Social Capital, Panchayats and Grass Roots Democracy: Politics of Dalit Assertion in Uttar Pradesh Author(s): Sudha Pai

Reviewed work(s): Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 8 (Feb. 24 - Mar. 2, 2001), pp. 645-654 Published by: Economic and Political Weekly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4410321 . Accessed: 17/08/2012 02:04
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Social Capital, Roots and Grass

Politics of Dalit Assertion

Panchayats Democracy
in Uttar Pradesh

A studyof the new panchayatsof UP provides an opportunity the roleplayed for understanding by social capital in the functioning of democratic institutions in segmented societies. A keyfinding of the study in two districts of UP, Meerut and Azamgarh, is that segmentation arising out of caste/class divisions is a significant contextual variable in determiningthe developmentof trust, social capital between groups and democraticfunctioning.
SUDHA PAI

in Italy that recentyears attentionhas been fo- study of local governments is first democratic of institutions cused upon the new panchayats performance mootedby the RajivGandhigovern- substantiallya function of networksof mentin the late 1980s andcreatedby the trustand civic engagements amongcitiin coAmendment Act 1992. zens, as it makesthem participate 73rdConstitutional collectiveaction[Putnam This is becausean earliergenerationof ordinated 1993]. in the 1960s after an initial His workhas shiftedthe debateaboutthe panchayats for economic development either prerequisites failedto generate of optimism period of pro- and democracyaway from ideology and or implementation participation but whichhe deemsnecessary Lack of funds, ab- institutions, posed programmes. sence of regularelections, bureaucratic insufficient,to culturalfactors such as andcapture of theseinstitutions by values and virtues. apathy In this context, the new panchayats led the dominant elites in the countryside thelastfactorhad providean important to theiratrophy. Indeed, worthy experiment to understand the been anticipatedby scholars who had of studyin our attempt in the funcsocial to local that of role capital playedby argued granting power institutions in segand tioningof democratic conservative bodiesin the prevailing hierarchical social milieu would lead not mentedsocieties,moreso becausecertain in the 1990s have changed of thehold developments butstrengthening todemocracy of ruralupper castes elites upon local the context in which they function.The affairs.A second roundof experimenta- state of Uttar Pradesh(UP) where our tion beginningin 1977 based upon the study is located has witnessedsince the Ashoka MehtaCommitteereportwhich mid-1980s the new role of panchayats of social shiftedthefocusfromdevelopment perse 'frombelow',andthesharpening devolution identities and political consciousness to localgovernment by greater the of powerachieveda modicumof success among the lower castes, particularly in only four states - West Bengal, dalits, who are demanding improvedsosharein economic AndhraPradeshand to some cial status,anda greater Karnataka, extent Jammu and Kashmir.This was andpoliticalpower.This has been due to in civil society of democratisation socio-cultural movements afaster because process in thesestatesby thelate and mobilisationby low caste political andpoliticisation to parties. of reservations 1970s andthe granting SCs and STs in the panchayatsallowed Hence,this stultyexamines,in the conthe text of the politics of identityin UP, the the ruralpopulationand particularly of sixgram weakersectionsgreater than functioning (village) panchayats participation the lowest before [Crook and Manor 1998]. This andtheirsamitis(committees), shows that the social structure in which level in the new panchayatinstitutions areembedded andthe context createdin 1992, in selectedblocksin two panchayats in which they functionis important and districtsof UttarPradesh.By means of can to a largeextentdetermine theirsuc- extensive empirical analysis the study cess or failure.This is in keeping with explores firstly, whether democratic introducedby the 73rd Robert baseduponthe decentralisation Putnam's argument In

Amendment has led to greaterparticipation by and successfulimplementation of government-funded programmes, particuModelVillage larlyunderthe Ambedkar forthelowercastes.Secondly, programme whether within the panchayatsconflict resolution takesplaceamongsocialgroups forthebenefitsof development competing baseduponthecreation of common norms, values,trust,andcollectiveaction,or are they an arenaof conflictandcontestation over scarce resources,social status and politicalpower?In otherwords,is there 'socialcapital'in ruralsociety,whichhas enabledpanchayats to overcomeexisting social cleavagesand promotegrassroots democracy. is a largestate,the plains UttarPradesh areaconsistingof threeregions:western, eastern andcentralwithsubstantial-socioeconomicandpoliticaldifferenceswhich have persistedover time. Two districtsMeerutandAzamgarh in the westernand the eastern region respectively - were selected to study the performance of in differingsocioinstitutions, panchayat economiccontexts.In bothdistrictsthree were selected gram (village) panchayats on the following basis: (a) The sample of dalits villages have a high proportion astudy andlowerbackwards whichenabled of dalitassertion, andits impactuponthe withinthepanchayat between relationship the traditionally dominantgroups,dalits, and the backwards. (b) They have been identified as Ambedkar villagesby theUP As this providesthem with government. extrafundsfor programmes for the lower castes, it enableda studyof bothparticiof benefitsto pationby and distribution thesegroups.A purposive random sample of 45-55 respondent householdsin each

Economic and Political Weekly

February 24, 2001645

village, from four age groups of each caste, were selected keeping in mind their proportion in the population to whom a dewas administered.lThe tailedquestionnaire at the block level the and village pradhans BDO and other functionaries were also interviewed.2 Two featuresof the new panchayatsmake an examination of their democratic performance useful for our study. First, the 73rd Amendment by providing reservation to dalits and women has changed their social composition by giving these groups a predominantposition in these institutions. Second, by increasing the powers and finances of these bodies it has furthered the process of democratisation [Khanna 1994]. Equally important is the initiation in 1991 by the UP government of the Ambedkar Village Programme (AVP) which is implemented by panchayats. Although begun by the Mulayam Singh government in 1991, its political importance stems from its enthusiastic adoption by the BSP underMayawati, when it came to power in collaboration with the SP in 1993 and the BJP in 1995 and 1997. Mayawati created a separate department for the AVP, posted dalit officers at the block level and a series of government ordersissued from 1995 onwards gave top priority to its implementation,3 The aim was to concentrate developmental funds spread thinly over the state, in villages where dalits are in large numberto provide maximum benefits to them. It is not a separate, but an overarching programme under which in every block, villages with 50 per cent dalit population were selected and provided extra funds to carry on the existing programmes for weaker sections. The villages selected remain under the AVP for one year and areprovided an extra fund of Rs 1 lakh for village development, which supplements already existing special programmes for the dalits and backward castes. Planning of various programmesfor the villages is carried out at the Block Development Samiti (BDS) meetings held four times a year, attended by all the 'gaon' pradhansand block level officials.4 At the village level the pradhans are expected to hold monthly meetings of the panchayat samiti at which the funds available, schemes for village development and applicationsof villagers for loans are discussed. Between 1991 and 1997-98, a total of 25,434 Ambedkarvillages all over UP were selected on the criteriondescribed above, though the programmehas not been implemented in many of them. The BSP

in 1995 loweredthe required government to 22-30 percent thereby dalitpopulation Singh coveringmorevillages.TheKalyan in 1997 decidednot to adopt government villages with less than30 per cent dalits The capture of political in the population. power by the BSP, dalit assertionand fordalitsin panchayat reservations bodies, together providea settingfor ourstudyof of panchayat the democratic performance in thesecondhalfof the 1990s. institutions

