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South Asian History and Culture

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The multiple self: interfaces between Pashtun nationalism and religious conflict on the frontier
Rubina Saigol
a a

Independent Scholar Published online: 23 Mar 2012.

To cite this article: Rubina Saigol (2012): The multiple self: interfaces between Pashtun nationalism and religious conflict on the frontier, South Asian History and Culture, 3:2, 197-214 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19472498.2012.664418

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South Asian History and Culture Vol. 3, No. 2, April 2012, 197214

The multiple self: interfaces between Pashtun nationalism and religious conict on the frontier
Rubina Saigol*
Independent Scholar The aim of this article is twofold: rst, to examine the veracity of the scholarly and journalistic tendency to equate Pashtun nationalism with Talibanization and second, to explore whether there exists an entity called Pashtun nationalism or, if it is, like most other nationalisms, an imagined and mythical construct that dees denition. Herein, the tension between the three identities Muslim, Pashtun and Pakistani never at total ease with one another historically, has risen to the point where these aspects of the self compete for primacy. Keywords: Taliban; Pashtun nationalism; Pakistan; nationality

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In an oft-quoted incident in the late 1980s, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, head of the Pashtun nationalist National Awami Party, was asked by a journalist whether he was a Pashtun rst, a Pakistani rst or a Muslim rst. He famously replied that he had been a Pashtun for 3000 years, a Muslim for 1300 years and a Pakistani for 25 years. While acknowledging his multiple identities he clearly traced his longest ancestry to his ethnic recognition as a Pashtun. Religious and national identities followed in that order, both being much more recent in their origin. The three identities may never have been at total ease with one another, but in contemporary times the tension between them has risen to the point where these aspects of the self compete for primacy. With the post-Cold War rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the frontier regions of Pakistan, Pashtun nationalism has become a hotly contested construct. The articulation of Pashtun nationalism, by both its detractors and adherents, has initiated a conict over the meanings of Pashtun identity and Pashtun nationalism. In the seething debates regarding the multiple and contradictory manifestations of Pashtun nationalism, the latter is being continuously dened and redened. There are attempts to correlate Pashtun nationalism with Talibanization and to make the two appear entirely compatible with each other. These attempts are vehemently resisted by those who posit Talibanization as the very antithesis of Pashtun culture, identity and tradition. In this article, an attempt is made to unpack the debate by exploring its various angles in order to understand, rst, if there exists an inherent compatibility between Pashtun nationalism and Talibanization and second, to explore whether there exists an entity called Pashtun nationalism or if, like most other nationalisms, it is an imagined and mythical construct that dees denition.
*Email: rubina.saigol@gmail.com
ISSN 1947-2498 print/ISSN 1947-2501 online 2012 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19472498.2012.664418 http://www.tandfonline.com

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Talibanization as Pashtun nationalism A number of critics and supporters alike believe that the phenomenon of Talibanization is an expression and reection of Pashtun nationalism. Robert D. Kaplan sums up pithily, arguing in The Revenge of Geography that The Taliban constitute merely the latest incarnation of Pashtun nationalism.1 It is not too difcult to see why this view has gained currency. As the critical journalist Michael J. Totten points out while referring to the purported ethnic component underlying Talibanization:
Almost all areas that are either Taliban-controlled or Taliban-inuenced, are Pashtun. . .The Taliban are more than an expression of Pashtun nationalism, of course. They represent a reactionary movement that idealizes the simplicity and extreme conservatism of 7th century Islam. By burnishing this ideology, the Taliban is able, absurdly, to attract support beyond its Pashtun base. . .The ethnic component, though, is a formidable one. It all but guaranteed a certain degree of success by the Taliban in all of Pashtunistan, in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. Yet all the while, the ethnic map imposes constraints, if not limits, on how far the Taliban can expand.2

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The Pashtuns are the Taliban view is one that is now a virtual article of faith for several major US scholars, key elements within Pakistans polity, including the army, and some leftist scholars as well. For its proponents, the focus on the religious fundamentalism of the Taliban has meant that the ethnic dimension of the religious conict in Pakistans border regions has been overlooked by analysts and strategists. Fusing simplistic notions of ethnicity with older orientalist notions of Pashtun clannishness and ideas of resistance to foreign intervention, this is an argument that essentially concludes that the military ght against the Taliban is unwinnable due to its ethnicity. As Selig Harrison writes:
To American eyes the struggle raging in Pakistan with the Taliban is about religious fanaticism. But in Pakistan it is about an explosive fusion of Islamist zeal and simmering ethnic tensions that have been exacerbated by U.S. pressures for military action against the Taliban and its al-Qaeda allies. Understanding the ethnic dimension of the conict is the key to a successful strategy for separating the Taliban from al-Qaeda and stabilizing multiethnic Pakistan politically.3

Harrison paints a grim scenario wherein an army, under US pressure, and composed primarily of rival ethnic Punjabis, clashes with the Taliban who, in his opinion, are entirely Pashtuns. Such a clash, it is argued, would ignite a civil war leading the Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line to unite for the formation of an independent Pashtunistan. In order to assuage the Pashtun sense of victimization, Harrison recommends that the United States should support the Pashtun desire for a stronger position in relation to the Punjabdominated government at the centre. He warns that eventually either a Pashtun or Islamist identity would triumph and then raises the haunting spectre of Islamic Pashtunistan, a term coined by Pakistans former ambassador to the United States, Hussain Haqqani.4 It is a nightmare scenario, conjured up by others as well. As the defence analyst Major General Mahmood Ali Durrani said at a seminar at the Pakistan Embassy: I hope the Taliban and Pashtun nationalism dont merge. If that happens, weve had it, and were on the verge of that.5 The merger of radical Islam with the potency of Pashtun nationalist sentiment seems to echo in the minds of those fearful of hitherto unknown forces being unleashed upon an obstreperous borderland. For proponents of this line, the threat to Pashtun nationalism from rival ethnic groups like the Tajiks is the basis of the Pashtun support for the Taliban insurgency.6 Tajiks hold key posts in the Afghan government, which engenders resentment among the Pashtuns,

