MANAGERS AS NEGOTIATORS: A Test of Power versus Gender as Predictors of Feelings, Behavior, and Outcomes

Carol baron
Rider University

L. Richard Hoffman
Rutgers University

This study explores the impact of gender and power on the feelings, behavior. and outcomes achieved by managerial managers hypotheses men and women engaged in an intm-organizational conflict. Forty pairs of practtcing of several (40 men and 40 women in same- and mixed-gender in ~~r~ani~ation~ power. pairs) took part in a simulated negotiation permitted the testing

in which the parties differed power would accumulate

This design

about the direct effects of gender and power. as well as the question of whether gender and to mens advantage and womens disadvantage. they achieved. Results show that managerial than managerial managers, men High-power of both and less satisfaction or in the outcomes behavior managers with their own performance with their partners.

women expressed less confidence genders, attempted to engage

but did not differ in their behavior cooperative outcomes. But low-power

in cooperative

and believed they achieved by the

were more competitive

and felt they gained their own and limitations of the study

ends at the expense of the other party. Some interactions are discussed.

between gender and power are suggested

results, but none of them match predictions from existing theory. implications

INTRODUCTION
The ability to negotiate effectively has long been recognized as an integral and im~o~ant aspect of managerial success. Indeed, negotiator and disturbance handler were
* Direct all correspondence Lawrenceville, NJ 08648.3099. to: Carol Watson, College of Business Administration, Rider Ilniversity,

Leadership Quarterly. 7( 1 I, 63-85. Copyright 0 1996 by JAI Press Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 10489843

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identified by Mintzberg (1973) as key managerial roles, representing formal and informal types of managerial negotiations. Managers negotiate with peers and superiors within the organization, suppliers and customers outside the organization, and even with subordinates when the manager prefers not to, or is unable to, use legitimate authority or coercion (e.g., Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Mechanic, 1962). While negotiation has always been an important part of a managers job, its importance will likely be increased by current trends toward more networked organizations, employee empowerment, and team structures which dramatically alter the nature of relationships between organizational members (e.g., Lawler, 1986; Weisbord, 1987). The negotiation skills required to develop these kinds of collaborative working relationships may well be different from those associated with competitive negotiation (Fisher & Ury, 198 1; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Savage, Blair, & Sorenson, 1989). Accompanying these kinds of changes in the nature of managerial work is the growing presence of women in managerial ranks, a presence which increasingly puts women into positions of authority (Morrison, White, & VanVelsor, 1987). Will women and men fare differently in the new organizational environments that are beginning to emerge? Can men and women be expected to negotiate similarly with peers, superiors, and subordinates or will they bring different attitudes and skills to such negotiations? Moreover, can they be expected to negotiate similarly with male and female peers, superiors, and subordinates, or will gender and organizational status and power interact to produce different expectations and patterns of behavior? These questions motivated the study reported here.
Gender and Negotiation

Our focus on gender addresses the question of whether there are gender differences in negotiating attitudes and behaviors. Many researchers agree with the conclusion Vinacke and his colleagues (e.g., Vinacke et al., 1974) drew from their studies of coalition formation in bargaining that women show a concern for interpersonal relationships, an orientation toward discussion rather than competitive bargaining, and a reliance on rules of fairness, whereas men engage in ruthless bargaining, the exercise of power, and an orientation toward maximizing individual gain (Vinacke et al., 1974, p. 511). Rubin and Browns (1975) review of all the negotiation and bargaining studies that had been conducted up to that time found some studies in which women were more cooperative than men, others in which they were less cooperative, and still others in which there were no differences. While recognizing that there were no consistent gender differences, Rubin and Brown still concluded that women are more highly sensitive to the interpersonal aspects of their relationship with their partners and would probably be more likely than men to approach negotiations with a cooperative orientation. More recently, Thompson (I 990) also found support for this view. Kolb and Coolidge ( 1988) have offered a feminist rationale for the assertion that women are more relationship-oriented than men. Drawing on the work of Gilligan (1982) and Chodorow (1978), they argued that women find the negotiating table an alien place because it puts them in opposition to others and calls for aggressiveness, which is antithetical to womens prescribed supportive role in society (Eagly, 1987). Consequently, Kolb and Coolidge expect women to feel disadvantaged and uncomfortable when they need to negotiate. Further, they express the concern that womens tendency toward

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empathy and their preference for problem-solving approaches may lead to their exploitation in negotiations, especially when confronting a competitive male opponent. Despite the general assumption that women are more cooperative, pleasant, and relationship-oriented in negotiations, empirical support for it is far from consistent. As noted earlier, Rubin and Brown (1975) found a substantial number of studies in which there were either no gender differences or in which women were actually less cooperative than men. Some researchers have actually concluded that women are more vindictive than men (e.g., Rapoport & Chamm~, 1965). This conclusion has been drawn primarily from laboratory studies of gaming behavior which tend to use tasks with limited choices and highly constrained interactions (e.g., Prisoners Dilemma studies in which participants may either compete or cooperate and seldom can communicate with their opponent). However, Kanter (I 977, 1979) observed lower-level women managers to be mean and petty in their treatment of subordinates, so the possibility exists that women become petulant, threatening, and vengeful when they fail to get their way in bargaining situations. In light of this conflicting evidence concerning the nature and even existence of gender differences, we examine the question in the context of an intra-organizational negotiation simulation involving practicing managers. The following hypotheses are tested in the present study: Hypothesis la. Manage~al women will feel less confident, more cooperative, expect more cooperation from their opponents, feel less powerful before the negotiation, and less effective as negotiators afterwards than will managerial men. Hy~thesis lb. Manage~al women more often will use acquiescence and concession as tactics and will seek out the other partys preferences and needs than will managerial men. Hypothesis lc. Managerial women will obtain more win-lose outcomes in which they give up more than they get than will managerial men. Structural Power and negotiation The bargaining and negotiating literature has generally assumed that gender per se leads men and women to negotiate differently, but a completely different explanation has been offered in the literature on structural power and social status. Both status and structural power have been shown to determine such things as perceptions of ones competence, frequency of attempts to use power, and success at influence attempts (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977). Women historically have been excluded from the higher ranked positions in organizations (e.g., Kanter, 1977, 1979; Morrison et al., 1987; Schwartz & Zimmerman, 1992), have had lower status than men (e.g., Lockheed & Hall, 1975), and have been viewed as less competent, less powerful, and less successful influencers than men (Eagly & Wood, 1982; WiIey & Eskilson, 1983). Thus, it has been argued that womens more cooperative and compliant behavior in poweroriented interactions arises from their experience in adapting to low-power, low-status positions in organizations and in society generally, not from their gender or from

