International Phenomenological Society

Meinong's Hume Studies: Part II. Meinong's Analysis of Relations Author(s): Kenneth Barber Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Jun., 1971), pp. 564-584 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105773 Accessed: 02/02/2009 10:35
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MEINONG'SHUME STUDIES* PART II. MEINONG'SANALYSIS OF RELATIONS difficulties for the The problem of relations created insurmountable tortuousand solutions Their causes are several;the proposed empiricists. in the main unconvincing.'Nor, clearly, is Meinong satisfiedwith these proposals. To Hamilton'sclaim that "No part of philosophyhas been developed,or ratherno partof philosophy morefully and more accurately 2 he replies, is more determinately certainthan the doctrineof relations"
quite emphatically, that ". . . scarcely has an historical scholar supported

the facts less correctly than Hamilton in the sentence just quoted."3 With a view toward correcting the deficiencies of earlier analyses Meinong devotes the entire, lengthy second Hume Study to the subject of relations. The structureof the second study is similar to that of the first. The bulk of the detailed argument is directed against his English predecessors. The rest of his essay - and here, it must be admitted,the second study excels the first - is devoted to his own analysis. Again, I shall make sparinguse of the historicaland instead concentrateon the crucial featuresof Meinong'sown analysisof relations,discussingfirst his basic ontologicalanalysis of relations and, second, his treatmentof similarity and equality. Of course, the analysis of similarity and equality is but a part, indeed, for our purposesthe most importantpart, of his general analysisof relations.This, though, is the conclusionwhich he arrivesat rather than his point of departure,which is why I shall first state as much as can be said about the ontological analysis of relationswithout becoming involved in the discussionof similarityand equality. Considerthe following three sentences (and assume them to be true): (1) The chair is to the left of the desk, (2) Red is darker than pink,
* Part I appeared in Volume XXX, 4, June 1970. 1 For a discussion of the causes of the difficulties see Bergmann, Gustav, "The Problem of Relations in Classical Psychology," Philosophical Quarterly 7 (April, 1952), 140-152. 2 H.S.II., p. 573. Also, Hamilton, William, Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, Vol. II, Edingburgh, 1859, p. 537. 3 H.S.ll., p. 573.

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(3) John is the brother of Bill. Each contains a relational expression.

The philosophical task, of course, is to give an analysis of the facts these sentences are about. For a proposed analysis to be adequate, it must account, among other things, for the fact that in each case there are two entities which are actually related. In other words, not only must one give an analysis of the relata, but a complete analysis of the situation must also yield an entity (or entities) which accounts for the

connectionbetweenthe relata.And it is the lattertask which has created all the difficulties. Meinong, as we saw, in his analysis of things has only one category of simples, namely, propertieswhich are perfect particulars.It is therefore reasonableto assume that his analysis of relations will in part be determinedby this prior commitment.If so, it may also be profitable first to establish a priori, as it were, the possibilitiesopen to him. Not only will this produceclarity about the problemiof the analysis of relatilonsitself, but it also may yield insight into why he makes the moves he does. 1. If the relation is a property,it may be either simple or complex. (Note that the issue is really whetherthere are any relations which are simple. But we shall not and need not concernourselveswith the examination of every relation in order to determineits simplicity or complexity.) 2. If the relationis simple it may be either in 'the categoryof nonrelational propertiesor in a unique categoryof its own, that of relational properties. If it is complex, the entities composing it may be (a) all

in the category of nonrelationalproperties, (b) all in the category of relational properties, or (c) some in both categories. 3. The relation may be either internalor externalto its relata, dependingon whetherit is, respectively,in the category of nonrelationalor relationalproperties. If it is complex, some of its constituentsmay be internaland some external to the relata. 4. If the relation,in case it iS simple, or some constituentof it, in case it is complex, is externalto the relata, it (or this constituent)may be "in the mind";that is, it may either be a constituent of an act or something"contributed" by an "activity"of the mind, or it may be externalto the mind as well as to the relata. Such a classificationof possibilitiesis but an idle dialectical exercise unless one can show some structuraland historical patterns to be involved with the alternatives. In the case of relations the historical pattern is quite clear. The inability to conceive nonlocalizedrelational 4 As propertiesled to a denial of the category of relationalproperties. a result, relationstended to be treated as complexes the constituentsof
4 See Bergmann, "The Problem of Relations in Classical Psychology."

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which were nonrelationalpropertiesinternal to the relata and, if there were additionalconstituents,these were treated as nonrelationalproperties in, or somehow connected with, the mind. The views Meinong discussesare but variationson this basic pattern,which, as I shall show, is inadequateon two counts. (1) By reducingthe relationto nonrelational propertiesinternalto the relata, one can no longer groundthe fact that the relataare actuallyrelated.(2) The attemptto bridgethe gap between the relata by introducingan entity which is a constituentof an act at best could only account for our judging that the two are related but not for the fact that the two actually are related. These comments, of course, form but a diagram or guide to the following discussion of Meinong. The adequacy of the diagram can only be supportedby a of his line of argument.So it will perhapsbe best detailedconsideration if we now turn for the first time to the text of the second Hume Study. Meinongfirst makes a distinctionof ultimateimportancebetween the relationitself and its foundation.5Briefly, foundationsare the attributes in the relata which are compared; relations are, so far rather uninformatively,somethingadditional,over and above the foundations.Let us for the time being assumethat the notion of a foundationis relatively clear, or, at least, let us therefore temporarilypostpone discussing it, and insteadfocus attentionon the additionalconstituent,the one he calls the relation. The relation, or what passes for it in the ontology of the Hume Studies,clearlyis somethingwhich in a peculiarway is dependent on mind, i.e., on the conceivingsubject.Thus we are told:
But insofar as relations are a product of psychic activity, it is clear that, strictly speaking, even for the realist, relations can only be subjective.6 ...Moreover, consideration shows at first glance that in some of the most important cases of relations the conceiving subject, i.e., the subject to whom the relation is presented, is active in a quite characteristic way, so that in these cases the subjective factor comes even more to the fore than in conceiving the so-called absolute qualities. Indeed, asserting a relation appears in many cases to be completely independent of asserting the existence of the things it relates. Thinking of two different colors or shapes, I can call them similar or dissimilar even without knowing that there are such in reality or,
even, knowing that there are not.7

