Sunday April 5,

North Korea launches 'long-range' rocket

SEOUL (AFP) - North Korea launched a long-range rocket on

Sunday, defying months of pressure from the United States and
its allies over what they warned would be an illegal ballistic missile
test. US President Barack Obama swiftly condemned
Pyongyang's "provocative" act, South Korea denounced it as a
"reckless" threat to world security, and the UN Security Council
was to hold an emergency meeting at America's request. Japan
said the rocket flew over its territory while the boosters landed
safely in the waters off its coasts, and that it had not moved to
intercept the rocket -- something North Korea had warned would
be seen as an act of war. But the launch, which the North said
was a peaceful move to test a communications satellite, angered
nations which have held years of nuclear disarmament talks with
Kim Jong-Il 's secretive communist regime. "The launch took place
at 11:30:15," a South Korean spokeswoman said, breaking first
news of a launch which the North had vowed would take place
Photo: AFP between April 4-8. There was no immediate announcement from
Pyongyang. The North tested a missile and an atomic bomb in
2006, while in the midst of the six-nation disarmament talks, and Obama said Pyongyang had tested a Taepodong-2, its
longest-range missile, with Sunday's launch. The North tested the Taepodong-2, which has an estimated range of 4,100
miles (6,700 kilometres) in July 2006 but it failed after 40 seconds. The US State Department reiterated it saw the launch
as a violation of Security Council Resolution 1718, adopted after that test, which imposed sanctions on the North and
warned against further nuclear or missile tests. The United States and North Korea have decades of hostility between
them, dating back to the 1950-53 Korean war which ended without a peace treaty, and Pyongyang's secretive regime has
often worried its neighbours. "Regardless of any North Korean claims, this is provocative activity which threatens stability
and peace on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia," South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-Hwan said. "North
Korea's launch is a clear violation of (Resolution) 1718," Yu said. Despite the flurry of confirmations and condemnations of
the launch, it was not immediately known if the exercise had succeeded. A South Korean official said Seoul believed the
rocket was carrying a satellite. "However, it does not necessarily mean that the launch was a success," the official was
quoted as saying by South Korea's Yonhap news agency. The other five nations in the disarmament talks had all called
on North Korea to refrain from the launch, including China -- the North's closest ally, which declined to make official
comment in the aftermath of the launch. The Taepodong-2 could theoretically reach Alaska or Hawaii at maximum range,
though North Korea was not believed to have configured a warhead for it yet. The North had given a window for the
launch beginning on Saturday, and the actual launch came not long after official radio announced favourable weather
conditions in the morning. Analysts said North Korea wanted good film footage of a launch as part of plans to maximise its
propaganda value. The regime is seen as eager to give its people news of a technological triumph to bolster support at a
time of lingering uncertainty over the health of leader Kim. There are widespread reports Kim suffered a stroke last
August. While apparently largely recovered, the incident has raised questions about who would succeed the 67-year-old.
North Korea is also seen as trying to strengthen its hand with Washington in future nuclear disarmament negotiations.
Pyongyang has said that bringing the matter to the UN Security Council -- let alone any sanctions -- would cause the
breakdown of the disarmament talks.

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North Korean Intelligence Agencies
Central Committee
Korean Workers Party
Cabinet General Intelligence Bureau

Liaison Department
Research Department for External
Intelligence (RDEI)

General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chosen

Soren)

General Staff Department

Reconnaissance Bureau

State Safety & Security Agency

State Security Department

Ministry of Public Security

North Korean Prison Camps

No. 25 Chongjin Prison

No. 22 Hoeryong Camp
No. 18 Bukchang Camp
No. 16 Hwasong Camp
No. 15 Yodok Camp
No. 14 Gaechun Camp

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Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea or DPRK) is a Communist state with an
underdeveloped economy, but a powerful military, situated on the Korean peninsula between northeast
China and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). North Korea limits trade and transportation links with other
countries and tightly restricts the circumstances under which foreigners may enter the country and interact
with local citizens. Telephone and fax communications are unavailable in many areas of the country, and
foreigners can expect their communications to be monitored by DPRK officials. In recent years, North Korea
has experienced intermittent famine, chronic fuel and electricity shortages, and outbreaks of disease. Many
countries, including the United States, have contributed to international relief efforts to assist the people of
North Korea.

