2011-06-21 NotesOnHegelPrefaceToPhenom 1

Notes on Hegel's Preface to Phenomenology of Spirit
By Russell Dale, June 20, 2011

1 Writing a PreIace in the ordinary sense to a philosophical work, Hegel argues, is 'not only
superIluous but 'even inappropriate and misleading. Statements oI the aim, historical context, basic
ideas, and so Iorth, are misleading in a work oI philosophy because 'none oI this can be accepted as the
way in which to expound truth. That is, what is most essential in a philosophical work is the method
that is used in it, or, better yet, the pathway taken in going through the various material in the work.
So, a statement oI things like the over all aim, or the main results, and so on, is misleading since these
say nothing about the method or pathway used.
Hegel considers a counter argument to his initially stated view. The counter argument says that
since philosophy deals with the universal, and since the universal contains within it the particular,
thereIore, stating the aim and Iinal results should be not only helpIul, but should get to the essence oI
what is said. The details oI what is said in the work as a whole, its method and actual paths, are, on this
view, less essential than the purpose aimed at and the results achieved.
Hegel counters this counter argument by looking at the case oI the study oI anatomy. In a work
on anatomy, even iI you get a sense oI the general aim oI the work, you still need to study all the details
about the bones, muscles, and so Iorth. You can't sum up what is studied in anatomy by simple
statements because anatomy doesn't deal with generalizable, that is, 'universalizable, truths, but in
particulars, in this and that bone or in this or that muscle, and so on. Hegel is emphasizing that a
philosophical work, although it deals with universal things, must give each particular its due within the
universal, and cannot simply be summarized apart Irom complete respect Ior the particulars involved.
Hegel notes though, that a work oI philosophy won't be a mere list oI parts and structures as he portrays
anatomy to be.
Page 1 of 40
In Iact, the Phenomenologv of Spirit itselI can be looked at, at least in part, as an attempt to
make clear the idea oI universality and how it relates to particulars. Hegel doesn't say this in this Iirst
paragraph, but he is giving an intimation oI it in talking already about universality and particulars in
this way. In philosophy, a 'universal is a term that can apply to many diIIerent particular things. For
example, 'human being applies to each particular human being. So, 'human being is a universal.
Philosophers also talk in terms oI concepts rather than linguistic terms when the speak oI universals.
So, a philosopher might say that the concept oI being a human being is a universal. Some philosophers
argue that the term we use is secondary and that what is most important is the concept. Plato thought
this. Other philosophers talk oI the linguistic term and the concept interchangeably. Hegel does this.
Hegel oIten speaks oI 'the notion and he means by that just the idea oI a concept.
1
Other philosophers
think we shouldn't talk about concepts but only oI the linguistic terms (this doctrine is oIten called
nominalism).
But, Ior Hegel, the problem oI universals is not about whether it is a linguistic term or a concept
that expresses universality (the bringing together oI many things under one term or idea). For Hegel,
the problem is where does this tendency come Irom and what is really going on in it. For the
empiricists up to David Hume (1711 1776), the answer was simple: concepts come Irom experience.
We simply experience that diIIerent things have the same properties, and that is how we come by our
concepts. Hume and Kant showed, though, that what we have in mind by universal terms cannot be
captured by or reduced to experience. For Kant (1724 - 1804), it is that the mind oI rational beings that
supplies our concepts and imposes them on experience. Kant called the basic concepts oI the
1 A. V. Miller sadly continues the habit English translators oI Hegel have oI capitalizing key terms oI Hegel's. So, you
will oIten see Miller's translation talk oI 'the Notion, Ior example. It sounds like some mystical thing, but it is just the
idea oI a concept. Usually 'the Notion should just be understood on analogy with 'the whale in the sentence 'the
whale is a sea mammal. In German ALL nouns are capitalized, so it is completely arbitrary Ior translators to capitalize
just some oI them. In English, capitalized nouns suggest that something special is going on with them. Philosophical
terms like 'Notion, 'Spirit, 'Absolute oIten end up sounding 'metaphysical, like they are about supernatural
entities. That is quite the opposite oI what Hegel intended, actually.
Page 2 of 40
understanding 'the categories. Kant oIIered a list oI 12 categories that he took Irom classical logic.
Hegel argues that this move was quite arbitrary on Kant's part,
2
and that a Iull derivation oI the
categories oI the mind should be provided by philosophy. You can look at the Phenomenologv (1807)
as, in part, a sort oI introduction to Hegel's eIIorts along these lines. Hegel's Science of Logic (1812 -
1816) and the Encvclopedia Logic (1817 - 1830
3
) can be looked at as Iuller derivations oI the basic
categories oI thought.
This might seem surprising, that a big part oI the Phenomenologv is about something so abstract
in the ordinary sense oI this wordas universalitv. But, as you will see, understanding the world Ior
Hegel is a matter oI our concepts: understanding and thinking about the world is a matter oI
conceptualizing it. So, the question oI what is a concept (or an 'idea, or a 'notion) is oI central
importance to Hegel. And, just to anticipate a bit, the universal Ior Hegel is going to involve reIerence
to ALL the particular things that are subsumed by it. So, 'whale will subsume all particular whales in
a certain way that Hegel will spell out in more detail and develop as he goes along. Even to speak oI a
single whale, Ior example, in saying 'Look! There's a whale! is to reIer to ALL whales, but to
'negate all the ones that you don't intend.
2 Hegel continues the line oI thought Irom 1 and argues that comparing a philosophical work
in a PreIace to other philosophical works is something oI a distraction that obscures the truth oI the
work. This is because such a comparison encourages in the reader the questions oI 'which work is
right and which work is wrong? Hegel thinks this is completely the wrong way to look at philosophy.
He argues that philosophical systems should not be looked at Irom a perspective where only one system
can be 'the right one. DiIIerent philosophical works should be seen as stages in a progressive
2 'We are all well aware that Kant's philosophy took the easy way in finding the categories. Hegel, The Encvclopedia
Logic, translated by T. F. Garaets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis, Indiana: Hacket Publishing Company,
1991, p. 84.
3 The Iirst edition oI the Encvclopedia Logic came out in 1817; the second edition, in 1827; the third, in 1830.
Page 3 of 40
sequence oI thoughts in which thought as a whole is developing. He uses one oI his most Iamous
metaphors to present this idea: 'The bud disappears in the bursting-Iorth oI the blossom, and one
might say that the Iormer is reIuted by the latter; similarly, when the Iruit appears, the blossom is
shown up in its turn as a Ialse maniIestation oI the plant, and the Iruit now emerges as the truth oI it
instead. But, each oI the stages is necessary, and it is not simply a matter oI 'Oh, it was all about the
Iruit, so we can completely Iorget about the bud and the blossom! We should look at philosophical
systems in a similar Iashion: they complement each other, and are stages in a single progress. OI the
stages oI the plant as oI the development oI philosophy, 'their Iluid nature makes them moments oI an
organic unity in which they not only do not conIlict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and
this mutual necessity alone constitutes the liIe oI the whole.
But, notice at the same time, Hegel is not saying that there are not contradictions between the
diIIerent stages. The bud IS NOT the same thing as the blossom. You don't have both, and they really
are two diIIerent things. Similarly, the Iruit is a diIIerent thing Irom both the bud and the blossom.
They are, in Iact, diIIerent. But, they are parts oI a whole, and philosophy is concerned with the whole.
It is crucial to ALWAYS remember that in Hegel, just because the next moment oI a process is
arrived at, the previous moment is not really Iully negated or just relegated to the past. The past
moments live in the later moments. 'Negation, a word that is VERY important to Hegel, doesn't mean
Ior Hegel utter and absolute annihilation. Negation always gives way to what Hegel will call 'the
negation oI the negation, which doesn't bring you back to where you started exactly, but to a new
level. In this analogy Hegel has three moments in the development: (1) bud, (2) blossom, (3) Iruit.
We will talk at the end oI 3 more about Hegel's propensity to put developments in threes, something
he calls the 'triadic Iorm later in the PreIace (50). But, here he seems to be anticipating this idea Ior
the Iirst time in the Phenomenologv. Step 2 can be called the negation oI step 1, and step 3 can be
Page 4 of 40
called the 'negation oI the negation. Step 2 negates what was in step 1, but it doesn't totally annihilate
it. Step 1 persists through step 2. And, step 3 doesn't wholly annihilate step 2. Hegel oIten reIers to
the negation oI the negation as the Aufheben (past tense: aufgehoben) which gets translated by Miller
as 'supersession (the verb Iorm is to supersede; past tense: superseded) and by Pinkard and others as
'sublation (verb: to sublate; past tense: sublated). This is an essential concept oI Hegel's dialectical
method. Don't Iorget that when something is aufgehoben (superseded, sublated), it carries with it the
essence oI the moments that came beIore it and led to it. This is not obvious in the 'bud, blossom,
Iruit metaphor, but I mention it here anyway.
Hegel is anticipating here a number oI crucial ideas in his work. First, we can look at Hegel's
plant metaphor as a very general description oI the way dialectical movement happens in thought. But,
he is also anticipating his idea that 'The True is the whole (20). What philosophy is aIter is not just
this or that stage oI philosophy, but the whole oI thought. Thirdly, he is anticipating the idea that the
appearance oI the beginning oI a thing doesn't allow you to inIer all the details oI the whole: the bud's
appearance doesn't reveal the Ilower or the Iruit, even iI it announces their coming. Hegel has already
indicated this third theme in 1 when he talks about stating the aim oI a philosophical work ahead oI
the work as misleading. The aim can't reveal to you the whole.
3 Hegel directly addresses the counter argument he introduced in 1 that a philosophical work
should present its aims and results at the beginning because a philosophical work deals with
universality which contains the particular, and not just with particulars. Recall that this counter
argument holds that the aim and results are what is essential, and the details are inessential. In again
countering this argument, Hegel introduces a new issue oI universality here: a universal distinguishes
itselI Irom other universals, so that it is clear what belongs to one universal and what belongs to
another. So, Ior example, a whale and a human are both mammals, but the concept oI a whale
Page 5 of 40
distinguishes itselI Irom the concept oI a human. Let's look into this distinguishing oI diIIerent
universals Irom each other in a little more detail.
