Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification

Audi, Robert. The Structure of Justification. New York, 1993. Chisholm, Roderick. The Foundations of Knowing. Minneapolis, 1982. Davidson, Donald. A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge, in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Ernest LePore, ed. New York, 1989. Foley, Richard. The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge, Mass., 1986. Haack, Susan. Evidence and Inquiry. Oxford, 1993. Klein, Peter and Ted Warfield. (1994) What Price Coherence? Analysis 54 (1994), pp. 129-132. Klein, Peter and Ted Warfield. (1996) No Help for the Coherentist, Analysis 56 (1996), pp. 118-121. Kvanvig, Jonathan L. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. New York, 2003. . Coherentists' Distractions, Philosophical Topics 23 (1995), pp. 257-75. Kvanvig, Jonathan L. & Riggs, Wayne D. Can a Coherence Theory Appeal to Appearance States? Philosophical Studies 67 (1992), pp. 197-217. Lehrer, Keith. Theory of Knowledge. Boulder, 1990, 2nd ed 2000. Lycan, William G. Judgment and Justification, Cambridge, 1988 . Plantinga and Coherentisms. Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology, Jonathan L. Kvanvig, ed. Totowa, N.J., 1996. Olsson, Erik. Why Coherence is not Truth-Conducive. Analysis 61 (2001), pp. 236-241. Olsson, Erik. What is the Problem of Coherence and Truth? Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002), pp. 246-272. Olsson, Erik. (2005) Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Plantinga, Alvin. Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford, 1993.. Shogenji, Tomoji. Reply to Akiba on the Probabilistic Measure of Coherence. Sosa, Ernest. Knowledge in Perspective: Essays in Epistemology. Cambridge, 1991. Thagard, Paul. Coherence in Thought and Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. Analysis 61 (2001), pp. 147-150.

Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification

Ayer, A. J., 1956. The Problem of Knowledge, London: Cambridge University Press. Fumerton, Richard, 1995. Metaepistemology and Skepticism, Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield.

Goldman, Alvin, 1986. Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Goldman, Alvin, 1988. Strong and Weak Justification, in Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology, James Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Co., pp. 5169. Huemer, Michael, 2002 Fumerton's Principle of Inferential Justification, Journal of Philosophical Research, 27: 32940. Klein, Peter, 1998. Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LVIII: 91926. Mill, John Stuart, 1906. A System of Logic, London: Longmans, Green, and Co. Nozick, Robert, 1981. Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Price, H. H., 1950. Perception, London: Methuen. Pryor, James, 2000, The Skeptic and the Dogmatist, Nos, 34 (4): 517549. Russell, Bertrand, 191011. Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description, The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11: 20932. , Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript, Elizabeth Eames (ed.), London: Allen and Unwin Ltd. Sosa, Ernest, 2003, Privileged Access, in Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays, Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 27392. Williamson, Timothy, 2000. Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification

Alston, William. 1989. Epistemic Justification. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Bach, Kent. 1985. A Rationale for Reliabilism. The Monist. 68. Chisholm, Roderick. 1977. Theory of Knowledge. 2nd. Edition. Englewood Cliffs. Prentice-Hall. Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard. 2001. Internalism Defended. In Kornblith, Hilary. Editor. Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Cambridge. MIT Press. Fumerton, Richard. 1995. Meta-Epistemology and Scepticism. Lanham, Md. Rowman-Littlefield. Ginet, Carl. 1975. Knowledge, Perception, and Memory. Dordrecht. D. Reidel. Goldman, Alvin. 2001. Internalism Exposed. In Kornblith, Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Prichard, H.A. 1950. Knowledge and Perception. Oxford. Clarendon Press. Steup, Matthias. 1999. A Defense of Internalism. In L. Pojman. Editor. The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings. 2nd edition. Belmont. Wadsworth Publishing.