Meinong here distinguishesbetween relational and nonrelationalqualities on the basis of whetherthe subjectis, respectively,active or passive in conceivingthem. A relationis a productof a psychic activity;a nonrelationalpropertysuch as, say, blue, is, properlyspeaking,a quality of
5 H.S.II., pp. 614-617. 6 H.S.,., p. 614. 7 H.S.II., p. 609.

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thing, not a product of conceiving it. The argument supportingthe distinctionurges us to considerthe fact that in many cases we can assert a relationindependently of assertingthe existenceof the relata, i.e., one can call one shade of blue darker than another without knowing, or requiring,that these two shades actually be exemplified.Notice, first of all, that the contrast is between assertinga relation and asserting the existence of a thing, not, as one might have thought,between asserting the existence of a relation and assertingthe existence of a thing. The argumentis fallacious. I can assert, in a sense, that unicornshave four legs without knowing whether or not there are unicorns, by merely
asserting that if there are any, then they do have four legs. But if there

are some, then the propertyof being four-leggedwhich they have is in no way dependenton my conceivingor assertinganything.Similarly,if the two shades of blue are perchanceexemplified,then the relation of darker-than which they jointly exemplify does not depend on my conceiving or assertinganything.This is the proper analogy between relational and nonrelationalproperties,and, evidently, it undercutsrather than supportsthe distinctionfor which Meinong argues. The most interestingthing about this argumentis indeed somethingelse. It appeals to what is commonlycalled an a priori truth, e.g., in the example, the fact that a certainshade of blue is darkerthan a certainother. Since we cannot conceive the two colors standingin any other relation,the assertion that they stand in this relation does not depend on experience,or, to unpack this formula, it need not be based in anythingfurnishedto the mind from without. Such a base would be "objective."Hence, the "subjective" of relations.The weaknessof this epistemologicalargument is that it does not in the least precludethe ontologicalpossibilitywhich it purportsto preclude,namely, that the relation is independentof the conceivingsubject and, if anything,dependenton the relata. The chief objectionto this account,however,is not that the objectivesubjective distinction fails to support a distinction between relational and nonrelationalqualities,but, rather,that this analysis leaves nothing for the relationaljudgmentto be about.To say that a relationaljudgment is the product of a psychic activity is ontologicallyharmless.With this harmless claim, however, Meinong is not content, insisting instead on the much strongerone that the relationitself, and not just the judgment, is the product of such an activity. If so, then what is the latter about? On the one hand,'it cannot be about the relata, for the line of the argur ment, if taken seriously, is that the relata as such or by themselvesdo not in effect stand in or have the relation. On the other hand, to say that the judgmentis aboutitself, as one would have to since the judgment

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or the psychic activity producesor has the relation, is patently absurd, since what is being comparedare the relata. Fortunately,that is not all that Meinonghas to say. He thinks he can avoid the objectionby appealingto the foundationof the relationwhich, as the word suggests,carries the burdenof groundingthe truth of relational judgments,And, as we shall see, what he has to say about foundationsis quite interesting.Furthermore, he does recognizethat at least one relation,namely, the one which binds qualitiestogetherso that they form a complex,is "real"and not merely "ideal"and hence independent of any phychic activity.8 In other words, the fact that qualities are presentedbundled into complexes is not the result of any psychic activity. This, though is the exception. In general, the additionalconstiis of little help in tuent which he calls the relation, being "subjective," the analysis of the "objective"state of affairs. So I turn to the more fruitful discussionof the foundation. What Meinongmeans when saying that a relationhas a foundationis that there is somethingin the relata which accounts for or determines there can be no relatheir being related in eacertainway. Furthermore, tion without two foundations,one in each relatum.9 Conversely,these two foundations jointly determine the relation. To discover what Meinong might consider to be a foundation, turn to the examples. (1), The clair is to the left of the desk, (2) Red is darker than pink, (3) John is the brotherof Bill. (3) offers the best indicationof what the foundationof relation may be, and thereby of the claim that there is somethingin the relata which groundstheir being related as they are. If John is the brotherof Bill one might reasonablyargue that this is so in virtue of the fact that both have the same father. In other words, they have the propertyof being brothersin virtue of their both having another property,namely, the propertyof having the same father. Hence, this other propertygroundstheir being brothers.(Ignorefor the moment the obvious fact that this other property is also relational.) "Brotherthe relation for which hood," then, is defined in terms of "fatherhood"; it stands is a complex whose constituentsground the relation. The reasonablenessof this particularexplication of "foundation"is obvious. What is not obvious is that the other two cases (and, of course, "fatherhood" itself) can be handled in the same way. The point is that "John"and "Bill" refer to complexes.But again, it is not obvious that, for example, "red"and "pink"in (2) refer to complexes.Yet the relation of darker-thanmust on his view be groundedin the two colors.
8

H.S.II., pp. 715-720.

