CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1)Sources and Nature of the Constitutiona.Constitutional Act 1867 i.

British North American Act 1867(changed in 82 to Constitutional Act 1867)ii.No amending clause in this actiii.No mention or system of responsible government ( the prime minster, the cabinet) b. Constitutional Act 1982 (enacted through 1982 Canada Act)i.domestic amending formula was adopted ii. authority over Canada of the UK Parliament was terminated 1. Canada Act 1982 -a short statue of the UK Parliament which terminated the authority over Canada.iii.Part 7 General 1. The Supremacy Clause is 52(1)This makes it the supreme law of the country. 2. The Entrenchment clause- 52(3)This entrenched the Constitutions Act 1982 and makes it only amendable by the proscribed procedure. c. Constitution of Canada includes defined for first time in 1982 Const Act (s52): 1. The Canada Act 1982, including this Act (includes the Constitution Act 1982 Schedule B) 2. the Acts and orders referred to in the schedule - list of 30 Acts and orders (includes The Constitution Act 1867, itsamendments, the orders in council and statues admitting or creating new provinces and boundaries, and the statue of Westminster. (a) Statute of Westminister conferred on Canada power to repeal or amend imperial statutes applying to Canada, but BNA Act excluded at Canadas insistence (so Const wd be more difficult to amend)3.any amendments to any Act or order referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) 4. Includes in s 52(2) indicates that the word is not exhaustive. (a)

Other unwritten principles underlie text of Const Act (i) Secession Reference [1998] - 4 unwritten principles of Const - democracy, federalism, constitutionalism,protection of minorities . B/c of democracy, federalism - fed govt and other provinces would be under dutyto enter negotiations1.Reference by the federal government to the Supreme Court of Canada, in which the Court was askedwhether Quebec could secede unilaterally from Canada. Unilateral secession not possible -- Secessionwould require constl amendmt in accordance with its procedures (but did not specify which one wouldapply). a. SCC also stated: a clear majority on a clear question of law put to referendum in Quebec, wouldconfer legitimacy on demands for secession and give rise to an obligation on all parties toConfederation to negotiate the required constitl changes. SCC also pointed out that the politicalramifications for failure to negotiate in good faith would include the defaulting govts legitimacyin the eyes of the international community would be undermined. ... b.Principle of Effectivity: If seceding govt achieved effective control of a territory and recognition by international commty the secession although unconstitutional would have to be recognizedeventually as a reality by Canadas own Constl Law. 2.Clarity Act ( created after Succession Reference) Hogg 5.7(a) a. Defines clear - s1 if a province proposes a referendum on succession , the HoC is to consider the question and determine whether the question is clear. Whether clear depends on thequestion would result in a clear result in clear expression of the will of the population of a province on whether the province should cease to be part of Canada and become an independentstate. i.Act states question is unclear if mere focus to negotiate or envisages economic /politicalarrangement with Canada that obscures a direct expression of the will of the population of that province b. s2 if q is clear, the Hof C has to determine if the majority is clear.i.The act does not define clear- requires HoC to take into acct size of majority, percentage of eligible voters who voted, and any other matters or circs ii.If HoC finds that no clear majority in favour of secession, then Govt is prohibited by Act fromenterin into negotiations

c. s3 the Act recognizes that under the Constitution of Canada, there is no right to unilateralsuccession, and an amendment would be needed to succeeds from Canada. (ii)Federalism 1. Reference re Secession of Quebec - In interpreting our Constitution, the courts have always beenconcerned with the federalism principle, inherent in the structure of our constitutional arrangements, which has fromthe beginning been the lodestar by which the courts have been guided.a.Described federalism as a means of recognizing regional cultural diversity at the foundingof Canada, particularly w/ respect to the distinct nature of Quebec as predominantly a French-speaking society. Notesexperience of Canada East and Canada West had been bad under the Union Act (1840)new Const structure enabledFrench-speaking Canadians to form numerical majority in Quebec .2.Hodge v. Queen (1883)- national and provincial legislatures were coordinate authorities withequal sovereign status derived from Const. (iii)Democracy (Secession Reference) 1.The democracy principle can best be understood as a sort of baseline against which the framersof our Constitution, and subsequently, our elected representatives under it, have always operated. . . Democracy iscommonly understood as being a political system of majority rule. Democracy encompasses a number of values,including: respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality,accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and politicalinstitutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society. (iv) Parliamentary Privileges - Houses of Parliament and the provincial legislative assemblies posses a setof powers and privileges that are necessary to their capacity to function as legislative bodies 1. New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v Nova Scotia (1993) unwritten doctrine parliamentaryprivilege should be included in the s52(2) definition even though no mention of it. strangers wereexcluded from the Nova Scotia legislative assembly. 2. Also includes freedom of speech in debate, including from legal proceedings for things said in debates.It also includes right of members of parliament or legislative assemblies not to testify in

court proceedings while Parliament or the Legislature is in Session. 3. Does not include all internal affairs of employees of House chauffer of Speaker alleged that hed been constructively discharged on grounds forbidden by Human Rights Act, SCC denied Parliaments position that they were internal affairs of Parliament SCC held didnt fulfill test of necessity 4. Powers authorized by parliamentary privilege are not subject to the Charter Rights. 5.The courts decision means the definition can be expanded. (v)Parliamentary sovereignity 1. Babcock v. Canada [2002] SC rejected challenge to S. 39 of Evidence Act, which allows fed govt towithhold cabinet docs from ct proceedings to which docs are relevanteven though rule of law,sepration of powers and independence of judiciary at stake balanced against principle of parliamentary sovereignity. a.Secession Reference: With the adoption of the Charter, theCanadian system of govt was transformed to a significant extent from a system of Parliamnetary supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy. (vi) Judicial independence 1. Ref re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Prov. Court of PEI (1997) SCC assertedthat there was an unwritten principle of judicial independence in Const that could have the effect of invalidating statutes that reduced judicial comp. but decides case under 11(d)a.even though independence explicitly guaranteed in s.99 of 1867 BNA, Ct held unwritten principle required elaborate procedures be followed to remove a judge and even to set salaries 2 b. Reasoning: Core characteristics of judicial independence include: security of tenure, financialsecurity and administrative independence. Independence necessary to maintain public confidencethat justice will be done in individual cases, and that rule of law will be maintained. relationship between the judiciary and other branches of government must be depoliticized so courts both befree and appear to be free from political interference through economic manipulation by the other branches of government. c. FACTS: A statute decreased provincial court justices salaries b/c of a provincial deficit.Concern that this eroded judicial independence guaranteed under s 11(1)(d) of Charter. Held-Judicial

salaries can be reduced, so long as (1) economic manipulation occurs through anindependent body, combined with a judicial compensation commission (between the judiciary andother branches of government) that would depoliticize the process. (2) No negotiations on judicialremuneration b/w the judiciary and the executive/legislature. (3) Judicial salaries may not fall below a minimum level. Here, didnt happen so breach of section 11(d) of the Charter of Rights.As well as unwritten rule. d.Conventions i. Rules of the constitution that are not enforced by the law courts. although the existence of a convention has occasionally been recognized by the courts 1. Why do people obey them if not law ? The breach of a convention would result in serious political repercussionsand eventual changes in law. 2.Const. Convention UK parliament would not amend BNA Act except at request of Canada 3. Patriation Reference (1981)SCC was asked whether there was a convention requiring that the consent of the provinces be obtained before the federal government requested the United Kingdom to enact an amendment to theConsti of Canada (1982 Const Act and Canada Act). That would affect the provinces. The court was also askedwhether there was a legal requirement for provincial consent. SC found the convention required a substantialdegree of provincial consent but it was not necessary to decide exactly what the requisite degree is. (later heldQuebec approval not necessary- Quebec Veto Reference 1982) 4. Public School Boards Assn v Alta. [2000} & English Catholic Teachers Case v Ont [2001]public schoolsupported argued that provincial educational statues violated a constitutional convention. Held- in both cases that noconvention restricted the policy or substance of what could be enacted by the provincial Legislature in exercise inits power to make laws in relation to education.e.Usage 1. A usage is not a rule, but merely a governmental practice which is ordinarily followed, although it is not requiredas obligatory . ie of Usage- the practice of appointing to the position of Chief Justice of Canada the person who isthe senior puisne judge of the SCC at the time of the vacancy. This practice has been departed with the appointmentof McLachlin in 2000. A

usage may develop into a convention. The process of evolution from usage toconvention may be called a custom. f.Main Conventions1.the governor general only acts on the advice of the Privy Council2.this Privy Council is not the full Council described in s13 of the Constitution Act 1867 but rather a smaller subset,the Cabinet3.the cabinet chosen by the Prime Minister, and the number of ministers is up to him/her 4.the primes minster, although no where mentioned in the Constitution Act 1867, is the head of government5.the prime minster and his/her cabinet must have the support of a majority of members in the house of commons6.the prime minster and his/her cabinet must have seats in the House of Commons or Senate7.House of Commons support for Prime Minsters and cabinets is rallied by means of Political parties and8.A failure to command and support of a majority of members in the House of Commons results in the governmentstepping down and usually the calling of a general election.g.Other Conventions1.The operation of Parliament and the legislatures generally, including political parties and at the national level, therelationship between the elected house of Commons and the appointed Senate2.The operation of the federal and provincial cabinets, minsters and civil services and the relationship among them3.Federalism generally, aside from the formal divisions or powers, including reservation and disallowance of federaland Provincial acts and the role the federally appointed lieutenant governor in provincial matters4.The role of judges and courts in the governmental process and the independence of judges and courts interference 3

by the executive and legislative branches and 2) Amending Procedures Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 headed Procedure for Amending Constitution of Canada.a.5 different amending procedures. i. General amending procedure (s38) for amendments not otherwise provided for (as well as for amendments listed ins42proportionate representation, selection of Senate, SC of Canada, establishment of new provinces). 1. 7/50 Rule

 requires resolutions to be passed by: Senate + HofC + 7 of the 10 Provinces which have in total atleast 50% of the population. 2. Opting out: 38(3) applies to any amendt that derogates from the legislative powers, proprietary rights or any other rights or privileges of the legislature or government of a province (a) Prov can pass resolution of dissent prior to proclamation = amendt will not take effect in that province(i)38(4): resolution of dissent can be revoked at any time, but 46(2): resolution of assent cannot be revokedafter proclamation (b) S40 compensates provs for opting out, for any transfer of Provl legislative powers to Fedl govt (in relation toeducation or cultural matters only).- otherwise wd be powerful incentive not to opt out, b/c opting out wdinvolve bearing substantial expense from which other provincial govts would be freed by amendment (e.g.transferring legis authority over universities from provinces to parliament) ii. Unanimity procedure (s41), required for five defined kinds of amendments, requiring the assents of the federalParliament and all of the provinces s39 time limits do not apply. 1. Office of Queen, representation in parliament-Senate floor entrenches right of least populous provinces to minrepresentation in HoC, use of English or French- subject to S.43, composition of SC, amendment to amending procedures themselves2.But re: SC, the composition of SC is dictated by Supreme Court Act, which is not part of Const, so this is ineffective iii. Some but not all provinces procedure(s43 ), for amendment of provisions and only those provinces affected; 1. used for language usage within a province, altering provl bopundaries. Note: protection of minorities is afforded bythe fact that it also requires resolutions of the Senate and HofC (ie Fedl level approval) as well as the affected provinces. Hogan v Newfdlnd (2000).

iv. The federal Parliament alone (s44) has power to amend provisions relating to the federal executive and House of Parliament ;and 1. covers amendments to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the federal executive, or Senate and the House of Commons- provided that the amendments do not fall within the category of amendments caught by the General andUnanimity Formula. v. Each Provincial Legislature alone (s45) has power to amend the constitution of the province. 1. Laws amending constitution of prov (ie those that bear on the operation of an organ of govt of the province SCC). Note does not include: Constl guarantee of language rights (per SCC in AG Quebec v Blaikie , now explicit ins45). b.Limitations i. Must wait 1 year to proclaim (unless all have consented/dissented) (allows time to consider) 39(1) ii. Expires in 3 years if required consent not achieved 39(2) iii. Regional Veto Statute (not constitutional, 1996) : no amendt can be proposed by Minister of the Crown unless it hasfirst been considered by a majority of the provinces that includes: Ont, Que, BC, 2+ Atlantic Provs rep min 50% pop, 2+Prairie Provs rep min 50% pop. Applies to amendments that: do not allow for opting out, and must otherwise follow thegeneral 7/50 procedure. Does not apply to : s41(unanimity) or s43 (some but not all) amendments. 1.Of course, non-minister can propose resolution, but not likely to pass w/o minister support

c.Attempted Amendments i. French Canadian Nationalism : Meech Lake Accord 1987 to appease Que, but fell short of ratification by 2 provs. ii. Division of Powers : Reducing Fedl and incr Provl power easiest way to address French Candian and Western Canadiangrievances. 1982 amendmts incr provl power over natural resources. On the other hand: Enlargement of certain Fedl 4

powers may facilitate effective national economic policies, Fedl power is lacking or only avail in emergencies withrespect to: foreign ownership, securities regulation, wage and price controls. 3)Federalism and Judicial Review a. Sources: Constitution Act, 1867 , ss.91-95 i. Constitution Act, 1982 , s.52ii.Hogg, chapter 5, Federalism b. Federalism- Unitary vs. Federal state i. Unitary state government power is vested in one national authority - powers given to municipal governments aregranted by a national authority and can be taken away, altered or controlled at any time by the national legislature.(Montreal-to Quebec). ii. Federal- Coordinate power - general and regional govts are each within a sphere coordinate and independent

. 1.Hodge v. Queen (1883)- national and provincial legislatures were coordinate authorities withequal sovereign status derived from Const. 2.Both sections use terminology giving legislative authority in relation to matters coming with classes of subjects. 3. s91federal Parliament(a)To provide collective benefits of economic union and greater financial strength and increase defence. As a resetthe BNA act 1867 gave federal Parliament authority over customs and excise, interprovincial and internationaltrade and commerce, banking and currency, all forms of taxation and national defence. Authority over criminallaw, penitentiaries, marriage and divorce4.s92- - provincial Legislatures.(a)BNA Act 1867 gave provincial legislatures authority over property, common civil rights, common courts, police, municipal bodies, hospitals and education iii.Federalist History 1. BNA 1867 Indications that the framers planned a strong central government. The Act gives the provinces onlyenumerated powers to make laws giving the residue of power to the federal Parliament. (a) s90 allows the federal government to disallow provincial statues (power has not been exercised since 1943)(b)by s58 the federal government was given the power to appoint the Lt Governor of each province (c) by s96 the federal government was given the power to appoint judges of the superior, district and county courtsof each province. by s91(29) and 92(10)(c) the federal parliament was given the power unilaterally to bringlocal works within exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction simply by declaring them to be for the generaladvantage of Canada used for railways and sparingly in recent years. (d) s93 of the Constitution Act 1867- gives the federal power to enact remedial laws to correct provincial incursionson minority educational right- has never been exercised and the practice has become obsolete. 2. Judicial Interpretation (a)

Lord Watson 1880-1899 and Lord Haldane 1911-1928. - both believed strongly in provincial rights andestablished precedents that elevate the provinces to coordinate status with the Dominion. (b) They gave a narrow interpretation to the principle federal powers ( the residual power and the trade andcommerce power and wide interpretation to the provincial powers c.Judicial Review i. Supremacy Clause- s52(1) is the current basis of judicial review in Canada.1.s52 Consti Act 1982-any law contrary to provision of the Constitution of Canada is of no force effect 2. Judicial independence- Elemental constitutional doctrine, closely tied to the separation of powers - ensures that judges, as arbiters of disputes, are at a complete liberty to decide individual cases on their merits withoutinterference (SCC, Mackin v. New Brunswick). Federalism requires an impartial arbiter to settle jurisdictionaldisputes between the federal and provincial orders of government. Remuneration Reference (1997) 5 3. Administrative Law Jurisdictionsupervisory jurisdiction with respect to exercises of executive governmentauthority. Judicial review of exec power is hallmark of s. 96 jurix. (Admin-Crevier)ii.Limitations of judicial review 1. Justiciability: the idea of a sense of lack of fitness of submitting questions to a judicial or quasi judicialdetermination. (a) Operation Dismantle v The Queen(1985) Americans testing cruise missiles in Canada, s.7 challenge-cruise missile increases the risk of nuclear war. Court held it was ok to consider- no doctrine of political questions in Canadianconstitutional law. If what we are being asked to do is to decide whether any particular act of the executive violates the rightsof the citizens, then it is not only appropriate that we answer the question; it is our obligation under the charter to do so, butcausal link between the actions of the Canadian government, and the alleged violation of the appellants rights under theCharter is simply too uncertain, speculative and hypothetical to sustain a cause of action 2.

Enforcement: Cts normally have to rely on the executive and legislative branches of government for theenforcement of their decisions. (a) In Doucet Boudreau v NS, the issue of court usurping executive function arose (where the court orderedthe government of Nova Scotia to use its best efforts to build a French Language school to comply with its dutiesunder the Charter (minority language rights). Periodic reports on its progress was also ordered [How close is this tothe judiciary usurping the role of the executive?] (b) Reference re Language Rights Under s 23 of Manitoba Act, 1870 (SC, 1985): But In 1890 , theManitoba Legislature enacted the Official languages Act which provided English Language only in records and journals of the Legislature and in the pleadings and process in the Manitoba courts. Courts held that ManitobasOfficial Languages Act was unconstitutional 4 times- but legislature didnt respond. Re Manitoba Language Rights(1985) SCC confirmed that the failure to comply with s 23 requirement resulted in the invalidity of the purportedstatue. To conform with rule of law, Court decided on a drastic remedy namely allowing the invalid acts to remainlaw until statutes were translated. The constitution will not suffer a province without laws- avoiding a legal vacuum inManitoba and ensuring the continuity of the rule of lawiii.Steps 1. First function of JR is to enforce the rules of federalism (a) First step identify the matter (pith and substance or characterization) of the challenged law (b) Second step is to assign matter to one of the classes of subjects. 2. Second function of judicial review is to enforce the Charter restrictions and the other non federal restrictions.(a)Charter- one identifies the purpose and effect of an impugned statue infringes charter right.) iv. Presumption of constitutionality - In choosing between competing, plausible characterization of a law, the court shouldnormally

choose one that would support validity. (Only for federalism, not charter cases.) 1. Rational basis - Where the validity of a law requires a finding of fact ( finding of emergency) the finding of factneed not be proved strictly by the government. It is enough that there be a rational basis for the finding. 2.Reading down (a) Where a law is open to both narrow and wide interpretation and under the wide interpretation the lawsapplication would extend beyond powers of the enacting legislative body, the court should read down the lawso as to confine it those applications that are within the power of the enacting legislative body. 6

(b) General language of the statue which is literally extending beyond provincial or legislative power will beconstrued more narrowly so as to keep it within the permissible scope of power .3.Severance (a)Rule- severance is inappropriate when the remaining good part is so inextricably bound up with the partdeclared invalid that what remains cannot independently survive.A-G Alta v A-G Can [1947](i)Hogg: usually one legislative plan of which all parts are interdependent, so presumption against severance (ii) Toronto v York [1938] If two parts can exist independently then it is plausible to regard them as twodifferent laws. (b) Charterseverance is more common in Charter cases. The same test is applied but it is unlikely that the entirestatue is struck down on Charter rights. Only one case where entire statue was struck down- R v Big M DrugMart (1985) 4. Progressive interpretation

- Canada didnt go for originalism(a)Same Sex Marriage reference (2004). The SCC emphasized the living tree quality of the Constitution. (b) Also purposive interpretation e.g. R v Van der Peet (1996): defining aboriginal rights.(c) v.Interjurisdictional Immunity/Reading down(a) Limitation on the power of the provincial legislatures to enact laws that extend into core areas of exclusivefederal jurisdiction- Inapplicable (not inoperative, which is paramountcy)(i)Difficult to distinguish pith and substance (which allows provincial matter to affect federal matter) fromwhen interjuris immunity should apply (and statute read down) (b) Federally-incorporated companiesa valid provincial law may not impair the status or essential powers of afederally incorporated company. John Deere Plow Co v Wharton [1915] (c) Federally regulated undertakingsundertakings engaged in interprovincial or international transportation or communication , which come under federal jurisdiction under the exception to s92(10) are immune fromotherwise valid provincial laws which would have sterilizing the undertakings 1. Vital part test outdatedCommission du Salaire Minimum v. Bell [1966] Bell was interprovincialand was immune from provincial min wage law b/c law affected vital part of mgmt and operation.a.Bell Canada v. Quebec [1988] bound by Quebec law that required protective reassignment of pregnant workers? Even though law requiring reassignment of small no. of workers could notimpair operations of undertaking, regulation of labour relations affect vita part of mgmt andoperation of firm and no concurrent provincial jurix 2. New impairment test: Provincial laws may validly extend to federal subjects unless laws bear uponthe those subjects in what makes them specifically of federal jurisdiction. a. Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 If, the provincial law did not impair core competence of Parliament, or if a vital or essential part of an undertaking would beimpaired the pith and substance doctrine stipulated that the provincial law validity applied to

thefederal subject.i.If albertas insurance act could apply to banks- promotion of insurance by banks was too far removed from core of banking to qualify as a vital part of the banking undertakingii.If provincial law just affected provincial law, no immunity applied pith and substancedoctrine would prevail enabling provincial law to apply to core of federal subject d. Characterization/Matter identify the most important characteristic of the challenged law. 1. What is the dominant feature (the pith and substance) of the law? (a) Bank of Toronto v Lambe (1887)- Privy Council upheld provincial law which imposed a tax on banks.Domonant feature of law was to raise revenue >> it was in relation to taxation (pith and substance) andmerely affected banking. The pith and substance doctrine enables one level of government to enact laws withsubstantial impact on matters outside its jurisdiction. 2. General application ok, Singling out frowned on (but not determinative of pith and substance) (a) Alberta Tax Reference Privy council struck down Albert law which imposed tax solely on baks, concludedthat pith and substance was to discourage operation of banks in Alberta, taxing quality of law incidental. 7 (i) Prohibiting the provincial legislatures from singling out banks or other federal undertakings for specialtreatment. (b) But some cases uphold singling out - even though the laws singled out a person or class of persons withinfederal jurisdiction1. e.g. Bank of Toronto imposed special rate of tax on banks alone (c) And some cases overturn general application 1. if the effect of the provincial law would impair the status or essential powers of a federallyincorporated company, or affect a vital part of the federally regulated enterprise-- will not apply to thefederally-incorporated company or federally regulated enterprise. 3.