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the largest single ethnic group in Afghanistan. According to Harrison, a common refrain among those critical of the government in Kabul is that they get the dollars, and we get the bullets. The bullets are a reference to the air strikes and ground operations in Pashtun areas located in the south and east of the country. Pashtun nationalism in Afghanistan is posited in opposition to the rival ethnic groups consisting of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, just as in Pakistan it is constructed in opposition to the ethnic Punjabis who comprise the majority of the population. In both countries, the Pashtun population appears to be in a state of tension with the state dominated by a competing ethnic formation. The corollary to this is7 the fear of a terrifying vision one that haunts the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan of a potential unication of Pashtuns across the Durand Line, often seen by Pashtuns as a line of hatred that raised a wall between the two brothers. The fear is that a unied Pashtunistan would be led by a radical Islamist leadership as the Taliban would be likely to capture the leadership of Pashtun nationalism. Pashtuns have historically resisted the domination of the Punjabis in Pakistan and Tajik minority in the Afghan government, and the sense of victimization among Pashtuns has been intensied by the large number of civilian casualties since the US-led invasion of 2001. In spite of General Musharrafs efforts to appease his Pashtun generals by striking peace deals with Pashtun leaders in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the latter have been irrevocably polarized and politicized. According to Harrison, a major proponent of this view is that the radicalization of the Pashtun areas has intensied both Islamist zealotry and Pashtun nationalism.8 As a solution for the growing Pashtun disenchantment, he recommends the fullling of promises of provincial autonomy and democracy, enshrined in the Constitution of 1973. Added to the complex strategic argument of ethnic calculations and geopolitical concerns is another classically orientalist one of supposed Pashtun atavism. Adnan R. Khan, for example, presages a bleak scenario based on what he considers an inherent Pashtun proclivity towards vengeance. He foretells a future where the clan and tribal rivalries among the Pashtuns would degenerate into a bloodbath that could dwarf the ght by the Pakistani state against the Taliban:
Indeed, the Pakistani Taliban is broken, possibly for good. But a new menace is rising, largely hidden from the eyes of the outside world. To see it, you have to venture into what many consider the worlds most dangerous place, a cauldron of tribal vendettas and clan rivalries in the heart of Pakistans Pashtun belt. Here the culture of vengeance is stronger than any concept of justice. Revenge, for the Pashtuns, is justice, and in the aftermath of the crimes committed against them, often by their own people, it is that justice they are seeking. Communities have been divided by the ghting; armed tribal militias have formed to counter the remaining Taliban threat, led by locally powerful men who have the potential to become warlords. The Pashtuns are turning their guns against one another, in what could quickly spiral into an era of tribal conict that would make the war against the Taliban feel like a minor skirmish.9

Khan rst reduces the Taliban to Pashtuns and then Pashtuns to primitive, revenge-seeking and bloodthirsty tribes. He claims that for the Pashtuns, revenge is justice and tribal vendettas are a part of their culture. By stripping Pashtuns of all human characteristics, needs, desires, wants and suffering, Khan not only dehumanizes them, but reduces them to cameos. They play one small part in the larger drama of conict and struggle and have no dimensions other than that as warring tribes. Through this reductionist approach, Khan reinforces the stereotype of the wild, uncivilized and uncouth Pathan that rst appeared in colonial ethnographic accounts. The fear of the Taliban is projected on to the gure of the Pashtun. The anger against the Taliban is also thus deected on to the Pashtuns as a whole.

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This device serves to re-create and reiterate the prejudices against the Pashtuns as an ethnic group. In reality, however, the interface between Pashtun nationalism and the Talibanization is much more complex and goes beyond ethnicity alone. It can be traced back to the decline of secular Pashtun nationalism from the 1970s when the National Awami Party formed an alliance with the religious parties in the Pakistan National Alliance movement for the ouster of Zulqar Ali Bhutto.10 Manzur Ejaz argues that secular Pashtun nationalism was much stronger in the rst two decades of Pakistans history and contends that it weakened with the integration of the Now Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (NWFP) economy with Pakistan, thereby eroding its material basis. With the rise of the Taliban and extremist religious forces, the secular-minded Pashtuns migrated to other parts of the country. The social and economic situation created an exodus and the continuing reconstructions of Pashtun identities must be seen as part of this complex social palimpsest, not just as the continuation of a primordial way of life. Ejaz differentiates between Afghan Taliban who used religion to maintain their dominance in relation to the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance and Pakistani Taliban who have actively sought to transform state and society in Pakistan:
The Pakistani Pashtun Taliban manifested their aspiration to change the state and indeed the entire ideological make-up of Pakistan. In other words, the Pakistani Pashtun Taliban have acted as a centralist rather than a separatist ideological force, notwithstanding their temporary takeover of certain tribal areas. This shows how much Pashtun nationalism has weakened over the last thirty years.11

Actually, the nature of Pashtun nationalism itself has changed signicantly through the years. Secular Pashtun nationalism has eroded paving the way for a more religious version of Pashtun nationalism. The articulation of nationalism in a religious idiom is also seen rather too simplistically by some leftist thinkers only as an anti-imperialist impulse. For example, in a lecture delivered at the South Asian Forum, University of Toronto, in November 2008, Tariq Ali, a well-known Marxist critic, portrayed the Taliban as an anti-imperialist force, while simultaneously conating them with Pashtun nationalism. He eulogized the Taliban as an indigenous movement, inspired by Pashtun nationalism and ghting against imperial occupation. His romanticism provoked a caustic response from Imtiaz Baloch, who was disappointed by Alis binary division of the world into imperial and anti-imperial camps. As he put it: For him, the world had shrunk to the two opposite poles America on one side and the global Islamic militancy. Anything anti-American would do, regardless of its nature being oppressive, anti-progressive, anti-democratic and anti-human. Resistance is romantic, especially when clubbed with anti-imperial fantasies but the reality of Pashtun nationalism is far more complex and this brings us to those on the other side of the debate those who regard the Taliban as the opposite other of Pashtun nationalists and as a force that has destroyed the basic fabric of Pashtun society. Talibanization as the Destruction of Pashtun Nationalism On one side of the discursive divide are those who see overlaps between Pashtun nationalism and Talibanization and view the latter as a continuation of the former in an altered form. On the other side of the hardening fence are those who decry the essentialism that underlies the characterization of Pashtuns as though they comprise some kind of a monolithic, seamless, primordial group that has not been touched by history. Critics in this group