Hence, the relationshipbetween social capitalwhichimpliestrust,horms,andan active associationallife among citizens, whichcreatesdivisions andsegmentation among them, needs to be discussed. socio-economiccleavages Historically, a segmentary in Indiahavecreated society are'cellular', inwhichthevarious segments each havinga distinctlife of i e, separate, its own [Saberwal 1995].Thehierarchical of these divisionsof casteand arrangement class especiallyat the top andthe bottom which socialanimosities, level hascreated overcome. are not Undoubtedly easily andSegmentation Social Capital conflicts exist in all societies, and it is in a Transitional Society arguablethat positive attitudesto demos cracy are not partof the normsinherent Putnam' of Robert Sincethepublication workon theimpactof socialcapitalon the in social capital.However,in India,segin Italy, mentationhas createddeep-seateddivifunctioningof local institutions determinant this concept has attractedconsiderable sions,whicharean important in the action and of social scholars attention 1993]. [Putnam capital political among While the concept has roots in older countryside.Thus, a culture of distrust have historically has developed among the andJames Coleman theories,Putnam further developed it in their studies. varioushierarchical segmentsof society. Putnam's study of Italy showed that Nevertheless, these are not watertight mobility regions in which social capital is high, divisionsbut allow considerable is better andvice and have been affectedby the forces of institutional performance in anddevelopment versa.In the study,social capitalrefersto democracy beginning thatinherein family the colonialperiod,but moreparticularly "theset of resources socialorgani- since independence. andin community relations sations", and features such as "trust, Beginningwith the colonialperiodtwo have societal thatcan improvethe closelyinter-related normsandnetworks processes efficiency of society by facilitatingco- been significantin the northernplains: andfission or differordinatedactions"[ibid]. Colemandes- fusionor integration social structural entiation [Rudolphand Rudolph 1967]. cribesit as an important hasbeendueto mobilisational 'resource'or capital asset for the indi- Theformer within the caste system leading which is vidual, makingpos- changes productive of large caste blocks or of certainends that to the formation sible the achievement in place of small would not be attainablein its absence. horizontal aggregations Coleman (1990) also discusses the cre- fragmentedlocal 'jatis' or sub-castes, of social belongingto the same level in the caste anddestruction maintenance ation, trawhichwerenotinter-linked capitalandits impact,andarguesthatthe hierarchy, value of the conceptlies in the fact that ditionally.While in the colonial period their it identifiescertainaspects of the social theseeffortswereaimedatimproving aids social position and obtaining concesandthereby structure bytheirfunction for different outcomes sions, in the post-independence in bothaccounting period, andmaking they have been for joint political action actors atthelevelof individual of political transition. often leadingto the formation the micro-to-macro The conceptof social capitalhas been parties. None of them were aimed at of thecastesystem;rather tothestudy destruction withsomeexceptions,5 they applied, industrial providedgreatermobilitywithin it. withinadvanced of institutions In the colonialperiodamongscheduled countries thandeveloping societies6 rather thechamars socialtrans- castesinnorth suchasIndia India, attempted undergoing rapid formationwhose institutionshave been collectively to rise in the caste hierarchy and the establishedfairly recently.An important by meansof census re-definition whichaffectsinsti- processof sanskritisation. societalcharacteristic Theyattempted orthakurs, is segment- toregister themselves asrajputs inthelatter tutional performance inthecolonialcensus.Often ation,i e, cleavagesalongcaste,commu- i e, kshatriyas, asamong evidence waspresented, nityandclasslines.Inourstudy,segment- historical of Agra,thattheywereorigiation is a crucial intervening variable the chamars caste who had over the between social capital and democracy. nally a kshatriya Economicand PoliticalWeekly February 24, 2001

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centuries cometobewrongly outside prosperous ahirs,koerisand kurmis,and placed the varna system [Owen Lynch 1969]. betweenboth these groupsand the most thelife- backward castes(MNCs); andbetweenthe UsingSanskritisation theyimitated styles andritualsof the uppercastes spe- upwardlymobile chamarsand the less such as adoptionof ambitiousbalmikisandpasis, amongthe cially the brahmins, vegetarianism, donningthe sacredthread, schedule castes. Differentialgains from rituals,etc. While they failed in economic development and access to marriage the attemptto be acceptedas kshatriyas, political power have been responsible. to rename in the Thus, conflictratherthanconsensusis a themselves theymanaged 1931censusas chamar-jatavs, whichthey majorchara'cteristic of rural societyin UP constituted a specialsectionof the today.Hence,in this studya central argued, quesin theGangetic chamars of social/political plains.A number tionis:canleaders groups ofcaste associations werealsoformed which basedwithinthepanchayats trust generate atistoform helpedj larger 'paracommunities'and cooperative norms of functioning [Rudolphand Rudolph 1967:33] which which could bridgethe existing societal enabled joint political action, such as conflictsandpromote collectiveactionfor inthebureaucracy ruraldevelopment? reservations demanding orlegislature. theseactivities failed Though in bringingthemabovethe line of polluII various untouchable tion,itbrought groups Dalit Assertion andContext of socialreform within together creating unity, Panchayat Functioning the community andjoint politicalaction totheformation oftheUP Scheduled The two selected regions of east and leading Caste Federationin the 1940s and the west UP, with roughlyequal population Republican partyof India in the 1960s. sizes provide two differing contexts in of panchayats Thepost-colonial have periodhas witnessed, whichthe functioning Thedifferences betweenthe beginningin the mid-1960s, successive been studied. of Meerut andAzamgarh, waves of caste-basedhorizontalmobili- selecteddistricts sation in UP leadingto the formationof of significance forourstudy,aretheextent politicalpartiessuch as the BKD, BLD, of economic developmentand low caste JD andmorerecentlythe BSP, represent- mobilisation. Ourstudyindicates thatthese otherbackward castes variables dalitassertion ing the backward, together promote anddalits,as theselargeconglomerations against upper/middlecaste domination, arenowcalled.Thesegroups forchangesin by construct- whichhasbeenresponsible ing distinct social identities and joint the functioningof panchayats. political action were able to effectively Meerut District challenge the dominantposition of the [Pai1993].Bythesemeans, Congress Party the middle and lower castes developed Muchliterature exists whichshowsthat networks andshared Meerut values,whichallowed the western region particularly them to function as a collective social district,is the most prosperous regionin group in politics. However,the process the state. Beginning from the colonial remainsincomplete, fusion has not com- period the ruralareas have experienced downtraditional differences considerable agriculturaldevelopment pletelybroken between variousjatis or sub-castespro- [Pai 19931.Duringthe last threedecades, A parallelpro- rural poverty was only 26 per cent in ducing homogenisation. cessof fissioncloselyassociated withclass- 1987-88 comparedwith 43 per cent in basedchangesin therural economy,com- easternUP [Drezeand Gazdar1997:49) bined with democratisation,'has created Due to rapid expansion of educational rivalryandclass conflictbetweenjatis. In facilitiesin Meerut,therehas been diverthe colonial period, the introduction of sification of theoccupational structure and new landsystems,irrigation andcommer- rise in incomes.Consequently, the condicialisationof agriculture createda small, tion of dalits comparedto the eastern prosperouspeasantclass, which subse- districtshas alwaysbeen muchbetter.In someownedland, quentlybenefitedfrom the post-colonial thecolonial period wages relations withlandlords better policies of landreformandgreenrevolu- werehigher, tion and emergedas a rich peasantclass. and povertylevels lower [Singh 1947]. In recent years, rivalry has intensified Dalitsform 15-20percent of the popubetween differentsections of the back- lationin Meerut district[HD Singh1998]. wardand schedulecastes in partsof UP: Thechamar-jatavs of thedistrict havebeen the relativelybetter-off activesincethelate jats and the less sociallyandpolitically
Economic and Political Weekly February 24, 2001