Double aspect Doctrine (a)Some laws have both a federal/provincial matter -- laws prescribing rules of conduct on the roads have adouble aspect and therefore competent to both Parliament and a Legislature. (b) A little inconsistent with the stipulation in ss91 ss92 that each list of classes of subjects assigned exclusively(c)Hodge v The Queen (1883) held subjects which in one aspect and for one purpose fall within s92 may inanother aspect fall within ss91. (d) E.g. Provincial driving offenses relation to road conduct (property and civil rights in province-92-13 or residual 92-16) and crim code (Mann v. The Queen 1966-upheld crim code) (i) Provincial Secretary of PEI v Egan (1941)- upheld suspension of drivers license for anyone who wasconvicted under fed crim code of drivin impaired SC held provincial law was in relation to regulation of highway traffic (ii) Boggs v. the Queen (1981)- fed crim law - driving w/suspended state drivers license struck down law b/c cd come from failure to pay provincial taxes (iii) Re BC Motor Vehicle Act [1985] a law that imposes only a penalty of a fine is not a deprivation of liberty. (Larmer left open imprisonment as an alternative to non-payment could be)(iv) 4. Court will look at purpose, but not efficacy (a) R v Big M Drug Mart ( 1985)- if the purpose of the statue had not been religious but rather the secular goal of enforcing a uniform day of rest from labour then the Act would have fallen under provincial rather than federalcompetence.(i)Statute was valid federal exercise of crim powers but struck down under Charter, provincial was power over property and civil rights1.Cf. R. v. Edwards Books (1986) Ontarios Retail Business Holidays ct valid under s.1 (ii) Statute can have a purpose in a preamble. The legislative history is helpful for interpreting specific provision of a staute but has been held inadmissible for characterizing the entire statute. Reports of royalcommissions, law reform commissions, government policy papers and parliamentary debates areadmissible. (b) Effect-

a court will consider the effect of the statute but not dominant consideration, goes more tocolourability (i) Saumur v Quebec ( 1953)- the judges were influenced by the actual use of the by law. Bylaw made offenceto distribute literature w/o written permission of Chief of police, who used bylaw as vehicle of censorship-so ct found it was in relation to speech or religion and incompetent to province. They regarded the facts asto the actual use of the by-law as relevant and admissible on the question of classification. (c) Efficacy - Re Firearms Act [2000]- Parliament is the judge of whether a measure is likely to achieve itsintended purpose; efficaciousness is not relevant to the Courts division of powers analysis. 5. No cheating - colourability doctrine (a) Invoked when a statue bears the formal trappings of a matter within a jurisdiction but in reality is addressed to amatter outside jurisdiction. The colourability doctrine applies the maxim that a legislative body cannot doindirectly what it cannot do directly.(b)Alberta Bank Taxation Reference- although ostensibly designed as a taxation measure, was in reality directed at banking. 8 (c) R. v. Mogentaler (1993)- SC- Nova Soctia statute required designated medical procedures to be performed inhospital, labelled as health measure, but stimulas for statute from legis history was suppressing perceived harmor evil of abortion clinics- so invalid criminal lawse.Classes of Subjects 1. Exclusiveness - each class of subjects are listened in ss91 and ss92 of the Constitution Act 1867. 2. But double aspect sometimes, and pith and substance 3. Residual POGG/Provincial (a)s91 - make laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada relation to all classes

not assigned to provinces(b)But any matter which does not come within any of the specific classes of subjects will be provincial if it ismerely local or private (s92(16))(i)Unimportant because the wide scope property and civil rights in the province has left little in residue inlocal or private matters. (ii) But s92(16)- Is a possible alternative to a92(13) rather than an independent source of power. Jurisdictionover highway traffic is provincial but SCC has not confirmed itself to a head of power, noted s92(16) or s91(13) 4. No ancillary doctrine - but pith and substance doctrine enables a law that is classified as in relation to. (a) The rational connection test allows each enumerated head of power to embrace laws that have some impacton matters entrusted to the other level of government and it provides a flexible standard which gives theenacting body considerable leeway to choose the legislative techniques it deems appropriate which was applied(i)Papp v Papp (Ont CA 1970) upholds custody provisions of federal Divorce Act- asks whether there isrational, functional connection between what is admittedly good and what is challenged(ii)R v Zelensky ( 1978) SC upholds crim code authroizing payment of compensation to victim of crime (b) But for a major encroachment it deserves a stricter test- the impugned provision must be essential to thelegislative scheme igation to contribute to support of a juvenile delinquient(i)General Motors v. City National Leasing (1989)- civil remedy in federal competition statute, rationalconnection test only limited intrusion over power 5. Concurrency3 provisions that confer concernent powers (a) Natural resources - s92A(2) confers on the provincial Legislatures the power to make laws in relation to theexport of natural resources and s92A(3)- is explicit that power is concurrent with trade and commerce power. (b) Pensions s94A confers on the federal Parliament the power to make laws in relation to old age pensions andsupplementary benefits and the sections acknowledges the existence on concurrent provincial power .

(c) Agriculture/immigration - s95- confers power on both the federal Parliament and the provincial legislaturesconcurrent powers over agriculture and immigration.. 4)Paramountcy a. Sources: Hogg, chapter 16, Paramountcy i. Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan , [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188 b. Federal paramountcy where inconsistent federal and provincial laws, fed law prevailsi.Provincial law is to say that it is rendered inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency. c. Levels of inconsistency i. Express Contradiction - Impossibility of dual compliance (express contradiction)1. BC v Lafarge Canada (2007) - where agency wanted to work on a port in Vancouver. Needed consent from federalgovernment and provincial government. Held- until the city refuses permit, dual compliance is not impossiblehere. 2. Multiple Access v. McCutcheon (1982)- same remedy for insider trading (provincial securities, federal corporatelaw)- no conflict- no paramountcy, provincial law good. Duplication is not test of inconsistency. (a) Double Civil liability double civil liability is also a possibility under overlapping or duplicative federal and provincial laws. But in Multiple Access, SC noted that no ct would award damages to a P who has already been 9 fully compensated. (b) Cf. Double Criminal Liability- The existence of overlapping/duplicative penal provisions raise the possibilitythat person may be liable to conviction under both federal law and provincial law

for the same conduct. Nothingto prohibit under paramountcy doctrine, but s. 11(h) of Charter would apply (double jeapordy). ii. Frustration of federal purpose - Canadian courts also accept a second case of inconsistency where a provincial lawwould frustrate a federal law. Where it is possible to comply with both laws but following the provincial law wouldfrustrate the federal one, this is also a case of inconsistency. 1. Law Society of BC v Mangat (2001)- federal immigration act provided that a party could be represented by a non-lawyer in front of refugee board. The BC legal Profession Act stated that non lawyers were prohibited from practicing law (and appearing before federal tribunals/boards) Compliance with the federal law would go tocontrary to Parliaments purpose to in enacting the federal laws)-they wanted to establish and informal, accessible,and speedy process. 2. Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan , [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188(a)Federal Tobacco Act prohibited the promotion of tobacco products, except a person may display at retail, atobacco product(b)Saskatchewan Tobacco Control Act banned the display of tobacco products in any premise in which personsunder the age of 18 years of age were permitted. (c) Court held : the retailer could comply with both laws , either by refusing to admit persons under the age of 18or by not displaying the tobacco products . Any federal frustration - Courts said no- because the general purpose of the Tobacco Act (address health problems) and the specific purpose of the permission to displayremained fulfilled. iii. But not Negative implication (tough to differentiate from frustration of purpose) 1. Covering the field - SCC does not infer an inconsistency between federal and provincial laws based on animputation that federal law covers the field or carries a negative implication forbidding supplementary law in thesame field.

Rio Hotel v NB (1987) 2. But a n express covering the field clause would be effective according to Hogg. Example- s88 of the federal IndianAct provides that provincial laws are inapplicable to Indians to the extent that such laws make a provision for anymatter for which provision is made by or under this Act 5)POGGa.Sources i.Hogg, chapter 17 b. S. 91- Peace, Order, and Good Government - residual power in its relationship with the provincial heads of power. 1.3 ways of POGG power: Gap, National Concern, Emergencyc. Gap Branch 1. Fill the gaps in the scheme of distribution of power. (a) I.e.- incorporation of companies s92(11) gives the provinces the power to incorporate companies with provincial objects). Since there is no equivalent enumerated federal power the courts have held it falls under POGG power because it is residual in nature.(b)Jones v. A-G NB (1974)- SC upheld validity of federal official language act- attempted to guarantee equal fr and English in parliament since federal institutions and agencies are clearly beyond provincial reach they must be within fed reach under pogg d.National concern branch i.Local or provincial legislation could acquire national dimension and come w.i pogg 1. Provincial inability test- One national law which cannot be realistically be satisfied by cooperative provincial action because failure of one province to cooperate would carry with it adverse consequences for the residents of others provinces. 10 ii. R v Crown Zellerbach Canada 1988 federal jurisdiction over marine pollution. 1.distinctiveness (a)an identity which make it distinct from provincial matters and a sufficient consistence to retain the bounds of form. allays concern that national concern branch of pogg will swallow provincial pwers(b)Majority upheld the federal Ocean Dumping Control Act which prohibited dumping at sea on the basis of marine pollution was a matter of national concern- marine pollution did have ascertainable and reasonablelimits, in so far as its impact on provincial

legislation is concerned. LaForest dissented-he felt the power toregulate marine pollution thus intruded too deeply into industrial and municipal activity, resource developmentand other matters in provincial jurisdiction. (c) indivisibilit y clearly distinguishing it from matters of provincial concern 2. the failure of one province to enact effective regulation would have adverse effects of interests exterior to the province(a)the scale of the impact on the provincial jurisdictions is reconcilable with the fundamental distribution of legislative power under the Constitution.iii.Cf. Insurance Reference 1. POGG Power CANNOT - be used to regulate a particular industry merely because the industry is nation-wide andimportant to the national economy. e.Emergency i. Reference re Anti-Inflation Act , [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 1. Federal anti inflation Act was upheld as an emergency measure. Their was a period of double digit inflation andhigh rates of unemployment. Problem was the preamble of the Act itself did not recite reasons for the legislation or assert the existence of an emergency. There was factual material (economic study) which was agreed to by professionals and not serious challenged.(a)Important note about temporary charter of law- the anti-inflation reference the legislation was temporary. No permanent measure has ever been upheld under the emergency power.ii.War Measures Act upheld in Wartime Leashold Regulations Reference (1950)- rent control, even after end of WWIIiii.Will only support temporary measures 6)Criminal Law a. Constitution Act, 1867 , s.91(27)- confers on the federal Parliament power to make criminal laws.1.Division of powers(a)Enforced by provinces under 92(14)(b)Rules of procedure and evicence are federal 91(27) (c) 92(15) gives provinces power to have penal sanctions for any matter coming within their classes(i)E.g. Provincial Secretary of PEI v Egan (1941)- upheld suspension of drivers license

for anyone who wasconvicted under fed crim code of drivin impaired SC held provincial law was in relation to regulation of highway traffic b. Definition- A criminal law must have a valid criminal law purpose backed by a prohibition and a penalty. i. Criminal Purposes - Prevention of harm to other human beings. Protection of the environment, protection to the crueltyof animals, various forms of economic regulation has been upheld criminal law . 1.Not Federal Crim (a) Food standards- Margarine Reference (1951) struck down law banning margarine sale on the basis that the purpose of legislation was an economic one protecting the dairy industry property and civil rights in province (i) If injurious to health then no doubt would be a criminal public purpose and food standards cd be upheld (b) False labelling - Labatt Breweries v A.G. Can (1971) no basis for national food standards (light beer) -cant be justified under crim (no relation to health with light beer), commerce, pogg precludes national regime of 11 compositional standards for food (c) Drivers license - Boggs v. the Queen (1981)- fed crim law - driving w/suspended state drivers license struck down law b/c cd come from failure to pay provincial taxes (d)

Civil remedy MacDonald v. Vaporsection 7e of TM Act prohibited business practices contrary to honestindustrial usage, authroized ct to grant civil relief for breach of this section property and civil rights.(i)Cf. Papp v. Papp pith and substance is divorce, custody (under provincial jurix) is incidental. 1. whether there is rational, functional connection between what is admittedly good and what ischallenged. (not criminal issue)(ii)Cf. R. v. Zelensky (1978)- crim code authroized ct to order accused to pay victim compensation enforced by victim as civil judgment (e) Competition ActSince economic competition is important and its difficult for provinces to regulate anticompetitive practices it has been agreed it has to be federal to be effective under trade/commerce power , (civilremedies allowed to private parties could not be supported under crim power)- - jurix of Competition Tribunal(w/remedies of blocking mergers, requiring divestitute, other civil stuff) not supported by crim, most of act notsupported under crim, 2.Fed Crim(a)Illicit drugs (i) R. v. Malmo Levinenon medical use of drugs such as marihuana, cocaine and heroin is proscribed-upheld as a criminal law, even though no harm to others, harm can be moral. (ii) Cf. Schineider v The Queen (1982)-the SCC upheld the BC Heroin Treatment Actcompressiveapprehension , assessment and treatment of drugs addicts. was provincial s92(16). Not criminal becausedetention was not for punishment. (b) TobaccoRJR-MacDonald v Canada ( 1995)- the SCC held the power to prohibit the use of tobacco on accountof its harmful effects on health also encompassed the power to take the lesser step of prohibiting the advertisingof tobacco products even though legal, within crim power. Protection of public from dangerous product. (c) Environmental protection R v Hydro-Quebec (1997)-SCC agreed that the protection of the environment wasa public purpose that would support a federal law under the criminal law power and the EnvironmentalProtection Act was covered. (d)

Abortion The CCC used to prohibit abortions. In Morgentaler v The Queen- the validity of the prohibitionwas challenged on the basis that the safety of modern techniques of abortion made prohibition inappropriate asa protection for the health of the pregnant women. therefore prohibition was not authorized by the criminal law power but crim power ok to protect state interest in fetus (e) ReligionIn R v Big M Drug Mart (1985)- the SCC confirmed that the Lords Day act was a valid exercise of the criminal law power, because it pursued the religious purpose of preserving the sanctity of the ChristianSabbith because it was intended to safe guard morality (this was kiss of death under Charter). (f) Gun Control In 1995, the federal parliament amended the CC provisions by enacting the Firearms Act which expanded the existing rules by requiring all guns to be registered and all gun owners to be licensed. (i) Alberta appealed this act and the SCC held that this was a valid exercise of criminal law power. The purpose was to restrict access to inherently dangerous things. History had revealed violent crimes, domesticviolence, suicides, and accidents. The court held it was not merely regulatory because if provisions wereenforced by the criminal law means of a prohibition and penalty, because the Act prohibited possession of agun without a license and a registration certificate, imposed penalties for breach of the prohibition.1.Guns were property but incidental to main purpose of public safety 7)Trade and Commerce a. s92(13) Provincial power over property and civil rights in the province 1. Parsons Case- it has been accepted that intra-provincial trade and commerce is a matter within provincial power,under property and civil rights in the province (s92(13) b.

s91(2) Federal Power over trade over regulation of trade and Commerce1.Federal trade and commerce power is confined to 1) interprovincial trade or international trade and 2) commerce andgeneral commerce in 91(2)(a)There is a strong argument that whenever a market for a product is national (or international) in size as opposedto local, there is a strong argument that effective regulation of the market can only be national but - Canadiandecisions have not gone that far yet like the US. 12

2.R. v. Klassen (1959)- Wheat Board Act provided for compulsory purchase by Canadian Wheat Bd of all graindestined for mkts outside province of production, applied to purely local work (feed mill which processed locally- produced wheat) thus applied to wholly inerprovincial transaction where main object was to regulateinterprovincial trade 3. Egg market in Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act (1978)- federal marketing was upheld, provinces pt of effort(a)Provincial statute also upheld, Ct divided fed to inter, province to intra 4. Chicken market in Federation des producteurs v Pelleand (2005) the court upheld a federally imposed quota oneach of the provinces without the regard for the destination of the product. 5. Cf. Beer labelling. Labatt Breweries v AG Can(1979)- another case where the federal trade and commerce power was rejected as a support for federal legislation. 6. Cf. Dominion c.General Trade and Commerce i. Until General Motors- the general category of trade and commerce had been rather consistently rejected as a support for federal policies of economic regulation. ii. General Motors v. National City Leasing-

Investigation Act ( now the Competition Act) was a valid exercise of thegeneral trade and commerce power no longer crim b/c remedies for act were decriminalized. Allowed regulation of intra-provincial trade.1.the presence of a regulatory scheme2.the oversight of a regulatory agency and3.a concern with trade as a whole rather than with a particular industry.4. the legislation should be of a nature the provinces jointly or severally would be constitutionally incapable of enacting5. the failure to include one or more provinces or localities in a legislative scheme would jeopardize the successfuloperation of the scheme in other parts of the competition. 8)Property and Civil Rights a.Sources:i.Hogg, chapter 21, Property and Civil Rights ii. BNA- s92(13)- confers power on the Provincial Legislature to make laws in regards to property and civil rights in the province 1. Civil Rightsin s92(13) is used in an older stricter sense- contractual or tortuous rights 2. But trade and comm. (s91(2)), banking (s91(15), bills of exchange and promissory notes (91(18), interest s91(19), bankruptcy and insolvency s91(21), patents and invention and discovery (s91(22), copyrights s91(23) and marriageand divorce s91(28)- POGG power in s91 can also deal with matters of property and civil rights b.Insurance 1. Provincial Power-19 th century both level of governments started to regulated insurance . a provincial statue is what brought the first case to court. Citizens Insurance Co v Parsons ( 1881 ) the Privy Council helped an Ontariostatue requiring certain conditions be included into every policy of fire insurance entered in ONT. They heldregulation of the terms of contracts came under property and civil rights in the province s91(13) and did not comewithin trade and commerce s91(2). several attempts by the federal government to regain jurisdiction had failed. 2. Federal Power continues to regulate a substantial part of the insurance industry under statues covering British andforeign companies, federally-incorporated companies and on a voluntary basis, provinciallyincorporatedcompanies. There has no constitutional attack since 1942.

The federal statues that include preambles indicating the powers trade and commerce and aliens and insolvency are relied upon. All the litigation between 1916-1942- thefederal power over insolvency (s91(21) was never considered as a possible jurisdiction . c.Labour Relations 1. Provincial powersthe regulation of labour relations over most of the economy is within provincial competenceunder property and civil rights in the province. Unemployment Insurance Reference 1937 2. Federal there is still a substantial federal presence in this field.(a)Bell Canada v. Quebec provincial health law re no monitors for pregnant employees interefered with federally 13 regulated industry= immunity d.Marketing 1. Federal Power - federal regulation in grain and oil has been upheld. It is because these goods traveled from provinceto province or export could be regulated. 2. Provincial Power -contracts of sale and purchase are prima facie matters within property and civil rights (s92(13) (a) Const. Act 1982 s50 added a new s92A enlarging provincial powers over natural resources. these apply to non-renewable natural resources and forestry resources. it has no application to eggs or other agriculture products.(b)But provincial intra regulation ok, even if some effects outside province (Carnation v. Quqbec Agr Mktg. Bd1968) e. Securities Regulation 21.10 1. Provincial powerthis a matter within the property and civil rights of the province. (there are exceptions federallyincorporated company can be regulated by both provincial and federal.) The question is in each case, whether a thedegree of provincial control amounts to a denial of an essential attribute of corporate status. (e.g. raise capital) 2.