The DPRK adopted Marxism-Leninism as its ruling philosophy when it proclaimed its establishment in 1948,
but in a Constitutional revision in 1972, supplemented it with the juche ideology, or national self-reliance.
The two philosophies were combined into one as "the juche idea of the Worker's Party of Korea, a creative
application of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of our country". In 1980, the official ideology was
simplified as "the juche thought of the Great Leader, Kim Il-Sung". According to the DPRK Constitution,
juche is "a revolutionary ideology with a people-centred view of the world that aims to realise the
independence of the masses, the guiding principle of its actions". Juche consists of two parts: the
philosophical theory that claims the masses are the masters of history and the revolution, and the principle
that the masses need the guidance of a leader (Kim Il-Sung and his son, Kim Jong-Il) to fulfil their destiny.

In practice, juche resulted in an inward looking economic and political system that ostensibly rejected
international trade, but in reality became heavily dependent on the provision of goods on favourable terms
from fraternal socialist states. With the demise of the communist bloc, the difficulties of this position soon
became apparent. Shortages in spare parts, fuel, and food have grown but the isolationist ideology of juche
continues to underlie all government policies and emphasis remains in advancing an independent road to
national development. The population is motivated to pursue juche through an intensive ideological
campaign and a pervasive programme of political indoctrination. Since its inception, juche has primarily
stressed independence from external powers, but the regime now faces the dilemma of how to expand trade
and investment with the outside world in order to resuscitate the economy, without jeopardising its political
stability.

The "Military First" orientation has always been the heart and soul of the North Korean regime. It provides
the only conceivable means by which the regime can survive and achieve its ultimate security through
reunification. The military continues to grow in both conventional and asymmetrical forces with increasing
emphasis on the latter. The military provides deterrence, defense, and a massive offensive threat, as well as
leverage in international negotiations. The army is much more than just a military organization; it is North
Korea's largest employer, purchaser, and consumer, the central unifying structure in the country, and the
source of power for the regime.

In August 1945, the Japanese in Korea surrendered to the former Soviet Union, which gained control of the
Korean peninsula south to the 38th parallel. In August 1948, supposedly following general elections
throughout the peninsula, the DPRK was established, with Kim Il-song heading the central government.
These factitious elections are the basis for Pyongyang's claim as the only legitimate government of Korea,
and Pyongyang has made a national goal of reunifying the country on its terms. In pressing this claim, the
DPRK has engaged in a political, economic, and military competition with the Republic of Korea (ROK).
However, in any comparison except military power, Pyongyang is a poor second.

On Saturday, 24 June 1950, DPRK forces invaded the ROK. The United States, acting with a mandate from
the UN, took the lead in defending the ROK. The Chinese entered into the fighting, and the war's
inconclusive end led to a return to the status quo at the 38th parallel. An armistice, signed in July 1953, was
followed 2 months later by the signing of a mutual defense treaty between the United States and the ROK.

The country is currently being led by Kim Chong-il who succeeded his father upon the latter's death on 8
July 1994. The elder Kim was a ruthless, charismatic leader who retained tremendous loyalty from the
people, despite their hardships. Kim Chong-il has been described by detractors as paranoid, spoiled, and
suspicious, not having his father's abilities, and his access to the government bureaucracy is through a
clique. The country is facing insurmountable internal problems and is unstable politically, economically, and
socially.

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Other political setbacks have further isolated the DPRK and include the 1990 formal recognition of the ROK
by the former Soviet Union, and the 1991 entrance of both Koreas to the UN. The DPRK lost one of its major
supporters with the demise of the Soviet Union. Moreover, although the People's Republic of China (PRC)
remains the only credible supporter of the DPRK, economic and political rapprochement between the PRC
and the ROK continues. The DPRK will continue to be both economically and socially repressed and will
become increasingly isolated. The DPRK will likely cling to its outmoded style of communism and political
change will not occur until the current leaders are gone.