Distinguishing universals or concepts one Irom another is done in various ways, but let's
simpliIy things Ior now: the whale is a mammal and so is a human, but the whale is a sea mammal and
humans are land mammals. The concept oI a whale contains the idea that a whale is a sea mammal.
The concept oI a human contains the idea that a human is a land mammal. Let's ignore all other
mammals Ior right now and pretend that there are only whales and humans.
Classically, the notion oI mammal here would be called a genus and the notions oI whale and
human would be called diIIerent species within the genus. Mammal is a universal, too, just as human
and whale are. The concept oI a mammal, we can say, subsumes the concepts oI human and whale.
When one universal subsumes others as here, we oIten call the subsuming concept a genus (plural:
genera) and the subsumed universals we call species ('species is both a singular and a plural word).
There is a whole technical way these terms work in biology today, but we will ignore that. In
philosophy we oIten call any subsuming concept a genus and any subsumed concept a species. Thus,
color is a genus that contains the species blue, green, red, etc. Now, the idea oI the sea is a universal
too, since there are many seas. Similarly Ior land. These terms denote properties or qualities that
diIIerent mammals can have, and we distinguished the whale Irom the human by saying that the whale
is a sea mammal; the human, a land mammal. That is, we used this other quality or property oI
mammals, along with the genus, to speciIy the diIIerent species within the genus. The genus is
mammal. The species whale is a sea mammal. The species human is a land mammal. (Remember, we
are pretending there are just two kinds oI mammals Ior right now to keep things simple.) The Iunction
oI the concepts sea and land here is to distinguish two species Irom each other. These concepts are
used to show the diIIerence between the two species within the genus mammal. Thus, we call a term
Page 6 of 40
like sea or land used in this way a specific difference. In this phrase, specific difference, the word
'speciIic is in its original meaning: oI or relating to species. We usually use the word 'speciIic in
modern English to mean something like 'particular. But, it really comes Irom the word 'species.
4

You can see why this transIer oI the meaning oI 'speciIic probably happened, Irom 'relating to
speciIies to 'particular since the diIIerent species within a genus are the 'particulars with respect to
the genus: the human species is a particular kind oI the genus mammal; the whale species is also a
particular kind oI that same genus.
I've introduced a number oI crucial terms here: genus, species, speciIic diIIerence, property,
quality. Let me summarize this all.
The words property, quality, concept, idea, and notion are oIten used completely
interchangeably in philosophy. There are other words that are also used to mean the same thing as
these terms: aspect, type, kind, and others, Ior example. All oI these are the same thing: concepts in
the sense oI something that humans classiIy other things by way oI. They are all words Ior universals.
Why we have so many terms Ior the same thing is a matter oI the long history oI the discussion oI this
subject which goes back at least to Plato and Aristotle, both oI whom lived in the 4th-century B.C.E.
The terms genus, species, and speciIic diIIerence also reIer to properties and qualities. But,
these termsgenus, species, and speciIic diIIerenceimply certain relations: a species is subsumed
under a genus, and is distinguished Irom other species in the genus by its speciIic diIIerence. Again, to
revert to our example above: all oI whale, human, mammal, sea, and land are properties. Numerous
particulars can be whales; numerous can be humans; numerous, mammals; numerous, seas; numerous,
lands. But, whale and human are subsumed under mammal and are diIIerentiated by sea and land
(again, we are assuming there are only two types oI mammals Ior right now). Thus, whale and human
4 You might be interested to know that the word 'special also comes Irom 'species via a similar iI somewhat diIIerent
path.
Page 7 of 40
are species oI the genus mammal, and sea is the speciIic diIIerence oI whale within mammal, and land
is the speciIic diIIerence oI human within mammal.
In the second sentence oI 3, Hegel speaks Irom the point oI view oI the proponent oI the
counter argument that Hegel introduced in 1: 'Where could the inner meaning oI a philosophical
work Iind Iuller expression than in its aims and results, and how could these be more exactly known
than by distinguishing them Irom everything else the age brings Iorth in this sphere? The
'distinguishing here should remind you immediately oI the idea oI a specific difference. For one way
to describe, classically, the essence oI something, is by saying to what genus it belongs to generally,
and then providing its speciIic diIIerence within that genus. And, Hegel's imaginary interlocutor here
(the propounder oI the counter argument Hegel introduced in 1) is speaking in just this way. But,
Hegel argues that providing the speciIic diIIerence between one philosophical system and another can
be very misleading. In Iact, he argues, getting too involved in the statement oI such speciIic
diIIerences can be 'a device Ior evading the real issue, a way oI creating an impression oI hard work
and serious commitment to the problem, while actually sparing oneselI both. Hegel repeats that the
mere statement oI the 'aim or oI the 'result oI a philosophical work cannot be a substitute Ior the
work itselI. The work as a whole is 'the result together with the process through which it came about.
The 'aim, Hegel says, 'by itselI is a liIeless universal that 'lacks an actual existence. That
is, a statement oI the 'aim oI a philosophical work is something that many other works can have in
common. It is a universal. It is liIeless because it doesn't indicate a particular system, but only what
many systems might have in common. The only thing that can give liIe to the 'aim is the particular
unIolding oI the system. Similarly, the 'result is dead: it is 'the corpse which has leIt the guiding
tendency behind it. That is, both the 'aim and the 'result are dead. They don't show the particular.
Just as the word 'human by itselI doesn't have liIe in it even though particular humans are alive: the
Page 8 of 40
mere general concept doesn't actually name any particular living thing.
But, besides the 'aim and the 'result oI a philosophical system, its speciIic diIIerence Irom
other systems is also not something that we should spend much time on. Interestingly, Hegel suggests
again in anticipation oI what he will develop in the workthat a speciIic diIIerence not only says
what a thing is, but also what it is not. That is, a thing involves not only what it is, but what it is not.
Sometimes this idea is reIerred to as the doctrine in dialectics oI the interpenetration of opposites.
5

Usually Hegel appreciates understanding things in terms oI what they are not. Dialectical thinking
oIten proceeds that way. So you may wonder, why does he NOT want to start with a comparison with
other systems. He gives the answer here, but in a way that is hard to recognize without more
Iamiliarity with the book as a whole and things he will explicitly say later. For, he says that to worry
about the aim, the result, and the speciIic diIIerence, is not to deal with the 'real issue while we should
be 'tarrying with it, and losing |ourselves| in it...surrendering to it. A crucial aspect oI Hegel's method
is exactly submerging ourselves in the phenomena to examine them as they are in themselves. In doing
this, indeed, we will oIten see how phenomena point to and embrace what they are not, and when we
see this, we will describe exactly how that works. But, we won't start outside the phenomena, but let
the phenomena themselves show us which 'outside is relevant to it. So, to start with what is outside
oI the current philosophical system, that is, other philosophical systems, and to use them to mark oII
the speciIic diIIerence THIS philosophical system has, is an arbitrary thing to do Ior Hegel. We can
only meaningIully judge a system once we comprehend it, and we can only comprehend it by
submerging ourselves in it. This will be Hegel's method throughout the work.
Hegel ends this section with the sentence: 'To judge a thing that has substance and solid worth
is quite easy, to comprehend it is much harder, and to blend judgement and comprehension in a
5 See Friedrich Engels, Dialectics of Nature, 'Dialectics, Moscow, U.S.S.R.: Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1954, p. 83. See: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/don/ch02.htm.
Page 9 of 40
deIinitive description is the hardest thing oI all.
6
He will gloss this sentence in 4. But, you should
notice the three-part progress here: (1) judging 'substance and solid worth, (2) comprehension, and
(3) blending the judgment and the comprehension. Almost every aspect oI the Phenomenologv is
arranged in three-part units. Later in the PreIace (50), Hegel will reIer to the 'triadic Iorm, and this
sentence is perhaps the Iirst pretty direct example oI its use in the book. People oIten reIer to the
'triadic Iorm in terms oI the Iormula 'thesis'antithesis'synthesis. Hegel NEVER uses this
Iormula. Some have claimed it is Iound in Fichte, but I have not seen it there directly.
7
But, he does
work in threes quite oIten and it can help to see this. And, notice that Hegel will speak oI the 'triadic
Iorm approvingly later. So, keep that in mind when you read 14 16, especially, when he attacks a
certain kind oI strict Iormalism. I'll return to this point when I discuss those sections. But, I mention
the point here.
4 This section is a gloss oI the last sentence oI 3, quoted just above. We can see three stages
6 Terry Pinkard's translation is better than Miller's here: 'The easiest thing oI all is to pass judgment on what is substantial
and meaningIul. It is much more diIIicult to get a real grip on it, and what is the most diIIicult oI all is both to grasp
what unites each oI them and to give a Iull exposition oI what that is. The German Pinkard gives Ior this is: 'Das
leichteste ist, was Gehalt und Gediegenheit hat, zu beurteilen, schwerer, es zu Iassen, das schwerste, was beides
vereinigt, seine Darstellung hervorzubringen. Pinkard's extremely helpIul translation with the German text in the
opposing column is available online at:
http://web.mac.com/titpaul/Site/PhenomenologyoISpiritpageIiles/Phenomenology20oI20Spirit2028entire
20text29.pdI.