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point to the daunting diversity among the tribes that compose Pashtuns and the enormous heterogeneity among both the Pashtuns and the Taliban.12 The British romanticized and lionized the Pashtuns as brave, valiant and unbeatable when they failed to subjugate them. However, the myth of the unbeatable Pashtuns has been shattered, revealing the human side of the mysteriously heroic Pathan.13 Notions such as the martial races, and the proud and indomitable Pathans, belong to the era of colonial ethnography in which human beings were classied into mutually exclusive strict categories and conning boundaries.14 The watertight compartments into which people were divided precluded the possibilities of mixture, hybridity, overlaps and transformations in identity. Identities were xed in time and across geographies with specic, unchanging characteristics attributed to populations. The uidity and malleability of human beings, and their potential to change in response to external situations, were not included in the calculation of identities that became frozen in time and space. People were reduced to being prototypes of a particular group, clan or tribe. This kind of latent racism appears to underlie the construction of Pashtuns, Taliban and Pashtun nationalism. The colonial legacy and the essentialism of what were seen as martial Pashtun traits is alive and well in the present-day discourse, as evidenced by the Tehreek-e-Insaaf Chairman, Imran Khans reduction of Pashtun identity to a few eternally immutable, permanent and xed characteristics.15 In a talk delivered in London in early 2010, he advocated the end of military operations in the tribal areas and the resumption of talks. As he told a Chatham House foreign policy think tank in London: The solution is to hold a dialogue with the militants. . .The solution is to win them onto our side, not to bomb them with airstrikes. Otherwise, he warned, If we continue with this military operation we are facing a catastrophe. Imran Khan argues that militants operating in the tribal areas did not share the beliefs of the Afghan Taliban, who wanted to create an Islamist state and expressed the opinion that they are political Taliban, they are not religious Taliban . . . they will fade away as soon as the Pakistan Army moves back and dialogue is held.16 Contrary to Imran Khans assertions, repeated attempts at dialogue and negotiation with the Taliban, and other militants, ended in disasters with the entire Jirga being bombed and/or a scornful rejection of democracy, liberty, equality and constitutionalism. The conclusion of a peace agreement, Nizam-e-Adl, with Su Muhammad of the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi in 2009, led to his rejection of democracy, the parliament, the judiciary and constitutionalism. As a result, Operation Rah-e-Raast was launched by the Pakistan Army to clear the Swat valley of militancy. Imran Khans distinction between religious and political Taliban is as facile as the Talibans world view is totalitarian in that it does not differentiate between the sacred and the secular and is based on the idea that Islam is a complete way of life and politics cannot be separated from religion in a strictly Islamic state. Perhaps the most robust and informed public argument against the simplistic pigeonholing of Pashtun culture as an essentially moribund, xed-in-time, revenge-bound culture comes from columnist and writer Farhat Taj and this section draws a great deal from her insights on Pashtun society. Contesting and debunking the attribution of essential characteristics to the entire Pashtun nation, Farhat Taj argues that
Essentialism has been greatly challenged by social scientists all over the world. Essentialism is the belief that people have an unchanging essence that wipes off the possibility of changeable human behaviour. Most social scientists will disagree that each and every Pakhtun would take to violent means in the name of revenge. Agreed that revenge is an important notion of the code of Pakhtunwali, but, nevertheless, this is a notion. When put in practice it may take different forms, not necessarily the violent forms.17

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Challenging the simplistic portrayal of Pashtuns as savage and uncivilized people who can be so blinded by revenge that they become stripped of any capacity to differentiate between the innocent and guilty,18 she highlights the fact that the notion of revenge in Pashtun culture is circumscribed by strict rules that govern the conditions for it. Vengeance in the culture does not ow from free-oating, mad rage that can be expressed freely without any constraints. Instead:
There is nothing in the code of Pakhtunwali that sanctions or even justies indiscriminate use of violence in revenge. Revenge is a qualied notion in the code. There are clear limits to who can be targeted for revenge. Such limits are not respected by the Taliban. Innocent people, women and children (even from the enemys family) are never the targets of revenge killing according to the code of Pakhtunwali.19

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The notion of revenge has been replaced in modern states by the idea of justice, which has to be ensured by the state. The individualized notion of revenge has given way to the collective notion of justice, and the state as the repository of the collective will is expected to punish culprits and arrange for retribution. It is possible to disagree with the personalized idea of revenge in tribal codes; nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the ancient codes too do not recognize the unbridled exercise of violence by an individual in order to seek vengeance. The prevalence of rules and norms that guide retribution or revenge in ancient codes has been replaced by the vigilantism of the Taliban. The Taliban do not seem to conform to any of the known systems of justice and retribution. This is what renders their vigilante actions criminal the actions of outlaws. Second, the Pashtuns are as diverse a social and cultural group as any other ethnic formation. It is important to acknowledge the multiplicity of Pashtun culture as well as the fact that their religiosity can sometimes be overrated by outsiders.20 It is important to underline the multiplicity of Pashtun culture. It intermingles with Islamic values in a complex mix where the worldly and the sacred coexist, and the contradictions between the two are kept in separate compartments:
Most Pakhtuns have deep respect for their religion, Islam. But at the same time they have worldly pursuits in life that are very important for them. Whether they would give up their worldly pursuits for the sake of religion as interpreted by their fellow Pakhtun-the Taliban- at the gunpoint is a big question mark. To explain it better I will give an example. Many Pakhtun businessmen are notorious for taking heavy interest on the loans they make to people. Once I asked an Alhaj (a person who had visited the holy Muslim site in Saudi Arabia many times) Pakhtun who also happened to be quite regular in saying ve times prayer that why he takes so much interest on the loans when the Quran forbids it. His answer was: That (Quran) is my religion and this (taking interest) is my business. I do not mix them up. But I keep both. I need both.21

It is easy for journalists, armchair intellectuals and self-proclaimed voices of Pashtun culture to dehumanize and objectify Pashtuns through the projection of fantasy.22 The lazy and uninformed way out is to take the path of caricature and stereotyping. In popular media representations, it often looks like as if the Pakhtun are not human beings with human needs, constraints and concerns but objects who are programmed to behave in line with the fantasies of those people. It is this unbridled imagination on the part of uninformed analysts that conjures up the imagery of the Pashtun religious fanatic and violent extremist, simplistically collapsing the Talibans ideology into Pashtun culture. As Farhat Taj fulminates:

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In their zeal to be seen as expert or at least informed commentators on the Pakhtun culture, scores of discussants in media depict that Talibanization is somehow compatible with the Pakhtun culture. That connement of women to homes, compulsory wearing of burqa, ban on female mobility in public sphere, minus those accompanied by related men, ban on girls education, ban on music, compulsory beards, killing people by slitting their throats, preference of madrassa over school education, compulsory punishments for not saying the daily ve time obligatory Islamic prayers, and above all, going mad in revenge spree and eliminating innocent and perceived enemies without discrimination, all is Pakhtun culture. . .They argue the Talibans Islam is not Islam, it is Pakhtun culture. The key premise seems to that a religion, especially a text based religion like Islam, is interpretation and interpretation is affected by culture. So, Islam, when seen through the lenses of Pakhtunwali turns out to be Talibanization.23