9 H.S.J1., p. 615.

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That leaves two alternatives.Either he must straightforwardly grant that red and pink are complexes in the same sense in which John and Bill are; or he must, while denyingthat, maintainthat they have natures
which somehow ground the relation. Ignoring for the moment the

phemonenologicalobjection to the first alternativeand the dialectical difficultiesinvolved in the doctrine of natures, it is clear that whether the foundationor ground be a property or a nature, it must be of a peculiar sort. For the property or nature which grounds the fact that red is darkerthan pink must be, on the one hand, the propertyor nature
of being darker than pink, on the other hand, the property or nature of

being lighter than red. That is, each relatumcontains a peculiar entity which, as it were, reflects the relaton in which it stands. This peculiar entity which both groundsthe relation and is in the relatumI shall call
an internal relation.l1 This designation is not arbitrary. The entity is

both internal to the relatum and is in some sense a reflection of the relation.Hence, althoughsuch entities are in things, they are not to be confusedwith ordinarypropertiessince, unlike the latter, they point to or indicate other things. Yet, since they are in things, they are not to be confusedwith what he calls the relation,i.e., the result or productof an act of comparing which is not in the relatumbut insteadis dependent on the mind. The second example, then, is crucial for isolating the kind of entity which must be involved in the claim that there are foundationsof relations. Before, however, examiningin detail the dialectics of this claim, I wish to considerbrieflythe first of the three examples,the chair being to the left of the desk, for this case reveals a further peculiarity of
Meinong's ontology. Preliminary to this, though, it is necessary to dis-

cuss the issue of relative and absolute foundations,a distinctionwhich, as it happens,is at the heart of what Meinong says about spatial relations. Although a relation presupposesfoundations,it may be the case, as we have seen, that the foundation itself is a relation. But, Meinong argues,'" if the foundationis itself relationalthen this further relation must also have foundations.At some point, then, one must arrive at a
10 Although I have used the property or nature of being darker than as an illustration of what it would mean to have an internal relation, I do not wish here to saddle Meinong with a view as to the exact nature of this property. It is sufficient for my point to note that the talk of foundations requires that there be (internal) constituents grounding the relation. As we shall see, his own view of the nature of this internal constituent is a bit more sophisticated than the illustrative example here suggests. 11 H.S.11., p. 616.

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foundationwhich is nonrelational,or absolute, as he uses the term. To deny this would be absurd: "A relation without absolute foundation would be a comparisonin which nothing is compared.'2That is, if the relation is the result of an act of comparing,then at some point one of any act of commust start with somethingwhich exists independently paring. This is but the converse of stating that relations are dependent on minds in a way in which absolute or nonrelationalqualities are not, and thus but anotherway of depressingthe status of relations.Yet the need for absolutefoundationsis in no way surprising.Its consequences, however, are ontologicallyinteresting. To see that, turn to (1). The chair is to the left of the desk. The relation involved clearly is spatial. The ontological issue concerning facts of this kind, as Meinong sees,'3 is whether space is absolute or relative,i.e., whetherthe simple or primaryspatial entities are relational or nonrelational.ChargingLocke and Hume with holding the simple spatial entities to be relational,he then argues that this analysis is funTo show that it is, he asks what the expression damentallymistaken.14 "15 meters long" really means.'&Although the complex referredto by "15 meters long" involves relations one could not begin to apply this of which being 15 meters long is compounded.'6 unit of measurement Meinong claims that And concerningthis absolute unit of measurement even if one were to construe it relationally,it would involve two end points which were related:
It is true, however, that the idea of juxtaposition is relative and therefore forces one to take one more step back to something which turns out to be really the last one on which our determinationsrest. This is the something by virtue of which a place in the continuum of a subjective space is distinguished from every other place arat which therefore can only be called a subjective 17 space determination.

Thus we see that Meinong arrives at a doctrine of absolute space through his analysis of relations; there are simple entities which are spatial and nonrelational.That he needs, or thinks he needs, such entities in order to solve the problemof individuationbecame obvious earlier. Now we see that he needs them also for another purpose, indeEven if one must ultimately pendentlyof the problemof individuation. reject his ontology, it may be said in its favor that its various parts do
12 13 14

-5 16 Ibid.
17

Ibid. H.S.II., p. 618. Ibid. H.S.II., pp. 618-619. H.S.II., p. 619.

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supportone another.The introductionof spatial qualities, for instance, is by no means merely an ad hoc solution to the problem of individuation. Notice, however, that the example does not appear to lead to his conclusion. For, it would seem that there is nothing about either the chair or the desk which determinesor groundsthe former being to the left of the latter. The chair might just as well have been to the right of the desk. Meinong, however, reasons that while it is true that being a chair or being a desk does not determineor preclude any spatial relation, it is preciselybecause of this fact that the chair and the desk must contain an element which allows us to make spatial judgments.That is, each is a complex containinga primaryspatial property.Nor is this all. The case of the spatial propertiespresentsthe clearestpossible evidence that he is in fact arguingfor what I have called the doctrine of internal relations.In supportof this claim, consider the following passage:
If A and B are two place determinations, a their distance, then it is clear that a is independent of A and B in the sense that the distance a can also obtain between infinitely many other place determinations. If, therefore, only a is given, neither A nor B need be involved. If, on the other hand, A and B are given, no other distance than a is possible and this distance can expand or contract only if either a different A i or Bi step in for either A or B.18

The example here is the relationof distance.This, though, is irrelevant. The analysishe arguesfor in the case of distancecan be extendedto all other relations.The natures of A and B in all cases determinethe relation a obtaining between them; there is something in the two which groundstheir being so related. Nor does Meinong just argue for what I called internal relations, but he does so by again appealing to the alleged a priori nature of relational judgments.Recall that above we saw him establish the mind-dependence of his relations, i.e., of certain entities in minds, not those in the objects which I called internal relations, on the ground that we can know two relata to be related in a certain way independentlyof knowing whether they exist, and that, therefore, we know this fact a priori, or independentlyof perception. Here we see him appeal to the necessity of A and B being at a certain distancefrom one another ('If, on the other hand, A and B are given, no other distance than a is possible... .") and hence to the alleged a priori characterof relationaljudgmentsin the case of space. The argument for foundationsand hence for internal relations then rests not
18

H.S.Il., p. 620.

