FRAMEWORK AND GUIDELINES FOR REDUCING AVAilABiliTY OF UNLAWFUllY TERRORISMRELATED MATERIAL ON THE INTERNET

DRAFTED BY aSCT PREVENT FINALISED 31 JULY 2008

Introduction
1. Terrorists and violent extremists use the internet both as an operational platform and as a tool for radicalisation and recruitment. In response the cross-Government strategy for countering terrorist use of the internet aims to make the internet a more hostile environment for terrorists and violent extremists. 2. The strategy encompasses four work streams: Increase understanding of how terrorists and violent extremists use the internet; Increase disruption of those using the internet for terrorist and violent extremist ends and of terrorist material available on the internet; Use the internet to counter the terrorist and violent extremist message; Raise visibility of what Government s doing to tackle terrorist and violent extremist use of the internet.

3. As one package of work under the second work stream, Government is seeking to reduce the availability of terrorist and violent extremist material on the internet for UK audiences. The impact and effectiveness of this work will be reviewed in the wider context of the strategy for countering terrorist use of the internet in the summer of 2009. 4. Some of the terrorist and violent extremist material available on the internet encourages people to adopt more radical beliefs and to move towards passively or actively supporting violent extremism. Government is concerned in particular with the subset of this material that is unlawfully terrorismrelated as defined in section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006 (which will be referred to in this document as 'unlawful material' and means terrorist and violent extremist related material only). Such material either encourages terrorism or would be useful to someone in the commission of an act of terrorism. 5. Government wants to reduce the availability of unlawful material on the internet because: a) The material is unlawful under the Terrorism Act 2006; b) Material encouraging terrorism or violent extremism may have a radicalising effect on some people in some circumstances; c) It could be useful to someone in the commission of an act of terrorism.

Not all unlawful material has a negative effect on all individuals who see or hear it. However, by reducing the amount of this material available to UK internet users we hope to reduce the risk that people will be exposed to material that- encourages them to adopt violent extremist ideas and commit terrorist acts. 6. This paper has been written by the Office of Security and CounterTerrorism and sets out how Government intends to reduce the availability of unlawful material on the internet for UK users. 7. Part 1 of this document sets out: An overview of options that exist for reducing availability of unlawful material on the internet; An overview of filtering as a method for reducing the availability of unlawful material on the internet; The process that will be used by Government to identify unlawful material on the internet and create a list of URLs for inclusion in filtering and parental control software. 8. Part 2 of this document contains: SpecifiC' guidelines to be used by Government analysts carrying out this work. 9. Government analysts charged with carrying out this work should read both parts of this document in full. They should then sign a copy of the document to say they have read and understood it. Part 2 should then be used on a routine basis to inform decision making.

I have read and understood this document. Name: Date: Signature:

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Part 1 Options for reducing availability of unlawful material on the internet

10. There are three main methods for reducing the availability of unlawful material on the internet. The material can be removed at source; The material can be blocked at the network level by the ISP; The material can be filtered at the desktop by filtering or parental control software.

Removal at source 11. The most logical way to reduce the availability of material on the internet is to remove it at source. ISPs anywhere in the world can be asked to remove material from their servers, and those in.the UK usually do so when the material is clearly illegal and/or it contravenes their Acceptable Use Policies. 12. In addition to this informal path, section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006 created a notice and take down regime for unlawfully terrorism-related material. Section 3 allows a constable to serve a notice on the person(s) responsible for unlawfully terrorism-related material on the internet. The notice requires that the terrorism-related material be removed or modified within two working days. Failure to comply with a section 3 notice is not an offence but the person on whom the notice is served will not be capable of using the statutory defence of non-endorsement contained in sections 1 and 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 were a prosecution to ensue under those sections. Section 3 notices can be issued on person(s) in the UK or overseas. 13. For material hosted in the UK the above mechanisms work well. However, asking for material hosted outside the UK to be modified or removed either through informal contaCt or through a section 3 notice is impractical and difficult to achieve. There is no mechanism for enforcing a section 3 notice (either in the UK or overseas) other than to prosecute and it would be extremely difficult and time consuming to bring a prosecution against an individual located outside the UK for offences under sections 1 or 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006. 14. Although removal at source is appropriate in some circumstances it has a limited effect given that it is obvious to the owner of the material that it has been removed and the material can then easily be moved elsewhere. It can also be difficult to achieve if the material is hosted overseas as outlined above. Network level blocking 15. Blocking occurs at the network level so users have no choice about the controls that are applied to the material they wish to view. The only material currently blocked at the network level for UK based users is