colonial period.This region experienced mobilisationby the RepublicanPartyof Indiain the 1960s, whichwas very active in Hastinapur (village)assemblyconstituency close to the sample villages. However,declineof the RPIin the late 1960s, anduppercastedominance keptthe dalits in a subordinate positionuntilrecentlyin society and politics. Traditionally,the formed thedominant caste/ rajputs andjats, richpeasant, landowning groupwho controlledthe panchayats andmaintained an over socio-economic oppressive system the dalits and the lower backwards. In recentyears,due to rapideconomic a strongwaveof dalitasserdevelopment, tion and establishmentof the BSP, the traditional structures .of ruraldominance based on land and caste have been questioned.At the grass roots, dalit assertion has expressed itself in a socio-cultural i e, tremenprocessof 'Ambedkarisation', dous growthin the consciousnessamong dalits, mainlythe jatavs, aboutthe ideas andlife of Ambedkar [PaiandSingh1997j. This phenomenonhas united the jatavs making them aware of their common andneedto redress themcollecproblems tively. As the dalits constitutealmost50 in our sample per cent of the population villages and are economicallybetteroff than in other regions, this process has madeits mark,irrevocably alteringintercaste relationships. Though,as in the rest of Meerut district, it has affected the mobilejatavsto a greater extent upwardly than the balmikiswho remaineconomically backward and not so politically conscious.Dalitassertion hasbeenaccompaniedby social and politicalconsciousness amongthe MBCswho arealso quesof themiddle tioningthedominant position castes.7 Albeitnumerically thanthe larger dalits in west UP, only the sainis among them are as united, socially aware and politicisedas the former.Thoughas poor as thedalits,theysee themselvesas 'clean castes'abovethelineof pollution andtherefore, are not open to the idea of collaborationwith the formerin local affairs. Thesechangesarevisiblein ourselected villages of Khanauda,Maithena Inder andUldiypur, whichlie Singh(Maithena), within 15-20 km of Meerutcity, the first two, in Dauralaand the third,in Rajpura block. Among them Maithena, with a of 4,955 (810 families) is the population with3,097 largest,followedby Khanauda (416 families) and Uldiypurwith 2,814 (382 families) persons.8 Despite their smallernumbers, jats in Khanauda, rajput

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election chauhans in Uldiypur, and jats and industryno alternative employmentwas victoryin the 1998parliamentary in east UP, has made an inMaithena stillformthemiddle available.However,since the 1980s,due from Akbarpur chauhans Thedalits,consist- to spreadof HYVs of rice, consolidation impacton the region and was visible in castedominant groups. of tubewellsand our sample villages. The MBCs in the balmikisformthe of holdings,introduction of the chamars and ing inmost agricultural eastern plainsarenumerous, poorer largestgroup,constitutingabout 50 per ruralelectricity,considerable andurbanisation hastaken cases thanthe dalitsandremaindisparate whiletheMBCsare transformation centof thepopulation fewer in number. place, leading to increasedemployment caste groups, with little to hold them hadnot fordalits andMBCsonfarms, together. Mostof ourrespondents the mainsourceof occu- opportunities Landremains andincomewiththerajputs sites, and rick- heardthe term 'sarvadhik pichadavarg' andjats brick kilns, construction pation land,though shawpullingin the cities, thoughpoverty or MBC. Lackingeducationand alternaowningmostof thecultivable tradia few dalithouseholds own largeplots in remainsandthe pace of changehas been tive employment they still perform andprovideservicesto Maithena The MBCs are slow. The absolutedependenceon land- tionaloccupations and Khanauda. relationships the middlecastes with whom they retain largelylandless,the dalits owning more ownersandold patron-client anddalitshavegivenup a feudal relationship. land.In recentyears, the surplusgained havedisappeared and are less preThe ahirsandkurmis,clean cultivating fromfarming hasdeclineddue to fragmen- demeaningoccupations Shankar castes categorisedas OBCs, but roughly tationof holdings,andrisingcost of culti- paredto sufferindignities[Kripa vation;educationand jobs in the state 1993]. equivalent to the jats in the west and in this constituting about 15 per cent of the and service sector, have The natureof dalitmobilisation bureaucracy9 becomethe majorcatalystfor change in region is historicallydifferentfrom the populationof Azamgarh,still form the caste [H D Singh 1998]. Their economicand social status.More impor- western plains as it did not experience dominant andland has contributed to increas- mobilisationby a dalit party/movement, positionhas not beenquestioned tant,education andassertionamongdalits untilthe rise of the BSP. However,there and ritualstatus,remainthe main source ing awareness movements of their socio-economic dominance in in local affairs.This is visible in the esta- is a legacy of two anti-feudal in in which the colonial blishment dalits of 'alternative' dalits, village affairs.However, the oppressive private period, by in thecase of the second,took practices of thepastsuchasbeating, unaided and (UAUR)schools particularly taking unrecognised in our sample villages, and attemptsto part. TheKisanSabha andEkamovements overthe landsof the lowercastes,andnot andlow allowingthemto vote have begunto disindebtedness send childrento Meerutfor high school in the 1920s,against and college education as government wages led at times by low caste leaders appearthough social distance is mainandPasiMadari; tained.They sharetheir dominantstatus schoolsprovidepoorqualityof education suchas BabaRamchand [Jaipal Singh 1998]. Named after [Siddiqui1978]. and second,a spontane- with 'upperclass' Muslim Siddiquisin the aim of the privateschools ousrural Ambedkar, agitation bydalitsin 1946,against Azamgarh. In our sample villages the of 'begar'(unpaid dominant is to spreadhis ideas and to ensurethat theexploitative practice groups- both HinduandMuswill be ableto competewith labour)[RamNarayan1996].Afterinde- lim - resideon one side of the village the dalitchildren in all spheresof life. Conse- pendence, both the Socialist and the dalits are on the otherside. While this is 'manuvadis' hada strong basein the a common.pattern in UP, the continuation parties quently,only 25 per cent of our totalres- Communist hasledtominimum social mainlyfromthelowercastesare easterndistricts and supportedland re- of untouchability pondents lowerlandceilings,abolition interaction anda few havebeento college.10 distribution, between the two sections. -illiterate, thesechangeshavecreated in of landrevenueon smallholdings, The three selected villages of Anaura, etc, in Collectively our samplevillages a post-independence the 1960s.Followingthedeclineof theleft Nevrahi and Sammapur Khalsa thelowercastesshifted (Sammapur) areapproximately 20-30 km parties, generation amongthejatavsanda section andsocialist of theMBCs,whichis educated, upwardly their allegianceto the Congress,and in from Azamgarhcity and lie in Rani Ki Saraiblock. While Anauraand Nevrahi mobile,politicallyconscious,prosperous more recentyears, the BSP. The dalitsconstitute25 per cent of the were selected as Ambedkarvillages in andvery aggressivetowardsthose above It is this populationin Azamgarhdistrictand are 1995, Sammapur themin thecaste/classhierarchy. was selected in 1994. sectionthatis playinga centralrole in the the largestcastegroup,consistingmainly Anaura is the largestvillage with a popuin Meerutdistrict. new panchayats of chamars,pasis and musahars. In our lation of 2,130(280families)Nevrahi 1,386 in there is andSammapur thesmallest (185 families) sample villages Azamgarh, AzamgarhDistrict inAnaura, Kurmis ahirs definitely politicisation and awareness 960(183families). The easterndistricts,form a region in among dalits of their low status and a in Sammapur, and rajputchauhansand whichhistorically dalitidentity Muslim Pathans inNevrahi, formthedomidespitefertile soil and desireto changeit. However, andthereis lack nantcastes in our samplevillages.While adequaterainfallthere has been a rare has not fully crystallised combination of extreme thechamars. TheBSP inNevrahi almostallthedalitsarechamars, povertyanddense of unityevenamong withheavypressure on agricul- is identifiedhere as a 'dalit partyof the in the othervillagestherearepasis,musapopulation turalland,with adverseeconomicconse- poor'andnota chamar partyas in Meerut. hars and.a few paswans.Anaurahas the forthedalits. Inthecolonialperiod More important than the legacy of past largestnumber of MBCswhileSammapur quences dueto lackof alternative is themobilisation and struggles employment by theleaders has veryfew. EastUP is a regionof small mostplotsare indebtedness, theywereharwahas, literally of the BSP and spreadof the electoral plots andexceptin Anaura, castes ploughmenbondedto zamindars[Singh processin a regionwherethe dalitswere less thana bighaandthe dominant collec1947].Afterindependence, thoughabsen- not allowed to exercise their vote until own thebiggerplots.Thechamars tee landlordism disappeared, agriculture recently. Most dalits identify with tively held a large amountof land in the remainedbackwardand due to lack of Mayawatiratherthan the BSP, and her colonial period, but their individual 648 Economicand PoliticalWeekly February 24, 2001

