known in heaven by the blessed.94

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 56, art. 3, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

I reply that it must be said that the angels can have some knowledge of God by their own
natural [principles].

To see that this is so, one must consider that something can be known in three ways. In one
way, by the presence of its essence in the knower, just as if light were seen in the eye, and in
this way it is said that an angel understands himself. In another way, by the presence of its
likeness in the knowing power, just as a stone is seen by the eye by the fact the its likeness
results in the eye. In the third way, by the fact that a likeness of the thing known is not
received immediately from the known thing itself, but from another thing in which it results,
just as when we see a man in a mirror.95

93
responsio. dicendum quod dupliciter aliqua res cognoscitur. uno modo per formam propriam, sicut oculus
videt lapidem per speciem lapidis. alio modo per formam alterius similem sibi, sicut cognoscitur causa per
similitudinem effectus et homo per formam suae imaginis.
94
per formam autem suam aliquid dupliciter videtur. uno modo per formam quae est ipsa res, sicut deus se
cognoscit per essentiam suam et etiam angelus se ipsum. alio modo per formam quae est ab ipso, sive sit
abstracta ab ipso, quando scilicet forma immaterialior est quam res, sicut forma lapidis abstrahitur a lapide;
sive sit impressa intelligenti ab eo, utpote quando res est simplicior quam similitudo per quam cognoscitur,
sicut avicenna dicit quod intelligentias cognoscimus per impressiones earum in nobis. quia igitur intellectus
noster secundum statum viae habet determinatam habitudinem ad formas, quae a sensu abstrahuntur, cum
comparetur ad phantasmata sicut visus ad colores, ut dicitur in iii de anima, non potest ipsum deum
cognoscere in hoc statu per formam quae est essentia sua, sed sic cognoscetur in patria a beatis.
95
respondeo dicendum quod angeli aliquam cognitionem de deo habere possunt per sua naturalia. ad cuius
evidentiam, considerandum est quod aliquid tripliciter cognoscitur. uno modo, per praesentiam suae
essentiae in cognoscente, sicut si lux videatur in oculo, et sic dictum est quod angelus intelligit seipsum. alio
modo, per praesentiam suae similitudinis in potentia cognoscitiva, sicut lapis videtur ab oculo per hoc quod
similitudo eius resultat in oculo. tertio modo, per hoc quod similitudo rei cognitae non accipitur immediate
ab ipsa re cognita, sed a re alia, in qua resultat, sicut cum videmus hominem in speculo.

57
X. ON WHAT IS SIGNIFIED TAKEN ACCORDING TO THE PARTS OF SPEECH.

1. On the consideration of simple words according to the parts of logic.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 1., n. 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

But if one were to ask, since in the book of the Predicaments he had spoken about simple
words, why it was necessary that here, besides, the name and the verb were determined
about; to this it must said that there can be a threefold consideration of simple words. One,
according as they signify absolutely a simple understanding, and in this way their
consideration pertains to the book of the Predicaments. In another way, according to
the account they have as parts of an enunciation; and thus they are determined about
in this book. And so they are treated under the account of the name and the verb, to whose
account it belongs that they signify something with time or without it, and other things of
this kind, which belong to the account of words, according as they constitute an
enunciation.96 [But the third consideration may be passed over here.]

• according as they signify absolutely a simple understanding

• according to the account they have as parts of an enunciation

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, n. 17 (tr. Jean T. Oesterle):

It should be said in answer to this objection that the operation of the intellect is twofold, as
was said above, and therefore the one who utters a name or a verb by itself, determines
the intellect with respect to the first operation, which is the simple conception of
something. It is in relation to this that the one hearing, whose mind was undetermined
before the name or the verb was being uttered and its utterance terminated, is set at
rest. Neither the name nor the verb said by itself, however, determines the intellect in
respect to the second operation, which is the operation of the intellect composing and
dividing; nor do the verb and the name said alone set the hearer’s mind at rest in respect to
this operation.97

• the first operation of the intellect is the simple conception of something

• the second operation is the operation of the intellect composing and dividing

2. On what the name and the verb signify.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 4, n. 1. (tr. B.A.M.):

96
si quis autem quaerat, cum in libro praedicamentorum de simplicibus dictum sit, quae fuit necessitas ut hic
rursum de nomine et verbo determinaretur; ad hoc dicendum quod simplicium dictionum triplex potest esse
consideratio. una quidem, secundum quod absolute significant simplices intellectus, et sic earum
consideratio pertinet ad librum praedicamentorum. alio modo, secundum rationem, prout sunt partes
enunciationis; et sic determinatur de eis in hoc libro; et ideo traduntur sub ratione nominis et verbi: de
quorum ratione est quod significent aliquid cum tempore vel sine tempore, et alia huiusmodi, quae pertinent
ad rationem dictionum, secundum quod constituunt enunciationem.
97
sed dicendum est quod cum duplex sit intellectus operatio, ut supra habitum est, ille qui dicit nomen vel
verbum secundum se, constituit intellectum quantum ad primam operationem, quae est simplex conceptio
alicuius, et secundum hoc, quiescit audiens, qui in suspenso erat antequam nomen vel verbum proferretur et
eius prolatio terminaretur; non autem constituit intellectum quantum ad secundam operationem, quae est
intellectus componentis et dividentis, ipsum verbum vel nomen per se dictum: nec quantum ad hoc facit
quiescere audientem.

58
 With respect to the first he does two things: First, he determines about the name, which
signifies the substance of a thing; second, he determines about the verb, which signifies
an action or passion proceding from a thing, at But a verb is what consignifies time, etc.98

• the name signifies the substance of a thing

• the verb signifies an action or passion proceding from a thing

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri., lect. 5, n. 15 (on 16b 19) (= Aristotle: On Interpre-
tation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan. Translated from the Latin with an Intro-
duction by Jean T. Oesterle. Milwaukee 1962, p. 49):

15. He points out the conformity between verbs and names where [16b19] he says, Verbs in
themselves, said alone, are names. He proposes this first and then manifests it.

He says then, first, that verbs said by themselves are names. Some have taken this to mean
the verbs that are taken with the force [49-50] of names, either verbs of the infinitive mode, as
in “To run is to be moving,” or verbs of another mode, as in “Matures is a verb.” But this
does not seem to be what Aristotle means, for it does not correspond to what he says next.
Therefore “name” must be taken in another way here, i.e. as it commonly signifies any word
whatsoever that is imposed to signify a thing. Now, since to act or to be acted upon is also
a certain thing, verbs themselves as they name, i.e., as they signify to act or to be acted
upon, are comprehended under names taken commonly. The name as distinguished
from the verb signifies the thing under a determinate mode, i.e. according as the thing
can be understood as existing per se. This is the reason names can be subjected and
predicated.99

• Verbs themselves as they name signify to act or to be acted upon.

• But “[t]he name as distinguished from the verb signifies the thing under a deter-
minate mode, i.e. according as the thing can be understood as existing per se.”

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, nn. 4-5 (tr. B.A.M.):

But it is the third part by which the verb is distinguished not only from the name, but also
from the participle, which signifies with time. And so he says it is always an indication of
those things which are predicated of another; that is, (it is) a sign, because names and
participles can be put down on the side of the subject and the predicate, but the verb is
always on the side of the predicate.100

98
circa primum duo facit: primo, determinat de nomine, quod significat rei substantiam; secundo, determinat
de verbo, quod significat actionem vel passionem procedentem a re; ibi: verbum autem est quod
consignificat tempus etc..
99
dicit ergo primo, quod ipsa verba secundum se dicta sunt nomina: quod a quibusdam exponitur de verbis
quae sumuntur in vi nominis, ut dictum est, sive sint infinitivi modi; ut cum dico, currere est moveri, sive sint
alterius modi; ut cum dico, curro est verbum. sed haec non videtur esse intentio aristotelis, quia ad hanc
intentionem non respondent sequentia. et ideo aliter dicendum est quod nomen hic sumitur, prout
communiter significat quamlibet dictionem impositam ad significandum aliquam rem. et quia etiam ipsum
agere vel pati est quaedam res, inde est quod et ipsa verba in quantum nominant, idest significant agere vel
pati, sub nominibus comprehenduntur communiter acceptis. nomen autem, prout a verbo distinguitur,
significat rem sub determinato modo, prout scilicet potest intelligi ut per se existens. unde nomina possunt
subiici et praedicari.
100
tertia vero particula est, per quam distinguitur verbum non solum a nomine, sed etiam a participio quod
significat cum tempore; unde dicit: et est semper eorum, quae de altero praedicantur nota, idest signum:

59
 But this appears to admit of an exception in the case of verbs in the infinitive mood, which
now and then are put down on the side of the subject, as when it is said, ‘to walk is to move’.
But it must be said that verbs in the infinitive mood, when they are put in the position of the
subject, have the force of a name: and so in Greek and in the expression of everyday Latin
they admit the addition of an article just as names [or nouns] do. The reason for this is that it
is proper to the name [or ‘noun’] that it signify some thing as existing per se [or ‘as
such’];but it is proper to the verb that it signify action or passion.101
But action can be signified in three ways: in one way, per se [or ‘as such’] in the abstract,
as a certain thing, and in this way it is signified by a name [or ‘noun’], as when it is said,
‘action’, ‘passion’, ‘(a) walk’, ‘(a) run’, and the like. In another way, [it can be signified] in
the manner of an action, namely, as going out from a substance and inhering in it as in a
subject; and in this way it is signified by verbs of the other moods, which are attributed to
predicates.102
But because the very process or inherence of an action can also be apprehended by the
understanding and be signified as a certain thing—it follows that verbs in the infinitive
mood, which themselves signify the very inherence of an action in a subject, can be taken as
verbs by reason of concretion, and as names [or nouns] according as they signify as certain
things.103

3. The three ways in which ‘action’ can be signified:

• “in one way, per se [or ‘as such’] in the abstract, as a certain thing, and in this way
it is signified by a name [or ‘noun’]”
• “In another way, [it can be signified] in the manner of an action, namely, as going
out from a substance and inhering in it as in a subject”
• “But because the very process or inherence of an action can also be apprehended by
the understanding and be signified as a certain thing—it follows that verbs in the
infinitive mood, which themselves signify the very inherence of an action in a
subject, can be taken as verbs by reason of concretion, and as names [or nouns]
according as they signify as certain things.”

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, n. 8 (tr. B.A.M.):

n. 8. Then when he says And it is always (an indication), etc., he explains the other part.
Where it should be noted that since the subject of an enunciation is signified as (that) in
which something inheres, since the verb signifies an action in the manner of an action,

quia scilicet nomina et participia possunt poni ex parte subiecti et praedicati, sed verbum semper est ex parte
praedicati.
101
sed hoc videtur habere instantiam in verbis infinitivi modi, quae interdum ponuntur ex parte subiecti; ut
cum dicitur, ambulare est moveri. sed dicendum est quod verba infinitivi modi, quando in subiecto ponuntur,
habent vim nominis: unde et in graeco et in vulgari latina locutione suscipiunt additionem articulorum sicut
et nomina. cuius ratio est quia proprium nominis est, ut significet rem aliquam quasi per se existentem;
proprium autem verbi est, ut significet actionem vel passionem.
102
potest autem actio significari tripliciter: uno modo, per se in abstracto, velut quaedam res, et sic
significatur per nomen; ut cum dicitur actio, passio, ambulatio, cursus et similia; alio modo, per modum
actionis, ut scilicet est egrediens a substantia et inhaerens ei ut subiecto, et sic significatur per verba aliorum
modorum, quae attribuuntur praedicatis. N.B. The phrase quae attribuuntur praedicatis here presumably
means the same as ‘they are put down on the side of predicates’, and this would be proper to ‘verbs of the
other moods’ insofar as they are ‘always an indication of those things which are predicated of another’.
103
sed quia etiam ipse processus vel inhaerentia actionis potest apprehendi ab intellectu et significari ut res
quaedam, inde est quod ipsa verba infinitivi modi, quae significant ipsam inhaerentiam actionis ad
subiectum, possunt accipi ut verba, ratione concretionis, et ut nomina prout significant quasi res quasdam.

60
 <or, in the case of passive verbs, a passion in the manner of a passion,>104 to whose
account it belongs that it inhere, it is always put on the part of the predicate, but never on
the part of the subject, unless it be taken with the force of a name, as has been said. There-
fore the verb is always said to be an indication of those things which are said of another:
both because the verb always signifies that which is predicated; as well as because in every
predication there must be a verb, by reason of the fact that it implies composition, by means
of which a predicate is composed with a subject.105

• the subject of an enunciation is signified as (that) in which something inheres, from

which it follows that a predicate is signified as that which inheres in something else

4. On the verb as the perfection of speech.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. De Ver., q. 4, art. 1, sc. 6 (tr. B.A.M.):

Further, according to grammarians, the part of speech which is called verbum appropriates
the common name to itself because it is the perfection of the whole of speech, as its
preeminent part,106 and because by the verb the other parts of speech are manifested, insofar
as the name [or ‘noun’] is understood in the verb.107

5. On the name taken commonly.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, n. 15 (tr. B.A.M.):

And so it must said otherwise that ‘name’ is taken here, according as it commonly
signifies any word whatsoever that is imposed in order to signify a thing.108

6. The logician’s consideration of the verb and participle according to St. Thomas Aquinas.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 9, q. 1, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

104
The words added are required by the sense; for it is not true to speak of every verb as if it were active,
inasmuch as some are passive. Cf. In I Peri Herm., lect. 4, n. 7 (tr. B.A.M.): “In another way, that which is
measured by time can be considered insofar as it is of this sort. And because that which is first and
principally measured by time is motion, in which action and passion consist, therefore the verb which
signifies action or passion signifies with time.” alio modo, potest considerari id, quod tempore mensuratur,
in quantum huiusmodi: et quia id quod primo et principaliter tempore mensuratur est motus, in quo consistit
actio et passio, ideo verbum quod significat actionem vel passionem, significat cum tempore.
105
deinde cum dicit: et est semper etc.,exponit aliam particulam. ubi notandum est quod quia subiectum
enunciationis significatur ut cui inhaeret aliquid, cum verbum significet actionem per modum actionis, de
cuius ratione est ut inhaereat, semper ponitur ex parte praedicati, nunquam autem ex parte subiecti, nisi
sumatur in vi nominis, ut dictum est. dicitur ergo verbum semper esse nota eorum quae dicuntur de altero:
tum quia verbum semper significat id, quod praedicatur; tum quia in omni praedicatione oportet esse
verbum, eo quod verbum importat compositionem, qua praedicatum componitur subiecto.
106
One may presume that the verb is called the perfection of speech for the reasons outlined in the previous
excerpt.
107
praeterea, secundum grammaticos, haec pars orationis quae verbum dicitur, ideo sibi commune nomen
appropriat, quia est perfectio totius orationis, quasi praecipua pars ipsius; et quia per verbum manifestantur
aliae partes orationis, secundum quod in verbo intelligitur nomen.
108
et ideo aliter dicendum est quod nomen hic sumitur, prout communiter significat quamlibet dictionem
impositam ad significandum aliquam rem

61
 For certain ones signify inherently, not signifying the substance with respect to the mode
of signifying which grammarians consider, saying that the noun signifies a substance with a
quality, such as verbs and participles.109

7. In sum:

The verb and the participle signify in the manner of an act, which is signified as in-
hering. The verb and the participle also signify with time. But “that which is measured by
time can be considered insofar as it is of this sort. And because that which is first and prin-
cipally measured by time is motion, in which action and passion consist, therefore the
verb which signifies action or passion signifies with time”.