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It is important to debunk certain myths about the construction of Pashtun identity by others, its detractors as well as supporters, myths that are regularly purveyed by the media. First, Talibanization is not merely incompatible with Pashtun culture, it violently clashes with it.24 In contrast to those who argue that the Taliban have strong support and emotional appeal among the victimized Pashtun, the reality is that large sections of Pashtuns in the NWFP are simply not supportive of the Taliban, tired as they are with the destruction it has brought.25 If the Taliban were really so popular in the FATA, what explains the formation of so many anti-Taliban armies all over the Pashtun regions? The Taliban have killed a number of leaders of such lashkars reportedly with the consent of Pakistans intelligence agencies and replaced the ancient Pashtunwali code with the Taliban order that is incompatible with the traditions of the older code.26 The people of FATA, who for centuries ordered their lives in line with the Pashtunwali code, cannot possibly support an alien ideology imposed on them by the Taliban. Since the Pashtuns are unwilling to surrender long-established traditions based on Pashtunwali, they have faced the retaliatory savagery of the Taliban. The Pashtun tribes have been historically tolerant towards outsiders venturing into their land carrying a culture that is not indigenous to the tribes; however, the Taliban severely punish anyone who does not conform to their ideology and practices. The common fallacy about tribal culture forbidding dancing, singing and other art forms and the disputes with the Taliban over this is a good example:
. . . in FATAs culture the drum and dance have always played an important role. However, since the Talibans occupation of the area, these two age-old traditions have been banned. Hence, only outsiders who are not well-informed would think that the local people would be supporting the occupiers who have replaced their melodious Pashto music with jihadi anthems that are played loudly throughout the region.27

It was not until the rise of the Taliban that violence was used to suppress Pashtun traditions that characterized their lands for centuries. The puritanism of the Taliban is essentially at odds with the lived traditions of the Pashtuns:
Taliban bans music, which is an integral part of the Pakhtun traditions. Before the rise of the Taliban no one ever heard of attacks on musicians and music shops. There have always been men with and without beard among the Pakhtuns. Those with beard never forced the others to grow beard. There have always been Pakhtun who were regular in saying daily prayers and those were not so regular and even those who hardly say any prayers for years and years. Before the Taliban, it was unheard of that those who are regular in saying daily prayers would force the other to be regular.28

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Sectarian diversity is upheld as another Pashtun value that has been violated by the Taliban. Most Pashtuns are Sunni Muslims while a signicant minority is composed of the Shiite sect. For centuries the two sects lived in peace until the Taliban, with their homogenized vision of Muslims and Islam, chose to impose their Wahhabi-Deobandi brand of religion on all others. Intermarriage among Sunnis and Shiite Muslims was accepted as a part of Pashtun communities. Sunni Pashtuns participated in Ashura ceremonies and helped in their arrangements. Many Sunni Pashtuns believed that it was a good omen to attend Shiite ceremonies like the Ashura as ones hopes and wishes would be fullled. The Taliban, however, consider Shiite Muslims as Kars (indels) liable to murder. The Taliban particularly singled out the Shiite soldiers of the Pakistan Army for beheading when they were captured. However, it is also true that for a large number of Pashtuns, the ShiaSunni problem did not exist; instead, what one witnessed was tribal rivalries which came to be cloaked in sectarian garb in the heat of the moment. Were the Saudis and Iranians to leave the Pashtun to their own devices and were the government of Pakistan willing to full its constitutional obligations and repel the ideological intervention of these two countries, it is possible to argue that the Pakhtunwali code would sufce to resolve the sectarian tensions as indeed it has for long.29 Another Pashtun value that the Taliban have violently insulted is the reverence for the Jirga the council of tribal elders. Evolved over centuries of Pashtun history, the institution of the Jirga has always been respected by Pashtuns in all circumstances. Parties long engaged in a blood feud would temporarily cease hostility during Jirga proceedings and on the instructions of the Jirga. The Taliban have attacked with suicide bombings at least two grand Jirgas, one in Darra Adam Khel and the other in Orakzai agency, killing the entire tribal leadership of these areas. The Taliban have even been attacking funeral ceremonies, an abhorrent act in any culture. While one can quarrel over the idea of the tribal Jirga, given the history of misogynist rulings by such tribal councils, one can nonetheless sympathize with the argument that there are serious ruptures and points of interruption between the Taliban and Pashtun nationalism each of which draws upon a different ideology and world view to perpetuate itself. While the Taliban draw inspiration from a grotesquely distorted view of Wahhabi Islam, Pashtun nationalism seems to spring primarily from the ancient Pashtunwali code. The Taliban are accused of violating another set of Pashtun values that have been held dear for centuries. These are family values that are dened and articulated within the Pashtunwali code. Disregarding age-old traditions, the Talibans omnipotence in cultural matters cuts at the very core of family values of the Pakhtun. For example, a womans appearance and mobility in the public sphere were matters that were adjudicated by the family, which alone had the right and privilege in these matters. With the coming of the Taliban, however, the control over womens clothing and movement has passed out of the hands of kin albeit male kin to unrelated men, who physically coerce women to wear the burqa or determine their movement in the public arena. There are examples from various cities across NWFP where Taliban have forbidden women from going shopping or stepping out of their homes with threats. They have even publicly executed women, some for working with NGOs have accused others of prostitution and some of adultery. So, its not the family but unrelated Taliban men controlling the women.30 While feminists have rightly questioned the Pashtunwali code which has led to the death of women in the name of familial and community honour, the ceding of the control of women to the Taliban is experienced as the loss of power and masculinity among the Pashtuns. Women appear to have become the battleground on which the struggle for