Federal Powerregulation of securities by federally-incorporated companies and authorizes some degree of regulation of trading those securities. Criminal law can punish deceptive practices. The federal power would not aregulatory regime in licensing of brokers and discretionary powers in administrative agencies. (corporations act) f. Foreign ownershipMorgan v AG PEI a province can control ownership of land. A statue in PEI stated that no person whois not a resident of the province could acquire holding of real property of more than a specified size except with the permission of provincial cabinet. If it was aliens instead of non-residents it may have been federal jurisdiction becausenaturalization and aliens s91(25). 9)Charter of Rights and Freedomsa.Commencement of Charter i.Any laws enacted before April 17 1982 will have no force or effect ii.Exceptions 1. s13 incriminating evidence that the witness may have given in earlier proceedings. The right may be invoked evenif the earlier proceedings took place before April 17 1982. 2. another example Brenner v Canada ( 1997)- He was born in 1962 that was refused citizenship in 1987 differentstds for child born of Canadian man vs woman. He challenged immigration laws and won b/c statuts createdcondition that continued after 4/17/82. b.Dialogue with the Legislative Branch i. R. v. OConnor statutory regime for disclosure to accused of confidential records in sexual assault cases, courts had to balance between the accusers right under s 7 to make full answer and defense and the complainants right under s8 rightto privacy and under s 15 equality. After OConnor, Parliament enacted new laws which were upheld w.o resort to s.1.The court described this process as a notable example of the dialogue between the judicial and legislative branches ii. Canada v. JTI-Macdonald (2007)- ban on tobacco advertising struck down as breach of freedom of expression too severeunder s.11.ct says the fact that its parliaments response to earlier decision does not militate for or against deference2.Parliament changed law so that informational advertising ok, shouldnt be banned - lifestyle advertising and ads tokids should be specifically targeted. Ct upholds under s.1. c.Interpretation of the Charter

i. Progressive Interpretation Since a constitution is difficult to amend and its language is broad to accommodate a widerange of facts. It calls for a flexible interpretation. Edwards v A.G. (1930) a living tree capable of growth and expansionwithin its natural limits. Not originalism. ii. Generous Interpretation suitable to guarantee rights iii. Purposive Interpretation this involves an attempt to ascertain the purpose of each Charter right and then to interpretthe right so as to include activity that comes within the purpose and exclude activity that does not. (This usually comeswith the generous approach) 14

1. e. g. R v Van der Peet (1996): defining aboriginal rights. iv. Process as purposethe Charter guarantees the integrity of the political process itself by enhancing the opportunitiesfor public debate and collective deliberation. This approach has two advantages. The first advantage is that it supplies ahelpful context for interpreting particular guaratantes. The second advantage of the process-based theory of judicialreview is that it offers a solution to the problem of the legitimacy of judicial review.1.e.g. free speech is essential to democratic govt 10) Rights a.Hierarchy of Rightsi.Conflict between rights 1. s25- aboriginal and treaty rights-recognizes the possibility of conflict and provides that the aboriginal and treatyrights are to prevail against guarantee of equality of races 2. 93 (denominational school rights)- s29 recognizes the possibility of conflict and provides that

denominational schoolrights are to prevail. (e.g. BNA 93 vs Charter 15- discrimination on the ground of religion))3.R. v. Keegstra (1990)- hate propaganda offence of criminal code- upheld under s.1, courts didnt buy argument thatcode provision furthered values of racial equality in s.15 b. Who can use? i. Everyone in Canada including illegal immigrant in s.71.Singh v Minsters of Employment and Immigration (1985) held that anyone who entered the country, however Illegally, was instantly entitled to assert s7 rights which apply to everyone.2.Deportation and possible torture would usually be a breach of the Charter Suresh v Canada ( 2002)3.Exterritoriality (a) R v Cook ( 1998)- American citizen arrested in America for Canadian murder. Argued statement given in US toCandian police was illegal due in violation to right of counsel. Ct said breach of Charter. (b) R v. Hape no breach for search and seizure. Two tests under s.32 of Charter, only applicable to Canadianstate actors, but not those acting abroad b/c principle of sovereignty will mean that Charter doesnt apply.Second question is under s. 7 whether admitting evidence obtained through foreign investigation makes it unfair ok here b/c wd not make trial unfair. (c) Canada v Khadr ( 2008)- Hape reasoning did not apply to this case. Breach of duty of 24(1) of charter to provide to disclosure to Kahdr of interviews with Canadian intelligence. Hape distinguished b/c Canada participated in Guatanamo process and breached Genea conventioncharter kicked in.ii.Not available to Corporations1.s2(a) Freedom of conscious and religion in does not apply to corporation, because a corporation cannot holdreligious belief or any other belief.2.s7 does not apply because it is limited to deprivations of life, liberty and security of person which are attributes of individuals, not corporations.3.s9-The right to not be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned4.s10 arrest and detention5.s11 (e) the right to reasonable bail because a corporation cannot be detained, imprisoned or arrested.6.s13 The right to self incrimination7.s14 the right of a witness to an interpreter iii.But corps have standing to invoke a right of others under s.241.freedom of religion for Sunday selling c. Who is bound? Not private actors except indirectly. i.S32 requires that there must be action by a Canadian legislative body or govt for the Charter to apply. ii. S32Parliament and Legislature make it clear the Charter operates on these powers and any statue

enacted by either Parliament or a Legislature which is inconsistent with the Charter will be outside the power of ( ultra vires) the enacting body and will be invalid. 1. anybody exercising statutory authority GG, ministers, officials, municipalities, administrative tribunals, and policeofficers are all bound by the Charter. ( NOTE- action taken must be within the scope of that authority) flows down 15

chain of statutory authority2.involves a power of compulsion that is not possessed by a private individual or organization.3.Cf. Schreiber v Canada (1998) A letter sent by RCMP to get information about Swiss Bank accounts againstcriminal in Canada. The criminal argued the letter was a breach of the Charter. Held- the letter had no legal affectand was not subject to the Charter. iii. Citizens Arrest - A private person making a citizens arrest under statutory authority is subject to the Charter. R v Lerke( 1986) iv. Insurance terms stipulated by law- The Charter was applicable to an automobile insurance policy that excluded commonlaw spouses from spousal accident benefits-although both the insurer and the insured were private parties, the terms werestipulated by state. Miron v Trudel [1995] v. Failure to protect Vriend v. Alberta (1998)- dismissal from employment, P sues under s.15, Charter violation for failure to protect gays vi.Labour 1.Bhindi- a closed shop where employer agrees to hire on union workers. Court held that the collective agreementwas a private contract to which the Charter did not apply.2.Lavigne- SCC held the Charter did apply because the employer was an agent for the province which made thecollective agreement a governmental act. If employer had not been a part of the government then the collectiveagreement would be a private contract and the Charter would not have applied. vii. Not applicable to hospital Stoffman v. Vancouver (1990)- charter didnt apply to hospital created by statute sinceno

compulsion1.vs. Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (a) Charter was applicable despite the absence of any power of compulsion. Issue- Is a hospital bound by aCharter? The hospital did not provide sign language interpretation for deaf people seeking medical services,(breach of s15 equality guarantee) The Hospital Services Act funded the hospitals services program so it wasimplementing a specific government policy and program this contrasted (Stoffman) held the Charter did notapply to hospitals and their day-today operations.[Hogg says BS distinction] viii. Courts - R v Rahey ( 1987) The SCC had to determine whether a criminal court had denied to a defendant the s11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time. ix. Not Common Law or private actors vs. US, where NYS v. Sullivan found 1A limited defamation c/a1.RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery [1986] Where a civil obligation is created by the common law (law of contract) therewill be no Charter remedy because the Charter does not apply to private parties. x. The Charter can have an indirect impact on private action. - In all Canadian jurisdiction Human Rights Codes have been enacted that prohibit private acts of discrimination. 1. Blainey v Ontario Hockey Association (1986)Facts- Human Rights Codes themselves are subject to the Charter of Rights. Girl who was excluded from Hockey team challenged a provision of the Ont. Human Rights Code- that permitted single sex sports teams. Usually prohibited discrimination by sex but allowed single sex teams. TheOntario Court of Appeal held that it was a breach of s15 because it denied to the plaintiff the benefit of the HumanRights Code by reason of her sex. The effect of nullifying the exception which gave the plaintiff a remedy under theHuman Rights Code. The Charter did not apply to the hockey association but did apply the Human Rights Code. 2. McKinney v University of Guelph (1990)- The Charter can have an indirect impact on private action . A professor did not want to retire at the mandatory age of 65 so he challenged the law. The university was a private body so the Charter did not apply. Ontario human rights code permitted the mandatory requirement so he argued theCode was a breach of s15

age discrimination. SCC held - that it was a breach of s15 but went on to state that it was justified under s1.11)Rights Override s33 a.common rights ( subject to override) s 2, s 7, s8, s9, s10, s11, s12, s13, s14 b.privileged rights ( not subject to override) s3, s4, s5, s6, s 16, s 17, s18, s19, s20, s21, s22, s23, s28 c.Role of section 33 i. s 33 is an override power which enables the Parliament or a Legislature to enact a law that will override the guarantees in 16 s 2, and s7 to 15 of the Charter. All that is necessary is the enactment of a law contacting an express declaration that thelaw is to operate notwithstanding the relevant provision of the Charter.1.The override provision extends to s2 (expression), s7 to 14( legal rights) and s 15(equality). 2. It does not extend to s3-5(democratic rights), s6 (mobility rights) s16 to 23 ( language rights) or s 28(sexualequality). No override is possible with these provisions. ii. Needs express declaration that it is to operate notwithstanding a provision included in s2 or s7-s15-- s33(2)1.It also must be specific as to the statue and must be specific as to the Charter right which is to be overridden. iii. Sunset clause which will automatically expire within 5 years. 33(4) permits the express declaration to be reenacted. Thesunset clause makes Parliament/Legislatures to re think the laws.d.Examples i. Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General) , [1988] law banning english language reviewed. SC allows quebec to omnibusnotwithstanding amending all statutes, even though doesnt specify which specific charter rights violated, specificstatutes no mentioned, but no good retroactively (before qubec

law passed). In any event, law expired after 5 yrsii.Outside Quebec, the power has been used 3 times e.g. Alberta law that marriage couldnt be same-sex 12) Judicial Review of Charter Challenges a.2 stage process i. First stage: Determine whether the challenged law derogates from a Charter right. 1.Characterization of the challenged law (a) A law will offend the Charter of Rights if either its purpose or its effect is to abridge a Charter right.(i)Vs. pith and substance inquiry is just purpose(ii)R v Big M Drug Mart [1985] It is very rare that legislative bodies enact laws that have the purpose of abridging a Charter right. ( Lord Day Act)(iii)R. v. Edwards Book and Art [1986]- purpose was secular purpose to establish uniform pause day for retailworks. Passd purpose test, effects testimposed burden on Sabbatarian retailers(b)Can be servered or read down 2. Understand Meaning of the asserted right. ii. Second stage: Justified under s. 1 (S-1 Charter guarantees rights and freedomsonly to such reasonable limits prescribe by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.) (Oakes test below)1.Proof in s1 analysis(a)The burden is on the person alleging a breach of the charter. If established, then the burden shifts to thegovernment rep. who is supporting the law. R v Oakes (1986) The government must persuaded the court the lawis a reasonable limit in a free and democratic society.(b)The standard is proof by a preponderance of probability. b.S.1 Prescribed by law Std. i.Makes it clear that if the act that is not legally authorized it can never be justified under s1.ii.Court decisions usually show the 1. the law is accessible & 2. the law is precise. 1. This incorporates two crucial values of the rule of law. 1) The law must be adequately accessible to the public and 2)law must be formulated with precision to enable people to regulate their conduct by it and guidance to those whoapply it. (not void for vagueness) 2. accessible

- statues, rule of common law, regulations will qualify. Irwin Toy v Que [1989] (a) not accessible- directives, guidelines issued by government departments or agencies. Committee for Cth of Can.v Can [1991] (airport internal directives) 3. precision prescribed by law (a) Irwin Toy v Que [1989] 3 factors shd be taken into acct when determining whether ad was directed a personsunder 13 yrs, challeneged as void, but ct held it was not practicable to seek absolute precision in a statute (b) Would fail prescribed-by law test only where there is no intelligible standard and where the legislature has been given a plenary discretion to do whatever seems best in a wide set of circumstances. Irwin Toy v Que[1989] 17

(c)Court held prohibitions passed as an intelligible standard ( prescribed by law test/precision) on a limit onfreedom of expression:(i)a prohibition on communicating for the purpose of prostitution Re: s193 and 195.1 CC [1990](ii)a prohibition on communicating hatred or contempt towards minorities Can. v Taylor [1990](iii)a prohibition on political campaigning by civil servants Osborne v Can [1991] (iv) a prohibition on the sale of obscene materials, Butler test R v Butler [1992](v)a prohibition on tobacco advertising that was likely to create and erroneous impression of the healthhazards of tobacco Can v JTI-MacDonald Corp [2007] iii. Also discretionary exercise of authority will usu. satisfy prescribed by law requirement1.Statue that expressly or by necessary implication authorized a decision that would infringe a Charter right. (OntarioFilm and Video) (a) Will satisfy the

prescribed by law requirement if the discretion is constrained by legal standards. Re OntarioFilm and Video Appreciation Society struck down statute b/c censor was given unfettered discretion and statutedid not stipulate criteria.2.Statute that conferred a discretion in language that was broad enough to encompass decisions infringing a Charter right although the language did not expressly or by necessary implication authorize infringements of the Charter. (a) Shd be Read Down so it does not infringe the Charter (i) Organized police car stops unfettered discretion conferred by the statue, upheld b/c statute shd beinterepreted to extend to random stops - R v Hufskys (1988) c. Reasonably and demonstrably justified stdOakes Test Dickson CJ 1. Sufficiently important objective : The law must pursue an objective that is sufficiently important to justify limitinga Charter right. (a) Ct usu doesnt object to legislative judgment that the object of law is important enough to limit Charter. (i) Children - Irwin Toy v Quebec (1998) SCC upheld a Quebec law that prohibited advertising directed atchildren under 13. It infringed on freedom of expression but was justified by s1. It had a very low levelgenerality objective in that it protected children (vulnerable) from advertising. (ii) FrenchAG of Quebec v Ford (1988)- Court held: purpose ok, but banning of English had gone too far andcould not be justified under #3. (iii) Day of rest R. v. Edwards (1986) day of rest from work upheld under s.1- provincial law- dayfor retail workers. Legis history- day is one to provide pause day. (iv) Cf. Exclusion from statute-

Vriend v Alberta (1998)- the legislation did not protect against discriminationon the basis of sexual orientation. The breach of the Charter lay in what was omitted from Act. The province had failed to establish the existence of an important objective that would satisfy the first step of the Oakes test. The limit then could not be justified under s1 and the omission was unconstitutional. (v) Cf. ReligionR v Big M Drug Mart (1985)- Is the only one case where the courts rejected the legislativeobjective. No Sunday shopping. (b) Cf. Cost-(i)Singh v Minsters of Employment and Immig (1984)- Immig argued full hearing would impose anunreasonable burden on the resources of government. It was held that a full hearing right had to be provided.(ii)R v Lee (1989)- reducing administrative inconvenience and reducing expense are not, in my view,sufficient objectives to override such a vital constitutional right.(iii)Cf. Newfoundland v NAPE (2004)- Binnie J stated-normally financial considerations would not be suffice but the government was in a financial crisis, so s.15 Charter gender-equity pay was outweighed by s.1.(c)Shifting objectives (i) Rv Big M Drug Mart (1985) Required Objective to cause the enactment of the law. Rejected the notion thatthe purpose of a law might change over time with changing social conditions. Religious motivation whenlegislation enacted in 1906, couldnt now be viewed as secular purpose. (ii) Rv Butler (1992)anti-obscenity law, original objective was morality, interpreted to mean that objectivehad always been the protection of society from the harms caused by obscene materials. Held this was it promoted sexual equality gave it a permissible shift in emphasis. This made the objective into a 18

generality that could be remain constant over time. Hogg- path around the rule against shifting objectives. (iii) R v Zundel (1992)- original objective was to protect great man of realm from malicious lies, heldthat the prevention of harm from deliberate falsehoods was too general a statement of the laws objective toallow shift in emphasis. Law struck down. 2.Rational connection (a)The law must be rationally connected to the objective.(very rare that law is not rationally connect to theobjective(i)RJR MacDonald v Canada (1995)- Judges will use common sense, reason and logic to determine if arational connection exists -- no rational connection between the advertising ban and the objective of reduced consumption. (ii) R v Oakes [1986] Reverse onus clause. Dickson There must be a rational connection between the basicfact of possession and the presumed fact of possession for the purpose of trafficking. The reverse onusclause could not satisfy this requirement because it did not make any stipulation as to the quantity of narcotics in the possession of the accused-possession of a small amount of narcotics does not supportinference of trafficking. (iii) Benner v Canada (1997)Moms citizenship. It was a breach of equality rights to impose morestringent requirements for Canadian citizenship on a person born outside Canada before 1977 to a Canadianmother than a person born outside Canada before 1977 to a Canadian father. Government argued that that itwas a security measure and it was rational to to screen potential citizens in order to keep out dangerous persons. Court Held: the objective was justified in keeping out dangerous citizens but it was not rational todiscriminate against kids from Canadian mothers as more dangerous as ones from Canadian fathers. 3. Least drastic means The law must impair the right no more that is necessary to accomplish the objective ( mostissues) (a)

In almost any situation it could be easier to come up with a less drastic means -- judges have to allow provinciallegislatures a margin of appreciation so provinces can provinces different social objectives. R v AdvanceCutting & Coring [2001](b)Overturned (i) Felony murder rule . R v Valliancourt [1987]-Criminal Code felony-murder rule has been held to be toodrastic a means of discouraging the use of weapons by criminals. (ii) Ban on English . Ford v Que [1988] Quebecs prohibition of the use of English in commercial signs has been held to be too drastic a means of protecting the French language. (iii) Ban on non-resident lawyers . Black v Law Society of Alta [1989]-Albertas rule prohibitingAlberta lawyers from entering into partnership with lawyers not resident in Alberta has been held to be toodrastic a means of regulating the standards of the legal professions.(c)Upheld (i) Reverse Onus . R v Whyte (1988)- upheld a Criminal provision which presumes person in a driver seat -care and control of vehicle - for the purpose of Drunk driving offences. The reverse onus- was a response toa pressing social problem and a minimal interference with the presumption of innocence. (ii) Ban on disclosure of sex victim name - Canadian Newspapers Co V AG of Canada (1988)- court order banning the disclosure of sexual assault victim so that it would serve the purpose of fostering complaints byvictims of a sexual assault. (iii) Ban on picketing - BC Gover. Employ. Union v AG of BC (1988)- injunction from picketing atcourt because a picket line ipso facto impedes the public access to justice. The injunction limited freedomof expression by the least drastic means because the union was free to picket workplaces. (iv) Limited exemption for Sabbath observers - R v Edwards Book and Art (1986) Debate abt Ontario lawSabbatarian exception went far enough b/c exemption for Sat. observers limited o small stores. 4.

Proportionate effectThe law must not have disproportionately severe effect. Balancing test objective of important law vs. infringement of charter. (a) Hogg believes restatement of first step, and that it has never been used. An affirmative answer to the 1 st step,(sufficiently important objective,) will always yield an affirmative answer to the 4 th step proportionate effect. 13) Freedom of Conscious and Religion s2(a) 19

a. Constitution Act, 1982, s.2(a) guarantees to everyone the fundamental freedom of conscience and religion . i. conscience- R v Morgentaler [1988] protects systems of beliefs which are not theocentric (centered on a deity) andwhich might not be

characterized as religious for that reason (or for some other reason) ii. definition of freedom of religionR v Big M Drug Mart (1985)-Dickson J- is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and theright to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching or by dissemination. 1. manifest - such manifestations do not injure his or her neighbours or their parallel rights to hold and manifest beliefs and opinions of their own. 2. sincerely held test - Anselem- all that was necessary to qualify a practice for Charter protection was that theclaimant sincerely believed that the practice was of religious significance Religious belief was intensely personaland can easily vary from one person to another. The test was wholly subjective. Expert evidence was not necessary because the claimant has to show a sincerity of belief . Even an inquiry into the sincerity of belief was to be aslimited as possible Individuals change and so can their beliefs. (a) Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys (2006) Sikh boy wants to wear kirpan to school-Thecourt found that he sincerely believed that he needed to wear it. It was irrelevant that other Sikhs accept such acompromise. Oakes test made tried to limit his freedom as possible and made him carry it in a wooden sheathsewn inside his pants. b.Protected (struck down) i.Donald v Hamilton Bd Education [1945]- refusing to salute the flag or sing the national anthemii.Saumur v City of Quebec [1953] -distributing proselytizing tractsiii.R v Harrold (1971)- chanting a mantraiv.Syndicate Northcrest v Amselem (2004) - building of succahs on patiosv.Denominational schools1.s2(a) requires a province to permit children to be educated outside the secular public system. Provinces do have theright to regulate alternative schools to ensure core curriculum and standards are met. 2.

Protestant and Catholic schools are recognized under s 93 and may receive public funding that is denied to theschools of religious denominations not recognized by s93. c.Not protected under s.1 (struck down stautes)i. R. v. Edward Brooks- even though secular purpose to provide common pause day for retail work, effect was to impose aneconomic burden on retailers who closed Saturday, competitive pressure to abandon a non-Sunday Sabbath, but upheldunder s.1. ii. Young v Young (1993)Harm to children Father was not allowed to speak about his Jehovah Witness religion to son because it caused fights with mother. SCC held - the right to the freedom of religion did not guarantee any religiousactivity that would not be in the best interests of the children. But stuck down, b/c not shown in best interest of child. iii. Blood transfusion B.R v Childrens Aid Society (1995) Harm to childrenparents did not want blood transfusion butthe Childrens Aid Society. Wards did it anyway. Court Held: a breach of their s2(a) right but it was justified under s1. a parents freedom of religion does not include the imposition on the child of religious practices which threatens the safety,health, or life of the child iv. Public School Practices 1. Zylbergberg v Sudbury Board of Education (1988)challenge school opening and closing with religious exerciseconsisting of the reading of the Scriptures or other suitable readings and the repeating of the Lords Prayer or other suitable prayers. Unconstitutional because it imposed Christian observances upon non-Christian pupils andreligious observances on non-believers. Even though statute authroized non-christian prayers and readings. v. Religious marriage 1. Same-sex marriage reference (2004)- SCC was asked by Parliament if it could enact a bill legalizing same-sexmarriage for civil purposes. SCC Held

- it could do so under marriage in s91(26) of the Constitution Act 1867. (a) But invalidated provision providing that nothing affects the freedom of officials of religious groups to refuse to perform marriages that are not in accordance with their religious beliefs.- Ct held ultra vires Parliament b/c provinc power under s92(12) soleminization of marriage. The court then went on to say the invalid section was protected by s2a of the Charter. S2a was broad enough to protect religious officials from being compelled bythe state to perform civil or religious same sex marriages that are contrary to their religious beliefs. 20

d. Waiver of rights i. Syndicate Northcrest v Amselem (2004) Succah. The majority brushed aside the argument of their co-owners that theclaimants had waived their religious rights b/c prohibition in condo bylaws. Iacobucci J- wondered whether a religious practice could be waved at all, he wondered if he by law was sufficiently clear to amount to a waiver. ii. Bruker v Marcovitz (2007)- the husband refused to a Jewish divorce for 15 years despite K to do so. Court held againstthe husband and upheld an award of damages for breach of contract against the husband. Important were the public polices of equality, religious freedom and autonomous choice in marriage and divorce. Outweighed religious rt towithhold b/c contractual obligation. 14) Freedom of Expression 43 a.s2(b)- Charter of Rights guarantees to everyone the fundamental freedom of thought, belief, opinion, and expression,including freedom of the press and other media of communication. i. P rovincial power over speech does not extend to the regulation or prohibition of political ideas, does authorize theregulation of speech on commercial or local grounds. ( ie tort of defamation- provincial jurisdiction-s92(13)) b.Definition i. Re: s193 and s195.1 SCC has defined expression-activity is expressive if it attempts to convey meaning

. (Prostitution.) Excluded is: purely physical and does not convey or attempt to convey meaning. 1. Choice of language is protected - Ford v Que [1988]- . it colors the content and meaning of expression, thefreedom to express oneself in the language of ones choice. 2. Cf. R v Keegstra (1990) Expressive activity that takes the form of violence is not protected by s2(b) . ii.Content neutrality 1. R v Keegstra (1990)governing principle- is the content of a statement cannot deprive it on the protection accorded by s2(b) no matter how offensive it bec.Policy i. Important for democracy - The right of free expression of opinion and of criticism were essential to the working of a parliamentary democracy such as ours. Switzman v Elbling (1957) ii. Instrument for truth On Liberty by Mills and Oliver Wendel Homes argues suppression of opinion is wrong because amarket place of ideas can create the truth with history, social/natural science, medicine and all branches of humanknowledge. iii. Instrument of personal fulfilment (must include a communicative purpose) or to allow personal growth and self realizationiv.Irwin Toy v Quebec (1989)-they embraced all 3 reasons for protecting freedom of

expression.v.R v Sharpe (2001)- instrument of personal fulfilment was discussed by SCC. Child pornography and materials involvedmade no contribution to democratic government and made no contribution to search for truth. d. Upheld under s.1 1. Film censorship. NS Board of Censors v McNeil (1978)- SCC upheld provincial censorship of films on the basisthat the exhibition of films was a business within provincial jurisdiction and censorship was part of a local matter.The censors board power was thus limited to apply moral standards to the depiction of sex and violence, issues of primary local significance. 2. Communicating for the purpose of prostitution , upheld under s.1 - Re: s193 and 195.1 3. Border control Prohibited material can be controlled at the border with customs officials serving as the censors.The federal Customs Tariff Act used to prohibit the importation of immoral or indecent books and magazines.This was struck down to be too vague. 4. Obscenity 21