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internalized gender roles (Kanter, 1977; Meeker & Weitzel-ONeill, 1977). This proposition has received little empirical investigation (see Watson, 1994a, 1994b), but some support for it has been found with regard to social exchange behavior (e.g., Molm, 1985, 1986; Molm & Hedley, 1992), visual dominance (Dovidio et al. 1988), tactics in labor-management negotiations (Putnam & Jones, 1982), and expressions of hostility in group discussions (Siderits, Johannsen, & Fadden, 1985). We therefore propose the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 2. High power managers, regardless of gender, will feel more confident, more competitive, more certain that their partners will cooperate with them, more powerful, and more satisfied with the outcomes they achieve than will low-power managers. Independent of possible gender differences in negotiating behavior is the question of how managers negotiate from different organizational power positions. Although a managers power may derive from many sources-for example, position, reward, expertness, and so forth (French & Raven, 1959)-recognition and acceptance by the other are necessary to legitimate the managers attempts to influence even when the other has less power. The latter also has some power, if no more than the willingness to break off the relationship on which the high-power person depends. Thus, in negotiations between more and less powerful managers, one may ask whether people with greater power will simply attempt to dominate to attain their own ends or whether they will consider the other persons needs and try to maximize joint outcomes. The dominant models of conflict management behavior (e.g., Blake & Mouton, 1964; Pruitt, 1983a; Rahim, 1983; Savage, Blair, & Sorenson, 1989; Thomas, 1979, 1992; Walton & McKersie, 1965) classify negotiating tactics in terms of two independent dimensions: ( 1) degree of concern with ones own needs and (2) degree of concern with the needs of ones opponent. Tactic choice is presumably dictated by ones degree of concern for own and others needs and ranges from competitive behavior (based on concern for own needs only) to accommodative behavior (based on concern for others needs only) to problem-solving behavior (based on simultaneous and strong concern for both own and others needs). There is ample evidence from studies of bargaining and negotiation that more powerful people focus on their own needs and, therefore, dominate the less powerful in gaining their own ends (e.g., Bartos, 1970; Gifford, 1989; Lawler, Ford, & Blegen, 1988; Rubin & Brown, 1975; Wall, 1985). In fact, some theorists recommend that high-power parties use their power to exploit a weaker opponent rather than waste their resources trying to get their way by improving their relations with the opponent (Wall, 1985), a view that assumes that ongoing relations between the parties are unimportant. Yet, recent studies of managers influence behaviors by Yukl and others (Yukl & Falbe, 1990; Yukl & Tracey, 1992; Yukl, Falbe, & Youn, 1993; Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980) have shown that managers vary their choice of intluence tactics when dealing with peers, superiors, and subordinates. Perhaps because they recognize that these are all ongoing relationships, managers have been found to be more likely to use consultation and ingratiation tactics initially to influence peers and subordinates, resorting to pressure tactics only when these fail. On the other hand, managers usually attempt to influence their superiors through

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rational persuasion. Thus, it appears that experienced managers may use a power advantage to collaborate rather than to compete, whereas they are likely to engage in what has been called soft competition (Savage, Blair, & Sorenson, 1989) when they have less power. We therefore propose the following hypotheses concerning the impact of structural power on tactic choice: Hypothesis 3a. High-power managers will enact both more problem-solving behaviors and more coercive behaviors than will low-power managers. Hypothesis 3b. Low-power managers will enact more soft competitive tactics (e.g., use of reason and logic to persuade) than will high-power managers. The expected impact of these tactics on the outcomes of negotiations is implied by their descriptions. Accommodating is expected to lead to low personal substantive gains, though it may also produce the positive outcome of good relations with the other (e.g., Savage et al., 1989). Competing is expected to lead to high personal gains but often at the expense of future relations, especially when threats and abuse occur. Integrative, problem-solving behavior is expected to yield high personal gains as well as build good relations between the parties. Nevertheless, it is clear that the outcomes one can achieve depend not simply upon ones own behavior but also upon that of ones opponent as well (e.g., Putnam & Jones, 1982; Savage et al., 1989). For example, while competitive tactics are supposed to lead to high individual gains, if both parties compete, impasses are likely to result, leading to low personal outcomes for both parties. Furthermore, while problem-solving seems to be the most desirable approach, since it leads to high substantive and relationship outcomes, it is considered a risky tactic because ones opponent might not reciprocate, leaving one open to exploitation (e.g., Pruitt, 1983a; Savage et al., 1989). Assuming the studies of managerial influence attempts are correct (e.g., Yukl & Falbe, 1990; Yukl & Tracey, 1992; Yukl, Falbe, & Youn, 1993; Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980). high-power managers and low-power managers can be expected to employ antithetical approaches. Since it is unclear how this situation will be resolved, we will treat this as an exploratory aspect of the study rather than fo~ulating a specific hypothesis. Gender and Power The discussion so far has considered only the direct and independent effects of gender and power. However, the theories of structural power and status suggest possible interactive effects of gender and power. Since gender confers higher status on men and lower status on women, some (e.g., Lockheed & Hall, 1975) have suggested that being male should enhance structural power and being female should detract from it (Fagenson, 1990; Powell, Posner, & Schmidt, 1984; Terborg, 1977). Thus, male highpower managers can be expected to feel especially powerful and attempt even more dominating forms of influence, while female low-power managers would feet especially powerless and be even more accommodating. In the other two conditions, the gender and power effects would presumably cancel each other out. On the basis of

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this argument, we test the following additivefy such that

hypotheses

that gender and power will combine

Hypothesis 4a.