On June 19, 2000, the US eased economic sanctions against North Korea.
Imports from North Korea are allowed, subject to an approval process.
Direct personal and commercial financial transactions are allowed between
US and North Korean citizens. Restrictions on investment have also eased.
Commercial US ships and aircraft carrying US goods are allowed to call at
North Korean ports with prior clearance. Although modified periodically
since 1995 as a result of commitments made to begin normalization of
relations, US economic and financial sanctions against North Korea --
administered by the US treasury department -- remain in force. They affect
all US citizens and permanent residents wherever they are located, all
people and organizations physically in the united states, and all branches,
subsidiaries and controlled affiliates of US organizations throughout the
world.

Negative economic growth , chronic shortages of raw materials (especially

oil), ineffective centralized economic planning, and an emphasis on military
power contributed to the economic failure of North Korea. The requirement
by Russia and the PRC that materials exported to the DPRK be paid for
with cash further degraded North Korea's economic viability. The DPRK can no longer generate sufficient
electrical power to meet industrial needs, social services have been severely degraded, and segments of
society have been reduced to one meal a day. There are chronic shortages of many of the basic
commodities required for subsistence and industrial production. Critical resources continue to be dedicated
to the military with increasing detriment to the economy.

There will be no relief from the severe shortages, which could foster growing dissatisfaction among the
intelligentsia, workers, students, and bureaucrats. The DPRK's management of its economy provides no
freedom of action for producers, real incentives for individuals to excel, or a government responsive to
scientific and technological progress. If the DPRK keeps its emphasis on its military and does not reform its
eco-nomic system, the country could eventually be in grave danger of imploding. The DPRK is, and will
likely remain, one of the most dangerous countries in the world.

In terms of inter-Korean relations, considerable accomplishments were made in the first half of 2004: inter-
Korean cooperative projects were smoothly carried out; military cooperation was realized; and an
atmosphere conducive to resolving the nuclear issue was created, etc. Up until late July, nine occasions of

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political/military talks, 13 occasions of economic talks, and three occasions of Red Cross /sports-related
talks were held (total of 25 meetings).

After July, however, when members of an organization failed to visit Pyongyang to observe the 10th
anniversary of Kim Il-sung's death, and when hundreds of North Korean defectors arrived en masse in South
Korea, government-level inter-Korean dialogue governments came to a halt, with North Korea pointing to the
abovementioned issues as obstacles to improving inter-Korean relations. Meanwhile, consultations have
continued for humanitarian aid for North Korea and the three major economic cooperation projects, including
construction of the Gaesong Industrial Complex. Private-level contacts were held intermittently.

Taking advantage of major political events such as the 10th anniversary of the inauguration of the military-
first policy, the fifth anniversary of the June 15 Joint Declaration, and the 60th anniversary of Korea's
liberation from Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945), during 2005 North Korea was expected to focus on
reinforcing the direct rule regime of Kim Jong-il and intensifying internal solidarity.

Maps of North Korea

Click on the small image to view a larger version

Terrain

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 Attack Corridors

North Korean North Korean

Military Facilities Military Facilities [PDF]

Corps Areas Major Airfields

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7
China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

China’s influence on North Korea is more than it is willing to admit but far less than
outsiders tend to believe. Although it shares the international community’s
denuclearisation goal, it has its own concept of how to achieve it. It will not tolerate
erratic and dangerous behaviour if it poses a risk of conflict but neither will it endorse or
implement policies that it believes will create instability or threaten its influence in both
Pyongyang and Seoul. The advantages afforded by China’s close relationship with the
North can only be harnessed if better assessments of its priorities and limitations are
integrated into international strategies. Waiting for China to compel North Korean
compliance will only give Pyongyang more time to develop its nuclear arsenal.