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supremacy is fought between the Pashtuns and Taliban, for women are often regarded as the symbols and repositories of the honour of family, community and nation. The public beating by unrelated men is viewed with acute pain by Pashtun men who believe that exercising control over family members is their prerogative which has been forcefully wrested by the Taliban. It was the video of the public ogging of a 17-year-old girl by the Taliban that led to open disgust of their ideology and hatred for the Taliban across Pakistan. In Afghanistan, the Taliban had forced women into beggary and prostitution by banning all kinds of work and schooling for them. This, it is argued, is diametrically opposed to Pashtun values which may be based on control and surveillance of women but do not tolerate prostitution and beggary by them. The Taliban, and the militants inspired by them, contravene a range of old Pashtun values regarding the treatment of women. In response to those who claim that the Taliban never engaged in such violent behaviour before the US invasion and military operations, it is important to remember that leaders like Mualana Su Mohammad of Tehrik Nifaz Sharia Mohammadi in Malakand even prior to 9/11 openly called upon his followers to capture and take in Nikah any female NGO worker that they spotted in the Malakand agency. In yet another incident dating to pre-9/11 days, female activists of the pro-Taliban Jamaat-e-Islami attacked a girls college in NWFP and the participants of a Meena Bazaar, forcing the administration to close down the event because some of the girls were wearing kurta pajama that the Jumaat activists deemed as Un-Islamic Hindu culture.31 Pashtun culture is not only seen as internally diverse but also constructed as exible and adaptable in response to social and historical change. In other words, like all cultures, it is dynamic and evolving. This is a quality of culture that the Taliban, inuenced by ahistorical fundamentalist vision, are unable and unwilling to grasp. There are many subtle as well as overt transformations in what is regarded as Pashtun culture. For example, as Farhat Taj points out, the shuttlecock burqa, once perceived as a part of Pashtun customs, has been discarded in several Pashtun communities. It is not a universal norm that epitomizes Pashtun womanhood. The universal norm now is the Chadar, the length of which varies across communities. Similarly, an increasing number of Pashtun communities are clamouring for girls education. The Taliban are violently destroying girls educational institutions precisely because they do not conform to the Taliban world view being imposed upon an old and dynamic culture. Interestingly, it was the elders of the Pashtun areas who implored the government to build schools for girls. Increasing numbers of Pashtun communities have exposure to education and modernity and women in these areas have taken up nontraditional roles in the public sphere. Before the rise of the Taliban, no one had heard of violent reactions to Pashtun women who had transgressed the boundaries of connement imposed by gender roles.32 Pashtun culture, ostensibly the basis of Pashtun nationalism, is thus neither homogenous nor static. It is located in history much as all cultures essentially are historical. Several critical scholars agree that it would be a mistake to hyphenate Pashtun nationalism and Talibanization. As Fredrik Baarth, a famous Norwegian scholar of Pashtun culture, concluded, in terms of Pakhtun culture, Talibanization is obscenity.33 The incisive critique of the lumping together of Talibanization and Pashtun nationalism is also corroborated by Pepe Escobar who writes
Islamic extremism or what they mistakenly call Talibanization in the West is directly opposed to Pashtun nationalism. It is eroding Pashtun nationalism in a big way. The most favorite targets of the Taliban include symbols of Pashtun nationalism, like the tomb of saint-poet Rehman Baba, which they have bombed out, as well as schools, artists houses, etc.34

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Similarly, responding to the Pashtun nationalism equals Talibanization theory propounded by writers like Tariq Ali, Naeem Wardag argues emphatically that the
Taliban do not represent Pashtun nationalism. They do not draw their inspiration from Pashtun culture, identity, or history. Their ideology has been imported for them from the real basis of pan and political Islam across the Indus. This ideology has more to do with the regional ambitions of the elite of the dominant nationality as envisioned by General Zia than with Pashtun aspirations.35

Wardag is rightly critical of what he sees as Tariq Alis reductionist approach and suggests that the entire discourse cannot be couched in the vocabulary of imperialism and antiimperialism. In fact, as he argues, equating Taliban movement to Pashtun nationalism, greatly offends Pashtuns who have immensely suffered at their hands. One can mention thousands of innocent girls in Swat and FATA who have been deprived of education through intimidation and destruction of their schools not to mention thousands of Pashtuns that have perished in suicide bomb blasts and hundreds of thousands of them that have been displaced. This approach also does not take into account the thousands of Pashtuns who have risen against Taliban nor their recent electorate choices.36 In collapsing the Taliban and Pashtuns, writers like Tariq Ali overlook the thousands of Pashtuns who have suffered and perished in suicide blasts and displaced. They also overlook the destruction of womens education and the large number of Pashtuns who have risen up against the Taliban. Wardag, like other Pashtuns who contest the equation of Pashtuns with Taliban, attributes the rise of the Taliban to the dominant Pakistani nationality the Punjabis and the army in which the latter are predominantly represented. For Wardag, Taj and others, the Taliban are not the product of Pashtun culture, Pashtun nationalism or the alleged Pashtun propensity for violence, rather, they are the product of a historical nexus between imperialism, the state, Punjabi domination and Wahhabi religion. For these writers, Pashtun nationalism has survived in the movements of Bacha Khan, Achakzai and other nationalist political parties and in the aspirations of general Pashtun masses for peace and progress despite a century of marginalization. It is maintaining its power-base, standing its ground, and holding onto its liberal traditions. It will never allow its society to be permanently hijacked by forces of obscurantism.37 Some of the myths and legends constructed about the Taliban have been challenged by other observers who argue that Pashtun nationalism was secular in origin. In the rst half of the twentieth century, Bacha Khan, the founder of the Khudai Khidmatgars, was also known as the Frontier Gandhi for his belief in peace, non-violence and tolerance.38 The reforms he promoted regarding education, road-building and sanitation were secular in nature. In contrast, Taliban rule was a nightmare for the art, music and dance-loving Pashtuns and all Afghans who were divested of their rich cultural renditions. The centre of Afghan religious lives the shrines was deserted over the charges of anti-Sharia practices and the people were forced to pray at mosques and grow beards of a certain dened length. The Pashtun tribal code of conduct was eviscerated by the Wahhabi brand of puritanical religion. In practice, the rich and variegated history and culture of the Pashtuns was ravaged by the Taliban, all the while conjuring up a narrative of peace and stability under their rule. The destruction of secular-socialist Pashtun nationalism initially by the British administration paved the way for an alien Salast version of Islam to be imposed in later years by forces favoured by the Pakistani state. Pashtun nationalism was historically secular

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and premised on the progressive ideals of Emir Amanullah, Bacha Khan, Samad Khan Achakzai, Noor Muhammad Tarahkai, Dr Najibullah, Afzal Khan Lala and all the Pashtun elders. As Arqam puts it
The Taliban are not by any means a representation of Pashtuns as what we are witnessing today in the shape of the barbaric Talibanized militant values are not of hospitality and sanctuary as well as regard for women, children and family. Killing and abduction of women and children, entering into houses to kill family members of the opponents, and attacking funerals, Mosques and Imam Bargahs has become commonplace in the Taliban culture. As a result, Islam as well as Pashtunwali have been raped by the Taliban-ISI alliance.39

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The disjuncture between Pashtun nationalism and Talibanization appears to be obvious from the many values and norms of Pashtunwali that have been destroyed by the Taliban. It is time to examine the forces and dynamics that, in the eyes of many Pashtuns, led to the creation of the Taliban.