For participants with equal structural power, managerial women will feel significantly less confident, competitive, powerful, and trusting before negotiation and less successful afterward than will managerial men, but managerial women with high structural power will not differ from managerial men with low structural power.

Hypothesis 4b.

For participants with equal structural power, managerial women will engage in more yielding and accommodating behavior than will managerial men, but managerial women with high structural power will not differ from managerial men with low structural power in their use of negotiating tactics.

Finally, an even more complex prediction about the interaction between gender and power has been offered by expectation states theory (Berger et al., 1972; Berger et al. 1977), another prominent theory of social status. According to this perspective, status characteristics affect feelings, behavior, and outcomes only when they are activated. Status characteristics are activated when members of a pair differ on those characte~stics. Because members of negotiating pairs always had different power positions in this study, power should be activated in all pairs. Gender, however, should be activated only in mixedgender pairs, resulting in the prediction that gender and power will combine additively in mixed-sex pairs of negotiators but not in same-sex pairs.

Hypothesis 5a and 5b.

mixed-gender

The predictions of Hypotheses 4a and 4b will hold only in pairs of negotiators, not for same-gender pairs.

To test these hypotheses about the impact of gender and power on managerial negotiations, we developed a realistic, intra-organizational, simulated negotiation suitable for practicing managers. The simulation placed two managers in a situation of high versus low structural power to negotiate the selection of a vendor for an important company project and the means of implementation of the project. By assigning actual male and female managers randomly to the high- and low-power roles, we created an experimental design capable of assessing separately the effects of gender and structural power on the feelings, behaviors, and outcomes of negotiations, The possibility that experienced male and female managers might negotiate differently in high- and low- power positions and with a same- or opposite-gender partner can also be examined within this design.

METHOD Participants
A sample of 80 practicing managers from 18 firms in manufacturing, service, and educational fields formed 40 negotiation pairs. The 40 men and 40 women were comparable on almost all demographic measures. On average, these managers were 38

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years old, had 4.7 years of education beyond high school, and were middle managers (46%) with 13 direct reports. They generally spent little time handling formal negotiation (11% of their time on average) but considerably more time handling informal negotiations (42% of their time on average). Most (82%) had received no more than a day or less of training in negotiation. They differed significantly only in how long they had been in their current managerial positions (4.5 years for men, 2.7 years for women, F,,, = 6.02, p < .02). Because the number of years in current position was moderately (negatively) correlated with several dependent variables, it was used as a covariate in all statistical analyses so we could isolate the effect of gender.
Procedure

Participants took part in half-day sessions devoted to data collection via a simulated in&a-organizational negotiation and subsequent processing of the simulation. They had been told that they would receive training in negotiation, but there was no training in, or even discussion of, negotiation until all participants had finished the simulation and completed all questionnaires. Participants were paired with either a same- or opposite-gender opponent, in most cases with someone they did not know. Their partners were pointed out to them before they negotiated so they knew if they would be negotiating with a male or female. They were not allowed to meet or talk before they negotiated, however. They read their role instructions, completed a battery of questionnaires, negotiated for 20 minutes in private rooms, and then completed another battery of questionnaires.
The Negotiation Simulation

The simulation developed for this study involves two managers who work for the same division of a large conglomerate. The division is about to purchase and install a turn-key computer system to track sales activity in its numerous field sites. The two managers, the Head of Field Sales Operations and a Division Staff Specialist, have been assigned to the turnkey project by the divisions president. They are to select a vendor to provide the system and then to oversee the implementation of the system. The project has high visibility because the division has been experiencing significant declines in sales and the division president is hoping the sales tracking system will help them overcome this problem. The Field Manager is given more structural power in the role-play than the Staff Manager. This power derives from the Field Managers higher rank in the division (indicated through an organization chart included in the role descriptions), formal authority over all phases of the project (Staff is in strictly an advisory capacity), longer tenure with the division (15 years versus 2 years), and being a line manager in what is described as a historically line-run organization. In addition, the meeting is held in the Field Managers office and kept to 20 minutes due to his/her busy schedule. The Staff Manager has little structural power but has expertise in computer systems. S/ he wants to obtain a strong hand in the project, since this is the kind of thing his/her department was created to do. The Staff Managers boss has instructed him/her to try to control which vendor is selected and to secure the right to oversee system imple-mentation, because the Field Manager is not believed to have the relevant expertise.