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just on the fact that Meinong cannot otherwise understandhow two objects come to exemplify a spatial relation,but rather,or at least just as much, on the fact that he cannot otherwise understandtheir necessarily being so related. To deny foundationsat this point would make
the relation "arbitrary" and not necessary.

I do not wish to enter here into the difficult issue of the synthetic a priori. I merely argue that its appeal is a structuralmotive behind the two claims which Meinongdid in fact make, namely, first, that relations and second, that they have foundations,i.e., that are mind-dependent, there are in the relata the entities I call internalrelations,which determine the relations involved. Since I thus ignore the issue of the synthetic a priori it will be only fair not to use his appeal to it as an argument against the adequacy of his analysis of relations, but merely, as I just did, by way of a brief diagnosticsuggestion.The central issue, to which I now turn, is his doctrine of what I call internalrelations. The doctrine is most fully articulatedin the discussion of the relations of comparisonin general and in that of similarityand equality in particular.About the doctrine itself little is said. Yet the detailed and most explicit treatmentof similarity and equality reveals the role the doctrine plays in this ontology. We shall therefore first examine his analysis of similarityand equality. Then we shall be in a position to offer a critiqueof his more or less implicit doctrineof internalrelations with at least some assurancethat we have accuratelygraspedits role. Meinong's thesis is that all relations of comparisoncan be divided into two mutually exclusive classes on the basis of the result of the comparison.The comparisonof two attributes,we are told, can only result in (a judgmentof) either equality or inequality(difference,diversity).'9 That is, two attributesare either equal or unequal. If the latter, they may be either similar or dissimilar,both similarity and dissimilarity being but special cases of difference.Similarity,in other words, is not, as some philosophershave argued,20a distinctrelation on par with equality and inequality. Furthermore,equality and similarity stand as follows. If two attributes are equal, no more can be said about them. There are no degrees of equality. There are, however, degrees of similarity;two colors can be more or less similar to one another than two others. Furthermore, two objects, or complexes,are equal only if all of their constituentsare equal; again, two complexescannot be more or less equal.2' While these
'19 H.S.ll.,
20 21

pp. 647, 652.

H.S.ll., p. 647. See, for example, Mill, System of Logic, B.I., Ch. III, Sect. II. H.S.II., P. 648.

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considerationsshow equality and similarityto be distinct, they do not show how they are connected.Meinong'snegative claim in this respect is that equality cannot be defined in terms of similarity.Positively, he claims that similarityis to be defined in terms of equalityor difference. That is, if two complexes are similar,they are so in virtue of agreeing in some constituent;they have constituentswhich are equal. Given this fact, one might supposethat equalitycould be defined as completesimilarity; by placing more and more constituentsequal one moves from lesser to greater similarity and finally to equality. The difficulty with this line of reasoning,Meinong argues,is that while it is true that similarity implies agreementof some constituents,it is also true that similarity implies that some are differentor unequal.Hence, this account of equality would sanction our calling somethingboth equal and (exactly) similar, which is objectionable since equality implies there being no diversitywhile similarityimplies that there is diversity.22Part of this argumentis merely a verbal quibble concerning the use of "equality" and "similarity."Yet it has a nonverbal core that reveals a certain peculiaritywhich presents Meinong with an insoluble difficulty. The difficulty arises from the acceptance of Meinong's definition of Equality of two attributesobtains only if "equality"and "similarity": the attributes(and their constituents,if any) are perfect particularsof the same kind. Similarityof two attributes,on the other hand, only obtains if each attributecontains at least one perfect particularwhich is of the same kind as one perfect particularof the other as well as at least one differentin kind from at least one in the other. One sees immediately that these definitions require the relata to be complex in every case where they are in fact similar, although the definition of equalityis neutralwith respectto whetherthe relata are simple or complex. This is obvious since the similar relata must be equal in at least one respect and unaqualin at least one other respect. Hence, at a minimum, objects serving as relata between which similarity obtains must contain two constituents. At first glance the complexity requirement appearsharmless;one can say that the chair is similarto the table (they each have four legs) or that the pencil is similar to the ball (they both have the same shade of yellow). Hence, at least some cases of similarity be handled in this way. The question, as can quite unproblematically cases of similaritycan be so treated. all is whether Meinongsees, I The question, repeat,is simplywhetherin every case of comparison one can say that the two relata involved are in fact complex, each con22

Ibid.

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trainingat least one constituent equal to some constituent in the other. Meinong himself explains the difficulty which arises in the case of colors:
If in the case of blue and red we accept one (or several) common elements

to the word color, then one can do the same with the differcorresponding ent shades of blue, all of which have in commonthat they are blue. Similarly, one establishes several gradations within the different shades, then gradations within these gradations, and so on, ad infinitum; all these being divisions neither more nor less arbitrary than the distinctions of traditional classes of red, blue, green, and so on, the transitions between which are equally continuous. Each of these divisions would entail the supposition of

elements.That shows that an eventuallyinfinite comcommon determining

plication could not be avoided. If one accepts it, then we can to all cases in which it is possible to speak of continua of qualities apply the principle that similarity is partial agreement.23