China’s priorities with regard to North Korea are:

• avoiding the economic costs of an explosion on the Korean Peninsula;

• preventing the U.S. from dominating a unified Korea;
• securing the stability of its three economically weak north eastern provinces by
incorporating North Korea into their development plans;
• reducing the financial burden of the bilateral relationship by replacing aid with
trade and investment;
• winning credit at home, in the region and in the U.S. for being engaged in
achieving denuclearisation;
• sustaining the two-Korea status quo so long as it can maintain influence in both
and use the North as leverage with Washington on the Taiwan issue; and
• avoiding a situation where a nuclear North Korea leads Japan and/or Taiwan to
become nuclear powers.

China’s roughly two-billion-dollar annual bilateral trade and investment with North
Korea is still the most visible form of leverage for ending deadlock and expediting the
nuclear negotiations. However, there is virtually no circumstance under which China
would use it to force North Korea’s compliance on the nuclear issue. Even though the
crackdown on North Korea’s banking activities in Macao in September 2005
demonstrated that China is not completely immune to outside pressures to rein in bad
behaviour, Beijing is unlikely to shut down the North’s remaining banking activities in
the country.

China opposes sanctions on North Korea because it believes they would lead to
instability, would not dislodge the regime but would damage the nascent process of
market reforms and harm the most vulnerable. It also has reasons related to its own quest
for reunification with Taiwan – not to mention human rights issues in Xinjiang and Tibet,
and its own economic interests in Sudan and elsewhere – for opposing aid conditionality
and infringements on sovereignty and being generally reluctant to embrace sanctions.

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The bilateral relationship affords China little non-coercive influence over Pyongyang.
Viewing it as one sustained by history and ideology ignores powerful dynamics of
strategic mistrust, fractured leadership ties and ideological differences. Pyongyang knows
Beijing might not come to its defence again in war and fears that it would trade it off if it
felt its national interest could benefit.

One factor shaping China’s preference for the status quo in North Korea is the presence
of two million ethnic Koreans in the country including an estimated 10,000 to 100,000
refugees and migrants at any one time. Although refugee flows are perceived to present
one of the greatest threats to China in case of political or economic collapse in the North,
most Chinese analysts and officials are unconcerned about the short-term threat posed by
border crossers. Meanwhile, genuine political refugees are now quietly leaving China and
being resettled in South Korea without Chinese opposition – sometimes even with its
assistance – so long as they depart without causing embarrassment.

Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2005 and Kim Jong-il’s
return visit in January 2006 underscored deepening economic relations. China is
undertaking a range of infrastructure projects in and around North Korea and now
accounts for 40 per cent of its foreign trade. Since 2003, over 150 Chinese firms have
begun operating in or trading with North Korea. As much as 80 per cent of the consumer
goods found in the country’s markets are made in China, which will keep trying
gradually to normalise the economy, with the long-term goal of a reformed, China-
friendly North Korea.

Although it cannot deliver a rapid end to Pyongyang’s weapons program, China must still
be an integral component of any strategy with a chance of reducing the threat of a nuclear
North Korea. No other country has the interest and political position in North Korea to
facilitate and mediate negotiations. It is also the key to preventing transfers of the North’s
nuclear materials and other illicit goods, although its ability to do this is limited by
logistical and intelligence weaknesses, and unwillingness to curb border trade. Over the
long-term, Chinese economic interaction with the North may be the best hope for
sparking deeper systemic reform and liberalisation there.

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• The China-North Korea Relationship

Introduction
China is North Korea's most important ally, biggest trading partner, and main source of food, arms,
and fuel. In the hope of avoiding regime collapse and an uncontrolled influx of refugees across its
800-mile border with North Korea, China has helped sustain Kim Jong-Il's regime and opposed harsh
international economic sanctions. After Pyongyang tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006, experts
say that China has reconsidered the nature of its alliance to include both pressure and inducements.
But Beijing, arguably, continues to have more leverage over Pyongyang than any other nation and has
played a central role in the ongoing Six-Party Talks, the multilateral framework aimed at
denuclearizing North Korea.