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The power manipulation was highly successful. Immediately prior to negotiating, participants in the Field Manager role reported that they had significantly more power (mean = 4.1 on a 5-point scale where 5 = I have much more power than my partner) than those in the Staff Manager role (mean = 2.1 where 1 = S/he has much more power than I; F 1.78= 71.74,p < ,001). The conflict between the two parties revolves around three key issues: which vendor should provide the system, whether to include a penalty clause in the vendors contract, and oversight of the implementation of the system. The simulation was designed to be a mixedmotive situation with integrative potential. This was done by manipulating how important the issues were to each party so that each had something to trade off for what they wanted most. Post-negotiation manipulation checks (all measured on 9-point scales) verified that Staff Managers cared more about which vendor would be selected (mean = 6.8) than did Field Managers (mean = 1.8; F,,,, = 63 1.14, p < .OOOl); that Field Managers cared more about the penalty clause (mean = 6.6) than did Staff Managers (mean = 2.0; F,,,,y = 343.33, p < .OOOl); and that both cared equally about project oversight (Staff = 6.4, Field = 6.6; F 1,7s = .64, n.s.).
Dependent Measures

Scales were constructed from questions asked of the participants immediately before and immediately after the negotiation concerning their perceptions of and feelings about the negotiation. These scales provided three types of dependent measures: Pre-Negotiation Feelings, Post-Negotiation Feelings, and Outcomes. In addition, audio tapes and transcripts of the negotiation sessions were analyzed to determine participants behavior during the negotiation.
Pre-Negotiation Feelings

Prior to taking part in the simulation but subsequent to having their partners pointed out to them and reading their roles, participants rated their feelings of confidence, competitiveness, power, and the degree of cooperativeness they expected from their opponents. The items designed to assess confidence were a set of six semantic differential scales (e.g., confident/nervous, prepared/unprepared, calm/tense, self-assured/hesitant). Scores on these items were combined and formed a scale with standardized item alpha = JO. Participants feelings of competitiveness versus cooperativeness were derived from another set of three semantic differentials (competitive/cooperative, guarded/open, untrusting/trusting). These items formed a scale with standardized item alpha = .6 1. We also included a rating (single item, 5-point scale) of the degree of expected cooperation since Pruitt (1983b) has argued that this provides an operational definition of trust. Finally, to verify that the power manipulation had worked, we asked participants to indicate whether they believed they or their partners had more power in the situation depicted in the role-play (single item, 5-point scale).
Behavioral Measures

The negotiation sessions were audio taped and transcribed. Coding of the tapes and transcripts proceeded in two stages. First, two trained coders divided the transcripts into

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Table 1 Factor Loadings and Reliabilities for Coded Behaviors

Justifies Own Position Brags of Own Competence Criticizes Others Position Builds up to Own Position Questions Others Position Expresses Negative Affect Interrupts Other Releases Tension Is Interrupted Seeks Approval of Own Position Agrees with Other Expresses Positive Affect Makes Self-Deprecating Remark States Own Position Discloses Underlying Concern States Joint Concern Questions Joint Solution Rejects Joint Solution Backchannel Agreement AcknowIedges Others Concerns Eigenvalue Percent Variance Explained Standardized Alpha Norr: a Pearson r bcrwecn coders.

(72) (.83) (.84) (.72) (68) (69) 1.72) 1.87) 1.83) (85) (.78) (.79) (57) (.72) (.63) (.63) (.74) (88) 1.99) (.78)

.7O .61 .65 .49 .79 .74 .67 .68 .66 .63 .42 .I3 58 Sl .52 .48 .83 .79 .83 .77 3.83 18.2 .52 2.33 Il.1 .8S 2.03 9.6 .68 1.74 8.3 .72

1.62
7.7 .80

1.31 6.3 .77

codable speech acts following guidelines spelled out by Morley and Stephenson (1977). The mean intercoder agreement on speech acts was .86. Next, each speech act was coded for content (position, underlying need, etc.), referent (self, other, etc.), and mode (statement, clarification, rejection, criticism, etc.), which were ultimately collapsed into 20 general codes (e.g., stated own position, criticized others position, expressed negative affect toward partner, etc.). The mean intercoder correlation on these 20 codes across pairs was .74, with only one code below .60 (see Table I for a complete reporting). The 20 codes were analyzed by principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation. This analysis yielded six factors with eigenvalues z=1, which accounted for 61.2% of the variance. Factor loadings, eigenvalues, intercoder reliabilities, and standardized alphas are presented in Table 1 for the six scales that emerged from this analysis. We have labeled the six factors Placates (alpha = .77), Discloses (alpha = .72), Pleads (alpha = .6X), Argues (alpha = .52), Bullies (alpha = .85), and Wont Cooperate (alpha = .80). They depict tactics that are closely related to the general negotiation strategies (accommodating, competing, integrating, and compromising) that have been identified by two-dimensional models of conflict (e.g., Blake & Mouton, 1964; Rahim, 1983; Thomas, 1979, 1992) as discussed above. Placates refiects a cooperative, accommodating orientation since it involves acknowledging the others concerns.

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Discloses represents a problem-solving orientation in that it includes disclosures of underlying concerns and statements of joint concerns. Pleads, Argues, and Bullies are examples of different types of competing behaviors since they ah reflect attempts to get ones own way, though with varying degrees of demandingness. Pleads appears to be a very soft competing approach in which the party seeks agreement with his/her position but nervously, allowing interruptions and taking pains to agree with the opponent. Arguing is a stronger competing approach that relies on the use of reason and logic to persuade the opponent of the correctness of ones own position and the incorrectness of the opponents. Bullies seems to be the most aggressive of the competing approaches and reflects a dismissal of the opponent as a person as well as of his/her position. The sixth factor, Wont Cooperate, appears to be the obverse of collaborative problem-solving