The Punjabis, the army and the state: Talibanization It has been argued that the creation of the Taliban was a requirement of the dominant nationality in Pakistan the Punjabis and the army in which the latter are predominantly represented. To support his claim, Naeem Wardag cites from a course in geopolitics that is taught in the Command and Staff College, Quetta. According to an excerpt from this course, the Pakistan Army says that Punjab is the core of Pakistan and rest of the provinces are just invasion routes. This view is emphasized by the use of phrases such as Punjab is the sword arm of Pakistan and the bastion of Pakistan ideology. When Pakistan is identied with Punjab, the rest of the provinces become mere irritants that have to be tamed and browbeaten into submission. The army of the core nationality was sent to crush rebellions and resistance movements in all other provinces in East Pakistan until it separated, in Sindh in the 1980s during the Movement for Restoration of Democracy, in Balochistan since the 1940s and in every subsequent decade and now in Swat and Waziristan to eliminate the threat created by itself. The state of Pakistan has been perpetually at war with itself because the dominant ethnic group, which controls state power, is unwilling to share power and forcibly captures the resources of others for the benet of Punjab. As Wardag writes:
The fact is, it is fundamentally the imperial overgrowth of the power of the dominant nationality and its regional ambitions not Pashtun nationalism that is driving the so-called anti-imperialist struggle. It is the fear of further loss of power and inuence should a balance in relations between nationalities and states in the region emerge that is fanning the instability. . .Taliban who had been imposed on Afghans and were recognized only by their three ideological and political mentors.40

A crucial part of this argument is the myth that all Taliban are Pashtuns. In reality, a complex mixture of ethnic and national groups makes up the extremist and terrorist groups mistakenly called Taliban. They are an amalgam of jihadists and terrorists from various ethnic groups and nationalities with Punjab-based groups being a prominent component. The latter groups include Jaish-i-Mohammad, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Lashkar-i-Toiba, whose creation predates the Taliban, a fact seldom highlighted by non-Pashtun Pakistani writers. What they highlight is the Pashtun connection of Taliban. A number of these jihadi groups were created in the 1980s mainly as inltrators into Indian

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Kashmir. The Pakistan Armys obsession with India as the permanent, eternal enemy is the basis of the strategic depth theory according to which Afghanistan is perceived as Pakistans backyard. It is believed that Afghanistan provides depth to Pakistan in case India attacks from the eastern border. Hence, Pakistan has been eager to install a pro-Pakistan Taliban government in Kabul, one that would be sympathetic to its military-oriented national security paradigm, than the Northern Alliance which is pro-India. Most observers agree about the role of Pakistani state agencies in spreading religious terrorism in Pashtun regions. In February 2009, prior to the operations Rah-e-Raast and Rah-e-Nijat launched by the Pakistan Army against the Taliban, Farhat Taj wrote:
The common perception among all Pakhtuns, including those in FATA, is that the Taliban are strategic assets of the military establishment and have been given a free hand by the establishment to eliminate all those Pakhtuns who dare to challenge them. Many Pakhtuns see what is happening between the military and the Taliban in FATA as instances of friendly re. The belief is that, by doing so, they both get what they want the Taliban, a terrorised population on whom they can implement their jihadi agenda and the establishment gets to play its power games vis-a-vis regional and international powers. . .People believe that the army is perfectly capable of crushing the Taliban but that the will is lacking. Many people in FATA and other parts of the NWFP I have met in recent weeks and months as part of my ongoing research have said that they dont see much difference between Baitullah Mehsud and Fazlullah on the one hand and the senior and retired leadership of the establishment.41

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It is a bit absurd that while many Pakistanis denounce the drone attacks by the United States as a violation of Pakistans sovereignty, yet few spoke out when large parts of FATA and Swat were ceded to the Taliban long before the drone attacks. The Taliban occupation of Pashtun lands was not only tolerated, despite the clear violation of sovereignty, it was tacitly supported based on the faulty theory of strategic depth. Naseerullah Babar, the Minister of Interior in the second Benazir Bhutto government actually described the Taliban as our children. It would, in fact, be apt to consider the Taliban control of FATA as foreign occupation because of the presence of a large number of foreigners among their ranks. Those running an Islamic Emirate in Waziristan include stateless Uzbeks, Arabs, Africans, Afghans, Chechens, Tajiks and even Muslim immigrants from Europe. Among the Pakistanis there is a preponderance of Punjabis and Pashtuns. With such a wide range of people belonging to various ethnic and national groups, it seems objectively impossible to reduce the phenomenon of Talibanization to Pashtun nationalism.42 It is also pertinent here to consider the historical lineage of Afghanistans wars since the 1970s. As Fatima Ahmad and Batoor Khan argue, the government strategy against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the ensuing Afghan Jihad wrested the political power away from the traditional secular and nationalist elements in the Pashtun dominated areas and empowered the politico-religious parties which have always been far more supportive of the establishment. In fact by projecting the Taliban as representing the political aspirations of the Pashtuns, while still retaining their religious leanings, Pakistan wants to reassure the international community of their legitimacy as a group having popular support of the Pashtuns.43 The two writers argue that the characterization of the Taliban as Pashtun nationalism, and terming the Taliban insurgency as a demand for the political empowerment of the Pashtuns, must be taken with a pinch of salt as it signies the continuity of the state policy of the 1980s. Ahmad and Khan assert that the Taliban never represented a nationalist movement nor did they enlist support for their agenda from the ethnic Pashtun population. Instead, as Ahmed and Khan observe

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They were created by extending support to the politico-religious right over the decades, indoctrinated, nourished and aided according to a strategy. That strategy has been and still remains the same political maneuvering by the powerful elite in Pakistan to use religious extremism and indoctrination to divide the Pashtuns, denying their political rights and at the same time to regain and maintain some degree of inuence in Afghanistan. Obviously this can not be achieved by siding with and supporting the largely liberal, secular and democratic minded majority of the Pashtuns; for the fear that the elite will have to relinquish the powers they hold over all ethnic minorities and give them their political rights and control over their resources.44