holdingswere small and today they are dwarf-holders and agricultural labourers. However,as they areable to pursuetheir traditional of leatherworking, occupation their economic condition is better thanthat of the balmikisand musahars. Theliteracy ratehasriseninrecentyears butis lowerthanin the west, being 37.68 percent in ruralAzamgarh against46.44 butamongdalits, Meerut; percentin rural it is only 39.22 per cent in Azamgarh as against51.30 per cent in Meerut[Census 1991]. All the villages have a primary school, the only high school being in Anaura. morethanhalf Exceptin Anaura, the personsin the samplefrom the other villages are illiterate,the largestnumber beingamongthe MBCs,followed by the dalits. Among our respondents, only 25 percenthavestudied up to class 8, and 12 percentup to high school butthreedalits andone MBCin Nevrahi,andone yadav in Sammapur have been to college, all children areattending schoolin thesample villages and generational change is very marked amongthoseupto 25 yearsof age. Education has not substantially contributedto assertionagainst the dominant castes. Despite rise in literacy, land remainsthemajorsourceof livelihoodwith little diversification of the occupational fromsmallbusinessessuch structure, apart as poultry farming, sheepandpig rearing. TheMBCsparticularly in Anaura, follow their traditional occupations of potetc. With little indusmaking,carpentry, trialdevelopment or employmentexcept in quarries andbrickkilnsnearby, poverty and continuation of feudal relationships, the largemajority of dalitsremaindependent uponthe middlecastes for employment. Nevertheless,in all the villages a fewdalitsareinserviceeitherinAzamgarh or Sethwal,the numberbeing highest in Nevrahi. social Thus,although education, and politicisationhas risen in awareness recentyears amongdalits and MBCs, in contrast to Meerutdistrict,they have yet to openly challenge the position of the dominantgroups. traditionally

Ill TwoPatterns of Panchayat Performance

Ourfieldstudyrevealed a marked difference in the performance of panchayats in MeerutandAzamgarh districts.Two different of participation, institutional patterns and distribution of benefits performance emerge due to the differential socio-