Outcomes
following the role-play, p~icipants completed a questionnaire in which they indicated what decisions, if any, had been reached about each of the key issues: choice of vendor, inclusion of a penalty clause in the contract with the chosen vendor, and which manager would oversee system design and implementation. In any informal negotiation in which the final settlement is not written down (as in a formal contract), each individual may leave the meeting with his or her own perception of what the final terms were. Therefore, in the present case, each party was asked independently to report his or her understanding of the resolution of the three principal issues (choice of vendor. penalty clause, and oversight of the project). These reports, which reflect each partys belief about how the specific issues had been resolved, provided the data from which the various outcome measures were derived, Naturally, if parties beliefs differ. there will be no unified measure of outcome to examine. Nevertheless, we are still able to look at the effects of power and gender on the perceived outcomes reported by each member. Competitive success in negotiations represents the amount a party wins for him/ herself, both in terms of the total amount (Absolute Success) and relative to the amount achieved by ones opponent (Relative Success). Although parties in our simulation were not negotiating over dollars or other such readily quantifiable commodities, each was trying to achieve certain outcomes. A person was given 2 points for each personally illlportant outcome he/she reported attailli~g, 1 point for gaining some of that goal or gaining some reduction in the others important outcome, and 0 if they failed to achieve their goal in any way. Absolute Success for each party was the sum of these scores for the three issues at dispute and could vary from 0 to +5. Relative Success was the algebraic sum of the subjects Absolute score minus the opponents and could vary from -5 to +S. The quanti~cation of cooperative success (Quality) was based on the assumption that integrative, win-win solutions, in which the outcomes met both parties needs, were of highest quality (+4), since they ensured both that the tasks are accomplished and that longterm relations between the managers would be good. The integrative solution was defined in this instance as one in which the parties traded off the issue they were indifferent about (either choice of vendor or penalty clause, depending on role assignment), got what they wanted on their important issue (again, either vendor or penalty), and agreed to work together on the issue of mutual irnp~~~~ance (oversight of system inlplemen~tion~. Compromise solutions (+3) were deemed as somewhat less cooperative and were defined as those in which each party obtained one of his/her desired outcomes but compromised on

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the other or left it unresolved. Win-lose outcomes (+2) were those in which one party obtained more of his/her desired outcomes than the other and were considered of much lower quality, since only one partys needs were satisfied. Finally, lose-lose outcomes (+1) were those in which none of the issues was resolved.
Post-Negotiation Feelings

Following the negotiation, participants completed another questionnaire on which they rated how much power they felt they had had during the negotiation and how satisfied they were with the results achieved and with the process. A post-negotiation rating of power was included to determine whether there had been any shifts in felt power during the negotiation. To explore feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction following the negotiation, we included a variety of ratings. Three ratings were included to assess satisfaction with the decisions that had been reached (e.g., How satisfied are you with the decision you and your negotiating partner reached. 7 To what extent do you feel you got what you wanted in this negotiation? etc.). Combined ratings on these items yielded a scale labeled Satisfaction With Decision, with standardized item alpha = .88. Two items were included to evaluate participants satisfaction with their own behavior during the negotiation (e.g., How satisfied are you with the way you negotiated just now/). Combined ratings on these items yielded a scale labeled Satisfaction With Self, with standardized item alpha = .56. Finally, fourratings were included to evaluate participants reactions to their opponents (e.g., How well do you like your partner as a person. 7 If the two of you had to continue working together on this project, how well would you work together? etc.). Combined ratings on these items yielded a scale labeled Satisfaction With Partner with standardized item alpha = .73. RESULTS To aid in understanding the many analyses that were conducted to evaluate the five sets of hypotheses concerning gender and power, we present the results for each grouping of dependent variables in essentially the sequence that they were generated in the experiment: pre-negotiation feelings, negotiation behaviors, outcomes, and post-negotiation feelings. The means and intercorrelations of the measures used as dependent variables are presented in Table 2, grouped according to these categories. The hypotheses were tested through a three-factor MANCOVA design, in which each of the four types of dependent variables was analyzed simultaneously. Main effects for gender, power (high versus low), and pair composition (mixed- versus same-gender partner), as well as all the two- and three-way interactions, comprised the model for each of these analyses. The top part of each table reports the means of each variable (high numbers represent greater amounts) for each experimental condition, while the bottom part shows the source and magnitudes (eta2) of all effects significant
at p < .10. This value was chosen so that small effects, which the design lacked sufficient power to detect, would not be overlooked. The covariate was years in current managerial position, since that variable showed small but significant correlation with two of the dependent variables. Pre-Negotiation Feelings

After being paired with their partners, but before starting the negotiation, participants rated their feelings of confidence, competitiveness, how much cooperation they expected

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from their opponent, and how much power they had vis-a-vis their opponent. The means of the resulting indices are reported for each experimental condition in the top part of Table 3. The MANCOVA revealed multivariate main effects for gender (F4,67 = 2.62, p < .04), and power (FdlG7 = 23.71, p < ,001). There were no significant interactions. Results of the univariate analyses are reported in the bottom part of Table 3. Prior to negotiating, women reported feeling significantly less confident than men (means = 4.9 for women, 5.4 for men) and expected somewhat more cooperation than men (means = 3.0 for women, 2.5 for men). However, women felt neither more nor less competitive or powerful than men. Thus, Hypothesis la received partial support. The gender effects are small, accounting for 4%-S% of the variance in feelings. In contrast, high-power parties felt significantly more powerful before negotiating than did low-power parties (means = 3.94 for high-power parties, 2.03 for low-power parties) and expected more cooperation (means = 3.06 for high-power parties, 2.44 for low-power parties) than did low-power parties. High-power parties felt neither more confident nor more competitive than low-power parties prior to negotiating. Thus, Hypothesis 2 received partial support. The power effects range from small to large with power accounting for 10% of the variance in expected cooperation and 50% in feelings of power before the negotiation. Negotiation Tactics

Analyses of participants behavior during the negotiation revealed the six tactics which we labeled: Placates, Discloses, Pleads, Argues, Bullies, and Wont Cooperate. Table 4 Table 3 Pre-Negotiation
Mkd-Gender Reported Feeling High Power MC& Confidence Competitiveness Expected Cooperation Power 5.4 4.4 2.6 3.9 Fern& 4.8 4.6 3.4 3.8 Pairs Low Power Male 5.2 3.8 2.4 1.8 Funale 5.1 4.0 2.8 2. I