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In the 1980s, competing and rival imperialisms between the United States and the USSR in Afghanistan dovetailed with the interests of military rule in need of political legitimacy in Pakistan. The interests of the military establishment were in turn compatible with the ruling elites eagerness to maintain its hold on power by using religion as the instrument of national integration. Though Islamization was a weak tool with which to stitch together the fragile fabric of Pakistani society, it was deployed in the service of diminishing the demands for provincial autonomy and rights of the provinces. Islamization, in the last resort, was the political and ideological cover for Punjabi domination in the military, bureaucratic and security establishment. The sovereign and autonomous units, as envisaged in the Pakistan Resolution of 1940, were to be forcibly repressed by the Punjab-dominated centre through the use of religion as an overarching and binding force. It was a part of this strategy, coupled with imperial ventures that produced the monstrosity today known as the Taliban. To conate the Taliban with Pashtun nationalism is to weaken, and ultimately erase, the secular and democratic wellsprings of secular Pashtun nationalism. A nation in ux: negotiating identities The rst object of this article, that is, to determine whether or not there exists an inherent connection between Pashtun nationalism and Talibanization, has been addressed in a detailed manner in the preceding sections. The conclusion that can be drawn from the seething debate between those who aver a strong connection and those who staunchly refute it is that the connection is tenuous at best and part of a deliberate state strategy for nefarious purposes at worst. In short, Pashtun nationalism cannot be reduced in a simplistic way to Talibanization which, by most accounts, is its nemesis. The second question raised at the beginning of the article is whether Pashtun nationalism is mythical, as nationalisms are wont to be, or does it have a strong material base which gives it a reality beyond discourse. Even if one accepts the idea that all nationalisms are discursive constructions that create imagined communities,45 Pashtun nationalism nonetheless has material and political effects that cannot be dismissed. It must also be remembered that there are multiple articulations of Pashtun nationalism as it is a contested and complex concept. Like other nationalisms, this one too harks back to an ancient past reected in Wali Khans assertion that he has been a Pashtun for 3000 years. There are conicting accounts of the historical moment of the rise of Pashtun nationalism, but by most accounts the Pashtunwali code, from which it draws inspiration, predates Islam by centuries. However, other accounts claim that it was an evolutionary accomplishment that dates back to the twelfth century with the foundation of the Ghorid polity. Rudimentary forms of Pashtun nationalism are said to lie in that period. It is an ongoing reconstruction, changing in response to historical realities such as the British incursions and the current phase of Talibanization.

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Prior to 1979, Islam played a supplementary and secondary role in the articulation of Pashtun nationalism. Pashtunwali, a moderate version of Islam and the Persian language played a role in cementing Afghan and Pashtun nationalism. It was after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 that radical forms of Islam began to supplant the consciousness of Pashtun nationalism. After the 1980s, Sharia law replaced civil laws and the modern methods of statecraft and Islamic fundamentalism came to monopolize political power. Pashtun nationalists believe that the superimposed Islamic fundamentalism undermines 50 million Pashtuns on either side of the Durand Line. Some Pashtuns claim that the Pashtunwali code is democratic and has established rules and systems that have been passed down generations by Pashtun forefathers. However, this too is a contested terrain as there are other Pashtuns who nd the code outdated and feminists in particular challenge the Pashtunwali honour code with regard to its relation with women. Nonetheless, like other nationalisms, Pashtun nationalism tends to draw upon a long and pristine tradition, given by the forefathers, according to which all aspects of life must be ordered. Nationalism tends to weave territory, identity and citizenship into the sense of nationhood that is purportedly shared by all members of the nation. Territory seems to provide solidity and permanence to an otherwise scattered sense of nationhood. The eighteenth century ruler also regarded by many as the founder of modern Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Abdali is reported to have said that Pakhtoonkhwa spanned the territories from the River Jhelum in the Punjab province of Pakistan to River Amo in the deep north of Afghanistan.46 The Awami National Party government sought to revert to the name suggested by Abdali for the province that it rules. Not surprisingly, this claim was contested by the PML (N) which represents the dominant Punjabi nationality. The debate was resolved by changing the name of NWFP to Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa in the eighteenth constitutional amendment. Pashtun nationalism seeks territory, and control over territory, as a way of asserting itself among its adherents. Territory and autonomy are viewed as the destiny of a people wronged by history. National narratives are predicated on difference and conict from others who are rivals or enemies in the landscape of national imagination. Pashtun nationalism appears to be locked simultaneously in a struggle with the state and the majority Punjabi ethnic group that controls the state apparatus. National narratives are also woven around the idea of past suffering and feelings of being deeply wounded by history. Wali Khans lucid account of the manner in which the Pashtuns were divided among themselves by the British is poignant.47 He deplores the inghting and disunity among the Pashtun tribes who butchered and murdered fellow Pashtuns for paltry sums of money offered by the British.48 His heart-rending account of the drawing of the Durand Line in 1893 is expressed as a knife driven straight through the heart or one that severed the head from the body.49 For Wali Khan, this unnatural line destroyed the home of the Pashtun. He explains how the North-Western region was the frontier not only of the colonial government in India but also for the whole of the British Empire threatened by Russia whose territory spanned Europe and Asia.50 Afghanistan, he writes, was created as a buffer zone between the golden bird that was British India jewel in the crown and Russian expansionism.51 Such accounts of Pashtun nationalism are backed up by critical scholarship. Through the British divide and rule policy, people of the frontier regions were divided among themselves, as well as portrayed as being Central Asian rather than Indian or South Asian in their characteristics.52 According to Sir Olaf Caroe, Governor of the North-Western Frontier Province from 1946 to 1947, the Pathans were from almost every point of view,

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ethnic, linguistic, geographical, historical different even from the Muslims of the Punjab.53 Such ethnographic accounts by colonial administrators served to harden the boundaries of consciousness between peoples. National narratives revolve around past glory and the idea of bygone greatness. The frontier region had also been a historical invasion route through the Khyber Pass and was renowned for being indomitable. Legend has it that Alexander the Great, the Sikhs and British were all unable to beat the Pashtuns into submission. Many Pashtuns proudly partake of the great traditions of being warriors brave and hardy, mountain people who faced many hardships but no conqueror could subdue them. The idea that Afghanistan is the graveyard of Empires resonates with Pashtun sensibilities as neither the British nor the Soviets or Americans were able to win a war against the ferocious and erce Pashtun tribes. Such stories may be in part myths and legends, designed to bolster a sense of pride among a beleaguered people; they nevertheless ring true in the heart of many a Pashtun. In contemporary times, Pashtun nationalists nd themselves besieged from all sides. The state of Pakistan is spilling Pashtun blood in the tribal regions. The al-Qaeda and Taliban militants are shedding Pashtun blood in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Americans and NATO forces are spilling Pashtun blood in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, they are pitted against the centralized and authoritarian state as well as the Punjabi majority. In Afghanistan, they are pitted against the Tajiks and Uzbeks and the erstwhile Northern Alliance. All this is going to reinforce feelings of oppression and injustice. It is likely to strengthen nationalist sentiment even further. In conclusion, it may be said that Pashtun nationalism is a contested idea. It is derived not only from what its adherents speak but also from the speech of its opponents. It is therefore contradictory and in a continual process of elaboration, reection, sharpening and renewed articulation. It is therefore dynamic and not static. It partakes of many of the characteristics discerned in most forms of nationalism such as nostalgia for a lost past, a fractured history, painful memories of disunity and bloodshed and narratives of both greatness and suffering. A minority comes to imagine itself as a nation at the point where it seeks territory, autonomy and ultimately sovereignty. It is an open question whether history unites the Pashtuns on both sides of a porous and permeable borderland by erasing the imaginary line drawn on a map coloured with tragedy. Notes
1. 2. 3. 4. Kaplan, Revenge of Geography. Totten, Taliban and Pashtun Nationalism. Harrison, Pakistans Ethnic Fault Line. In late 2011, Hussain Haqqani was recalled as Pakistans ambassador to the United States after being accused of masterminding a memorandum to the then Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, to help prevent an expected military coup in Pakistan. In return, the civilian Pakistani government would change the national security team, move decisively against the Haqqani Network of Afghan Taliban which attacks NATO forces in Afghanistan, freeze the nuclear programme and subordinate army postings and transfers to the civilian government which will promote and appoint ofcers more amenable to the US interests. The memo, routed through a businessman of Pakistani origin, Mansoor Ijaz, was deemed to be dubious by Admiral Mullen. However, an article in the Financial Times by Mansoor Ijaz led to explosive media disclosures leading to Hussains resignation and the setting up of a parliamentary and a judicial commission to probe the issue. Former Ambassador Haqqani is at the time of writing living in the Prime Ministers Secretariat facing possible charges of treason and sedition. Basically, it would be fair to say that Hussain Haqqanis view of the issue is at variance with that of the state intelligence agencies and the military.