potentially illegal child abuse imagery. For such material the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) produces a list of URLs containing potentially illegal child sexual abuse content hosted overseas. The list is sent to IWF members (mainly ISPs, filtering and parental control software companies and mobile network providers) who implement the list so that their users cannot access those URLs. Filtering 16. Unlike blocking, which occurs at the network level and over which users have no choice, filtering or parental control software allows end users to choose to apply filtering at the desk top level. Most ISPs offer filtering products as part of their internet access and additional tools can be purchased and installed. Users are normally able to choose what level of filtering they require. Once installed the software filters out many types of offensive or inappropriate content on the internet, some of which may be legal.

Filtering as a method to reduce availability of unlawful material on the internet

17. Government is committed to pursuing all options that have the potential to make the internet a more hostile environment for terrorists and violent extremists. Although removing material at source is appropriate in some circumstances, we do not believe it is the best option for tackling large amounts of material. In order to restrict access to unlawful material on a wider scale, the OSCT strategy for countering terrorist use of the internet proposes that Government should: Use filtering and parental control software to restrict access to unlawful material for UK internet users; and, Explore whether network level blocking might be an appropriate solution in the longer term for such material. This paper now focuses on how Government proposes to make use of existing filtering and parental control software to restrict access to material that is unlawful under the Terrorism Act 2006. 18. Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006 provides that a statement, article or record is unlawfully terrorism-related if it is either likely to be understood by anyone or more of the persons to whom it has or may become available as a direct or indirect encouragement to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences; or it is likely to be useful to anyone or more of those persons in the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism and it is likely to be understood by those persons as being wholly or mainly for that purpose. 19. Government will establish a process to: identify material of concern on the internet; decide whether that material is unlawful or not; and if it is to decide whether it is appropriate to pass details of the material to industry for inclusion in filtering/parental control software. The final part of the process will be to monitor the effectiveness of such action.

20. Filtering and parental control software companies will then accept the list of unlawful URLs from Government for inclusion in their software.

Summary of process: identification of material and creation of list

21. The Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) has set out the following process to be followed by the Government analysts tasked with identifying unlawful material on the internet and creating a list of URLs for inclusion in filtering and parental control software. The process is: Identify 22. Government analysts scan the internet searching for material that they believe encourages terrorism or would be useful in the commission or preparation of an act of terrorism. Decide 23. Once material has been identified, the Government analysts decide whether it is unlawful under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006 referring to the Guidelines at stage 1 on page 6 of this document. 24. Government analysts do not attempt to determine whether an offence has been or may have been committed under sections 1 or 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006. This is a matter for the police and Crown Prosecution Service. 25. If the material is not thought to be unlawful then no action is taken.1

Act 26. If the material is thought to be unlawful the Government analyst considers a number of other factors set out in the Guidelines at stages 2 to 4 on pages 6 and 7 of this document and, taking these into account, determines the appropriate course of action. Possibilities include taking no action, passing details of the material to the police, or passing details to industry for inclusion in filtering and parental control products. A record of the decision leading to the action is also made. Monitor effect 27. Government analysts will continue to monitor the internet and record the effectiveness of the action taken (e.g. if the material moves elsewhere). 28. OSCT will provide oversight of the work carried out and through the Internet Working Group2 will conduct regular reviews of the material included
1 In due course, a community group may take on the role of deciding how best to tackle material that is legal but may be having a radical ising effect. 2 The Internet Working Group is a cross Whitehall group that meets regularly to discuss countering terrorist use of the internet and is chaired by OSCT PREVENT.

on the list and the effectiveness of the action taken. OSCT will also update the guidelines as required.

Part 2 Guidelines

for Government

analysts

The following questions should be cons'idered when carrying out work to reduce the availability of unlawfully terrorism-related material on the internet. Refer to Annex A for the definition of terrorism and Convention offences. Refer to Annex B for relevant sections of the Terrorism Act. 2006. Stage 1. Is the material unlawfully terrorism-related?