Strong Allies
China has supported North Korea ever since Chinese fighters flooded onto the Korean peninsula to
fight for their comrades in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1950. Since the
Korean War divided the peninsula between the North and South, China has lent political and
economic backing to North Korea's leaders: Kim Il Sung and his son and successor, Kim Jong-Il.

In recent years, China has been one of the authoritarian regime's few allies. But this long-standing
relationship suffered a strain when Pyongyang tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006 and China
agreed to UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which imposed sanctions on Pyongyang. By signing
off on this resolution—as well as earlier UN sanctions that followed the DPRK's July 2006 missile
tests—Beijing departed from its traditional relationship with North Korea, changing from a tone of
diplomacy to one of punishment. Jonathan D. Pollack, an East Asia expert at the Naval War College,
describes the DPRK's tests as "jarring" to China's diplomatic effort to compel North Korea to the Six-
Party Talks. He says Kim Jong-Il was effectively telling Beijing, "You can not tell us what to do and
we can not be taken for granted.'" Despite their long alliance, experts say Beijing does not control
Pyongyang. "In general, Americans tend to overestimate the influence China has over North Korea,"
says Daniel Pinkston, a Northeast Asia expert at the International Crisis Group.

In general, Americans tend to overestimate the influence China has over North Korea. – Daniel
Pinkston, International Crisis Group
At the same time, China has too much at stake in North Korea to halt or withdraw its support entirely.
"The idea that the Chinese would turn their backs on the North Koreans is clearly wrong," says Adam
Segal, CFR senior fellow for China studies. Beijing only agreed to UN Resolution 1718 after revisions
that removed requirements for tough economic sanctions beyond those targeting luxury goods, and
China's trade with North Korea has continued to increase. The Chinese are "doing just what they have
to do and no more" in terms of punishing North Korea, says Selig S. Harrison, Asia program director
at the Center for International Policy. He says the two countries will not jeopardize their mutually
beneficial economic relationship.

Pyongyang's Gains
Pyongyang is economically dependent on China, which provides most of its food and energy supplies.
According to Nicholas Eberstadt, a consultant at the World Bank, since the early 1990s, China has
served as North Korea's chief food supplier and has accounted for nearly 90 percent of the country’s
energy imports.

China also provides aid directly to Pyongyang. "It is widely believed that Chinese food aid is
channeled to the military," (PDF) reports the Congressional Research Service, which allows the World

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Food Program’s food aid to be targeted at the general population "without risk that the military-first
policy or regime stability would be undermined by foreign aid policies of other countries."

China is also a strong political ally. "As an authoritarian regime that reformed, they understand what
Kim Jong-Il is most concerned with—survival," Segal says. China has repeatedly blocked UN
Security Council resolutions against North Korea, including some threatening sanctions.

China's Priorities
China's support for Pyongyang ensures a friendly nation on its northeastern border, as well as
providing a buffer zone between China and democratic South Korea, which is home to around 29,000
U.S. troops and marines. This allows China to reduce its military deployment in its Northeast and
"focus more directly on the issue of Taiwanese independence," Shen Dingli of the Institute of
International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai writes in China Security (PDF). North Korea's
allegiance is important to Beijing as a bulwark against U.S. military dominance of the region as well
as against the rise of Japan's military.

As an authoritarian regime that reformed, they understand what Kim Jong-Il is most concerned with—
survival. – Adam Segal
China also gains economically from its association with North Korea; growing numbers of Chinese
firms are investing in North Korea and gaining concessions like preferable trading terms and port
operations. Chinese trade and investment in North Korea now totals $2 billion per year. "They're
becoming a stakeholder in the North Korean economy," Pinkston says.