7 See Gustav E. Mueller, 'The Hegel Legend oI 'Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis', reprinted in Jon Stewart, The Hegel Mvths
and Legends, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1996, pp. 301 305. According to Mueller, in 1837,
Heinrich Moritz Chalybus published a book titled Historische Entwicklung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant bis
Hegel, Zu nher Jerstndigung des wissenschaftlichen Publikums mit der neuesten Schule (which roughly translates as
'The historical development oI speculative philosophy Irom Kant to Hegel, to Iurther the understanding oI the
scientiIically-minded public with the latest school). In this work, Chalybus uses the Iormula 'thesis-antithesis-
synthesis. Again, according to Mueller, this book was discussed by the Hegel Club at the University oI Berlin where
Marx was a student in the late 1830s. Marx picked up the expression and used it in his The Povertv of Philosophv and
Irom there it spread everywhere. Indeed, Marx uses the term in The Povertv of Philosophv. In the passage in which
Marx uses the phrase, he doesn't seem to attribute it to Hegel at all, but, in Iact, suggests that the Iormula is a Greek
version oI Hegel's actual Iormula which Marx states as 'aIIirmation, negation, and negation oI the negation. See Karl
Marx, The Povertv of Philosophv, New York, New York: International Publishers, 1963 (new edition: 1992), pp. 77
78. Or, search on 'thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-
philosophy/ch02.htm. In any event, Mueller has intense contempt Ior Marx and his understanding oI Marx is absurd.
Marx was certainly not over-simpliIying Hegel in The Povertv of Philosophv, but mocking Proudhon's simplistic
understanding oI Hegel and the dialectic. One has only to read the book to see this. Nonetheless, it could be that the
Iormula 'thesis, synthesis, and antithesis spread widely in the way that Mueller suggests, Irom Chalybus to Marx in
The Povertv of Philosophv, and Irom there to posterity.
Page 10 of 40
in the Iirst quite long sentence here: (1) 'the immediacy oI substantial liIe, (2) the apprehension oI
'the rich and concrete abundance |oI liIe| by diIIerential classiIication, and (3) 'accurate instruction
and passing 'serious judgment on |liIe|. These three stages correspond to the three stages named in
the Iinal sentence oI 3: (1) judging 'substance and solid worth, (2) comprehension, and (3) blending
immediate judgment and comprehension. Hegel oIten starts a 'triad with something he calls
'immediate, as here with the 'immediacy oI substantial liIe. We'll see this very notably in the very
Iirst chapter oI the Phenomenologv where Hegel starts the entire book with the notion oI what he calls
'sense-certainty which Hegel says is 'immediately our object and which he constantly talks oI in
terms oI 'immediacy. The section on sense-certainty is the Iirst oI three sections in the Iirst major
section, oI the book, called 'Consciousness.
5 Truth comes in a scientiIic system. The aim oI the book is to make philosophy a science and
bring it closer to 'actual knowing rather than just being a 'love oI knowing. In Hegel's philosophy,
philosophy can become actual knowing because it ends up developing into selI-consciousness in which
subject and object are one and the same thing: I am I. 'I am both the subject and the object oI that
sentence. With the love oI knowing, the lover and the knowledge appear as two separate things: the
knowledge is separate Irom the lover oI knowledge, and there is always a gap there. But, with selI-
knowledge, the gap is overcome.
Hegel speaks here oI an 'inner necessity and an 'external necessity in the system oI
philosophy. The 'inner necessity is the strictly logical relations among the concepts and moments oI
the system. The 'external necessity is the development oI philosophy in history. This relates to
Hegel's 'bud, blossom, Iruit analogy and how he used it in 2.
Hegel gives his 'aim in this section, even though up to now he seemed reluctant to do so. He
seems to have Ielt the need to put his statement oI aim in a proper context so as, hopeIully, not to
Page 11 of 40
mislead readers into thinking that they had very much in having a statement oI just the aim.
Hegel also is saying here that NOW, 1806, is the time to turn philosophy into a system. He is
saying that this hasn't been true in history beIore, that philosophy has been expressed as a system, but
that now is the time, and it would be worthwhile to demonstrate this. This suggests, too, why Hegel
doesn't think it is helpIul to give the speciIic diIIerence oI his system with others: Iirst oI all, the
systems are all part oI a single progressive development in which the development is more important
than the diIIerences between the stages ('bud, blossom, Ilower, 2); but second oI all, no system has
ever really been quite like what Hegel is aiming at, so it is beside the point to compare what he is doing
to what others have done.
6 Hegel equates the idea oI systemic science with the idea oI conceptualization: 'To lay down
that the true shape oI truth is scientiIicor, what is the same thing, to maintain that truth has only the
Notion as the element oI its existence....
But, now Hegel also starts his discussion, which will continue through to the end oI 10, oI the
Iashion in his time to look at knowledge not as conceptual, but as intuitive and immediate. This
dichotomy between the immediately given and the conceptual is constant in the Phenomenologv. I've
already mentioned how he will start oII the book, once it does actually get started aIter the PreIace and
Introduction, with what Hegel calls 'immediate knowing or 'sense-certainty. He anticipates this
here, but now he is talking speciIically about the Iashion Irom the end oI the 18th-century and the
beginning oI the 19th-century to look at knowledge as a direct matter rather than a conceptual matter.
This tendency was exempliIied in the 'Sturm und Drang and 'Romantic movements in Germany at
the time as well as by 'enthusiastic religion such as Methodism and the Quakers. In religion, the idea
was that people could have an immediate revelation or intuition oI God that no conceptualization could
enable or even express. In philosophy, Fichtewhom Hegel greatly admires Ior other innovations
Page 12 of 40
argued Ior the need Ior a sort oI direct 'intellectual intuition as at the Ioundation oI philosophical
knowledge. Hegel rejected this idea and understood philosophy as a matter Ior conceptual knowledge
and not immediate, ineIIable intuition. His critique oI 'sense-certainty in the 'Consciousness chapter
will lay out some oI his argument against immediate knowledge.
By the way, we Iind the term 'the Absolute here Ior the Iirst time. Here is an example oI how
capitalizing a term really mystiIies it. It would be better as 'the absolute. Hegel, in general, just
means by it 'the way the world actually is in its highest stage oI development. This is not a
'supernatural conception at all. Please, don't read the term as iI it is. In the present context where
Hegel Iirst uses the term, oI course, he is allowing it to stand Ior God. That is, he is actually talking
about the views oI dogmatic religious people who believe that 'the way the world actually is in its
highest stage oI development is this nature-transcendent (or 'supernatural) entity personiIied as
'God. Hegel does not think that we should simply get rid oI the concept oI 'the way the world
actually is in its highest stage oI development just because at a previous moment in history this was
looked on as the historically conditioned idea oI a nature-transcending person called 'God. We might
see the latter notion as Ialse, but it was a stage in helping us better understand the Iormer notion Ior
Hegel. Again, think oI the 'bud-blossom-Iruit metaphor. The concept oI 'the way the world actually
is in its highest stage oI development can be looked at as the supersession (Aufgehoben) oI the notion
oI a nature-transcendent, personal 'God.
When you read the term 'the absolute you should think oI Parmenides' One. Parmenides
believed the world was One, or, in other words, that there really is only one thing that exists and that all
sense that there is more than one thing that exists is an illusion. This is a tricky notion at Iirst. Don't
get too hung up on it. Parmenides discussed this idea with Socrates when Socrates was young and
Parmenides was old, according to Plato's dialogue called the Parmenides. In Neoplatonic philosophy
Page 13 of 40
which we usually date Irom the time oI Plotinus (205 270 C.E.)the One oI Parmenides was
identiIied with the concept oI 'the Good and oI 'Being in Plato's Republic. Christians have always
interpreted these ideas as the personal and nature-transcendent God they believed to be the creator.
Thus, they also identiIied the One, the Good, and Being, with the 'demiurge that created the world in
Plato's dialogue Timaeus. OI course, the early Christians never knew how deeply they were inIluenced
by platonic thought brought to the Levant (today's Palestine) through Alexander's invasion (332 B.C.E.)
and the hundreds oI years oI Greek and then Roman rule oI Palestine.
And, it is probably a good idea to think oI Spinoza's understanding that all oI nature must be
identiIied as 'God. This view was considered heretical by the Jewish community in the late 17th-
century when Spinoza Iirst presented it. In the 1780s in German universities, a whole commotion
reIerred to as the 'Pantheismusstreit or 'pantheism controversywas created around Spinoza's
conception oI nature as God. Again, there were all sorts oI intimations oI heresy in this idea. Hegel
looks at all this as the development oI the idea oI the absolute. We will return to this.
In any event, it should be clear that here Hegel is criticizing those who argue Ior an immediate
intuition oI the Absolute or God or religion or being. He will pursue this criticism Ior the next Iew
sections.
7 Notice here in the Iirst sentence Hegel uses the term 'substantial liIe. This should
immediately remind you oI this term's occurrence at the beginning oI 4. There Hegel talked about the
'immediacy oI substantial liIe. Immediate things are always negated in Hegel, and indeed, here Hegel
talks about how 'selI-conscious Spirit...has now got beyond the substantial liIe. There is a lot in this
and it is very hard to see what Hegel means without knowing much about the Phenomenologv as a
whole.
First, again, the word 'Spirit is capitalized by Miller which I think is a mistake. All nouns are
Page 14 of 40
capitalized in German. To capitalize them in English just makes them look mystical and supernatural,
as here. 'Spirit in Hegel translates the German word 'Geist which can also be translated 'mind.
But, what Hegel means by this term is best understood, actually, as simply 'community. Spirit is
community. Or, better, it is the way in which individuals are bound to a community so that they share
both by inheriting and contributing toknowledge within it. In the second major part oI the book,
the chapter called 'SelI-Consciousness, Hegel will speak oI spirit as ''I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is
'I'. And, he will explicitly tell us that with this notion we '|leave| behind...the nightlike void oI the
supersensible beyond. What Hegel means by the supersensible beyond will partly be clariIied in the
third part oI the Consciousness chapter ('Force and the Understanding). But, we are not wrong to
understand this as meaning that Hegel intends nothing supernatural by the concept oI spirit. It is best
to look at spirit as simply communitv, where community isn't just a bunch oI people who happen to
inhabit homes more-or-less near each other, but as a Iunctioning community where each individual
contributes to the whole, and the whole takes care oI each individual.
