Buoscio 1 Joey Buoscio Professor Williams PLSC 327 American National Security Research Paper Asymmetrical Warfare and

d the Forced Change of the American Way of War Reading the news lines and watching footage of the current war zones in the Middle East, one can see the horrible experience of war. Even more terrifying and heart wrenching is the reality that many of our brave troops overseas live in an environment of constant violence and gore. Albeit something that they signed up for, the experience of war itself, regardless of the specifics, is terrible and a great modicum of gratitude should be observed of our troops, that they fight day and night to keep us safe. The United States of America ever since her beginning has, for the most part, enjoyed a relative isolation from the World and its conflicts and despite several horrible wars since the year of the Lord 1776, the United States has emerged better and more suited for each subsequent war, or have they? The American way of war has been drastically altered in the wake of the September 11th attacks of 2001, but many of these alterations and new forms of asymmetrical warfare have been seen much earlier in the United States experience. Asymmetrical warfare has had pretty noticeable impacts on our military and has brought up many challenges. These challenges have been addressed with solutions, some of which are worth noting. Understanding these challenges and how they have evolved over the course of the Republic will give valuable insight as to how our nation can prepare for these newly fostering scenarios. Despite recent media portrayals and findings, the concept of asymmetrical warfare is not new and continues to thwart the efforts of many powerful and militarily superior nations like the United States. Asymmetrical warfare by definition is defined by Snow In this form of combat, one side fights traditionally, while the other side organizes itself differently, may or may not share the same objectives as its opponent, may or may not represent a government or a movement aspiring to become a government, and rejects the conventions or laws of warfare propounded by the conventional side.i This type of warfare is demonized in the media, and for the most part, it is well deserved, however; the underlying idea behind asymmetrical warfare is more instinctual than it is evil or cynical. If a weaker force must go up against a stronger force, and play by the exact same rules, it becomes cruelly obvious who is going to win. A good example is the Iraq war in the early 1990s. When Iraqs inferior army fought by the rules of engagement of the United States, they lost, tremendously. So naturally, in the will to survive, a weaker force can and will resort to unacceptable methods of warfare to equalize the playing field. Sneak attacks, ambushes, targeting officers, etc are all low blows by our standards, as well as the standards of every sophisticated Western nation, but to little third world forces who are lacking in the resources and funds taken for granted by the stronger forces, these are just ways to survive and stand a chance against a foe that otherwise would obliterate them in an instant. As Vincent Goulding Jr., put it weaker opponents have sought to neutralize their enemys technological or numerical superiority by fighting in ways or on battlefields that nullify it.ii Current wars like the ones in the Middle East are excellent examples of asymmetrically fought wars. The United States was good at countering asymmetrical warfare at the beginning of the twentieth century, specifically in the Philippine-American War. Unfortunately, we as a nation seem to have abandoned the