Virtue Epistemology

Axtell, G., and A. Carter, 2008, Just the Right Thickness: A Defense of SecondWave Virtue Epistemology, Philosophical Papers, 37: 413434. Baehr, J., 2006a, Character in Epistemology, Philosophical Studies, 128: 479 514. Baehr, J., 2006b, Character, Reliability and Virtue Epistemology, The Philosophical Quarterly, 56: 193212. Baehr, J., 2008, Four Varieties of Character-based Virtue Epistemology, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 45, 469502. Baehr, J., forthcoming, Epistemic Malevolence, forthcoming in Metaphilosophy. Battaly, H., 2008, Virtue Epistemology, Philosophy Compass, 3: 639663. Battaly, H., forthcoming, Epistemic Self-Indulgence, forthcoming in Metaphilosophy. Brogaard, Berit, 2006, Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge? Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 36: 335354. Descartes, R., Meditations on First Philosophy. Fricker, Miranda, 2003, Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing, Metaphilosophy, 34: 154173. Fricker, Miranda, 2007, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing,, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Greco, J., 1999, Agent Reliabilism, in J. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology, Atascadero: Ridgeview. Greco, J., 2000, Putting Skeptics in Their Place, New York: Cambridge University Press. Greco, J., 2001, Virtues and Rules in Epistemology, in L. Zagzebski and A. Fairweather, eds., Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Greco, J., 2002 Virtues in Epistemology in P. Moser, ed., Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, New York: Oxford University Press. Greco, J., 2003,Knowledge as Credit for True Belief, in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Greco, J., 2004, A Different Sort of Contextualism, Erkenntnis, 61: 383400. Greco, J., 2007, The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge, Philosophical Issues, 17: 5769. Greco, J., 2008, What's Wrong with Contextualism? The Philosophical Quarterly, 58: 416436. Greco, J., 2009, Knowledge and Success From Ability, Philosophical Studies, 142: 1726. Greco, J., 2010, Achieving Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hookway, C., 2004, Truth, Rationality and Pragmatism: Themes From Peirce, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hume, David, 1748, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Kvanvig, J., 1992, The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind, Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. Kvanvig, J., 2003, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3

Lackey, J., 2007, Why we dont deserve credit for everything we know, Synthese, 158: 345361. Lackey, J., 2009, Knowledge and credit, Philosophical Studies, 142: 2742. Lehrer, K., 2000, Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edition, Boulder: Westview Press. Levin, M., 2004, Virtue Epistemology: No New Cures, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 397410. Montmarquet, J., 1993, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Peirce, C., 1955, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. Justus Buchler, New York: Dover. Pritchard, D., 2005, Epistemic Luck, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pritchard, D., 2007, Recent Work on Epistemic Value, American Philosophical Quarterly, 44: 85110. Pritchard, D., 2008a, Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements, The Philosophical Quarterly, 58: 437447. Pritchard, D., 2008b, Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited, Metaphilosophy, 39: 6688. Pritchard, D., 2009a, Epistemic Value and Apt Performance, Philosophical Studies, 143: 407416. Pritchard, D., 2009b, The Value of Knowledge, in Haddock, A., A. Millar and D. Pritchard, The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reid, T., 1764, Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. Reid, T., 1785, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Riggs, W., 1998, What Are the Chances of Being Justified?, The Monist, 81: 452472. Riggs, W., 2002, Reliability and the Value of Knowledge, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 7996. Riggs, W., 2003, Understanding Virtue and the Virtue of Understanding, in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Riggs, W., 2006, The Value Turn in Epistemology, in New Waves in Epistemology, V. Hendricks and D.H. Pritchard (eds.), Aldershot: Ashgate. Riggs, W., 2007, Why Epistemologists Are So Down on Their Luck, Synthese, 158: 329344. Riggs, W., 2009, Two Problems of Easy Credit, Synthese, 169: 201216. Russell, B., 1948, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, London: Routledge. Sellars, W., 1956, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, in Science, Perception and Reality, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. Sellars, W., 1975, The Structure of Knowledge: (I) Perception; (II) Minds; (III) Epistemic Principles, in Action, Knowledge, and Reality, H. Castaeda (ed.), Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill. Solomon, D., Virtue Ethics: Radical or Routine? in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sosa, E., 1991, Knowledge in Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4

Sosa, E., 1999, How Must Knowledge be Modally Related to What is Known?, Philosophical Topics, 26: 373384. Sosa, E., 2000, Skepticism and Contextualism, Philosophical Issues, 10: 118. Sosa, E., 2003, The Place of Truth in Epistemology, in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sosa, E., 2007, Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume 1: A Virtue Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zagzebski, L., 1996, Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zagzebski, L., 1999, What is Knowledge? in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, ed. John Greco and Ernest Sosa, Malden, MA: Blackwell. Zagzebski, L., 2001, Recovering Understanding, in Knowledge Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, ed. Matthias Steup, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zagzebski, L., 2003, The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good, Metaphilosophy, 34: 1228. Zagzebski, L., 2009, On Epistemology, Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth.