Again, the verb is always an indication—that is, a sign—of those things which are
predicated of another, because names and participles can be put down on the side of the
subject and the predicate, but the verb is always on the side of the predicate.

8. Peter of Spain on the mode of signifying of the participle and the verb.

Cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncategorematum (ap. Peter of Spain, Tractatus

Syncategorematum and Selected Anonymous Treatises. Translated by Joseph P. Mullaley,
PhD, p. 20).

Similarly in the case of a participle there is a composition of a united act with a united
substance, as for example, “reading” only signifies the same as “who reads.” Whence “who”
affirms substance; it affirms indefinite substance and “reads” affirms a determinate act. From
this it is clear that a verb and a participle do not differ so far as the signified is concerned
because each signifies an act conjoined with an intrinsic substance. Therefore Priscian3
says that a participle has reference to that which is signified by a verb under the accidents of
a noun. However, verb and participle differ in the mode of signifying. A verb signifies an
act or movement in the manner of going out of a substance in the case of action or in
the manner of going into a substance in the case of passion, by virtue of which it signifies
in the mode of predicable of another and it implies an act in a mode of being distinct from an
exterior substance and for this reason it implies the composition which belongs to a
proposition. A participle signifies an act in a mode implying substance, but not in the sense
of going into a substance or of going out of a substance.
3
Priscian, Institutiones Grammaticae. Books I to xiii are edited by Henry Keil from an
edition by Martin Hertz (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1855), volume I. Books xiii to xviii are
edited by Martin Hertz (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1859), volume II. All references are to these
editions of Priscian, ix, I. 9.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 4, nn. 8-10 (tr. Jean T. Oesterle):

8. The fifth part is the fourth difference, no part of which is significant separately, that is,
separated from the whole name; but it is related to the signification of the name according as
it is in the whole. The reason for this is that signification is a quasi-form of the name. But no
separated part has the form of the whole; just as the hand separated from the man does not

109
quaedam enim significant ut inhaerenter, non significantes substantiam quantum ad modum significandi
quem grammatici considerant dicentes, nomen significare substantiam cum qualitate, sicut verba et
participia.....

62
 have the human form. This difference distinguishes the name from speech, some parts of
which signify separately, as for example in “just man.”110

9. When he says, for in the name “Campbell” the part “bell” as such signifies nothing, etc.,
he explains the definition. First he explains the last part of the definition; secondly, the third
part, by convention. The first two parts were explained in what preceded, and the fourth part,
without time, will be explained later in the section on the verb. And first he explains the last
part by means of a composite name; then he shows what the difference is between simple
and composite names where he says, However the case is not exactly the same in simple
names and composite names, etc.

First, then, he shows that a part separated from a name signifies nothing. To do this he uses a
composite name because the point is more striking there. For in the name “Campbell” the
part “bell” per se signifies nothing, although it does signify something in the phrase “camp
bell.” The reason for this is that one name is imposed to signify one simple conception; but
that from which a name is imposed to signify is different from that which a name signifies.
For example, the name “pedigree”, is imposed from pedis and grus [crane’s foot] which it
does not signify, to signify the concept of a certain thing. Hence, a part of the composite
name—which composite name is imposed to signify a simple concept—does not signify a
part of the composite conception from which the name is imposed to signify.111 Speech, on
the other hand, does signify a composite conception. Hence, a part of speech signifies a part
of the composite conception.112

10. When he says, However, the case is not exactly the same in simple names and composite
names, etc., he shows that there is a difference between simple and composite names in
regard to their parts not signifying separately. Simple names are not the same as composite
names in this respect because in simple names a part is in no way significant, either
according to truth or according to appearance, but in composite names the part has meaning,
i.e., has the appearance of signifying; yet a part of it signifies nothing, as is said of the name
“breakfast.”

110
quinto, ponit quartam differentiam cum subdit: cuius nulla pars est significativa separata, scilicet a toto
nomine; comparatur tamen ad significationem nominis secundum quod est in toto. quod ideo est, quia
significatio est quasi forma nominis; nulla autem pars separata habet formam totius, sicut manus separata
ab homine non habet formam humanam. et per hoc distinguitur nomen ab oratione, cuius pars significat
separata; ut cum dicitur, homo iustus.
111
Note that these arguments leave untouched the fact that parts of words are nonetheless meaningful, as
being indicative of something, as certain sounds of voice as parts of names signify the plural, or the genitive
or accusative cases, and the like. See further below.
112
deinde cum dicit: in nomine enim quod est etc., manifestat praemissam definitionem. et primo, quantum
ad ultimam particulam; secundo, quantum ad tertiam; ibi: secundum vero placitum etc.. nam primae duae
particulae manifestae sunt ex praemissis; tertia autem particula, scilicet sine tempore, manifestabitur in
sequentibus in tractatu de verbo. circa primum duo facit: primo, manifestat propositum per nomina
composita; secundo, ostendit circa hoc differentiam inter nomina simplicia et composita; ibi: at vero non
quemadmodum etc.. manifestat ergo primo quod pars nominis separata nihil significat, per nomina
composita, in quibus hoc magis videtur. in hoc enim nomine quod est equiferus, haec pars ferus, per se nihil
significat sicut significat in hac oratione, quae est equus ferus. cuius ratio est quod unum nomen imponitur
ad significandum unum simplicem intellectum; aliud autem est id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum,
ab eo quod nomen significat; sicut hoc nomen lapis imponitur a laesione pedis, quam non significat: quod
tamen imponitur ad significandum conceptum cuiusdam rei. et inde est quod pars nominis compositi, quod
imponitur ad significandum conceptum simplicem, non significat partem conceptionis compositae, a qua
imponitur nomen ad significandum. sed oratio significat ipsam conceptionem compositam: unde pars
orationis significat partem conceptionis compositae.

63
 The reason for this difference is that the simple name is imposed to signify a simple concept
and is also imposed from a simple concept; but the composite name is imposed from a com-
posite conception, and hence has the appearance that a part of it signifies.113

113
deinde cum dicit: at vero non etc., ostendit quantum ad hoc differentiam inter nomina simplicia et
composita, et dicit quod non ita se habet in nominibus simplicibus, sicut et in compositis: quia in simplicibus
pars nullo modo est significativa, neque secundum veritatem, neque secundum apparentiam; sed in
compositis vult quidem, idest apparentiam habet significandi; nihil tamen pars eius significat, ut dictum est
de nomine equiferus. haec autem ratio differentiae est, quia nomen simplex sicut imponitur ad significandum
conceptum simplicem, ita etiam imponitur ad significandum ab aliquo simplici conceptu; nomen vero
compositum imponitur a composita conceptione, ex qua habet apparentiam quod pars eius significet.

64
DOCTRINAL RESUME.

The Categories on what is signified in sum:

1. things are said in three ways: equivocally, univocally, or derivatively

2. things are said either with intertwining or without
3. things said without intertwining are either substance, or how much, or what sort,
etc.
4. all substances appear to signify a ‘this something’
5. all substances signify a sort of something (in common names, this something is
taken in abstraction from singulars, but in proper names it is not)

• things named equivocally or univocally involve the logos tes ousias, “the account
of the substance”, corresponding to the name (where ‘substance’ means the ‘what it
is’)
• things named denominatively (or ‘derivatively) involve a change in ending
(denominative names are taken from an accidental form, or from something in the
manner of such a form)

denominative naming = appellation

denominative names = adjectives

things said, which are also

beings
things may be said with intertwining or without

vocal sounds are uttered

but things are said

before they are said they are sayable

before they are sayable they must be signified
before they are signified they must be understood
before they are understood they must be excogitated

for a thing to be said, it must have a name

for a thing to be named, it must have a vocal sound imposed on it for the purpose of
signifying

things (pragmata)
things said (ton legomenon)
beings (ton onton)
‘are said’ (legetai)

beings are either substance, or how much, or of what sort, etc.

things are signified

but things are beings

65
but beings are substance or accident
substance is what exists through itself or per se
accident is what exists in dependence on another

substance and accident are either universal or particular

things said may be said with some sort of intertwining or without any intertwining

‘man’ or ‘runs’
‘a man runs’
‘running man’

The signification of words according to Ammonius:114

those which signify certain natures or persons: names

those which signify actions or passions: verbs
those which show the relationship of the predicate to the subject (that is, they show the
relationship of one part to another): adverbials

the principal parts of speech (the name and the verb and their adjuncts)
those which are more the bonds of the parts of speech, rather then parts themselves

those which signify something absolute

those which signify something relative

categorematic terms
syncategorematic terms

what is the rationale common to the latter?

to be a secondary part assisting a primary part, either by binding together two or more
parts, or by distinguishing a part from a part

114
Cf. Ammonius, Commentary on the Peri Hermeneias (= Ammonius: On Aristotle’s On Interpretation 1-8,
tr. David L. Blank’ slightly rev. B.A.M.), pp. 23-24:

The truth of what we have said is also clear from the fact that the very names of the other parts of
speech relate to the name and the verb. For they name the pronoun as they do [antinumia, literally,
‘instead-of-name’] as being a ‘name’, not of certain natures [phuseis], but simply of persons; and the
participle [metokhe, literally, ‘sharing’, ‘partaking’] as partaking of both, i.e. of the name and the
verb, even if it inclines more to the particular nature of the verb by indicating certain times, and the
[23-24] article [arthron, literally, ‘joint’] as ‘joined’ to names and having reference to them.114 And
why should we even speak of prepositions [prothesis], adverbs [epirrhema], or conjunctions [sundes-
mos]? The first of them has its name since it ‘precedes’ both names and the verbs equally; the second,
since it is combined in such-and-such a way with ‘verbs’; and the third, since it ‘conjoins’ detached
[apertemenoi] speeches. And you will find that, in certain passages, Aristotle seems to relent and call
all [of them] more generally ‘parts of speech’. This is why in what follows he will say that some of
the parts of speech are significant, as though there were also some which were non-significant,—un-
less some more appropriate explanation of this manner of speaking, which does not in any way con-
tradict what we have now said, occurs to us.

66
 APPENDIX I

ON WHAT WORDS SIGNIFY IN RELATION

TO THEIR MODES OF SIGNIFYING

1. On the order of signification, the division of being, and the modes of predication.

Let us take our beginning by recalling that vocal sounds are signs of passions of the soul,
where ‘passions’ are understood as thoughts, but thoughts are likenesses of things.115 Ac-
cordingly, the name and the verb, being significative vocal sounds, must, in the first place,
be referred to things by means of thoughts. Now the things of which the thoughts are the
likenesses, and of which the names the signs, are beings. But, by a before and after in its
meaning, ‘being’ is immediately divided into substance and the nine categories of acci-
dent, for, “since being is predicated analogously of the ten genera, it is divided into them
according to diverse modes. And so a proper mode of predicating should belong to each of
the the genera” (In I Sent., dist. 22, q. 1, art. 3, ad 2).116 What these modes are will be
evident from what follows.

2. On the modes of being in relation to the modes of predicating.

As St. Thomas Aquinas teaches, “the modes of being are proportional to the modes
of predicating,”117 which is as much as to say that “as often as being is said; that is, in as
many ways as something is predicated, so often is ‘being’ signified; that is, in so many
ways is something signified to be.”118 Hence the modes of predicating follow after the
modes of being, which, as we have seen, are immediately divided into the mode appro-
priate to substance, and that appropriate to accident. We must therefore consider how dif-
ferences in the modes of predicating of substance and accident give rise to different species
of words.

3. How the mode of being of substance is taken from the mode of predicating.

Now as St. Thomas explains, “all substances have one mode of predicating, inas-
much as they are predicated as not existing in a subject”,119 from which it follows that to
be predicated as not existing in a subject is to be signified as that whose being is not to be
in a subject. But that whose being is not to be in a subject exists through itself. Hence, the
mode of being of substance is that it exist or be through itself, and not exist or be in an-
other, as St. Thomas teaches explicitly in many places.

115
Cf. De Int. I. 1.
116
For “it is to be noted that the division of being into the ten predicaments is not a univocal division, but an
analogous one: for ‘being’ is said of them analogously: for per prius it is said of substance, in which its real-
ity is chiefly preserved; but it is said of the others insofar as they are something of [= belonging to] substance
itself: for quantity is extended matter, or the extension of substance; but quality is its affection—that is, its
disposition; and so on about the others.” (Ignotus Auctor, Summa Totius Logicae Aristotelis, tr. 2, cap. 1 [tr.
B.A.M.])
117
In III Physic., lect. 5, n. 15: modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi.
118
Op. cit., lect. 9, n. 6: quoties ens dicitur, idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur, toties esse significatur,
idest tot modis significatur aliquid esse.
119
In V Meta.. lect. 8, n. 13: omnes substantiae habent unum modum praedicandi, inquantum praedicantur
non ut in subiecto existentes.

