The

Trouble

with JOHN ELLIS

Fragrance

By 'in a subject' I mean what (a) is in something, not as a part, and (b) cannot exist separately from what it is in. (Aristotle, Categories la24-5) These lines have been extensively discussed in recent years. The crux of the debate is whether the existence clause (b) is to be construed in a way that commits Aristotle to particular, non-sharable properties. On the 'traditional' interpretation, a property is in an individual thing as in a subject, say, Socrates, only if it cannot exist apart from Socrates. This implies that the properties of an individual thing are peculiar to it or non-sharable, in the sense that they cannot be in any other thing. The particular white in Socrates, for example, ceases to exist when he gets a tan. It does not move on to inhere in Callias or any other subject, nor is the white in Callias numerically the same white as the white in Socrates. Although both are white, perhaps even the same shade of white, nonetheless they are numerically distinct particulars inhering in different individual things. have tried to 'rescue' Aristotle from the Many recent commentators Their strategy has been alleged committment to such Stoutian particulars. to weaken (b) so that the particular inherent property is not existentially dependent on the very particular substance it inheres in. G.E.L. Owen opened the debate by arguing that (b) can mean 'cannot exist without something to contain it',2 and thus Aristotle is only committed to the view that particular properties need some substance or other in order to exist. A particular white, for example, would be a particular shade of white, which could, of course, be exemplified by more than one particular substance. The task I've set for myself in this paper is not to argue for either the weak or the strong interpretation of inherence in Aristotle. That is already a well-trodden path. Instead I shall look at what the ancient commentators on

290

Aristotle had to say on the subject. Which interpretation, the strong or the weak, do they support? My strategy is to focus on one of the many problems they consider, that of fragrance, and to see if their treatment of it yields an answer. The fragrance problem attacks the basis of Aristotle's ontology, the distinction between substance and accident. Didn't Aristotle say that accidents cannot exist apart from that in which they inhere? But fragrances seem to travel to us from their subjects, and aren't they accidents? In the attempts, from Porphyry (232-309 AD) to Elias (fl.541), to save Atistotle's ontology from this objection, we shall find, I hope to show, an interesting development in the complexity of the discussions. Not surprisingly, given the nature of the problem, the discussions move into psychological theory, and we find that, in order for his ontology to be saved, Aristotle's psychological theory must be deepened. Ammonius Ammonius (c. 435/445 - c.517/526) gives a clear statement at in Cat. 28,8-11: of the fragrance

problem

Those who say' that it [the definition of accidents] does not fit every case say these things, that he [Aristotle] defined only the inseparable ones. For note that the to us from the apple far fragrance in the apple is separated and also travels (XWQEZ) away, yet it is an accident. So if it is separated from its subject, it is not covered by the definition which has been given. Ammonius next states two ways in which 'we solve'4 the problem. It is important to realize that the first solution' is simply a repetition of the one offered by Porphyry6 (232-309 AD); otherwise, in its abbreviated form in Ammonius, it might seem enigmatic. I shall call it the tense solution since it turns on the distinction between the past and present tenses of FIvat.