If red and blue are similar, then they must share a common constituent, namely, that constituent in virtue of which they are colors. If, however we say, as we often do, that two shades of blue are similar, then this requires that the two shades also contain equal constituents grounding their similarity. Furthermore, this common constituent of the shades cannot be the same constituent (color) as in the case of red and blue for the two shades are more similar than are red and blue. Hence, the problem is not in accounting for similarity but for degrees of similarity. And once the problem is raised with respect to shades of blue the difficulty multiplies; since the shades can be ordered in a continuum, every time two of the shades are more similar than two others, then additional constituents are required. The number of constituents eventually needed is limited only by the number of possible similarities. The precise difficulty Meinong facuses on is the possibility that there may be an infinite number of shades; if this were the case then every shade would have to contain an infinite number of constituents. Before turning to Meinong's discussion of this impasse it will be profitable to delineate sharply the difficulties raised by this analysis so that we may see clearly that there are two difficulties, not merely the one he chooses to emphasize. (1) A shade of blue is phenomenologically simple. Whereas one can argue that a colored spot is complex because of the fact that one can distinguish at least a shape and a color, one can make no such distinction with respect to a shade of blue. To think one could do so is only a deception; one would have in mind, for example, the mixing of several other colors to form this shade. But the causal process of producing the color does not affect the phenomenological simplicity of the shade of blue resulting from it. Furthermore, the causal
23

H.SII.., p. 649.

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factors involved in producingthis shade of blue are clearly irrelevant for knowingthat it is similarto another;for we can know this fact without knowinghow either has been produced.Meinong'sdesire to provide a ground or foundationfor the similarityrelation, therefore,leads him to argue for complexes where there are only simples. This is an interesting dialectical twist. Against Hume, he argued at length, and correctly, for the complexity of what Hume insisted was simple.24 But readiness to make the simple-complexdistinction, however admirable in one case, is disastrouswhen carriedbeyond the point where it can be phenomenologicallysecured. Or so at least I am prepared to argue againstMeinong. (2) The second difficultyarises from the possibilitythat, for example, the color continuummay contain an infinite number of distinguishable shades. Although Meinong makes no commitmentwith respect to this possibility,25he does worry about the fact that prima facie simple objects could contain an infinite number of constituents. He does not, however,make clear the exact natureof his worry.For he appearsto be merely concerned with the possibility that what appears simple is infinitely complex.Yet the numberof constituentsor, if you will, the issue of how complex a simple object is, is secondary.The difficulty, as just seen, arises when any simple object is claimed to be complex. But it may well be that he worried about the logical difficulty of any object having an infinite number of constituents.In other words, it may be that certain difficult questions about "infinity"are at the root of his perplexityhere. Lastly, and most importantly,what goes for colors goes for places and moments and for any other "simple"element of this world. Phenomenologically,therefore, we are upon this analysis not acquainted with a single simple. This comes dangerouslyclose, to say the least, to giving up any possible good reason for the simple-complexdistinction. Yet this distinction is at the very heart of the ontological enterprise. Without it one could not even begin ontology. Just remember how ardently Meinong himself strugglesto maintain it throughoutthe first Hume Study. Meinong's discussion was, I said, peculiar. What I meant was that while he sees preciselywhat is involved, he does not give up this analysis of similarity.Yet his agony becomes evident when he faces the alternativeshe has. (1) He may try to undercutthe force of the objecsimple) tions resultingfrom the claim that, say, a (phenomenologically
24

H.S.I., pp. 220-247.

25 H.S.II., p. 649.

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shade of blue is complex, perhaps infinitely so, or, (2) he may argue that in some cases, at least, a similarity relation can obtain without having a groundor foundationin the sense explained. Concerningthe second possibility he mentions that one might give "similar"two rather different meanings. The first is the one already discussed. The second he does not really explore. He merely suggests that if one chooses it
... one will have to recognize still another principle by virtue of which the contents closer to one another in the continuum are more similar than those more distant, even though, as mentioned above (p. 623), this principle cannot be adequately defied as proximity in the continuum.26

What this "other principle"might be he does not say. Nor could he. The suggestioninvolves giving up the notion of a foundationand taking the relation of similarityitself to be primitive.In other words, instead of having different constituents accounting for degrees of similarity, one would have differentdegrees of similarity,each of which would be primitive.That in turn leaves only two alternatives.(1) The relationhas no "foundation." This is against the grain. Just rememberhow strenuously he argues that, given their relata, all relations are necessarily what they are. (2) He must break out of the historicalpatternin which the objective ground of a relation must be a property or, rather, two properties,one in each relatum, and propose a more radical doctrine. Upon this doctrinethe objectivegroundof the relationalfact is in addition to the two relata as such, this pair having been given a very special objectiveontologicalstatus as an "objectof higher order."This step he will eventuallytake in the famous essay on such objects, in 1899. In the Hume Studies,of 1877 and 1882, he was not yet ready for it. Hence the agony, or, if you please, the inconclusiveness of it all. Be this as it may, Meinong does try to minimize the objections to the claim that a shade of blue is complex upon the analysisof similarity we have at this time attributedto him. Nor, of course, would he have tried so hard to defend this analysis if he were then preparedto reject it. He in fact offers two defenses. The first is an epistemologicalclaim. One usually makes judgmentsof similarityat first glance without inquiring(being aware of) into what the similarityconsists.28Hence, the object's being complex (or even infinitely complex) does not hinder our makingjudgmentsof similarity.Against this defense two comments
H.S.II., p. 651. "Vber Gegenstainde h6herer Ordnung und deren Verhaltnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung,"1899, reprinted in Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Leipzig 1913-1914. 28 H.S.II., p. 652.
27