67
4. What the names ‘substance’ and ‘subsistence’ signify.

As for the name of such things, St. Thomas explains that, “according as (a thing)
exists through itself and not in another, it is called ‘subsistence’; for we say those things
‘subsist’ which are not in another, but exist in themselves”.120 But as St. Thomas points out
at In I Sent., dist. 8, q. 4, art. 2, sc. 2, “the name ‘substance’ is imposed from ‘substanding’
(‘standing under’)” (nomen… substantiae imponitur a substando). But what substance
‘substands’ or ‘stands under’ are accidents, as is evident from the following texts.

But it might appear to someone that, although the name ‘substance’ cannot properly belong
to God, since God does not ‘stand under’ accidents, still, the thing signified by the name
belongs to Him, and so He is in the genus of substance.121 But according as [a thing] is
supposed to [= ‘subject to’] accidents, it is called ‘hypostasis’ or ‘substance’.122

In light of the foregoing observations, we can say that a thing is called ‘substance’
insofar as it ‘substands’ or ‘stands under’ accidents; but it is called ‘subsistence’ insofar as
it is not in another, but exists through itself.

5. To signify in the manner of a subsistence, or subsistent thing.

Since it belongs to subsistence to be a thing existing through itself, it follows that,

as one may gather from In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, n. 7), to signify in the manner of a subsis-
tence, or subsistent thing, is to signify per modum rei per se existentis, ‘in the manner of a
thing existing through itself’.123

6. On substantives.

Again, according to St. Thomas, substantives signify substance in the manner of a

substance,124 which is to signify substance substantivally. Such names or nouns (e.g. ‘ani-
mal’, ‘man’, God’) are to be distinguished from those which signify substance adjectivally,
like ‘animal-like’, ‘human’, ‘god-like’, and from those which signify in abstraction, like
‘whiteness’ or ‘humanity’.

7. On signifying in the manner of a substance.

120
Summa Theol., Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c.: secundum…quod per se existit et non in alio, vocatur subsistentia, illa
enim subsistere dicimus, quae non in alio, sed in se existunt.
121
Contra Gentes, I, c. 25, n. 9: potest autem alicui videri quod, quamvis nomen substantiae deo proprie con-
venire non possit, quia deus non substat accidentibus; res tamen significata per nomen ei conveniat, et ita sit
in genere substantiae.
122
Summa Theol., Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c.: secundum vero quod supponitur accidentibus, dicitur hypostasis vel
substantia.
123
“So he first explains by an example that the verb consignifies time, since ‘(a) run’, because it does not sig-
nify an action in the manner of an action, but in the manner of thing existing through itself, does not consign-
nify time because it is a name”.
124
In I Sent., dist. 9, q. 1, art. 2, c.: respondeo dicendum, quod haec est differentia inter adjectiva et substan-
tiva: quia substantiva significant per modum substantiae, et ideo significant rem suam absolute....; “I reply
that it must be said that there is this difference between adjectives and substantives: because substantives
signify in the manner of a substance, and so they signify their ‘thing’ absolutely....” N.B. It will become ap-
parent from additional witnesses that the ‘thing’ of a name is that upon which a name is placed for the pur-
pose of signifying.

68
 In accordance with the teachings of St. Thomas outlined above, we conclude that to
signify per modum substantiae is to signify in the manner of that which exists through it-
self (its material mode) and in the manner of that which names a nature (its formal mode).
The material mode of a substance may also be described as that by which a ‘this some-
thing’, or individual substance, is expressed, which is to signify in the manner of a sup-
posit; or again, as that by which a thing exists through itself, which is to signify in the
manner of (a) subsistence, or subsistent thing. The formal mode may also be described as
that by which a ‘what’, or the essence of substance, is expressed, which is to signify in the
manner of a ‘what’ or essence; or again, as that by which a nature or determinate form is
expressed, which is to signify in the manner of a nature or determinate form.

8. On signifying in the manner of an accident.

To signify per modum accidentis is to signify in the manner of existing in another,

or of depending on another; that is, as inherent in another.125 Note that, whereas one can
signify a substance in the manner of an accident, as happens in names or nouns like
‘animal-like’ and ‘human’, one cannot signify an accident in the manner of a substance.
Rather, one can signify an accident concretely—that is, as taken in concretion with its sub-
ject, as is the case with ‘white’ or ‘black,126 as is evident from the division of nouns into
‘concrete substantivally’ and ‘concrete adjectivally’.

9. On matters pertaining to the noun in sum.

In sum, names, or nouns, grammatically speaking, signify a substance with a

quality,127 which is to signify a supposit with a nature or determinate form in which it
subsists,128 and hence such names signify subsistence and perfection.129 (And note that
‘substance’ in the foregoing definition means the supposit.) Alternatively, it may also be
said that such names or nouns signify a nature or determinate form or quality as existing in
a supposit.

125
Cf. Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 8, art. 2, c.: ratio enim accidentis est inesse; quantitas enim significatur ut
alicuius in quo est, et similiter qualitas; et ideo illa dico significari per modum accidentis quae significantur
ut inhaerentia alteri, sicut quantitas et qualitas; “for the ratio of an accident is to be in; and so I maintain that
those things are signified in the manner of an accident which are signified as inherent in another, like quan-
tity and quality; for quantity is signified as belonging to that in which it is, and likewise quality”. See further
below.
126
Cf. In VII Meta., lect 1, n. 11, where St. Thomas shows that to be signified in concretione ad substantiam,
‘in concretion toward substance’, is characteristic of names signifying accidents as inherent in another.
127
Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm. 2.4.18 (= GL II, 55, 6): Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem signi-
ficare, “It is proper to the noun to signify substance and quality”. On this definition, cf. Anneli Luhtala, Phil-
osophy and Grammar in Late Antiquity, p. 84: “This is almost certainly of Apollonian heritage, since Apol-
lonius [Dyscolus] seems to have been the only grammarian to define the noun in terms of substance and qual-
ity, and to have used definitions of the form proprium est (i)/dion)”.
128
S.Th., Ia, q, 13, art. 1, obj. 1, c. and ad 3, the last which reads as follows: ad tertium dicendum quod
significare substantiam cum qualitate, est significare suppositum cum natura vel forma determinata in qua
subsistit; “To the third it must be said that to signify a substance with a quality is to signify a supposit with a
nature or determinate form in which it subsists”.
129
ibid., c.: unde, sicut de deo dicuntur aliqua in concretione, ad significandum subsistentiam et perfecti-
onem ipsius, sicut iam dictum est, ita dicuntur de deo nomina significantia substantiam cum qualitate; “And
so, just as certain things are said of God in concretion in order to signify His subsistence and perfection, as
has already been said, so names [or ‘nouns’] signifying a substance with a quality are said of God”.

69
 Again, according to St. Thomas, it is specifically concrete names or nouns which
signify a nature in some supposit (or which signify a supposit subsisting in some nature).130
But to signify a nature in some supposit, or as existing in a supposit, is to signify it in the
manner of a supposit (per modum suppositi). But abstract names or nouns, which signify
the form or quality itself, signify as that whereby something is,131 and hence signify per
modum abstractionis (‘in the manner of an abstracttion’).132 Again, whereas common or
appellative names or nouns signify the nature as in the thing having it,133 the proper or
private noun or name is imposed in order to signify the individual, such as ‘Achilles’.134

Additional points to be noted in the consideration of these matters are that sub-
stance expresses a ‘what’ and a ‘this something’; by the former the essence of substance

130
ibid., q. 13, art. 1, ad 2: ad secundum dicendum quod, quia ex creaturis in dei cognitionem venimus, et ex
ipsis eum nominamus, nomina quae deo attribuimus, hoc modo significant, secundum quod competit
creaturis materialibus, quarum cognitio est nobis connaturalis, ut supra dictum est. et quia in huiusmodi
creaturis, ea quae sunt perfecta et subsistentia sunt composita; forma autem in eis non est aliquid completum
subsistens, sed magis quo aliquid est, inde est quod omnia nomina a nobis imposita ad significandum aliquid
completum subsistens, significant in concretione, prout competit compositis; quae autem imponuntur ad
significandas formas simplices, significant aliquid non ut subsistens, sed ut quo aliquid est, sicut albedo
significat ut quo aliquid est album. “To the second it must be said that because we arrive at knowledge of
God from creatures, and we name Him from them, the names which we attribute to God signify in this way,
according as they belong to material creatures, the knowledge of which is connatural to us, as has been said
above. And because in creatures of this sort the things which are perfect and subsisting are composed—in
them, however, the form is not some complete subsisting thing, but rather that by which something is—from
this it follows that all names imposed by us in order to signify some complete subsisting thing signify in
concretion, as is appropriate to composed things; but those [names] which are imposed by us in order to
signify simple forms do not signify something as subsisting, but as that by which something is, as ‘whiteness’
signifies as that by which something is white”.
131
ibid.
132
Cf. In II Sent, dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, c.: …aut per modum abstractionis, secundum quod universale aliquid
significatur ut abstractum a differentiis contrariis dividentibus ipsum….; “…either by way of abstraction,
according as something universal is signified as abstracted from the contrary differences dividing it….”.
133
op.cit., q. 13, art. 9, ad 2: ad secundum dicendum quod hoc nomen deus est nomen appellativum, et non
proprium, quia significat naturam divinam ut in habente….; “To the second it must be said that the name
‘God’ is an appellative name and not a proper one because it signifies the divine nature as in the thing [or
‘one’] having it….”
134
ibid., q. 13, art. 9, c.: sed singulare, ex hoc ipso quod est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus aliis. unde
omne nomen impositum ad significandum aliquod singulare, est incommunicabile et re et ratione, non enim
potest nec in apprehensione cadere pluralitas huius individui; “But the singular, by the very fact that it is
singular, is divided off from all the others. For this reason, a name imposed to signify something singular is
incommunicable both in reality and in account; for plurality cannot fall in the apprehension [i.e. the
‘conception’] of this individual”.

70
being understood, by the latter, the supposit;135 and that substance exists through itself,
whereas accident exists in another.136
Again, a noun or name is said to name a nature, whereas a pronoun determines a
person, and therefore is put in place of a name.137

10. Supplement: Certain Modistae on the mode of signifying of the nomen.

According to certain Modistae,138 the nomen signifies per modum per se stantis, ‘in
the manner of standing by itself’, a description which may be understood to distinguish the
material mode of a substance from that of an accident, which exists in the manner of
‘existing in’139 or of ‘depending on’140 something else. But they also add that it signifies
per modum habitus et quietus, ‘in the manner of having and of rest’—‘having’ here mean-
ing ‘existing all at once’—and per modum permanentis, ‘in the manner of remaining’,
which may be taken to distinguish the nomen from the verbum, which signifies in the man-
ner of a flux or of what is in motion, the being of which is successive. 141 As for the formal
mode of a substance, they say that the nomen signifies per modum determinatae appre-
hensionis, ‘in the manner of determinate apprehension’, which distinguishes it from the
pronomen, and so is equivalent to St. Thomas’ description of the nomen as what nominat
naturam, ‘names a nature’, as opposed to the pronomen, which according to him personam
determinat, ‘determines a person’.

135
In VII Meta., lect. 1, n. 3: primo proponit intentum quod ens dicitur multipliciter, ut dictum est in quinto
libro, in quo diviserat quoties dicuntur huiusmodi nomina, quia quoddam ens significat quid est et hoc
aliquid, idest substantiam; ut per quid, intelligatur essentia substantiae, per hoc aliquid suppositum, ad quae
duo omnes modi substantiae reducuntur, ut in quinto est habitum. illud vero significat qualitatem vel quanti-
tatem, aut aliquid aliorum praedicamentorum. et cum ens tot modis dicatur, palam est quod inter omnia
entia, primum est quod quid est, idest ens quod significat substantiam; “First, he proposes what he intends,
that being is said in many ways, as was stated in the fifth book, in which he distinguished the many ways in
which names of this sort are said, the reason being that some being signifies a ‘what it is’ and a ‘this some-
thing’; that is, ‘substance’, such that by ‘what’ the essence of substance is understood, by ‘this something’,
the supposit, to which two every mode of substance is reduced, as is explained in the fifth book. But another
signifies ‘quality’ or ‘quantity’, or one of the other predicaments. And since ‘being’ is said in so many ways,
it is clear that among all beings the first is that which is; that is, the being which signifies ‘substance’”.
136
In VII Meta., lect. 1, n. 4: secundo ibi, nam quando probat propositum; et utitur tali ratione. quod est per
se et simpliciter in unoquoque genere, est prius eo quod est per aliud et secundum quid. sed substantia est
ens simpliciter et per seipsam: omnia autem alia genera a substantia sunt entia secundum quid et per sub-
stantiam: ergo substantia est prima inter alia entia; “Second, at For when [we say], he proves what he has
proposed, and he uses the following argument. In each genus, what exists through itself and simply is prior to
what exists through something else and in a certain respect. But substance is being simply and through itself.
But all the genera other than substance are beings in a certain respect and through substance. Therefore sub-
stance is first among the other beings”.
137
In I Peri Herm., lect. 1, n. 3: sub nominibus enim comprehenduntur pronomina, quae, etsi non nominant
naturam, personam tamen determinant, et ideo loco nominum ponuntur….; “For under names [or ‘nouns’]
are comprehended pronouns, which, although they do not name a nature, nevertheless, determine a person,
and therefore are put in place of names”.
138
All of the following descriptions will be found in the Tractatus de Modis Significandi of Martin of Den-
mark, as well as in the Quaestiones de Modis Significandi of Pseudo-Albertus. The explanations of these de-
scriptions, however, have been taken out of St. Thomas by me.
139
Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 8, art. 2, c. For this text, see above.
140
In II Sent., dist. 8, q. 4, art. 3, c.: quia esse accidentis est inesse et dependere; “For the being of an
accident is to be in, and to depend”.
141
Cf. In I Sent., dist. 8, q. 2, art. 3, ad 4, where St. Thomas distinguishes between things quorum esse est in
fieri, ‘whose being is in coming to be’, which are successiva, ‘successive things’, sicut est motus, ‘as is
motion’, and those quorum esse consistit in permanendo, ‘whose being consists in abiding’.