economic and politicalcontextin which dalitfamilies.The pradhanis thus,do not are embeddedand function. representthe democraticchoice of the panchayats dalits,norhavethejats totallylost control over the panchayat Meerut District system. In the elections to the grampanchayat ParticipatoryPatterns samitisandtheblockdevelopment samitis Oursurveyof the selectedvillages and (BDS) there was a contest between the of thechangestakingplace j atavsandother castegroups. Intheformer, understanding - threeof them in westernUP, suggestedthatoursample in Maithena,13 members from women- were elected consistingof one villages are in a phaseof transition controlby the dominantcaste/richpeas- jat, one MBC and one balmiki and 10 ants to a more democratic system which jatavs.In the othervillages,all candidates - ninejatavs,two to thelower wereelectedunopposed providesgreater participation of thefunc- Muslims, one MBC and one jat, in castes.However, examination andsixjatavs,onebalmiki, two tioningof the gramandblockpanchayats Khanauda; revealed thatdespite intheirsocial MBCs and two rajputsin Uldiypur.Two changes dueto reservations andques- members wereelectedfromMaithena, one composition of the dominant of the from and a fourth from Khanauda, tioning position jats jointly and rajputs, therehas been little increase Khanauda and Uldiypur to the BDS in participation in decision-making and Daurala,which consistedof 5T persons. of programmes implementation bythelarge Of the two memberselected to the BDS of villagers. Whileearlier thejats fromMaithena- four of the eight candimajority andrajputs controlled thepanchayats, and they datesbeingjatavs- one was a rajput now sharetheirdominance with a small, the otheran MBC. However,in the other butinfluential was group ofjatavs.At thesame two villagesfromwhereone member hasalsoemerged candidates time,competition among electedto theBDS,thewinning the jatavs for the status and patronage, werejatavs.Thus,thejatavstakingadvanwhichcontroloverpanchayat andtheir functioning tageof thereservations provided inKhanauda numerical Thisis moreevident havebeenableto gain provides. majority andMaithena, whereassertion bodies. amongthe controlof the panchayat is than in more marked of jatavs Uldiypur, Analysis participatory patternsrein theelectionsto thepanchayats andtheir vealed thatin our samplevillages, meetor panchayat patternof functioning. ings of the gaon panchayat dueto theirnumerical Although prepon- samiti have never been held. It is the derance dalitshavebeenpradhans earlier, pradhan,(actually the husband of the thiswasdueto thesupport of thedominant 'pradhanis') some members electedto the havegiventhem BDS and a few influentialvillagers,who middle reservations castes; amoreindependent Inoursample meetandtakealldecisions distriposition. regarding theAVPalthough elections held butionof benefitsunder villages, in the panchayat in 1995, the post of pradhan was sharply therulesprescribe discussionon schemes/ contestedbetweenthe leadingdalitfami- applicationspresentedby villagers.The lies.11 In Maithena,the largest village, womenpradhanis, who stoodfor election therewere 14 womencandidates dueto thereserbelong- in placeof theirhusbands - only two of vations for women, do not attendthese ing to the dalitcommunity whomwerebalmikisthe restbeingjatavs meetingsand merelysign on paperssent - in Khanauda therewere6 candidates and to their residence [Pai 1998]. In many in Uldiypur5,12but only 2-3 candidates casestheelectedmembers of thepanchayat substantial of the a number votes samiti are also not As a result included. gained cast. In Maithena, the winningcandidate most respondents in our sample- includthe gained520 out a totalof 1,507.votescast, ing dalits- hadlittleinformationabout in Khanauda underthe AVP, fundsavail425/869, and in Uldiyapur programmes 323/659.Priorto the panchayat andheldthat elections, able,ortheirimplementation, at meetingsin the dalitmohalla,prosper- a few influential'chamars'made all the ous andenterprising dalitfamiliesdecided decisions after 'consulting' influential to put up their women as candidates for membersof the upperand middlecastes. thepostof pradhan. dalit However,someof our Only a few of the youngereducated thesecandidates heldthat were andMBCrespondents in oursample could respondents also approvedand supported of the AVPandits by the jats discussthe advantages andtherefore theirelectionwas the result impact on the village. In fact some of a tacitagreement betweenthepowerful expressed akeendesireto attend panchayat and the forward and and families, jat prosperous meetings arguedthat they were not 649

Economicand PoliticalWeekly February 24, 2001

invited to attend them. Thus in the sample villages, a new nexus has developed between the more prosperous jatavs under the leadership of the pradhan, and the dominant landowning castes, specially the jats. Together they constitute the elite section of the village and control the panchayat. The present of Khanauda forexample, although pradhan ajatav is close to the jats and invites many of them to the panchayat samiti meetings held by him. The jats support his style of functioning, the schemes selected for village development and the mannerin which the benefits are distributed. Institutional Performance and Distribution of Benefits Despite the low participation, our respondentsagreedthattherehas been implementationof many developmental/welfare programmes under the AVP by the new pradhans. Out of a total of 29 villages selected in Dauralablock for the AVP since was selected in 1991-92, 1991, Khanoauda Maithena in 1992-93, and Uldiypur in Rajpurablock in 1996-97.13 Table 1 provides the main programmes implemented, which are the Intensive Rural Development Programme (IRDP) and the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY), two housing programmes and other smaller ones such as old age pension. As no jobs can be provided under the JRY in the village, it has been used for all round village improvement such as building of link roads, brick roads, school buildings, installation of handpumps,toilets, bore-wellsetc. Most of these schemes have been implemented in Khanauda and Maithena. In Uldiypur the smallest of the villages, a new panchayat bhawan costing Rs 72,000 in 1995-96, and in Khanauda, a 'chapaul' (community centre) for the dalits was built. These villages have also received direct grants from the state government for example, Khanauda received Rs 15,000 from the education departmentfor a primary school building, and Rs 10,000 from the welfare departmentfor building common toilets as part of the AVP. Until Mayawati became the chief minister in 1993, there was no metal road to the highway from these villages, but as part of a special drive this was done. These developments have considerably raised the standard of living of the people and improved the environment. Many villagers have taken advantage of the loan scheme under the IRDP programmeand setup tailoringunits, cycle andmachineryrepairshops,carpentry units,

etc, and there are a total of 56 shops in whateverfundsthey are entitledto. As a the samplevillagesownedby members of result, the MBCs can neither identify in themselveswith the upper/middle castes variouscastes.Two MBCrespondents Maithena andone in Khanauda sell milk, whom they served earlier and who on for whichthereis greatdemand in Meerut occasion still exploit them, or the dalits, from buffaloes under theIRDP whomtheyconsider beneath themsocially. bought city, loan scheme.OneMBCrespondent owns The jats and rajputsare acutelyaware a flourmill in the village and two dalit that the jatavs have benefitedfrom the this has bred respondents are contractorswho have AVP, and more important and solidarity profited by the road building activity amongthembothcommunal a new sense of self-respect.They also commissionedunderthe AVP. However, a differentpictureemerges resent losing their hold over the MBCs whenwe examinethemanner in whichthe who traditionally providedthem services benefitshave been distributed. The intro- and labour,and who they feel are incited ductionof the AVP, especiallyduringthe by the dalits againstthem.The jatavs on periodwhen the BSP was in power, in- the otherhandfeel thatthe MBCsdespite a new dimension troduced intothealready being part of the ruralpoor do not cosituation conflictual existingin oursample operatewith the dalits in the functioning villages, due to heightenedpoliticisation of thepanchayats. Theystill alignwiththe amonglow caste groupsin recentyears. high/middlecastes, provide them tradiOursurveyrevealedconsiderable discon- tionalservices,andbehavein a subserviinsteadof findingindependent tent, lack of trust,and even conflict be- entmanner tween caste groups.Table 1 shows that employment, which is now available. attitude theyresentthesuperior althoughthe AVP was conceived as a Moreover, meantfor the dalits and the of the MBCs who place themoutsidethe programme MBCs who togetherconstitutethe rural Hindu vama hierarchy. The balmikisfiare nallyaccuseboththeMBCsandthejatavs poor, in most cases the beneficiaries dalits.Secondly,respondents the formeroppressthem, arguedthat of ill treatment, mostof the pumps,drainsandbrickroads the latterhave not sharedthe benefitsof Infact, the AVP despite their being the poorest havebeenlaidinthedalitmohallas. the benefitsare even more narrowly dis- among the dalits. tributed,among the jatavs due to their control overthepanchayats, thanthe rather Azamgarh really poorwhoaretheMBCsandbalmikis, Patterns whichhascreated resentment amongthese Participatory In contrast,our study of the sample groupstowardsthem. While the MBCs and the dalitssharea villagesin Azamgarh revealed district that common antipathytowards the middle the middle castes still control the Thereis also a total absence castes,dueto theAVP mutual antagonism panchayats. and 'socialjealousies'betweenthemover of participation by the large majorityof issues such as, tontrol over commonvil- the villagers in the decision-makingor of programmes. Due to lage resourcesand political preferences implementation TheMBCscomplained hassharpened. the dalits have been able to that reservations on the one hand,only a small section of capturealmost all the elective posts, but 'forward'backwards such as the yadavs this has not given them controlover the and kurmishave benefitedfromreserva- panchayats. InAnaura, theearlier pradhan tionswhiletherestlikethemselves, remain a kurmi,hadto relinquish his post butthe and backward. On the other electionof his wife as thedeputypradhan, uneducated thecontinuation of his control hand,bothin thepastandunderthe AVP, hasensured the BSP government hasgiven helpin the overdisbursement of patronage. InAnaura, formof loans,landfor housebuildingand therewereninecontestants for the post of basicamenities suchashandpumps, mainly pradhanof whom only three gained a to the dalits, who see it as 'their party/ substantial number of votes-408, 165and government'and behave in an arrogant 110 out of a total of 1,016 votes cast. anddictatorial manner towards them.The Elevenmembers wereelected from Anaura, MBCs feel that these are now 'chamar three of them unopposed,to 'the gram samitiand two dalitwomento villages' in which the dalits are almost panchayat of the 10 contescastes, while the BDS. In Sammapur equal to the upper/middle needsareneglected their astheylackleaders tants for the post of pradhan,only two to voice their needs, and powerfullocal receivedsubstantial number of votes.More bureaucrats and pradhans the postof deputypradhan was misappropriate important, Economicand PoliticalWeekly February 24, 2001