26

ANALYSIS OFRELATIONS PART II. MEINONG'S

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merit consideration. First, the question of what we may or may not be awareof is not an ontologicalissue. Irrespectiveof how we make judgments of similarity,it should (also on Meinong'sview) at least be possible to become aware of the constituentsof a shade of blue. Yet this very possibility is excluded by the phenomenologicalsimplicity of the shade. Second, if what he says about making judgmentsof similarityis true, then it weakensratherthan supportshis analysis of similarity;for, if we do make such judgmentswithout being aware of the equal constituents,then how can one be sure that there must be these equal conOne need not press either of stituentsin orderto accountfor similarity? these commentsto make it obvious that this first defense is rather inconclusive. The second occurs in the context of replying to an argument of Hume's.Hume, contraryto Meinong,arguesthat there can be similarity The paradigmhe appeals to is the case without agreeingconstituents.29 of two simple ideas being similar in virtue of their being simple. Since they are similar,they could not possibly contain an agreeingconstituent, namely, simplicity. Hence, Hume concludes, similarity can obtain between simples and thus needs no foundation (in Meinong's sense). Ignoring the peculiarityof treating simplicityon a par with other properties, it is clear that this example does pose a treat to Meinong'sanalysis. The latter charges Hume with failing to distinguish between a simple idea and an idea of a simple. An idea may thusbe called "simple" because it is of a simple, even though it is not itself simple.30Whether Hume is in fact guilty of this confusionis here irrelevant.Distinguishing between object and idea does not help one to answer the question of whether and how a similarityrelation can obtain between two simple objectsin virtue of their being simple. If they are simple, then they have no constituents.Thus, howeverone treats this logical propertyof having no constituents,it cannot itself be a constituentof the object. Hence, Meinong'sargumentdoes not throw any light on what is at issue, namely, whether a relation can obtain between simple objects. I concludethat Meinong analyzessimilarityalways in terms of agreeof constituentseven though on his own grounds ment and disagreement this analysis encountersobjections that are difficult to answer. So we must now turn to what he has to say about equality. First, though, I want to call attention to the extensive use he makes of the similarity relation.
29 Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford, 1958, Appendix, p. 627. 30 H.S.II., p. 650.

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Equality and similarityare distinctivein their generality;their application is not limited by the different kinds of foundationsas, say, the spatial relation of to the left of is limited in applicationto those cases where the relata are place determinations.31 In the case of spatial relations,he argues, accordingly,that althoughwe do not ordinarilyso The speak, one could speak of similaritybetween place determinations. reasonwe do not is that the other relationaldesignations,such as to the left of, are more advantageousin virtue of their being more precise.32 Hence, even though the special nature of certain kinds of foundations favors use of relationsother than similarity,it does not preventus from analyzing the relations among them in terms of similarity. Thus he strengthenshis central idea that the division of relations of comparison into equalities and inequalities,and of the latter into similaritiesand is exhaustive.33 dissimilarities, Finally, then, we are in a position to discuss the internalrelation of equality.Its importance,as we saw, is very great in Meinong'sontology; for it purportsto account (a) for two perfect particularsof the same kind being of the same kind and (b), for similarity,includingdegreesof similarity.The adequacy of this ontology thus depends on whether or not an internalrelationof equalitycan in fact do all that. There is also a connection between (a) and (b). If his analysis does not yield an adequatesolution to (a), then it cannot possibly do so for (b). I do believe him to fail with respect to (a). Yet, the importanceof the issue warrantsa separatediscussionof (a) and (b). (a) Considertwo spots which are both the same shade of red. Upon his view each spot contains an entity which accounts for its being red. Furthermore,the red (entity) in the one spot is numericallydistinct from the red (entity) in the other spot. To express this, let us refer to the two entities as red, and red2 respectively.The claim is that while red, and red2 are numericallydistinct,they are yet equal. Nor are they just equal to each other, but also to all other entities which are, or ground, in other objects this particularshade of red. This latter fact, however,can be ignored since if the proposed solution fails, as it does, for red,, and red2, is also fails with respect to all other instances. Red, and red2 are simple. (We may surely ignore the dubiousness, due to what he says about similarity,of the simple-complexdistinction, since he does claim that simple propertiesare equal.) And not only are
they simple, but they are the only entities grounding the fact that red,
H.S.II., p. 652. H.S.I., pp. 622-625, 653-654. 33 H.S.II., p. 654.
31
32

ANALYSIS OF RELATIONS PARTII. MEINONG'S

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and red2 are equal. Equality,in other words, is neither a constituentof red, and re42 nor is it an entity jointly exemplifiedby red, and red2. Nor of course is that surprising.It merely restates what we learned earlierabout Meinong'sgeneral analysis of relations.The one thing left to be done is to find out what, if anything,can be made of this claim. First of all, it is obvious that if red, and red2 are simple and are the only entities in the fact of red, and red2 being equal, then red1 and red2 are not related. The relation dependenton the mind will not do. This latter relation is somehow about the fact that red, and red2 are equal, but it is not a constituentof this fact. Nor will it do to say that the relation is contained in the respective "natures"of red1 and red2, red, and red2 somehow "pointing"at or to one another.For red1 and red2 are simple. Thus they cannot have internalingredientsperforming this function. Nor, even if this difficultycould be overcome, would the notion of an ingredientwhich "points"to another entity be intelligible. There are no such ingredients.Hence, red, and red2 are in fact not relatedupon this analysis. Furthermore, even if one ignores this difficulty,it is hard to see how the relation of equality could account for the sameness of the two red spots. In other words, the difficultyis not merely that Meinongfails to give equality the objective status of an external relation, since, even if he somehowsucceededin doing this, there would still be a puzzle. How would he explain that just red, and red2 are equal, but not, say, red, and blue1? This could only be accomplishedby introducingdifferent equality relations (which is directly contrary to his claim concerning the "generality" of equality),34so that red1 and redi would exemplify equality, blue, and blue2, equality2, and so on. While this will formally work in the sense that the differentequalityrelationscan be used
to pick out the various classes of objets which are the same in a certain

respect, one still remains uncomfortableabout the ground of each of these several equalityrelations. The source of the discomfort lies in the fact that we are asked to accept as ultimate and ontologicallyadequatethe notion or, rather, the
principle, that two simple entities may be the same in kind yet different in number. There are supposed to be two simple perfect particulars

which are equal, or of the same kind. One may plausibly say that their being numericallydistinct is grounded simply in their being two, i.e., that their differenceis primitive.In other words, one need not worry the two perfect particularssince in effect they are about individuating individuatorsThe troubleis, rather,that if one takes their differenceto
34H.S.II., p. 652.