71
11. On the principal division of names or nouns.

One finds in St. Thomas, then, the following division of names or nouns. First, the
noun or name is divided into the common or appellative, and the proper. The common or
appellative is then divided into the abstract and the concrete, and the concrete into the noun
or name concrete substantivally and the noun or name concrete adjectivally. Other divi-
sions implicit in St. Thomas are to be treated hereafter.

12. Note on ‘action’ or ‘acting’ and ‘passion’ or ‘undergoing’.

Inasmuch as “action, according as it is a predicament, means something flowing

from an agent, and with motion” (actio, secundum quod est praedicamentum, dicit aliquid
fluens ab agente, et cum motu;—In I Sent., dist. 8, q. 4, art. 3, ad 3); so likewise ‘passion’,
according as it is a predicament, means something flowing into a patient, and with motion.

Again, since “action can be signified in the manner of an action, as going out from
a substance and inhering in it as in a subject” (potest actio significari…per modum acti-
onis, ut scilicet est egrediens a substantia et inhaerens ei ut subiecto;—In I Peri Herm.,
lect. 5, n. 5), it follows that passion can be signified in the manner of a passion as coming
into a subject and inhering in it as in a subject.

14. The meaning of ‘action’.

According as it is a predicament, ‘action’ means something flowing from an agent,

and with motion.

15. The meaning of ‘passion’.

According as it is a predicament, ‘passion’ means something flowing into a patient,

and with motion.

16. The mode of being of action.

To be in the manner of an acting, which is to be in another as extrinsic / as not en-

tirely outside it / as its agent cause / denominated from its effect.142

17. The mode of being of passion.

To be in the manner of an undergoing, which is to be in another as extrinsic / as not

entirely outside it / as its agent cause / from which it is denominated.

18. On being signified in the manner of an action.

To be signified in the manner of an action is to be signified as going out from a

substance and inhering in it as in a subject; or again, it is to be signified as flowing from an
agent, and with motion.

142
Cf. the ‘figures’ or ‘modes’ of predicating whereby the highest genera of beings are determined.

72
19. On being signified in the manner of a passion.

To be signified in the manner of a passion is to be signified as coming into a

substance and inhering in it as in a subject; or again, it is to be signified as flowing into a
patient, and with motion.

for verbs (and participles):

to signify as inhering
to signify in the manner of inhering
to signify in the manner of an act
to signify in the manner of an action
to signify in the manner of a passion

20. The grammarian’s consideration of ‘passion’ according to the mode of signifying.

That is called ‘passive’ that is derived from a passive verb. (see below)

21. Principal kinds of name or noun.

name or noun
common or appellative
proper

common or appellative name or noun

concrete
abstract

the concrete name or noun

the abstract name or noun

the concrete name or noun

concrete substantivally (homo, ‘man’; Deus, ‘God’)
concrete adjectivally (albus, ‘white’; humanus, ‘human’)
the abstract name or noun
abstract adjectivally (albedo, ‘whiteness’; humanitas, ‘humanity’)

the collective name or noun

the essential name or noun

the relative name or noun

22. Summary of St. Thomas on the principal parts of speech.

Names, understood as nouns, signify a substance with a quality, which is to signify

a supposit with a nature or determinate form in which it subsists, and hence such names
signify subsistence and perfection.

But verbs and participles signify with time—that is to say, they ‘consignify’ time.

73
 Pronouns, however, signify with demonstration or relation—demonstrative pro-
nouns (or ‘demonstratives’) being the kinds of name by which something sensed or under-
stood is demonstrated or pointed out (sc. to the sense or to the understanding)—relative
pronouns (or ‘relatives’) being the kinds of name by which things said before can be re-
called to mind, whether names, or participles, or demonstrative or relative pronouns.

Further, names or nouns said in the abstract, like ‘science’ or ‘humanity’, express a
quid, or ‘what’, imperfect and subsisting in itself, whereas names or nouns said in the con-
crete imply some composition.

Note the expression a principali significato, ‘by the principal thing signified’, used
in the Sentences text quoted above. Elsewhere (sc. at In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 10), St. Thomas
speaks of such a thing as being signified principaliter, as names in the genera of accidents
signify accident principaliter, but substance or the subject ex consequenti. In the present
text, however, St. Thomas is distinguishing between the principal thing signified and the
mode of signifying as these belong to certain names said of God.

74
 APPENDIX II:

TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS

1. That the modes of signifying are the concern of the grammarian.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 9, q. 1, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

DS9QU1 AR2- CO

quaedam enim significant ut inhaerenter, non
significantes substantiam, quantum ad modum
significandi quem grammatici considerant di-
centes, nomen significare substantiam cum
qualitate.
For some things signify as inhering, not signi-
fying the substance with respect to the mode of
signifying which grammarians consider, saying,
a noun signifies a substance with a quality.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent., dist. 35, q. 1, art. 1, ad 5 (tr. B.A.M.):

DS35QU1 AR1- RA5

ad quintum dicendum, quod passio potest sumi To the fifth it must be said that passion can be
dupliciter; taken in two ways:

vel quantum ad naturam rei prout logicus et
naturalis passionem considerat; et hoc modo
non oportet omnem poenam passionem esse;
sed quamdam poenam, scilicet poenam sensus:
vel quantum ad modum significandi, prout
grammaticus considerat; et sic illud passive
dicitur quod a verbo passivo derivatur.
either with respect to the nature of a thing, as
the logician or natural philosopher consider
passion—and in this way it is not necessary that
every pain be a passion, but a certain pain,
namely, the pain of sense: or with respect to the
mode of signifying, according as the grammar-
ian considers it—and in this way that is called
‘passive’ that is derived from a passive verb.

Cf. Pseudo-Aquinas, De Usuris in Communi, cp. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

CP01-

grammaticus circa signa principaliter versatur, The grammarian is principally concerned with
non propter res quae significantur, sed propter signs, not on account of the things which are
modum significandi quem ex se denotant. signified, but on account of the modes of sig-
nifying which they denote of themselves.

2. On the order between the modes of signifying, the modes of understanding, and the
modes of being.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 13, art. 9, obj. 2 (tr. B.A.M.).

QU13 AR9 RA2

nomina enim non sequuntur modum essendi qui For names do not follow the mode of being
est in rebus sed modum essendi secundum quod which is in things, but the mode of being ac-
in cognitione nostra est. cording as it is in our understanding.

75
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 45, art. 2, obj. 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

QU45 AR2 RA2

sed quia modus significandi sequitur modum
intelligendi, ut dictum est, creatio significatur
per modum mutationis, et propter hoc dicitur
quod creare est ex nihilo aliquid facere.
But because the mode of signifying follows the
mode of understanding, as has been said,
‘creation’ is signified in the manner of change,
and on this account it is said that to create is to
make something from nothing.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Meta. lect. 1, n. 9 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB7LC-1N.-9

pro tanto autem videntur accidentia in abstracto

significata esse non entia, quia nihil ipsorum est
aptum natum secundum se esse;

immo cuiuslibet eorum esse est alteri inesse, et

non est possibile aliquid eorum separari a
substantia;

et ideo quando significantur in abstracto quasi

sint secundum se entia et a substantia separata,
videtur quod sint non entia.

licet modus significandi vocum non consequatur …although the mode of signifying of vocal
immediate modum essendi rerum, sed mediante sounds does not immediately follow the mode
modo intelligendi; of being of things, but with the mode of under-
standing mediating—

quia intellectus sunt similitudines rerum, voces the reason being that understandings are like-
autem intellectuum, ut dicitur in primo periher- nesses of things, but vocal sounds [are signs] of
menias. things understood, as is said in the Peri Her-
meneias.

3. On the difference between the way things stand in themselves and the way they stand
when they are known.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Veritate, q. 2, art. 12, obj. 7 (tr. B.A.M.):

QU2AR12 RA7

aliter enim est de his quae attribuuntur rei For things stand one way about those things
secundum se, aliter de his quae attribuuntur ei which are attributed to a thing according to it-
secundum quod est cognita. self, and another way about those things which
are attributed to it insofar as it is known.

illa enim quae attribuuntur ei secundum se, con- For the things which are attributed to it accord-
veniunt ei secundum modum suum. ing to itself belong to it in accordance with its
own mode.

76
sed illa quae attribuuntur ei vel quae consequ- But the things which are attributed to it, or
untur ad ipsam in quantum est cognita, sunt which follow upon it, insofar as it is known, are
secundum modum cognoscentis. in accordance with the mode of the knower.

unde, si in antecedente significetur aliquid quod
pertineat ad cognitionem, oportet quod con-
sequens accipiatur secundum modum cogno-
scentis, et non secundum modum rei cognitae;
ut si dicam: si ego intelligo aliquid, illud est im-
materiale;
And so if in the antecedent something be sig-
nified which pertains to knowledge, it follows
necessarily that it be taken in accordance with
the mode of the knower, and not in accordance
with the mode of the thing known, as if one
were to say, ‘If I understand something, that is
immaterial’.

non enim oportet ut quod intelligitur, sit im- For it is not necessary that what is understood
materiale, nisi secundum quod est intellectum: be immaterial except according as it is under-
stood.

et similiter cum dico: si deus scit aliquid, illud
erit; consequens est sumendum, non secundum
dispositionem rei in seipsa, sed secundum mo-
dum cognoscentis.
And likewise when I say, ‘If God knows some-
thing, that will be’; the consequence is that it is
to be taken, not in accordance with the dispo-
sition of the thing in itself, but in accordance
with the mode of the knower.

quamvis autem res in seipsa, sit futura, tamen
secundum modum cognoscentis est praesens; et
ideo magis esset dicendum: si deus scit aliquid,
hoc est; quam: hoc erit; unde idem est iudicium
de ista: si deus scit aliquid, hoc erit; et de hac: si
ego video socratem currere, socrates currit: quo-
rum utrumque est necessarium dum est.
Now although the thing in itself is to come, still
it is present in accordance with the mode of the
knower; and so it ought rather to be said, ‘If
God knows something, this is’, rather than, ‘this
will be’; and so there is the same judgement
about this: ‘If God knows something, this will
be’; and about that: ‘If I see Socrates run, So-
crates runs’, either of which is necessary when it
is.

4. That names [or ‘nouns’] and verbs cannot signify things immediately, as is apparent
from the very mode of signifying.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 2, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB1 LC-2N.-5

circa id autem quod dicit, earum quae sunt in
anima passionum, considerandum est quod pas-
siones animae communiter dici solent appetitus
sensibilis affectiones, sicut ira, gaudium et alia
huiusmodi, ut dicitur in ii ethicorum.
But about his statement, But of those passions
which are in the soul, it must be considered that
commonly the affections of the sensible appetite
are wont to be called ‘passions of the soul’, like
anger, joy and others of the sort, as is said in the
second book of the Ethics (ch. 2, 1104b 16).

et verum est quod huiusmodi passiones
significant naturaliter quaedam voces hominum,
ut gemitus infirmorum, et aliorum animalium, ut
dicitur in i politicae.
And it is true that certain vocal sounds of men
naturally signify passions of this sort, like the
coughs of the sick, and [the vocal sounds] (In I
Peri Herm., lect. 4, n. 6.) of the other animals,
as is said in the first book of the Politics (ch. 2,
1251a 10)

77
sed nunc sermo est de vocibus significativis ex But at present the discussion concerns vocal
institutione humana; sounds significative by human institution.

et ideo oportet passiones animae hic intelligere
intellectus conceptiones, quas nomina et verba
et orationes significant immediate, secundum
sententiam aristotelis.
And so by ‘passions of the soul’ here is to
be understood the conceptions of the under-
standing, which names or nouns and verbs sig-
nify immediately, according to Aristotle’s un-
derstanding of the matter.

non enim potest esse quod significent im- For it cannot be that they immediately signify
mediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso modo significandi things themselves, as is apparent from the very
apparet: significat enim hoc nomen homo na- mode of signifying: for the name ‘man’ signifies
turam humanam in abstractione a singular-ibus. human nature in abstraction from singulars.

And so it cannot be that it immediately signifies

unde non potest esse quod significet immediate a singular [or ‘individual’] man; for which
hominem singularem; unde platonici posuerunt reason the Platonists held that it signified the
quod significaret ipsam ideam hominis separ- separated idea itself of man.
atam.
But because, according to Aristotle’s under-
sed quia hoc secundum suam abstractionem non standing, this [idea] in accordance with its ab-
subsistit realiter secundum sententiam aristot- straction does not subsist in reality, but only in
elis, sed est in solo intellectu; ideo necesse fuit the understanding, it was therefore necessary for
aristoteli dicere quod voces significant intel- Aristotle to say that vocal sounds signify the
lectus conceptiones immediate et eis medianti- conceptions of the understanding immediately,
bus res. and things with them.