Buoscio 2 lessons we learned. We can and should use the lessons we have learned in other wars and apply them to present conflicts. An early example, perhaps the earliest, of asymmetrical warfare in American history is the Philippine-American war. The Philippine-American war was a war that pitted the United States of America against Filipino revolutionaries over the annexation by the United States of the Philippines. The Filipino fighters and countrymen, while decently united, faced some serious impediments. For starters, the lack of weapons and ammunition resulted in many of the forces being armed with knives, bows and arrows, and other primitive arms. These inferior arms were outmatched by the superior rifles and munitions employed by US forces. The goals of the First Philippine Republic was the creation of a sovereign state led by their oligarchy. At first, guerilla warfare for the Filipinos was a last resort, but a few months after the beginning of the war, the leader of the Filipinos announced that guerrilla warfare would now be their foremost strategy. The Philippine army began to organize and execute violent ambushes, raids and sneak attacks, which in turn did lead to a decent amount of guerilla victories. The Philippines wanted to force an American withdraw, and it seemed that if they continued to pursue short term guerilla assaults, this would be the case. Despite initial setbacks, the United States Armys counter-guerilla and counter insurgency plan worked well for the United States and after a nasty little war, the United States emerged victorious. Some lessons learned during the Philippine insurrection are worth noting. In the struggle for the Philippines, the United States Army did not attempt to construct a one size fits all approach. They instead changed and evolved their specific and individual tactics to fit the local and or regional circumstance. In his book, The Savage Wars of Peace, Max Boot writes while the men complained about life in the boondocks . . .their very isolation forced them to become well acquainted with their area and the people who lived there. This in turn gave them good intelligence, the prerequisite for effective counterinsurgency operations.iii So the first lesson we learned in the Philippines was to encourage new and adapting army leadership within the local spheres of influence, rather than trying to micromanage the fighting from some far away location like Washington. The US campaign in the Philippines as well as its counterinsurgency doctrine was successful because it didnt evolve as a national unified plan of action, but rather, as a collection of autonomous, local campaigns waged in cooperation to one another.iv Another idea we gained from our experience in the Philippines is the taking of armed forces out of self governing and prosperous regions and the putting them into areas of greater turmoil. During the war, the US army was able to recruit groups of local supporters. This worked in the Northern cities of the Philippines like Luzon, but did not work in the southern and southwestern regions. General MacArthur took advantage of the calm in other regions to reposition his men into the south and southwest territories. Somehow, his plan placed pressure on local tribesmen and elites by threatening their sovereignty (pulling them) while at the same time providing immeasurable incentives (pushing them) for their enhanced cooperation. This, coinciding with national politics allowed the hasty elimination of most top rebel commanders. The most paramount lesson we, as a nation, learned in the Philippine war was that counterinsurgency, along asymmetrical lines, is a test of American political leadership just as much it is a test of military power and strength.v While outnumbered and out-gunned, guerilla fighters are able to blend in and dissolve into their respective societies and villages. Especially if they are not ranked and uniformed fighters, like many of the insurrectos, finding an appropriate outlet to fight back was a real problem. It is quite simple to shoot at the fighter with

Buoscio 3 the rifle or the machine gun, but when he runs away, throws down his rifle and walks into a village, the problem becomes not when to pull the trigger, but to whom to the gun at? This causes a ton of frustration and stalemate, and while American men are dying in a foreign land, public opinion tends to wane. The classic guerilla strategy is not to win, but to hold out and prevent the other side from winning. In the Philippines, insurrectos hoped to protract the war until either the U.S. Army broke down . . . or the American public demanded a withdraw.vi This was perfect timing on the part of the Philippine insurrectos because the fall of 1900 was a presidential election. By holding out and causing the Americans increased frustration and pain, they hoped to defeat McKinley in the political realm, in his race for reelection. Unfortunately, their plan backfired and the heightened attacks, much like the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, escalated the conflict and only produced more American troop involvement, sort of like the rally around the flag phenomena immediately after the September 11th 2001 attacks. The Philippine war uncovered many lessons and insights into asymmetrical warfare that we had previously not considered. The next two wars directly after Americas splendid little war, while horrible in their own rights, were fought very symmetrically and for all intents and purposes, contained no asymmetrical counterparts. Unfortunately, asymmetrical warfare would rear its ugly head again in the distant future, as America ventured into a conflict brewing in a little Southeast Asian country named Indochina. The Vietnam War by its very name conjures up images of extreme violence, American public opinion, failure, and utter disaster. After the French pulled out of Vietnam in the early 1950s, the Geneva Conference was held and split Vietnam into two halves, with Ngo Dinh Diem controlling the south and the communists, led by Ho Chi Mihn, controlling the North. Some South Vietnamese rebels attacked their own capital and a civil war ensued. North Vietnam invaded South Vietnam and in 1965, President Johnson, wanting to follow President Trumans and President Eisenhowers foreign policy, organized and ordered a bombing campaign against North Vietnam and its surrounding areas and mobilized troops to South Vietnam to defend against communist aggression, advancing the policy of communist containment. The war in Vietnam was characterized by large scale fighting not only by the North Vietnamese regulars who were uniformed and ranked soldiers, but also by regional guerilla fighters called the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong used a multitude of guerrilla tactics to level the playing field against the American G.I. who had far superior equipment and weapons. In 1965, the North Vietnamese leadership decreed a change in the way the war was to be fought. From now on, they were only to attack and show themselves to the Americans when a victory was obvious. Otherwise, they were to engage in hit and run attacks, ambushes, and raids. The Viet Cong, with the aid of other forces like the North Vietnamese Army built and maintained an enormous network of tunnels that spanned most of South Vietnam. These tunnels were so intricate and well designed that they effectively hid the Viet Cong fighters from the Americans eye sight, even during fighting. These tunnels allowed the Viet Cong to perform sneak attacks and better organized hit and runs, as well as raids. In some instances, ambushes led to firefights in which American forces approached enemy lines and were baffled as to where the enemy went and how he escaped. The ability of the Viet Cong to recruit more and more fighters in the cause against the United States also helped in their efforts, and unlike in the Philippines, the United States had a much harder time convincing their enemies of the feudal efforts of their fighting. In the Philippine War, the efforts of the insurrectos to recruit and train soldiers was somewhat suppressed by MacArthurs plan to isolate problems areas and provide incentives for