(a) R v Butler [1992]- CC: obscenity= undue exploitation of sex. SCC held that prohibition did offend s2(b) --stated the purpose and the effect of the prohibition was to restrict the communication of certain types of materials based on their content. (i) But - SCC held that the definition of obscene in the CC was a sufficiently clear standard and servedsufficiently justified social purpose under s.1 to serve as the basis of the criminal offence 1. Gloss on harmfulness by casela

w= intelligible std so not void for vagueness (ii) Held that undue exploitation of sex contemplated material that: 1. 1. portrayed explicit sex with violence or 2. 2 . portrayed explicit sex without violence, but in a degrading or dehumanizing manner by placingwomen and ( men) in positions of subordination, servile submission or humiliation. These forms of pornography, when not required by the internal necessities of a serious work of art, were intolerable tothe Canadian community, not because they offend against morals but because they were perceived by public opinion to be harmful to society, particularly women. 5.Porno (a)The expression cases in the SCC make clear that porn, including obscenity, is protected expression in Canada.Pornography, however defined, can only be identified by reference to the content of the challenged material.Since there is no content-based restrictions on s 2(b) it follows that pornography is covered by the guarantee. (b) R v Sharpe (2001)child pornchallenge on the constitutionality of the CC offence of possession of child pornography. Child porn was defined as a picture of a child engaged in explicit sexual activity, a picture of achilds sexual organ or anal region and written material that advocated sexual activity with a child. Heldfollowed Butler test and a found a reasoned apprehension of harm, and that was enough. Once harm tochildren was inferred and failed the Oakes test. 6. Hate propaganda, upheld under s.1 (but not false news) - R v Zundel (1992)(a)Canada v Taylor (1990) Defiance of ct order involving anti-Semitic phone messages. If this order has beenmade, it can made as an order for the federal Court and then disobedience is then punishable by contempt of court. Jail justified under s.1. (b) R V Keegstra (1990) - teacher/ anti Semitic The court rejected there were any content based restrictions on thes2 (b) right. s2 (b) covered all message however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the mainstream. Thecourt upheld the law under s1. Successful because

it was specifically directed at the wilful promotion of hatredagainst identifiable groups and it was easy to accept the prevention of harm caused by that activity was animportant objective.(c)R v Zundel (1992) false or truths - the CCC used to contain a prohibition of spreading false news. The SCCdecided that the deliberate spreading of falsehoods as well as truths, because the question whether a statement istrue or false can be determined only by reference to the content of the statement was protected s 2(b). The falsenews offence could not be justified under s1. false news struck down because statute did not specify any particular type of statement and did not specify what type of injury to the public interest was contemplated.False news was so broad it was hard to that it was difficult to identify an objective that was sufficientlyimportant to justify the limit on the freedom of expression. 7. Assemblies. AG Can and Dupond v Montreal (1978)- SCC upheld Montreal by-law that imposed temporary prohibition on assemblies, parades, and gatherings on municipal parks and streets. Beetz regulation of municipal pubic domain was within the provincial power over local matters. (s92(16)) none of freedoms of speech, assemblyand association of the press/religion is a single matter coming within exclusive federal or provincial competence 8. Professionals advertising- l awyers, doctors and dentists are typically subject to restrictions on advertising on avarying degrees of stringency. The object is to maintain the dignity of a learned profession. (a) Cf. Heavy restrictions on professional advtsgRocket v Royal College of Dental Surgeons (1990)- theregulation prohibited a dentist from advertising office hours and languages spoken. information which would be useful to the public and present no serious danger of misleading the public or undercutting professionalism.The court struck down the regulation. 9.False/bad advertising (a)Canada v JTI Macdonald Corp (2007) court upheld prohibition of false, misleading or deceptive advertising products. This activity was protected by s2(b) but because false advertising of products bad for health were 22

harmful to health was of low value and the prohibition was justified under s1.

(b) Irwin Toy v Quebec (1989)- the court upheld a law that restricted advertising to 13 year olds. It was justifiedunder s1 . 10. Forced expression re tobacco warnings (a) RJR MacDonald v Canada (1995) Sometimes people are forced to make a statement. Made cigarettecompanies to sell cigarettes to display prescribed warnings of the health dangers of smoking. This was a breachof s 2(b) on the basis that the freedom entails the right to say nothing or the right not to say certain things thegovernment had failed to establish the jusitification for non-attribution of warnings, so new statute hadcirgarette cos attribute warnings to Helath Canada (b) Canada v JTI Macdonald Corp (2007)- a new warning enforced by the Tobacco Act was required to occupy50% of the package. It was found to have infringe s2(b) but was justified by s1. 11.Ban picketing laws (a) The purposes of picketing are: a) advise the public that picketers are on strike b) to dissuade strike breakersfrom entering the workplace c) to encourage consumers to boycott the goods or services produced by the firm.d) intended to bring economic pressure on employer. There is also a communicative element to picket lines andits best probably regarded as commercial expression. The picket line may also convey implicit or explicit or even explicit political message. (b) Secondary picketing, private parties Dolphin Delivery Case (1986)union challenged the constitutionalityof a injunction that had been issued in BC prohibiting the union from picketing at a workplace that was not their employer. SCC held that the Charter of rights had no application between private parties governed by commonlaw. (it constituted the tort of inducing a breach of contract). McIntyre J went on to state that a prohibition onsecondary picketing would be justified under s1 as a measure to prevent industrial conflict from spreading beyond the parties in dispute. (c) Picketing courts - Vancouver Courthouse Case (1988) without notice to the union issued an injunction to prohibit the picketing of the courts. The basis of the injunction was the offence of criminal contempt. SCCturned down an application to have injunction removed. There was a legal basis that their actions was a criminalcontempt for court. SCC held that the injunction was limiting the freedom of s2(B) but was justified under s 1assuring unimpeded access to the courts.

(d) Cf. Struck downUCFW v Kmart Canada (1999)- secondary sites with just leaflets union wanted to peacefully, without picketing, handout leaflets at a secondary Kmart. Court held that the prohibition of thisform of expression was not justified by the legislative goal and was therefore unconstitutional.(e)Cf. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages v RWDSU (2002)-secondary sites, no regulation- unlike the Kmart case,union members were picketing at secondary sites and at places where Pepsi was being sold. And unlike theKmart case where the BC Labour code regulated secondary picketing, Saskatchewan Labour code did not.Held-that picketing secondary shops peacefully did not peaceful and did not involve the commission of a crimeor tort. However, picketing homes of the management personal amounted to the tort of intimidation. 12.Defamation (a)Tort of defamation provides a civil remedy for a person whose reputation has been damaged by false statementsmade by the defendant. Canada is out of step for the rest of the common law world in its failure to restrict theright of public figures to sue for defamation. (b) Hill v Church of Scientology (1995) SCC refused to alter the common law defamation to protect criticism of officials. The common law of defamation represented an accommodation between competing values of personalreputation and freedom of expression. The court held that false and injurious statements were not deserving of much protection. Reputation, although not explicitly connected to the Charter. Cory J concluded that the law of defamation was not unduly restrictive or inhibiting. High damages awards to increase the incentive for caution in criticizing or reporting the activities of public officials but does not involve the media or politicalcommentary about public policies. No cap on punitive, odd b/c cap on personal injury suits. Dicta left open door 23

for qualified priv. (c) WIC Radio v Simpson (2008)Host of radio show criticised guest on air implying that she would condoneviolence against homosexuals. This was false and injured the reputation of the plaintiff, making it defamatory.However, Mair comments were opinion and not fact. Therefore, no demonstration of truth was called for andthe defence of fair comment was available.

(i)More forgiving to statements of opinion (or comment) about individuals in the public eye than it is tostatements of fact. (ii) The defence of fair comment as long as the opinion is :1.based on facts2.is related to the matter of public interest and3.is one that an honest (but not necessarily reasonable ) person could hold. 13. Deliberate falsehood - R v Lucas (1998)- deliberate falsehoods were protected by s2(b). At issue was theconstitutionality of the CC offence of defamatory libel, which made it an offence to publish material that was knownto be false and that would expose the victim to hatred, contempt and ridicule. However the court upheld the prohibition against this with s1. 14.Access to Ct (a) Re Vancouver Sun 2004 - The SCC reviewed a judicial investigating hearing that had been held by camera( closed to public) by a superior court judge The presiding judge closed the hearing to the public and the press.The Vancouver sun appealed after having their application refused to the SCC. The SCC emphasized testthat the open court principle was guaranteed by s2(b) of the Charter. It could be limited under s 1 -applied toorders limiting access to court proceedings are: 1. that the order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk 2. thatthe salutary effects of the order outweighed the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties andthe public. (b) In CBC v New Brunswick (1996) freedom of press includes rt to media to have access to ct proceedings. the judge excluded the public and the media from part of the sentencing hearing of a prominent citizen who had pleaded guilty to various sexual offences involving young girls. The exclusion order covered part. have of thehearing detailing the acts and committed by the accused and it remained in force for about 20 mins. SCCupheld the provision - It was a breach of s2 (b) was upheld by s1. Parliament was pursuing an objective in providing a power to make an exclusion order when openness would be inimical to the administration of justiceand because the power was discretionary the provision was no broader than necessary.

(c) Re: Southam and the Queen (No.1) (1993) Ontario court of appeal had to consider the validity of s12.1 of theJuvenile Delinquents Act which provided that the trials of children shall take place without publicity The phrase without publicity had been challenged by a newspaper company claiming the freedom of expressionentailed a right to access the courts. The court upheld the newspapers claim and struck down the closed courts provision. The court acknowledged that in some cases the interests of the child would justify restrictions on press access to trial, but the court held that an absolute ban could not justify under s 1 because it did not pursue the least restrictive means of attaining its objective. (i) Young offenders act.- Criminal Code- provides that proceedings confer on the trial judge the power toexclude all or any members of the public from the court room for all or part of the proceedings The power can be exercised when a trial judge forms the opinion that access should be restricted in the interest of the proper administration of justice. 15.Voting 24

(a)Right to vote is guaranteed by s3 of the Charter but the right is limited to elections of the members of the federal House of Commons and of the provincial legislative assemblys. (b)Haig v Canada (1993)- A Canadian citizen who had slipped through the cracks of the residency requirementsfound himself unable to vote in a federal referendum to approve amendments know as the Charlottetownaccord. Being unable to rely on s3 he argued that the failure of the federal parliament to make provision for himto vote was a breach of freedom of expression, guaranteed by s2(b) of the Charter. The SCC had agreed that thecasting of the ballot in a referendum was a form of expression but went on to hold that s2(b) does not impose onthe federal/provincial governments a positive duty to consult citizens by referendum. No right to vote inreferendum!e.Rejected under s.1 i. Time, manner and place - Ramsden v Peterborough (1993)non profit groups complained because a by-law closed off obvious places to place posters. The SCC had taken this into account and held the by law was too broad and interpreted ina narrow targeting legitimate concerns littering, aesthetic blight, traffic hazards, and impediments to persons repairingutility poles. ii.

Application Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (2000) gay and lesbian communities in Vancouver upheld obscenity std but said biased implementation against gay literature no good 1. Border Control by federal Customs Tariff Act uses the same definition of obscenity as the CCC. Bookstorechallenged Butler test and customs . SCC said it was not inappropriate to use a single community standard of obscenity, pointing out that the Little Sisters bookstore was open to the public. The butler interpreted definition of obscenity in the legislation targeted harm in the form of violence, degradation and dehumanization that occur in thecontext of homosexual as well as heterosexual relationships. The definition was indifferent between homos andhetros. iii. Sign restrictionR v Guignard (2002)- a municipal by-law in Quebec prohibited advertising signs and billboards exceptin industrial zones of the municipality. The municipality attempted to justify the by-law as a reasonable limit that wasdesigned to prevent visual pollution and driver distraction. Held - the law was arbitrary, and not a reasonable solution anda disproportionate to any benefit that it secures for the municipality. 1. Vann Niagra v Oakville (2003)SCC accepted a by-law that banned billboard signs throughout the municipality.The law clearly stated that ground signs must be less than 80 square feet. Court felt this left room for commercialexpression with smaller signs and that larger signs may likely cause distraction to motorists and visual blight. iv.Access to public property 1. Ramsden v Peterborugh (1993)SCC struck down a municipal law by-law that prohibited the placing of posters onany public property within the municipality . Iacobucci J - recognized that the municipality objectives in enactingthe by-law, which are reduce littering, aesthetic blight, traffic hazards and hazards to persons engaged in the repair of the utility pole and justify some limitations on s2(b). However, the complete ban on postering on all public property was a broader than necessary to accomplish goals. The by-law failed the least dramatic-

means requirementof s1. 2. Cf. Montral (City) v. 2952-1366 Qubec Inc., strip club with a loud speaker on the street broad casting the showand music. The club was charged with a city by-law prohibited noise from sound equipment heard on the street. The bylaw did not contain language stipulating any particular level of noise or any disturbance of neighbours or passerbys. McLaclin CJ and Deschamps J- interpreted the by law as applying only to noise that adversely affectsthe enjoyment of the environment (a) Test : whether the place is a public place where one would expect constitutional protection for free expressionon the basis that expression in that place does not conflict with the purposes which s2(b) is intended to serve,namely 1 . democratic discourse 2. truth-finding 3. self fulfillment.(i)To answer the question it was necessary to consider the historical function of the place, the actual 25

function of the place and whether other aspects of the place suggest that expression within it wouldundermine the values underlying free expression (ii) In this case, the streets are clearly areas of public, as opposed to private, concourse where expression of many varieties has long been accepted. Therefore- the clubs broadcast expression was protected by s2(b) but went on to hold the bylaw was justified under s1 despite lack of stds over levels or effects of noise v.Restrictions on reporting news of trials 1. s2(b) expressly provides that freedom of expression includes freedom of the press and other media of

communication. 2.Edmonton Journal v Alberta (1989)-press reports on matrimonial lititgation- the SCC struck down an Alberta statuethat prohibited (with limited exceptions) press reports of matrimonial litigation. The court held that the statueviolated s2 (b): the courts must be open to the public scrutiny and to public criticism of their operation by the public With s1- the courts agreed that the protection of the privacy of individuals engaged in matrimonial litigationwould justify some limits on the right to report judicial proceedings. It was found the ban to be too wide and cannot be justified under s1. 3. Dagenais v CBC (1994)- Superior Court had granted an injunction prohibiting the CBC from broadcasting a TVshow called the The Boys of St Vincent The publication ban did not apply to reports of judicial proceedings because the programme was a fictional one. The injunction was granted to 4 priests who argued under the commonlaw power to prevent a real and substantial risk of interference with fairness of the trial. and limited to the periodof the four trials. SCC then: held the common law rule put too much weight to the right to a fair trial and noenough weight to freedom of expression. Since it was a limit on freedom of expression, the injunction had to be justified under s 1 of the Charter by reference to the Oakes test. The found that reasonably available alternativesmeasures would not prevent the risk of the fairness of the trial. Alternative measures were adjourning trials,changing venues, sequestering jurors, allowing challenges for cause and voir dires during jury selection and providing strong judicial direction to the jury. The injunction was not justified. 4. Cf. Canadian Newspapers Co v Canada (1988) reports on the identity of sexual assault victimCCC made a provision for court order prohibiting the media from disclosing the identity of the complainant in a case of sexualassault. The purpose was to foster complaints. The order was mandatory if requested by the complainant or prosecutor. SCC held that the CC section was valid. Although it limited the press under s2(b), it was justified under s1. The mandatory ban did not limit the right excessively, because it provided assurance that the complainant thather identify would be protected where discretion would not. vi.Public Service 1.The entire public service is a professional career service that serves governments of all governments with equaldiligence, and should be impervious to partisan political considerations in the administration of government programmes.2.Osborne v Canada (1991)-federal public servants attacked provisions in the federal Public Service Employment Actthat prohibited them from engaging in work for or against a candidate for election to Parliament or for or against afederal political party. SCC held-that the act did limit freedom of expression under s2(b) and that it was not justifiedunder s1. This did not pass the least dramatic means test because the Act was over-inclusive. A narrower prohibitionwould have been sufficient to protect the value of neutrality with less impact. 3.

Baier v Alberta (2007)- question of whether Alberta could enact a law that disqualified teachers and other employees of school boards from serving as trustees of school boards. The SCC held - upheld the law. The law didnot prevent the teachers from expressing opinions on any issues relating to education (or anything else) its purposewas to prevent them to be serving on school boards b/c conflicted since they were labor vii.Elections expenditures 26 1. Third party( not candidates) (a) Spending limits on election expenses were imposed by the Election Canada Act. Election expenses aredefined as money paid for the purpose of promoting or opposing...a particular registered party or the electionof a particular candidate.(b)National Citizens Coalition v AG Can (1984)- prohibition against third party spending was a breach and wasnot justified under s1. The prohibition was struck down.(i)Then 1993 Parliament amended the Elections Act replacing the third party spending prohibition with aspending cap. Third parties were permitted up to $1000.(ii)This cap was then struck down in Somerville v Canada (1996) as a breach of the freedom of expression.(iii)The 2003 Parliament then amended it from $1000 to $150,000 of which no more than $3000. could beincurred by a single electoral district. This new national limit was less than half the cost of a one page full page advertisement in major Canadian newspaper. (c) Harper v Canada (2004)the SCC held : yes they are. No evidence that the voices of the wealthy drowned theothers the court found the prevention of this evil was the objective of the legislation and this objective wassufficiently important to justify a limiting freedom of expression. (i) Did this statutory restrictions pass the least dramatic means test of the Oakes test? SCC majority held: therestrictions did not go too far. They allowed third parties to make modest means of advertising to informthe electorate of their message in a manner that will not overwhelm candidates, political parties or other third parties. 2. Spending during referendums: SCC also had to look at third party spending during a referendum. QuebecReferendums Act that when a referendum was held in the province each side of the campaign had to organize intoyes or now committees. No expense could be incurred by outside of these two committees.(a)Libman v Quebec (1997) - the court held it was a breach of freedom of expression and was not justified under s1. It failed the least dramatic means test because it left no room for

people who may want to argue for abstention.viii.Right to equalize payments (a) Hogan v Newfoundland (2000 Newfld CA) - a referendum was held by the Government of Newfoundland toamend the constitution to take away financial support to denomination schools. 72% said yes. Roman Catholicsupporters opposing the amendments seek compensation because the government had spend more on the YESside then they did on the NO side. The argued that the government was under a constitutional responsibility toequalize payments for both sides. trial judge awarded demands but decision was reversed in appeal. Rt tofreedom of expression did not demand spending limits- the fact the government spent more did not breach theno sides right. Amendment enacted by Canadian Parliament to Const Act 1982 (b) Native Womens Assn of Canada v Canada (1994) argued that the Government of Canada had denied their right to freedom of expression by providing funding /consulting with to other aboriginal groups but not to the NWAC over the Charlottetown accord. SCC held that: according to the principle in the Haig Case- generallythe government is under no obligation to fund or provide a specific platform of expression to an individual or group. 27