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won by a young educateddalit who has of in implementation been instrumental in thevillage. programmes developmental wereelectedto the gram Elevenmembers panchayatsamiti, of whom, two were yadavsthe rest dalitsand one member,a InNevrahi, outof nine dalit,to theBDS.14 a Gaud(MBC)was ableto win candidates, the post of pradhan due to acrimonybetween the chamarsand pasis, Thirteen to the candidates wereelectedunopposed samitibutonly four were chapanchayat consultations mars,the restdue to mutual to avoida contestconsistedof threepasis, two bhars, one yadavandthreebrahmins. - three chamars Four womenmembers and one pasi - were elected to the BDS. The captureof elective posts by dalits aqualitative hasintroduced changeinintercaste relationships, but the kurmis and inyadavsretaincontrolover panchayat wherethey stitutions. Onlyin Sammapur, are fewer in number, they have lost considerablegroundvis-a-vis the dalits. In fact, following reservation,capture of power by the BSP and particularly as chief minisMayawati'sappointment to tightentheir ter, they have attempted InAnaura holdoverpanchayat institutions. the kurmis andin Nevrahithe yadavs,are keento control thenewpanchayats, which theyperceiveas newcentresof powerand followingtheirincreasein stapatronage tus andfunctions. Therajputs on theother handargue thatthegovernment helpsonly them thedalitswhohavealwaysprovided a vote-bank,and do not favour further increasein the powersof the panchayats. Despitethese changes,in all the villages there is little participation by the large the functioning of the panchayat whichis instiviewed as a 'sarkari' (government) tutionresponsible for providing fundsfor oras a socialmechawelfare programmes, nism to settle disputesamong villagers. Lack of educationand understanding of the importance of participation in local affairs, remains an importantobstacle anduneducated sections amongthepoorer of the lower castes. InstitutionalPerformanceand Distributionof Benefits In all the villages as Table 2 shows, a of programmes number havebeen implementedunderthe AVP. These villages, wereselectedduring exceptforSammapur the period of the short-livedBSP-BJP coalition government in 1995 when Mayawati aggressively pursued this
majority of villagers - of all castes - in

throughthe districtbureauprogramme, As cracy for its speedy implementation. under fewjobsareavailable, JRY,families below the line of povertywere identified and providedemployment on large civil of link roads workssuch as construction imand drains,which have considerably orbenefiprovedthevillageenvironment, loansto set upsmall ciarieswereprovided businesses. Women from SC and ST and30 per households weregivenpriority, cent of job opportunities createdare reservedforthem.All villagesweregranted funds on the basis of their population, small villages with less than 1,000 population being counted along with those Anykindof civil having1,000population. work can be selected by the village with the provisothat at least panchayat, 50 per cent of the labourand 15 per cent of thefundsmust beusedtoprovide housing in the village. Other to the SC population schemeswhichmaybe takenuparepublic roads,floodcontrolworks,pondcleaning, centres, buildings,community panchayat primaryschool buildings,etc. InAnaura under JRY,fourmainschemes wereundertaken: the linkroadwithsmall nullahsfrom Rani ki Saraito the village at an expenditure of Rs 3,99,000;second, for the Anaura diggingwas'begun village drain project on which Rs 72,000 was spent;third,a numberof the sanctioned Sulabh toilets were built at a cost of Rs 88,420; and four, classroomsfor the primaryschool were built at a cost of Rs 60,000. The Sulabhtoilet scheme is very popular and 15 households have benefited fromit.Eachindividual is granted Rs2,500,andhastoinitially Rs 300 deposit with the pradhanwho enters it in his accounts and has it constructed.Dalit needto depositonly Rs 150 beneficiaries The initially. village has benefitedfrom the handpumps, whichhavebeenfittedin the schools and the bazaar,so that the entire village can draw water. AlthoughNevrahiwas selected as an Ambedkar villagein 1995-96,theselected were implemented over a 2programmes 3 year At least 14 period. ongoingprogrammes such as TRYSEM,special components programme, etc, have been partly financed by the AVP. Under the JRY - five of them six handpumps programme in thedalitbastisandone on themainroad of the village- wereinstalled, brickroads and drains laid and the primaryschool building repaired. Under most of the schemesdalitshavebenefitedspeciallyin the field of housing,as they do not have

thefull loanamount. IRDP to return Under households were able to buy bullocks, start setupshops, buffaloes, poultry farming, and women have begun sheep rearing, InSammapur, purchased sewingmachines. a smallvillagemanyprogrammes although werein operation, themainones aregiven in Table2. A new schoolbuildingin 1995 and extra classroomsthe following year were built,andthe extrafundsalso made construction of link roads and drains possible.About29 houseswerebuiltunder the two majorhousingschemesbetween 1993 and 1998.Therehas not been much progressunderthe IRDPin the village. These programmes were implemented due to the efforts of the pradhans, block officials and the supportof the middle castes in the samplevillages. In contrast to our sample villages in Meerut,more funds have been spent on schemes benthanindiefiting the entirevillage rather viduals.This is dueto the influenceof the kurmiswho are not keen to implement schemes which would materially benefit the dalits and MBCs makingthem more andassertive. confident theAVP has Hence, not generatedopen conflict amongcaste groupsas in Meerut.The dalitsincluding the chamars, aredividedintofactionsand due to lack of unity, have not been able to make their markfelt upon panchayat InAnaura forexample,while functioning. somefactionssupport thepradhan andare invitedby him to participate in decisionother'anti-pradhan' made making, groups, dalits,feel he is nothandling upof younger due to which full village affairsproperly benefit has not been made of the AVP. Thisgroupwouldalsoliketo increase dalit in the and chalparticipation panchayats domilenge the power of the traditional nantgroups. TheMBCsbeinguneducated, cannot articulatetheir needs and do not participatein the panchayatswith the exceptionof the bharsin Nevrahiwho are consciousandmorevocal.Thus politically lack of unity among and povertyamong the dalits and MBCs, which places them onadependent vis-a-vis themiddle position castes, has allowed the latterto continue to dominatepanchayat functioning.