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be primitive, then one cannot also take their sameness to be primitive. Yet this is precisely what we are asked to do. To repeat, one cannot say in ontology that both sameness and difference of two simple entities are primitive. Even more strongly, only the claim that difference is primitive is acceptable. With respect to sameness, one must always ask in what way, or in what respect, two entities are the same or equal. And this question can only be answered by pointing out an entity shared by or common to both of the entities which are said to be the "same" in some way or respect. Hence, Meinong, by taking equality to be primitive, fails to provide an acceptable ground for the sameness of the two red spots. (b) Let us for the time being ignore the fact that Meinong's solution to the problem of sameness is at best verbal and ask ourselves whether it could, at least verbally, account for similarity and its degrees, as he has analyzed them. The reason this question is important is this. One may account for his failure to provide an adequate ground for sameness by his inability to push the analysis of equality to greater explicit depth than he did. But about the reduction of similarity to equality and difference), he is, for better or worse, most explicit. Thus failure at this he has set himself, even though, structurally, the root of the weakness is his inability, implicit in his approach, to grasp and solve the problem of grounding equality. Similarity, we recall, is held to be a relation between complexes containing some equal perfect particulars. That raises two problems. First, it must be shown that equality does in fact account for similarity, i.e., for the fact of two objects in a continuum being more similar than two others farther apart in it. About the first problem, I shall not worry, since I agree that similarity of complexes is to be handled in terms of agreeing constituents. That he nevertheless incorrectly analyzes what it is for constituents to agree, we have already examined. The second problem is the interesting one since, prima facie, it would seem that equality cannot account for degrees of similarity. Indeed, some have argued that Meinong in fact fails at this point.35 To see why his analysis appears to fail and, furthermore, why upon a closer examination it nevertheless provides an ingenious way of at least formally solving the problem, it is perhaps best to use a simple example. Consider a restricted continuum consisting of five pitches, c, d, e, f and g.
35 See Grossmann, Reinhardt, The Structure of Mind, Madison and Milwaukee, 1965, p. 176, where he aplies an argument against Meinong's use of spatial determinations to ground degrees of similarity in terms of agreeing constituents.

ANALYSIS OF RELATIONS PART II. MEINONG'S

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Pitches being orderedin the familiarcontinuum,the similarityrelations in which they stand are readily ascertained.For example, the members of the pairs (c, e), (d, f), (e, g) all exemplifythe same similarityrelation, hg3 (higher-by-a-third), the membersof the pairs (c, f), (d, g), hg4, and so on.36 Consider next how one might plausibly explicate Meinong's analysis of this case. One might argue that, for example, the members of (c, e) exemplifyhg3 because they contain equal constituents.That is, there are two constituents,a, in c, a2 in e, such that a, and a2 are equal. The class of pairs, each memberof which contains some aj, then picks out the class of pairs the membersof which exemplify the similarity relation hg3.37 Similarity,the members of the pairs (c, f) and (d, g) each exemplifyhg4 in virtue of their containing,respectively,bl, b2, b3 and b4. This suggestion, then, amounts to defining quality order within a continuumin terms of equal constituents.In other words, the special case of the orderingrelation, hg3, is analyzed exactly the same way in is analyzed.But this, as I will which, say, similarity-with-respect-to-red show, does not work in the case of an orderingrelation, althoughit will (formally)work in the case of a nonordering similarityrelation. To see what is wrong with this attemptconsiderfirst the pairs (c, e) and (e, g), and then the pairs (c, f) and (d, g). In the first case a,, a2, a3 and a4 account for hg3 being exemplifiedrespectivelyby the members of the pairs (c, e) and (e, g). But notice that since c contains a3 and g contains a4, the members of the pair (c, g) should exemplify hg3, which they of course do not. In the second case, bl, b2, b3 and b4 accountfor hg4 being exemplifiedrespectivelyby the membersof (c, f) and (d, g). Again, since c contains b, and g contains b4, the membersof the pair (c, g) should exemplify hg4. Moreover,extendingthis reasoning,it can easily be show that the membersof the pair (c, g) will exemplifyall of the relationspeculiarto the continuum. The mistake, I submit, lies in analyzingthe orderingrelations solely in terms of equal constituents.If this were the only possibility, then Meinong'sontologicaledifice would indeed crumble.There is, however,
36 See H.S.1l., pp. 622-625, 653-654, for evidenec that hg3 is to be treated as a similarity relation. 17 Ignore, if you will, the problem of how the equality of ai and a2 can account for a relation such as hg3, even though the paradigm seems to show that it cannot be treated like similarity, and assume that there is something about the natures of at and a2 which not only makes them equal, but equal in a certain way. Ignore also the worry about what at and a2 might be, whether they themselves be pitches within the pitches, c and e, or some other quality, either auditory or non-auditory.