15) Life Liberty and Security of Person a. S. 7 Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except inaccordance with the principles of fundamental justice. i. Two right version1.1. a right to life, liberty and security of the person that is unqualified except by s1 of the Charter and 2. 2. a right not to be deprived of life, liberty and security of person except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.3.This two rights interpretation is supported by an English

version but not by the French grammatical version of thissection. ii. s7 does not include property and does not include the determination of rights and obligations respecting economicinterests. 1. Thus s7 affords no guarantee of fair treatment by courts, tribunals or officials with power over purely economicinterests of individuals or corporations see Authorson 2. But s8, protects property from unreasonable search or seizure b. Canadian BoR Statute still in force, propertycontinues to apply to federal (not provincial laws) i. s1(a)- guarantees the right of the individual to life, liberty and security of person and enjoyment of property, and the rightnot to be deprived thereof except by due process of law... ii. The Canadian Bill of Rights s2(e)- provides that no law of Canada is to be construed or applied so as to: deprive a personof the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rightsand obligations... 1. Authorson v Canada (2003)- Veteran challenged a provision in the federal Department of Veterans Affairs Act that barred any claim to interest on moneys held by the Department on behalf of disabled veterans. The plaintiff becamecompetent and the dept. paid him money that was owed to him which had accumulated over a 40 year period. Nointerest was paid on it. Plaintiff sued for interest. plaintiff invoked s1(a) and s2(e) of BoR- plaintiff argued that hehad been deprived the enjoyment of property without due process because parliament had take his right away toa fair hearing. The SCC denied relief.: (a) s1(a)Court refused to impose any additional procedural obligations on Parliament the only

procedure dueany citizen of Canada is that proposed legislation receive three readings in the Senate and House of Commonsand that it received a Royal Assent Court. Ct also refused to interpret s1(a) as imposing a substantive obligationto provide compensation for expropriated property. (b) s 2(e) didnt right to a fair hearing on parliamentc.Fed/Provinciali.s91(27) Consti Act 1867- are the federal powers in relation to criminal law or criminal procedure. (various stages of 28 arrest, trial, acquittal or conviction and sentence are federal)ii.s92(14) Consti Act 1867- giver provincial authority over the administration of justice. This includes the constitution of criminal and civil courts, civil procedure, and extends to some aspects of the investigation and prosecution of crime.d.Who?i.s7 is applicable to everyone a word that is normally apt to include a corporation as well as an individual. 1.Immigrants (a) Singh v Minster of Employment and Immigration (1995) everyone includes immigrants to Canada. Wilson Jsaid that s7 right could be asserted by every human being who is physically present in Canada and by virtue of such presence amenable to Canadian law.(i)This means that immigrant who claimed refugee status was entitled to a hearing before an official or tribunal to determine their case. Arguing that this would be too expensive or a strain on the system wasrejected by the court. 2. Not Corps - Irwin Toy v Que [1989] SCC held that the context of s7 everyone does not include a corporation because an artificial person (a corporation) is incapable of possessing life, liberty or security of person becausethese are attributes of a natural person.(a)But Corp permittd to rely on s. 7 defence to crim charge if avail to individual can challenge law for overbreadth 3. Not foetues- R v Morgentaler (No 2) everyone in s 7 does not include a foetus and so a foetus is not entitled to aright to life. The SCC had in fact used s7 to strike down restrictions on abortion because it infringed the security of the person of the mother. e.Life i. Chaoaulli v Que [2005]- The SCC held- that excessive waiting times for treatment in the public

health care system of Quebec increased the risk of death, and were in violation of the right to life (as well as security of the person). f. Physical liberty i. Re: ss 193 and 195.1 CC - Liberty includes freedom from physical restraint . Any law that imposes the penalty of imprisonment, whether the sentence is mandatory or discretionary is by virtue of that penalty a deprivation of liberty andmust conform to the principles of fundamental justice 1. R v Beare [1988]- statutory duty to submit to finger printing and imprisonment are deprivations of liberty. 2. Stelco v Can [1990]- to give oral testimony a deprivation of liberty 3. R v Heywood [1994]-to not loiter in or near school grounds, playgrounds, public parks and bathing areas is adeprivation of liberty.4.Change in sentence (a) Cunningham v Canada (1993)-the amended Parole Act cancelled the conditional release (under mandatorysupervision) and required the continued detention of the prisoner for the rest of the prisoners sentence. SCCheld that- although the amendment of the Parole Board had not lengthened the defendants 12 year sentence ithad altered the manner in which the sentences was to be served. ( Serving time on mandatory supervision 29

was a lesser deprivation of liberty that serving time in prison.) This

change in the law should be treated as thedeprivation of liberty interest making s 7 applicable. However, the court went on to hold that it was not a breachof the principles of the fundamental of justice. The defendant remained in prison. (b) May v Ferndale Institution (2005)- the court reviewed a decision by the correctional service to transfer a prisoner to a min. security prison to a medium security prison . Court followed Cunningham and held thedecision to transfer the prisoner was a deprivation of his residual liberty so s7 applied. The court held thefailure of the Correctional Service to fulfill a statutory obligation to provide information as to the reasons of the transfer was not important. (Stinchcome rules of disclosure did not apply outside criminal proceedingswhere the innocence of the accused was at stake.) It did make it unlawful so the prisoner was sent back to minsecurity.ii.But not: 1. Re BC Motor Vehicle Act [1985] a law that imposes only a penalty of a fine is not a deprivation of liberty.(Larmer left open imprisonment as an alternative to non-payment could be) 2. Buhlers v BC (1999)-the suspension of a drivers license is not a deprivation of liberty.3.Medovarski v Canada [2005]-the deportation of a non-citizen is not a deprivation of liberty, attracting the rules of fundamental justice because a non-citizen has no right to enter or remain in Canada.Unless detetention as part of process (Charkaoui) or deportation to torture (Suresh), refuge claim (Singh) g. Other Liberties i. Fundamental personal choices - Blencoe v BC (2000)- Bastarache J- asserted that liberty in s 7 is no longer restrictedto mere freedom from physical restraint; it applies whenever a law prevents a person from making fundamentalpersonal choices. 1. Mr Blencoes liberty had been impaired because of the unreasonable delay he waited for the BC Human rightsCommission took in disposing sexual harassment charges against him. Court held:in these circumstances, the statehas not prevented [Mr Blencoe] from making any fundamental personal choices.ii.Economic Liberty

1. banish Lochner v NY from Canada (freedom of contract) 2. Re ss 193 and 195.1 CC (Prostitution reference)- s7 liberty must not be interpreted to include property, notincluding freedom of contract and not including economic liberty. right to work? the regulation of trades andprofessionals should be regarded as restrictions on economic liberty that are outside the scope of s73.Gosslin v Que per Larmer J- the restrictions on liberty and security of the person that s7 is concerned with arethose that occur as a result of an individuals interaction with the justice system and administration. 4. R v Edwards Books and Art [1986]-liberty does not include the right to do business , by selling goods on Sunday. h.Security of Person1. Hitting kids. Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (2004)- challenge on a defence in theCC which provides that a teacher or parent can use reasonable force by way of correction against children intheir care. This exposed children to what amounted to assault. Court held:had no difficulty in finding that the provision adversely affected the security of person of the children to who it applied ( The court upheld the provision 30 on the ground that there was no breach of the principles of fundamental justice. 2. Abortionto mom . R v Morgentaler (no.2)- SCC held that CC restrictions on abortion which required that anabortion be approved by a therapeutic abortion committee of an approved hospital were unconstitutional. Evidenceshowed that hospitals would not set up the required committees and caused delays in treatments which increased therisk of health to the mother. Held- The risk of health that was caused by the law was deprivation of security of the person. 3. Right to buy private health ins.Chaoulli v Quebec (2005) SCC held that excessive waiting times in the publichealth care system of Quebec caused unnecessary pain and stress to those waiting surgery and other medical procedures. This was a breach of the right to security of person (as well as right to life, since the risk of death wassometimes increased by prolonged delays. (a)

Facts - Quebec law forbade the purchase of private health insurance. The law was designed to make the publichealth system exclusive. All 7 judges were unanimous that the law caused a breach of security to person, therewas an even 3-3 split on whether the law was a breach of the principles of fundamental justice under s7. Banson the purchase of private insurance or other impediments to access to private health care exists in other provinces and territories, but it will take another case to determine whether they are a breach to the Charter. i.Security- beyond health and safety 1. Psychological integrity of parent.. New Brunswick v G.(J) (1999)the SCC held an application by the state toremove children from a parent and place them under the wardship of the state affected the security of the person of the parent. Security of the person was affected because the government action would constitute a seriousinterference with the psychological integrity of the parent. s7 was applied and the removal proceedings had to beconducted in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 2. Blencoe v BC (2000) SCC held- that state induced psychological stress would be a breach of security of the person, but decided that the Commissions delays did not have a sufficiently severe impact on the applicant psychological state to qualify the breach. (stress came from other sources under facts). 3. Gosselin v Quebec (2002)- it was argued that s7 imposed on government a positive obligation to provide adequatewelfare benefits to those who were without other sources of income. Her challenge was on age discrimination s 15and on s7 and she failed on both grounds. Court held s.7 has not been extended to economic rights nor has it been interpreted as imposing positive obligations on the state to ensure that each person, enjoyed life, liberty or security of the person. 16)Fundamental justicei.Definition 1. BC Motor Vehicle Reference (1985)principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic tenets of thelegal system , those words (fundamental justice) cannot be given any exhaustive content or simple enumerativedefinition but will take on concrete meaning as the courts address allege violations of s72.R v Malmo-Levine (2003) marihuana- court created 3 requirements for a rule to qualify

as a basic tenet of legalsystem and therefore as a principle of fundamental justice .(i)a legal principle. (ii) significant societal consensus that is fundemenal to the way in which the legal system ought to fairlyoperate. (iii)rule must be capable of being identified with sufficient precision to yield a manageable standard. 31 ii. BC Motor Vehicle Reference The SCC held that fundamental justice did indeed cover substantive as well asprocedure justice b/c: 1.words fundamental justice are literally broader in scope than other formulations that could have been used such asnatural justice.2.expansions of the concept of fundamental justice has the effect of expanding the protection of life, liberty andsecurity of person 3. s7 is a kind of residuary clause for all legal rights. s8-14 are merely illustrative of deprivations of fundamental justice that could be easily be caught by s7 since s8-14 go beyond merely procedural guarantees it follows that s7also must go beyond a merely procedural guarantee. (Hogg: this reason is dubious) iii.Basic Tenets of Legal System 1. Yes- R v Parker (2000)absolute prohibition that threatened health was breach of fundamental justice -marihuana for medical use Could possession be prohibited for those who had medical use for the drug? OntarioCourt of Appeal answered no. The possession of marihuana could not be prohibited (with imprisonment as a possible penalty) if the prohibition did not include an exception for those with medical needs. Court suspended for ayear and the federal government responded with Marihunana Medical Access Regulations. 2. Not Harm to Others PrincipleThe SCC held that the harm principle did not satisfy the 3 requirements.Therefore Parliament was open to impose a sentence of imprisonment for crimes that did not involve harm to others.(cannibalism, bestiality duelling and consensual incest.

3. Not BIC test - Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (2004)- challenge on a defence for an assault charge for teachers and parents. It was argued that the best interests of the child was a principle of fundamental justice and that the exposure of children to corrective force was not in their best interests. The SCC hadaccepted the 3 requirements of fundamental justice that was stipulated in Malmo-Levine so BIC was notfundamental justice. iv. Strict Liability Offenses ok 1. 2 types (R v City of Sault Ste Marie (1978)) (a) offences of absolute liability -which the offence consists of doing the prohibited act. There is no requirement of fault, either mens rea or negligence. They could convicted even if they had no intention of breaking the law andalso exercised reasonable care to avoid doing so. (b) offences of strict liability - the offence consists simply of doing the prohibited act however, it is a defence if thedefendant proves to the civil standard of the balance of probabilities that he or she exercised reasonable care ( due diligence) to avoid committing the crime. There is a fault requirement of negligence because the accusedis liable only if he or she cannot prove the exercise of reasonable care. 2. Pontesmakes clear that s7 has no application to large fines because liberty is not affected. As long as imprisonmentis not a penalty Parliament can still make offences of absolute liability. 3. Absolute- struck down (a) Driving while prohibited or suspended from driving BC Motor Vehicle Reference(1985)-the subsection stated the offence was an absolute liability offence for which guiltis establish by proof of driving whether or not the defendant knew of the prohibition orsuspension. Short prison term. SCC held-that absolute was a denial of the principles of fundamental justice-since it carried a short term of imprisonment and a conviction would 32 mean a deprivation of liberty. The offence was declared to be in violation of s7 and of no force

of effect. (b) Statutory rapeR v Hess(1990)- CC made it an offence for a male person to have intercourse with afemale person under the age of 14 whether or not he believes that she is 14 years of age or more This offencewas absolute liability since it was no defence for the accused to show that he reasonably believed his act to beinnocent. The offence carried a penalty of imprisonment. SCC held- that the penalty of imprisonment was a breach of fundamental justice in violation of s7. the result was not to strike down the offence entirely. Whatsaved the offence is R v Hess is the power to use severance to eliminate the penalty of imprisonment. 4. Strict Liability Offences upheld where regulatory (a) R v Wholesale Travel Group (1991)- in this case the accused corporation was charged with the offence of falseor misleading advertising under the Competition Act. The act made it clear that there was no requirement of mens rea, the only defence was one of due diligence (reasonable care) and the burden of proving due diligencerested on the accused. Accused relied on BC Motor Vehicle Reference Act to argue a violation of fundamental justice and the crown argued that a fault element for an offence carrying a punishment of jail was needed butwas satisfied with the defence of due diligence. SCC held- that the crime was not a true crime but merely aregulatory offence or public welfare offence. Characteristics of a true crime was that it was inherentlywrongful conduct A regulatory offence was designed to establish standards of conduct for activity that could be harmful to others- no mens rea required v. Satisfied for negligence cases - if there is a defence of reasonable care ( due diligence) and the burden of provingreasonable care ( to the civil standard) may be cast on the defendant. 1. R V Hundel (1993)- the accused had driven his truck through a red light and collided with another car killing theother driver. He argued that he did not have time to safely stop through the amber light so he felt it was the rightcourse of action. Court cited Wholesale Travel and stated that in appropriate context, negligence can be anacceptable basis of liability which meets the fault requirement of s7 of the Charter. All that the crown needed toestablish was an objective departure by the accused from the appropriate standard of care. The fact that the accused believed that he was driving safely was irrelevant. 2.

R v Finlay (1993)- the SCC reviewed the CC offence of storing a firearm in a careless manner . The max penaltywas 2 years. Was negligence a sufficient fault requirement for the CC. Larmer CJ repeated the dictum in Hundalthat- in the appropriate context negligence can be an acceptable basis of liability which meets the fault requirementof s7. vi.Mens rea not required for other cases 1. R v De Sousa (1992)- CC charge of unlawfully causing bodily harm . Accused threw a bottle in a fight and injuredan innocent bystander. The accused neither intended nor foresaw the injury. What was the mental element for causing bodily harm? Sopinka J- held that there was no constitutional requirement that intention, either on anobjective or subjective basis extended to the consequences of unlawful acts in general 2. R v Creighton (1993)SCC had to determine what was the mental element of the offence of manslaughter byunlawful act. The court upheld the constitutionality of the CC requirement of objective foresight of bodily harm asthe mental element of unlawful act manslaughter. Foresight of the death was not required, despite the fact that themaximum penalty for manslaughter was imprisonment for life. vii. Murder/Attempted Murder mens rea constitutionally required 1. R v Logan ( 1990)- two accused robed a store with a gun in which a third person shot and injured the clerk. The two 33 were convicted as parties under s21(2) to the crime of attempted murder . SCC held - since the attempted murder wasone of those few offences for which s7 stipulated a requirement of subjective mens rea because the social stigma associated with the conviction . 2. Felony murder- All that was needed as proof was the felony, the use or carrying of the weapon

and the causingdeath. (a) R v Valliancourt (1987)- charge with murder as the result of a poolroom robbery. The accused knew theaccomplice was carrying a gun but did not foresee that a death was likely to occur (subjective) and there wasreasonable doubt that he ought to have know (objective standard). SCC held that the felony-murder rule was aviolation of fundamental justice under s7 of the Charter b/c either objective or subjective sufficed. There arecertain crimes where, because of the stigma attached to the conviction therefore\ or the available penalites, the principles of fundamental justice require a mens rea reflecting the particular nature of that crime. (murder).(b)R. v. Martineau (1990) held subjective foreseeability required by s.7. b.Other Issues of Fundamental Justice i.Involuntary Acts (a) Automatism - A tenant of the legal system should not be convicted of a criminal offence of an act that is notvoluntary. The courts have become persuaded that a person can engage in very complex behaviour while in astate of automatism and that automatic behaviour cannot be an offence because it is involuntary.(i)R v Parks (1992)- accused drove 23 km and killed his mother in-law and injured his father in law.. He wascharged with murder and attempted murder. His defence of sleep walking which was supported by 5 psychiatric exports. The also stated that he was not of a disease of the mind.(ii)R v Stone (1999)- accused after taunting by his wife, stabbed her to death. he argued he was provoke whichsuffered a psychological blow causing him to commit the act. He was found guilty of manslaughter instead of murder. He appealed that he should have been acquitted. SCC held- this defence was notavailable because a normal person would not have shift into a state of automatism as the result of thewifes taunts. (b) Duress (i)The CC by s17 makes duress an excuse for the commission of an offence: an offence committed under compulsions is excused from criminal liability. However, s17 stipulates that the compulsion must take theform of threats of immediate death or bodily harm from a person who is present when the offence iscommitted .1.Immediacy and presence requirements of s17 struck down as unconstitutional in Ruzic (ii) R v Ruzic (2001)- accused arrived at airport with heroin strapped to body. She was charge with false passport and drugs. She pleaded guilty to both crimes but claimed that she was forced to commit theoffences because her mother was going to be harmed by a man in Belgrade. This was believed by the jurywho acquitted her. The Crown appealed on the ground of limiting conditions of s17 were not satisfied.Corwn argued that- since the offences occurred in Toronto the threats were no immediate and he was notpresent when the offences were committed The SCC affirmed the acquittal of the accused s7 of theCharter was applicable because the offences carried the penalty of imprisonment Lebel J- held it would bea breach of the principles of fundamental of justice to convict a person of a crime when that person had notacted voluntarily.

34 (c)Intoxication (i) General intent mens rea to do actus reus - low threshold for establishing mens rea b/c even drunk peoplecan know what doing, so before Daviault- drunkenness couldnt escape responsibility for offenses of general intent1.Vs. Specific intent required mental element in addition to intention to do act (ii) R v Daviault (1994)- Sexual assault, crime of general intent, guy was drunk, wheelchair girl. TheSCC held that s7 requires that extreme intoxication (akin to automatism) be a defence to a criminal charge. 1. SCC heldthat s7 and 11(d)- of the Charter were offended by the rule that self induced intoxicationwas no defence to a criminal charge. Cory J- held that under s7 the requirement of mens rea for acrime of general intent could only be the intention to commit the prohibited act. The accused mustestablish the defence of extreme intoxication on the balance of probabilities. By reversing the usualonus of proof in a criminal case, Cory J created a new rule 2. Parliament added to the CC 33.1 in response describing extreme self-induced intoxication asmarked departure from std of reasonable caresufficient fault for offenses of violence. (iii) R v Robinson (1996)the SCC turned its attention to offences of specific intent . This was a murder casewhich required specific intent (i.e. intent to kill-foresight of death). The accused had been drinking and hehit the head of the victim with a stone. SCC HeldIf a drunkenness raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused in fact possessed the requisite specific intent, the accused was entitled to be acquitted even if there was no doubt that the accused possessed the capacity to form a requisite intent. ii.Overbroad Laws 1. Hypothetical - Raises serious practical and theoretical difficulties and confers exceedingly discretionary power of review on the courtdoesnt have to be ripe, cts may have to reject law based on hypothetical bad application

(a) Vs. Vagueness have this in common :either deficiency results in the invalidity of the entire law, including the part that is consistent with the purpose of the law and clear in its application- does not need to be ripe for overbroad, does for vagueness. 2. Playground pervs. R v Heywood (1994) SCC established a new doctrine of overbreadth which applies to a lawwhich is broader than necessary to accomplish its purpose- breach of the principles of fundamental justice.(a)In this case anyone previously convicted of sexual assault was not allowed to be found loitering in or near aschool ground, playground public park or bathing area. In this case the law was overboard because: 1. geographic scope was too wide, because parks and bathing areas include places where children werenot likely to be found 2. duration was too long because it applied for life without any possibility for review and 3. class of persons to whom it applied would not be continuing danger to children. 35 3. Pollution. Ontario v Canadian Pacific (1995)- offence under EPA for discharging smoke into the air, since corp caninvoke s. 7 defense to crim charge if would be avail to individual, D here cold invoke. Here, statute could capturecampers in wilderness. Lamrer CJ solved the problem by invoking the presumption of constitutionality and adoptingan artificial narrow interpretation of the Act exempting the wild 4. Pot possession. R v Clay (2003) possession of marihuana- law criminalizing marihuana which includes the penaltyof imprisonment and therefore impaired liberty under s7 offended the principles of fundamental justice because itwas overbroad. The SCC did not agree- pot bad, rational basis for extending prohibition to all users. 5.

R v Demers- a committee was designed for people who were found to be unfit for trial. This committee wouldreview their case annually. People unfit were getting trapped in the system because there was not power by thecourts to order a discharge even if the person was not a public threat. Since the law made no provision for anabsolute discharge for the permanently unfit accused- t was overbroad. iii. Disproportionate law 47.16 1. R v Malmo- Levine (2003)the SCC established a new doctrine of disproportionaity which is a breach of the principles of fundamental justice. This doctrine of disproportainalty requires the court to determine:(a) whether a law pursues a legitimate interest and if it does(b) whether the law is grossly disproportionate to the state interest iv. Vague Laws 47.181.Here under S. 7 fundamental justice not S.1 requirement of precision 2.Not hypothetical scenarios like overbreadth3.Two problems: (i) First , the law does not provide fair notice to persons of what is prohibited which makes it difficult for them to comply with the law . (ii) Secondly the law does not provide clear standards for those entrusted in enforcement which may lead toarbitrary enforcement. 1. Prostitution Reference (1990)SCC acknowledged that the prohibition was broad and far reaching,denied that it was so vague that a court could not give sensible meaning to its terms. 2. United Nurses of Alberta v Alberta (1992)The SCC held that it was not a requirement of fundamental justice that a criminal offence be codified in stator form. Although the elements of thecommon law offence were not as clear as could be achieved

in a statutory definition, the offence wasneither vague nor arbitrary3.R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutial Society (1992)- the word unduly was attacked under s7 on theground that the word was unconstitutionally vague. This argument was rejected by the SCC. 4. Ontario v Canadian Pacific (1995)- EPA and the use of the words contaminent, into the natural 36 environment and for any use that can be made of it were not so vaguealthough broad, scopereasonably delineated so that legal debate can occur as to the application of the provision in a specificfact situation. All s. 7 required. (But void for overbreadth) 4. Standard of precision (i)Same under s. 1 and s.7, 11(e) - Nova Scotia (ii) R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society (1992)- The law should be intelligible and should sufficientlydelineate an area of risk and whether the law provides an adequate basis for legal debate ( Hogg seesthis last one least useful.) However the SCC has employed in subsequent cases. Gontheir J- there is norequirement that the law be absolute certain because no law can meet that standard. (iii)Canadian Foundation for Children Youth and Law v Canada reasonableforce by way of correction in s43 of the CC. It appeared vague and manylower courts that found that s43 did not provide meaningful standards. TheSCC ignored this body of law and instead relied on expert evidence. on thebasis of expert evidence - so interpreted she held that s43 sets realboundaries and delineates a risk zone for criminal sanction that issufficiently clear standard to avoid the charge of unconstitutional vagueness. v.Wrong Laws 47.19 1. R v Gamble (1988)the person was tried and convicted of murder and imprisoned under laws that had just beenenacted, but not come into effect. Parole after 25 years, not 10. She should have been tried with offences whichexisted during the time of the offence. This affected her eligibility for parole. Wilson J- for the SCC held- thecontinued detention of the prisoner without the eligibility for parole was a breach of s7. A basic tenant of the legalsystem is that an accused must be tried and punished under the law in force at the time the offence was committed.She was eligible to apply for parole immediately. vi.Right to Silence1. s7 contains residual of the right to silence which supplements s11(c) and 13.