5. That in any name there are two things to consider, namely, the thing signified, and the
mode of signifying.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 22, q. 1, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

DS22QU1 AR2- CO

respondeo dicendum, quod quamvis omnis
perfectio quae in creaturis est, exemplariter a
deo descendat, sicut a principio praehabente in
se unice omnium perfectiones; nulla tamen crea-
tura potest recipere illam perfectionem secun-
dum illum modum quo in deo est.
I reply that it must be said that although every
perfection which exists in creatures descends
from God as from an exemplar, just as from a
principle uniquely prepossessing in itself every
perfection—still, no creature can receive that
perfection in the mode in which it exists in God.

unde secundum modum recipiendi deficit a per- And so according to the mode of the recipient it
fecta repraesentatione exemplaris. falls short of a perfect representation of its ex-
emplar.

et ex hoc etiam in creaturis est quidam gradus,
secundum quod quaedam quibusdam plures
perfectiones et nobiliores a deo consequuntur, et
plenius participant;
And from this there is also a certain grade in
creatures insofar as certain ones follow upon
God with a greater number and with more noble
perfections, and participate [in them] more
fully.

et ex hoc in nominibus est duo considerare: rem And from this there are two things to consider in

78
significatam, et modum significandi. names: the thing signified, and the mode of
signifying.

considerandum est igitur, quod cum nomina sint
imposita a nobis, qui deum non nisi ex creaturis
cognoscimus, semper deficiunt a divina
repraesentatione quantum ad modum signify-
candi:
It must therefore be considered that, since
names are imposed by us, who do not know
God except from creatures, they always fall
short of the divine representation with respect to
the mode of signifying,

quia significant divinas perfectiones per modum the reason being that they signify the divine per-
quo participantur in creaturis. fections in the mode in which they are par-
ticipated in by creatures.

si autem consideremus rem significatam in
nomine, quae est id ad quod significandum im-
ponitur nomen, invenimus, quaedam nomina
esse imposita ad significandum principaliter ip-
sam perfectionem exemplatam a deo simpliciter,
non concernendo aliquem modum in sua sig-
nificatione;
But if we were to consider the thing signified, in
a name, which is that for which a name is im-
posed in order to signify, we shall find certain
names to be imposed in order to signify prin-
cipally the very perfection formed simply ac-
cording to the exemplar in God, not concerning
any mode in its signification;

et quaedam ad significandum perfectionem and certain ones [imposed] in order to signify

receptam secundum talem modum participandi; the perfection received according to such a
mode of participating.

verbi gratia, omnis cognitio est exemplata a For example, every knowledge is formed accor-
divina cognitione, et omnis scientia a divina ding to the exemplar in divine knowledge, and
scientia. every science from divine science.

hoc igitur nomen sensus est impositum ad Therefore, the name ‘sense’ has been imposed
significandum cognitionem per modum illum in order to signify knowledge in that mode in
quo recipitur materialiter secundum virtutem which it is received materially in accordance
conjunctam organo. with a power conjoined to an organ.

sed hoc nomen cognitio non significat aliquem But the name ‘knowledge’ does not signify any
modum participandi in principali sua signi- mode of participating in its principal signifi-
ficatione. cation.

unde dicendum est, quod omnia illa nomina And so it must be said that all the names which
quae imponuntur ad significandum perfecti- are imposed in order to signify some perfection
onem aliquam absolute, proprie dicuntur de deo, absolutely are said of God properly,

et per prius sunt in ipso quantum ad rem signi-
ficatam, licet non quantum ad modum
significandi, ut sapientia, bonitas, essentia et
omnia hujusmodi; et haec sunt de quibus dicit
anselmus, quod simpliciter et omnino melius est
esse quam non esse.
and they are in Him per prius with respect to the
thing signified, although not with respect to the
mode of signifying, like ‘wisdom’, ‘goodness’,
‘essence’ and everything of the sort; and these
are the ones Anselm speaks of, because it is
simply and in every way better to be than not to
be.

illa autem quae imponuntur ad significandum But those which are imposed in order to signify
perfectionem aliquam exemplatam a deo, ita some perfection from the exemplar in God such
quod includant in sua significatione imperfect- that they include in their signification an im-

79
tum modum participandi, nullo modo dicuntur perfect mode of participating in no way are said
de deo proprie; properly of God;

sed tamen ratione illius perfectionis possunt dici but rather by reason of that perfection* they can
de deo metaphorice, sicut sentire, videre et be said of God metaphorically, just as ‘to
hujusmodi. sense’, ‘to see’ and the like.

et similiter est de omnibus aliis formis corpor-
alibus, ut lapis, leo et hujusmodi: omnia enim
imponuntur ad significandum formas cor-
porales secundum modum determinatum partici-
pandi esse vel vivere vel aliquam divinarum
perfectionum.
And it is similar in the case of all other bodily
forms, like ‘stone’, ‘lion’ and the like: for they
are all imposed in order to signify bodily forms
in accordance with a determinate mode of par-
ticipating ‘being’ or ‘living’ or any of the divine
perfections.

* Should not the text read, ‘but rather by reason of that imperfect mode of participating’?

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 13, art. 3, c. (tr. B.A.M.).

QU13 AR3 CO

respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est,
deum cognoscimus ex perfectionibus proce-
dentibus in creaturas ab ipso; quae quidem per-
fectiones in deo sunt secundum eminentiorem
modum quam in creaturis.
I reply that it must be said that, as has been said,
we know God from perfections proceeding from
Him into creatures, which perfections, in fact,
are in God in a more eminent mode than they
are in creatures.

intellectus autem noster eo modo apprehendit Now our intellect apprehends them in the way
eas, secundum quod sunt in creaturis, et secun- in which they exist in creatures, and according
dum quod apprehendit, ita significat per as it apprehends [them], so it signifies [them] by
nomina. names.

in nominibus igitur quae deo attribuimus, est Therefore, in names which we attribute to God,
duo considerare, scilicet, perfectiones ipsas sig- there are two things to consider, namely, the
nificatas, ut bonitatem, vitam, et huiusmodi; et very perfections signified, like ‘goodness’,
modum significandi. ‘life’, and the like, and the mode of signifying.

quantum igitur ad id quod significant huiusmodi Therefore, with respect to that which such
nomina, proprie competunt deo, et magis pro- names signify, they properly belong to God, and
prie quam ipsis creaturis, et per prius dicuntur more properly to Him than to creatures, and are
de eo. said of Him per prius.

quantum vero ad modum significandi, non pro- But with respect to the mode of signifying they
prie dicuntur de deo, habent enim modum signi- are not properly said of God, for they have a
ficandi qui creaturis competit. mode of signifying which belongs to creatures.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 34, q. 3, art. 2, ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

DS34QU3 AR2- RA3

ad tertium dicendum, quod in creaturis To the third it must be said that in spiritual
spiritualibus possumus duo considerare: creatures we may consider two things:

80
scilicet ipsas perfectiones divinae bonitatis namely, the very perfections of the divine good-
secundum se acceptas; ness taken according to themselves;

et his nominatur deus, non quidem symbolice, and God is named by these, not indeed sym-
sed proprie; sicut dicitur sapiens et intelligens, bolically, but properly, as He is called ‘wise’
et hujusmodi; and ‘understanding’ and the like.

unde etiam dicitur in lib. de causis, quod deus For this reason it is also said in the Book of
nominatur nomine primi causati sui, quod est Causes that God is named by the name of His
intelligentia. own first caused thing, which is intelligence.

vel possumus considerare ipsum modum deter- Or we can consider the determinate mode itself
minatum participandi hujusmodi perfectiones, of participating perfections of this sort, which
qui modus pertinet ad determinatam naturam vel mode pertains to a determinate nature or order
ordinem angelorum. of the angels.

unde nomina exprimentia istum modum non
possunt proprie de deo dici, nec etiam meta-
phorice, quia metaphora sumenda est ex his
quae sunt manifesta secundum sensum:
For this reason names expressing this mode
cannot be said of God properly or even meta-
phorically because metaphors are to be taken
from those things which are manifest according
to sense.

et ideo nunquam invenimus deum in scriptura And so we never find in Scripture God named
nominatum cherubim vel seraphim vel aliquid cherubim or seraphim or something of the sort,
hujusmodi, sicut leonem vel ursum vel aliquid like lion or bear or something of the sort.
hujusmodi.

6. On the difference between the principal thing signified and the mode of signifying as
this bears on the nature of adjectives and substantial verbs.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 8, art. 2, obj. 7, ad 7 (tr. B.A.M.):

QU8AR2 AG7

praeterea, quaecumque sunt idem, ita se habent,
quod quidquid praedicatur de uno, praedicetur
de alio, quia, secundum philosophum, quantam-
cumque differentiam assignaverimus, osten-
dentes erimus quod non idem.
Further, whatever things are the same, they so
have themselves that whatever is predicated of
the one will be predicated of the other because,
according to the Philosopher, whatever differ-
ence we might have assigned, we will be re-
vealing that it is not the same.

sed de essentia divina praedicatur quod sit But it is predicated of the divine essence that is
sapiens, quod creet mundum, et huiusmodi; it is ‘wise’, that it ‘creates the world’, and the
quae non videntur praedicari posse de paterni- like, which it does not seem possible to predi-
tate vel filiatione. cate of fatherhood and sonship.

ergo relatio in divinis non est essentia divina. Therefore relation in the divine is not the divine
essence.
QU8AR2 RA7

ad septimum dicendum, quod sicut philosophus To the seventh it must be said that just as the
dicit in iii phys., non oportet quod omnia eadem Philosopher says in the third book of the

81
praedicentur quolibet modo de eisdem, sed Physics, it is not necessary that all the same
solum de eisdem secundum rationem. things be predicated in any way of the same
things, but only according to the same notion.

essentia autem divina et paternitas, etsi sint But the divine essence and paternity, even if
idem re, non sunt idem ratione; they be the same in reality, are not the same in
notion;

et ideo non oportet quod quidquid praedicatur and so it is not necessary that whatever is
de aliquo uno, praedicetur de alio. predicated of any one be predicated of the other.

sciendum tamen, quod quaedam sunt quae
consequuntur proprias rationes essentiae et
relationis: sicut quod esse commune sequitur ad
essentiam, distinguere sequitur ad relationem.
Still it must be understood that there are certain
things which follow upon the proper notions of
essence and relation, as that ‘to be common’
follows upon essence, but ‘to distinguish’ fol-
lows upon relation.

unde unum horum ab alio removetur, neque And so the one of these is removed from the
enim essentia distinguit, neque relatio est com- other, for essence never distinguishes, nor is re-
munis. lation ever common.

quaedam vero non quantum ad principale sig- But certain things involve some difference from
nificatum, sed quantum ad modum significandi, the notion of essence or relation, not with re-
habent aliquam differentiam a ratione essentiae spect to the principal thing signified, but with
vel relationis; respect to the mode of signifying;

et ista praedicantur quidem de essentia vel
relatione, licet non proprie; et huiusmodi sunt
adiectiva, et verba sub-stantialia, ut bonus,
sapiens, intelligere, et velle: huiusmodi enim
quantum ad rem significatam, significant ipsam
essentiam;
and these are predicated indeed of an essence or
relation, albeit not properly; and of this sort are
adjectives, and substantial verbs, like ‘good’,
‘wise’, ‘to understand’, and ‘to will’: for such
things with respect to the thing signified signify
the essence itself;

sed tamen significant eam per modum suppositi, but still they signify it in the manner of a sup-
et non in abstracto. posit, and not in the abstract.

et ideo propriissime dicuntur de personis, et de And so they are most properly said of the Per-
nominibus essentialibus concretis, ut deus, vel sons, and of concrete essential names, like
pater bonus, sapiens, creans, et alia huiusmodi; ‘God’, or ‘the Father is good, wise, creating’
and others of the sort;

de essentia autem in abstracto significata, et non but of the essence signified in the abstract, and
per modum suppositi, sed improprie. not in the manner of a supposit, but improperly.

adhuc autem minus proprie de relationibus, quia But besides less properly of relations because
huiusmodi conveniunt supposito secundum such things belong to the supposit with respect
essentiam, non autem secundum relationem: to essence, but not with respect to relation:

deus enim est bonus, vel creans, ex eo quod for God is good or creating because He has an
habet essentiam, non ex eo quod habet relati- essence, and not because He has a relation.
onem.

82
N.B. Something can be signified in the abstract or in the concrete. What is signified in the
concrete is signified in the manner of a supposit. What is signified in the abstract is
signified in the manner of that by which something is or exists—that is, in the manner of a
form. Adjectives like bonus or ‘good’ and sapiens or ‘wise’, and substantial verbs like
intelligere or ‘to understand’ and velle or ‘to will’, signify the essence principally, but they
do so in the manner of a supposit. Such names are said properly of the three Persons of the
Trinity, and of essential concrete names like Deus or ‘God’: e.g. Deus bonus or ‘God is
good’, Pater bonus or ‘The Father is good’; Deus sapiens or ‘Wise God’, Pater creans or
‘creating Father’.

7. On the principal thing signified.

Note the expression a principali significato, ‘by the principal thing signified’, used
in the Sentences text quoted above. Elsewhere (sc. at In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 10), St. Thomas
speaks of such a thing as being signified principaliter, as names in the genera of accidents
signify accident principaliter, but substance or the subject ex consequenti. In the present
text, however, St. Thomas is distinguishing between the principal thing signified and the
mode of signifying as these belong to certain names said of God.

8. On the difference between the adjective and the substantive and their relation to sig-
nifying in the manner of a substance and in the manner of an accident.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 9, q. 1, art. 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

DS9QU1 AR2-TT

utrum pater et filius possint dici plures aeterni. Whether the Father and the Son can be called
‘many eternals’.

DS9QU1 AR2- AG1

ad secundum sic proceditur. One proceeds to the second as follows.

videtur quod pater et filius non possint dici It seems that the Father and the Son cannot be
plures aeterni, per id quod habetur in symbolo called ‘many eternals’ by what is had in the
athanasii: Symbol of Athanasius:

et tamen non tres aeterni. And yet not three eternals.

DS9QU1 AR2- AG2

praeterea, augustinus: quidquid in divinis ad se Further, Augustine: Whatever is said with re-
dicitur, singulariter de tribus, et non pluraliter spect to itself in the divine is predicated singu-
praedicatur. larly and not plurally of the three.

sed aeternus ad se dicitur: non enim est rela- But ‘eternal’ is said with respect to itself: for it
tivum. is not a relative.*

ergo singulariter de tribus dicitur, et non Therefore it is said of the three singularly, and
pluraliter. not plurally.