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5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

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Quoted in Harrison, Pakistans Ethnic Fault Line. Harrison, Tyranny of the Minority. Harrison, Pashtun Time Bomb. Ibid. Khan, Dirtiest War. Ejaz, Pashtun Nationalism. Ibid. There are a number of Pakhtoon tribes and clans and each one has certain traditions and customs that are peculiar to it. The famous Pukhtoon tribes, to mention a few, are Yousafzais of Bajaur and Malakand Agencies, Afridis of Khyber Agency, Kohat and Peshawar, Mohmands of Mohmand Agency, Orakzais of Orakzai Agency, Turis and Bangash of Kurram Agency, Waziris of North Waziristan Agency, Mahsuds and Urmars of South Waziristan Agency and Bhittanis and Sheranis attached to Tank and D.I. Khan Districts. The Khattak tribe of the wellknown warriorpoet Khushal Khan Khattak is also one of the well-known tribes of Peshawar and Kohat borders. There are other smaller tribes such as Shinwaris, Mullagoris, Shilmanis, Sas, Zaimukht, Muqbil, Mangal, Zadran, Para Chamkani, Kharoti, Jadoon, and Daur. Sareen, Myth of the Unbeatable Pakhtoon. Rajasingham-Senanayake, Identity on the Borderline, 46. Rajasingham-Senanayake argues that colonial ethnography and knowledge systems created mutually exclusive identities in terms of either/or. People had to be either one ethnic group or another; those who straddled more than one identity deviated from the norms established by xed classications that disallow mixtures. Imran Khan, the Chairman of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf, has appeared dozens of times in innumerable TV talk shows to express his views as an expert on the conict in the frontier region. Some of his ideas include the claim that the Taliban are anti-imperialist nationalist ghters, Pashtun tribes have always resisted foreign intervention, the Taliban are popular Pashtun freedom ghters and represent Pashtun nationalism, Pashtun tribesmen are killing innocent civilians due to anti-US sentiment, the assassinated tribal leadership in Waziristan was proUS and the government of Pakistan is pleasing India by making the soldiers ght the Taliban. Such claims about the Pashtuns, Taliban and tribal leaders have been challenged and debunked by others who perceive the Taliban as the antithesis of the Pashtunwali code of conduct. See, for example, Arqam, Taliban Vs Pashtuns; also see Sulehria, Three Myths about Taliban. Sulehria challenges the myths that the Taliban are anti-imperialists, harbingers of peace and against the growth of poppy. Such myths have been constructed to romanticize the Taliban who are regarded by other writers as criminals. Butt, Imran Khan, Wrong on the Taliban War Again. Taj, Compatibility. Ibid. Ibid. Taj, Objectifying the Pakhtun. Taj, Pakhtun Culture and Talibanization. Taj, Fantasies, Objectication and the Pakhtun. Taj, Compatibility. Taj, Pakhtun Culture and Talibanization. Taj, Fantasies, Objectication and the Pakhtun. The Pashtunwali code is an informal, unwritten code of ethics around which Pashtuns in both Pakistan and Afghanistan are expected to order their lives. While its exact date of origin has not been determined, it predates Islam by hundreds of years. Some of its basic tenets and principles include Nang (honour), Ghairat (pride), Badal (revenge), Oogha Warkawel (giving a lift to persons in need), Pannah Warkawel (offering asylum), Ashar (shared cooperative work), Zhamena (commitment), Melayter (patrons), Chegha (call for action), Soolah (truce), Panah (protection), Pashtunwali consists of qualications such as Khpelwaki (self-authority), Sialy (equality), Jirga (assembly), Roogha (reconciliation or compromise), Barabari (equivalence), Teega/Nerkh (law), Aziz/Azizwale (clan and clanship), and Terbor/Terborwali (cousin and tribal rivalries). Taj, Fantasising about FATA. Taj, Compatibility. Taj, Fata. Taj, Pakhtun Culture and Talibanization.

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13. 14.

15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30.

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46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

Ibid. Taj, Compatibility. Ibid. Escobar, Kashmir. Wardag, Tariq Ali, Pashtun Nationalism and Taliban. Ibid. Ibid. Arqam, Taliban. Ibid. Wardag, Tariq Ali, Pashtun Nationalism and Taliban. Taj, Fantasising about FATA. Taj, Compatibility. Ahmed and Khan, Talibanization and Pashtuns. Ibid. Anderson, Imagined Communities. In this celebrated work on nationalism, Benedict Anderson pointed out how nationalism, made possible by print-capitalism, is an imagined idea which connects people across time and space in a feeling of unity and is a notion that is akin to family and kinship. Anderson was careful to point out that although nations and nationalisms may be imagined, their effects nonetheless are real and material. Isfahani, Pakthtoonkhwa. Khan, Bacha Khan Aur Khudai Khidmatgari. Ibid., 23, 1415. Ibid., 13. Ibid., 1. Ibid., 2. Barton, Indias North West Frontier, 57, 83. Caroe, The Pathans, 346.

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