(a) s11(c) which applies only to the accused in a criminal trial (making the accused a non-compellable witness) issupplemented by s7 which applies to any witness in any proceeding and which makes the witness non-compellable if the true purpose of calling the witness was to obtain incriminating evidence against the witness. (b) use immunitywhich protects the witness from having the compelled testimony used to incriminate him or her in a subsequent proceeding. This is provided to a witness who testifies in any proceedings by s13 and to persons other than witness by s7 illustrated by R v White ( 1999) (c) derivative use immunitywhich protects the witness from having the compelled testimony used to obtainother evidence (derivative or secondary) to incriminate him or her in a subsequent proceedings unless thederivate evidence is discoverable independently of the compelled testimony. 2.Jailhouse confessions if voluntary (a) R v Hebert (1990)the accused had been arrested and advised of his right counsel. He did retain counsel andadvise the police he did not want to make a statement. He then was placed in custody with an undercover cop towhom the accused made an incriminating statement. SCC held -that the statement had been obtained in breachof the Charter. In effect the police had used a trick to subvert the accusers election not to make a statement tothe police. The reason why it was under s7 and not s10(b)(right to counsel) is because court took the right tosilence route which was principal of fundamenta justice under s. 7. (i) Note : If it was a voluntary statement to another prisoner or even an undercover cop the result would have 37

been different- so long as statement was no actively eliecited by questioning. (b) R v Broyles (1991)was another jailhouse confession. The accused made a statement while in custody to afriend who visited him in the jail. The friend had been recruited as police informer. The difference betweenHerbert and this case is that it was a police informer. SCC held it was still a breach to his right and thestatement was excluded. 3.Regulatory regime (a) R v Fitzpatrick ( 1995) concerned the requirement of the federal Fisheries Act that records be kept by fishersand supplied to government on a daily basis detailing their daily catch of fish. Could these records be used intrial as evidence against him? SCC heldthere was no breach of s11(c) and no breach of s7 because in thecontext of the regulatory scheme to which the accused had voluntarily submitted by engaging in the business of fishing fundamental justice did not prove an immunity against the use of statutory compelled information. (b) R v White ( 1999)whether reports made to police under the compulsion of a provincial law could be usedagainst the person reporting them. SCC held - because the accident reports were provided under compulsiontheir admission into evidence against the accused would violate a principle of fundamental justice under s7 a principle against self-incrimination. The court distinguished on the grounds that driving is not freelyundertaken in precisely the same way as one is free to participate in a regulated industry such as commercialfishery. (c) R v Jarvis ( 2002)Tax related case. The taxpayer was vulnerable to the penalty of imprisonment meaning s7was applicable. SCC held

-the CRA during the investigative phase-tax officials could not continue to use theaudit power to collect evidence for criminal prosecution. If more material was needed it would have to be donethrough a search warrant. vii.FAIR TRIAL/Procedural Protections1. s7 overlaps with s11(d)which also guarantees a person charged with an offence a fair and public hearing by anindependent and impartial tribunal , but s7 is wider than s11 (d) because it also applies to civil/administrative proceedings where they affect life liberty and security of persons.(a)But Right to a fair trial does not mean that all existing rules and procedure are constitutionalized. (b) Courts rely on c/l procedural fairness to interpret S.7 fundamental justice - Suresh Ct -- The principles of fundamental justice of which sec. 7 speaks, though not identical to the duty of fairness elucidated in Baker , arethe same principles underlying that duty applied Baker framework to assess the adequacy of procedure affordedto Suresh so basically, principles of fundamental justice become procedural fairness in this Charter context. 2. New Brunswick v G.(J).[1999]SCC held: that an application by the state to remove children from the custody of a parent affected the parents security of the person and made s7 applicable. Principles of fundamental justicerequired a fair hearing be provided and that the parent be provided with state funded representation . 3. Winnipeg Child and Family Services v KLW ( 2000)held that the warrantless apprehension by the state of achild in need of protection was not a breach of the principles of fundamental justice.

A requirement of a warrantissued by a judge or a hearing before a judge prior to apprehension would lead to delay which would create a risk of harm to the child. The principles of fundamental justice were satisfied by a post-apprehension hearing. 4. R v. Levogiannis [1993]- SCC upheld another provision that allows a witness under the age of 18 to testify from 38

behind a one-way screen so the witness cannot see the accused (although the accused can see the witness) 5. Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1985, SCC) (a) Recognized that s. 7 applies to non-citizens -- Security of the person includes threat of phys suffering too threat of torture. caused the govt to overhaul the statutory scheme and establish the Immigration and RefugeeBoard to ensure that all refugee claimants receive a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. (b) Cannot be saved under s. 1 , because adopting administrative procedures which ignore the principles of fundamental justice merely for reasons of cost and efficiency is not sufficiently compelling to justify thelimitation of rights.(c)Facts: Refugee claimants had limited oppty to present their cases in oral hearings before either the decision-maker at first instance or the IAB on appeal-- only oppty if the IAB concluded on the basis of the asylumseeker's written submissions that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the claimant could make asuccessful claim at an oral hearing. (No c/l right b/c enabling statute limited oral hearings.) Oral hearingrequired here. 6. Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (a) Issuewas the process for the issue of a security certificates under the federal Immigration and

RefugeeProtection Act. The Act empowered 2 minsters to issue the certificate declaring a noncitizen named in thecertificate to be a threat to national security. The certificate authorized the arrest and detention of the person.The certificate was then brought to a judge to review on the standard of reasonableness then if found to bereasonable the person would be deported. During the review process, ex parte and in camera hearings are held atthe request of the Crown if the judge believes that disclosure of some or all of the evidence on which thecertificate is based could undermine national security. The judge then provides to the named person a summaryof the evidence, but not its sources or any other details that might compromise national security. If the judgedetermines that the certificate is reasonable, there is no appeal or opportunity for further judicial review. (b) SCC held thatS. 7 doubly engaged (i) Liberty - persons subject to security certificates face detention pending deportation (ii) Security - person's removal may be to a place where life/freedom threatened (iii) No fundamental justice b/c no fair hearing judge acting w/incomplete info-The principle of knowingthe case to meet when liberty is in jeopardy has not merely been limited by the provision allowingundisclosed material to be presented; it has been effectively gutted." (c) Not narrow enough under S.1 : To remedy the procedural shortcomings of the statutory scheme, the Courtsuggests that an amicus curiae (security-cleared special advocate ) could be appointed to represent the named person during in camera proceedings. The Crown's failure to incorporate such a measure, or to otherwise correctthe procedural deficiencies, leads to the conclusion that the violation of s. 7 could not be saved under s. 1 because the infringement did not minimally impair the right at stake. 7. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2002, SCC) (a) S. 7, process by which determination made violates Charter- not enough procedure - Ct upheld provision inImmigration Act that permitted Minister of Immigration to deport non-citizens who were found to be a danger to the security of Canada, and held Suresh did not have rt to an oral

hearing, but did have the right to: (i) Disclosure of materials on which the Minister would base her decision, including the memorandum fromthe immigration officer who initially reviewed Suresh's case. 1. Subject to privilege or other valid reasons for reduced disclosure, such as safeguarding confidential public security documents.2.Also Prichard v. Ontario (HRC)- under c/l, priv allowed agency to withhold legal opinion, consistentwith procedural fairness (ii) Right to written reply to the claims set out in the memorandum, including claims relevant to the threat he posed to Canada and the risk of torture he would have if deported (oppty to challenge Ministers info) (iii) ReasonsCt held that the Minister herself (and not a delegated officer) must provide responsive reasonsthat demonstrate both that the individual is a danger to Canada and that there are no substantial grounds to believe he would be subject to torture. (b) Ct also noted Deportation to torture will generally violate the principles of fundamental justice protected by s.7 of the Charter unless exceptional circs. Reviewable on correctness, whereas other substantive findings(threat to national security, actual likelihood of torture) reviewable on deference.(c)Facts: Suresh detained on a security certificate for links to terrorist group. Fed Ct upheld the certificate and, in 39 the subsequent deportation hearing, the adjudicator found Suresh to be inadmissible as a refugee. (i) Separate ongoing process called the danger opinion - whether the risk of danger posed by this personremaining in Canada would outweigh the risk of a well-founded fear of torture- Unlike the statutory provisions under scrutiny in Singh , Immigration Act did not require the Minister to adopt or follow any particular procedure. Minister notified Suresh that she intended to consider danger opinion and gaveoppty to make submissions. After submissions, officer recommended in a memorandum to the Minister thatshe issue an opinion

under s. 53(1)(b) that Suresh constitutes a danger to Canada. Suresh did not have theopportunity to see or respond to the officer's memorandum, which the Court described as more like a prosecutor's brief than a statement of reasons for a decision. Minister issued danger opinion,notwithstanding an acknowledgement that Suresh would face a risk of torture upon his return to Sri Lanka. viii. Full answer and defence/Disclosure (a) R v Seaboyer ( 1991)- Rape shield lawSCC held- that both s7 and 11(d ) guaranteed an accused the right to present full and answer and defence and that this right was reduced by a rape shield provision in the CC-which restricted the right of a person charged with a sexual assult to cross examine the complainant about their past sexual activity McLachlin J- this provision would occasionally have the effect of excluding relevantevidence that was required to enable the accused to make full answer and defence . (b) R v Cook(1997) Crown calling witness- The SCC rejected the argument that the inability of theaccused( assault) to cross examine his accuser was a denial of the accsueds right to make full answer anddefence. SCC Held the Crown has discretion as to the witness ( did not call victim) it chose to call and theaccused right to make full answer and defence was protected by his right to cross witnesses that did comeforward-evidence the jury had found the accused guilty. The argument that the accused would be surprised attrial was rejected because of pre-trial right to full exposure. SCC acknowledged there might be rare caseswhere the suppression of potentially exculpatory evidence by the Crown amounted to an abuse of process, butthe onus is of proving misconduct lay on the accused and had not been discharged in this case (c) R v Stinchcombe ( 1991)- disclosure- SCC held that pre-trial disclosure by the Crown, of all informationrelevant to the conduct of the defence is a constitutional obligation, entailed by the accused to make a fullanswer Crown has no duty to disclose irrelevant information or privileged information. The crown retainsdiscretion as to the timing of disclosure, since premature disclosure could impede investigations. (i)

Also applies to 3 rd pty info in possession of crown but not necessarily if not in possession of crown (e.g. 3d pty witness who has privacy and equality rts balance w/full answer and defense)(d)R.v. La (1997)tape of 13 yr old prostitute w/cop making accusation, tape was lost, not deliberately destroyed,no unacceptable degree of negligence and no prejudice to trial w/I s.7 Equality a. S.15- Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of thelaw without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,sex, age or mental or physical disability. b.Generally 1. Named grounds of discrimination - by the phrase in particular, not exhaustive.2.Freedom from discrimination law/freedom to promote egalitarian values3.Policy(a)Commentators have described equality as an empty idea. The idea is empty in the sense that it cannot beapplied without first working out the criteria of likeness and like treatment and the idea of equality cannot byitself supply those criteria.(b)Formal and Substantive equality (i) Common criticism of the pre-charter similarly situated definition is that it can mask discriminationoccurring indirectly. (ii)Formal equality can strike down directly discriminatory laws, but an apparently neutral law may have adisproportionate effect on a particular group which as a consequence is being treated unequal.(iii)Substantive law requires is that the identification of persons who are similarly situated must take into 40

account of contextual factors related to race, sex and disability (examples) making a persons situationsufficiently different to require different treatment in order to be treated fairly.4.Timing (a)

s32(2) - Charter delayed the coming into force of s15 for 3 years after coming into force for the rest of theCharter. (b) That brought it into force on April 17 1985. The purpose of the delay was to provide time for the federalgovernment and each province to review its body of laws and make those amendments to bring conformity with s 15 Charter.5.Equality is expressed in 4 different ways, to cover narrow interpretation given to before the law in BoR:(i)equality before the law (ii) equality under the law - extended to the substance of the law, not only way in which it was administered. (iii)equal protection of the law (iv) equal benefit of the law- so that legislative provisions of benefits was subject to equalitystandards. c. The burden then shifts the government to justify the discriminatory law under s1. 1.Newfoundland v NAPE (2004) - Law that imposes a disadvantage on the basis of a listed or analogous ground alsoimpairs human dignity, was the where SCC found where Newfoundland was facing serious financial crisis couldenact a law that postponing implementation under collective agreements under which the government hadundertaken to increase the wages of women. d. Law in s 15 does not exclude governmental action that is not law , but does exclude private actors 1.Discretionary Decisions (a) R v S.(S.) (1990)- did not apply to an exercise of discretion conferred by law, but only to the enabling law itself.Therefore, the AG of Ontarios decision not to establish a diversion programme could not be impeached under s15.(b)R v S.(G.) (1990)- the Court also rejected an equality attack on a diversion programme that had been establishedon the ground that the programme was an exercise of discretion under the Act. (c)

Then -- Douglas/ Kwantlen Factutly Assn v Douglas College [1990]- SCC had asserted that the requirement of law in s15 is satisfied by conduct taken under the authority of law. This case had no mention of the two Scases. 2. Not Private Action- s32 of the Charter excludes private action from the application of the Charter . (a) This means that s15 does not apply to private acts of discrimination (hiring male employees) or a landlord rentsonly to white people, or a shop keeper refuses to serve children.(b)In all Canadian jurisdiction Human Rights Codes have been enacted that prohibit private acts of discrimination. (c) Blainey v Ontario Hockey Association (1986)- The Charter can have an indirect impact on private action. Facts- Human Rights Codes themselves are subject to the Charter of Rights. Girl who was excluded fromHockey team challenged a provision of the Ont. Human Rights Code- that permitted single sex sports teams.Usually prohibited discrimination by sex but allowed single sex teams. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that itwas a breach of s15 because it denied to the plaintiff the benefit of the Human Rights Code by reason of her sex. The effect of nullifying the exception which gave the plaintiff a remedy under the Human Rights Code. TheCharter did not apply to the hockey association but did apply the Human Rights Code. Provision struck down. (d) McKinney v University of Guelph (1990)- The Charter can have an indirect impact on private action . A professor did not want to retire at the mandatory age of 65 so he challenged the law. The university was a private body so the Charter did not apply. Ontario human rights code permitted the mandatory requirement sohe argued the Code was a breach of s15 age discrimination. SCC held - that it was a breach of s15

but went onto state that it was justified under s1. e.Discrimination Andrews v Law Society of BC (1989) Andrews- SCC held that s15 was a prohibition of those violations of equality thatamount to discrimination and that discrimination could only be based on a ground listed in s15 or that was analogous tothose listed in s15. Test has evolved: (a) challenged law imposes (directly or indirectly) on the claimant a disadvantage (in the form of a burden or withheld benefit) in comparison to other comparable persons ; 41

(b) disadvantage is based on a ground listed in or analogous to a ground listed in s15; and (i)articulated in Andrews, affirmed in Law (ii) Corbiere v Can [1999]- SCC held that an analogous ground is one based on a personal characteristic thatis immutable or changeable only at unacceptable cost to a personal identity. (c) disadvantage also continues an impairment of the human dignity of the claimant (i) Law v Canada ( 1995)added this new restriction, defeated claim, The claimant was survivor seeking a payment from a

spouse but was ineligible because she was under 35- Canadian Pensions purpose payment plan it was much easier for younger widowers to support themselves then seniors . 1. four contextual factors not to be taken exhaustively: a.the existence of pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice and vulnerability b. correspondenc e between the distinctions and claimants characteristics or circumstancesc.existence of ameliorative purposes effects on other groupsd.nature of the interest effected. 2. The correspondence, or lack thereof, between the ground of grounds on which the claimant is basedand the actual need, capacity, or circumstances of the claimant or others. Hogg-Really means: Anassessment by the court of the legitimacy of the statutory purpose and the reasonableness of using alisted or analogous ground to accomplish that purpose. This factor leaves very little for s1 to do. 3.Often is absorbed by the question of disadvantage making it hard for thecourt to keep the two ideas distinct.(ii) Nova Scotia v Walsh (2002 ) was unanimous that marital status was an analogous ground. However thecourt held that the matrimonial property regime of NS which was restricted to people legally married didnot breach s15 because it did not impair the human dignity of the common law spouses who were excluded by reason of their marital status. (iii) R v Kapp (2008)SCC had changed their mind (confusing and dificul to apply) and retracted therequirement of an impairment of human dignity-replacing it with impairment of human dignityorperpetuation of disadvantage and prejudice, or stereotyping, but incorporating same 4 contextualfactors. (iv) Canadian Foundation for Children Youth (2004)SCC held that a reasonable use of correctiveforce against children by parents/teachers was on a whole beneficial to children. It held that human dignitywas not impaired, taking the perspective of a reasonable person acting on behalf of the child, whoseriously considers and values the childs views and development needs. (v)

Law v Canada ( 1995)defeated claim, The claimant was survivor seeking a payment from a spouse butwas ineligible because she was under 35- Canadian Pensions purpose payment plan it was much easier for younger widowers to support themselves then seniors . f.Analagous Grounds 1. Citizenship - (Andrews v Law Society of BC (1989) - was the first analogous ground. Challenge to the statutory 42

requirement of the province of BC that members of the bar had to be citizens of Canada . SCC held -unanimouslythat this requirement was contrary to s15 and was not saved by s1. 2. Marital Status (Miron v Trudel (1995)concerned the statutory provision dictating insurance accidents benefitsto a spouse a term that was defined as a person legally married to the victim. The claimant was a common lawspouse succeeded in striking down the requirement of marriage. Struck down under s.15. 3. Sexual Orientation Egan v Canada (1995) 8/9 judges decided that sexual orientation was an analogous ground.The claimants were a same sex couple who were seeking a spousal allowance under the federal Old Age security program and did not succeed. (a) Vriend v Alberta (1998)Court held that Albertas Human Rights code violated s15 by excluding same sexcouples from spousal obligations.

(b) Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (2000) - the Court held that the practices of custom officialsin obstructing the importation of gay and lesbian communities was a breach of s15. (c) Egale v Can ( 2003)BC courts held, along with other provinces that opposite sex requirements for marriagewas contrary to s 15, thereby legalizing same sex marriage in several provinces. 4.Not analogous grounds are: (a)Place of residence has not been accepted ( except Indians on Reserves)(b)Occupation has not been accepted- so laws denying bargaining rights to police officers cannot be challengedunder s15.(c)Substance orientation is not an analogous ground- so laws prohibiting the use of marijuana cannot be challengedunder s15. (d) Privileges for the Crown and other public authorities in litigation cannot be challenged under s15. g.Disadvantage i.This involves two inquires: 1.Whether the group to which the claimant compares herself is the appropriate comparator group2.whether the distinction that the law draws between the claimant and the comparator group is disadvantageous to theclaimant. ii.Comparator group1.Comparison with other to whom the claimant may legitimately invite comparisons i.e. others who are similar situated to the complainant except for the presence of alisted or analogous personal characteristic.(a)The complainant will compare himself to someone who is better treated themhim (Martin). The responding government will suggest a different comparatorgroup that either receives worse treatment or the same treatment (Hodge) orthat does not exist (Auton) The courts will be assited by its sense of the purposeof statutory scheme.43

2. Andrews

The plaintiffs non-Canadian citizenship denied him access to the legal profession, while permittingaccess to others whose qualifications to practice law were no different from his except-for the possession of Canadian citizenship. 3. Hodge v Canada (2004) survivors benefit under Canada Pension Plan. C/l spouse of CPP contributor at time of contributors death, but left him shortly before death. Ct held that she selected the wrong comparison group. Thecorrect comparative group was not married souses living apart but former spouses since c/l marriage requirescohabitation. 4. Auton V BC (2004) a claim of discrimination was made by autistic children and their parents. They complainedthat the province did not fund the applied behaviour therapy. Lower court found the province in breach s 15. SCCreversed the decision because the lower courts erred on the comparative groups. The court stated that it was wrongto compare autism claimants with recipients of fully funded therapies because it ignored the fact that autism therapyhad only recently become recognized as medically necessary. Funding of new therapies may be legitimatelydenied or delayed because of uncertainty about a program and had administrative difficulties related to itsrecognition and implementation. The claimant had adduced no evidence that the province was funding other comparable, novel therapies they could not show disadvantage or unequal treatment. iii.Disadvantage1. Eatton v Brant County Board of Education (1997)no finding of disadvantage Tribunal found that a child withcerebral-palsy who had been educated in a regular classroom should be educated in a special classroom. The parentstook the view that without parental consent it was a breach of equality rights. SCC held there was no breach of s15. evidence showed that segregating setting was in the best interest of the child. The equality right was that of thechilds and not the parents. Given the tribunal ruling, placement of the child in a segregated setting could not becharacterized as the imposition of a disadvantage on the child. 2. Court in Law v Canada (1999) stated that both subjective and objective standard should be employed. The inquirywas to be undertaken from the perspective of the claimant and from no other perspective but the

claimantassertion must be supported by an objective assessment of the situation. h. Direct and Indirect Discrimination (Disadvantage) 1. Andrews- both indirect and direct discrimination is covered by s15. Note- only two claimants of indirectdiscrimination have been successful.(a)Eldridge v BC (1997)- BC health care to fund sign language interpretation to deaf people.(b)Vriend v Alberta (1998)- Albertas human rights legislation not including sexual orientation. 2. Direct -A law may be discriminatory in its face. ( a law that excludes women from the police force would bediscrimination on its face) 3. IndirectA law may be discriminatory on its effect( a law that imposes weight and height qualifications for admission to the police force would be discriminatory (whether or not intended) because most women arent as largeas men. (indirect) Indirect does not expressly employ any of the categories listed in s15 ( or analogous) 44 4. Indirect- A law may be discriminatory on its application.a law that prescribed no discriminatory qualificationsfor admission to the police force would be discriminatory in its application if police recruitment procedures led tothe rejection of a disproportionate number of female applicants. i.Affirmative Action 55.13i. s15(2)makes it clear that s15 does not preclude affirmative action programs or equity programs in favour of disadvantaged individuals or groups ii. Affirmative Action Program fails s15(2)? 1.