IV Conclusion
Ourstudy has examinedthe impactof socialcapital,on thedemocratic functionin two dising of panchayatinstitutions trictsof UttarPradesh.A centralfinding is thatthe contextin whichsocial capital 651

Economicand PoliticalWeekly February 24, 2001

functions is important, leading to differential consequences. In developing societies such as India, segmentation arising out of caste/class divisions emerges as a significant contextual variable determining the development of trust,social capital between groups, and democratic functioning of institutions. Further the nature of segmentedness in transitional societies is not 'fixed' but fluid with consequences for the natureof social capital. Rapid change in post-independence India due to the twin processes of democracy and development, has led to construction of new identities and shifts in the balance of power between caste andclass groups,creatingboth fusion and fission, leading to horizontal and verticalmobilisation. In UP, since the mid1980s, fasterpolitical mobilisation through socio-cultural movements in civil society and political parties thrown up by democratisation,has united disadvantaged groups creating larger identities of dalit and MBC that have challenged upper/ middle caste dominance. At the same time, capitalist development and state-funded welfare programmeshave sharpenedcompetition and conflict between dalits and MBCs, and subcastes within them, for control over economic resources, social statusandpolitical domination. Thus, what we are witnessing is increasing differentiation, not homogenisation; social conflict is no longer confined to the dominant and lower castes, but has sharpened between sections of the rural poor. These processes have impacted differently in our two study areas underlining the significance of the context. In Meerut district, closer ties and stronger bonds of social capital have emerged among the jatavs that has enabled them to challenge the dominance of the jats and rajputs,gain control over the panchayats and more benefits from the AVP, though this has created open conflict with the MBCs and other subcastes of dalits. In Azamgarh district, the dalits remain economically weak, with divisions even among the chamars and unable to collectively challenge the power of the kurmis and yadavs and play a more effective role in the panchayats.The pace of economic change andpolitical mobilisation among the dalits has been much slower in east UP, creating lower levels of conflict and maintaining existing structures of dominance. These developments have both positive and negative connotations for the building of social capital. In positive terms, social capital in the form of communal solidarity

has united the dalits makingthem conscious of theirspecialproblems, bringing forjointsocialandpolitical themtogether actionagainsttheupperandmiddlecastes and providingthem collective mobility Innegative social increased terms, upwards. andimprovement awareness, politicisation in theireconomicposition,have divided thechamars fromother of theirown groups such as the balmikis and community and sectionsof the ruralpoor musahars, such as the MBCs with whomthey have Thisdoesnot common economicinterests. meanthatsocial capitaldoes not exist in morebyconflictual societiescharacterised Ourstudy thanconsensualrelationships. showsthatsocialcapitalexists,butwithin in rural andnotbetweensegments society. Group ratherthan individualidentities, have the potentialto createstrongreserwithinsegments, but voirsof socialcapital they do not facilitate- and can in fact inhibit- the creationof a more broadbased civically useful and constructive social capital,which has the capacityto democratic ensure responsive government. Trustacrosssegments outof memarising andsharing of thesamepanchayat, bership common interestswhich need to be adandexperienced is rare dressed, onlyduring a crisis,or whenit benefitsall individuals such as buildinga road or flood control works.Yet, in oursamplevillagesin west UP andto a muchlesserdegreein eastUP, the chamars are playing the role of a vanguardprovidingleadershipto other subcastes,a process, which remainsinof greater completeandholdspossibilities futurepolitical cooperation among variThepossibilityof cooperaous subcastes. tion between the dalits and the MBCs castesseemless, againsttheupper/middle but cannotbe ruledout. to bridge Theincapacity of socialcapital colhas hindered boundaries, segmentary lective action among all caste groups speciallythe rural poor,greater participation and democratic functioning of This is because the compopanchayats. nents of social capitalare differentfrom those in western societies, where the is uponequalcitizensparticipatemphasis in ing public life for the commongood. Inoursample relationpanchayats, uneq-ual and conflict ships of power,competition occupy centralplace. Despite considerable democratisation of theirsocial comdevolution of power, positionandgreater the panchayats remainunderthe control of a small groupof jatavs in Meerutand Kurmisin Azamgarhdistrict.An 'elite'

democracyfunctionsin which the large in of members do not participate majority in some not are or, cases, decision-making even aware of available programmes resulting in inequitable distributionof benefits of the AVP and competition and conflict between segments. Thus, panchayatinstitutionsin UP, faithfully andsegmented reflecttheunequal society in which they are embeddedand are an arenaof contestation rather thancooperation among variouscaste segmentsover resourcesand benefits. However,the conflictsamongthe various groupswithinthepanchayats neednot be viewed in a negativelight and do not demoalways, it is arguable,undermine cratic functioning. As Hirschman has pointedout,socialconflictis animportant pillar and in fact builderof democratic society.Whilea degreeof socialcohesion is needed in every society, he holds that the integration of modemsocietieseverywhere, is the result withoutthe citizens realisingit, of theirexperienceof passing andsomehowmanaging or tendthrough of conflicts [Hirschman 1994]. ing,avariety conflictsareseen as dangerous Generally andpotentially destructive of social order and collective action, and need to be containedprecisely by the existence of socialcapitalorcommunity spiritin a civil society. Yet, social conflicts themselves thevaluable tiesthatholdmodem produce democratic societiestogether andprovide them the strength and cohesion they requireto functionand survive. In the absenceof an active and democraticcivil society, it is the state- given itscentrality indeveloping societies-which is playing a seminalrole. In westernsocieties, complex institutionalstructures have been devised to constrain the participants to reduce uncertaintyin social interaction.Rules and regulationsexist to ensure that the gains of progressare realised.Someof theseinstitutional structuresareweakor non-existent in developing countries.In the Indiancontext,what is important is nottheexistenceof conflict of conflictby per se, butthe management the stateand the leadersof varioussocial andbargainnegotiations groups. Through ing betweengroups,conflicts can be rehierarchies solved,traditional questioned, and more egalitarianequationsbetween segments established, which help in building a cohesive democraticorder. andre-distribSecond,the interventionist utive role of the state, helping the poor andunder-privileged, througha number