By 'selI-conscious Spirit Hegel means spirit (or community) as it has developed passed the
stage oI mere consciousness (where it is bound by sensuous knowledge). Hegel thinks that Europe
since the French Revolution which started in 1789 has entered a new stage in history. The European
community is aware oI itselI and with the French Revolution has emancipated itselI Irom the bondage
oI older Iorms oI consciousness, not just Irom the old French regime. He perceives that a Iundamental
change has taken place. When he speaks here oI 'selI-conscious Spirit, at least in its Iirst moving past
sense consciousness and past a certain basic relationship oI bondage, he is speaking about Europe in
1806 and 1807.
Hegel is, undoubtedly, what we would call today a VERY Eurocentric thinker. He says
explicitly in his Philosophv of Historv, that 'Europe is absolutely the end oI History.
8
Hegel, Ior
8 Hegel, The Philosophv of Historv, translated by J. Sibree, New York, New York: Dover Publications, 1956, p. 103.
Page 15 of 40
example, knew about the incredible struggles oI the Haitian people in their revolution against the old
French regime, but completely Iails to discuss that struggle, esteeming the struggle oI the French
bourgeoisie over the old regime much more highly than the struggle oI the AIrican working people in
Haiti.
9
Hegel is criticizing those who want to '|suppress| the diIIerentiations oI the Notion and
|restore| the feeling oI essential being, that is, those who don't want to approach the world through
conceptual understanding, but to grasp it in an immediate intuition.
8 Here Hegel is expressing a sympathy with the initial intentions oI those he has been
criticizing in 6 7. He is saying that those who want to grasp the world through enthusiasm or
intuition initially just want to get people to stop being wholly obsessed with their sensuous, sensual,
bodily being. Indeed, conceptual knowledge Irom the time oI Francis Bacon (1561 1626) and
Thomas Hobbes (1588 1679) through to David Hume (1711 1776), conceptual knowledge became
associated with the philosophy oI empiricism, and with the body and materialism. The great exception
to this rule is George Berkeley (1685 1753)a Bishop in the Church oI Irelandwho saw the
tendency oI materialism to atheism and tried to resist this tendency conceptually, that is, on its own
grounds. But, by the late 18th-century, religion and much else in culture seems to have conceded that
God could not be Iound through conceptual understanding. Thus, the turn to 'enthusiasm in religion
and in art. There is much more to say about all oI this, but I am suggesting a Iirst approximation.
Hegel sympathizes with the desire to move people away Irom obsession with the body, with
materialism, but not because he wants to reinstitute the Iormer religion, but because Ior Hegel, material
being is the locus oI immediate consciousness which must be superseded. But, the supersession is in
thought, that is, it is conceptual; it is not in a return to immediate experience.
9 See the indispensable Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal Historv, Pittsburgh: University oI Pittsburgh
Press, 2009.
Page 16 of 40
Hegel here is reIlecting not only on the tradition oI British Empiricism already mentioned
(Bacon and Hobbes through Hume), but oI the so-called French Enlightenment oI the 18th-century,
which he will discuss in detail in the third major part oI the book, 'Reason. The French
Enlightenment took much Irom the tradition oI British Empiricism and also encouraged people to a
worldly, atheistic sensibility. It is to British Empiricism and the French Enlightenment that Hegel is
reIerring when he says that 'The eye oI the Spirit had to be Iorcibly turned and held Iast to the things oI
this world. That is, Empiricism and the Enlightenment Iorced people to look at the world diIIerently
by dropping the other-worldliness oI the Middle Ages. Hegel says that it took a while Ior this to unIold
because people were so used to seeing things in terms oI God and 'otherworldly ideas. But, Iinally,
people did come to see 'experience as 'an interesting and valid enterprise. Hegel is not completely
opposed to this at all. It is a stage in a process and not to be judged apart Irom the process as a whole.
But, he sees the current demand Ior enthusiastic religion and immediate, intuitive, non-conceptual
knowledge as a reaction to Empiricism and the Enlightenment. And, he sees it as a misguided reaction.
You can't get back, he is arguing, what was lost in this way.
Notice here the three-part sequence: Middle Ages, Emiricism, enthusiasm. But, enthusiasm
here is not the sublation oI the Middle Ages and Empiricism, but a misguided attempt to Iind that
sublation.
10
9 When Hegel speaks oI 'this modest complacency in receiving, or this sparingness in giving
he is reIerring to the desperation oI those who demand enthusiasm and immediate, intuitive knowledge.
In wanting enthusiasm and intuitive knowledge, they are asking Ior Iar less than they can have. And, in
oIIering it to others, they are oIIering Iar less than possible. The second sentence here shows how little
10 In the First Part oI the Encvclopedia Logic, Hegel identiIies as 'The First Position oI Thought the metaphysical
conceptions that came out oI the Middle Ages with its systematic theology (pp. 65 76). He identiIies 'The Second
Position oI Thought with Empiricism (pp. 76 80) and the Critical Philosophy oI Kant (pp. 80 108). This gives
partial corroboration to what I am describing here, but it is not a good idea to try to make the Encvclopedia Logic match
too precisely with the progress in the Phenomenologv. But, oIten the comparison is very helpIul.
Page 17 of 40
Hegel wants and intends anything 'mystical in his work: 'Whoever seeks mere ediIication |that is,
the ediIication oI enthusiastic religion or immediate, intuitive knowledge|, and whoever wants to
shroud in a mist the maniIold variety oI his earthly existence and oI thought, in order to pursue the
indeterminate enjoyment oI this indeterminate divinity, may look where he likes to Iind all this. I
always want to add at the end oI this sentence, '...but they won't Iind it in this book! This shows quite
clearly that Hegel thinks that the move through Empiricism and the Enlightenment is a good thing, a
positive thing, even iI there is a sense that something has been lost. In a sense, Hegel clearly
understands the later dictum oI Nietzsche that 'God is dead.
11
But, he is uninterested in any Iacile,
Iorced, cheap, Ialse attempts to recreate a sense oI religion and community, as represented Ior him by
the then recent traditions oI enthusiastic religion and immediate, intuitive knowledge.
Notice the word 'indeterminate: you can read this as 'non-conceptual or, to put it in a phrase
that sounds like Hegel, 'lying apart Irom or outside the notion.
Hegel tells us that philosophy shouldn't go Ior such imaginary solutions to the sense oI loss oI
modernity: 'philosophy must beware oI the wish to be ediIying.
10 Enthusiasm, as I will call it, 'looks disdainIully at determinateness. Note the word
'Horos in parentheses. This is apparently the Greek word 'po which transliterates as 'horos and
means 'boundary.
12
This should remind you oI 3 where Hegel said that 'the speciIic diIIerence oI a
thing is...its limit...where the thing stops, or...is what the thing is not. Enthusiasm cannot draw
boundaries between things, but must take them as unanalyzed, that is, unconceptualized wholes. It
'deliberately holds alooI Irom Notion and Necessity as products oI that reIlection which is at home
only in the Iinite.
11 In the third section oI the IiIth major part, 'Religion, oI the Phenomenologv Hegel will actually use the expression
'God is dead. The term was not original with Nietzsche. Hegel was the Iirst to use the expression in philosophy. But,
it is not original with Hegel either. Hegel is quoting an old Lutheran hymn that has the line in it, reIerring to Christ's
death. See 753 (p. 455 in the Miller translation).
12 See http://www.perseus.tuIts.edu/hopper/morph?lo28\ros&lagreek.
Page 18 of 40
With these deIinitions Irom the Encvclopedia Logic, we can understand what Hegel is arguing
here a bit better. He is saying that enthusiasts, iI I may, disdains conceptual thought because they see it
as merely Iinite thought, that is, thought only about objects oI sense. They don't realize, Hegel is
intimatingthough not really saying this explicitlythat there is another kind oI object Ior thought:
thought itselI. Thought itselI is an object Ior thought that is not an object, in the sense oI being outside
oI thought. It is thought itselI. Just why this is so important Ior Hegel can't be clear at this point in the
book. But, it will be central Ior Hegel. SelI-consciousness opens up a whole new Iield oI experience
Ior human beings. This is one oI Hegel's central points in the Phenomenologv. Remember how Hegel
has already reIerred, iI somewhat obtusely, to the Europe oI his day as a time where 'selI-conscious
Spirit had 'got beyond the |immediacy oI| substantial liIe (7, with the interpolation oI 'immediacy
oI Irom the Iirst sentence oI 4). Hegel is saying here in 10 that the enthusiasts don't get that there is
a new possibility in the air, and are misguidedly aiming Ior the restoration oI God in a superIicial way.
Times have changed, Hegel is saying, and they are missing the signiIicance oI the change, and what the
possibilities are at this juncture.
There is much to say about the notion oI the 'Iinite. In the Encvclopedia Logic, Hegel deIines
the Iinite exactly as 'whatever comes to an end, what is, but ceases to be where it connects with its
other, and is thus restricted by it.
13
That is, the 'Iinite Ior Hegel means the 'bounded. Hegel also
has a deIinition Ior the 'inIinite in the same passage: basically, it is selI-consciousness. 'Thus, the I,
or thinking, is inIinite because it is related in thinking to an |object| that is itselI. An |object| as such is
an other, something negative |that is, not me| that conIronts me. But iI thinking thinks itselI, then it has
an |object| that is at the same time not an |object|, i.e., an |object| that is sublated |Aufgehoben|, ideal.
Thus thinking as such, thinking in its purity, does not have any restriction within itselI.
14
13 Encvclopedia Logic, pp. 66 67.
14 Ibid., p. 67. I put 'object in square brackets to overstep a quirky bit oI translating art by the translators oI the passage.
I also put 'that is, not me in there to stress what Hegel means by 'negative: he just means something that is other than
Page 19 of 40
Notice the use oI the word 'Iorce here. This translates 'KraIt in Miller's translation.