"For the Chinese, stability and the avoidance of war are the top priorities," says Daniel Sneider, the
associate director for research at Stanford's Asia-Pacific Research Center. "From that point of view,
the North Koreans are a huge problem for them, because Pyongyang could trigger a war on its own."
Stability is a huge worry for Beijing because of the specter of hundreds of thousands of North Korean
refugees flooding into China. "The Chinese are most concerned about the collapse of North Korea
leading to chaos on the border," Segal says. If North Korea does provoke a war with the United States,
China and South Korea would bear the brunt of any military confrontation on the Korean peninsula.
Yet both those countries have been hesitant about pushing Pyongyang too hard, for fear of making
Kim's regime collapse. The current flow of refugees into China is already a problem: China has
promised Pyongyang that it will repatriate North Koreans escaping across the border, but invites
condemnation from human rights groups when sending them back to the DPRK. Jing-dong Yuan of
the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in California says Beijing began its construction of a barbed
wire fence along this border in 2006 for that reason.

Experts say China has also been ambiguous on the question of its commitment to intervene for the
defense of North Korea in case of military conflict. According to the 1961 Sino–North Korean Treaty
of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, China is obliged to defend North Korea against
unprovoked aggression. But Jaewoo Choo, assistant professor of Chinese foreign policy at Kyung Hee
University in South Korea, writes in Asian Survey that "China conceives itself to have the right to
make an authoritative interpretation of the principle for intervention," (PDF) in the treaty. As a result
of changes in regional security in a post-Cold War world, he writes, "China now places more value on
national interest, over alliances blinded by ideology." But, he argues, Chinese ambiguity deters others
from taking military action against Pyongyang.

Beijing's Leverage
Beijing has been successful in bringing North Korean officials to the negotiating table at the Six-Party
Talks many times. "It's clear that the Chinese have enormous leverage on North Korea in many
respects," Sneider says. "But can China actually try to exercise that influence without destabilizing the

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 regime? Probably not." Pinkston says that for all of North Korea's growing economic ties with China,
Kim still makes up his own mind: "At the end of the day, China has little influence over the military
decisions."

Also, China does not desire to utilize its leverage except for purposes consistent with its policy
objectives and strategic interests, say experts. Choo writes, " After all, it is not about securing
influence over North Korean affairs but is about peaceful management of the relationship with the
intent to preserve the status quo of the peninsula." This CFR.org Crisis Guide offers an in-depth
analysis of the dispute on the Korean peninsula.

A Difficult Relationship
Pyongyang is not an ally Beijing can count on. Kim Jong-Il's foreign policy is, like its leader, highly
unpredictable. "North Korea is extremely difficult to deal with, even as an ally," according to Sneider.
"This is not a warm and fuzzy relationship," he says. "North Korean officials look for reasons to defy
Beijing." The relationship is further plagued by:

o Mutual distrust. North Korea jeopardized relations with China, its most important
ally after the fall of the Soviet Union, through its 2006 nuclear testing. Yet distrust between the two
countries predates the nuclear blast. Peter Hayes, executive director of the Nautilus Institute for
Security and Sustainable Development, says it goes back in part to 1992, when China became a "bad
patron" by opening up relations with South Korea without requiring Washington to do the same for
the North. The test was also a way for North Korea to tell Beijing that it is not China’s tributary state,
as it was until the Korean peninsula fell under Japanese control in the early twentieth century.
o Japanese military spending. Pyongyang's reckless behavior has sparked increasing
debate in Japan over whether it should go nuclear in the face of the North Korean threat. China has
witnessed with growing wariness Japan's remilitarization in recent years and fears the DPRK test
could set off an arms race in the region. The test also drives a wedge between China and South Korea,
which share a softer approach to North Korea, and the United States, which supports a stronger
Japanese military.
o U.S. relations. The DPRK test complicated Beijing’s relations with Washington by
calling into question China’s diplomatic approach to North Korea. Pollack of the Naval War College
says Kim conducted the nuclear test to say, "Ok, now I am on a more equal level to the United States,
whether they like it or not," and the result is a "palpable sense that [Chinese] strategy has failed." But
if China ’s policy has disappointed, so has the United States' more severe stance and unwillingness to
engage in bilateral talks with North Korea. "It's a shared failure," says Pollack.