291

Porphyry begins' by pronouncing that Aristotle did not say that an accident 'cannot be separated' (M6bvaIov xmglEa0ai) from that in which it is, but 'cannot exist separately' (M6bvaIov xmgig ElVaL). In support of this he offers the tense solution: pronouncement, For neither did he [Aristotle] say, 'cannot exist separately from that in which it was', but 'cannot exist separately from that in which it is'. For the fragrance can be separated from that in which it is, though it is impossible [for it] to exist separately on its own, but it either perishes or is transferred (?,eza8v8oza?) to another subject. For that it is inconceivable for an accident to exist separately on its own, this he indicated, but not that it cannot be separated.' The two distinctions work together. If one grants that to be separated and to exist separately from something are different things, then one can grant that an accident can be separated from its subject without conflicting with the definition. One would then have to say, of course, that the accident was in A, but is now in B. But that is not problematic, so the tense argument runs, because Aristotle did not say 'cannot exist separately from that in which it was', but 'cannot exist separately from that in which it is'. As we can see from Porphyry (quoted above), this solution allows particular accidents to migrate to other subjects. Yet the commentators, with the possible exception of Simplicius (as we shall see), fail to notice that the definition is thus weakened. For now one must understand the definition to mean that a particular accident must always be in some subject; not the stronger version whereby it must always be in that in which it is. Yet, the weaker version presents a problem for them which they apparently fail to countenance. For when they9 argue against the objection that Socrates is in a place as in a subject, their reply is, in short, that the definition is strong enough to discount the example. True enough, they argue,1O Socrates must always be in some place, but, unlike an accident, he is not restricted to just one. If the tense solution is taken seriously, however, that contrast is lost, for according to it, accidents are not restricted to just one subject, but may be transferred to others; consequently, those commentators who take the tense solution seriously run the risk of making Socrates an accident after all.

292

It is not altogether clear that Ammonius takes the tense solution seriously. He simply mentions it as one of two ways in which 'we solve' the problem. It may be that Ammonius is here doing nothing more than repeating a solution which his school inherited from Porphyry. He doesn't tell us outright that he prefers the second, 11 effluence solution to the tense solution, but he does give it fuller treatment. We know that the tense solution allows accidents to migrate to another subject. The advantage of the effluence solution, on the other hand, is that migration is not required to explain how the fragrance comes to us when the apple is, say, across the room. Since, as the effluence solution runs, some of the apple comes away with the fragrance, the fragrance rides on part of the apple through the air and so reaches us without having separated from it. Ammonius, however, does not compare the two solutions in this way. Ammonius supports the effluence theory by offering three pieces of evidence. (1) After some time the apple wrinkles, showing that some of the apple's substance has been carried away with the fragrance. (2) Covering our nose with a cloth enables us to breath the air without foul smells, which can be explained by the fact that the effluence, on which the foul smell is carried, cannot pass through the cloth. (3) Vapours given off by burning incense 'fall under sight on account of the mass that is carried away and the thickness of the underlying substance'. l He also counters an objection to the wrinkling argument, which states that while the apple is still on the tree it smells without wrinkling and, in fact, nonetheless continues to grow. Ammonius responds by arguing that, through nourishment, more substance is added to the apple, replacing what is carried away.

Simplicius In his Categories commentary, 13 Ammonius' pupil Simplicius (writing after mentions the effluence solution as one of four 532), possible ways of solving the fragrance problem. Significantly, Simplicius objects to the tense solution14 and offers instead three different, though not all new, ways of dealing with the fragrance problem. As we have seen, the tense solution allows the fragrance to change subjects. Simplicius understands this to mean not just that the fragrance is transferred to another subject, but also that it moves 49,18; ?.Eia[3?acia?, 49,19) out of its subject. But he (wEia(3avcw,

293

objects that predicating motion of a quality is to view it as having a separate nature. 15 He then goes on to offer the first alternative: So perhaps it is better to say that every fragrance and all accidents of such a sort exist with their own substance and are never drawn away from it, while (a) the substance at one time is stretched out, having been rarefied, and dispersed among other substances, and (b) at another time changes into itself the things continuous and naturally fitted to undergo change, which is manifestly seen in the case of fire. For the initial spark is not what spreads over all the material, but the fire which is multiplied quickly from it." As this passage shows, Simplicius prefers, given the objection he has found to the tense solution, a stricter construal of inherence than it allows: accidents never separate from their own substance. All three alternatives conform to this stricter construal. The first alternative, which I've subdivided into two parts, (a) and (b) above, is perhaps best understood as supplying two possible explanations of how an accident can appear to separate from its subject. This solution attempts to explain away the fragrance problem. The explanation involves nothing unusual taking place on the part of accidents, but turns solely on certain, perhaps unexpected or unrecalled, capacities of substances. If the fragrance appears to separate from its subject, it could be either that (a) the substance has been rarefied in some way and dispersed among other substances, or (b) the substance itself may have grown. It may appear that the heat which was at the source of the fire is now, on its own, some distance away. What has really occurred, or could have occurred, Simplicius seems to be saying, is that the fire itself has grown. Simplicius then offers a second possible solution which also conforms to a strict construal of inherence, but does so by suggesting that the fragrance is not an accident after all: But perhaps it is clear from what has already been said" that the fragrance of the apple and incense are complements of the form and they would not be said to be in what has been completed as in a subject.'8 Accordingly, the fragrance of the apple is not threat after all to the definition of accidents. Since the fragrance is a part of the apple's form, it fails to satisfy the first of the conditions of the definition: 'not as a part'. It may still puzzle us how this answer would solve the problem of smells generally. Let