Meets the CriteriaIf an affirmative action plan met the criteria of subsection (2)then the program was validunder s15(2) not s15(1) and s15(1 analysis is needed. 2. Fails to Meet the Criteria - If it failed to meet criteria under s15(2) then a s15(1) analysis would have to beundertaken to determine whether the program was discriminatory. (Substantive equality built into 15(1) analysis) iii. R v Kapp[2008] makes clear that a program cannot not be attacked under s 15(1) if it targets a group identified by one of the listed or analogous groups in s 15(1) so long as:1.the group is disadvantaged and2.the purpose of the program is the improvement of the conditions of the group. j. Discrimination Permitted by Constitution 55.14i. Although the Charter came after the Constitution Act 1867, it is not to be read as impliedly repealing or amending those provisions of the earlier instrument that are inconsistent with the unqualified language of s15. It is to be read as qualified by the language of the earlier instrument. ii. Religion in

s93 1. Ontario Separate School funding case (1987)The case reviewed the validity of an Ontario statue that extendedfull public funding to Roman Catholic separate secondary schools which at the time were being funded to grade 10only. Religious schools other than Roman Catholic schools received no funding. The SCC unanimously upheld thestatue on the basis that the distinctive treatment of Roman Catholic school supporters was expressly permitted by theConstitution. The Charter of Rights he held, cannot be interpreted as rendering unconstitutional distinctions thatare expressly permitted by the Constitution Act 1867. iii.Sex 55.171. Statutory rape okR v Hess (1990) SCC held that the offence of statutory rape (intercourse with a female personunder the age of 14) did not offend s15 although it could only be committed by a male person. Wilson J- for themajority stated intercourse was defined by penetration, which is a biological fact it could only be committed bymales. 2. Female guards in jail ok Weatherall v Canada (1993) prisoner challenged the constitutional validity of femaleguards frisking males ( male guards did not frisk women).La Forest- that equality did not demand that men andwomen always be treated in the same way and the effort of cross gender searching was different and morethreatening for women than men. Even if it was a breach of s15, it would be saved by s1. 3. Citizenship parents struck downBenner v Canada (1997) provision in federal Citizenship Act that distinguished between men and women was struck down under s15. The discrimination by sex applied to the parents of applicants 45

and not to the applicants themselves. It was a breach of s15 and not saved under s1. 4. Naming for birth certificates struck down Trociuk v BC (2003) (men/women-law)- father challenged the provincial law that permitted the mother on the birth of the child, to leave the fathers name off the birth certificateand if she did that, to alone choose the surname of the child. The mother was unmarried and were estranged. SCCheld- the law distinguished on the basis of sex since the fathers were disadvantaged in comparison with mothers.The court also held the naming process impaired their human dignity therefore it was a breach of s 15 and not justified under s1. iv.Age1.Two differences between age and the other named grounds of discrimination (a)age is a characteristic that is shared by everyone. In the course of a life span everyone will pass through thevarious stages of childhood-old age. (b)the other between age and other grounds is that there is some correlationbetween age and ability. This is not the case with race, color, ethnic origin, sexalthough (true for mental or physical disability).2. Survivor Pension Benefits upheld . Law v Canada (1999)upheld a law thatdenied a benefit to a young person. It did not exclude them because they were lesscapable or less worthy, but that older people were more in need support and wereoften limited without resources. Didnt impair human dignity.3. Welfare benefits upheld.

Gosselin v Quebec (2002)the distinction was notdiscriminatory that the amount of welfare benefit would change if you were underthe age of 30. It did not impair human dignity. The scheme was described as harshand misguided but did not treat people less worthy or less deserving"4. Autistic education limit upheld . Wynberg v Ontario (2006)Ontario preschoolprogram which supplied therapy to autistic children would cease one the childturned 6. It was aimed at this age because expert opinion stated that youngchildren respond well to this treatment. The court held: that the programcorresponds to the needs and circumstances of children aged two and five and forthis reason the human dignity of school age children who were denied the therapy.5. Beating kids upheld. Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (2004 )constitutionality of s43 of the CC which made it a defence to charge of assault for a school teacher or parent to use force by way of correction toward pupil or child The distinction was not discriminatory because it did not impair the dignity of thechildren who were exposed to corrective force. SCC held that criminal law should not intrude into normal schooland family discipline. Criminal law remained available to punish force that was violent and abusive. where it was agenuine effort to educate the child, poses no reasonable risk of harm... 6. Mandatory retirement upheld and overturned. McKinney v University of Guelph (1990)a number of university professors in Ontario challenged themandatory requirement polices of their universities ( 3 cases similar but were foundto be outside the scope of the charter. this case was a community college whichwas tightly controlled by the government) It held that mandatory retirement was abreach of s15 but was upheld by s1 .(a) Vs. Tetreault-Gadoury v Canada (1991) the question arose whether a provision of the UnemploymentInsurance Act, which denied benefits to people over 65 was a breach of s15. The court distinguished McKinneyon 3 grounds:(i)that a university was a closed system with limited resources 46

(ii)that faculty renewal was crucial to extending the frontiers of knowledge(iii)that academic freedom required a minimum performance review up to retirement age. v.Mental or Physical Disabilities1. Eaton v Brant County Board of Education (1997) what form of accommodation was required by s 15 for astudent with mentally and physical disabilities. SCC held- that the school had to accommodate someone with mentaland physical disabilities but it was in the best interest in the child and not the parent. In this case experts held thatspecial needs was better than regular class (what the parents wanted) 2. Wynberg v Ontario (2006)this was an age and disability claim. Child with autism and under the age of 6. Theautistic preschool program ended at the age of 6. Experts stated that children at this age respond best to the therapytherefore it was the best interest of the child. not a breach of s15. 3. Winko v BC (1999 )a challenge to the Criminal Code that provided for the disposition of the accused following averdict of not criminally responsibly Court held that because this provision actually helped mentally Ill peoplefrom not being punished it was not a breach of s15. 4. Granovsky v Canada(2000)challenge to the Canada pension plan. His back pain put him in a category of temporary disablement and not permanent disablement therefore he could not take advantage of the program. He fellthrough the cracks of the program. SCC held the denial was not a breach of s15. Parliament was recognizing agreater need and not impairing human dignity to those who had been temporarily disabled during the qualifying period. LANGAUGE 2)

Generally a. Vs. Free Expression - No rights in the constitution protect the use of English or French in private commercial settings.However they may offend the the guarantee of freedom of expression in s 2(b). see Ford v Quebec ( 1988) b. No plenary power to language in federalism division of powers c. s16 CharterEnglish and French the Official Languages of Canada and New Brunswick. d. s20 Charter - Obligation on government to provide bilingual services on the Public. e. Law-Making/Legislature i. Constitution Act, 1867, s.133 1. Federal statues have been enacted in both languages - court have held that both versions equally authoritative andhave developed rules for resolving discrepancies. Any doubt or ambiguity is solved by looking at the clear version. 2. s133 permits English and French to be used in debates in the House of the federal Parliament and QuebecLegislatures, and in courts 3. AG v Blaikie ( 1979)-SCC struck down provisions of Quebecs Charter of the French language that purported tomake the French language of the Legislature and court pleadings and process. The Act provided that bills were to be provided in French only and only the French version be official. This contravened s133. S133 requires law be printand published in both languages especially in records and journals, and that court process could be issues in any 47

language. This means all statues enacted after the Quebecs Charter were in violation of s133. This was fixed thenext day. 4. MacDonald v. City of Montreal ( 1986)- English-speaking quebec defended speeding charge had been issued byquebec ct in French language only. Ct held did not infringe s. 133. ii. Manitoba Act 1870 1870 includes s23 a provision that provides for the use of English and French in the Legislature (andcourts ) of Manitoba in terms very similar to s133. No other province created after 1867 had language guarantees writteninto their constituent instruments or terms of union. 1. Reference re Language Rights Under s 23 of Manitoba Act : But In 1890 , the Manitoba Legislature enactedthe Official languages Act which provided English Language only in records and journals of theLegislature and in the pleadings and process in the Manitoba courts. Courts held that ManitobasOfficial Languages Act was unconstitutional 4 times- but legislature didnt respond. Re ManitobaLanguage Rights (1985) SCC confirmed that the failure to comply with s 23 requirement resulted in theinvalidity of the purported statue. To conform with rule of law, Court decided on a drastic remedy namelyallowing the invalid acts to remain law until statutes were translated. iii. Constitution Act, 1982 , ss.16-231.Duplicate S1332.French language of constitutional docs(a)s55 Constiution Act 1982directs the Minster of Justice to prepare French version of the English only parts of the Constitution of Canada 1867. It still remains unofficial . Any discrepancy would have to use the English one because it is official.(b)s57 The Constitution Act 1982- provides that the English and French version of that Act are equallyauthoritative. s56 provides that both languages versions of other parts of Constitution of Canada are bothequally authoritativef.Language and education 1. s93 Constitution Act 1867confers powers upon the provincial Legislatures the power to make laws in relation toeducation but it prohibits the Legislatures from prejudicially affecting rights or privileges with respect todenominational schools existing by law at the time of confederation . (a)

If a language of instruction was a right or privilege of denominational schools in a province at the time of confederation then the province would have to respect that. 2. s23 Charterminority language rights have now been provided for in s23. It is on citizens of Canada, who areEnglish speaking minority in Quebec or French Speaking majority in other provinces . the right to have their children receive primary and secondary school in their language in that province.(a)Parent has to fit into 1 of 3 categories: (i) mother tongue of the parent s23(1a)1.They have to reside, be Canadian citizen, be an language minority French or English, Need to provethe language was first language learned and is still understood2.By virtue of s59 Constitution of Act 1982- the paragraph does not apply in Quebec until the legislativeassembly or government of Quebec decides to adopt it. English speaking parents in Quebec have no 48 right to send their children to English speaking schools, unless they fit into the second or third categoryof parent recognized by s 23. (ii) language of primary school instruction in Canada of the parents ( 1b) 1.This is called the Canada Clause. Citizens who move from one provinceto another retain their right to have their children educated in the samelanguage as that which parent was educated anywhere in Canada.Quebec is not exempt from this para(b).2. AG of Que v Quebec Protestant School Board (1984) - Quebec Charter of theFrench Language had a Quebec clause but limited admission to English schoolsin Quebec to children of persons educated in English in Quebec. SCC held thatthis clause was in conflict with Canada Clause. The Quebec clause has to yield tothe Canada clause. (iii)language of instruction in Canada of one child of the parent s23(2) (b) Limitationwhere the numbers warrant(i)s23 (3)(a) and (b) applies wherever in the province the number of children of citizens who have such right is sufficient to warrant the provision to them outof public funds of minority language instruction and minority languageeducational facilities provided out of public funds(ii)Mahe v Alberta (1990)- S.23 established sliding scale of entitlement basedon number of kids. If very small, maybe no minority rights. Court rejectedargument that language facilities

was not just physical facilities. It alsoincludes a degree of management and control that was proportionate to thenumber of qualifying children (could include independent school board, butnot under facts of case).(iii)Arsenault-Cameron v PEI (200) - French language school for 49 students,didnt want to bus their kids 28 ki away, even though that was less than avg.bus distance for English-language students in province. SCC sided withparents and held the relevant number to consider was somewhere betweenthe known demand and the potential students who could potentially takeadvantage of the service. The number in this case who potentially would gois 155. ABORIGINALS 1) Fed Power a. Constitution Act, 1867, s.91(24) - confers power upon the federal Parliament the power to make law in relation to Indians,and lands reserved for the Indians. i. Federal govt has taken a broad view incl matters otherwise outside its legislative competence: 49 1.e.g. Indian Act- provisions that govern: succession to the property of deceased Indians, administration of property of mentally incompetent Indians and infant Indians 2. Are they in pith and substance in relations to Indians? Lysyk-doubts as to the validity of the Indian Acts forays intothe law of property. b.Power over Indians i.Reserved for only Indians where they reside on, or have any connection with, lands reserved for Indians.)ii.Federal Indian Act - defines the term Indian /establishes a register to record names/ and persons within this statutorydefinition are known as Status Indians. They can enjoy the right to live on Indian reserves.1.Non-Status Indians some persons with Indian Blood and Culture-who are outside the definition. Metis People(French/Indian) outside reserve system most likely Indians Under s 91(24) & The Inuit or Eskimo people- areoutside reserve system but held to be Indians within the meaning of s91(24) 2.R v Powley- Courts lays down 3 indicia of Metis people(a) FACTS: P charged with unlawfully hunting moose; P argues that, as Metis, theyhave an aboriginal right to hunt for food in the Sault Ste Marie area(i)(1) Self-identification(ii)(2) Ancestral connection(iii)(3) Community acceptancec. Power over lands reserved for Indians 1.Maybe exercised in respect of Indians and Non Indians so long as the law is related to lands

reserved for the Indians. 2. St Catherines Milling and Lumber Co v the Queen (1889) The title of the provincial crown is subject to theaboriginal rights of the Indians and of those rights along with other matters pertaining to the control andadministration of the reserves are subject to the legislative authority of the federal government. 3. Delgamuukw v B.C. (1997)the SCC went even further holding the phrase extends to all lands held pursuant toaboriginal title. For that reason, only the federal Parliament had the power to extinguish aboriginal title. Includeshuge area of land recognized by the Royal Proclamation 1763. This is all land within the territory covered by the proclamation that was in possession of the Indians and that had not been covered by the crown. d.Provincial Laws i.General rule is that provincial laws apply to Indians and lands reserved for the Indians. 1. R v Hill (1907)Ont. Court of appeal held that a provincial law confining the practice of medicine to qualified physicians applied to Indians: an Indian was convicted of the offence of the unauthorized practice of medicine. ( noton reserve but it didnt matter) 2. Four B Manufacturing v United Garment Workers( 1979) The SCC held that that provincial labour law appliedto shoe manufacturing business which was located on a reserve, which was owed ( through a corporation) byIndians, which employed manily Indians and which had been funded by the Department of Indian Affairs. 3. R v Francis- (SC 1988)the court held that a provincial traffic laws applied to an Indian who had been driving avehicle on a reserve. 50 ii.Five Exceptions 1. A) Singling Out A provincial law that singles out Indians or Indian reserves for special treatment would run therisk of being classified as a law in relation to Indians or Indian reserves and if so classified, the law would beinvalid. R v Sutherland [1980] 2.

B) Indianness - basically anything that affects status or capacity- Kruger and Manuel v The Queen [1978] 3. C) ParamounctyIf a provincial law is inconsistent with a provision of the Indian act (or any other federal law) the provincial law is rendered inoperative by the doctrine of federal paramountcy. 4. D) Natural Resource AgreementProvincial laws cannot deprive Indians the right to take game and fish for food.The NRA is part of the Constitution of Canada. 5. E) Section 35 has protected treaty rights. 2)Aboriginal Rights a. Royal Proclamation of 1763 , which reserved to the Crown the exclusive right to negotiate cessions of Aboriginal titlei.Aboriginal people were not to be "molested or disturbed" on their landsii.Transactions involving Aboriginal land were to be negotiated properly between the Crown and "assemblies of Indians".Aboriginal lands were to be acquired only by fair dealing: treaty, or purchase by the Crown.iii.The proclamation portrays Indian nations as autonomous political entities, living under the protection of the Crown butretaining their own internal political authority.iv.It walks a fine line between safeguarding the rights of Aboriginal peoples and establishing a process to permit Britishsettlement-divide and share sovereign rights to the lands that are now Canada. b. Constitution Act, 1982 , s.35 i. Elevated existing common law aboriginal rights to constitutional status 1. 1 - The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized andaffirmed. 2. (2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada. 3. (3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) "treaty rights" includes rights that now exist by way of

land claimsagreements or may be so acquired 4. (4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) areguaranteed equally to male and female personsii.S.25- Charter doesnt detract from existing rts. iii.Charter Challenges under S.15 1. Corbiere v Canada (1999)the SCC struck down a provision of the Indian Act that made residence on the reserve arequirement for voting in band elections. Held: That the distinction between Indians who lived on the reserve( ancould vote) and Indians who lived off the reserve was a breach of s 15. 2. Lovelace v Ontario ( 2000) The SCC rejected a challenge to the distinction of the Casino Rama gambling profitsthat was limited to communities registered as bands under the Indian Act. The court held that the exclusion of non 51

status bands from the distribution of the profits was not a breach of s15. c. Scope of Rights enforceable at c/l or s.35, protected by govt. fiduciary 1.R v Van der Peet (1996): Definition of Rights w/I s .35 (a) Aboriginal rights not held by virtue of Crown grant, legislation or treaty but b/c the doctrine of aboriginalrights exists, and is recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1), because of one simple fact: when Europeans arrived in North America, aboriginal peoples were already here, living in communities on the land, and participating indistinctive cultures, as they had done for centuries..(i)by reason of the fact that aboriginal peoples were once independent, self governing entities in possessionof most of the lands now making up Canada. (b) To identify an existing aboriginal right within the meaning of s35 of the Constitutional Act 1982.: identifyingthe crucial elements of those pre-existing distinctive societies. Test - In order to be an aboriginal right anactivity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of theaboriginal group asserting the right.

(i) In order for the practice to be integral, the practice, custom or tradition must be of central significanceto the aboriginal society : it must be a defining characteristic of the society, one of the things that made theculture of the society distinctive. (Not incidental to another practice.) (ii) The practice must have been developed before contact that is, before the arrival of Europeans in NorthAmerica 1. cf. R v Powley ( 2003)- Held- f or Metis claimants of aboriginal rights, the focus on European contacthad to be moved forward, not to the time of European sovereignty, but to the time of effectiveEuropean control. The focus should be on the period after a particular Mtis community arose and before it came under the effective political and legal control of European laws and customs in a particular area. (iii) The practice can evolve over the years as the result of contact- ( ie bone hook-metal hook & bow andarrow- gun) but Do not qualify- contemporary practices that developed solely as a response to Europeaninfluences do not qualify. See harvesting timber below. (iv) the existence of an aboriginal right will depend entirely on the practices, customs and traditions of the particular aboriginal community claiming the right (c) Facts: Van der Peetdefendant had been convicted of catching and selling fish that she had caught under theauthority of a Indian food-fish license. The court held that fishing for food was part of the Sto:lo society as wellwith the exchange of fish, but selling the fish was not an integral part of the Stolo culture. The exchange of fish took place, but was not a central, significant or defining feature of Sto:lo society. No right to sell.Conviction upheld. 2. Sparrow-type obligations (rights) arise when the Crown must respect constitutionally protected Aboriginal or treaty rights and justify interferences with those rights no extinguishing rights (a) R v Sparrow ( 1990) The SCC unanimously recognized the aboriginal right of a member of the MusqueamIndian Band to fish for salmon in the Fraser River. where his ancestors had fished from time immemorial(i)The defendant had been charged with the violation of the federal Fisheries Act and because the chargerelated to facts occurring after 1982 he was able to invoke the s35 of the Constitution Act 1982.

52

(ii) Held- That s35 did provide constitutional protection for the aboriginal right (existing language requiredthat rt had to exist at time of 1982, not extinguished rights) -- gives a measure of control over governmentconduct and a strong check on legislative power. Court refused to imply an extinguishment from theadmittedly extensive regulatory control of the Fisheries Act b/c only if the intention to extinguish wasclear and plain. The government is required to bear the burden of justifying any legislation that has somenegative effect on any aboriginal right protected under s. 35(1)- but s35 rights are subject to regulation byfederal laws, provided that the laws meet a standard of justification. (iii)Standard of justification test: 1. Is there a valid legislative objective that is compelling and substantial? Is the regulation sought to beimposed required to complete that objective? 2. Consider the special fiduciary relationship and responsibility of government vis a vis aboriginals. Ask:is the limitation unreasonable?a.Fiduciary been interpreted as (Delgamuukw v British Columbia)i.idea of priority, namely that aboriginal demands should be placed first; but this does notdemand that aboriginal rights always be given priority.ii.whether there has been as little infringement as possible in order to effect the desired result;iii.whether, in a situation of expropriation, fair compensation is available;iv.whether the aboriginal group in question has been consulted with respect to the conservationmeasures being implemented) (b) Ct enlarged the fiduciary duty

the Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity. (i) R v Sparrow , which was the Courts first s 35 decision, extended scope of the relationship the generalguiding principle for section 35 is that the Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciarycapacity with respect to aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the Government and aboriginals istrust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship; (ii) "the honour of the Crown is at stake in dealings with aboriginal peoples(7)The special trust relationshipand the responsibility of the government vis--vis aboriginals must be the first consideration in determiningwhether the [infringing] legislation or action in question can be justified; (iii) [t]he justificatory standard to be met may place a heavy burden on the Crown, while inquiries such aswhether the infringement has been minimal, whether fair compensation has been available, and whether theaffected Aboriginal group has been consulted may also be included in the justification test(8)3.Other Rights: (a) Not Selling fish: R v. NTC Smokehouse rights not established The practice of of exchanging fish was notsufficiently central to the aboriginal culture to qualify as an aboriginal right . (b) Yes - Hunting/fishing on non-title lands : Rights to particular activities such as hunting, fishing and harvestingmay also exist on land to which the aboriginal people do not have title to. ( Fishing - R v Adams [1996]) (c) Yes- harvesting timber, even if originally for survival purposes.R v Sappier (Even though a practice may have been undertaken for survival purposes, it can still be considered integral to an Aboriginal communitysdistinctive culture) (i) FACTS: Charged w/ unlawful possession or cutting of Crown timber to build permanent home ok?

Indefence, they say they possess an aboriginal and treaty right to harvest timber for personal use. In the present cases, the relevant practice for the purposes of the Van der Peet test is harvesting wood. The record 53

shows that wood was used to fulfil the communities domestic needs for such things as temporary shelter,transportation, tools and fuel. I would therefore characterize the respondents claim as a right to harvestwood for domestic uses as a member of the aboriginal community. (ii) Evidence established that the wood was critically important to the Maliseet and MiKmaq people pre-contact, evolved into modern right to harvest wood by modern means to construct permanent dwelling. Further, even though the practice may have been undertaken for survival purposes, it can still beconsidered integral to an Aboriginal communitys distinctive culture (iii) Continuity: Although the nature of the practice which founds the aboriginal right claim must be consideredin the context of the pre-contact distinctive culture of the particular aboriginal community, the nature of the right must be determined in light of present-day circumstances; logical evolution means thesame sort of activity, carried on in the modern economy by modern means . So, the right to harvestwood for the construction of temporary shelters must be allowed to evolve into a right to harvest wood bymodern means to be used in the construction of a modern dwelling. Any other conclusion would freezethe right in its pre-contact form. (d) Yes- hunting in Sault Ste. Marie - R. v. Powley-Mtis community enjoy a constitutionally protected right tohunt for food under s.