Feelings by Condition
Same-Gender High Power Male 5.5 4.2 3.2 3.9 Femcde 5.0 3.6 3.1 4.2 Pairs Low Pm,er Mule 5.4 3.7 2.0 2. I Fumcde 4.8 3.8 2.5 2.1

Significant Effects 0, < Reported Feeling Confidence Expected Cooperation Power _ Model Vm+hlr Gender (Male > Female) Gender (Female > Male) Power (High > Low) Power (High > Low)

(10.df 1.7 I)
F 3.89** 3.25* 7.87*** 71.74*** r 2 .05 .04 10 .50

***p<.oI.

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presents descriptive statistics, by condition, on each of these scales. The MANCOVA revealed multivariate main effects for power (F,,,, = 14.57, p < .OOl) and a marginally significant main effect for pair composition (F,,,, = 2.07, p < .07). Results of univariate tests are presented in the bottom part of Table 4. Managers in the high-power role engaged in more problem-solving (Discloses) than did low-power parties (means = 10.32 for high-power parties, 7.75 for low-power parties), but in neither more aggressive nor threatening types of competitiveness (e.g., Bullies or Wont Cooperate) than did low-power managers. Low-power parties significantly more often Pleaded (means = 6.93 for low-power parties, 4.72 for high-power parties), Argued (means = 10.54 for low-power parties, 4.96 for high-power parties), and Placated (means = 13.63 for low-power parties, 7.60 for high-power parties) than did high-power parties. These results support the first half of Hypothesis 3a, that high-power managers would choose cooperative, problem-solving approaches more so than low-power manager. They also support Hypothesis 3b, that low-power managers would choose soft competition as their key strategy. The power effects are generally small, accounting for less than 10% of the variance in Placating, Disclosing, and Pleading. However, power accounted for 33% of the variance in Arguing.

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Although no specific hypotheses were developed for pair composition, the analysis revealed that people behaved differently in pairs of different gender composition. Mixedgender pairs displayed significantly more Pleading (means = 7.0 for mixed, 4.7 for same) and marginally more Placating (means = 13.1 for mixed, 8.1 for same) than did samegender pairs. The effects of pair composition are small, accounting for 4%-10% of the variance in these behaviors. In summary, there was no support for Hypothesis lb that there would be consistent differences in the behavior of the men and women in this negotiation, nor did gender and power interact to make men more dominant or women more passive generally (Hypothesis 4b) or in mixed-gender groups in particular (Hypothesis Sb). In fact, contrary to Hypotheses 4b and 5b, the means in Table 4 show that low-power women tended to be a feisty bunch, refusing to cooperate (Wont Cooperate) more than other participants in the study and displaying a tendency to bully high-power male opponents. Although gender had no impact on behavior, structural power did, with high-power managers primarily attempting to develop a problem-solving climate as predicted in Hypothesis 3a and lowpower managers preferring to compete softly in accord with Hypothesis 3b. Low-power managers also accommodated (Placated) more than high-power parties.
Outcomes

As discussed in the Method section, we obtained each partys independent report about the resolution of the three principal issues (choice of vendor, penalty clause, and oversight of the project). Interestingly, we found little agreement between the parties about how the three issues were resolved. Only 20% of the pairs agreed on the final settlement of all three issues, while half (48%) agreed on only one or none. Furthermore, there were essentially no differences in the degree of agreement between parties by experimental condition (chisquare = 1.O, n.s.). Therefore, we are unable to examine the effects of power and gender on the outcomes of these negotiations, since in most pairs the members disagreed about the results. Rather, we can only ask what the effects of these variables were on the perceived outcomes reported by each member and on their relationship to each other. For example, are high-power parties more likely to perceive that they achieved their goals, regardless of how they think the low-power person fared? As described in the Methods section above, the way the issues were resolved was quantified into several indices of the competitive and cooperative success of the negotiations. These measures included Absolute Competitive Success (own total points), Relative Competitive Success (own points less partners points), and Quality (assumes cooperative outcomes are of higher overall quality than competitive outcomes). The top part of Table 5 presents descriptive statistics on these three outcome measures respectively by experimental condition. The MANCOVA revealed a multivariate main effect for power (F 4,66 = 2.8, p <: .03) and a marginally significant three-way interaction between gender, power, and pair composition (F 4.66 = 2.33, p < .07). No effects for gender were found for any of the outcome measures. Results of the univariate analyses are reported in the bottom part of Table 5. In general, almost all parties reported that the issues had been resolved in their favor (mean Absolute Competitive Success = 2.8 out of 5.0) although that was marginally (p < 10) less often true for high-power managers (mean Absolute Competitive Success =

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Absolute Sucess Relative Success Quality of Solution

3.0 -33 2.9

2.9 .32 2.5

2.1 -.2x 2.0

3.5 .39 2.5

2.2 p.85 2.4

2.3 -.I4 3.7

3.2 .99 2.4

2.9 .I6 2.2

Significant Oh.rmY4 B&IliOI Absolute Sucess Relative Success Quality of Solution

Modrl Vuihlr

Effects (p < 10.

df 1.7/)
6

Power (Low > High) Power (Low > High) Power (Low > High) Gender x Power x Pair Composition

2.92* 4.06 7,62* 7.59***

Nr>re\:

N = IO per cdl.
*
,I <

IO **/I

< .05 ***p

< .Ol

2.62 for high-power managers, 3.06 for low-power managers). In fact, high-power managers reported that they gave low-power managers significantly more than they themselves got (mean Relative Competitive Success = -.37 for high-power managers, +.34 for low-power managers). However, high-power managers reported achieving significantly more cooperative outcomes (win-win and compromise) than did lowpower managers (means Quality = 2.64 for high-power managers, 2.28 for low-power managers). The power effects are small, accounting for 40/o-10% of the variance. There was also a three-way interaction between group composition, role, and gender for quality of outcomes. High-power men reported more cooperative outcomes in mixed-gender than in same-gender pairs, whereas there were less marked differences when women were in the high-power role. When paired with females, high-power win-win outcomes in 70% of the pairs (and the women agreed in males reported 40% of them), but when paired with other males, only one reported such a result. This interaction, however, in no way supports the predictions from expectation states theory that men in high-power roles would completely dominate the women (Hypotheses 5a and 5b). In summary, there was no support for Hypothesis Ic-that managerial women would obtain less competitive success than managerial men. Structural power did affect perceived outcomes, however, with high-power managers believing they had achieved more cooperative, high quality outcomes and low-power managers believing they had outnegotiated their high-power peers. High-power men were especially likely to believe they had obtained win-win solutions when they negotiated with a low-power woman, but to admit to having given up more to a low-power man.

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Table 6 Post-Negotiation
Mix&Gender High Power Male Fern& Pairs Low Porrer Mole Femtrle

Feelings by Condition
Same-Gender Pain High Power Mole Frmule Low Pm-vrr Male Ferntde

Had Power Satified with Decision Satified with Self Satisfied with Partner

4.1 4.5 4.2 4.2

4.1 4.7 3.8 4.2

2.1 3.1 4.0 3.9

2.1 3.9 3.8 4.1

3.8 4.4 4.4 4.0

3.6 4.4 3.1 4.1

2.0 3.7 3.8 4. I

1.8 3.2 3.3 3.9

Significant Effects (p < 10. df 1.71)

Rrprted Feelings Model Vuricrhle F e7

Had Power Satified with Decision Satified with Self

Notr.r: N = IO per cell **
,I <

Power (High > Low) Power (High > Low) Gender (Male > Female)

68.18** 16.26** 7.17**

.49 .I9 .09

.os.

Post-Negotiation

Feelings

Following the negotiation, participants completed a questionnaire designed to assess their feelings of satisfaction with the decisions reached, with their own performance, and with their opponents. In addition, the power manipulation was checked again to see whether highpower parties had indeed felt more powerful during the interaction. Descriptive statistics for these measures are reported by condition in Table 6. The MANCOVA yielded a marginally significant multivariate main effect for gender (F5,67 = 2.23, p < .06) and a significant multivariate main effect for power (F5,67 = 17.65, p < .OO1). There were no interaction effects. The results of the univariate analyses are reported in the bottom part of Table 6. High-power members of both genders felt they had had much more power during the negotiation than did low-power parties (means = 3.89 for high-power, 2.01 for low-power). High-power parties also felt significantly more satisfied with the decisions reached than did low-power parties (means = 4.50 for high power, 3.64 for low power). These power effects are large, accounting for 19%-49% of the variance. Gender also had some effect on post-negotiation feelings. Women reported feeling significantly less satisfied with their own performance during the negotiation than did men (means = 3.64 for women, 4.10 for men). Gender did not affect feelings of power during the negotiation, satisfaction with the decisions reached, or reactions to ones opponent. The impact of gender was small, accounting for 9% of the variance in feelings about oneself. DISCUSSION The results of this study have implications for three somewhat separate aspects of negotiation: (1) gender differences, (2) differential managerial power positions, and (3) effective negotiating behavior in organizations. We discuss each of these in turn.

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Skill versus Their Lack of Confidence

Although our review of the literature on gender and negotiation found a continuing belief that women are nicer, if possibly less effective, negotiators than men, our study has found no evidence of any simple gender effect. These experienced managerial women were neither worse nor better negotiators, neither more cooperative or open to the other, and neither more or less persuasive or threatening than were men. Whether they were in the high-power role or the low-power role, men and women could not be differentiated in either their behavior or in the outcomes they and their partners reported. There was as much variability in observed behavior among the women as among the men, thus precluding any basis for gender stere~)typing. The concept of women as nice negotiators may, in fact, represent a confusion of the effects of gender and the low-power statuses that women generally occupy in U.S. organizati~~ns. The low-power managers in our study, regardless of gender, attempted to placate their opponents and to use softly persuasive tactics rather than direct confrontation and threats (see Table 4). Our conclusion, then, is that managerial women should not be expected to be any more or less nice or successful negotiators than managerial men. Furthermore, the results provide no support for any of the theories that suggested possible interactions between gender and power (e.g., Berger et al., 1972, 1977; Powell et al., 1984). Although a few suggestive, marginally significant interactions were found , in no case did they support the notion that gender and power would accumulate to mens advantage and womens disadvantage. One of the more intriguing of these occurred in mixed-gender pairs in which the men had more power than the women-the traditional power imbalance. These managers reported higher rates of cooperative outcomes (Table 5) than did managers in any of the other combinations. Why this happened in these pairs is not clear from our data but may warrant further examination with a larger sample. Overall, then, this study adds to the growing body of empirical literature which shows that women are as likely as men to enact appropriate behaviors when they are placed in managerial positions (e.g., Powell, 1990; Kanter, 1977, 1979). There is one caveat to this conclusion, however. Womens attitudes toward negotiation and toward themselves as negotiators appear to be quite different from mens, These managerial women felt less confident in anticipation of negotiating and were less satisfied with their performance after the meeting, despite the fact that their performance and the outcomes they achieved were similar to the mens. To the extent that women lack confidence in their negotiating abilities and find the experience distasteful, they may penalize themselves by failing to negotiate with other managers to achieve their own legitimate ends. Research is needed in organizations to determine whether managerial women are more likely than men to avoid negotiating because they lack confidence, and if so, whether it serves as an impediment to their effective performance or advancement.
The Behavior of More and Less Powerful Managers