294

it be granted that apple fragrances are complements of the forms of apples; nonetheless, are all smells related to their source in the same way? We don't know how Simplicius would have answered that question. In his defence, one might say that at least this answer would solve the problem under discussion. It would then be left to the next opponent to counter. This may not satisfy, but we should remember that the fragrance of the apple had become a standard problem by the time of Simplicius. It was probably invented by Lucius or his followers. 19 Simplicius at any rate, seems to have thought so. For, in the passage just quoted, he refers back to 48,1 - 49,9, where he discussed a difficulty (involving the complements doctrine) raised by 'those around Lucius'. And Simplicius' second alternative is itself couched in terms of what 'they would be said to be'; presumably in accordance with the doctrine of Lucius and his followers. Simplicius, therefore, may think that he has satisfied them with the complement solution; he is apparently addressing the problem only as it is raised. Simplicius finishes off this section by referring in a condensed way to Ammonius' effluence solution, marshalling in the standard evidence :2o That some substance is also carried away with such fragrances, the wrinkling of the apple and the consumption of incense indicate."

Philoponus Philoponus, another pupil of Ammonius (490 - 570s AD), does little more than repeat his teacher in his Categories commentary.22 He only adds a counter to an objection to Ammonius' cloth argument. If it sometimes occurs that we still inhale a foul smell even though a cloth is applied, it may be that either the cloth has slipped, its position changing in such a way that the odour is allowed passage, or the fragrant effluence has been blown about and thus rarefied enough to pass through the fabric. 23 Like Ammonius, Philoponus does not indicate whether he prefers the effluence solution to the tense solution. Later, however, in his de Anima

295

commentary,24 Philoponus comes to realize that the effluence solution is inconsistent with Aristotle's de Anima. For on Aristotle's theory, as Philoponus understands it, the medium is only supposed to convey, incorporealthe activities of the odours. In the case of smell, the medium does this through its 'diosmic', or transodorant capacity (fi 610apog just as in the case of sight, the capacity is called 'transparent' and, in the case of sound, 'transsonant' But if smell takes place by means of effluences from fragrant objects, the air, or water, no longer functions as a medium. The objects of smell themselves would only be carried by the air or water to the sense organ, and smell would then take place by contact, a result explicitly rejected by Aristotle. 28 Philoponus comes to realize the inconsistency by considering a problem which the diosmic theory cannot handle, why does one odour overpower another? Someone might raise the problem, if the sense of smell apprehends through the medium, it being air and water, why does one odour overpower another? For often, when there is a bad odour an ensuing sweet odour overpowers it, or also vice versa, which ought not occur if air were fit for transmitting odours, and the odorous vapours themselves did not come to the sense organ, just as the air transmits all colours, and the activity of, say, white never overpowers some other colour, e.g., black, because the colours themselves don't come to be in the air, but [only] the activities of them. Thus it ought to occur also in the case of odours, if, at least, [the air] transmits only their activities and not the vapours themselves, which are bodies.'" Philoponus points out that this problem is worsened if one considers the rival theory that 'sensation is, not by means of the medium, the apprehension of what is smellable, but the object of smell itself comes to the sense organ'.3 For in that case, the diosmic theory is not only challenged by the overpowering problem, but also by a rival, effluence theory. But Philopo-