Reliabilism

Alston, William P. (1988). An Internalist Externalism, Synthese, 74: 265283. Reprinted in Alston, Epistemic Justification, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (1989). Alston, William P. (1980). Level Confusions in Epistemology, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5: 135150. Reprinted in Alston, Epistemic Justification, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (1989). . Beebe, James (2004). The Generality Problem, Statistical Relevance and the TriLevel Hypothesis, Nos, 38: 177195. BonJour, Laurence (1980). Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5: 5373. BonJour, Laurence (2003). Reply to Sosa, in Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa (eds.), Epistemic Justification, Malden, MA: Blackwell. Cohen, Stewart (1984). Justification and Truth, Philosophical Studies, 46: 279 295. Cohen, Stewart (2002). Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 309329. Comesana, Juan (2006). A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem, Philosophical Studies, 129: 2747. Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard (1998). The Generality Problem for Reliabilism, Philosophical Studies, 89: 129. DeRose, Keith (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem, Philosophical Review, 104: 152.

DeRose, Keith (1999). Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense, in J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 187205. Dretske, Fred (1971). Conclusive Reasons, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49: 122. Dretske, Fred (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Feldman, Richard (2003). Epistemology, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Feldman, Richard and Conee, Earl (1985). Evidentialism, Philosophical Studies, 48: 1534. Foley, Richard (1985). What's Wrong with Reliabilism? Monist, 68: 188202. Goldman, Alvin I. (1983). Review of Philosophical Explanations. Philosophical Review, 92: 8188. Goldman, Alvin I. (1988). Strong and Weak Justification, in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 13. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. Reprinted in A. Goldman, Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1992). Goldman, Alvin I. (1992). Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology, in Goldman, Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 155175. Goldman, Alvin I. (1999). Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Goldman, Alvin I. (2008). Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism, in Q. Smith, ed., Epistemology: New Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Preprint available from the author (PDF)] Goldman, Alvin I. (forthcoming). Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement, in R. Feldman and T. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement, New York: Oxford University Press. [Preprint available from the author (PDF)] Goldman, Alvin I. and Olsson, Erik J. (2008). Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge, in D. Pritchard, A. Millar and A. Haddock (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Preprint available from the author (PDF)] Greco, John (2000). Putting Skeptics in Their Place, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Greco, John (2006). Virtue, Luck and the Pyrrhonian Problematic, Philosophical Studies, 130: 934. Heller, Mark (1995). The Simple Solution to the Generality Problem, Nos, 29: 501515. Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence (2001). Practicing Safe Epistemology, Philosophical Studies, 102: 227258. Henderson, David and Horgan, Terence (2006). Transglobal Reliabilism, Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 6: 171195. Jones, W. E. (1997). Why Do We Value Knowledge? American Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 423439. Kornblith, Hilary (1980). Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory, Journal of Philosophy, 77: 597612.

Kvanvig, Jonathan L. (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kvart, Igal (2006). A Probabilistic Theory of Knowledge, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72: 144. Lehrer, Keith (1990). Theory of Knowledge, Boulder, CO: Westview. Nozick, Robert (1981). Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Plantinga, Alvin (1993b). Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ramsey, F. P. (1931). Knowledge, in his The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Essays, R. B. Braithwaite (ed.), New York: Harcourt Brace. Riggs, Wayne D. (2002). Reliability and the Value of Knowledge, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 7996. Roush, Sherrilyn (2005). Tracking Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sosa, Ernest (1988). Beyond Skepticism, to the Best of Our Knowledge, Mind, 97: 153188. Sosa, Ernest (1991). Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue, in E. Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sosa, Ernest (1996). Postscript to Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology, in J. L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Sosa, Ernest (2000). Skepticism and Contextualism, Philosophical Issues, 10: 1 18. Sosa, Ernest (2007). A Virtue Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Steup, Matthias (2004). Internalist Reliabilism, Philosophical Issues, 14: 403 425. Swain, Marshall (1981). Reasons and Knowledge, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Swinburne, Richard (1999). Providence and the Problem of Evil, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Unger, Peter (1968). An Analysis of Factual Knowledge, Journal of Philosophy, 65: 157170. Van Cleve, James (2003). Is Knowledge Easy or Impossible? Externalism as the Only Alternative to Skepticism, in S. Luper (ed.), The Skeptics, Aldershot: Ashgate. Vogel, Jonathan (2000). Reliabilism Leveled, Journal of Philosophy, 97: 602 623. Williamson, Timothy (2000). Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wunderlich, Mark (2003). Vector Reliability: A New Approach to Epistemic Justification, Synthese, 136: 237262. Zagzebski, Linda (1996). Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zagzebski, Linda (2003). The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good, Metaphilosophy, 34: 1228.