Washington's Role
The United States has pushed North Korea to verifiably and irreversibly give up its uranium-
enrichment activities before Washington will agree to bilateral talks. Experts say Washington and
Beijing have very different views on the issue. "Washington believes in using pressure to influence
North Korea to change its behavior, while Chinese diplomats and scholars have a much more negative
view of sanctions and pressure tactics," Pinkston says. "They tend to see public measures as
humiliating and counterproductive."

Having complained for years that the Bush administration was demanding too much, the Chinese now
say they fear Washington is secretly prepared to accept North Korea as a nuclear-weapons state. –
Gary Samore
After the October 2006 nuclear test, Beijing convinced Pyongyang to return to the negotiating table
and the Six-Party Talks resumed on the basis of its last agreement, from February 2007. But now
Beijing, which until then had been the central player in the nuclear negotiations that had first started in
2003, is increasingly feeling sidelined, says CFR Director of Studies Gary Samore. According to

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Samore, China perceives the February agreement as a U.S. surrender to North Korean nuclear
weapons. "Having complained for years that the Bush administration was demanding too much, the
Chinese now say they fear Washington is secretly prepared to accept North Korea as a nuclear-
weapons state," he writes.

But Christopher R. Hill, U.S. envoy to the talks, in an interview with ABC News in February 2007
said: "This whole Six-Party process has done more to bring the U.S. and China together than any other
process I’m aware of." Hill said the United States is working very closely with China and South Korea
and hopes that "if the North Koreans were to ever think about walking away from this, they would
understand they were walking away from all their neighbors as well."

Looking Forward
"Everyone who deals with North Korea recognizes them as a very unstable actor," Sneider says.
However, some experts say North Korea is acting assertively both in its relationship with China and
on the larger world stage. "The North Koreans are developing a much more realist approach to their
foreign policy," Pinkston says. "They’re saying imbalances of power are dangerous and the United
States has too much power—so by increasing their own power they’re helping to balance out world
stability. It's neorealism straight out of an international relations textbook."

Despite the ongoing talks, fears of further testing still loom, and if North Korea conducts another one
Sino-DPRK relations could get "dicey," says Pollack. But China will avoid moves—economic
sanctions or aggressive actions—that would cause a sudden collapse of the regime. It no longer has
the kind of deep knowledge of North Korean military personnel that it had twenty-five years ago when
Beijing could have staged a coup. "It isn't as though China really has the option of overthrowing Kim
Jong-Il," says Harrison.

But Asian military affairs expert Andrew Scobell writes, "No action by China should be ruled out
where North Korea is concerned." According to Scobell, Beijingmight stop propping up Pyongyang
and allow North Korea to fail if it believed a unified Korea under Seoul would be more favorably
disposed toward Beijing. A January 2008 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies
and the U.S. Institute of Peace, two Washington-based think tanks, says China has its own
contingency plans (PDF) to dispatch troops to North Korea in case of instability. According to the
report, the Chinese army could be sent into North Korea on missions to keep order if unrest triggers
broader violence, including attacks on nuclear facilities in the North or South.

Beijing may find ways to cause North Korea discomfort, but Hayes describes China as "patient" and
foresees Beijing undertaking long-term training of North Koreans in China to help stabilize the
country. "The Chinese are thinking one hundred years ahead," he says. "China will conduct inside-out
transformation of North Korea over the next twenty years." Andrei Lankov, associate professor at
Kookmin University in Seoul, writes in Foreign Affairs that Chinais tiring of pouring aid into the
inefficient North Korean economy. "The Chinese government is promoting its own style of reform in
Pyongyang: economic liberalization with limited, incremental political change," he writes. But he
acknowledges that China, so far, has failed and "North Korea's leaders are in no hurry to introduce any
reforms."

Esther Pan and Carin Zissis contributed to this Backgrounder.

Relation ; China Pak North korea

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