296

nus goes on to provide this theory with the evidence that we can waft the fragrance of incense closer to our nose in order to inhale it more quickly, and, as if that were not enough, he also marshals in all of Ammonius' evidence for effluences by referring back to his Categories commentary." Having made the challenge as acute as possible, Philoponus asks, How, therefore, are both arguments to be brought together, the one just stated and the one which says that, incorporeally, through the transodorant capacity of the air, the odours are carried over to the sense organ ?32 Philoponus' answer is that although there are indeed effluences from fragrant bodies, this fact helps to explain the overpowering problem,33 but it does not explain how we smell; for that, one must appeal to the diosmic capacity of the medium.34 The effluence theory cannot account for the fact that water animals, like crocodiles, smell bait suspended above the surface of the water, for the effluence would travel up, not down, being smoky or vaporous. Nor does it seem likely that effluences could travel the great distances from which vultures smell putrefying bodies . However, as Philoponus goes on to point out,36 effluences arising from fragrant objects are helpful for those animals, like human beings, who have a weak sense of smell. They serve to bring the fragrant object closer to the sense organ, just as those with weak sight or hearing move nearer to what's visible or audible, and thus enable the activity to do its work while it is still strong. Moreover, the fact that a cloth can prevent the odour from reaching the sense organ shows that effluences do exist. Yet Philoponus now adds an important qualification to that evidence. When a cloth is applied, the odour is blocked, especially if the cloth has thick parts or the odour is not vigorous, since if the odour were vigorous, even though the cloth were applied, the transodorant capacity of the air would be sufficient, even without the fragrant vapour being close to the sense organ, to make an effect on the sense organ. 37 The idea that an odour can be more or less vigorous, or an activity more or less strong, was absent from Philoponus' discussion of the fragrance problem in his Categories commentary. He uses it here, in in DA, to supplement his earlier discussion. He now sees that a diosmic empowered medium is a

297

necessary condition for smell as well as sight and hearing, and that even one of his best pieces of evidence for effluences, the cloth example, must be seen in a new light. For in his Categories commentary,38 as we have seen, Philoponus had answered an objection to the cloth example, that the odour sometimes reaches the sense organ even though a cloth is applied, by saying that either the cloth has slipped and allowed the odour passage or the effluence had been rarefied enough to pass through the cloth's fibres. But now, in support of a rival theory, he offers a new answer: if the odour is vigorous enough, the cloth will fail to block it. Thus Philoponus' final view on the sense of smell would appear to be that a diosmic medium is required. Effluences may help account for certain facts about fragrances, but they do not explain the process of smelling itself. By revising his view in this way, however, Philoponus can no longer appeal to effluences to solve the fragrance problem. For even though an effluence, in some cases, brings the fragrance part of the way to the sense organ, there still must remain, according to the diosmic theory, some distance between the fragrant object and the sense organ. How does the fragrance reach us, then, if not by separating from its subject? Although Philoponus does not address that problem, perhaps the diosmic theory provides an answer. For on that theory, as Philoponus understands it, the fragrance itself is not transmitted by the diosmic medium, but only its activity. And since the fragrance problem alleges that a quality, the fragrance, separates from its subject, Philoponus might argue that the activity is what's separated, not the quality itself. After all, the term 'diosmic' evidently implies, at least to Philoponus, that, whatever is in fact transmitted, it travels through the medium without affecting it, which would be the case if the quality itself came to be in the air as an affection of it, i.e., if the air itself underwent a qualitative change and became odorous. Philoponus' insistence, then, that only the activity of the fragrance is transmitted seems to indicate an awareness of the distinction between the quality itself and its activity. Furthermore, he could have called on Plotinus for support, for Plotinus, when discussing whether light is an affection of the air, makes the required distinction between a quality (ztoi6Iqg) and an activity (EVEpyeta). After asking if light could move from one luminous body to another if air did not exist, Plotinus says, But if [light] is only a quality and a quality of something, since every quality is in a subject, one must look for a body in which light will be. But if it is an from something else, why should it not exist and travel to what activity