83
DS9QU1 AR2- AG3

praeterea, sicut una deitas est trium personarum, Further, just as there is one deity of three Per-
ita etiam est una aeternitas, cum aeternitas sit sons, so there is also one eternity, since eternity
ipsa divina substantia. is the divine substance itself.

sed non potest dici: pater et filius sunt plures dii; But it cannot be said: ‘The Father and the Son
propter unitatem divinitatis. are many gods’, by reason of the unity of the
divinity.

ergo nec etiam propter unitatem aeternitatis Therefore also by reason of the unity of the
potest dici: pater et filius sunt plures aeterni. eternity neither can it be said: ‘The Father and
the Son are many eternals’.
DS9QU1 AR2- AG4

sed contra est quod habetur in symbolo But to the contrary, it is had in the Symbol of
athanasii, quod tres personae sunt sibi Athanasius that the three Persons are coeternal
coaeternae. with themselves.

si dicas, quod hoc est, quia deus est
substantivum, sed aeternus est adjectivum, et
ideo aeternus recipit pluralem numerum,
secundum numerum suppositorum. contra,
adjectivum significatur per modum accidentis.
If you object that this is because ‘God’ is a
substantive, but ‘eternal’ is an adjective, and
therefore ‘eternal’ admits a plural number in ac-
cordance with the number of supposits—to the
contrary, an adjective is signified in the manner
of an accident.

sed in deo non potest esse aliquod accidens, But in God there cannot be any accident be-
quia, sicut dicit boetius, cetera praedicamenta cause, as Boethius says, The rest of the pre-
cum in divinam venerint praedicationem mutan- dicaments, when they will have come into the
tur in substantiam. divine, are changed into substance.

ergo non potest ibi esse adjectivum. Therefore, there cannot be an adjective there
[i.e. one cannot predicate an adjective in the
divine].
DS9QU1 AR2- AG5

praeterea, adjectivum trahit numerum a Further, an adjective draws its number from a
substantivo. substantive.

sed aeternus est adjectivum. But ‘eternal’ is an adjective.

cum ergo pater et filius sint plures quidam, Therefore, since the Father and the Son are a
videtur quod debeant dici aeterni. certain ‘many’, it seems that they should be
called ‘eternal’.

* What is said ad se, ‘with respect to itself’, is absolute; but what is said ad aliquid, ‘with
respect to another’, is relative.

DS9QU1 AR2- CO

respondeo dicendum, quod haec est differentia I reply that it must be said that there is this dif-
inter adjectiva et substantiva: ference between an adjective and a substantive:

84
quia substantiva significant per modum sub- that a substantive signifies in the manner of a
stantiae, et ideo significant rem suam absolute; substance, and so it signifies its subject in an ab-
solute manner;

et ideo substantivum non dicitur in plurali and hence a substantive is not said in the plural
numero, nisi formatio sua numeretur; number unless its formation be numbered—

adjectivum autem significat per modum but an adjective signifies in the manner of an ac-
accidentis, quod non habet esse absolutum, nec cident, which has neither absolute being nor
unitatem: sed esse suum et unitas sua dependet unity, but its being and unity depend on that in
ex eo cui inhaeret. which it inheres.

unde etiam non multiplicatur secundum And so it is not also numerically multiplied by
numerum per divisionem alicujus quod sit pars the division of something which is its part, as
sui, sicut species substantiarum multiplicantur the species of substances are multiplied through
per individua, secundum divisionem materiae. individuals according to the division of matter.

sed accidens multiplicatur secundum divisionem But an accident is multiplied according to the
subjecti in quo est; division of the subject in which it is;

unde haec albedo est alia ab illa, inquantum and so this whiteness is other than that one in-
haec est hujus, et illa illius; sofar as this one belongs to this [subject], and
that one to that;

et ideo adjectivum non habet numerum plural- and hence an adjective does not have a plural
em, nisi ex parte suppositorum. number except on the part of the supposits.

dicendum igitur, quod omnes termini signi-
ficantes substantiam per modum substantiae,
sicut sunt substantiva, non praedicantur in
plurali de tribus personis, eo quod formatio sig-
nificata, scilicet ipsa essentia divina, non divi-
ditur.
Therefore, it must be said that all terms signi-
fying substance in the manner of a substance, as
are the substantives, are not predicated in the
plural of the three Persons because the forma-
tion signified, namely, the divine essence itself,
is not divided.

termini vero significantes substantiam adjective
per modum inhaerentis, vel assequentis sub-
stantiam, ut dicit damascenus, praedicantur in
plurali de tribus personis, propter pluralitatem
suppositorum.
But terms signifying substance adjectivally in
the manner of inhering, or of following upon
substance, as Damascene says, are predicated in
the plural of the three Persons by reason of the
plurality of the supposits.

sed tamen in talibus terminis, qui significant But still in such terms, which signify substance
substantiam adjective, est ordo. adjectivally, there is an order.

quaedam enim significant ut inhaerenter, non
significantes substantiam quantum ad modum
significandi quem grammatici considerant di-
centes, nomen significare substantiam cum
qualitate, sicut verba et participia:
For certain ones signify inherently, not signi-
fying the substance with respect to the mode of
signifying which grammarians consider, saying
that the name signifies a substance with a
quality, such as verbs and participles:

et ista nullo modo debent praedicari in singulari, and these in no way ought to be predicated in
quia significant per modum actus, qui non sig- the singular because they signify in the manner
nificatur nisi ut inhaerens. of an act, which is not signified except as
inhering.

85
quaedam autem significant substantiam quan- But certain ones signify substance with respect
tum ad modum consideratum a grammaticis, to the mode considered by grammarians, like
sicut nomina adjectiva. adjectival names.

omne enim nomen significat substantiam et For every name signifies substance and quality.
qualitatem.

sed forma quae est qualitas, significat ut inhaer- But the form, which is a quality, it signifies as
entem; et talia possunt magis praedicari singu- inherent; and such [names] rather can be pre-
lariter, et praecipue quia possunt substantiari, dicated singularly, and especially because they
sicut aeternus, et hujusmodi. can substand, like ‘eternal’ and the like.

quando tamen talibus adjectivis additur per Still, when some preposition denoting the rela-
compositionem aliqua praepositio denotans tionship of a Person to a Person is added to such
habitudinem personae ad personam, magis adjectives by composition, they are drawn rather
trahuntur ad suppositum; to the supposit;

et tunc nunquam debent praedicari in singulari, and then they ought never to be predicated in
sed tantum in plurali, sicut coaeternus. the singular, but only in the plural, like ‘co-
eternal’.

DS9QU1 AR2- RA1

dico igitur ad primum, quod si aeternus sub- Therfore I say to the first, that if ‘eternal’ be
stantive sumatur, tunc praedicatur in singulari taken substantivally, then it is predicated in the
de tribus; et sic accipit athanasius. singular of the three; and Athanasius takes it
this way.

si adjective, tunc praedicatur pluraliter. If adjectivally, then it is predicated plurally.

sed coaeternus semper debet pluraliter praedi- But ‘coeternal’ should always be predicated
cari, propter habitudinem personae ad plurally by reason of the relationship of a Per-
personam, quam importat. son to a Person, which it implies.

DS9QU1 AR2- RA2

ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut dictum est, To the second it must be said that, as has been
in corp. art., adjectiva non habent numerum ex said in the body of the article, adjectives do not
seipsis, sed ex suis suppositis; have number from themselves, but from their
supposits.

et ideo aeternus, quamvis non numeretur ex And so ‘eternal’, although it not be numbered
seipso, quia absolutum est, tamen praedicatur in from itself, because it is absolute, still it is pre-
plurali propter pluralitatem suppositorum, quae dicated in the plural by reason of the plurality of
relativa sunt. the supposits, which are relative.

DS9QU1 AR2- RA3

et per hoc patet solutio ad tertium: quia deus And by this the solution to the third is clear, be-
non est adjectivum, ut recipiat numerum ab alio, cause ‘God’ is not an adjective such that it ad-
sicut aeternus. mit a number from another, as does ‘eternal’.

86
unde non posset pluraliter praedicari nisi propter And so it cannot be predicated plurally except
pluralitatem suae formae: quam pluralitatem by reason of the plurality of its form, which
non est in deo ponere. plurality cannot be placed in God.

DS9QU1 AR2- RA4

ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis secundum To the fourth it must be said that although in
rem non sit accidens in divinis, reality there is no accident in God,

tamen quantum ad modum significandi potest still, with respect to the mode of signifying,
aliquid ut adjacens significari, vel assequens there can be something that can signify as ad-
substantiam; jacent to, or as following upon, substance.

et inde sunt adjectiva in divinis. And from this it follows that there are adjectives
in the divine.

9. That names signifying concretely are those which are imposed by us in order to signify
some complete subsisting thing (sc. a hoc aliquid, or ‘this something’); but those names
which are imposed in order to signify simple forms do not signify something as subsisting,
but as that by which something is, for which reason they signify abstractly.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 13, art. 1, obj. 2, ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

QU13 AR1 AG2

praeterea, omne nomen aut dicitur in abstracto, Further, every name is said either in the abstract
aut in concreto. [or ‘abstractly’] or in the concrete [or ‘con-
cretely’].

sed nomina significantia in concreto, non But names signifying concretely do not belong
competunt deo, cum simplex sit, to God, since He is simple,

neque nomina significantia in abstracto, quia nor do names signifying abstractly, because they
non significant aliquid perfectum subsistens. do not signify some perfect subsisting thing.

ergo nullum nomen potest dici de deo. Therefore, no name can be said of God.

QU13 AR1 RA2

ad secundum dicendum quod, quia ex creaturis
in dei cognitionem venimus, et ex ipsis eum
nominamus, nomina quae deo attribuimus, hoc
modo significant, secundum quod competit
creaturis materialibus, quarum cognitio est
nobis connaturalis, ut supra dictum est.
To the second it must be said that because we
arrive at knowledge of God from creatures, and
we name Him from them, the names which we
attribute to God signify in this way, according
as they belong to material creatures, the know-
ledge of which is connatural to us, as has been
said above.

et quia in huiusmodi creaturis, ea quae sunt And because in creatures of this sort the things
perfecta et subsistentia sunt composita; which are perfect and subsisting are com-
posed—

87
forma autem in eis non est aliquid completum in them, however, the form is not some com-
subsistens, sed magis quo aliquid est, plete subsisting thing, but rather that by which
something is—

inde est quod omnia nomina a nobis imposita ad from this it follows that all names imposed by
significandum aliquid completum subsistens, us in order to signify some complete subsisting
significant in concretione, prout competit thing signify in concretion, as is appropriate to
compositis; composed things;

quae autem imponuntur ad significandas formas
simplices, significant aliquid non ut subsistens,
sed ut quo aliquid est, sicut albedo significat ut
quo aliquid est album.
but those [names] which are imposed by us in
order to signify simple forms do not signify
something as subsisting, but as that by which
something is, as ‘whiteness’ signifies as that by
which something is white.

quia igitur et deus simplex est, et subsistens est, Therefore, since God is simple, and He also
attribuimus ei et nomina abstracta, ad subsists, in order to signify His simplicity we at-
significandam simplicitatem eius; tribute abstract names to Him;

et nomina concreta, ad significandum
subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius, quamvis
utraque nomina deficiant a modo ipsius, sicut
intellectus noster non cognoscit eum ut est,
secundum hanc vitam.
and in order to signify His subsistence and per-
fection [we attribute to Him] concrete names,
although both kinds of name fall short of His
mode, just as our intellect cannot know Him as
He is, according to this life.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentes, I, cp. 30 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB1 CP30 N.

quae nomina de deo possint praedicari.

LB1 CP30 N.1

ex his etiam considerari potest quid de deo dici

vel non dici possit, quidve de eo tantum dicatur,
quid etiam de eo simul et aliis rebus.

LB1 CP30 N.2

quia enim omnem perfectionem creaturae est in

deo invenire sed per alium modum eminen-
tiorem, quaecumque nomina absolute perfecti-
onem absque defectu designant, de deo praedi-
cantur et de aliis rebus:

sicut est bonitas, sapientia, esse, et alia huius-

modi.

quodcumque vero nomen huiusmodi per-

fectiones exprimit cum modo proprio creaturis,
de deo dici non potest nisi per similitudinem et

88
metaphoram, per quam quae sunt unius rei alteri
solent adaptari, sicut aliquis homo dicitur lapis
propter duritiam intellectus.

huiusmodi autem sunt omnia nomina imposita

ad designandum speciem rei creatae, sicut homo
et lapis: nam cuilibet speciei debetur proprius
modus perfectionis et esse.

similiter etiam quaecumque nomina proprietates

rerum designant quae ex propriis principiis
specierum causatur.

unde de deo dici non possunt nisi metaphorice.

quae vero huiusmodi perfectiones exprimunt

cum supereminentiae modo quo deo conveniunt,
de solo deo dicuntur: sicut summum bonum,
primum ens, et alia huiusmodi.

LB1 CP30 N.3

dico autem aliqua praedictorum nominum

perfectionem absque defectu importare,
quantum ad illud ad quod significandum nomen
fuit impositum:

quantum enim ad modum significandi, omne

nomen cum defectu est.

nam nomine res exprimimus eo modo quo

intellectu concipimus.

intellectus autem noster, ex sensibus

cognoscendi initium sumens, illum modum non
transcendit qui in rebus sensibilibus invenitur, in
quibus aliud est forma et habens formam, pro-
pter formae et materiae compositionem.

forma vero in his rebus invenitur quidem

simplex, sed imperfecta, utpote non subsistens:

habens autem formam invenitur quidem subsis-

tens, sed non simplex, immo concretionem
habens.

unde intellectus noster, quidquid significat ut

subsistens, significat in concretione:

quod vero ut simplex, significat non ut quod est,

sed ut quo est.

89
et sic in omni nomine a nobis dicto, quantum ad
modum significandi, imperfectio invenitur, quae
deo non competit, quamvis res significata aliquo
eminenti modo deo conveniat: ut patet in
nomine bonitatis et boni;

nam bonitas significat ut non subsistens, bonum

autem ut concretum.

et quantum ad hoc nullum nomen deo

convenienter aptatur, sed solum quantum ad id
ad quod significandum nomen imponitur.

possunt igitur, ut dionysius docet, huiusmodi

nomina et affirmari de deo et negari:

affirmari quidem, propter nominis rationem;

negari vero, propter significandi modum.

LB1 CP30 N.4

modus autem supereminentiae quo in deo dictae

perfectiones inveniuntur, per nomina a nobis
imposita significari non potest nisi vel per
negationem, sicut cum dicimus deum aeternum
vel infinitum;

vel etiam per relationem ipsius ad alia, ut cum

dicitur prima causa, vel summum bonum.

non enim de deo capere possumus quid est, sed

quid non est, et qualiter alia se habeant ad
ipsum, ut ex supra dictis patet.