Is the material:(a) Something that is likely to be understood by anyone or more of the persons to whom it has or may become available as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences3; or (b) Information which:(i) Is likely to be useful to anyone or more of those persons in the commission or preparation of such acts; and (ii) Is in a form or context in which it is likely to be understood by anyone or more of those persons as being wholly or mainly for the purpose of being so useful. If yes to (a) or (b), proceed to question 2. If no, take no action. Stage 2. Does the context of material demonstrate that it is aimed primarily at an extremist audience? (For instance, a video on a mainstream media web site is likely to be aimed at a different audience to one in an extremist chat forum.) If yes, proceed to question 3. If no, take no action.
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If yes, take no further action. If no, proceed to question 4. Stage 4. Is the material hosted in the UK?

See Annex A for the definition of terrorism, and details of Convention offences.

Regardless of where the material is hosted details of material that passes stages 1-3 should be passed to the police so that they can consider what action to take. If yes, the material is hosted in the UK, the URL should not be added to the list of URLs. If no, add details of the material to the list of unlawfully terrorism-related material, and make a record of your action. The record should note the URL of the material, when it was found and why it was thought to be unlawfully terrorism-related (e.g. encourages terrorism or useful in commission of act of terrorism).

ANNEX A
Definition of terrorism The Terrorism Act 2006 uses the definition of terrorism contained in the Terrorism Act 2000. Section 34 of the 2006 Act amends the earlier definition slightly, to include specific types of actions against international governmental organisations4. The definition in the Terrorism Act 2000 (as amended) states: 1. - (1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action wherea. the action falls within subsection (2), b. the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and c. the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (2) Action falls within this subsection if ita. involves serious violence against a person, b. involves serious damage to property, c. endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, d. creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or e. is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. Section 1(3) to (5) goes on to expand on the effect and definition. In particular, the use or threat of action does designed to influence or intimidate if it involves the use explosives and the action, person, property, public and concerned can be in or out of the UK. Convention offences Schedule 1 of the Act lists specific "Convention Offences" which are referred to below. The following categories of offences are'included: i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi.
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extent of this not need to be of firearms or government

explosives offences offences relating to biological weapons offences against internationally protected persons hostage taking hijacking and other offences against aircraft offences involving nuclear material

This paragraph will be updated in due course to reflect the changes being made to the definition in section 1 by the current CT Bill.

vii. viii. ix. x.

XI.

xii.

offences under the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 offences involving chemical weapons offences relating to terrorist funds directing a terrorist organisation offences involving nuclear weapons the offences of conspiracy, incitement, attempt, aiding, abetting, counselling and procuring related to the offences listed in Schedule 1.

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ANNEX B
The Terrorism Act 2006
Section 3 and the definition of unlawfully terrorism-related material

Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006 contains provisions specifically relating to the internet. It allows for the service of a notice by a constable where s/he believes unlawfully terrorism-related material is available on a website, on the person or persons responsible for that material. The notice requires that the terrorism-related material be removed or modified within two working days. Section 3(7) of the Act provides that: For the purposes of this section a statement or an article or record is unlawfully terrorism-related if it constitutes, or-if matter contained in the article or record constitutes(a) something that is likely to be understood, by anyone or more of the persons to whom it has or may become available, as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences; or (b) information which(i) is likely to be useful to anyone or more of those persons in the commission or preparation of such acts; and (ii) is in a form or context in which it is likely to be understood by anyone or more of those persons as being wholly or mainly for the purpose of being so useful. Section 3(8) of the Act provides that: The reference in subsection (7) above to something that is likely to be understood as an indirect encouragement to the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences includes anything which is likely to be understood as(a) the glorification of the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or such offences; and (b) a suggestion that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated in existing circumstances. Sections 1 and 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 For completeness, sections 1 and 2 of the Act are'outlined below, including the defences for the offences outlined. It is important to note the defences because they make clear that there may be a legitimate reason for otherwise objectionable material to be put on the internet. Encouragement of Terrorism

Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 creates the offence of Encouragement of Terrorism. In order for a person to commit the offence a three element test must be met. The three elements are: -