298

lies beyond without the existence of an adjoining body, but with a kind of void in between (if that is possible)?39 Apparently, Plotinus did not regard qualities and activities in the same way. Qualities, he seems to say, are covered by the Aristotelian definition of accidents, but activities are not. Nothing prevents them, then, from traveling 'to what lies beyond without the existence of an adjoining body'. Therefore, because the diosmic theory involves the separation of activities, not qualities, it may be seen as a solution to the fragrance problem. and Elias

Olympiodorus

In fact, the diosmic theory was so regarded in the Categories commentaries of Olympiodorus40 (495/505, died after 565) and Elias4l (fl. 541). Elias mentions it as one of three solutions to the fragrance problem. 4' He attributes the diosmic theory to Aristotle, the effluence theory to Plato and a theory which brings 'together the Aristotelian and Platonic views' to Plotinus. Olympiodorus, on the other hand, attributes the effluence theory to 'the Aristotelians'43 and, evidently, the diosmic theory to Plotinus.44 Although they apparently disagree as to who gets credit for the diosmic and effluence theories, both Olympiodorus and Elias treat the diosmic theory as a solution to the fragrance problem. The disagreement is, to some extent, only apparent. By 'the Aristotefor it was lians', Olympiodorus probably means Aristotle's commentators, a solution to as after who introduced the effluence Ammonius, all, theory the problem. Plotinus' credit for the diosmic theory is more problematic. First, let us see how Olympiodorus describes Plotinus' solution. Plotinus brought to bear a different solution when he solved that aporia, alleging as a cause the transodorant (bCouRov)[capacity] of the air. For he said that the air, being potentially transodorant, becomes in actuality fragrant, and in this way we apprehend the fragrance. Now, according to the diosmic theory as I have construed it, the air does not become fragrant. As we saw in Philoponus, only the activity of the fragrance is supposed to be transmitted through the medium. If the fragrance

299

itself were to come to be in the medium, then the medium would no longer be trans-odorant ; it would itself be odorous. But as Alexander says,45 'the air is not odorous, but when it transmits one of the odorous things it becomes trans-odorant Such, I think, is the traditional underof the diosmic standing theory. Olympiodorus, then, is either introducing a new way of construing 'diosmic' or has simply gotten the theory wrong. Elias, on the other hand, does not use the term 'diosmic' in his description of Plotinus' view. Plotinus, bringing together the Aristotelian and Platonic views, holds that part of the air is changed by the fragrance. For the fragrance, remaining in the apple, generates another quality like itself which changes part of the air, and which is what we perceive. The view here attributed to Plotinus has it that the medium is affected, but the resultant quality or fragrance is not identical to the fragrance in the apple. It is a new quality, an offspring, if you will, of the original fragrance in the apple. The apple's fragrance, then, has not moved from it. It is in this way that the Plotinian view can be seen as a solution to the fragrance problem. The view does rely on Plotinus, I believe, in that it involves one quality generating another quality like itself, as we will see shortly. Plotinus himHe self, however, would probably have found the view objectionable. in the case of the need for a medium sight,46 and, repeatedly argues against since he takes sight to be the representative case '41 his arguments are presumably to be applied to the other senses, about which he says very little. The sense in which the view relies on Plotinus can perhaps best be seen if we first look at an anonymous gloss on Philoponus in Cat. 36,10. The author not only follows Elias' description of Plotinus' view, but he also adds a comparison. And Plotinus claims that part of the air changes into a smellable quality. For the fragrance, remaining in the apple, generates another quality like itself which changes part of the air, and which is what we perceive. As also the heat in the fire does not come to us cold having left the fire behind, but remaining in the fire it generates in the air another heat, formally the same as itself. Now Plotinus uses the example of the heat in fire to illustrate how, since the One 'abides unchanged', it can nonetheless generate the Intellect. In each and every thing there is an activity which belongs to substance and one which goes out from substance; and that which belongs to substance is the active