LB1 CP31 N.

quod divina perfectio et pluralitas nominum

divinorum divinae simplicitati non repugnant.

LB1 CP31 N.1

ex praedictis etiam videri potest quod divina

perfectio et plura nomina dicta de deo ipsius
simplicitati non repugnant.

LB1 CP31 N.2

sic enim omnes perfectiones in rebus aliis

90
inventas deo attribui diximus sicut effectus in
suis causis aequivocis inveniuntur.

qui quidem effectus in suis causis sunt virtute,

ut calor in sole.

virtus autem huiusmodi nisi aliqualiter esset de

genere caloris, sol per eam agens non sibi simile
generaret.

ex hac igitur virtute sol calidus dicitur, non

solum quia calorem facit, sed quia virtus per
quam hoc facit, est aliquid conforme calori.

per eandem autem virtutem per quam sol facit

calorem, facit et multos alios effectus in inferi-
oribus corporibus, utpote siccitatem.

et sic calor et siccitas, quae in igne sunt quali-

tates diversae, soli attribuuntur per unam virtu-
tem.

ita et omnium perfectiones, quae rebus aliis

secundum diversas formas conveniunt, deo
secundum unam eius virtutem attribui est ne-
cesse.

quae item virtus non est aliud a sua essentia:

cum ei nihil accidere possit, ut probatum est.

sic igitur sapiens deus dicitur non solum

secundum hoc quod sapientiam efficit, sed quia,
secundum quod sapientes sumus, virtutem eius,
qua sapientes nos facit, aliquatenus imitamur.

non autem dicitur lapis, quamvis lapides fecerit,

quia in nomine lapidis intelligitur modus deter-
minatus essendi, secundum quem lapis a deo
distinguitur.

imitatur autem lapis deum ut causam secundum

esse, secundum bonitatem, et alia huiusmodi,
sicut et aliae creaturae.

LB1 CP31 N.3

huius autem simile inveniri potest in potentiis

cognoscitivis et in virtutibus operativis humanis.

intellectus enim unica virtute cognoscit omnia

quae pars sensitiva diversis potentiis appre-
hendit, et etiam alia multa.

91
intellectus etiam, quanto fuerit altior, tanto
aliquo uno plura cognoscere potest, ad quae
cognoscenda intellectus inferior non pertingit
nisi per multa.

potestas etiam regia ad omnia illa extenditur ad

quae diversae sub ipso potestates ordinem
habent.

sic igitur et deus per unum simplex suum esse

omnimodam perfectionem possidet, quam res
aliae, immo multo minorem, per quaedam di-
versa consequuntur.

LB1 CP31 N.4

ex quo patet necessitas plura nomina deo dandi.

quia enim eum non possumus cognoscere natur-

aliter nisi ex effectibus deveniendo in ipsum,
oportet quod nomina quibus perfectionem ipsius
significamus, diversa sint, sicut et perfectiones
in rebus inveniuntur diversae.

si autem ipsam essentiam prout est possemus

intelligere et ei nomen proprium adaptare, uno
nomine tantum eam exprimeremus.

quod promittitur his qui eum per essentiam

videbunt, zach. ult.: in die illa erit dominus unus
et nomen eius unum.

10. That those things are said to be predicated denominatively which are concrete adjec-
tivally, and are denominated or derived from certain abstract accidents.

Cf. Ignotus Auctor, Summa Totius Logicae Aristotelis. tr. 2, cap. 1 (tr. B.A.m.):

TR2 CP01

denominative vero dicuntur praedicari, quae But those things are said to be predicated de-
concreta sunt adjective, et ab aliquibus acci- nominatively which are concrete adjectivally,
dentibus abstractis denominantur seu derivantur: and are denominated or derived from certain
abstract accidents,

ut album de homine praedicatur, et de equo
denominative: quia album derivatur ab hoc ab-
stracto quae est albedo quae est in homine, quae
sic in abstracto sumpta de homine praedicari
non posset:
as ‘white’ is predicated of man and horse de-
nominatively because ‘white’ is derived from
this abstract thing which is the whiteness which
is in man, which when taken in the abstract can-
not be predicated of man,

92
nulla enim pars, ut supra dictum est, potest de for, as was said above, no part can be predicated
toto praedicari: of the whole—

albedo enim est quaedam pars accidentalis for ‘whiteness’ is a certain accidental part of a
hominis albi, et sic de eo praedicari non posset. white man, and so it cannot be predicated of
him.

concernitur autem et dicitur album, quod idem But what is considered together with and is
est quod habens albedinem: called ‘white’ is the same as ‘that (thing) having
whiteness’;

et tale potest de homine praedicari. and such a thing can be predicated of man.

11. On signifying in the manner of inhering, or of following upon substance.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 9, q. 1, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

DS9QU1 AR2- CO

termini vero significantes substantiam adjective
per modum inhaerentis, vel assequentis
substantiam, ut dicit damascenus, praedicantur
in plurali de tribus personis, propter pluralitatem
suppositorum.
But terms signifying substance adjectivally in
the manner of inhering, or of following upon
substance, as Damascene says, are predicated in
the plural of the three Persons by reason of the
plurality of the supposits.

12. On signifying inherently, or as inhering, which pertains to verbs and participles.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 9, q. 1, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

DS9QU1 AR2- CO

quaedam enim significant ut inhaerenter, non
significantes substantiam, quantum ad modum
significandi quem grammatici considerant
dicentes, nomen significare substantiam cum
qualitate, sicut verba et participia.
For some things signify as inhering, not signi-
fying the substance with respect to the mode of
signifying which grammarians consider, say-
ing, a name signifies a substance with a quality,
such as verbs and participles.

et ista nullo modo debent praedicari in singulari, and these in no way ought to be predicated in
quia significant per modum actus, qui non the singular because they signify in the manner
significatur nisi ut inhaerens. of an act, which is not signified except as in-
hering.

13. That a form, which is a quality, signifies as inherent.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 9, q. 1, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

DS9QU1 AR2- CO

sed forma quae est qualitas, significat ut in- But the form, which is a quality, it signifies as
haerentem; et talia possunt magis praedicari inherent; and such rather can be predicated sing-
singulariter, et praecipue quia possunt sub- ularly, and especially because they are able to
stantiari, sicut aeternus, et hujusmodi. substand, like ‘eternal’ and the like.

93
14. That to signify a quality in the manner of a quality is to signify it as inherent; but to
signify it in the manner of a substance is not.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Fallaciis ad Quosdam Nobiles Artistas, cp. 10 (tr. B.A.M.):

CP10-

et est notandum quod non facit fallaciam figurae
dictionis mutatio praedicamentorum quantum ad
rem significatam, sed quantum ad modum signi-
ficandi.
But one must note that a change of predica-
ments with respect to the thing signified does
not produce the fallacy of the appearance of the
words, but [a change] with respect to the mode
of signifying does.

albedo enim significat qualitatem, sed significat For ‘whiteness’ signifies a quality, but it signi-
eam per modum substantiae, quia non significat fies it in the manner of a substance because it
eam ut inhaerentem; does not signify it as inhering;

album autem significat eam per modum but ‘white’ signifies it in the manner of a quality
qualitatis, quia significat eam ut inhaerentem. because it does signify it as inherent.

15. That that from which a thing is denominated need not always be a form in reality, but it
suffices that it be signified in the manner of a form.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 72, art. 10, obj. 8, ad 8 (tr. B.A.M.):

QU7AR10 AG8

praeterea, omnis denominatio est a forma. Further, every denomination is from a form.

forma autem est aliquid inhaerens ei cuius But a form is something inhering in that to
est…. which it belongs…..

QU7AR10 RA8

ad octavum dicendum est, quod illud a quo ali- To the eighth it must be said that that from
quid denominatur, non oportet quod sit semper which something is denominated need not al-
forma secundum rei naturam, ways be a form according to the nature of the
thing [i.e. in reality],

sed sufficit quod significetur per modum for- but it suffices that it be signified in the manner
mae, grammatice loquendo. of a form, grammatically speaking.

denominatur enim homo ab actione et ab indu- For man is denominated from action and from
mento, et ab aliis huiusmodi, quae realiter non clothing, as well as from other things of the sort,
sunt formae. which in reality are not forms.

16. That to be signified in the manner of an accident is to be signified as inherent in

another.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 8, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

94
QU8AR2 CO

respondeo. dicendum quod, supposito quod I reply that it must be said that, having supposed
relationes in divinis sint, de necessitate oportet that relations are in the divine, it is necessary to
dicere quod sint essentia divina: say that they are the divine essence,

alias oporteret ponere compositionem in deo, et otherwise one would have to hold that there is
quod relationes in divinis essent accidentia, composition in God, and that relations in the
divine were accidents,

quia omnis res inhaerens alicui praeter suam because everything inhering in something be-
substantiam est accidens. yond its substance is an accident.

oporteret etiam quod aliqua res esset aeterna, It would also be necessary that some things be
quae non erit substantia divina; quae omnia sunt eternal which will not be the divine substance,
haeretica. all of which are heretical.

ad huius ergo evidentiam sciendum est, quod
inter novem genera quae continentur sub acci-
dente, quaedam significantur secundum ratio-
nem accidentis: ratio enim accidentis est inesse;
For the evidence of this, then, it must be under-
stood that among the nine genera under which
accident is contained, some are signified accor-
ding to the ratio of an accident: for the ratio of
an accident is to be in;

et ideo illa dico significari per modum acci- and so I maintain that those things are signified
dentis quae significantur ut inhaerentia alteri, in the manner of an accident which are signified
sicut quantitas et qualitas; as inherent in another, like quantity and quality;

quantitas enim significatur ut alicuius in quo est, for quantity is signified as of [= ‘belonging to’]
et similiter qualitas. that in which it is, and likewise quality.

ad aliquid vero non significatur secundum But ‘toward something’ [= ‘relation’] is not
rationem accidentis: signified according to the ratio of an accident:

non enim significatur ut aliquid eius in quo est, for it is not signified as something of that in
sed ut ad id quod extra est. which it is, but as to that which is outside.

et propter hoc etiam dicit philosophus, quod And on this account the Philosopher also says
scientia, in quantum est relatio, non est scientis, that science, to the extent that it is a relation, is
sed scibilis. not of the knower, but of the knowable.

unde quidam attendentes modum significandi in And so some men, paying attention to the mode
relativis, dixerunt, ea non esse inhaerentia of signifying in relatives, have said they do not
substantiis, scilicet quasi eis assistentia: inhere in substances, as, so to speak, ‘attached’
to them:

quia significantur ad quoddam medium inter because they are signified as a sort of mean
substantiam quae refertur, et id ad quod refertur. between the substance which is referred, and
that to which it refers.

et ex hoc sequebatur quod in rebus creatis And from this it would follow that in created
relationes non sunt accidentia, quia accidentis things relations are not accidents, since the
esse est inesse. being of an accident is to be in.

95
unde etiam quidam theologi, scilicet porretani,
huiusmodi opinionem usque ad divinam
relationem extenderunt, dicentes, relationes non
esse in personis, sed eis quasi assistere.
And so certain theologians, for instance, Porre-
tanus, have extended an opinion of this sort
even to divine relation, saying that the relations
are not in the Persons, but are, so to speak,
‘attached’ to them.

et quia essentia divina est in personis,
sequebatur quod relationes non sunt essentia
divina; et quia omne accidens inhaeret, seque-
batur quod non essent accidentia.
And because the divine essence is in the
Persons, it would follow that relations are not
the divine essence; and because every accident
inheres, it would follow that they would not be
accidents.

et secundum hoc solvebant verbum augustini And according to this they understood the words
inductum, quod scilicet relationes non praedi- of Augustine adduced, namely, that relations are
cantur de deo secundum substantiam, nec secun- neither predicated of God with respect to sub-
dum accidens. stance, nor with respect to accident.

sed ad hanc opinionem sequitur quod relatio non But upon this opinion it follows that relation is
sit res aliqua, sed solum secundum rationem: not some thing, but only according to reason:

omnis enim res vel est substantia vel accidens. For everything is either a substance or an acci-
dent.

unde etiam quidam antiqui posuerunt relationes And so some of the ancients also held that re-
esse de secundis intellectis, ut commentator lations are of second things understood, as the
dicit xi metaph.. Commentator say in the eleventh book of the
Metaphysics.

et ideo oportet hoc etiam porretanos dicere, And so it was also necessary for Porretanus to
quod relationes divinae non sunt nisi secundum say that the divine relations do not exist except
rationem. according to reason.

et sic sequetur quod distinctio personarum non And thus it would follow that the distinction of
erit realis; quod est haereticum. Persons will not be real, which is heretical.

unde dicendum est, quod nihil prohibet aliquid
esse inhaerens, quod tamen non significatur ut
inhaerens, sicut etiam actio non significatur ut
in agente, sed ut ab agente, et tamen constat
actionem esse in agente.
And so it must be said that nothing prevents
something to be inhering, although it is not
signified as inhering, as even ‘action’ is not
signified as in the agent, but as from the agent,
and yet it is undeniable that action is in the
agent.

et similiter, licet ad aliquid non significetur ut And likewise, although something is not
inhaerens, tamen oportet ut sit inhaerens. signified as inhering, still it is necessary that it
be inhering.

et hoc quando relatio est res aliqua; quando vero And this is when the relation is some thing; but
est secundum rationem tantum, tunc non est when it is merely according to reason, in that
inhaerens. case it is not inhering.

et sicut in rebus creatis oportet quod sit And just as there must be accidents in created
accidens, ita oportet quod sit in deo substantia, things, so there must be substance in God
quia quidquid est in deo, est eius substantia. because whatever is in God is His substance.

96
oportet ergo relationes secundum rem, esse
divinam substantiam; quae tamen non habent
modum substantiae, sed habent alium modum
praedicandi ab his quae substantialiter prae-
dicantur in deo.
And so relations according to reality must be the
divine substance, which, nevertheless, do not
have the manner of a substance, but have
another manner of predicating from those things
which are predicated in God.