15
Force
in Hegel, is basically an imperceptible power that holds things and the world together. The world oI
Iorces is not only the world oI God as conceived by the theologians oI the Middle Agesand modern
thinkers such as George Berkeley who created an Empiricism with God at its center rather than matter
or substancebut it is also the world oI modern science, which systematizes the natural world by
reIerence to just such invisible, imperceptibly operating Iorces and natural laws. The world oI Iorce is
also the world oI Kant's 'thing-in-itselI or 'noumenon which is supposed to be the reality that lies
beneath and beyond our sensations. It is this world oI Iorces that Hegel reIers to as the 'supersensible
beyond when he says in the SelI-Consciousness chapter that with the notion oI spirit we have leIt
behind 'the nightlike void oI the supersensible beyond. What is the notion oI spirit? Again, it is
community, but Ior Hegel, community starts with selI-consciousness, as you will see in the SelI-
Consciousness chapter. Community cannot happen without at least two people who recognize each
other, and whose recognition oI each other becomes their own selI-consciousness. Hegel argues that
you have community iI and only iI you have selI-consciousness. Or, you can have spirit iI and only iI
you have selI-consciousness, since spirit is community.
So, Hegel is really arguing that the enthusiasts want missing spirit, but they mistake the missing
spirit Ior a personal experience rather than the bond oI community. Hegel is arguing that what is really
missing is not some transcendent entity, some supernatural entity called 'spirit, but a real communal
me, or opposed to me, here. And, I put 'AuIgehoben in brackets to remind the reader oI what the word 'sublated
translates.
15 In Pinkard, unIortunately, KraIt is translated here as 'power, but in the third section oI the Consciousness chapter as
'Iorce! Thus, Pinkard's translation is liable to lead the reader into missing a very important point by connecting this
passage with the meaning oI the third section oI the Consciousness chapter. But, Miller is not perIectly consistent here
either. Miller has: 'The power oI Spirit is only as great as its expression.... This translates the German, 'Die KraIt des
Geistes ist nur so gro als ihre uerung.... True, 'power sounds more colloquial here in English, but it misleads the
reader. There are other words in German that can express 'power, Ior example, 'Macht, as in Nietzsche's Iamous
phrase 'the will to power: 'der Wille zur Macht. But, Hegel uses 'KraIt here, and Miller tends otherwise to translate
'KraIt as 'Iorce. I wish he had been consistent here. On the other hand, Pinkard actually reverses his practice in this
passage and translates 'Die KraIt des Geistes ist nur so gro als ihre uerung... as 'The Iorce oI spirit is only as great
as its expression.... It doesn't sound that bad. And, no doubt Pinkard did realize that Hegel is connecting what he is
saying in this passage with his section in the Consciousness chapter, 'Force and the Understanding.
Page 20 of 40
bond. And, Hegel identiIies a real communal bond as what spirit really is. You might think oI him
identiIying spirit as a real communal bond in parallel with science identiIying water as H
2
O. Once
upon a time water may have been identiIied as a supernatural, occult personality, but today it is
understood as a moderately straightIorward part oI nature. Similarly, spirit was once understood as all
sorts oI things, but what it really is is community, or the bond oI community which is based on selI-
consciousness. SelI-consciousness itselI can only happen in a community. The two things, in Iact,
must arise together.
Now, you might think it is strange that I am talking so much about community here in talking
about 10 since Hegel doesn't mention community at all directly in 10. But, he does: he talks about
'spirit, and the 'Iorce (Kraft) oI spirit is the bond oI community.
What does conceptual knowledge have to do with community or spirit? For Hegel, as you will
see, scientiIic knowledge, that is, conceptual knowledge reaches its highest Iorm in selI-consciousness.
Recall that I mentioned above (1) that we can look at Hegel's work in the Phenomenologv and the
Logic as his derivation oI the categories through which we look at the world. Ultimately, Hegel will
trace all universality in its developed Iorm to selI-consciousness, and, as we just saw, selI-
consciousness to community. Thus, universality is bound up with community. Conceptual knowledge
is a matter oI community, and community expresses itselI in its conceptual understanding oI the world.
The Anglo-U.S. intellectual community only picked up on this idea that our conceptual
knowledge is communal with the tradition started by Charles Sanders Peirce in the late 19th-century
that is oIten called today the tradition oI 'American pragmatism. This school includes Peirce, William
James, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, Willard Van Orman Quine, and Richard Rorty, to name just
a Iew oI its most Iamous exemplars. It is essential to realize, however, that Peirce was deeply
inIluenced by Hegel as was Mead. That is, this tradition represents in important ways the inIluence oI
Page 21 of 40
Hegel, which is so oIten denied by Anglo-U.S. philosophy which seems at times to pride itselI in its
contempt Ior Hegel. The Iull community-based conception oI science and its categories really comes
to the Iore in the Anglo-U.S. philosophical tradition with Thomas Kuhn's 1964 book, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions.
Notice that at the very end oI 10 Hegel returns to the dream metaphor that he used at the end
oI 9. He is implicitly reiterating that he himselI is not at all interested in just Iantasizing about the
world, or describing it in terms oI mystiIications, but in getting at the true essence Irom which the
appearance oI the world comes.
With this section, Hegel leaves the enthusiasts behind which he had been discussing since 6,
and he now returns to a point he started in 5.
11 Hegel picks up on the question he started in 5 concerning at what point in history he is
writing. Here he says that his time represents 'a period oI transition to a new era. Here, in talking
about 'spirit, he is talking about the whole European community. It is moving Iorward aIter some
goal, leaving behind its Iormer, Iormative experience. Europe is about to make not just a quantitative
movenot just increasing its knowledge by this or that single piece oI knowledge or change to its
social organization, but a qualitative leap, a revolution. You can hear in the language here the
memory oI the recent and continuingalbeit in the distorted Iorm oI Napoleon's Empire, which Hegel
admired deeplyFrench Revolution. The 'sunburst which, in one Ilash, illuminates the Ieatures oI the
new world can be understood as Hegel's appreciation oI his own philosophy: that is, Hegel thought
very highly oI his philosophy and its historical signiIicance.
Napoleon was Iighting in Jena while Hegel was writing the Phenomenologv. Hegel apparently
made much oI this. This story is oIten repeated in the literature on Hegel in one Iorm or another.
12 The new world that Hegel thinks Europe, and thereby the whole world, is on the brink oI is
Page 22 of 40
a break with the past, and it is sudden. But, still, it will go through its own development and will have
to start oII as merely an idea oI what is wanted. The details have to be worked out in history. Thus: 'It
comes on the scene Ior the Iirst time in its immediacy or its Notion. You might think oI this
immediate notion as an 'aim such as Hegel talked about at the beginning oI the PreIace. The idea oI
the whole, is not the same as the completed whole. An acorn is not an oak tree. And, the philosophical
knowledge is not complete until it is carried out in its actual, detailed investigations. Compare the
word 'culture (Bildung) here with the Iirst word oI 4.
13 '...the wealth oI previous existence is still present...: that is, what is negated is not lost,
but remains in the new condition in a sense. But, since the world is in a new state, what is going on is
not clear to most people. Only a Iew experts (like Hegel, oI course) get it.
14 From here until the end oI 16 Hegel will discuss what we can call 'Iormalism in this
transition period to the new age Hegel has been speaking about. By 'Iormalism I mean scientiIic
investigation that proceeds by a ready-made 'Iorm. For example, the Iormula, 'thesis, antithesis,
synthesisalthough they didn't use just those wordsis used in a certain way by both Fichte and
Schelling, who are usually recognized to be the main targets oI Hegel's criticism here. Hegel's problem
with using Iormalism is that it makes it seem like the Iorm is an absolute that the world must conIorm
to. Hegel's view is that thought should conIorm to the world, not the world to thought. Using a ready-
made Iormula, like a cookie cutter, imposes its shape on the world and makes the world come out in a
distorted way. Rather, Hegel thought the right method is to let the world itselI, the phenomena itselI,
show thought how it is: thought should adapt to each new thing it thinks about, not impose a rigid Iorm
on it. Mind you, this is criticism that Hegel intends Ior those oI his time who basically accept the need
Ior conceptual knowledge, this is not another criticism oI the enthusiasts. But, there is some overlap
here, as Fichte did argue Ior conceptual knowledge, but he also put 'intellectual intuition, a sort oI
Page 23 of 40
immediate non-conceptual experience, at the Ioundation oI his system. But, here, Hegel is not really
aiming at that part oI Fichte, but his Iormalizing tendency.
The 'side that 'boasts oI its wealth oI material and intelligibility is that oI the Iormalists. The
'side that 'scorns this intelligibility, and Ilaunts its immediate rationality and divinity is the side oI
the enthusiasts.
In general, Hegel thinks new scientiIic practice must develop to meet the demands oI the
coming new era.
On 'boredom, compare to 11 and 15.
15 Here he is talking about the Iormalists. Compare 'monochromatic Iormalism to 16's
'the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black. I always think that Hegel has the
Empiricists and the scholars oI the French Enlightenment in mind here, too.
16 On 'the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black: it is oIten said that Hegel
is speciIically reIerring to Schelling with this remark and that Schelling, who had been Hegel's Iriend
Ior some 15 or more years, was deeply oIIended by this comment. Schelling had gotten Hegel his job
at Jena where Hegel wrote the Phenomenologv. The story is that Schelling never again was on good
terms with Hegel aIter this.
This passage ends the criticism started in 14 oI Iormalism.
17 Hegel really starts describing what he is about to do in the Phenomenologv in this section.
This is one oI the most important passages in the PreIace and the book. It is a Iundamental description
oI the general idea Hegel wants to establish: 'the True must be grasped and expressed 'not only as
Substance, but equally as Subfect.
Substance is what holds things together in classical metaphysics that comes down to us Irom
Aristotle. Why does this cup have all these properties all at once? Because there is something
Page 24 of 40
underneath all the properties that holds it together that is called 'substance. That is what substance is:
what holds things together.