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Table 1: Major Panchayat Programmes: Malthena, Khanauda and Uldlypur Programmne 1 IRDP (loans) Year 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1987-88 1989-99 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1997-98 Maithena No and Caste Amount of Beneficiaries (Rs) 7SCs,5MBCs,2jats 8SCs,2MBCs,2jats 9SCs,6MBCs 1SC, 2MBCs 10SCs,6MBCs 8SCs,1MBC 3SCs 17SCs,2MBCs 4-8000 4-8000 3-10000 7-9000 9-20000 5-13000 5-12000 5-15000 Khanauda No and Caste Amount of Beneficiaries (Rs) 8SCs 16others 2Jats,1OSCs, 1MBC, 10SCs, 1MBC 22SCs, 2 MBCs 6SCs, 6 MBCs 11SCs, 1MBC 11SCs, 2 MBCs 4-7000 5-11000 5-10000 5-15000 7-15000 5-14000 7-7500 No and Caste of Beneficiaries 36SCs,8MBCs Uldiypur Amount (Rs)

2 JRY Forvillage Development

6-60000 55,300 52992 39185 12130 45017 20,734 33915

3 NirbalAwas Yojana 4 Pension Pension (Widow in case of Uldiypur) 5 IndiraAwas Yojana (Housingloans for SCs.)

6 SulabhToilets

115524 150785 43091 175948 49716 35000 5SCs,1MBC 8500 each 6SCs 9500 each 3 caste not known 1.00pm 1 2 8 15 6000 20 8000 18 8000 8 9000 50SCs, 50 others 1,10,000

63307 39535 110441 48167 36,000 4 SCs,Jat, 1MBC 8500 8SCs, 2 MBCs 9000 1MBC 9000 2SCs2MBCs* 10000 34 caste not known(1991-96) 100pm 6SCs 6000 10 SCk 8000 .12 SCs, 4 MBCs 9000 2 SCs 9000 25 SCs,25 others 64,000

3SCs,1 rajput 10SCs, 1MBC 4SCs,5MBCs 14 5 3 -

NA

9000

9000 9000

Table 2: Major Panchayat Programmes: Anaura, Nevrahl and Sammapur Programmes 1 IRDP (loans) 2 JRY Year 1994-95 1995-96+ 1996-97 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96+ 1996-97 1997-98 1995-96+ 1996-97 1994-95 1995-96+ 1996-97 1997-98 1991-92 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96+ 1996-97 Anaura BeneficiariesAmount No and Caste (Rs) 5 caste not known 3 caste not known -Forvillage Development -

Nevrahi No and Caste of Beneficiaries 14 SCs and 4 others 5SCs, I other 5SCs, 4 others
-

Amount (Rs) 6-22000 56048 56206 50285 46998 10-20000 125 pm 10-12000 -

Sammapur No and caste Amount of Beneficiaries. (Rs) 5 chamars4 others 1 MBC 7 chamars 7 chamars 4chamars 1pasi pasi 14 caste not known 3-12000 9750 6-12000 23963 54614 82397 60000 60000 6-10000 6-10000 10000 100pm 7-12500 10-17000 6-10000

NA NA NA 65,932 46295 38670

3 Nirbal Awas Yojana

4. Pension 5 Indira Awas Yojana 6 SulabhToilets 7 Free Boring (cost borneby Panchayat)

3 SCs, I other 8-10,000 1SC 10000 13, caste not known Rs125pm 1 8000 10 8000 10 SCs, 5 others 2500 2 8
---

45 SCs, 12 others yet to be begun-

2 chamars 1pasi, 9 chamars pasi, 2 chamars . 2 4 1

6 SCs 2 others -

Note. + the figuresin the case of Nevrahiare for 1995 to 1998.

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of welfare programmes, has played an role in conflict containing important between the privileged and underprivileged. In our samplevillages,despitethe andlackof particiauthoritarian structure patorydemocracyin the functioningof of welfare/developa number panchayats, mental programmeshave been implementedboth in Meerutand Azamgarh, fromwhichdalitsandMBCs have benefited.Ourstudyindicatesthatan ongoing process of conflict-resolution,through intervention by state officials and local in thefunctioning casteleaders, is present in our two study of the new panchayats districtsof UttarPradesh.This suggests thata broad-based social capital,capable of bringingtogetherdifferentcaste/class groupsmay evolve over a periodof time out of an interplayof both conflict and consensus, negotiation and bargaining, of leadingto moredemocratic functioning panchayats.E1

Notes
1 Thepaper drawsuponfourroundsof fieldwork: the first was conducted in May 1996, a more detailed one from Februaryto May 1997, a thirdin November 1998 and a final round in -March 1999. The resultsof the first February are available in, Sudha Pai and Jagpal Singh (1997) The second roundconcentratedon the functioning of panchayats, the AVP and its The last impactuponcaste/classrelationships. two rounds concentratedupon eastern Uttar Pradesh. 2 I am grateful to Jagbir Singh, schoolteacher in Meerut, for his painstakingand dedicated fieldworkwithoutwhich this study would not have been possible. 3 AmbedkarGram Vikas Yojana Sambandith Shasanadesh(Reportin Hindi) Mahatvapoorn Governmentof UP, Lucknow, 1999. 4 All informationabout the Ambedkarvillage scheme and developmental/welfare programmeswithin it are from the recordsof the block development officer, Daurala block, Meerut.I attendeda BDS meeting at Daurala in April 1997, at which the pradhans andother elected members from our sample villages presentedthe problems of their villages and asked for new grants. 5 A few examples are:(1) Olle Tomquist 1998. (2) RenataSerra, 1999. (3) Articles on India and Mexico in special issue WorldDevelopment, 24, no 6, 1996. 6 A recentexampleis, RobertA, Couto,Making Democracy Work Better: Mediating Social Capital,andtheDemocratic Structures, Prospect, Universityof NorthCarolinaPress, 1999. 7 Placed on the borderdividing the clean and the unclean castes, traditionallyMBCs were servicecastes- suchas washermen, carpenters, barbers, etc - forming part of the Jajmani

system. (Singh 1991) They includejatis such as dhivars, jogis, dhobis, telis, etc, among Hindu and badais, lohars, dhunasand julahs, amongMuslimMBCgroupsin Meerutdistrict. The Most BackwardClassess Commissionof UP 1975, listed 41 castes as most backward on the basis of social, economic, educational and political backwardness. 8 For a descriptionof these villages see Pai and Singh, 1997. 9 The number of SCs employees in the UP government compare favourably with those from the brahmin,kayasthaand vaishyacaste groups. Economic Times,New Delhi, June 4, 1995. 10 For details about the educationallevel of the respondents see, Pai 2000. 11 All informationabout panchayatelections in the sample villages in both Meerut and Azamgarhis from the BDO of the respective block. 12 The subcastes of the candidatesin Khanauda and Uldiypurcould not be ascertained, but the winner in all cases was a jatav. andMaithena were selected 13 ThoughKhanauda in the early 1990s, the actual implementation began in 1993 after the SP-BSP government came to power. Moreover the Mayawati government (1997) granted extra funds for completion of schemes begun earlier. 14 The subcastes of the elected dalit members could not be ascertained,but most of them were chamars.

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