17. On the signification of the names of accidents when taken in abstraction.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Meta. lect. 1, nn. 8-12 (tr. B.A.M.):

LB7LC-1N.-8

secundo ibi, unde et probat idem per quoddam

signum.

quia enim alia entia non sunt entia nisi

secundum quod referuntur ad substantiam, ideo
potest esse dubitatio de aliis entibus in abstracto
significatis, quando non significant cum aliqua
habitudine ad substantiam:

utrum sint entia vel non entia, scilicet utrum

vadere, sanare et sedere et unumquodque
istorum in abstracto significatorum sit ens aut
non ens.

et similiter est in aliis talibus, quae in abstracto

significantur; sive significentur per modum
actionis, ut praedicta, sive non, ut albedo sive
nigredo.

LB7LC-1N.-9

pro tanto autem videntur accidentia in abstracto

significata esse non entia, quia nihil ipsorum est
aptum natum secundum se esse;

immo cuiuslibet eorum esse est alteri inesse, et

non est possibile aliquid eorum separari a sub-
stantia;

et ideo quando significantur in abstracto

quasi sint secundum se entia et a substantia
separata, videtur quod sint non entia.

licet modus significandi vocum non consequatur

immediate modum essendi rerum, sed mediante
modo intelligendi; quia intellectus sunt similitu-
dines rerum, voces autem intellectuum, ut
dicitur in primo perihermenias.

LB7LC-1N.10

97
licet autem modus essendi accidentium non sit
ut per se sint, sed solum ut insint, intellectus
tamen potest ea per se intelligere, cum sit natus
dividere ea quae secundum naturam coniuncta
sunt.

et ideo nomina abstracta accidentium significant

entia quae quidem inhaerent, licet non signi-
ficent ea per modum inhaerentium.

essent autem significata per huiusmodi nomina

non entia, si non inessent in re.

LB7LC-1N.11

et quia ista in abstracto significata videntur non

entia, magis videntur entia nomina accidentium
concreta.

magis autem videtur aliquid entium esse vadens

et sedens et sanans quia determinatur eis aliquod
subiectum per ipsam nominis significationem,
inquantum significantur in concretione ad
subiectum. hoc autem subiectum est substantia.

et ideo unumquodque talium nominum, quae

significant accidens in concreto, apparet in tali
categoria, idest videtur importare praedica-
mentum substantiae; non ita quod praedica-
mentum substantiae sit pars significationis
talium nominum (album enim, ut in praedica-
mentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat);

sed inquantum huiusmodi nomina significant

accidentia ut inhaerentia substantiae. bonum
autem aut sedens non dicitur sine hoc, idest sine
substantia.

significat enim accidens concretum substantiae.

LB7LC-1N.12

et quia accidentia non videntur entia prout

secundum se significantur, sed solum prout
significantur in concretione ad substantiam,
palam est quod singula aliorum entium sunt
entia propter substantiam.

et ex hoc ulterius apparet, quod substantia est

primum ens, et ens simpliciter, et non ens
secundum aliquid, idest secundum quid, sicut
est in accidentibus.

98
esse enim album non est simpliciter esse, sed
secundum quid. quod ex hoc patet, quia cum
incipit esse albus, non dicimus quod incipiat
esse simpliciter, sed quia incipiat esse albus.

cum enim socrates incipit esse homo, dicitur

simpliciter quod incipit esse.

unde patet quod esse hominem significat esse

simpliciter.

esse autem album significat esse secundum

quid.

Cf. Anon., De Natura Generis, cp. 10 (tr. B.A.M.):

CP10T

in quo ostenditur ratio novem generum acci- In which the ratio of the nine genera of acci-
dentis. dents is shown.

CP10-

nunc superest de novem generibus accidentium Now the nine genera of accidents are to be
tractare. treated.

sciendum est igitur quod in accidentibus in
rerum natura non est aliquid correspondens
operationi intellectus, eo modo quo possint
rationem generis et differentiarum recipere,
sicut est in substantia.
It must be understood that in accidents there is
not something in the nature of things corres-
ponding to the activity of the understanding in
the way in which the ratio of genus and of dif-
ferences are able to admit, as is the case in sub-
stance.

essentia enim accidentis designata in abstracto
non videtur ens aliquod significare, cum ab-
stractum significet ut per se existens, accidens
autem per se esse non potest: unde accidens in
abstracto non videtur ens aliquod significare.
For the essence of an accident designated in the
abstract does not appear to signify some being,
since what is abstract signifies as existing per
se, but an accident cannot exist per se: and so an
accident in the abstract does not appear to
signify some being.

sed significatio quae importatur in nominibus
non pertinet ad naturas rerum nisi mediante con-
ceptione intellectus, cum voces sint notae passi-
onum quae sunt in anima, ut dicitur in libro
perihermenias.
But the signification which is implied in names
does not pertain to the natures of things except
by the mediating of the conception of the under-
standing, since vocal sounds are indications of
the passions which are in the soul, as is said in
the book Peri Hermeneias.

intellectus autem potest seorsum intelligere ea Now the understanding can understand apart
quae sunt coniuncta. those things which are joined.

illud autem quod seorsum accipitur, videtur ut But that which is taken apart is seen as existing
per se existens, per se,

99
et ideo designatur nomine abstracto, quod and so it is designated by an abstract name,
significat remotionem eius ab alio. which signifies its removal from another thing.

sed nomina abstracta non important res per se But abstract names do not imply things existing
existentes in genere substantiae: ut humanitas per se in the genus of substance, as the name
nomen abstractum est, non tamen per se existit. ‘humanity’ is abstract, yet it does not exist per
se.

sic ergo per actionem intellectus nomina ab- Thus, then, by the action of the understanding,
stracta accidentium significant entia, quae abstract names of accidents signify beings
quidem inhaerent, which, in fact, do inhere,

licet non significent ea per modum inhaer- although they do not signify them in the manner
entium. of inherence.

unde per actionem intellectus efficiuntur nomina And so by the action of the understanding
quasi res quaedam, quibus idem intellectus pos- names are fashioned as certain things to which
tea attribuit intentiones generum et specierum. the same understanding afterwards attributes the
intentions of genus and species.

in substantiis vero in natura rerum fuit super But in substances in the nature of things it was
quod intellectus fundaret intentiones univer- the case that the understanding founded univer-
sales. sal intentions on them.

cum autem accidens non sit compositum ex Now since an accident is not composed of
materia et forma, non potest genus et differentia matter and form, a genus and difference cannot
sumi in eo, sicut sumitur in substantia genus a be taken in it, as in substance the genus is taken
materia, differentia a forma; from the matter, the difference from the form;

sed in unoquoque accidentium genus debet sumi but in each genus of accident the genus ought to
ab eo quod prius in eo reperitur, differentia vero be taken from that which is found in it before
ab eo quod postea accidit. [i.e. first], but the difference from that which
happens to it afterward.
primum autem quod invenitur in quolibet acci- But the first thing found in any accident is a
dente est specialis modus entis includens diver- particular mode of being including a certain
sitatem quamdam ad alios eius modos: diversity from the other modes of being be-
longing to it:

sicut in quantitate est specialis modus entis per just as in quantity there is a particular mode of
aliud, scilicet quod sit mensura substantiae; being through another, namely, that it be the
measure of substance;

et in qualitate, quod sit dispositio eius; and in quality, that it be its disposition;

et sic de singulis. and so on in the individual cases.

quod autem in genere diversitas quaedam accipi But that in a genus a certain diversity can be
possit, manifestum est. taken is obvious.

nam licet res unius generis non differant ab For although things belonging to one genus do
invicem propter suum genus, sed potius not differ from one another by reason of their
conveniant; genus, but rather [in this] they agree—

100
res tamen diversorum generum suis generibus
diversificantur, sicut, licet rationale differat ab
irrationali, quae tamen conveniunt in animali,
homo tamen differt a non animali per animal.
still, things belonging to diverse genera are di-
versified by their genera just as, although
‘rational’ differs from ‘irrational’, which never-
theless agree in ‘animal’, still ‘man’ differs
from ‘not animal’ by ‘animal’.

et ideo in generibus accidentium invenitur And so in the genera of accidents there is found
diversitas alia ab illa quae est per differentias another diversity from that by which there are
generis inter res eiusdem generis. differences of genus between things of the same
genus.

differentia vero debet sumi in eis per aliquid But in them the difference ought to be taken
quod in illo modo a quo genus accidentis accep- through something implicitly contained in that
tum est, implicite continetur. mode from which the genus of accident is taken.

hoc autem invenitur in diversitate principiorum But this is found in a diversity of principles
ex quibus causantur: sicut, verbi gratia, ratio from which they are caused, just as, to take an
mensurae reperitur in quantitate, example, the ratio of a measure is found in
quantity,

et hoc est commune omni speciei quantitatis, et and this is common to every species of quantity,
ab hoc est acceptum nomen generis. and from this the name* of the genus is taken.

sed constat quod successiva sunt diversa prin- But it is undeniable that successive things are
cipia in natura sua a permanentibus; et ideo principles diverse in their nature from perma-
naturaliter diversas habent mensuras. nent ones, and so they naturally have diverse
measures.

et inde est quod, cum definiuntur accidentia in
abstracto, subiectum ponitur in eorum defi-
nitione oblique, et secundo loco;
et hoc est proprium differentiae, ut cum dicitur
simitas est curvitas nasi, per quod differt simitas
a curvitate quae est in ligno.
And from this it follows that, since accidents are
defined in the abstract, the subject is put in their
definition indirectly, and in the second place.
And this is proper to a difference, as when it is
said ‘snubness is a curvedness of the nose’, by
which snubness differs from the curvedness
which is in wood.

accidentia autem in concreto dicta non sunt in But accidents in the concrete are not in a genus
genere nisi per reductionem, ut album vel musi- except by reduction, like ‘white’ and ‘musical’
cum et huiusmodi. and the like.

aliquando autem propria principia accidentis But sometimes the proper principles of acci-
quae sunt in loco differentiae, latent: et tunc dents which are in the place of differences, are
loco illorum ponimus eorum effectus. hidden: and then in their place we put their
effects.

sicut lucis effectus est disgregare cum intensa Just as the effect of light is ‘to pierce’ when it
fuerit: quae est principium albedinis: will have been intense, which is the principle of
whiteness.

ideo aliquando ponimus disgregativum in eius Therefore, we sometimes put ‘able to pierce’ in
definitione, sicut dicimus quod albedo est color its definition, just as we say that ‘whiteness is a
disgregativus visus. color able to pierce the sight’.

101
disgregativum enim non est differentia absoluta
in eodem genere cum colore, sicut est rationale
cum animali, sed est differentia sumpta a subi-
ecto coloris exprimens excessum quemdam in
receptione lucis.
For ‘able to pierce’ is not an absolute difference
in the same genus as color, as ‘rational’ is with
‘animal’, but it is a difference taken from the
subject of color expressing a certain excess in
the reception of light.

unde accidentia definitionem non habent per res And so accidents do not have a definition
proprii generis, cum non dicant quid simpliciter, through things of their own genus, since they do
sicut dicit substantia. not express a ‘what’ simply, as does substance.

cum enim quaeritur quid est albedo, respon- For when it is asked, ‘what is whiteness’, it is
detur: color; est enim color quid albedinis, sicut replied, ‘color’; for ‘color’ is the ‘what’ of
animal hominis. whiteness, just as ‘animal’ of man.

sed animal quod dicit quid hominis, dicit sub- But ‘animal’, which expresses the ‘what’ of
stantiam simpliciter. man, expresses the substance simply.

et ideo color qui dicit quid albedinis, magis dicit
substantiale, quam substantiam, quia sub-
stantiale dicitur quod modum substantiae induit
etsi substantia non sit.
And therefore ‘color’, which expresses the
‘what’ of whiteness, expresses the substantial
rather than substance, because that is called
‘substantial’ which puts on the mode of sub-
stance, even if it is not substance.

inter omnia autem accidentia quantitas est But among all the accidents quantity is nearer to
propinquior substantiae. substance.

et hoc manifestum est: quia sicut subiectum And this is obvious because, just as the subject
quantitatis est divisibile per se, in partes scilicet of quantity is divisible per se, namely, into es-
essentiales, ita quantitas habet propriam divisi- sential parts, so quantity has a proper division,
onem, per partes scilicet quantitatis. namely, into the parts of quantity.

et ideo si quantitas esset separata a substantia, And so if quantity were separated from sub-
non oporteret quod esset una tantum, quia potest stance, it would not necessarily be only one
dividi propria divisione in multa. thing, because it can be divided by a proper di-
vision into many.

albedo vero si esset separata, necessario foret But whiteness, if it were separated, would per-
tantum una, cum non haberet in natura sua unde haps be only one thing since it would not have
dividatur, sed a natura quantitatis. in its own nature that whereby it is divided, but
[it would have this] from the nature of quantity.

* Nomen is an obvious slip for ratio. The text should read, ‘from this the ratio of the
genus is taken’.

18. To signify a relation as subsistent is to signify it in the manner of a substance.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 29, art. 4, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

QU29 AR4 CO

persona igitur divina significat relationem ut Therefore ‘divine Person’ signifies a relation as
subsistentem. subsistent.

102
et hoc est significare relationem per modum And this is to signify a relation in the manner of
substantiae quae est hypostasis subsistens in a substance, which is the hypostasis subsisting
natura divina; in the divine nature,

licet subsistens in natura divina non sit aliud although the thing subsisting in the divine
quam natura divina. nature is nothing other than the divine nature.

19. On the signification of ‘subsistent’.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

QU29 AR2 CO

secundum enim quod per se existit et non in For insofar as it exists per se and not in another,
alio, vocatur subsistentia, it is called ‘subsistent’,

illa enim subsistere dicimus, quae non in alio, for we say that subsists which does not exist in
sed in se existunt. another, but in itself.

N.B. To subsist is to exist per se or in se and not in another.

(c) 2013; 2024 Bart A. Mazzetti

N.B. See also Part I of this paper.

103