Buoscio 4 cooperation. Denis Warner notes that the Viet Cong, in the best Maoist tradition, clearly regards the peasants as the sea in which they will swim to victory. They have begun an intensive recruiting campaign in the rural areas to fill the ranks depleted by casualtiesvii This spelled gloom and doom for the US Army, most of whom did not really want to be there to begin with. Like the Filipino fighters, the guerrilla fighters in Vietnam were able to hold out and exhaust American patience and might. Some scholars say that the utopian messages of communist ideology kept the North Vietnamese fighting so long, in direct contrast to the Filipino fighters, who eventually succumbed to American muscle. In both cases the United States faced challenges that can draw similar conclusions to the wars we fight today in the Middle East. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have similar implications to the way in which we fight guerrilla fighters. Once again, as in the Philippines and in the jungles of Vietnam, counterinsurgency is won and lost at the grassroots level, this is the direct result in which guerilla fighters, being unable to command a competent conventional force, are unable to establish a system of national command and control over their armies.viii This inability to control and command a national force results in the localization of fighting culture. As observed in the Philippine and Vietnam conflicts, fighting and methods changed from town to town and village to village. Using local conditions to exploit and mold solutions is key here. Referring back to the first lesson we learned in the Philippines (adaptive military leadership at the local level) it is vital in Iraq as well as Afghanistan to resist the temptation to treat insurgency and guerrilla fighting with a one size fits all approach, advocated by bureaucrats in Washington D.C. Tactics that work in places like Baghdad or Al Fallujah might not work as well (if at all) in Qandahar or Kabul. What is needed is an approach that allows informants and military personnel to measure the public mood of certain circumstances and actions and proceed accordingly. Again, what was so instrumental in the Philippine War success was the ability of the military to pinpoint and identify which regions were more volatile and explosive and which ones were more open to the American mission. Once a comprehensive overview is born, the individual actions for each region or province can be mandated. A good place to start in Afghanistan is the conversion of the Pashtuns. If the US army can use the individual comprehensive missions of each area, then maybe the Pashtuns will be convinced of the US mission and maybe, just maybe they can be given incentives to give up Taliban leadership and expose Al Qaeda movement. General MacArthur had to use force in some places in the Philippines and in others he had to use incentives and influence. It all depends on the regional mood and public opinion. As much as warfare and weaponry have changed in the last century, the fundamental ideas of counterinsurgency and asymmetrical warfare have remained the same its a manpowerintensive operation that depends on the gathering of quality intelligence and face-to-face interaction.ix Remember, for every Al Qaeda, Viet Cong, or insurrecto that hate(s/d) the American soldier, there were three times as many people who loved his presence and his devotion to the lofty principles of self-governance, liberty, and equality for all. As an Afghan provincial governor said in March 2008, to win them over, first you have to protect their people, prove that the extremists cant hurt them if they come to your side.x Our last lesson of guerrilla warfare learned in the Philippines was that counterinsurgency and asymmetrical fighting are tests of political leadership as much as they are tests of military dominance. This lesson is almost too obvious to mention. In Iraq, before the war ended, and in Afghanistan now, it is the hope of guerrilla fighters that increasing the death toll of American soldiers with unravel American resolve. To them, this unraveling of American resolve can take on forms such as actual fighting, (i.e. American soldiers giving up or failing missions), or at the