35 . The practice of subsistence hunting and fishing was a constant in the Mtiscommunity, even though the availability of particular species might have waxed and waned. The evidenceindicates that subsistence hunting was an important aspect of Mtis life and a defining feature of their specialrelationship to the land. Evidence supports the trial judges finding that hunting for food was integral to theMtis way of life at Sault Ste. Marie in the period just prior to 1850 (which meets the modified time frame test)(i)The main justification advanced by the appellant is that of conservation. Although conservation is clearly avery important concern, we agree with the trial judge that the record here does not support this justification.(ii)Legislation is invalid4.Extinguishments of Aboriginal Rights(a)by surrender (must be voluntary and to the Crown) R v Howard [1994(b)by constitutional amendment R v Horseman [1990](c)legislation w/ clear and plain intention to extinguish aboriginal rights (Sparrow) 3)Aboriginal Title 1.Exclusive occupation of land, which permits the aboriginal owners to use the land in a variety of purposes. It wouldobviously permit the owners to hunt fish and harvest their lands .(a)Aboriginal title vs non-aboriginal title(i) Source of aboriginal title- derives from pre sovereignty occupation rather than post sovereignty grant fromthe crown.(ii)Range of uses to which aboriginal title land may be put.(iii)Aboriginal title is inalienable, except to the Crown. The Crown has to act as an immediatry between theaboriginal owners and third parties. To pass to third parties, the aboriginals must surrender the land toCrown.(iv)Aboriginal title can only be held communally.(v)Aboriginal title is constitutionally protected. 54 2. Guerin-type obligations fiduciary w/r/t/ land - arise in situations where the Crown has a duty to act in the interestsof an Aboriginal group (a) Guerin v The Queen (1984) . SCC recognized that the aboriginal title of Musqueam Indian Band to land inBC. a legal right derived from the Indians historic occupation and possession of their tribal lands. Aboriginalrights that have not been extinguished are recognized by the common law and are enforceable by the courts (i) Fiduciary duty : The aboriginal title to the land gave rise to a fiduciary duty on the part of the crown todeal with the land for the benefit of the surrendering Indians. 1. The fiduciary relationship is rooted in the concept of Aboriginal title, coupled with the requirement,outlined above, that the Aboriginal interest in land may be alienated only via

surrender to the Crown;this requirement, which places the Crown between the Aboriginal group and third parties to preventexploitation, gives the Crown discretion to decide the Aboriginal interest, and transforms its obligationinto a fiduciary one so as to regulate Crown conduct when dealing with the land for the Aboriginalgroup; (ii) Held- This fiduciary duty had been broken and awarded damages to the Band for lease of reservation landto golf club - $10mm. 3. Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1997) proceedings for a declaration that they had aboriginal title and self government right over a territory in northern B.C. The SCC did not grant the declaration sought and ordered a newtrial. (a)Test for Aboriginal Title 1. The land must have been occupied prior to sovereignty (Not prior to contact)2.If present occupation is relied on as proof of occupation pre-sovereignty, there must be a continuity between present and pre-sovereignty occupation.3.At sovereignty, that occupation must have been exclusive (b) Source: Aboriginal title is a common law interest in land - arises from the prior occupation of Canada byaboriginal peoples; what makes aboriginal title sui generis is that it arises from possession before the assertionof British sovereignty.1.Aboriginal title at common law is protected in full form under s.35(1) (c) Scope: Aboriginal title encompasses the right to (1) exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant tothat title for a variety of purposes doesnt have to be for aboriginal practices, custom and traditions. But itsnot fee simple(2) use must not be irreconcilable with the nature of the groups attachment to that land1.E.g. occupation of land for hunting cant use it to destroy value for such a use (e.g. for strip mining) 2. held communally , 3.

May not be alienated - Other than Crown. Alienation would bring to an end the entitlement of theaboriginal people to occupy the land and would terminate their relationship with it i. Extinguish: If aboriginal peoples wish to use their lands in way that aboriginal titles does not permit, then they must surrender those lands and convert them in to non title lands to do so can exchange for non-aboriginal land in exahnge for fair consideration from Crown. 55

ii. The relevance of the continuity of the relationship of an aboriginal community with its land isthat it applies not only to the past but to the future as well as a result, uses of the land thatwould threaten that future relationship are, by their very nature, excluded from aboriginal title (d) Evidentiary Proof oral histories ok. (e) Limitation : Rights may be infringed, both by the federal (e.g., Sparrow ) and provincial (e.g., Ct )governments. However, s. 35(1) requires that those infringements satisfy the test of justification. 4. Haida Nation v BCduty to consult when the Crown (or province) has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it (esp.where aboriginal interests are in the process of being proved), scope of the duty is proportionate to a preliminaryassessment of the strength of the case (i) Duty to consult and accommodate

- duty grounded in honour of the Crown, and embodied in s.35: In all itsdealings with Aboriginal peoples, from the assertion of sovereignty to the resolution of claims and theimplementation of treaties, the Crown must act honourably- requires that these rights be determined,recognized and respected. Content of the duty varied with the circumstances - but may require it to consultand, where reasonable, accommodate Aboriginal interests. (ii) Scope of the duty is proportionate to a preliminary assessment of the strength of the case supporting theexistence of the right or title, and to the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the right or titleclaimed.However, there is no duty to agree; rather, the commitment is to a meaningful process of consultation 1. At one end of the spectrum lie cases where the claim to title is weak, the Aboriginal right limited, or the potential for infringement minor. In such cases, the only duty on the Crown may be to give notice,disclose information, and discuss any issues raised in response to the notice. At the other end of thespectrum lie cases where a strong prima facie case for the claim is established, the right and potentialinfringement is of high significance to the Aboriginal peoples, and the risk of non-compensabledamage is high. In such cases deep consultation, aimed at finding a satisfactory interim solution, may be required2.Duty doesnt extend to 3d party (iii) FACTS: This brings us to the issue before this Court. The government holds legal title to the land.Exercising that legal title, it has granted Weyerhaeuser the right to harvest the forests in Block 6 of the land(which is subject to a land title claim by the Haida people)- Haida people have not proven title to land.Govt duty to consult?? 1. Held- The Crown, acting honourably, cannot cavalierly run roughshod over Aboriginal interests whereclaims affecting these interests are being seriously pursued in the process of treaty negotiation and proof even before final detrmination. 4)Aboriginal Self Government a.Paramountcy of aboriginal law vs. provincial/federal?i.Should be resolved by the Sparrow test.b. SlattteryThe aboriginal right of self government must exist because aboriginal people56 were living in self government communities before the arrival of Europeans. c. R v Pamajewon (1996)

the aboriginal right to self government extends only to activities that took placebefore European contact and only those activities that were an integral part of the aboriginal society. 1. SCC rejected a claim by the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First nations to conduct high stakesgambling on their reserves. In each case the gambling operations were conducted pursuantto a law enacted by the band council. It was not a by-law of the Indian Act. They werecharged with a gaming offence under the Indian Act. Larmer CJ characterized the claimedright as a right to participate in and regulate, gambling activities on their respectivereserve lands. Evidence showedthat they gambled before the arrival of Europeans, itwas small scaled and informal and was never part of the means by which the communitieswere sustained. Court was concerned withthe ability of aboriginal people to immunize themselves from therules of the Criminal Code was a major concern for the courts. 5)Definition of Treaty has been described as unique or sui generis.i.It is an agreement between the Crown and aboriginal nation with the followingcharacteristics. 1. PartiesCrown on one side, aboriginals on the other. 2. Agencythe signatories on the treaty must have the authority to bind theirprinciples, namely the Crown and the aboriginal nation. 3. Intention to create legal relations : the parties must intend to create legallybinding obligations.4. Considerationthe obligations must be assumed by both sides, so that theagreement is a bargain . 5. Formality: there must be a certain measure of solemnity. ii.

Principle of interpretation- that treaties and statues reacting to Indians should be liberally construed and doubtfulexpressions resolved in favour of the Indians. Simon v The Queen [1985] iii.2 leading cases about treaties, both cases were applying s88 of the Indian Act not s35of the Constitution Act 1982-(safe to say word treaty is similar. )1. Simon v the Queen (1985)Held to be a valid treaty to except the Micmacdefendant from the game laws of Nova Scotia.iv. R v Marshall (Marshall 3- 2005) 1. Aboriginal treaty right : Scope of treaty right is to be determined by what trading activities were in thecontemplation of the parties at the time the treaties were made. This is correct . But treaty rights are not frozen intime. Modern peoples do traditional things in modern ways. The question is whether the modern tradingactivity in question represents a logical evolution from the traditional trading activity at the time the treatywas made 2. FACTS: M and B were convicted of offences related to the selling/possession of timber, commercial logging w/oauthorization in violation of provincial forest mgmt laws. Do Mikmak people in NS and NB have the right to log 57

on Crown lands for commercial purposes pursuant to either treaty or Aboriginal title?

The question is whether thecommercial logging here at issue is the logical evolution of a traditional Mikmaq trade activity . In Marshall , CurranProv. Ct. J. found no direct evidence of any trade in forest products at the time the treaties were made- evidencesupports the trial judges conclusion that the commercial logging that formed the basis of the charges against therespondents was not the logical evolution of traditional Mikmaq trading activity/minor trade in wood products protected by the treaties of 1760-61. 58 20. Remedies Constitution Act, 1982 , s.24, s.52Hogg, chapter 40, Enforcement of Rights Schachter v. Canada , [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 Vriend v. Alberta , [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, per Iacobucci J., paragraphs 129-179 Constitutional Law January 2010 Page 9 Supreme Court Judgments : http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/index.html 1.Generally a. In choosing how to apply s. 52 or s. 24 a court will determine its course of action with reference to the nature of theviolation and the context of the specific legislation under consideration.Schachter v Canada 2. The supremacy clause- for laws. a. Generally speaking, it will be the declaration of invalidity under s 52(1) that provides the remedy for laws that violate aCharter right, while s 24(1) provides the remedy for government acts that

violate an individuals Charter right.(Schacter) b.Once s. 52 is engaged, three questions must be answered. i. First, what is the extent of the inconsistency? 1.The extent of the inconsistency should be defined:a.Broadly where the legislation in question fails the first branch of the Oakes test in that its purpose is held not to be sufficiently pressing or substantial to justify infringing a Charter right or, indeed, if the purpose is itself held to be unconstitutional -- perhaps the legislation inits entirety; b.More narrowly where the purpose is held to be sufficiently pressing and substantial, but thelegislation fails the first element of the proportionality branch of the Oakes test in that themeans used to achieve that purpose are held not to be rationally connected to it -- generallylimited to the particular portion which fails the rational connection test; or,c. Flexibly where the legislation fails the second or third element of the proportionality branchof the Oakes test.ii.Second, can that inconsistency be dealt with alone, by way of severance or reading in, or are other parts of thelegislation inextricably linked to it?iii.Third, should the declaration of invalidity be temporarily suspended? c.There are 6 choices of available remedies for s 52(1):i.Nullification ii. Temporary validity : The rationale for this remedy is that it would be better for Parliament/legislatures tocorrect the constitutional defect (dialogue). In re Manitoba Language Rights (1985). 1. A court may strike down legislation or a legislative provision but suspend the effect of that declarationuntil Parliament or the provincial legislature has had an opportunity to fill the void. This approach isclearly appropriate where the striking down of a provision poses a potential danger to the public. Itmay also be appropriate in cases of underinclusiveness as opposed to overbreadth. For example, in thiscase some of the interveners argued that in cases where a denial of equal benefit of the law is alleged,the legislation in question is not usually problematic in and of itself. It is its underinclusiveness that is problematic so striking down the law immediately would deprive deserving persons of benefits without providing them to the applicant. (Schacter) iii. Severance - When only a part of a statute or provision violates the Constitution, it is common sense that onlythe offending portion should be declared to be of no force or effect, and the rest should be spared. The doctrineof severance requires that a court define carefully the extent of the inconsistency between the statute in questionand the requirements of the Constitution, and then declare inoperative (a) the inconsistent portion, and (b) such part of the remainder of which it cannot be safely assumed that the legislature would have enacted it without theinconsistent portion. iv.

Reading in : Applies to under inclusive statute which, usually, confers a benefit on a class that failed to includeall persons who had an equality based right to be included. Vriend. (Schachter): 1. Caution on Reading In: Regarding the reading in remedy, in some cases, the question of how thestatute ought to be extended in order to comply with the Constitution cannot be answered with asufficient degree of precision on the basis of constitutional analysis. In such a case, it is thelegislature's role to fill in the gaps, not the court's. 59
http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/index.html

2. One way to ask whether to read in or sever would be an illegitimate intrusion into the legislative sphereis to ask whether the significance of the part which would remain is substantially changed when theoffending part is excised.3.Another way is to look at the significance of the remaining portion: has the permissible portion always been there? If so, then it would be safe to assume that the legislature would have enacted the permissible portion without the impermissible portion v. Reading down when statute will bear two interpretations, one of which offends charts and one which doesnt. Can. Foundation for Children (2004). vi. Constitutional exemption 3. Remedy clause for govt action a. S 24(1) is needed only where a remedy provided by the general law is not available, or will not provide satisfactoryredress- limit to the remedies that may be ordered under this section b. In sentencing broad range of remedy- R. v. Nasogaluak (SC 2010)

Charter violations allow reduced sentencingi.Intoxicated driver, pulled over, cops beat him up to get him to comply. Pled guilty for drunk diving, atsentencing ct found that cops violates Charter s.7 and 11(d). As remedy, lower granted reduced sentence of conditional discharge, despite statutory min sentence. SC held ct could consider state actors conduct indeveloping sentence relating to offense- Section 718.2(a) of the Code provides that a court should reduce asentence "to account for any relevant ... mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender". But Ctusu couldnt order remedy below min sentence from Parliament- would be unlawful interference in role of Parliament. Even under s.24(1) of charter, departure from min not warranted, although possible in other circs.SC upheld appeals ct Imposeing min fine. c. Under 24(1), just individualized remedySchachter v Canada . S 15 claim was made. Does s. 24(1) of the Charter confer on the Federal Court Trial Division the power to order that natural parents are entitled to benefits on the sameterms as benefits are available to adoptive parents under s. 32 (subsequently s. 20) of that Act? No. Section 24(1) provides an individual remedy for actions taken under a law which violate an individual's Charter rights. (Again,however, a limited power to extend legislation is available to courts in appropriate circumstances by way of the power toread in derived from s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 . d. Range of Remedies: There are defensive remedies (where the court nullifies or stops an act, for example by dismissinga charge, staying a proceeding, quashing a warrant), and affirmative remedies (such as ordering a province to providestate-funded counsel to an indigent litigant, ordering the return of goods improperly seized or a mandatory injunctionrequiring positive action). Damages is sometimes appropriate, and so is an order of costs. REASONING: Severance or reading in will be warranted only in the clearest of cases, that is, where each of the following criteria is met:A. the legislative objective is obvious, or it is revealed through the evidence offered pursuant to the failed s. 1 argument, andseverance or reading in would further that objective, or constitute a lesser interference with that objective than would strikingdown;B. the choice of means used by the legislature to further that objective is not so unequivocal that severance/reading in wouldconstitute an unacceptable intrusion into the legislative domain; and,C. severance or reading in would not involve an intrusion into legislative budgetary decisions so substantial as to change thenature of the legislative scheme in question.(iii) Temporarily Suspending the Declaration of InvalidityTemporarily suspending the declaration of

invalidity to give Parliament or the provincial legislature in question an opportunityto bring the impugned legislation or legislative provision into line with its constitutional obligations will be warranted evenwhere striking down has been deemed the most appropriate option on the basis of one of the above criteria if:A. striking down the legislation without enacting something in its place would pose a danger to the public;B. striking down the legislation without enacting something in its place would threaten the rule of law; or,C. the legislation was deemed unconstitutional because of underinclusiveness rather than over breadth, and thereforestriking down the legislation would result in the deprivation of benefits from deserving persons without thereby benefitting theindividual whose rights have been violated. 60 Vriend v Alberta Remedy The leading case on constitutional remedies is Schachter The first step in selecting a remedial course under s. 52 is to define the extent of the Charter inconsistency which must be struck down. In the present case, that inconsistency is the exclusion of sexual orientation from the protected grounds of the IRPA. As I haveconcluded above, this exclusion is an unjustifiable infringement upon the equality rights guaranteed in s. 15 Once the Charter inconsistency has been identified, the second step is to determine which remedy is appropriate. In Schachter ,this Court noted that, depending upon the circumstances, there are several remedial options available to a court in dealing with a Charter violation that was not saved by s. 1. These include striking down the legislation, severance of the offending sections, strikingdown or severance with a temporary suspension of the declaration of invalidity, reading down, and reading provisions into thelegislation. Must apply the

twin guiding principles here (respect for role of Legislature and purposes of Charter) Court chooses reading in as appropriate remedy : It seems to me that the remedy of reading in would minimize interferencewith this clearly legitimate legislative purpose and thereby avoid excessive intrusion into the legislative sphere whereas striking downthe IRPA would deprive all Albertans of human rights protection and thereby unduly interfere with the scheme enacted by theLegislature. Also, this remedy respects purposes of Charter In Schachter , supra , Lamer C.J. noted that the twin guiding principles can only be fulfilled if due consideration is given to severaladditional criteria which further inform the determination as to whether the remedy of reading in is appropriate. These include remedial precision (this can be achieved here; just adding words sexual orientation), budgetary implications (not sufficientlysignificant here), effects on the thrust of the legislation (no deleterious impact, because all persons protected would continue tobenefit), and interference with legislative objectives (reading in would only enhance the legislative objective) . 61 [7] DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS ANSWER STRUCTURE The main issue here is _____________. In order to address this issue, we must engage in the division of powers analysis. There are two stages to this analysis, the first being to determine the pith and substance of the law. The secondstep is to classify that essential character by reference to the heads of power under the Constitution Act, 1867 in orderto determine whether the law comes within the jurisdiction of the enacting government.Note, here, that the presumption of constitutionality means that [the party challenging the Act] is required todemonstrate that the Act does not fall within the jurisdiction of [the enacting body] ( NS Board of Censors v. McNeil ) STEP 1: Pith and Substance Analysis - To determine the pith and substance, two aspects of the law must be examined: the purpose of the enacting body,and the legal effect of the law

Purpose - In order to determine the validity of legislation X, first must identify its main purpose - To do this, we may exam: the preamble, the mischief that the law is trying to rid and, optimally, reference toextrinsic material ( Morgentaler ).- Of course, however, we must look to true purpose, not necessarily the stated purpose ( Canadian Western Bank )[Application] - Thus, it appears that the Acts overall goal is to _________ Effects - We must also look at its effects (legal and practical), in order to determine how the law will operate and how itwill affect Canadians, e.g. how it will affect indiivduals rights and liabilities (Morgantaler)- Where the effects of the law diverge substantially from the stated aim, it is sometimes said to be colourable (Ibid) - [Application: try and say that the effects coincide with the purpose, and the enacting bodys attemptdoesnt appear to be a colourable one e.g. in Chatterjee v Ontario (A-G),the purpose and effect of theimpugned Act was to take profit out of crime] Conclusion - The [Act] is in pith and substance directed to _______. STEP 2: Assignment to Heads of PowerThe second step is to determine whether that matter comes within the jurisdiction of the enacting legislature. Theheads of power in ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 must be analysed, and it must be determined what thematter is in relation to The determination of which head of power a particular law falls under is not an exact science. In a federal system,each level of government can expect to have its jurisdiction affected by the other to a certain degree (i.e. incidentaleffects are permitted) ( Papp v Papp ). However, in light of the exhaustive principle, we must be able to characterizethe law as falling in one of the heads in s 91 or 92.- In this case, the question is whether the law falls under

______ or the ______ heads of legislative power.[This step often involves little more than a review of the relevant decisions and a recitation of the principles emergingfrom them. e.g., if its the criminal law power, define it; what are its elements? What do the cases say have to beestablished in order for a statute to be upheld under that power? Cite the most important cases here. One way to doit is first decide, in your head, which head it you will conclude the legislation falls under. Then, start off with theheads that it APPEARS might support it, then disregard and then show why those heads dont work by distinguishingthe cases. Finish up by showing how it falls under the head in your head][REMEMBER: (i) Where there is overlap between two heads of power, it is for the court to identify the DOMINANTFEATURE of the impugned statute. Although there may be incidental intrusion into another head over which therelevant government has no control, incidental intrusions are allowed (see, e.g. Chatterjee ); (ii) Incidental intrusionsare ok] Conclusion - The law is (intra/ultra) vires (Parliament/the provincial legislature) BONUS MARKS:- Ancillary purpose (and the rational connection/necessary test) (if relevant)The double aspect doctrine- Criteria of choice- Exhaustive principle (law must be assignable to one of the heads of power)Singling out doctrine 62 63 [12] CHARTER ANSWER STRUCTURE (1) Application of the Charter:s 32, Constitution Act, 1982 - Does the Charter apply in this situation? (2) Is there an override provision in the law:s 33Note: Only mention this if there is an impugned Act (legislation). Does not apply to government actions. (3) Infringement of a Charter rightThe onus is on the applicant/claimant to demonstrate that an infringement has occurred (presumption of constitutionality)a. What is the purpose or effect or the law/action ( Big M )b. Does its purpose or effect infringe a Charter right? [Note: This is where you outline the law of the relevantCharter right in relation to how what the right protects, e.g. does the effect of the legislation infringefreedom of religion? To answer that, first must define what religion is as per s 2(a)]c. Is the infringement more than trivial? (No Charter right, including freedom of religion, is absolute.

Charter prohibits only burdens or impositions on religious practice that are non-trivial) (R v Jones) (4) Section 1 analysis ( Oakes )- Burden shifts to legislature/Parliament/government to justify violation- The Charter does not guarantee rights absolutely. The violation may be lawful if it results in a reasonable limit,prescribed by law, that is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.a. Is the limit prescribed by law? (Consider whether the law is accessible, precise and not vague. Re:accessibility, a statute or regulation suffices: Dolphin Delivery . Re: precision and vagueness, make a judgment call)- The next step is to apply the Oakes test:b. Does the legislation/action have a sufficiently pressing and substantial objective ?c. Does the legislation/action pass the proportionality test ?(i) Is the limit rationally connected to the legislative purpose? (the laws means mustcontribute to the achievement of its objectives)(ii) Does the limit minimally impair the right? (Means chosen must be the leastrestrictive manner of accomplishing the objective of the impugned provisions.Requires a consideration of alternatives available to government. In making thisassessment, the courts accord the legislature a measure of deference, i.e. there isamargin of appreciation) ( Edwards Books )(iii) Is the law proportionate in its effect ? In other words, when one balances the harmdone to the claimants (list the right infringed) against the benefits associatedwith(state what the impugned law essentially does), is the limit on the rightproportionatein effect to the public benefit conferred by the limit?- Salutary effects?Deleterious effects?- Balancing the salutary and deleterious effects of the law, I conclude that theimpact of the limit on (name the infringed right) (is/is not) proportionate.

d. Conclusion? (e.g., Based on the analysis above, I conclude that I conclude that the limit on ____ is/is not justified under s 1) (5) Overall conclusion - Therefore, _____ (does/does not) offend the Charter, and is therefore constitutionally (valid/invalid) (6) Remedies:ss 24 & 52 - The next step would be a Court imposing a remedy