A subject is, in simples terms, a person. But, Hegel means something broader than just a Iull-
blown person as we would think oI it. Still, it is helpIul to always think oI 'subject as a person. But,
what Hegel means by 'subject is anything that has desire and is 'selI-moving. By 'selI-moving is
meant something that doesn't just react to its environment in a way determined by some natural laws,
but something that does things in its environment to achieve some goal, some desire. Something is
'selI-moving when it has desires and intentions, and on behalI oI these, acts on its environment. That
is what Hegel has in mind by 'subject. OI course, persons are primary examples. But, other things as
well. Rabbits or other organisms that seem to behave on the environment out oI concern Ior their own
integrity, maintenance, and reproduction. Also, communities oI people which act as whole groups.
Communities can have common intentions, desires, and goals, and act on these.
So, Hegel is saying here that his Iundamental idea is not to see the world in terms oI a monism
oI substance, but to see it as a monism oI subjectivity, oI subjects.
The sentence 'II the conception oI God as the one Substance... is generally said to be about the
so-called Pantheismusstreit that started in 1780 over the resurrection oI Spinoza's pantheism (I
mentioned this already above in 6). That was a monism that made substance the one sort oI thing
there was, not subject. As such, it insulted traditional religious sensibilities who saw it as taking the
subjectivity oI God away Irom God and turning God into nature. They perceived that iI God is nature,
than God has lost whatever subjectivity 'he was supposed to have. You can read the term 'selI-
consciousness in this sentence as 'subjectivity. By 'selI-consciousness/subjectivity being
'submerged and not preserved Hegel means that the 'selI-moving nature oI God was taken away
Irom 'him.
Page 25 of 40
Let's go through this whole passage line by line, because it is one oI the trickiest passages so Iar
in the whole PraIace. It is actually, believe it or not, completely intelligible, but it just takes some
practice with Hegel's ideas to get it. At Iirst, passages like this seem completely opaque to most
readers. So, here we go.
I will start with the core sentence: 'everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not
only as Substance, but equally as Subfect. By 'the True we can just understand something like 'the
ultimate reality oI the world as a whole. So, he is saying, we must take the ultimate reality oI the
world not just as mindless substance, but as a subject, which means, as something that is selI-moving in
the sense I described above. This doesn't mean that Hegel is NOT taking the world as substance. He
is. He is saying that we must express the world as substance, but ALSO as subject. Both are crucial.
Next: 'At the same time, it is to be observed that substantiality embraces the universal, or the
immediacv of knowledge itselI, as well as that which is being or immediacy for knowledge. What he
is saying is, not only do we have to take the world as a whole to be substance and as subject, but we
must understand that as substanceputting aside questions oI the subjectivity Hegel wants herethere
are two aspects to consider: the conceptual ('the universal) and the sensuous ('being). It is
impossible to get on a Iirst reading oI this, beIore you have read the whole book, and especially the Iirst
section oI the Consciousness chapter, 'Sense-Certainty, that 'being Ior Hegel reIers to
undiIIerentiated sensuous appearance. He will explain this in some detail in the Consciousness chapter,
but you can take my word Ior it Ior now. Now, it might be pretty obvious how the sensuous might be
seen to be in the world, in nature, let us say, but how is universality there? Well, there really are
diIIerent species oI animals and plants, and there are diIIerent properties oI things that enter into
objective natural laws. So, universals, as Aristotle thought as well, are out there in the world, not just
in our minds. So, iI we look at mindless substance, we see that it contains both the sources oI
Page 26 of 40
sensation, namely, physical things, as well as qualities or properties, species, genera, kinds, types oI
things, in which the world Iunctions in terms oI all by itselI, apart Irom any minds. But, when we look
at the world Irom this perspective, as pure substance, without subjectivity, it is simply like a giant
clock, Iunctioning according to its eternal laws which are all oI the Iorm, 'II something oI type X
happens, then something oI type Y happens (where 'type X and 'type Y are both properties or
qualities or Iorms, whatever you would like to call them).
The rest oI the paragraph basically consists oI an explanation oI the the statement that 'the
conception oI God as the one Substance shocked the age in which it was proclaimed. As we have
already seen, this statement is usually taken to reIer to the Pantheismusstreit oI the 1780s. But, it also
applies to the Jewish community in Amsterdam in the 1670s when Spinoza Iirst published his ideas.
Keep in mind as we go through Hegel's explanation oI what this controversy was about that
'substance here means 'mindless, non-subect-like substance. We are assuming through the
remainder oI this paragraph that substance does not involve mind, but merely the on-going and orderly
working out oI the laws oI nature.
Hegel explains the shock oI the claim oI pantheismthat all oI nature is to be identiIied as God
in terms oI three consequences: (1) that all subjective aspects oI God is lost in a purely material
(sensuous) world, (2) that even the universals become liIeless in such a world, and (3) that iI you try to
join materiality and universals, matter and Iorm, it is not clear that matter could really plays any role.
Let's see how Hegel spells this out one part at a time.
(1) '...the reason Ior this was on the one hand an instinctive awareness that, in this deIinition,
selI-consciousness was only submerged and not preserved. This is addressing the result oI identiIying
God with mindless nature, that is, the realm oI the senses, which Hegel calls 'being and 'immediacy
for knowledge. 'Immediacy for knowledge just is another way oI saying 'sensuous: the sensuous
Page 27 of 40
is something that appears to be immediately given to us, apparently allowing us direct access to the
world. II God is mindless nature, then God's subjectivity is lost. God is not a selI-consciousness in
that case, but the mere substance that sustains the appearances that emanate Irom nature, nothing more.
This God is very similar, by the way, to Berkeley's God who is also argued to be a substitute Ior what
Berkeley believed to be the philosopher's invention oI the notion oI substance. The religious
conceptions oI God took him to be a person who selI-consciously did things out oI 'his own desire to
do them, not a mere servant oI an objective necessity to maintain the regularity oI sensuous appearance.
God, on the Spinoza/Berkeley view, is merely there to make sure that the chair is still there the next
time you look at it, iI you happen to look away Ior a moment. He is the substance underneath the
sensuous appearances oI nature. And, that is just not what God is supposed to be, according to
Spinoza's critics. Notice, Hegel here does not address the question whether the world as mere sensuous
material, without any universals, can be known by anybody. He will make it clear in the Iirst section oI
the Consciousness chapter, 'Sense-Certainty, that he doesn't think that this is possible at all:
universals are required Ior knowledge, so a world oI mere sensuous matter, without universals, cannot
really be known. Hegel doesn't bring ANY oI this up just here, at this point in the paragraph, but he
will raise this question in point (3), which I will get to just below, though without answering it Iully.
(2) 'On the other hand, the opposite view, which clings to thought as thought, to universalitv as
such, is the very same simplicity, is undiIIerentiated, unmoved substantiality. Besides the direct
sensuous appearances oI nature, there is the Iact that natural events happen by laws, and that these laws
proceed not on the basis oI particular individuals, it seems, but on the basis oI the properties these
individuals have. II I tend to bump my head on that low doorway, it is not because I am this particular
individual, but because I have the property oI being 5' 10 tall, and that low doorway has the property
oI being only 5' in height. So, I keep hitting my head on the door. The regularity is not between me
Page 28 of 40
and the door as particulars, but between any two things that have the properties oI being 5' 10 tall and
oI being 5' tall. There is a general law that deals only with properties, indiIIerent to the individuals who
actually have those properties. 5' 10 things can't directly pass under 5' things. All physical, natural
laws are like this: they never mention particulars, but only properties, or qualities oI things. That is
what makes them laws: they are general and are indiIIerent to the particulars that are subsumed under
the laws. For Hegel as Ior many philosophers, thought is about universals and not about particulars
since, as they take it, thought aims at having a generalized understanding oI the laws oI nature. Hegel
also thinks that the sensuous is not directly involved in thought because it cannot really be described
without using universals. So, Hegel, now, having considered the purely sensuous side oI things, turns
to the non-sensuous side oI things, that is, 'thought as thought, that is, 'thought as conceptual, that is,
'thought as expressed in universals. Now, iI God is identiIied with substance where substance is
taken not to be merely the particular matter (the sensuous stuII) oI the world, but the law-like behavior
oI the world by way oI universals, then God is simply the regulator oI the laws, the thing that makes
sure the laws keep working the way they must: he is the thing that makes the clockwork keep turning
Iorever. His role is not a living role, but merely a dead, perIunctory supporting role. God is not really
diIIerentiated (he is 'undiIIerentiated) Irom the Iunctioning oI the laws, and God does not move (he is
'unmoved) on his own accord. He is simply the thing that supports the continued, eternal Iunctioning
oI the system, always according to the laws oI nature. This is not the God oI traditional Judeo-
Christian theology.
(3) Hegel considers one Iinal possibility. The way this is introduced is clumsy in English. He
already has used the device where we say 'on the one hand... and then 'on the other hand.... That
was clumsy enough because he started the 'on the one hand... in the middle oI one sentence (at least
according to Miller), and he started the 'On the other hand... in the Iollowing sentence, which can
Page 29 of 40
throw the reader oII. But, in English, we usually don't keep going iI we use the device oI 'on the one
hand... and then 'on the other hand.... People only generally have two hands. So, we generally end
the comparison with the 'on the other hand... bit. But, here Hegel says, 'And, iI thirdly, ..., which is
really quite conIusing, especially when the reader is already struggling with such diIIicult andIor
most peoplequite unIamiliar material. It is disorienting.' But, now, Hegel looks at a third possibility
which is that somehow the the sensuous can be taken not just as matter but, somehow, as thought as
well. This is, actually, the conception oI those thinkers I have been calling the 'enthusiasts whom
Hegel criticized in 6 10. Hegel is considering the view oI the 'enthusiasts, that is, the
identiIication oI God with an immediately and intuitively knowable substance. And, Hegel will argue
that such an identiIication cannot be a satisIying, or at least not shocking, picture Ior traditional
theological conceptions. 'And iI, thirdly, thought does unite itselI with the being oI Substance, and
apprehends immediacy or intuition as thinking, the question is still whether this intellectual intuition
does not again Iall back into inert simplicity, and does not depict actuality itselI in a non-actual
manner. The view in (1) above was that God is identiIied with matter. And, we saw that iI that was
the case, God is reduced to the mere regulator oI nature's appearances: iI I look at this tree, and turn
around, then turn around again, it is God that makes sure that the perception oI the tree is still there,
God is the substance. Hegel only considered all this Irom the perspective oI the objective material and
noted that iI God was so identiIied, then traditional sensibilities would understandably be shocked since
it took away agency, or any type oI personhood Irom God. But, Hegel returns to the issue here. II the
world is conceived as mere matter, devoid oI universals then how can it be known? By 'immediate
intuition that bypasses concepts. But, in that case, the world is a blob oI pure undiIIerentiated being:
undiIIerentiated now because there are no qualities that our minds can use to distinguish one thing Irom
another. It is just a blob. From such a blob, how can there be motion? Physical, spatial motion
Page 30 of 40
requires diIIerentiation oI place, at least, and that requires some sorts oI properties, Ior how does one
place diIIer Irom another place except because diIIerent properties inhere in one place Irom what
inheres in the other. Motion requires diIIerence. But, diIIerence requires properties, that is, universals.