Buoscio 5 voting polls during elections (American citizens will vote out leaders who are not vehemently opposed to the war, using their power of the vote to stop the fighting). Because of this tactic taken and advocated by guerrilla fighters, it is essential that the commander in chief and other national/military leaders continue to articulate and commend the importance of such missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States went into Iraq to topple a dictatorship and look for weapons of mass destruction. The United States went into Afghanistan to look for and take out Osama bin Laden, one of the masterminds and leaders of the September 11th attacks on US soil. It is also important to note that even when a victory is declared, US presence overseas must still be a reality. The days of pulling out of Germany or Japan and going back to normal (like in World War II) are long gone. This new type of unconventional warfare assures that no matter how well the United States does in the field of battle or in the political arena, there still is and will always be insurgents and radical guerrilla fighters plotting and conspiring against the United States and those local people who aid her. One hundred years later the US still has soldiers stationed in the Philippines, aiding them and helping them fend off their own terrorists and insurgents. I cannot discuss the implications of guerrilla and asymmetrical warfare without discussing its counterpart, symmetrical warfare. Throughout its history, America has fought most of its wars with and against conventional military forces, where both sides were organized in very much the same way, had largely the same, if opposing purposes, were representatives of independent states, and accepted the same general laws and rules surrounding the proper way to conduct fighting.xi During the American Revolution, although the use of some unorganized fighters were utilized, fighting was conducted between colonial regulars and the British royal army. Likewise, the Civil War was fought between the Union army against the Confederate army. The common theme in conventional war is that both sides are ranked and uniformed soldiers of independent armies representing sovereign (or hoped to be sovereign) entities. The first and second World Wars were the epitome of conventional fighting. The German war machine proved to be a hard working, organized, and very competent military fighting power, and as much as they were enemies of the Allies, they displayed a certain respect for the accepted rules of war. While the rules of war dont necessarily have binding consideration on the World (some nations do not attend meetings like the Geneva Convention, some do not sign the international treaties, and some just blatantly disregard the rules) most respectable nations follow the basic underlying ideas surrounding these rules of war. Purposely targeting officers, killing women, children and civilians, sabotages, ambushes, and other tactics that hit below the belt are generally off limits and while the US may be engaged with a hated enemy, both sides know the rules of the game. During the two World Wars, as much as we loathed German, Italian and Japanese fighters, we respected the rules of war because we expected them to do the same. The same thing goes for prisoners of war and captured enemy combatants. Lieutenant Colonel Marc E. Geneste of the French Army states Probably the first rule of war was to make fighter wear uniforms (indeed this must have been one of the steps of civilization) in order to save the civilian population from indiscriminate massacre. In the past when those uniform-wearing fighters were defeated, the war was over. But here in Indochina, the Communists have changed the rules of the game. Everybody is a fighter without a uniform. Some carry weapons. Others help by gathering information.xii This changing of the rules of the game was an unfortunate reality of the Vietnam War. Something to note on top of all this are all the benefits of having uniformed ranked soldiers. Allied forces liberating chunks of Europe at a time would clear our the Nazis village by village. If they saw the ominous grey uniforms, they knew the enemy was present.