In striking contrast to the lack of gender effects, structural power differentials made a substantial contribution to the process and the perceived outcomes of the negotiations. Although the managers in this simulation were not in a superior-subordinate relationship, the parties were both aware of, and reacted to, the power differences created by the line

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(high power) versus staff (low power) responsibilities for the outcomes of the project about which they were negotiating. Both prior to the negotiation and afterward, high-power parties felt signi~cantly more powerful than did low-power parties (Tables 3 and 6) and, as well, expected their low-power opponents to cooperate with them. Perhaps because they expected cooperation, experienced managers placed in the highpower role attempted to create a problem-solving type of interaction in which both parties needs might be met, rather than a competitive, win-iose one. By being open about their own concerns and preferences and behaving in a friendly way toward their opponents, they invited the low-power parties to express their views on the issues and to participate in creating a mutually satisfactory decision. This behavior contrasts sharply with the competitive attempts to dominate found in most laboratory studies of negotiation (e.g., Lawler, Ford, & Blegen, 1988), but it is consistent with the practices that more progressive managers have been found recently to take toward their subordinates (Heller, I97 I, 198 1; Karambayya, Brett, & Lytle, 1992; Sheppard, Saunders, & Minton, 1988; Yukl & Falbe, 1990). However, this approach seems not to have stimulated a reciprocal response from the lowpower managers. Although cognizant of their own lack of power, the low-power managers did not feel completely powerless (mean rating of power before the meeting = 2.03, after the meeting = 2.01). Their role instructions suggested that they were knowledgeable about the computer systems being discussed. Perhaps because of this, they appear to have misinte~reted the openness of the high-power managers as a willingness to be persuaded, rather than an invitation to jointly problem-solve. Therefore, they tended to argue for their own preferred solutions. Their expert power base (French & Raven, 1959) may have given them the confidence to argue assertively when given the opportunity by the high-power managers. The low-power managers generally avoided hard competition in favor of softer versions-such as pleading and using reason and logic to persuade plus some accommodation in the form of placating. They thought that this approach worked well for them since most of them reported that they were the winners of win-lose outcomes. That they had to argue and plead so hard to gain their wins (Table 4) may account for why they felt dissatisfied with the outcomes they achieved. Nevertheless, these results are instructive with regard to the strategic choice of tactics for low-power parties. They indicate that low-power parties can obtain good substantive outcomes for themselves if they persist in soft competition.
General Issues about Negotiations and Negotiating Styles

The lack of agreement between 80% of the negotiating partners about how the issues had been resolved indicates a failure of the parties to effectively communicate with each other about the central issues discussed. In the present case, a vendor may be hired, timelines developed, and meetings scheduled, all in conflict with the expectations of the other party. One of the fundamental skills recommended for concluding meetings is to summarize the agreements reached and check that everyones understanding is the same (e.g., Whetton & Cameron, 1991). This basic failure in a majority of these pairs is consistent, however, with the way in which the two parties typical approaches to the meeting were at odds with each other. As noted before, the high-power parties typically attempted to create a conciliatory, collaborative atmosphere by inviting the other person to join them in identifying and

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solving a common set of problems. Most of the low-power parties, however, declined the invitation and adopted a competitive stance, which then led to impasses, grudging concessions, or rejection by the high-power person. From an overall organizational perspective, this form of negotiation is less than optimum. Had a more problem-solving approach to the negotiation been adopted, the parties might have achieved truly win-win settlements, which both parties agreed to and with which the low-power managers might have been more satisfied. However, it is difficult to convert negotiations to problem-solving discussions. The implicit norms associated with each are quite different. The norms of negotiation dictate competition and obfuscation, not the openness expressed by the high-power parties in attempting to identify and solve a mutual problem (e.g., Hoffman, 1979). To turn negotiations into problem-solving meetings in which jointly satisfactory outcomes are achieved, one or both parties must not only take the risk of making conciliatory overtures and hope that the other will respond similarly, but be explicit about their view of the need for a collaborative, problem-solving process so they can develop cooperative norms jointly. Our observations of these sessions indicate that none of these managerial pairs ever adopted this strategy. Our conclusion, then, is that while situational power may encourage the adoption of facilitative, problem-solving approaches to conflict resolution by experienced managers, they do not necessarily do it effectively. Even managers with the level of experience of those in the present study (I 3 years of experience on average) need training in how to conduct joint problem-solving meetings, a long-standing prescription of scholars interested in management training (e.g., Maier, 1963; Hoffman, 1982).
Limitations of the Study

The results of this experiment, while consistent with studies of managerial behavior, clearly fly in the face of many other studies of the impact of power on behavior and outcomes. What accounts for these contradictions? Probably most obvious is the fact that the subjects in this study were experienced managers while much of the evidence for theories of negotiation are based on studies of students. The latter are likely to be more naive and unsophisticated in the uses of power, while our subjects had experience in both the advantages and limitations of using power in a dominating way. The reader might argue, on the other hand, that we are overemphasizing differences in subject populations when, in fact, the artificiality of the experimental situation accounts for the results obtained. While this is clearly an important consideration, our experience in the experimental sessions suggests that the participants took the role-playing situation quite seriously and acted as if the decision was an important one for them and the company. Others have reported similarly high involvement in negotiation simulations (e.g.. Karambayya et al., 1992). Previous research (e.g., Geller, 1978) has shown that when subjects are highly involved in role-playing, their feelings and behavior are indistinguishable from those of people in actual situations. Other studies in which these limitations have been removed will help to clarify the validity of the conclusions we have drawn. In the meantime, however, the results from this study suggest new directions in theorizing about the impact of gender and power on

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negotiators and, as well, provide useful new avenues to pursue in order to better guide managers in handling organizational conflicts.

Acknowledgments:

This research was supported by Grant No. G3-90-026 from the Fund for Research on Dispute Resolution. The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the position of the Fund.

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