And, motion in terms oI a person being a 'selI-moving thing, requires desire, as we have seen, and
desire requires diIIerence (me and the other I desire), and diIIerence is a Iorm oI universality and
involves negation: this, but not that; me and not me. So motion would be impossible on this view,
either in the sense oI physical motion, or oI the motion oI a 'selI-moving thing. Given that there is no
diIIerentiation and no motion, the world oI appearance, the actual world, would now have to be
explained. But, how? The actual world seems Iull not only oI physical motion but oI motivated
motion oI persons. How is this happening on this view? The enthusiast would have to explain actual
motion in terms oI a non-actual realm where there is no motion. So, the enthusiast's view cannot
prevent the traditional theological view Irom being shocked at the identiIication oI God with substance,
that is, all oI nature.
So, the traditional theological view oI the age was shocked by the view that God is substance,
that is, all oI nature. They were shocked because (1) this view took away all subjectivity Irom God and
turned him into a mere support Ior perception, (2) this view, even iI we looked at the world not as mere
matter, but as law-like regularity, made oI God nothing but the sustainer oI the regularities, and (3) this
view, would make God identical to a non-actual undiIIerentiated blob which would be supposed to be
the source and reality oI the actual world which is Iull oI motion.
18 This passage is a monumental piece oI language, in my opinion, and it really sums up
Hegel's own view. In 17, Hegel didn't say any more about his view than that it was about looking at
the world as both substance and subject. Then he leIt his own view and considered the view presented
by Spinoza and why this was so shocking to traditional theological thinking. But, Hegel said no more
Page 31 of 40
about his own view. Now he does give a precis oI his view, and it is thick and must always be
completely unintelligible at Iirst. There is very little here that anybody could possibly understand
without studying this whole book quite a bit, or getting someone who has to explain it a bit. It is totally
original and surprising and inIuriating at the same time. I will go through this line by line, too, but I
won't try to explain it in too much detail: you will just have to see how Hegel actually works this stuII
out in the actual book. But, I will try to give some idea oI what he is talking about.
'Further, the living Substance is being which is in truth Subfect, or, what is the same, is in truth
actual only in so Iar as it is the movement oI positing itselI, or is the mediation oI its selI-othering with
itselI. Yeah. So, let's break this down.
'...the living Substance is being which is in truth Subfect...: that is, what the world ultimately
is is alive and it is person-like. I've already described these ideas somewhat, above.
'...or, what is the same, is in truth actual only in so Iar as it is the movement oI positing
itselI...: by 'actual Hegel just means, really there. 'The movement is movement in the sense oI
'selI-motion that I have talked about above, and the words 'positing itselI shows that this is what
Hegel has in mind here: 'selI-motion, that is, motion oI something that is desiring in some sense and
that is seeking to IulIil its desire, ultimately to sustain itselI, or maintain itselI, or reproduce itselI. So,
Hegel is saying that we have to look at the world as a selI-moving subject rather than as inert
substance. The selI-moving subject, though, will be what substance was always supposed to be Ior
philosophers: the glue that holds appearance together and regulates the laws oI nature and society.
But, it won't only be substance in an inert sense as it has traditionally been held to be, but in an active,
selI-motivated sense.
'...or is the mediation...: mediation is a big word Ior Hegel. We will come back to this term in
20. But, Ior now, we can just say that a mediation is a universal or a property: it is something that
Page 32 of 40
goes between the immediate sensuous appearance oI something and thought so as to allow the
immediate sensuous appearance to be usable by thought. Thought can only think in terms oI universals
Ior Hegel. So, a universal is the Iundamental mediation or go-between, between the world and thought.
Sensuousness is immediate, that is, not mediated, that is, not conceptualized through a universal. But,
thought is in terms oI universals, that is, it is mediated.
'...oI its selI-othering with itselI. This is my Iavorite and yet is perhaps the most Irustrating
part oI all this. In Hegel, the external world oIten is talked about as iI it is not external aIter all, but is
out there because thought puts it out there. And, thought puts the external world out there so that the
external world can be the object oI desire, and as such, consumed by the consciousness that created it
and put it out there, and thereby returned to the unity oI the original consciousness. So, A selI-others
itselI and creates B Irom itselI, but outside itselI. Then A desires B and pursues B. Then A consumes B
and makes B a part oI A again. In more Hegelian language, now. A selI-others by negating itselI and
creating not-A, which we can call B, an other, the negation oI A, opposed (external) to A. Then A
desires this B, this not-A, and pursues it, and ultimately consumes it. This is called 'the negation oI the
negation: B was already the negation oI A, and now A in consuming it negates B's otherness, that is,
negates B as the negation oI A: the negation oI the negation. Hegel will say, usually iI not always, that
when the negation oI the negation occurs, A 'has returned into itselI. He will also oIten say that the
object, B has also 'returned into itselI when this happens. Now, how and why can he say that iI A was
the source oI B entirely?
Perhaps the best answer to that is the Iollowing. When we think oI this picture, or, better, this
dialectic applying between a person and the external world, it seems patently absurd. People don't
make the external world. OI course, on the other hand, Hegel has more up his sleeve here than just to
be thinking about individual persons, inhabiting individual bodies. He takes the entire community oI
Page 33 of 40
persons as it develops over history as itselI a person which he oIten calls 'absolute spirit. Remember,
he seriously doesn't intend this to be anything supernatural. He is really trying to explain the world we
actually inhabit as it actually appears. He just thinks the world we inhabit is Iar diIIerent Irom what we
tend to think oI it Irom the perspective oI what he calls 'ordinary consciousness. Somehow, Hegel
does seem to think at times, that the human community as a whole selI-others and creates the physical,
external world. And, I have to admit, I Iind that view completely baIIling iI not inIuriating. But, I do
have one more thing to say on behalI oI Hegel that has kept me going all these years with him.
Hegel's model Ior this process oI 'selI-othering and 'negating the negation and 'returning to
selI is not, I don't believe, an individual person and the external physical world. Rather, he is thinking
oI two persons and the way that each oI their identities depends on the recognition (Anerkennung) oI
the other. Hegel will start exploring this in depth in the SelI-Consciousness chapter. His initial
inspiration Ior this view comes Iirst Irom Rousseau and second, and perhaps more directly, Irom
Fichte.
16
From the point oI view oI 'mutual recognition between persons, this idea oI selI-othering is
not so preposterous. Your personhood is a prerequisite Ior my being a person and my personhood is a
prerequisite Ior your being a person. We can now read the idea oI As self-othering as A's giving
recognition to B, and thereby allowing B to achieve personhood. But, in A's selI-othering and creating
16 See Rousseau's Discourse on the Origins of Inequalitv, 1754. See, Ior example, the passage, 'In proportion as ideas and
sentiments succeed each other, and the head and the heart exercise themselves, men continue to shake oII their original
wildness, and their connections become more intimate and extensive. They now begin to assemble round a great tree:
singing and dancing, the genuine oIIspring oI love and leisure, become the amusement or rather the occupation oI the
men and women, Iree Irom care, thus gathered together. Every one begins to survey the rest, and wishes to be surveyed
himselI; and public esteem acquires a value. He who sings or dances best; the handsomest, the strongest, the most
dexterous, the most eloquent, comes to be the most respected: this was the Iirst step towards inequality, and at the same
time towards vice. From these Iirst preIerences there proceeded on one side vanity and contempt, on the other envy and
shame; and the Iermentation raised by these new leavens at length produced combinations Iatal to happiness and
innocence. Here, the person has an existence in some sense even beIore recognition by others. But, we can also look at
this as indicating the point at which personhood in the sense that we know it begins in history: when each person craves
and lives through the recognition oI the others. For Fichte, see his Foundations of Natural Right, 1796. In the 'First
main division, Fichte writes, 'The human being (like all Iinite beings in general) becomes a human being only among
human beings; and since the human being can be nothing other than a human being and would not exist at all iI it were
not this it Iollows that, iI there are to be human beings at all, there must be more than one.
Page 34 of 40
B, or creating the conditions Ior B to arise as an independent being, like A, but not A, B can now stand
as an object oI desire Ior A. A seeks and desires B. And, when B recognizes A, A returns to itselI, and
so does B, since in B's recognizing A, since A recognizes B, B establishes the legitimacy oI B's own
personhood, which can only be grounded in another person, that is, in someone else who is recognized.
Thus, Ior B to recognize A, is Ior B to establish that A is a person, and thereIore to establish that B's
personhood rests on the recognition oI a person, that is, on A's recognition. And, this dialectic can go
on, obviously to inIinity.
Here the idea oI selI-othering is, as I said, not so preposterous on the Iace oI it. In Iact, I think
that there is great merit to this account oI the origin oI personhood. G. H. Mead, the pragmatist
sociologist who I mentioned, above (10), borrowed a version oI just this sort oI theory Irom Hegel and
created a prominent Iield oI sociology Irom it in the early 20th-century. I also think that the
philosophical work oI the Oxonian philosopher H. P. Grice on communication is based on ideas and a
sort oI dialectic very much related the one above. II Grice inherited ideas somehow Irom Hegel, my
guess is that it was through Charles Sanders Peirce via Peirce's inIluence on the Oxonian linguist Alan
Gardiner.