Buoscio 6 The Viet Cong, and other guerrilla fighters by extension, had no established uniform so they were able to blend into towns and villages. Guerrilla fighters are able to take the United States rules of war (soldiers cant and wont massacre random townspeople indiscriminately, for example) and use them against the Americans. The guerrillas can hide in villages because they trust that the US army is not going to round up and massacre entire villages. Guerrilla fighters like the Viet Cong, the Taliban, and Al Qaeda are/were able to use our own rules against us because they know that we will stay true to principle, and not violate our high purposes. History tends to sweep our failures under the rug in order to highlight the successes we have had in other wars, specifically the World Wars. As much as our military and nation wants to avoid asymmetrical warfare, it is vital to understand that it cannot be eliminated. In October 2001, British historian John Keegan noted this The Oriental tradition, however, has not been eliminated. It reappeared . . .particularly in the tactics of evasion and retreat practiced by the Viet Cong against the United States in the Vietnam War. On September 11th, 2001, it returned in an absolutely traditional form. Arabs, appearing suddenly out of empty space like their desert raider ancestors, assaulted the heartlands of Western power in a terrifying surprise raid and did appalling damage.xiii Distinct circles of military historians have argued for some time that conventional western style warfare, like those fought along the Clausewitzian lines (what we call conventional) were just a historical coincidence or a temporal oddity.xiv British historian John Keegan is a champion of this position, he argues that there has been a Clasuewitizian interlude beginning with the Napoleonic era and ending with World War II. He argues that that era has passed and the dominant pattern of warfare from now on, as it was in the past before the Napoleonic period, will be what is identified here as asymmetrical warfare.xv Many other historians concur and have collectively deemed this new era the fourth generation warfare. Another of those who suggests this new generation of warfare is Israeli analyst Martin van Creveld. In his book The Transformation of War, he states should present trends continue, the kind of war that is based on the division between government, army and people seems to be on its way out. . . In the future, wars will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and robbers. . . their organizations are likely to be motivated less by professionalism than by fanatical, ideological based loyalties.xvi While the arguments and discussions surrounding this transformation of warfare have been alive and brewing for many years, they have made an appropriate resurgence after the events of September 11th. In this new era of warfare, it is important to not forget the lessons we as a nation learned in the Philippines and in Vietnam. Asymmetrical warfare is not new, and it definitely is not going anywhere anytime soon. The modernization of the West will assure that the world powers will, for the most part, live in relative peace and harmony. Its the third world extremist groups, which have the greatest threat of violence and ill will towards the United States and her allies, which the United States has to be cautious of. Taking and applying lessons we have learned in other previously fought conflicts is essential to our nations success in asymmetrical warfare. Policies for tackling challenges brought up by asymmetrical warfare cannot be forgotten every time a new leader comes into office or a new history book is written. It is absolutely vital that we do not abandon our lessons we have learned in previous conflicts. We were so good at countering asymmetrical warfare and since have forgotten the valuable insights we as a nation learned in conflicts like the Philippine War and Vietnam War. Remembering our faults and our successes will lead to more victories in the future and will help our nation to better understand this unusual method of warfare.

Buoscio 7 Asymmetrical warfare is not new, but unfortunately for us, embracing it as a legitimate type of warfare - one we will see more and more of in the coming generations requires us as a nation to think back and construct new solutions to something we have been good at for the last two centuries.

Buoscio 8

Endnotes
i ii

Donald M. Snow, National Security in a New Era, 4th edition (Boston: Longman, 2011). 276.

Vincent J. Goulding Jr., Back to the Future with Asymmetrical Warfare. Parameters 30, no. 4 (Winter 2000-2001), 21-30, as quoted in Donald M. Snow, National Security in a New Era, 4th edition (Boston: Longman, 2011). 277. Max Boot, as quoted in The Savage Wars of Peace, (Basic Books, 2002), p. 127 in Tom Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, U.S. Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Lessons from the Philippine War. November 3, 2003. http://www.newamericancentury.org/defense-20031103.htm. 4.
iii

Tom Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, U.S. Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Lessons from the Philippine War. November 3, 2003. http://www.newamericancentury.org/defense20031103.htm. 4.
iv

Tom Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, U.S. Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Lessons from the Philippine War. November 3, 2003. http://www.newamericancentury.org/defense20031103.htm. 5.
v

Brian McAllister Linn, as quoted in The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902 (University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 16. In Tom Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, U.S. Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Lessons from the Philippine War. November 3, 2003. http://www.newamericancentury.org/defense-20031103.htm. 5.
vi viiDenis

Warner, The Invisible Front Lines of South Vietnam, as quoted in Franklin Mark Osanka, ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New York: The Free Press, 1962), 279. Tom Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, U.S. Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Lessons from the Philippine War. November 3, 2003. http://www.newamericancentury.org/defense20031103.htm. 3.
viii

Tom Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, U.S. Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Lessons from the Philippine War. November 3, 2003. http://www.newamericancentury.org/defense20031103.htm. 4.
ix

Afghan provincial governor (anonymous), as quoted in David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 39. xi Donald M. Snow, National Security in a New Era, 4th edition (Boston: Longman, 2011). 276.
x

Buoscio 9

Lt. Col. Marc E. Geneste, Guerrilla Warfare, as quoted in Franklin Mark Osanka, ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New York: The Free Press, 1962), 265.
xii

John Keegan, as quoted in Donald M. Snow, National Security in a New Era, 4th edition (Boston: Longman, 2011). 290.
xiii

Donald M. Snow, National Security in a New Era, 4th edition (Boston: Longman, 2011). 287.
xiv

Donald M. Snow, National Security in a New Era, 4th edition (Boston: Longman, 2011). 287.
xv

Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York: Free Press, 1991. As quoted in Donald M. Snow, National Security in a New Era, 4th edition (Boston: Longman, 2011). 288
xvi