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i. The defendant must publish a statement, or cause another to publish a statement. ii. The statement must be likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement to them to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism or Convention offences. iii. When publishing the statement, or causing it to be published, the defendant must have the necessary state of mind. This is an offence that can be committed intentionally or recklessly: To commit the offence intentionally: The defendant must intend members of the public to be encouraged to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism or Convention offences. To commit the offence recklessly: The defendant must be reckless as to the possibility that the statement will have the effect of members of the public being encouraged to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism or Convention offences. In order to be reckless the defendant will need to be shown to have been aware of the risk that an effect of the statement would be to encourage terrorism or Convention offences, and in the circumstances known to him, it was unreasonable for him to take that risk. Indirect encouragement Subsection (3) provides an example of statements that may be understood as indirectly encouraging terrorism or Convention offences. It provides that: a. statements that glorify terrorism constitute an indirect encouragement to terrorism or Convention offences but only if b. the statements are of a type that the audience may reasonably infer that the conduct is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated in existing circumstances. Part (b) is a deliberate and important qualification of the concept of glorification. It has two parts: i. The audience must reasonably understand that they should emulate the conduct, in other words, that they should do something similar. ii. The concept of "in existing circumstances" means that it must be possible for them to emulate the conduct glorified in this day and age. This means that the glorification of distant historical events is unlik~ly to be caught. Interpretation of statements Subsection (4) sets out that the question of how a statement is likely to be understood must be determined in relation to the contents of the statement as a whole, and the context of its publication. This is intended to ensure that context is relevant, for example, it recognises that there is a difference in how an academic thesis on an issue and a radical and inflammatory pamphlet are likely to be understood. It is irrelevant whether the terrorist acts encouraged are specific acts, or acts in general (subsection (5)). The term "statement" is defined in the interpretation section as communications of any description,

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including those without words consisting of sounds, images, or both. This means videos or music are also covered. Section 1(6) contains a defence to the offence under section 1. The defendant has a defence if: a. he did not intend to encourage terrorism or Convention offences (in other words, he committed the offence recklessly); b. he can show that the statement he published did not express his views or have his endorsement; and c. he can show that it was clear in all the circumstances of the case that the statement did not express his views or have his endorsement. Dissemination of Terrorist Publications

Section 2 creates the offence of dissemination of terrorist publications. In order for a person to commit the offence a three element test must be met. Those three elements are as follows: a. The publication in question must be a terrorist publication. There are two ways in which a publication can be a terrorist publication:
i. The first way is if, in relation to the conduct described in section 2(2), matter

contained in it is likely to be understood by some or all of the persons to whom it is or may be disseminated as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement-to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism. ii. The second way is if, matter contained in it is likely to be useful in the commission or preparation of terrorist acts and if it is likely to be understood by some or all of the persons to whom it is or may be disseminated as containing that information wholly or mainly for the purposes of being so useful to them. b. The publication in question must be subject to one of the types of conduct in section 2(2), which sets out the conduct that will constitute the offence. The conduct is: distributing or circulating a terrorist publication; giving, selling, or lending a terrorist publication; offering a terrorist publication for sale or loan; providing a service to others that enables them to obtain, read, listen to or look at such a publication, or to acquire it by means of gift, sale, or loan; transmitting the contents of a terrorist publication electronically; and possessing a terrorist publication with a view to making it available in any of the ways listed. This list includes not only disseminating the publication but also doing acts preparatory to its dissemination and holding it with a view to its dissemination. It is also not limited to commercial transactions. Dissemination can be both in hard copy and electronically. c. The defendant must have the necessary state of mind. Under subsection (1), the offence can either be committed intentionally or recklessly:

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For an offence to be committed intentionally the defendant must either: a. have an intention that an effect of his conduct will be a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to terrorism, or b. have an intention that an effect of his conduct will be the provision of assistance in the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism. For the offence to be committed recklessly the defendant must be reckless as to whether his conduct has one of these effects set out in (a) and (b). Publications that glorify terrorism Subsection (4) sets out that matter contained in a publication that glorifies terrorism will be considered to amount to an indirect encouragement to terrorism where the person to whom it is made available could reasonably be expected to infer that the conduct that is being glorified is glorified as conduct that should be emulated in existing circumstances. As in section 1, glorification without this element is not enough to amount to indirect encou ragement. It is irrelevant whether the terrorist acts encouraged, or for which the information is useful, are specific acts, or acts in general. A publication can include matter to be read, listened to, or looked at or watched, and may include visual images without any accompanying text. Section 2(9) contains a defence to the offence in section 2. The defendant has a defence if: a. the terrorist publication that is the subject of the offence amounts to a direct or indirect encouragement to terrorism (in other words, the defence is not available if the publication is one that is useful in the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism); b. the defendant did not intend to encourage terrorism (in other words he commits the offence recklessly); c. he shows that the terrorist publication did not express his views and did not have his endorsement; and d. he shows that it was clear in all the circumstances that it did not express his views and did not have his endorsement.

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