17
But, am I suggesting that we should take Hegel as ONLY talking about persons and their
relations? That is a tricky question that is visited by a number oI scholars. Some, Ior instance,
Alexander Kojeve and Georg Lukacs, have argued that we should take Hegel as only talking about
social reality and NOT about physical reality in all this.
18
I am not trying to deIinitively answer this
question here, but I am suggesting that Hegel's thought might have gone like this: he hit on the idea oI
17 I told a large part oI the story oI the history oI Gricean ideas in Chapter 2, 'The Theory oI Meaning in the Twentieth
Century, oI my Ph.D. dissertation, The Theorv of Meaning (1996), CUNY Graduate Center. But, I didn't make the
connection to Hegel at that time. That idea only arose Ior me slowly over the next Iew years aIter writing that history.
You can read my dissertation iI you are interested at:
http://russelldale.com/dissertation/1996.RussellDale.TheTheoryOIMeaning.pdI
18 See Kojeve's Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, pp. 217 218, and Lukacs's Historv and Class Consciousness
(1923), Chapter 1, 'What is Orthodox Marxism?, Iootnote 6.
Page 35 of 40
the dialectic oI persons recognizing each other to constitute their personhood, and then abstracted Irom
that the dialectic oI the 'selI-othering and the 'negation oI the negation 'returning to the selI, and
Iinally, he decided to see iI he could base his whole system oI thought on that model. I cannot argue
that that is true. But, supposing something like that makes what is happening here somewhat more
intelligible Ior me.
So, let's go on with 18.
Next: 'This substance is, as Subject, pure simple negativitv, and is Ior this very reason the
biIurcation oI the simple; ... Simple negativity means, again, that at its core, the subject is something
that creates its own negation, an other. The selI is simple, but it is simple negation, and so, it creates an
other, that is, it biIurcates.
'...it is the doubling which sets up opposition, and then again the negation oI this indiIIerent
diversity and oI its antithesis |the immediate simplicity|. First, A doubles: it creates B. But, B is
really still Irom A: thus, the diversity oI A and B is 'indiIIerent. But, A negates this diversity as well
as it has negated itselI in the Iirst place to make B: in negating the diversity, oI course, A is negating
the negation and 'returning to itselI.
'Only this selI-restoring sameness, or this reIlection in otherness within itselInot an original
or immediate unity as suchis the True. This is crucial: the selI beIore the whole dialectic oI
recognition is not the Iull unIolding oI the selI, but only the beginning. The Iull development oI the
selI comes only when there is mutual recognition. This has already been a theme in so much oI what
has already come beIore in the PreIace Irom the resistance in the very Iirst paragraph to stating the aim
oI the book. What is the aim? It is not what it says it will be, and it cannot be what it suggests until it
is Iully carried out. Similarly here, A needs to create the other, B, by recognizing the other's
personhood, and that sets the conditions Ior the other to recognize A, and thereby create A's Iully
Page 36 of 40
Iormed personhood. Not until that whole dialectic between the persons takes place is there really yet a
Iully Iormed person. Both persons really get Iormed at the same time. Only then has 'the True come
about and revealed itselI: that is, only then has the 'aim unIolded into the whole that it promised to
become. The acorn became an oak. The bud gave way to the blossom; the blossom, to the Iruit.
'It is the process oI its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its
end also as its beginning; and only by being worked out to its end, is it actual. At this point, I hope
that that is actually pretty clear.
19 The word 'Iorm here should be read as 'Iorm oI appearance. The essence is the thing as
a whole, and that is given in its original notion (think oI 'aim in 1). But, that original notion is not
the actuality it will become (think 'result oI 1). The result, too, is the worked out notion oI the thing,
oI the essence. But, really, none oI this means much without explaining how the process went Irom
beginning to end. Thus, A is the start and the end oI the process. What does that tell you? Nothing.
All the richness oI what A really is is in the B that A recognized, and in A's pursuit oI B, and in B's
resulting recognition oI A. That is what deIines A. A is not a simply 'identity. A is this process oI
selI-othering, negating itselI, producing B, and then negating the negation, and returning to selI. That
is what makes me who I am: how I create others and they create me. This is a general process, but
who I am is in the details oI how it unIolds.
In this paragraph, Hegel uses God as an example. One can say that God is love and that love
loves love. That says nothing. God must create 'his otherthe world, the creationand then get the
creation to recognize 'him. That is the unIolding oI the world and the history oI the world. And, it
may just be that that is what Hegel really has in mind. But, the God here is not a transcendent other,
but is the subjectivity that in selI-othering, creates the world as an aspect oI 'himselI.
20 'The True is the whole. One oI the most Iamous sentences in Hegel. It should be clear
Page 37 of 40
enough at this point. We have a little glitch, I think, here in that he makes 'the Absolute 'a result
here. Hasn't he argued Irom the beginning that the 'result is not the essence, that we need the whole
path Irom beginning to end? But, then he says 'the spontaneous becoming oI itselI. So, he re-
establishes the process as what is Iundamental and not just the result. Notice that 'to be actual is to
pass through this whole process oI (1) the immediacy oI selI, (2) selI-othering (negation oI immediate
being), and (3) returning to selI (the negation oI the negation). Notice in this section the way he uses
the word 'immediate. It is the beginning oI the process and contains the notion oI what will unIold.
But, as 'notion it is only the beginning, the 'aim, as an abstract universal. It is potentiality, but not
yet actuality. The acorn, not yet the oak. A without even its other yet. Notice also the use oI the word
'mediation here. We looked at this concept, above, in 18. We said it is basically a concept, or a
universal. To use a singular term like 'the Absolute requires some sort oI mediation in order to say
something: 'the absolute selI-others. Here 'selI-othering is a mediation since it is a universal. Any
predicate represents a universal. 'John is tall: that is, John instances the general property oI being
tall. Hegel is here saying that just saying 'the Absolute says nothing. It is like in 19, speaking oI
God a love desporting with itselI: this says nothing. 'The Absolute must be mediated by something
Ior anything to be said. We have to predicate something oI the absolute. But, Hegel also has in mind
that to predicate a property oI something is to already indicate something about the movement oI the
thing in its process oI becoming. That is, the predicate is a mediation not only because it is a universal
that mediates between appearance and though, but it is a mediation because it indicates a stage in the
process oI a thing becoming itselI. Mediations are universals, but they are also links in the chain oI
becoming. Keep that in mind when you see the word used by Hegel. The mediation helps bring a
thing back into itselI Irom othering. II I say 'John is tall, Hegel looks at this as (1) 'John, (2) 'John
is (which is already John othering), (3) 'John is tall (where 'tall returns John Irom otherness since
Page 38 of 40
the sentences is, aIter all, applying 'tallness to John).
Now, Hegel says 'But it is just this that is rejected with horror.... What is rejected with horror?
Saying that everything, even 'the Absolute requires mediation. Who rejects this with horror? Those
who say that we can and must gain direct, unmediated, that is, immediate, access to things. Who says
this? Our old Iriends, the enthusiasts! Hegel continues: '...as iI absolute cognition were being
surrendered...: that is, as iI there is no immediate intuition. Yes, that is exactly what Hegel is and will
say throughout the book. '...when more is made oI mediation than in simply saying that it is nothing
absolute, and is completely absent in the Absolute. What more is being said oI mediation? It is being
said that mediation is necessary Ior knowing everything about the world. Everything is mediated. The
enthusiasts say that the Absolutethat is, what the world truly iscontains no mediations: it simply is
in its absolute pure being, unchanging. The enthusiasts say we should say nothing about mediation in
speaking oI the absolute, but should speak oI it directly, through knowledge that we gain without
mediations (universals) by the direct intuition oI the world. Hegel is saying this is nonsense.
Everything is mediated. We cannot know the world as it is without a struggle through mediations,
through concepts.
21 This section is very important Ior understanding the notion oI mediation in Hegel. Hegel is
saying that the enthusiasts don't understand either mediation, or even what the whole point oI
philosophy is in trying to understand the world as it is (the absolute).
The second sentence here is one oI those utterly poetic Hegelianisms that make absolutely no
sense to an unprepared (unmediated?) reader: 'For mediation is nothing beyond selI-moving
selIsameness, or is reIlection into selI, the moment oI the 'I' which is Ior itselI pure negativity or, when
reduced to its pure abstraction, simple becoming. The 'selI-moving selIsameness just means the A
that will go through the process oI becoming. AIter going through the process, A is itselI, but it is also
Page 39 of 40
something new, having gone through the process. It is reIlected Irom the process into itselI. I am still
me when I look into a mirror, but I am now more conscious oI myselI, oI what I look like, oI how I
appear to others. And, when I look at you? You become my mirror. People reIlect each other to each
other and allow each other to develop through that process as persons.
The English psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott wrote a paper on the idea oI the mother and the
Iamily being a mirror Ior the inIant to develop its sense oI selI in the other that is the mother.
19
Baby
must learn both selI and other at the same time. What greater metaphor Ior what Hegel is aIter here
than a mother selI-othering in having a baby, and reaching a new stage oI consciousness through the
experience. The French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan also wrote about mirroring in the child and even
wrote on Winnicott's notion. Lacan studied Hegel under Kojeve in the 1930s as did Sartre, Merleau-
Ponty, and many other very inIluential 20th-century thinkers.
19 See D. W. Winnicott, 'The mirror role oI Mother and Family in Child Development (1967), reprinted in D. W.
Winnicott, Plaving and Realitv, London: Tavistock Publications, 1971, pp. 111 118.
Page 40 of 40

2011-06-21 NotesOnHegelPrefaceToPhenom 1

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

2011-06-21 NotesOnHegelPrefaceToPhenom 1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Notes on Hegel's Preface to Phenomenology of Spirit

By Russell Dale, June 20, 2011

You might also like