300

actuality which is each particular thing, and the other activity derives from that first one, and must in everything be a consequence of it, different from the thing itself: as in fire there is a heat which is the content of its substance (auf.lJt'YIQoaa rnv o?aiav), and another which comes into being from that primary heat when fire exercises the activity which is native to its substance in abiding unchanged as fire.48 The context of Plotinus' remarks is far removed, of course, from that of inherence and the fragrance problem. What I'm suggesting is that they contain the idea of one quality generating another like itself, and so the comparison in the anonymous gloss (quoted above) is not without precedent in Plotinus. Yet the view attributed to Plotinus is, as already stated, not one which he would have accepted. Elias seems to be more interested in making Plotinus a harmonizer than reporting his views accurately. Elias doesn't tell us just how the Plotinian view harmonizes Plato and Aristotle. I suppose he thought that the Plotinian view follows the 'Platonic' effluence theory in that it involves one quality coming from another or, in a sense, coming out of the fragrant object. And it is similar to the Aristotelian diosmic theory insofar as a medium is responsible for transferring fragrances from the sense object to the sense organ. The difference remains, of course, that the medium is changed in the process: it takes on the newly generated fragrant quality. And, unlike the effluence theory, Elias' 'Plotinian' view gives the medium an essential role to play in the sensory process. Interestingly, after saying 'none of these opinions are true on their own' and then leveling objections against each of them,49 Elias goes on to claim, The three [views] are, at all events, true altogether, but in the case of those who smell poorly, effluences are also required;5in the case of those who smell accurately, the transodorant [capacity] of the air is also sufficient; while in the case of those with an average sense of smell, the change of the air is sufficient as well. 51 Elias points out that 'according to none of the views do qualities pass over from subject to subject'.52 But he evidently does not regard this feature of the solutions as an advantage, because he ends his discussion of Categories la24-5 by saying, It was also possible to solve these things more simply, [by saying] that Aristotle did not say 'what is incapable of existing separately from that in which it was', but 'from that in which it is', and wherever the quality is, it is in a subject.53 Is the tense solution still a live option for Elias? This would be somewhat surprising, since Simplicius, as we have seen, objected to the tense solution,

301

and Olympiodorus, who was arguably Elias' teacher,54 left it out of his discussion of the fragrance problem altogether. Elias has shown us his rebellious side: by diverging from his teacher in his presentation of the three main solutions to the fragrance problem and by arguing that the three are not true on their own, but are true altogether, thus gaining some credit for himself for the new amalgamation. Perhaps suggesting that the tense solution is the simpler way of solving the problem would above all reveal an attitude of independence. But it seems more likely55 that Elias has tacked on the tense solution for completeness' sake. Afterall, he has shown himself to be far more interested in the more sophisticated solutions and may have meant, not that the tense solution is 'simpler' in the sense of elegant, but in the sense of 'more simple-minded'. Concluding Remarks

There would seem to be a clear development of the way the commentators construed 'in a subject'. Starting with Porphyry's tense solution, it is possible to see a gradual movement away from that solution and the weak construal it implies, toward the stronger reading implied by the other solutions. Ammonius introduces an alternative, the effluence solution, His students, Philoponus and albeit without indicating his preference. modifications to his view: SimpliSimplicius, add further developments or cius, by rejecting the tense solution and offering new alternatives; and Philoponus, by turning the discussion more towards psychology and revealing both the conflict between the effluence and diosmic theories and his preference for the latter. This shift in the discussion towards psychology is evidenced by Olympiodorus, who responds to the fragrance problem only with alternative psychological theories, making no mention of the tense solution. And finally Elias, although mentioning the tense solution, devotes most of his energy to evaluating the alternative psychological answers to the fragrance problem . Memphis State University

302