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an alternative which effectively avoids the formal objections to the above suggestion. Whether Meinong actually had this alternative in mind when arguingfor the reductionof similarityto equalityI shall not try to decide. The suggestionis this. Instead of analyzingthe orderingrelations in terms of equal constituents,analyze them in terms of equal numbersof equal constituents.To see how this works, consider an arbitrarilylarge range of pitches. By calling it a range rather than a continuumI indicate that it consists of a finite, though arbitrarilylarge, number of pitches each of which contains in turn only a finite numberof constituents; for the introductionof a continuumand, thereby,infinity, would introduceunwantedmathematicalcomplications.Assume, for example, that there are 99 pitches in the range; call them t1, t2. . . t99, respectively. What are the constituentsof these pitches? The trick, as one might suspect, lies in the selection and arrangementof these constituents. As it turns out, to produce the desired order there must be a minimumof 199 different constituentsand each pitch must contain a minimum of 100 different constituents.38Designate the 199 different constituentsin the following way: 99 of them are a,, a2 .. . af9; 99 more are bl, b2 ... b9g. The remainingconstituent is p, standing for the propertyof being a pitch. As such, it will be the only constituent contained in all of the pitches. The other constituentswill vary from 1 to 99 in the numberof pitches in which they are contained.Having identifiedthe elements,I shall now exhibit the list of pitches with their constituents.
t2

t1 consists of: pa4,a2... a96,a97,a98,a99. consists of: p,a4,a2...a.6,aa98,ba. t3 consists of: pa4,a2... a96,a97,b2,bl. ... t4 consists of: p,a4,a2 a96,b3,b2,bl.
..........***.****..*****..*..*. ..........***.*.***..*****......

t96 consists of: t97 consists of: t98 consists of: t99 consists of:
38

paa2,b97,b6 ..... p,a1,b98,b97,b96.....

..... p,al,a2,a3,b96

..... p,bg9,b98,b97,b96

b3,b2,bl. b3,b2,bi. b3,b2,bl. b3,b2,bl.

As it turns out, they may contain more constituents. But if this is the case each of the additional constituents would have to appear as a constituent of only one pitch in order not to interfere with the principle of ordering in terms of equal numbers of equal constituents. Since these additional constituents would then play no role in ordering, let us ignore them.

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Now the members of the pairs (t1,t2), (t2,t3, (t3,t4) . . . (t96,t97) (t97, t98), (t089t99) all exemplify hg2. The members or the pairs t1,t3), t2,t4) ... (t96,t98), t97,t99) all exemplify hg3. From the above list of pitches and their constituentsit is obvious that all and only those pairs of pitches whose members exemplify hg2 agree in exactly 99 of their constituents.All and only those pairs whose members exemplify hg3 agree in exactly 98 of their constituents.And so on, until the pair (tltgg), whose members exemplify hg99 and agree in only one constituent,p. The class of pairs which exemplify hg2, then, is defined in terms of all of the pairs of pitches whose memberscontain an equal number of equal constituents,namely, 99. While no two pairs have memberscontainingthe same equal constituents,the numberof equal constituentsin all of these pairs is constant. The order of the relationshg2 to hg99 is defined in terms of the numerical order of pitches containing equal constituents.Hence, the pitches can be arrangedin the continuumand each pitch will stand in all and only those similarityrelationsin which it in fact stands to all of the other pitches.39 The formal adequacy of this interpretation is obvious. With it Meinong could account for degrees of similaritywithin his system. But the formal ease must not be allowed to blind us to the objections which can be raised. One such objectionis minor, the other major. The minor objectionrecalls the fact that in the analysis of similarityMeinong employs the notion of equal constituents,which notion we have found above to be defective. The reason I call this objection minor is that if he were to amendhis accountof equalityto meet the criticismwe haye broughtto bear againstit, he could indeed in this manneranalyze similarity in terms of equality. The major objection is to the claim that each pitch contains 100 constituents.Only two entities could plausibly be claimed to be presented,namely, the pitch itself and perhaps,p, the propertyof being a pitch. As for a, ... a99, b3 . . . b9g, one must simply say that one is not acquaintedwith any such entities. The objection is
39 At this point it can be seen why the number of pitches and their constituents must be finite. An infinite number of pitches would be absurd in the sense that it could not possibly be grounded in acquaintance.And, if one had a finite number of pitches each of which contained an infinite number of constituents, one would then face the problem of a non-Archimedeanseries, for while the first and second pitch would differ with respect to only one constituent, the first and last pitch would differ with respect to an infinite number of constituents. Thus, there would be no progression by which one could move from disagreementwith respect to one (or any finite number of) constituents to disagreement with respect to an infinite number of constituents in a finite number of steps.

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major because there is no way in which Meinong could even make

plausible acquaintance with such entities. Meinong thus fails in both tasks, though for different reasons. He cannot accountfor the fact that two perfect particularsof the samekind are of the same kind and he cannot account for degrees of similarity. The failure is due to his nominalismand his denialof externalrelations. he cannot Because he analyzespropertiesin terms of perfectparticulars, account for samenessin kind. He mistakenlythinks he can because he covertly appeals to his analysis of relations,by thinkingof samenessin terms of equality and of the latter as a relation which is in some sense primitive, unanalyzable,and somehow without need of an ontological ground. With respect to similarity,since he cannot accept it as an external relation, he is at this stage forced to accept transcendentalor simpleones. unpresentedentities as constituents of phenomenologically This examinationof Meinong'searly ontology has revealed its basic deficiencies.But althoughI have arguedthat Meinong fails to do what he sets out to do and, hence, that his early ontology must be rejected, it does not follow that the Hume Studies are merely a failure and have no merit whatsoever.Their shortcomingsare but those of the nominalistic empiricists, whose importance in the tradition has managed to survive the inadequacyof their solutions to the fundamental ontological problems.The Hume Studies' merit lies in having carried the empiricist line of argumentwith respect to equality and similarity furtherthan did Meinong'sEnglish predecessors. KENNETH BARBER.
STATE UNIVERSITYOF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO.