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Review of International Studies Bringing Religion into

International

Review of International Studies (2003), 29 Relations : pp 321-340 Copyright 2003 British International Studies Association DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0260210503003 218 (About DOI) Published online: 26 June 2003

Humanitarian responsibilities and interventionist claims in international society


Alex J. Bellamy

Abstract
This article calls for a widening of the debate about humanitarian intervention to incorporate insights from constructivism, Welsh School; Critical Security Studies, and critical approaches to Third World International Relations. After identifying a series of problems with the contemporary debate, which is dominated by the English School, it calls for a broadening of the concept of intervention and suggests a need to rethink the meaning of humanitarianism and terms such as the supreme humanitarian emergency.
Title: Author: Publication: Publisher: Peter Mandaville Perspectives on Politics Cambridge University Press Jan 1, 2006

Date:
Copyright Cambridge University Press 2011

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Religious Affinities and International Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts in the Middle East and Beyond

Jonathan Fox, Patrick James and Yitan Li Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique / Volume 42 / Issue 01

Canadian Journal of Political Science


Canadian Journal of Political Science (2009), 42 : pp 161-186 Copyright Canadian Political Science Association 2009 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0008423909090064 (About DOI) Published online: 07 April 2009

Perspectives on Politics

Perspectives on Politics (2006), 4 : pp 226-227 Copyright 2006 American Political Science Association DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592706810145 (About DOI) Published online: 24 February 2006

Table of Contents - 2006 - Volume 4, Issue 01

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BOOK REVIEWS: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Bringing Religion into International Relations


Peter Mandaville a1 a1 George Mason University

Bringing Religion into International Relations. By Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 224p. $55.00. With this book, Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler offer the most comprehensive meditation to date on the question of religion as a factor in international relations. Stating as their central purpose a desire to expand the boundaries of international relatio ns theory by the inclusion of religion as a variable in the research of international politics (p. 4), the authors provide a superbly structured overview of a topic that has been crying out for sustained engagement for some time now. While the questions asked (and many of the answers eventually posited) are by no means wholly original, Bringing Religion Into International Relations finally offers IR a systematic baseline of inquiry that subsequent scholarship on religion and international affairs can build upon or challenge.
Kayadibi, Saim (2011) Formation of the concept of Istisan in Islamic Law. In: Pool Finance Economic System: Law, Democracy, Alliance of Civilization. IIUM Press, Kuala Lumpur, pp. 181-217. ISBN 9789674181215 (In Press) PDF (Book Section-Formation of the concept of Istisan in Islamic Law) - Published Version Restricted to Repository staff only Download (1089Kb) | Request a copy

Abstract
The concept of istisn (juristic preference) played a crucial role in intellectual heritage of the history of Islamic law and the development of Islamic legal reasoning through putting humans contribution into judgments based on primary principles of securing ease and avoiding hardship. In the process of formation of istisn, the concept of qiys (analogy) was the main factor. When the result of qiys would cause hardship to the people, the concept of istisn was applied giving preference to unconsidered evidence which may eradicate hardships. No technical definition of istisn have reached us from the very early Islamic legal history, despite the notion of istisn has been used throughout the history of formation of Islamic law. This paper intends to investigate empirically the historical journey of istisn which was applied researching its traces throughout the history of Islamic legal reasoning and critically discuss their applications in Islamic law giving special emphasis on relationship with the concept of qiys. Kayadibi, Saim and Belem, Moctar (2011) The role of Abu anifahs trade life in the modern economic thought. In: Pool Finance Economic System: Law, Democracy, Alliance of Civilization. IIUM Press, Kuala Lumpur, pp. 218-247. ISBN 9789674181215 (In Press) PDF (Book Section: The role of Abu anifahs trade life in the modern economic thought) - Published Version Restricted to Repository staff only Download (1145Kb) | Request a copy

Abstract

Practical life experiences of economists play a great role in creating economic theories for a prudent society. Isolated ideas from the life of an economist would not find acceptance therefore an analysis of Ab anfahs trade life, which gave him an intensively absorbed knowledge of how to deal with the common practices and needs of the people and newly-occurring problems of daily life. This research aims to investigate the role of Ab anfahs trade life and how his daily life experiences helped to materialize a manner of addressing economic issues. Many modern economic theories and banking systems have been influenced by Muslim economists and one of them was Ab anfah. Investigating his practical experiences in trade life may contribute new understanding to modern economic thought. Global economists should possess both an ethical and practical comprehension of economics and finance rather than having solely theoretical knowledge. This has been exemplified in Malaysia, a country which is becoming a centre of Islamic Banking and Finance activities. New economists are in need of a more pragmatic and ethical comprehension of economic life in order to develop discreet view on Economic and Finance issues faced particularly by the Muslim community in the world.

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Article
International Politics38, 515-532 (December 2001) | doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8897050

Religious Causes of International Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts


Jonathan Fox

Abstract Ethnic conflict and international intervention have become increasingly important items on the international agenda since the end of the Cold War. Yet not all ethnic conflicts attract international intervention. While there are clearly other important motivations for international intervention, this study focuses on the influence of one of them: religion. Are religious conflicts perceived as more important to potential intervenors? Do those who intervene have religious affinities with the ethnic minorities on whose behalf they intervene? The results of this analysis find support for these relationships. Religious conflicts attract more political intervention by foreign governments and kindred groups to the minority living elsewhere. Intervening states are likely to have populations that are religiously similar to those minorities on whose behalf they intervene. Also, religious conflicts involving Christian and Moslem minorities attract military intervention by foreign governments about ten times as often as conflicts involving other religious minorities. These groups also attract more political intervention by kindred groups living elsewhere, whereas minorities that are not Christian or Moslem attract more intervention by NGOs and multi-state organizations.
To read this article in full you may need to log in, make a payment or gain access through a site license (see right).

Religious Causes of International Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts Author: Publication: Publisher: Date: Jonathan Fox and International Politics Palgrave Macmillan Dec 1, 2001

Copyright 2001, Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

Article
International Politics (2001) 38, 515532. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8897050

Religious Causes of International Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts


Jonathan Fox1
1

Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, ISRAEL

Correspondence: Jonathan Fox, E-mail: foxjon@mail.biu.ac.il

Ethnic conflict and international intervention have become increasingly important items on the international agenda since the end of the Cold War. Yet not all ethnic conflicts attract international intervention. While there are clearly other important motivations for international intervention, this study focuses on the influence of one of them : religion. Are religious conflicts perceived as more important to potential intervenors ? Do those who intervene have religious affinities with the ethnic minorities on whose behalf they intervene? The results of this analysis find support for these relationships. Religious conflicts attract more political intervention by foreign governments and kindred groups to the minority living elsewhere. Intervening states are likely to have populations that are religiously similar to those minorities on whose behalf they intervene. Also, religious conflicts involving Christian and Moslem minorities attract military intervention by foreign governments about ten times as often as conflicts involving other religious minorities. These groups also attract more political intervention by kindred groups living elsewhere, whereas minorities that are not Christian or Moslem attract more intervention by NGOs and multi-state organizations.

International Studies Review 2001 The International Studies Association Abstract: Religion is among the most overlooked factors in the study of international politics. Some reasons for this include a bias against the study of religion that dates to the origins of the social sciences, the influence on social scientists of classical liberal ideas that stress the separation of church and state, and the fact that religion is difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, the essay holds

that religion influences international politics in three ways: 1) religion influences the worldviews of many decisionmakers and their constituents and shapes the environment in which decisionmakers act; 2) religion is a source of legitimacy for political decisions and actions; 3) religion is an issue that crosses borders in many ways, including domestic conflicts with international implications. Equally significant are international religious movements, like fundamentalist movements and political Islam, and the foreign policies of theocratic states and other governments, which are guided by religious ideologies. Attention focuses on the international movement for the support of religious rights in the context of the world's growing interdependence. This underscores the importance of religion in the study of international politics.
Professor and Department Chair, Latin American and Latino Studies Department of Latin American & Latino Studies Jonathan Fox Jonathan Fox is a Professor of Latin American and Latino Studies at UC Santa Cruz with a Ph.D. in Political Science from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His research interests include: Latin American and Latino politics, including issues of democratization, accountability, social movements, transnational civil society, social and environmental policy, and immigration.

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Perspectives on Contemporary Ethnic Conflict: Primal Violence Or the ...


By Santosh C. Saha

religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism


By Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur

Interventionism
The theory of interventionism examines the nature and justifications of interfering with another polity (that is, political organization) or with choices made by individuals. Interventionism is characterized by the use or threat of force or coercion to alter a political or cultural situation

nominally outside the intervenors moral or political jurisdiction. It commonly deals with a governments interventions in other governments affairsand is thus an aspect of political philosophy, but it can also be extended to interventions in others cultures, religions, lifestyles, and economic activitiesand thus can fit into applied ethics, covering such issues as paternalism, imperialism, and topics in business, medical, and environmental ethics.

Table of Contents
1. 2. 3.
A Note on Methodological Considerations What Does Interventionism Deal With? Arguments for Interventionism 1. Epistemological Reasons 2. Political Realism 3. Rights Theories Non-Interventionist Doctrines Legal Positivism and Non-Interventionism Isolationism Economic Interventionism

4. 5. 6. 7.

1. A Note on Methodological Considerations


The context of interventionism requires an epistemological consideration. A methodological individualist will argue that it involves interventions in the lives of individuals; that essentially it does not matter whether the individuals are part of ones political entity or belonging to another interventionism applies solely to individuals. A methodological holist on the other hand will identify the object of interventionism as groupscultural, political, religious, national, and so on. Whilst the methodological individualist will focus on issues that infringe or attempt to alter individuals rights or choices, the holist will draw attention to issues affecting groups and their identities. Methodological compatibilism holds that interventions do affect individual rights or choices but individuals also identify themselves with groups who can also be separately affected by interference. For example, demanding that all female bank employees wear blue dresses affects the individuals choice of clothes in the workplace but also interferes with the banking corporations right to determine its own standard of dress.

2. What Does Interventionism Deal With?


Beyond epistemological considerations interventionism commonly deals with the justifications of governments to interfere in (a) the lives of its own civilian populationdomestic interventions, and (b) the activities of other nationsforeign interventions. In the case of domestic interventionism that apparatus is the police force (or the army acting as a domestic policing force as with the British army in Northern Ireland 1969-date); in the case of international interventionism it is the army. In either scenario interventionism implies the potential or actual use of coercion. Reasoning or persuading another group of people that a chosen policy, or a certain tradition, is wrong either morally (given a certain standard) or on consequentialist considerations (the policy

will not achieve what its meant to achieve) are not examples of interventionism. Reasoning includes all forms of rhetoric, example, persuasion, exhortation, counseling, discourse, and so on. The other group changes policy or tradition only if it desires is persuaded to change. They do so voluntarily. On the other hand, it may be claimed that in attempting to persuade others to change their minds is a form of interventionism. But this definition then becomes too broad to be of usemerely speaking to another or judging their behavior in the absence of any threats, coercion, or force, cannot be termed interventionist, for its goal is not to interfere but to explain possible choices. Breaking diplomatic relations also does not imply the use of force and hence is not a form of interventionism. This is an essentially peaceful attempt to alter another governments actions in effect by removing acknowledgement of its international political status. Voluntary decisions on the part of a people may change a nations values. Trading in goods and ideas can change a society, yet such changes should not, for the most part, be deemed interventionist. Changes in culture and language that result from the voluntary decisions of many individuals cannot be tied to any form of interventionism, for the policy of interventionism is a policy of threatening or using coercion or force of some description. Whether such examples exist is hard to ascertain, for commonly the expansion of freedom of trade that has led to an exchange of ideas and hence of cultures is historically almost universally connected with imperialist policies that do aim at explicit forms of intervention. Following World War Two (1939-45) when Western imperialism dwindled as a political value, it can be argued that various societies (e.g., Taiwan, Malaysia) voluntarily took up what are referred to as Western values through the influence of non-violent commercial ventures. However, critics may point out that previous military interventions could be considered as necessary precursors to changes in the culture of the people. Coercion is a form of interventionism. Coercion implies offering choices that normally would not be accepted, but which leave the individual to choose the option preferred by the coercer, or by default one that is less acceptable. For example: if a knife is held to your throat and you are given the option to hand over your car keys or die, you are being coerced; if a government demands that you open up your borders to a free trade in opium or face armed conflict (China, Opium Wars with Britain) your nation is being coerced. Domestic interventions entail restricting the choices of individuals or groups or altering their activities through legislative coercion. Limiting freedom of speech or trade, restricting occupational access to certain religious groups, or enforcing the draft are examples of interventions in the choices of individuals or groups, while increasing beer taxes are examples of altering choices through legislative frameworks; failure to comply may incur penalties. On the international level, interventionist activities involve threatening, coercing, or forcing another group or nation to alter its behavior or change its government or policies. International interventionism can incorporate direct activities such as the use or threat of war, as well as indirect activities such as assassination, subversion, and economic embargoes of all descriptions (complete or partial blockades, transport restrictions, etc.).

General goals of international interventionism include attempting to change: governments (e.g., Iran, 1979); peoples expectations of governmental activities; general attitudes of just conduct not held as appropriate in the wider international community (e.g., South African Apartheid). Specific goals can include changing a state apparatus or its personnel (the government), to remove a particular statesperson or group, to change specific or general policies, to alter cultural or political beliefs, or even to alter patterns of economic and population distributions.

3. Arguments for Interventionism


Utilitarian or consequentialist prescriptions are open-ended: they could support interventions either generally or in particular circumstances, depending on expected results. Other positions offer more principled cases for interventionism, for example on epistemological grounds, political realism or rights analyses.

a. Epistemological Reasons
Intervening can be justified on grounds of the government possessing better knowledge than individual agents, or from paternalistic reasons, which presume the target agents are incapable of making informed choices themselves. To that extent, governments may legislate a range of programs from ensuring that people take out adequate insurance or invest sufficiently into pensions to requiring health checks or continued education; or economic interventions could be justified on the grounds that economic agents (investors, corporations, banks) do not act in the long term interest of the nation, whereas civil servants who are deemed above the profit motive can take the longer view (as held by John Maynard Keynes 1883-1946, for example).

b. Political Realism
Political realism is defined by the primacy of national interest in international affairs. This can be viewed as either a moral duty or as a description of the ruling state of affairs. Policy prescriptions involve pursuing interventions as they benefit the national interest. The theory implies that states should be left alone to seek and to defend their own interests. In the realist tradition, of which there are many shades, such supporters include Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. Political realism offers a broad interventionist doctrine that can justify intervening for reasons of economic profit as well as for balance of power considerations. The history of the British Empire provides many examples of both justifications (Cf. its interventions in European politics in the War of the Spanish Succession 1702-13 and the War of the Austrian Succession 1740-8), whilst post-war US foreign policy offers more recent case studies (Vietnam War 1961-73 and the Gulf War 1990-91). It is captured by Thucydides description of the Pelopennesian War, that it was Spartan fear of Athenian growth that caused the war. Realists often invoke consequentialist concerns regarding the developing international state of affairsthat should the foreign power to grow unchecked, a war would ensue, or economic resource bases would be lost, or an invasion could occur. The Schlieffen Plan, prior to the First World War (1914-18) is another useful example of balance of power considerations.

Political realism assumes that interests are to be maintained through the exercise of power, and that the world is characterized by competing power bases (nation states [Hegel], for example, or classes [Marx]). Political realism is essence reduces to the ethical principle that might is right.

c. Rights Theories
Some claim that rights only pertain to individuals, and that nations and governments only acquire any rights or privileges by virtue of the civilians giving them power. Rights theorists thus argue that individual rights supersede or trump the rights or privileges of governments. On this basis, interventions in support of rights are morally justifiable. For example, if a foreign government tyrannizes its civilians, an intervention to support their rights can be justified, for the moral status of rights does not end at political borders. However, what needs to be considered is at what point do rights violations justify an intervention, or would an intervention do more harm than good? Second is the argument from hypocrisycan a nation be justified in intervening in anothers affairs when it does not have a clean slate of its own? Finally, given that rights are being violated, is a government guilty of moral failure if it fails to intervene, and if so, is that moral failure a failure of its duty or of virtuous behavior?

4. Non-Interventionist Doctrines
Non-interventionism is the theory that one does not have any moral justification in intervening in others affairs. On a rights based analysis, or from Kantian considerations of duty, this may be considered an absolutist prohibition on the grounds that it either violates others rights to freedom or respect due them as individual moral entities. Consequentialists may infer from evidence that interventionism is always counter-productive and should not be practiced. In contemporary ethical analysis, a rule utilitarian may claim that since interventions never work (an empirical, testable hypothesis), ethical considerations aimed at maximizing the greatest good for the greatest number should employ non-interventionism on principle. However, act utilitarians may agree that historically interventions have not worked, but that does not mean that they will not in a future situation, and hence non-interventionism should not be held categorically. As a political-economical doctrine, non-interventionism includes the economic doctrine of laissez-faire, which holds that governments should not intervene in the economic activities of individuals or corporations. Some thinkers, notably Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) have extended the doctrine to moral issues too, arguing, for example, that intervening in the plight of the poor only makes their condition worse by creating an atmosphere of dependency, rather than leaving them to independently struggle and find their own values. Other supporters of the economic laissez-faire doctrine do not go as far as Spencer; Friedrich von Hayek argues (Constitution of Liberty, 1956) that governments do have responsibilities to the poor resulting from their duty to provide a general framework to ensure the smooth operation of the free market system. On a broader view, non-interventionism is applied by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty; he claims that responsibility to others only goes so far as ensuring they know of the dangers that may befall them, but does not extend to actually physically restraining those who would knowingly injure themselves. In the international sphere, Mill (Notes on Intervention Collected Works) argues

for a policy of self-determination: that other people be allowed to make their own mistakes, and hence forge their own paths to freedom; intervening paternalistically on their behalf will not be conducive to their learning the value of freedom in its own right. Such a stance can be used in a variety of issues including freedom of press and expression. For example, John Milton in Areopagitica argues: And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play on the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?

5. Legal Positivism and Non-Interventionism


In the international sphere, legal positivists are commonly non-interventionists. Legal positivists, following Christian Wolff (1679-1754), argue that nation states possess absolute rights to political sovereignty and territorial integrity, which implies that national borders be inviolable. Wolff writes: Nations are regarded as individual free persons living in a state of nature. For they consist of a multitude of men united into a state. Therefore since states are regarded as individual free persons living in a state of nature, nations must also be regarded in relation to each other as individual free persons living in a state of nature. (Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum Trans. Joseph Drake. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1934, 2, p.9) The positivist theory of international relations implies that interventions would violate international borders; this position itself resolves into an absolutist doctrine that deems interventions should never be condoned and more pragmatic positions that permit some exceptions to the rule. Positivist exceptions to non-interventionism emanate from humanitarian considerations that overwhelm nominally sacrosanct national borders, if the target state is violating basic human rights to such an extent that it can no longer be deemed a proper representative of its people. The type of interventionism supported depends on the theory of the state entertained. If governments are viewed as instrumental institutions that exist to uphold the domestic rights of civilians, then a violation of its remit can warrant an intervention on behalf of the citizens. Michael Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars (1977) entertains this position, arguing that only in extreme cases of rights violations that shock the moral conscience of mankind (p.107), can interventions be supported. He gives the examples of genocide, mass murder or enslavement. Rights violations above this level, he implies, are not grounds for interventionism (e.g., removal of free movement, freedom of the press, etc). A Hobbesian case for interventionism can be maintained by those who consider governments the sole and proper moral and legal authorities. Hobbes claims that individuals give up the rights that they possess in the state of nature (except the right of self-preservation) to the state (the Leviathan). He argues the State should be obeyed, even it is acting quite tyrannically, for the alternative and the greater evil is the state of war in which justice and morality do not hold. However, if a state acts to takes its civilians into the state of nature by governing incompetently or unjustly then the people have a right to form a new state. This allows the legal positivist to condone interventions where governments have obviously failed in their obligations and have brought war to the people through their ineptitude.

The third possible justification for the positivist is when a supra-legal body legislates in favor of an intervention. For example, the United Nations has the jurisdiction to pass a resolution of intervention, but it does not condone unilateral interventions. Positivists draw parallels here between governments arbitrating in domestic disputes and a world body acting to dissolve international disputes.

6. Isolationism
Isolationism is the political doctrine of non-involvement in foreign affairs. The state, it is argued, should confine its activities to its own jurisdiction, and therefore, what happens abroad is of no concern. Isolationism can be argued from a consequentialist perspective: that getting involved would only make matters (whatever those matters are) worse; or from an intrinsicist perspective similar to the legal positivist case, that national jurisdiction (and hence moral and political concerns) ends at the political borders.

7. Economic Interventionism
Government intervention in the economy was noted above. Whilst the effects and the principles are the subject matter of economics, philosophers can fruitfully examine the nature of the epistemological arguments used in the debates which involve considerations of methodological individualism versus holism, and a-priori versus a-posteriori reasoning.

Author Information
Alexander Moseley Email: alex@classical-foundations.com United Kingdom

Terrorism and Political Violence


Volume 17, Issue 3, 2005

Terrorism and Political Violence


Volume 17, Issue 3, 2005

Third-Party Intervention in Ethno-Religious Conflict: Role Theory, Pakistan, and War in Kashmir, 1965

DOI: 10.1080/09546550590929200 Gauvav Ghose & Patrick James pages 427-445

Third-Party Intervention in Ethno-Religious Conflict: Role Theory, Pakistan, and War in Kashmir, 1965
Gauvav Ghosea&Patrick Jamesb* pages 427-445 Available online: 04 Sep 2006

ABSTRACT
Third-party intervention in ethno-religious conflict is an old phenomenon, although scholarly attention with a general range of application is generally new and uncommon. This study with attempt, through a systematic review of religion and other factors that can impact upon foreign policy role performance, to explain Pakistan's intervention in Kashmir, which led to full-scale war in 1965. The article unfolds in six sections. The first provides an overview of thirf-party intervention in ethno-religious conflict. The second section introduces systemism a framework that brings together unit- and system-level factors. The theory of role analysis in foreign policy and its usefulness in explaining third-party, ethno-religious intervention is covered in the third section. Section four brings together systemism and role theory and eleborates linkages, with an emphasis on religion and other salient factors from the literature on foreign policy and intenational conflict. The fifth section presents the case study of Pakistan's intervention in India in 1965. Section six sums up the findings from the case study and offers a few observations about the contemporary situation in Kashmir.

Economics and Religion


These two powerful aspects of human life deserve to be examined and they deserve to be freed from the errors foisted upon them by the ego-driven.
Monday, March 14, 2011

Prejudice Does The Same Thing As Interventionism. Religious prejudice rears its ugly head most often in two ways among Austrian economists. First of all, I am not saying that there are not Austrian economists who do not have
religious prejudices. Wertfrei is a convenient curtain to hide behind. It has been mistakenly used to justify atheism. The methodology of atheism is passed off as 'scientific.' The individuals who approach economic science in this manner have one type of religious prejudice - contempt for all religions. The other religious prejudice is not regarded as part of economic science even though some may even lean in that direction since religious history is intertwined with economic history. It is really just a specific type of ethnocentricity, passed off as a necessary part of a religious conviction. Not all adherents of religion are locked into an ethnocentric viewpoint but many are and those individuals who are exhibit religious prejudice. Prejudice of all kinds interferes with the flow of information in society and in human civilization. In that regard it acts in much the same way as interventionism! For more information go to my Go

website.

here to read about Mastery of ETHICAL ECONOMICS.

{I am currently taking a partial hiatus from blogging so frequently since I am preparing to write the fourth and final book in the divine economy theory series, due to be published around May 2011.}

Obama keeps pushing the bipartisan religion of interventionism


By mike | Published: April 2, 2012

Too often, I believe, Americans think about Washingtons interventionism only as the actual physical intervention of U.S. military forces abroad in places where no U.S. interest is at risk. That activity certainly is intervention, but President Obamas despicable decision last week to have his administration leak intelligence claiming that Israel has concluded an agreement with the government of Azerbaijan to allow its use of Azeri airfields for an air strike on Iran is just as much an unwarranted intervention by the United States government. Readers of this blog will know that I carry no brief for Israel, that I believe it is a state that is irrelevant to U.S. national interests, and one whose U.S.-citizen supporters are disloyal to America and involved in activities that compromise U.S. security and corrupt the U.S. political system. That said, Israel like the United States and all other nations has an absolute right to defend itself when it deems it necessary to do so. The right of self-defense

is the first and most important right of both individuals and nations. While Israel has no right to exist and neither does America or any other nation, for that matter it has an absolute right to defend its national interests according to its own best lights. In the present case, Obama and his leaking-lieutenants have tried to deny Israel its right to self-defense. Washington under Obama may not agree that Israels national security and even its survival are threatened by Iran, and they may well be right. But the Obama administrations leaking of the Azeri airfields data is an arrogant interventionist action that undermines Israels ability to defend itself as it sees fit. It as much of an unwarranted and unconscionable foreign intervention by Washington in another nations affairs as was the invasion of Iraq. This is not, of course, to argue that an Israeli attack on Iran is justified or in the interests of the United States. It seems unlikely that an Israeli air strike can more than marginally retard Irans progress toward a nuclear weapon, and such an attack will surely cost Israel something given Irans air defense system and its worldwide terrorism capabilities. Justifying the war, then, comes down to balancing gains and losses and, on that score, it seems a close call for the Israelis. Such an attack would also further cement Israels unchallenged position as the Muslim worlds most hated enemy. But with all this said, only Israel can decide what its national interests require it to do to cope with or destroy the threat it believes Iran presents. As far as U.S. interests are concerned an Israeli attack on Iran will be a disaster. Once underway, all the Muslim world will identify Obamas Washington as an unqualified supporter of the attack based on the past history of complete and supine bipartisan U.S. support for Israel and the fact that the Israelis will be using U.S. aircraft, ordnance, and technology to kill Iranians. Once Israels attack commences, anything Washington has done to stop Israel from acting be it behind-the-scenes pressure or the Azeri leak will be irrelevant as Iran and the rest of the Islamic world will attribute ultimate responsibility for the attack to the United States. Iran will surely respond with violence against the oil industry and/or trade in its own region and via its operatives in the United States. This surely is not a good result for the United States, and there are those who will argue that anything Washington can do to stop an Israeli strike is therefore justified, including the leak about Israel and the Azeri airfields. That argument, however, would be off the mark. As noted above, Israel and all nation-states even Assads Syria and Omar Bashirs Sudan have an absolute right to defend themselves at home and abroad when and as they see fit. For one nation to put obstacles in the way of another to prevent such an exercise of legitimate self-defense is unjustifiable intervention that the intervener will come to regret.

Obamas leaks, for example, have already ensured a damaging tit-for-tat Israeli leak of sensitive U.S. intelligence information, and has put an Azeri government heretofore friendly to the United States on Irans long-term hit list. Obama has incurred these costs for Americans whether or not Israel attacks Iran in the near term. At days end it is vital that Americans understand that while an Israeli strike on Iran will damage U.S. interests, kill U.S. citizens, and involve the U.S. military in a war that will look very much like a clash of civilizations, the fault for this lies not with Israel but with the U.S. government and its bipartisan willingness to negate U.S. sovereignty and independence by allowing an alien foreign power to decide when the United States goes to war. Under both political parties, Washington has performed as Israels unquestioning supporter, ready bully boy, eager weapons supplier, and abject apologist, in large part because all administrations have failed to enforce laws on the books that would properly designate AIPAC as an agent of a foreign power; discipline U.S. senators and congressman who meet privately with Israeli prime ministers and other leaders; and much more vigorously hunt, identify, and prosecute pro-Israel U.S. citizens in the private sector, intelligence community, military, Congress, and federal civil service who illegally pass Israel sensitive military, intelligence, technological, and economic information. Such action must begin if Americas sovereignty on the issue of going to war is to be restored, but for now the long record of massive U.S. government intervention on Israels side in the latters unending war with Muslims will be the main cause of the retribution Iran and other Muslim entities will exact from the United States if Israel attacks Iran. Interventionism is surely among the most lethal of poisons from which our republic is suffering. But there are two sides to interventionism; one in which U.S. power is used to do something removing Saddam, for example and the other where it is used to prevent a nation from doing something Washington opposes, in the present case Israels right to selfdefense. Many Americans who identify themselves as non-interventionists ignore this other side of the coin and act as though to be a non-interventionist one must be pro-Palestinian, pro-Iranian, anti-Israeli, or opposed to any and all U.S. military activities overseas. This is ahistorical and dangerous nonsense. From the Founders era to today, the strength of non-interventionism lies in its relentless focus on keeping U.S. interests as the central determinant in drafting and implementing U.S. foreign policy. In our time, for example, Palestine is as irrelevant as Israel to U.S. interests and security; supporting the Palestinians in no way serves U.S. interests. Likewise, U.S. security and economic prosperity do not depend on Washingtons intervention to promote the creation of secular democratic regimes in Egypt, Russia, Sudan, Morocco

Libya, Iran, Ivory Coast, Yemen, Bahrain, China, Pakistan, Burma, Mali, and Syria. Indeed, since early 2011 such intervention in the Muslim world by Obama and Mrs. Clinton with strong Republican support has done nothing but cultivate Islamism and a growing antiAmericanism which will hurt U.S. security and prosperity. One would think that the disastrous results of ill-defined, failed, and/or unnecessary U.S. interventions overseas most recently the U.S. military defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan and the deaths and debt they caused would make Washingtons bipartisan interventionism anathema to Americans. And yet media coverage and popular reaction to Obamas interventionist leak of the Azeri airfield information have been virtually nil, even though the leak will hurt America via Israels coming disclosure of sensitive U.S. intelligence and by strengthening the ability of the pro-Israel Fifth Column of U.S. citizens to credibly claim that Obamas leak prevented Israel from defending itself and so now Washington is responsible for protecting Israel by destroying Iran. Unnecessary U.S. interventions overseas undermine the security, economy, and constitutional grounding of the American republic. It adds massive and utterly unpredictable costs human and financial to the debt burden of an already bankrupt nation, and it steadily increases the arbitrary power unwisely lodged in the hands of the president. The current election cycle ought to be the occasion for a searching debate on whether Americans really want to see their republic destroyed by unnecessary overseas commitments initiated by Ivy league-educated politicians to install their anti-religious and elitist view of how humans should be perfected by dictatorial central governments on the rest of the world. An overstatement? Yesterday, Secretary of State Clinton lectured the world on how to treat Syria and Burma two states of no import to the United States and promised steady U.S. involvement in each. Meanwhile, this past weekend also saw local Tuareg tribesman and Islamist insurgents raise their flag over Timbuktu in Mali in an event that underscores the growing strength of Islamism in West Africa. The Islamists growing power in the region is at least in part due to the Obama-Clinton-McCain-Graham intervention in Africa to impose secular democracy since the start of the so-called Arab Spring. Unsurprisingly, there is no secular democracy on tap in the region, but the intervention of Washington, Britain, France, and the UN there has ensured a rising tide of Islamism. And, unlike Burma and Syria, the stability of the West African states is an important strategic interest for the United States because we are dependent on the regions oil and strategic minerals, and because our maritime commerce is threatened by increasing piracy in the shipping lanes off its coast. As Mrs. Clintons behaves like a silly, democracy-obsessed co-ed playing to the equally silly media on non-issues like Syria and Burma, the U.S. militarys next target for intervention West Africa is

emerging in ever clearer relief, thanks to the Obama administrations Republican-supported democracy crusade in Africa and the Congresss 40-year, bipartisan failure to assure Americas energy security. I suppose our coming military intervention in West Africa is a third variety of intervention, that which is an absolute necessity to secure genuine live-and-death U.S. national interests after they long have been left unprotected by a feckless two-party system that attracts men and women who detest the Founders, have no contact with reality, and care only for reelection.

jonathan fox religion armed intervention jonathan fox intervention religious

Are Middle East Conflicts More Religious?


by Jonathan Fox Middle East Quarterly Fall 2001, pp. 31-40 http://www.meforum.org/135/are-middle-east-conflicts-more-religious
If, as many believe and scholarship confirms, religion is particularly important in ethnic conflicts involving Muslims,1 how does this affect the nature of conflict in the Middle East?2 This is a simple question, but finding an accurate answer is not at all simple. It is complicated by two interrelated factors. First, due to differing perspectives and differing political agendas, interpretations of events in the region vary wildly, and accuracy is often lost. This problem is not limited to the study of the Middle East and, in fact, has been a central issue in political science since its inception. For instance, Karl Deutsch points out that comparative methodology, which consists of analyzing cases using introspection, intuition, and insight, while a powerful tool for analysis, is limited by our imaginations and preconceived notions.3 That is, a researcher who uses the method of familiarizing himself with as many facts as possible as well as with the insights of other scholars can easily be influenced by his own preconceptions. This can be problematic because due to such preconceptions we often think we see relationships that we expect to see even if they do not exist, and we often fail to see relationships that do exist but that we never expected to exist or even imagined might exist. Applied to the issue at hand, we must ask ourselves if the perception that religion is particularly important in the Middle East and is the driving force behind many of the regions conflicts is accurate, or merely a reflection of what we expect to see. To some extent, this is true of the study of religion and ethnic conflict in the Middle East. Second, the issue of Islams role in generating conflict has become especially controversial since Samuel Huntington asserted that Islam has "bloody borders" and predicted that the dynamics of civilizational conflict in the post-Cold War era would reinforce and intensify this phenomenon.4 His analysis is part of a larger notion that conflicts are increasingly defined by a "clash of civilizations." Huntington holds three points: that post-Cold War conflict is mostly between world civilizations defined primarily by religion; that conflicts involving Islamic civilization will be particularly common and

violent; and that Islamic civilization will be the greatest threat to Western civilization. While many, if not all, aspects of Huntingtons theory are controversial, his arguments concerning Islam have found acceptance among some policymakers. And that may, as some maintain, make Huntingtons analyses self-fulfilling.5 That is, if many Westerners expect Islam to be a threat and are disposed to perceive such a threat, whether it exists or not, then the expectations may wind up influencing policy. Thus can political agendas, preconceptions, and popular academic theories obfuscate and perhaps even alter the role of religion in the Middle East. These complications make an accurate assessment of Islams role in Middle Eastern conflict all the more essential. This study uses an empirical method to provide a perspective on the issue different from the comparative approach. While the empirical method has its limitationsprimarily, it can analyze only what can be measured and measurements of social, political, and economic factors are often imperfectit also has three advantages. It allows us to test and perhaps falsify theories. It makes clear what factors produce its results, and anyone analyzing the same data will get the same results. Also, it often produces surprising findings that would have never resulted from the comparative approach because no one would have looked for them. This analysis proceeds in two stages. First, the results from previous empirical analyses are summarized. Second, we examine data on ethnic conflict to assess the extent and nature of the influence of religion in the Middle East. Previous Findings Empirical analyses, several by this author, have established that the relationship between religion and conflict in general can be summed up as follows: Religious differences make conflict more likely and more intense. The more diverse a countrys religious population, the more violent its domestic conflicts tend to be.6 Similarly, when religious issues are important in ethnic conflicts, political, economic, and cultural discrimination, and rebellion all tend to increase.7 Religious differences also make international wars more likely.8 Religious issues influence the dynamics of conflicts. When religious issues are important in an ethnic conflict, religious institutions tend to facilitate unrest; but they tend to suppress conflict when religious issues are not important.9 Similarly, in countries where it is more legitimate to invoke religion in political discourse,10 ethnic conflicts generally focus more on religious issues as opposed to other political, cultural, and economic issues.11 Also, religious differences between combatants and religious affinities between minorities and those likely to intervene make foreign intervention in ethnic conflicts more probable. Religion shapes discrimination against ethnic minorities. Religious and non-religious discrimination is more likely in states where it is legitimate to use religion in political discourse and in conflicts where religious issues are important. Religious discrimination is likely against minorities that are otherwise culturally similar to the majority group - that is, where religion is the chief differentiating characteristic between the majority and the minority. Perhaps connected, religious minorities seeking autonomy are more likely to suffer non-religious discrimination than ethnic minorities who are not distinguished by religion.12 Autocratic regimes are more likely than non-autocratic regimes to discriminate against religious minorities. Autocracies engage in higher average levels of discrimination against ethno-religious minorities than do democracies, but it is those regimes that are somewhere between full autocracies and full democracies (and that are known as semi-democracies), that discriminate the least. At the same time, regime track type seems not to be correlated with discrimination against ethnic minorities that are not religiously different from the majority group in their states.13 Regimes in Muslim states are more autocratic. One study finds that Muslim states are the most autocratic states in the world, based on a measure of the extent to which a state is a liberal democracy as well as on a separate measure of institutional democracy.14 However, this study finds no relationship between Islam and a third measure which focuses on political rights. Another study, which

uses the measure for institutional democracy, finds these trends particularly pronounced in the Middle East.15 Taken together, these five results suggest that Middle Eastern conflicts should be particularly frequent and intense. One would expect religious factors to be particularly important and to exacerbate ethnic conflict in that region; religious discrimination to be high; and political behavior to be particularly influenced by religious differences between groups. This is especially true given the regions high level of autocracy combined with the particular importance of religion in the region. Is this in fact the case? Ethno-Religious Conflict in the Middle East The Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset, with information on 267 politically active ethnic minorities throughout the world, plus additional data collected by this author, provides insight into the nature of the Middle Easts ethno-religious conflicts.16 Three preliminary points: (1) The MAR dataset, developed by the MAR project headed by Ted R. Gurr, is particularly useful for our purposes. It documents all instances of ethnic conflict between 1945 and 1998 and contains a reasonably accurate list of all ethnic groups that are actively pursuing political agendas, violently or otherwise, or that suffer from high levels of discrimination. The dataset has been in existence since the mid-1980s and has received considerable attention and criticism which, over time, have led to a fairly accurate list of the groups that meet the stated criteria. Along with data collected separately on religion for use with the dataset, it constitutes one of the few aggregate-level datasets on religion and conflict that does more than simply measure whether the groups involved are of different religions.17 (2) For the purposes of this study, an ethnic minority is considered to be of a different religion than the majority group in that state if 80 percent of the population of the minority group is of a religion different from the majority group. Protestant and Catholic Christianity are considered separate religions, as are the Sunni and Shii branches of Islam. (3) MARs data refer only to conflicts involving ethnic minorities within states and not to conflicts within the same ethnic group. This means, for example, that the conflict between Egypts Coptic minority and Muslim majority is included but the same countrys conflict between the Islamist movement and the Egyptian state is not. Are ethnic conflicts between religiously differentiated groups particularly prevalent in the Middle East? Yes: Table 1 shows that 54 percent of the politically significant ethnic minorities in the Middle East are also religious minorities. Only Asia scores higher and then only slightly so. In the rest of the world, ethnic minorities are considerably less often religious ones. An examination of religious factors in ethno-religious conflicts reinforces this picture. Religious factors are considered to be present when any, and especially all, of the following conditions are fulfilled: religion is a significant issue in the conflict; religious discrimination exists; a minority group demands more religious rights; and religion is invoked in political discourse. Comparing the results for the Middle East to other world regions and Muslim-majority states outside of the Middle East allows us to see something important: whether the Middle East is unique in the intensity of conflicts with religious factors - or whether such conflicts exist in other world regions or are common to all Muslim states. That, in turn, allows us to say whether the explanation for such conflicts is regionally based (unique to the Middle East) or religiously based (common to states with Muslim majorities). It turns out that all four religious factors surface considerably more often in the Middle East than in other regions. From this, one can conclude that religion is indeed particularly important in the Middle Easts ethno-religious conflicts. Comparisons involving non-Middle Eastern states with Muslim majorities are particularly interesting. In such states, all four religious factors occur more often in ethno-religious conflicts than in non-Middle Eastern states lacking Muslim majoritiesbut less often than in Middle Eastern states. Turning this

around: ethnic conflicts in Middle Eastern states more often involve religious factors than similar conflicts in non-Middle Eastern states with Muslim majorities. The latter conflicts, in turn, more often involve religious factors than do similar conflicts in non-Middle Eastern states lacking Muslim majorities. Based on these findings, Islam provides a partial explanation for the unique importance of religion in Middle East conflicts but it cannot be considered a full explanation. Other factors must be at work. To assess whether the Middle Easts ethno-religious conflicts are particularly violent or intense, Table 3 (see page 36) measures the presence of seven factors important in ethnic conflict: political discrimination, economic discrimination, cultural discrimination, repression, an expressed desire by a minority for autonomy, political demonstrations, and rebellion (terrorism, guerrilla warfare, or armed insurrection). Except for political discrimination, the Middle East scores near the world average on these measures. This permits us to conclude that the Middle East is unique in the importance that religion plays in its ethno-religious conflicts, but those conflicts are otherwise mostly similar to the ones occurring elsewhere. Under what type of regimes do ethno-religious conflicts mostly take placeautocratic, semidemocratic, or democratic? Table 4 finds that 86 percent of Middle Eastern ethno-religious conflicts occur in autocratic states. This is a particularly strong finding considering that all of the 14 percent of cases of Middle Eastern ethno-religious conflict occurring in non-autocratic states occur in Israel.18 However, it is not a particularly surprising finding given that the Middle East is the worlds most autocratic region. Be that as it may, these results show that all Muslim majorities in the Middle East involved in ethno-religious conflicts, as documented by the MAR dataset, preside over autocratic states. As with the presence of religious factors, Islam can provide a partial explanation for this thorough-going autocracy in the Middle East, but not a full explanation. Non-Middle Eastern Muslim majorities involved in ethno-religious conflicts are not uniformly autocratic, although they do rule autocratic states more than twice as often as non-Muslim majorities (52 percent as compared to 20 percent). More importantly, these results imply that there may be a link between Islams, and particularly the Middle Easts, association with autocracy and the finding that in Islam and the Middle East religion tends to be particularly important. This brings up a final question: do Islam and autocracy in the Middle East combine to make religion particularly important in the regions ethno-religious conflicts? This requires a comparison of the Middle East with the non-Middle East. If the disproportionate importance of religion in Middle Eastern ethno-religious conflicts is due to a combination of Islam and autocracy, we would expect the religious factors to be similarly important outside of the Middle East in states that are both Muslim and autocratic. To measure this, conflicts in countries outside the Middle East are broken down into five categories (with some overlap between the categories): all autocratic states; states that are both autocratic and Muslim; states that are autocratic but not Muslim; semi-democratic states; and democratic states. Table 5 shows ethnic conflicts in Muslim autocracies outside the Middle East include religious factors less often than within the Middle East. Ethnic conflicts in non-Muslim autocracies outside the Middle East include three of the four factors less often than do non-Middle Eastern Islamic autocracies. Most notably, outside of the Middle East, Muslim autocracies discriminate against religious minorities less often than do non-Muslim autocracies. These results rule out Islam as an explanation for the disproportionate importance of religion in Middle East ethno-religious conflicts. After all, if Islam resulted in the increased importance of religion, we would have expected to find that religion was considerably more important in non-Middle Eastern Islamic autocracies than in other non-Middle Eastern autocracies as measured by at least a majority of the variables. In fact, the reverse is true and the non-Islamic autocracies scored considerably higher on two of four variables and slightly higher on a third. Autocracy is also ruled out as an explanation: if autocracy were the sole explanation for the disproportionate importance of religious factors in the Middle East, we would expect it to have a uniform impact outside of the Middle East, which is not the case. What about the Middle Easts combination of Islam and autocracy? Well, outside of the Middle East, the combination is associated with results quite different from the same combination in the Middle

East. Conclusions This study has both expected and surprising results. Religion is more important in Middle Eastern ethnic conflicts than elsewhere. Religion is important in the ethnic conflicts of all Muslim states, and it is more important in the Middle East than in Muslim states outside the region. This means that while Islam may provide a partial explanation for the particular importance of religion in the region, it cannot provide a full explanation. One potential explanation for this is the historical importance of religion in the Middle East, a region that gave birth to three of the worlds major religions. On the other hand, this historical importance may also mean that whatever it is that makes religion particularly important in the Middle East is not a new phenomenon, and the findings presented here are simply the latest manifestation of an age-old phenomenon. The Middle East is the most autocratic and least democratic region in the world. Muslim states outside of the Middle East are found to be more autocratic than other non-Middle Eastern states but less autocratic than Middle Eastern states. Again, Muslim states outside the Middle East are more often autocratic than their non-Muslim counterparts but considerably less often autocratic than those in the Middle East. Thus, Islam may provide no more than a partial explanation for the autocracy of the region. In this case, history may provide an alternate explanation. Democracy and the liberal ideologies upon which it is based were developed in the West. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the West is the most democratic region of the world. Other regions particularly influenced by the West, such as the states of Latin Americawhich began as colonies of the West and whose inhabitants speak almost exclusively Western languagesalso tend to be highly democratic, at least of late. Most of the former Soviet bloc is considered European but can be distinguished from the West in that it had limited historical exposure to central European experiences including the Reformation, Renaissance and Enlightenment.19For nearly a century it followed another Western ideology, Marxism, and is now in the process of democratization. Other than the Middle East, the regions that are the most autocratic are Asia and Africa, regions that have retained much of their own cultures despite Western influences. Thus, the link between the Middle East and autocracy may be due more to cultural and historical momentum than anything else. Also, the link between Islam and autocracy may be due to the fact that most Islamic states are in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, the regions that appear to have the highest levels of rejection of Western styles of government. The level of ethnic conflict in the Middle East is about average. This comes as a surprise, given that religion is disproportionately important in the Middle East and that the region is disproportionately autocratic. It may be due to a feeling among the regions inhabitants that religion and autocracy are normal, at least within the Middle Eastern context, and therefore do not deserve any special response. Perhaps expectations in the Middle East are lower. In the rest of the world, participants in ethnic conflicts are more sensitive to the presence of religious issues and more likely to respond to them than in the Middle East. To be specific, perhaps the Shii minority in Saudi Arabia, the Copts in Eg ypt, and the Christian and Bahai minorities in Iran understand that religious discrimination by the autocratic governments of the region is par for the course. Because of this, even though they suffer from high levels of religious discrimination, they engaged in no protest or rebellion in 1998 (the most recent year for which data is currently available). By contrast, in eastern Europe, where religion was suppressed by communist regimes until the 1990s, groups that suffered from religious discrimination tended to react more forcibly in 1998: the Turks in Bulgaria engaged in large demonstrations; the Abkhazians in Georgia rebelled against the state; the Chechnians in Russia have been continuously rebelling against the state; and the Albanians in Kosovo both demonstrated and rebelled. Islam is not an explanation for the Middle Easts uniqueness. As expected, religion is particularly important in the Middle East, and the region is the most autocratic in the world. Yet Islam cannot fully explain these findings; and the disproportionate importance of religion and the presence of autocracy in the region do not lead to the increased levels of ethnic conflict one would expect.

These findings show that the obvious explanations for phenomena are not always the correct ones. It is easy to assume that the prevalence of religious conflict in the Middle East is due to the regions Islamic and autocratic character. It is also easy to assume that the regions high concentration of autocracy is due to the regions Islamic character. Yet neither of these assumptions appear to be correct. Furthermore, the findings of this study show that, except for the finding that religion is particularly important in the region, ethnic conflicts which take place in the Middle East are not considerably different from similar conflicts elsewhere. In sum, ethno-religious conflict in the Middle East is unique but not in the way many believe. Yes, religion is disproportionately important in the regions ethnic conflicts and the region is the most autocratic in the world. But neither of these findings is explained by Islam. Furthermore, most Middle Eastern ethnic conflicts are otherwise similar to ethnic conflicts elsewhere. Implications These findings have several implications. First, they contradict Huntingtons notion of Islams "bloody borders," for ethno-religious conflict in the Middle East between Muslims and non-Muslims is not more violent than other ethnic conflicts. And Islam is not the cause of differences between ethnic conflicts in the Middle East and those taking place elsewhere.20 Despite this, Huntingtons theory remains popular, and if it prevails, it can become a self-fulfilling prophecy in which Western fears of Islam cause threats to be seen where they do not exist and small threats to be exaggerated into large ones. This can lead to reactions that will provoke the very conflicts and threats that at first were only imagined. That the issues involved in the Middle Easts ethnic conflicts are particularly religious does not bode well for conflict resolution, for such conflicts are among the most long-lasting, violent, and difficult to settle. One possible avenue may be to apply the growing literature on religious-based conflict resolution, which advocates using those aspects of religious traditions that emphasize compromise and accommodation to prevent, settle, and mitigate conflict.21 The Middle Easts remaining the worlds most autocratic place means that the post -Cold War trend of democratization has hardly reached it. While this may change, there is no reason to believe that that will happen any time soonas symbolized by the fact that the regions newest political entity, the Palestinian Authority, has been vigorously repressing dissension. In all likelihood, the regions ethnic conflicts will continue to flourish in an autocratic setting and the peaceful political avenues available to ethnic groups in democratic settings do not have a bright future in the Middle East. Opposition activity is likely to be violent. Political discrimination against minorities will probably continue. Jonathan Fox, a lecturer in political studies at Bar Ilan University, is the author of Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late 20th Century (Lexington Books, forthcoming). 1 Jonathan Fox, "Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Summer 2000, pp. 1-23. 2 In this study, the Middle East includes the Arabic-speaking countries (excluding Sudan), Turkey, Israel, and Iran. 3 Karl W. Deutsch, "On Nationalism, World Regions, and the Nature of the West," Mobilization, CenterPeriphery Structures, and Nation Building, ed. Per Torsvik (Oslo: Universitesforlaget, 1981), p. 51-93. 4 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, 72 (1993): 22-49; idem, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 5 Pierre Hassner, "Morally Objectionable, Politically Dangerous," The National Interest, Winter 1997, pp. 63-69; William Pfaff, "The Reality of Human Affairs," World Policy Journal, 14 (1997): 89-96; Tony Smith, "Dangerous Conjecture," Foreign Affairs, 76 (1997): 163-164; Stephen N. Walt, "Building Up New Bogeymen," Foreign Policy, 106 (1997): 177-189. 6 Rudolph J. Rummel, "Is Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism?" Journal of Peace Research, 34 (2): 163-175. 7 Jonathan Fox, "The Effects of Religious Discrimination on Ethnic Protest and Rebellion," Journal of Conflict Studies, Fall 2000, pp. 16-43. 8 Errol A. Henderson, "The Democratic Peace through the Lens of Culture, 1820-1989," International Studies Quarterly, Sept. 1998, pp. 461-484; idem, "Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity States, and the Onset of War, 1820-1989," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Oct. 1997, pp. 649-668. 9 Jonathan Fox, "Do Religious Institutions Support Violence or the Status Quo?" Studies in Conflict and

Terrorism 22 (1999): 119-139. 10 The legitimacy of the use of religion in political discourse is measured based on the variable which measures four aspects of religious involvement in politics in 1994-95: a history of religious involvement in politics; whether religious leaders are using religious rhetoric to mobilize the population; whether religion is offered as a solution to non-religious problems; and whether the state has an official religion. At least two of these factors must be present for religion to be considered legitimate in political discourse. 11 Jonathan Fox, "The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethnoreligious Minorities," Journal of Peace Research, 36 (1999): 289-307. 12 Jonathan Fox: "The Salience of Religious Issues in Ethnic Conflicts: A Large-N Study," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Autumn 1997, pp. 1-19. 13 Jonathan Fox, "Religious Causes of Ethnic Discrimination," International Studies Quarterly, Sept. 2000, pp. 423-450. 14 Manus I. Midlarsky, "Democracy and Islam: Implications for Civilizational Conflict and the Democratic Peace," International Studies Quarterly, Sept. 1998, pp. 458-511. 15 Keith Jaggers and Ted R. Gurr, "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data," Journal of Peace Research, 32 (1995): 469-482. 16 Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset is available at www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar. The MAR dataset currently includes 275 cases but eight of them, added after the religion data was collected, are excluded from this study. 17 For more information on the MAR dataset and the general findings on ethnic conflict based upon it, see Ted R. Gurr: Minorities At Risk (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993); idem.,Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century , (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000). 18 Turkey is also a non-autocratic state but the MAR dataset includes no ethno-religious minorities in that country, thereby ignoring the Alevis, a large Shii minority. On them, see Tord Olsson, et al. eds ., Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 1998). The Kurds are Sunni Muslims and so not an ethno-religious minority. 19 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, pp. 45-46. 20 Testing Huntingtons theories with regard to Islam more directly, I came up with similar results; see Jonathan Fox, "Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West," Journal of Peace Research, July 2001, pp. 459-472. 21 See, for example, Marc Gopin, Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (Lanham, VA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

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Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late Twentieth Century:


A General Theory
Jonathan Fox 0 Reviews Lexington Books, 2002 - 253 pages Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late Twentieth Century critiques the existing literature on religion and ethnic conflict, then presents and analyzes the original quantitative data gathered from a variety of sources. Fox draws upon the Minorities at Risk model of ethnic conflict to develop and test a dynamic and comprehensive theory of religion and conflict. He applies this theory to resurgent

conflicts between ethnic groups of different religions - from the Iranian revolution and the Afghan struggle against the Soviets in the 1980s to the ongoing Middle East conflict - to pinpoint the ways in which religion has become intertwined in, and lent legitimacy to, conflicts in the contemporary world.

Bringing Religion into International Relations


Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler Series: Culture and Religion in International Relations Palgrave Macmillan
This book has several main themes and arguments. International Relations has been westerncentric, which has contributed to its ignoring religion; while religion is not the main driving force behind IR, international politics cannot be understood without taking religion into account; the role of religion is related to the fact that IR has evolved to become more than just interstate relations and now included elements of domestic politics. The book proceeds in three stages. First, it looks at why religion was ignored by IR theory and theorists. Second, it examines the multiple ways religion influences IR, including through religious legitimacy and the many ways domestic religious issues can cross borders. In this discussion a number of topics including but not limited to international intervention, international organizations, religious fundamentalism, political Islam, Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' theory, and terrorism are addressed. Third, these factors are examined empirically using both quantitative and case study methodology.

Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations


Jonathan Fox International Studies Review Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn, 2001), pp. 53-73 Published by: Blackwell Publishing Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186242
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Tokoh pemikiran Islam negara


Hassan, Mohd Kamal (2010) Tokoh pemikiran Islam negara. Berita Harian. pp. 2-3. PDF (Tokoh pemikiran Islam negara) - Published Version Restricted to Repository staff only Download (376Kb) | Request a copy Official URL: http://www.bharian.com.my/bharian/

Abstract

Isu pendidikan tinggi daripada perspektif islam,krisis pembangunan,islamisasi pemikiran dan pengetahuan manusia masa kini ialah antara fokus penulisan dan kajian Prof Tan Sri Dr Mohd Kamal Hassan.

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INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION: CONFLICT, ECONOMIC DISLOCATION, AND THE HEGEMONIC ROLE OF DOMINANT ACTORS

Earl Conteh-Morgan Introduction The end of the Twentieth Century is still characterized by geopolitical fluidity and socioeconomic effervescence that tend to challenge the sovereignty of the developing state both from below and above. Violent ethnopolitical conflicts, separatist movements, rivalry for autonomy or political power, or territorial control, economic dislocation, among others, assail the integrity of the developing state, thereby impelling hegemonic actors (major states, Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), and International Financial Institutions - IFIs) to intervene in order to: (1) uphold state integrity/sovereignty; (2) promote/enforce human rights practices; or (3) forestall/contain the negative and dysfunctional aspects of globalization processes in developing countries. The ever-increasing negative effects of transnational social forces tend to generate the pervasive force of a neo-liberal cosmopolitan moral view of international relations that increasingly sanctions both military and non-military interventions to maintain the existing structure of states and international society. The consequence is that states, in particular, developing states, are progressively losing their individual identities, rights, and obligations vis-vis civil society, in the wake of external impositions. In other words, the disintegrative effects of globalization as well as the dislocative aspects of weak developing economies are increasingly undermining the twin pillars of non-intervention and state sovereignty. Conflict/peacekeeping interventions and economic dislocation/external economic policy impositions now constitute the most formidable sources of assault on the decision-making autonomy, territorial integrity, and overall sovereignty of the developing state. Essentially, the objective of this article is to utilize arguments and perspectives from neoGramscian, neo-Marxist, and World Systems analyses to underscore the fact that the developing state's sovereignty is being assailed by various transnational globalization processes such as: (1) the expansion and internationalization of peacekeeping/humanitarian efforts, or (2) newly emerging power relationships and structures that derive from crisis in politico-economic systems, especially in developing countries. The relationship between developing state sovereignty and national/global systemic forces could be understood more fully by examining the latter's impact on issues that generate external interventions. The focus of the analysis is first, on peacekeeping as a hegemonic function, especially the substantive shift from traditional intervention to new variation in peacekeeping. Second, an emphasis on how the changing economic and political paradigms of "good governance" over the decades contributes to the dialectic tensions between the transcendental/universalizing trend of economic globalization and the selfpreservative/confirming interactions between state and society in developing countries. The conceptualization of intervention in this analysis is broad and includes both coercive/military forms of intervention, and non-military/consensual forms of intervention. Interventions even when consensual often have serious human rights implications because of their tendency to subvert the managerial capacity of the state vis--vis the welfare of its citizens (Cox, 1981; Szentes 1988). An example is the coercive consensual relationship or consensual domination of the developing state by Great Powers and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in the area of economic policy. In post-Cold War international society in which militarystrategic-defensive issues have rapidly given way to socio-economic globalization processes,

non-military forms of intervention by Great Powers and IFIs on developing state sovereignty are increasingly becoming a moral problem as manifested in the reaction of large segments of developing state civil society to external economic impositions, such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionalities. In particular, the focus of this article will revolve around two dimensions of transnational/ global developments that threaten the managerial autonomy of the developing state. First is the changed nature of conflict in the international system in the form of a rise in internal, intrastate violence as opposed to inter-state conflicts which undermine the sovereignty of the state and produce external peacekeeping interventions. Second, is the economic dislocative effects of rapid globalization processes and deepening market forces that impel the intervention of IFIs in developing state economies, thereby destabilizing the "social contract" between state and citizens. In other words, to what extent do violent conflicts within developing states and interventions by external actors undermine the national sovereignty of the state? Or to what extent do IMF/World Bank policy impositions affect the capacity of the state to provide for the socio-economic welfare of its citizens? The issues of intra-state conflict/intervention and economic impositions will be used as a body of empirical evidence to illustrate the primary features of a declining developing state sovereignty, and its implications for human rights practice. Transnational Forces and the State: An Overview There are three dimensions relevant to the analysis of socio political and economic developments at the global level that adversely affect the developing state's sovereignty. The first is the practical-conjunctural level viewed in terms of intentional human agency (Robinson, 1996; Wallerstein, 1970). At this level, it is important to draw the distinction between means (which are policies) and ends (which are interests), and to recognize the tactical nature of many disputes related to policymaking between the developing state and external actors over the most effective means of achieving ends. The second dimension is the underlying global structure in which states and groups engage with the broader world system. Analysis at this level is structural analysis. Structure shapes and conditions events and activities at the state level, often apart from intentionality. The third dimension refers to processes in international society which straddle both the practical-conjunctural and the underlying global structure. Through its interconnectedness with the two, it enables analysts to identify mechanisms that monitor functionalist teleology. Institutionalization is an integral aspect of the Gramscian notion of hegemony because institutions (whether political-military, or socio-economic) provide the systemic legitimacy for dealing with conflicts either coercively or through peaceful means (Gramsci, 1971). The underlying structure of interstate relations intrinsically involves an enforcement potential under the control of the powerful nations. The consequence is two distinct forms of Great Power-weak state relations: coercive and consensual. In the latter sense, it is the condition whereby strong states exercise leadership over weak states by gaining their perennial consent. To a large extent the use of force is obviated to the point that the developing state submits to the prevailing power relations. Continuous submission is enhanced by the fact that the dominant states are willing to make concessions, implement policy adjustments, that from time to time help to alleviate the

politico-economic burdens of the weak states. Institutions provide the legitimacy of power relations, articulate the hegemonic mission of the powerful, and appeal for the cooperation of the weak. For example, images of proper global economic relations have been institutionalized and universalized by institutions like the IMF, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Trade Organization (WTO), and the World Bank, among others. Similarly, institutional provision for dealing with intractable and extensive conflict situations is located within the jurisdiction of the United Nations Security Council, and more recently within regional security organizations like NATO and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Developments are underway to make regional organizations like the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and so on, more responsive to peacekeeping interventions. Thus hegemony which comprises of both coercive and consensual relations help to cement and legitimize, and internationalize the dominant moral and cultural values, and disseminate the worldview of the dominant states. The hegemonic functions of the Great Powers, with the "consent" of the weak states create functional unity in a system of diversity. To a large extent, then, subordinate states either give "unwilling consent" or "voluntary consent" to the social logic imposed on specific issues by the strong states. Accordingly, social forces that commence within the powerful states soon spillover into weak states, and the policy implications or adaptive mechanisms that accompany them imposed upon or integrated into the political economy of these weak states. The socio-political developments produced by the dynamics of the economic system in turn generate institutions and policy changes that determine world orders (Colclough, & Manor, 1991; United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), 1995; Toulmin, 1992). Stated differently, economic crises and political transformations generate new policy imperatives and/or social forces, which in turn bring about changes in the structure of states and their relationship with civil society. For example, the transnational social forces unleashed by both the Cold War competition and post-Cold War era influence state structures in both the core and periphery. In other words, changes in systemic polarity spawn forces that influence state structures, underscoring the fact that state structures are largely a reflection of a particular structure of world order and forces in existence. A world hegemony in this sense is thus the expansive effects of the individual and collective social forces of the dominant advanced industrial states. The IFIs, the culture, the technology, and other entities associated with this collective hegemony constitute guidelines for development models in developing states. The dominant effects of such a collective hegemonic system also becomes a demonstration effect which could have a profound effect on the lives of groups in poor countries. In his analysis of world hegemony, Robert Cox makes reference to the effect hegemony has on peripheral states as a passive revolution: A world hegemony is thus in its beginnings an outward expansion of the internal (national) hegemony established by a dominant social class. The economic and social institutions, the culture, the technology associated with this national hegemony become patterns for emulation abroad. Such as expansive hegemony impinges on the more peripheral countries as a passive revolution. These countries have not undergone the same thorough social revolution, nor have their economies developed in the same way, but they try to incorporate elements from the hegemonic model with disturbing old power structures....In the world hegemonic model,

hegemony is more intense and consistent at the core and more laden with contradictions at the periphery (Cox, 1996:137). The near policy convergence among advanced industrial countries in this post-Cold War era, unifies socio-economic and political structures of this collective hegemony into a system of universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms which spell out general rules of national and international behavior for states and for those national actors whose activities transcend national boundaries. These are rules, which in short, further institutionalize dominant modes of sociopolitical and economic interactions. However, the pervasive effects of core collective hegemony subvert the developing state's monopoly of legitimate and autonomous decision-making within its own territory. The rules that core states have developed, upheld, and institutionalized help to maintain and deepen the marginalization of the developing state. Because these norms and rules (both international law and less formal rules) are largely handed down to them, it means the developing states undergo a process of socialization involving both "coerced consent" and voluntary internalization. States that deliberately challenge these transnational interstate rules are viewed as a threat to world order and its juridical foundation and could be labeled pariahs, rogues, or outlaws and face politico-economic sanctions from other states and dominant non-state actors (Armstrong, 1993; Beckman, 1992). The developing state shares but "unwillingly" in some developments that affect national political economies, often unwilling to reverse asymmetrical relationships with developed countries, or outrightly reject adverse policy impositions from supranational institutions. For example, the developing states of the international system attempted to reconstruct the international system in the mid 1970s New International Economic Order (NIEO) demands, but because of their weakness failed. In other words, fundamental transformation can only occur in international systems through a process by which normative change in states' relations is transmitted to the international stage by powerful states or some hegemon, be it a military, economic, political, or cultural hegemon. Because of powerful states and IFIs, for example, international systemic structures are not immutable, but rather the very structures are dependent for their modification or reproduction on the practices and changing institutions of these key actors. Fundamental change in the international system occurs when principal actors, through changes in their interests, power or practices, change the rules and norms that underlie international relations. In essence, changes in the practice of these hegemonic international actors depend on changes in the practices of their key domestic actors--individuals, power elite, and civil society in general (Gill, 1995; Ruggie, 1982). Thus profound developments in international relations can occur when beliefs and identities of key domestic entities in advanced industrial countries are altered thereby also altering the norms and rules that are constitutive of international relations, often quite independent of both domestic and international actors of weak states. For example, the end of the Cold War accelerated by changes (perestroika, glasnost) in the Soviet Union, changed the nature, scope, and intensity of violent conflict in many developing states, spawned new ones as well; and ushered in a period of democratization urged on the developing states by the powerful actors.

Impelled by its marginal status in the international system, the developing world has often challenged Western European concepts of international law and human rights (Lissitzyn, 1963). International law to these developing states was originally created to protect and reflect the class and state interests of the former colonial masters. It contains little or no substantive content of equity and justice because when extended to Asia, Africa, or Latin-America, it was frequently used as an instrument for the protection of the private economic interests of the powerful Western states. Key international institutions (the IMF, World Bank, or WTO), a reflection of international law, are the glue for safeguarding the global politico-economic structure that ensures the dominance of the advanced industrial states. In spite of the differences in interests, culture, and levels of education among these developing states, they nonetheless all exhibit, invariably, tendencies of resentment toward international law. The underlying reasons for such resentment being past foreign domination, and attitudes of superiority by the Western countries, their dependent development status and general adverse experiences within the international legal framework of the Westphalian state system (Oppenheim, 1955; Brierly, 1963). Nonetheless, in varying degrees, they participate in the development and codification of international law, they resort to its norms in disputes with other states, and in deliberations in international organizations, but many have equally complained about the overwhelming dominance of advanced industrial states in key international organizations like the IMF and the World Bank. Because of the perceptible current of discontent expressed by developing states about traditional international law, many observers often advocate the further development of international law so that it would play a more meaningful role in North-South relations. The realization that international law needs to be further developed, coupled with the constant concessions made by the North towards the South is a realization that the traditional norms of international law do not necessarily serve the needs and aspirations of the developing states. In particular, some of the requirements of the international institutions that reinforce the traditional norms of international law are often too painful when applied to developing societies. On a more general level, international law either intentionally or by accident reinforced an international division of labor. In the process of global capital accumulation that accompanied the modern world system, benefits accrued unequally among nations creating a North-South gap in power, wealth, and prestige (Wallerstein, 1970; Amin, 1974; Sunkel, & Fuenzalida, 1979). The ensuing process of uneven development and asymmetry has proved to be a constraint to the decisional latitude of the developing state. The periphery, satellite, or underdeveloped states have been superimposed upon, been penetrated and influenced, balkanized, and even imposed upon in the capitalist process of surplus extraction from the South to the North within a single global economy. Consequently, systemic struggles over the appropriation of wealth take place between and within nations with the developing states at the poor receiving end of an asymmetric relationship. Changes in North-South relations automatically generate changes in national political economies of the South. In particular, globalization processes as aspects of a new phase of capitalism, are transforming, rather than merely having a marginal effect on, all political ingredients in capitalist relations between North and South. The consequence is a seeming tradeoff between equality/welfare and efficiency/privatization. The transnationalization of the state produced intensive and extensive internationalization embedded in globalization processes, networks, and discourses is threatening the sovereign state by making it near impossible for the

state to perform its socio-economic and welfare functions towards civil society. A further deepening and intensification of globalization processes could make the developing state meaningless or obsolete (O'Brien, 1992; Weber, 1995; Strange, 1996; Friedman, 1992). In the developing state, state sovereignty, and the authority and legitimacy that go with it are not always by the overwhelming majority of individuals and non-state collectivities. The sovereignty principle and even its practice seems fated to be constrained and undermined at the international level, and it is difficult to see how the weak developing state will regain what it has lost. Although sovereign authority is not the same as the capacity to control everything, it is nonetheless challenged in many parts of the world. Most, if not all, of contemporary national struggles are struggles in which groups (guerilla forces or ethnic insurgency) are pitted against the state because of the desire to ensure group security or self-actualization. The clear challenge to the state that is revealed by such struggles is, perhaps, the final and most convincing evidence that the force of globalization coupled with the loosening of hegemonic (spheres of influence) ties between great and small states is a significant factor in rendering the state unacceptable or an obstacle to many groups. As group frustration intensifies it escalates to violent outbursts which in some cases produce external intervention, and a further diminution of state sovereignty assailed from both within and without. Peacekeeping interventions, accordingly develop within the context of transnational political processes and an extended view of the nation state which transcends territorial integrity and the sanctity of the doctrine of state sovereignty. Conflicts and Peacemaking Interventions While traditional international relations characterizes the international system as one of anarchy, at the same time classical conceptions of state structure tend to assume a territory comprised of people, sovereignty, and an effective government that forestalls domestic anarchy or state collapse (Bull, 1984; Waltz, 1979). Yet, the experience of the post-Cold War era, in particular, is characterized by centrifugal forces of violent ethnonationalism related to normative concerns of human rights and democratization that in turn spawn responses (for example peacekeeping interventions) from the international system. These interventions reflect a shift away from a strict adherence to the doctrine of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. The widening scope and intensity of violent conflicts that produce Great Power and United Nations (UN) sanctioned interventions in civil wars underscore the fact that principles, doctrines, and practices institutionalized through constant application, may be modified, violated, or changed in response to systemic disequilibrium. Such changes are done in response to the increased focus on the international or national protection of human rights: an idea that gained greater concern after 1945. Besides, such ideational developments that are transformed into new practices that violate existing modus operandi may originate from purely internal developments (for example, the clamor for democratization that produces violent civil conflicts), or from external developments and changing conceptions of policy such as the indexing of democratization to IMF conditionalities. Interventions whether coercive or non-coercive are undertaken by the key actors as part of the twin functions of "socialization" and "homogenization" of international society. Ideational change and international practice regarding intervention to protect human rights were spawned by the end of the Cold War and its turbulence. Internally, developing state sovereignty is assailed by ethnopolitical and other challenges to the state, and externally, as a response to

intense civil strife that result in genocide and massive suffering. The Great Powers under the umbrella of the UN have now extended their peacekeeping operations to include interventions in civil wars. The end of great-power ideological rivalry has produced unity in the pursuit of systemic stability and greater international cooperation under the auspices of the UN and other international mechanisms. The outcome is greater international social control by Great Powers and the UN Security Council over developing states. A critical element in Gramscian thought is the idea of social control which takes place on two levels: in civil society and through the state (political society) (Robinson, 1996; Aguelli, & Murphy, 1988). Where entities like Yugoslavia, Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, and so on, have at some point lost social control through the state (political society), a rejuvenated and ascendant Security Council, and a dominant rich North in cooperation exercise their hegemonic functions by arresting total state disintegration through peacekeeping interventions. Internally, the state is being challenged by what D. Horowitz (1985) has described as the "powerful, permeative, passionate, and pervasive," (Levinson, 1993:4) force of ethnonationalism. The constant struggle for power and resources in many resource-starved nations has produced a situation in which ethnic groups have resorted to pressure politics and coalition-building as a means of gaining political and economic power. Intractable and protracted conflicts have an especially destabilizing effect on the nation-state. While conflict resolution efforts do sometimes produce formal accords they rarely yield long-term peace and harmony. The duration, intensity, and scope of these violent conflicts have led to near-state collapse, and some state failures. These consequences stem first from the passionate, primordial, and permeative aspects of ethnic solidarity--which are in turn related to perceived high stakes in civil wars--the survival of a group, domination of one ethnic group by another, or their domination by the other group. The primordial sentiments and ethnopolitical factors involved in multiethnic societies extend the violent conflicts beyond the obvious struggle for political and economic control to powerful xenophobic and ethnocentric expressions of hate. The consequence is that such conflicts become especially impervious to rational resolution. Thus, while assailed internally by these centrifugal ethno rigidities, the international (via the UN) response has been intervention to maintain the structure of the state system. In most situations, international organizations and key state actors have to contend with the state itself, which in most situations is also a party to the dispute or has a stake in the victory of one group at the expense of another group. External peacekeeping intervention forces have at times had to carry out peace enforcement (doing battle if necessary with the state or rebels) functions in their efforts to carry out their rescue and humanitarian functions. The UN Security Council in cooperation with the Great Powers, and regional organizations have set the precedent of using accumulated physical power for the performance of a world systemmaintenance function that often challenges the sovereignty of the nation in which it is applied. Since the early 1990s, optimism for the role of Security Council backed use of force has encouraged other states (and regional organizations) to use the same method. In 1992 former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali deliberately sought to expand the peace enforcement powers of the UN Security Council. In Agenda for Peace in 1992 he recommended authorization of the use of force (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). These developments of using the UN "fig leaf" to conduct military interventions even in civil wars are impelled by public pressure amplified by

media effects in responding to grave violations of human rights in internal armed conflicts: former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, and so on. Public outrage often turns into political pressure on both Great Powers and the UN to intervene in order to halt humans rights violations whether by the state or non-state aggressors. With the end of the Cold War and the widening scope of violent intrastate conflicts, rationalization of the use of intervention in internal matters in contravention of the principle of non-intervention has developed as a trend in North-South relations. It is now rationalized that although Article 2(7) of the UN charter firmly endorses the principle of non-intervention, violent intrastate conflicts constitute "a threat to international peace and security" under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and therefore justifies UN Security Council use of force. Thus, the Security Council has often exercised a wide mandate in the determination of the existence of a threat to or breach of international peace, which tends to undermine the sovereign integrity of the state. In particular, the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs appears to have been modified, thereby legitimizing UN/Great Power intervention for humanitarian purposes in conflicts of an essentially domestic nature (Harris, 1991). Resolution 688, for example, was adopted on 5 April 1991 in connection with Iraq's suppression of Kurdish civilians following the Kurdish rebellion of March 1991 after Iraq's defeat at the hand of the Gulf War coalition. For Iraq, the Resolution itself amounted to a "flagrant, illegitimate intervention in Iraq's internal affairs and a violation of Article 2 of the Charter." Resolution 688, was the first Security Council Resolution to determine the existence of a threat to international peace and security as a result of a state's violation of its citizens human rights. The atrocities committed by Idi Amin of Uganda, or Pol Pot of Cambodia, did not elicit such a determination, response, or use of force by either the UN or the powerful states. The internecine and genocidal character of the Yugoslavian conflict produced Resolution 713 of 25 September 1991 which imposed an embargo on the entire region, and later Resolution 757 of 30 May 1992 imposing comprehensive economic sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro. Both Resolutions transformed the Yugoslavian domestic conflict into an international one (United Nations, 1995). By 1992 external powers had intervened militarily in the civil war. State failure or near-state collapse characterized by a total absence of state sovereignty has in the post-Cold War era generated UN/Great Power intervention in the developing state. In such cases, Somalia being a perfect example, the total absence of legitimate state authority did not raise problems of state sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction. Moreover, the precedent of intervention in domestic crisis had already been set in the case of Iraq and the Kurds and in the former Yugoslavia. Thus when the Security Council first imposed the mandatory arms embargo under Chapter VII (Resolution 733), there was little disagreement among Security Council member states of the principle of non-intervention. UN/Great Power intervention in a developing state can be precipitated if a "unique and exceptional circumstance" is recognized. For example, the Security Council in 1993 determined that the situation in Haiti threatened international peace and security. Accordingly, in Resolution 841 of 16 June 1993 an embargo was imposed on trade with Haiti. The unique and exceptional circumstances in Haiti were caused by the following factors: a January 24, 2001 coup d'tat that

forced into exile the legitimate government of President Jean-Betrand Aristide; an environment of fear, persecution, and economic dislocation that threatened to generate numerous refugees to neighboring countries; the request for a UN trade embargo by the legitimate government of Haiti; and the fact that an Organization of American States (OAS) embargo was previously in existence and only required to be universalized and further mandated by a Security Council sanction. Resolution 841 was thus precipitated by a coup d'tat and thus marked a change in Security Council practice in the area of intervention in domestic affairs, as the Council had never before been directly involved in restoring an ousted regime in the aftermath of a coup d'tat in a sovereign state, an issue previously considered purely internal in character. Although the Security Council President announced that the Resolution should not be regarded as constituting a precedent, it nevertheless marked a change in Security Council practice. In February 1998, and following the post-Cold War precedent of intervention to prevent massive human rights violations and to restore democracy, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group, known as ECOMOG, used its forces dominated largely by Nigerian soldiers to oust the military junta in neighboring Sierra Leone that in May 1997 had ousted a democratically elected government. ECOMOG intervened to restore the ousted regime with the full support of the Organization of African Unity, and the United Nations Security Council. In other words, domestic instability, massive atrocities, and the maintenance of democracy are increasingly becoming the concern of external actors, and no longer just the exclusive preserve of internal sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs. Between 1990 until the creation of a stable environment in Liberia in 1997, ECOMOG forces had intervened to stop the carnage and ethnic bloodletting that pitted Gio/Mano ethnic groups on the one hand, and Krahn/Mandingo groups on the other (Magyar, & Conteh-Morgan, 1998). Following the Gulf War, the objectives of forced intervention were initially limited to humanitarian purposes, but have gradually expanded in response to changing military needs in the conflicts concerned. The new resolutions spawned by the growing intensity of new conflict situations have implications for state sovereignty. But following the end of the Cold War, Security Council authorization of the use of force by states was introduced primarily for humanitarian purposes. Often the victim of the armed conflict was not a sovereign state, but civilians within the territory of a single state. Accordingly, the objective of the use of force in Resolution 770 of August 13 concerning the Bosnian conflict was: to "facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance" in order to guarantee the population's minimum humanitarian needs (United Nations, 1992). Similarly, Resolution 794 (3 December 1992) regarding Somalia and Resolution 929 (22 June 1994) in Rwanda, and in the case of Haiti (Resolution 940 of 31 July 1994) humanitarian needs were one reason for UN intervention. Despite initial US reluctance to intervene in 1992, the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Haiti and the rapid increase in refugees finally impelled the UN to act. President Bill Clinton demanded that the military leadership in Haiti yield power immediately, and emphasized his resolve: "when firm brutality occurs close to our shores, it affects our national interests. And we have a responsibility to act" (Clinton, 1993). Since the Korean War, virtually all military operations based on Security Council authorized use of force have been led and dominated by Great Powers, especially the US forces. Some critics argue that Security Council authorization has only served as an instrument to perform a systems maintenance function to the benefit of Great-Power national interests.

However, Security Council authorized use of force cannot work effectively without the political leadership of the Great Powers and the participation of their overwhelming military power. While in conflict with state sovereignty, intervention nonetheless helps to preserve the state and stop genocidal massacres and the blatant violation of human rights practices. However, in the domain of peacekeeping, because of post-Cold War political effervescence manifested in civil strife and various forms of ethnopolitical violence, the outcome has been not a shared conceptual and implementational consensus, but to a multiplicity of suggestion for effective peacekeeping. The result, it might be said, is that while the scope of peacekeeping has increased, methods for its application is varying from region to region, and from entity to entity. At the microlevel, the socio-economic and political patterns have been forged by a tendency on the part of peoples (ethnic, religious, and regional groupings) to resort to self-help in the attempt to guarantee their security (Horowitz, 1994; Gurr, 1993). The consequence is a gradual attack on the integrity of the state and a subversion of the national integration process. The idea of selfhelp results in the inability of the state and sub-entities to confront and solve big problems of collective political violence. The outcome is peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention to stop ethnic bloodletting, to put collapsing states together again, or to feed refugees and victims of starvation. Accordingly, the resulting sense that people have is that it is the responsibility of the UN and industrialized countries to prevent massive suffering, carnage, and uncontrollable escalation of conflicts. In other words, while the notion of state sovereignty is the underlying principle of socio-economic and political interactions in the global system, it is at the same time threatened by the fear of insecurity, the increase in world order problems associated with interethnic conflicts and other forms of political violence. The empirical statehood of developing nations is even more fragile in the post-Cold War era than ever before (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982). Civil wars and their spillover effects, refugeeism, the increase in actual and potential conflict situations, are but a few of the transnationalizing issues that seem to be rendering traditional peacekeeping methods rather inadequate, and prompting the adoption of new and perhaps questionable peacekeeping efforts. Among the broad consequences of challenges to global stability, three possibilities seem especially worthy of note: (1) the unity, authority, and legitimacy of many nation states may be forced to disintegrate under the mounting weight of centrifugal forces of ethnicity and nationalism, and further putting into question traditional methods of peacekeeping; (2) the distinction between civil and international conflict related issues may become increasingly obscure; and (3) the intersection of domestic problems of social heterogeneity and global interdependence issues may have become inextricably woven into a worldwide international security problem manifested largely in ethnic bloodletting, refugee creation, starvation, and the outbreak of deadly diseases in many countries. It is no surprise that with the end of the Cold War, the UN has launched nearly double the peacekeeping missions that it had in its roughly forty years of existence. The expansion of peacekeeping efforts is reflected in the Security Council peacekeeping resolutions adopted, in the UN active involvement in preventive diplomacy, and in the increasing involvement of regional and subregional organizations in active peacekeeping. Along with this expansion of peacekeeping activities, the concept and practice of peacekeeping seems to be undergoing a

paradigm shift or adaptive competence from peacekeeping (the deployment of military forces to forestall the escalation of a dispute) to preventive diplomacy (efforts made to abort disputes before they widen and intensify) to peacemaking (proactive intervention to encourage warring parties settle their dispute) to peace enforcement (the mandate to "impose" a ceasefire, or do battle with violators if need be) to peacebuilding (assist in reconstruction efforts after conflict resolution in order to prevent a fresh eruption of the conflict). Instances have occurred in this post-Cold War turbulence, where the bloodletting, carnage, or starvation were such that peace enforcement has been encouraged. Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (the ECOMOG intervention), and Bosnia, among others are cases in point. External Economic Interventions and State Crisis While UN Security Council-sponsored interventions tend to protect the human rights of citizens in volatile and explosive states, external economic policy impositions (interventions) by IFIs are limiting to a large extent, the sovereign exercise of certain rights and duties by the developing state in relation to its citizens. Intervention in the form of globalization imperatives (in particular Structural Adjustment Policies-SAPs) undermine the ability of the developing state to manage, accumulate, and redistribute economic resources within its own territory (Beckman, 1994). Accordingly, this may be limiting the developing state's capacity to achieve national political integration among its varied ethnocommunal groups, as well as its legitimacy vis--vis civil society in general. Great Power and IFI intervention in the developing state started with the economic collapse experienced during the late 1970s and early 1980s triggered by: sharp price fluctuations on the raw materials market, the adverse terms of trade on exports as a result of these downward fluctuations, the oil shocks that produced a downward spiral in the payments position of these developing states thereby directly generating the debt crisis of the 1980s. The combination of these deep-seated domestic problems and the recessionary international economic environment adversely affected the sustainability of the "social contract" and the various neopatrimonial alliances and networks built around it to guarantee political stability. As the developing state became increasingly distressed by economic crisis, the legitimacy of the state and the model of nation-building on which it was based, was called into question by both civil society and international society. Thus, in order to maintain stability in developing states and arrest the deepening crisis in economic management, the key state actors and IFIs inaugurated a shift from welfarist principles based on Keynesianism to neo-liberal principles that placed greater emphasis on market forces and the struggle against inflation (Vilas, 1996). This shift translated into a de-emphasis on the Keynesian goal of full employment and the role of the state in the economy. Coupled with this shift to neo-liberalism in economic policymaking, was the effect of the process of economic globalization which impacted greatly the management of national economic policies all over the wold. For example, the deregulation of financial markets from the late 1970s in powerful states meant that even they started to lose control over their own national economic policies. Neoliberalism eventually became an instrument for maintaining world order under the direction of the IMF, World Bank, and the Group of Seven (G7) powers. The catalyst for IMF imposition

of neoliberal ideas into the developing state came with the debt crisis of the 1980s. Further resources to combat severe payments problems, budgetary, inflationary, and debt servicing burdens was made conditional on the adoption of SAPs. They entailed a strict application of massive and repeated currency devaluations, exchange and interest rate liberalization, public enterprise privatization, the withdrawal of all subsidies, and the abolition of state marketing boards, among others. Eventually SAPs resulted in massive unemployment as large numbers of public sector employees were laid off. Increasing donor (IMF, World Bank, G-7) intervention in national economies meant a generalized curb on developing state intervention in economic processes. The economic austerity inherent in and produced by SAPs generated economic deprivation in both the poor and middle class alike. SAPs also complicated the deepening social crisis in developing states, crisis which escalated into social unrest, social fragmentation and greater inequality. In political terms, SAPs were often not the result of domestic consultation and popular approval, but were often the result of secret negotiations between external actors and unwilling state actors. Thus, developing state actors became increasingly accountable to powerful state and non-state donors rather than to their own citizens. The minimal human rights of citizens were further diminished when local opposition to the SAPs was often brutally repressed or stifled. Neoliberal ideas gradually became involved in political debates about poverty, gender, the environment, governance, and even human rights. In the process, the developing state is increasingly losing its decision-making autonomy to the hegemonic functions of powerful external actors. As crisis deepened in the developing state, so did the "managerial dilemma" or "the fiscal crisis of the state" intensify (O'Connor, 1973; Barnet, & Muller, 1974). These were directly passed on to ordinary citizens in the form of severe economic deprivations. The state has thus abandoned its welfare function to supranational institutions, in particular the IMF and the World Bank. In other words, neoliberal internationalism is being progressively manifested in what Gill and Law (1989) refer to as the imposition of the "structural power" of transnational capital over the "direct power" of the state. In particular, images or intersubjective agreements of what constitute proper global economic relations are further reinforced by these transnational institutions as part of the dominance of the strong over the weak. Dilemmas Posed by Economic Interventions The violence (riots in Venezuela, Egypt, Nigeria, or Indonesia) spawned by the imposition of SAPs constitute human rights violations because of the coercion needed to enforce them, and also because of the economic deprivations they produce among groups in society. The imposition of SAPs also constitute paternalism: deciding for the developing state what will be the most efficient way to manage its economy and govern its society. In the end, since Western paternalism ends up imposing its will on an often reluctant state leadership, the outcome in the relationship is one of consensual domination. Democratization and its accompanying economic liberalization seems to undermine the 20th Century ethos of the state as responsible for a substantial portion of the economic well?being of its citizens. The state, in other words, bears responsibility for functions ranging from the

maintenance of domestic tranquility and protection of the territory against external attacks to contributions to the material security of the members of society. The developing state, in particular, came into being when the twentieth?century notion of the welfare state was already the modus operandi of many states in the international system. Many states in this regard strive to achieve a guaranteed minimum through the dominant role played by the public sector and manifested in government subsidies on education, health, food, housing, and other sectors. In other words, many developing states aim at a greater availability of collective and distributional goods and institute policies directed at greater social and economic equality. Democratization involves the gradual establishment of values such as respect for civil rights and political liberties, as well as greater citizen participation in the politics of society. In general, however, such political liberalization devoid of societal cohesion and a high level of economic development is often plagued by electoral conflict and intense political rivalry. Besides, the indexing of economic liberalization to political liberalization may be acting as a stumbling block to the realization of political stability in many developing countries (Gibbon, Bangura, & Ofstad, 1992). The immediate reactions to economic austerity measures inherent in economic liberalization policies have been varied but destabilizing. Many take the form of spontaneous uprising against the government in response to the sudden experience or fear of loss of economic privileges. In countries where this has occurred it is often the military that is used to coerce the people back into peaceful behavior. The use of the military to put down riots is counterproductive of young experiments in political liberalization. The developmental success of advanced industrial countries is generally a strong argument that economic liberalization and political liberalization are interconnected and mutually supportive processes (World Bank, 1991). However, evidence from developing countries suggests that there is no consensus as to the real dynamics between them. To a large extent, the general relationship between the two so far, is one of a dialectical tension with economic liberalization acting as a constraint on political liberalization because of the limits it can put on the extent of political reforms. The consequence of the dialectical tension between the two is an oscillation between progress and regress within a context of lingering authoritarianism, caution, and control. The interaction of economic liberalization and political liberalization present serious dilemmas for developing states because of their contradictory consequences. In Africa, for example, economic liberalization in the form of structural adjustment measures decreases the role of the state in the economy thereby causing adverse effects on poorer classes (Olukoshi, 1996). The government is often confronted with the choice of when, and how much, to liberalize the economy, or how to prioritize the various adjustment programs that constitute economic liberalization and reform. Often, the state, concerned about the negative consequences of economic liberalization, can deliberately stall in its implementation of the required measures. The state is thus forced to waver between strict state control and restricted elections. In the final analysis, political liberalization can act as a brake on economic liberalization, and the latter can in turn severely undermine democratization. The fear of political instabilities caused by severe distributional inequities often keep the state heavily involved in the economy. After all, the so?called East Asian economic miracles of the 1980s and early 90s are a result of effective state intervention in stimulating the export?led sectors of those countries.

Developing state governments operating in a context of fragile legitimacy and a legacy of military intervention in politics are often faced with the dilemma of whether to shield the military or other groups from the austerity measures inherent in structural adjustments. If certain groups are privileged by economic liberalization the government is invariably confronted by resistance from the economically deprived and politically excluded groups in society whose interest are not protected by the new political economy. Generally political liberalization without visible economic improvements is likely to cause enough deprivation that would delegitimize the incumbent regime, awaken nostalgia for a more authoritarian regime, intensify ethnic divisions, or instigate a military intervention in politics (Deng, Kostner, & Young, 1990). This lack of sustained political confidence in incumbent regimes is to some extent responsible for the shifting economic development strategies in many developing countries. For example, many African governments have shifted from import substitution industrialization to what is now referred to as a free-market development strategy. Democratization and it's accompanying economic liberalization policies raise serious questions related to social justice in developing societies. The institutional structures that underlie the markets and economic behavior in many developing states are not adequately developed to integrate the bulk of the population into meaningful and viable political and economic existence. The link between economic and political liberalization is not a compatible one and thus works against the effective protection of the lower classes and the disadvantaged. In others words, despite the general emphasis on privatization and reduced government spending, the establishment of sensible social welfare systems is still a preserve of the state. Redistributive policies do not always promote efficiency and sustained economic growth. In some countries, the politically dominant segments of society (industrialists, top civil servants, the military, and the middle class) have been the beneficiaries of economic growth and liberalization. Thus, instead of liberalization and the probable economic growth diminishing the overt inequalities and divisive elitism in such countries, it has instead entrenched the power and position, and preserved the elitist traditions of these dominant groups. The further consequence is the increase in widespread corruption, economic distortion, and authoritarian tendencies. Such a situation results in the further alienation and marginalization of the lower classes, and the utter failure of economic and political liberalization programs. While effective economic liberalization may be a necessary aspect of viable democratic reform, it is nonetheless a sacrificial and prolonged process. Besides, the effectiveness and viability of structural adjustment programs are called into question when the state is not inclined to an "equitable" distribution of the gains from market reform. The widespread deprivation caused by adjustment programs, the vulnerable state of markets, and the ill-developed institutional infrastructure in many African countries, for example, suggest that there is a need for a "strong" state to ensure basic human needs, and to put in place the necessary structures for a functioning market economy (Francis, 1995). A decrease in glaring economic disparities through socio?economic inclusion of all classes and segments of society diminishes the probability of intergroup conflicts or violent challenges against the state. In the final analysis, formidable ethical questions still remain unanswered where economic and political liberalization are concerned. Does the goal of establishing a market economy based on long?term viability and sustained economic growth justify the initial negative social consequences of liberalization programs? How do we in fact know that such liberalization programs will ever work in many

developing states where the institutional structures and societal values may be quite at odds with the Westphalian, European legal-political order? What is the most effective way to ensure an "acceptable" and less strenuous political, social, and economic impact of economic liberalization policies for all segments of society? With the end of the Cold War, the relationship between people's rights (human rights) and state rights (sovereign rights) became one of the key issues within states and in world politics. For example the argument over whether state sovereignty is absolute or dependent on popular consent was reflected in the debate over the occupation of Haiti by the U.S. in 1994 in order to reinstall the elected government of President Jean?Bertrand Aristide, which had been overthrown by a military coup. In terms of Great-Power relations with weak states, it has now become generally acceptable in international politics for donors to impose foreign aid conditions on recipient states. Such impositions are considered legitimate and outside the bounds of blatant interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Even economic and political agreements between the World Bank and the IMF are considered legitimate because they are based on the state's consent, and on negotiations. However, in the context of the state's sovereignty versus popular sovereignty, does the state have the right to negotiate and agree on adjustment policies that impose intense deprivations on societal groups without their consent? Should not such intervention by powerful state and non?state donors be approved by popular consent? Should the state be made to succumb to external impositions that undermine its contractual obligations to its citizens, which is to ensure a modicum of welfare? Developing state economic crisis and external impositions are an integral part of the internationalization of the state. The motivation of state policy has shifted from domestic welfare to international competitiveness whose requirements include decreased state capacity or intervention in the economy. Internationalization effects call into question the very identity of the state vis--vis civil society. But in the case of the developing state, it is unable to overcome this progressive diminution of state capacity and legitimacy through a reconceptualization of its identity and internationalization of the national interest. For the developing state, state policy has been narrowly transformed into a desire to enhance the global competitive position of the national economy, rather than, for example, making efforts to increase levels of domestic employment. In other words, domestic concerns have been subordinated to the requirements of globalization emanating from the dominant actors. Conclusion In the Westphalian model of interstate relations, intervention is generally believed to be legally and morally unacceptable. However, the violent conflictual nature of the post-Cold War international system and its attendant humanitarian imperatives is challenging the twin principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention because the intensity of genocidal massacres and ethnic bloodletting are very repulsive to international society. There is also a growing consensus in the international relations of states that when such interventions are collectively authorized by either a regional organization, the international community, or Great Powers, they acquire legitimacy. This cosmopolitan moral theory of international relations is increasingly recognizing that members of the family of nations have an obligation to intervene to stop massive human rights violations. Thus, the once sacrosanct principle of non-intervention and sovereignty is being

steadily undermined by the new scope and intensity of intra-state conflicts. However, such interventions could be viewed in terms of the need by dominant actors of the international system to perform their hegemonic function of preserving the integrity of the existing statecentric system and reducing the level of anarchy in the international system. In the economic realm, economic interventions are outcomes of the impact of globalization processes on the sovereignty of the state. Their relationship portrays a serious tension as SAPs as an aspect of globalization challenge both state sovereignty and identity in the developing world. The transnationalization and supranationalism involved in SAPs challenge the effectiveness of both domestic and international state policies. The key international organizations embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders. They reflect orientations favorable to the dominant social and economic forces emanating from the powerful states, but which often have some negative human rights consequences for the developing state. It has become evident that SAPs do not by themselves reduce poverty, and macroeconomic recovery does not translate into a significant social improvement. In many developing states, the "national popular state" (or welfare state) declined as a result of SAPs. With the neoliberal model, the state was forced to abandon its role as an agent of social development and integration. In sum, the developing state is a sociopolitical and economic example of an externally-imposed and intersubjective creation of Great-Power responses to material conditions. All the anomalies, paradoxes, and dilemmas inherent in the weak developing state, are products of a prevailing ontology, in this case, a post-Cold War ontology. The modern state system comprised of both developed and developing states is constitutive of contending interest-based images of appropriate socio-economic and political order which divide North and South, and create tensions among competing ethnocommunal groups. References Amin, Samir. 1974. Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment. New York: Monthly Review. Armstrong, David. 1993. Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Augelli, Erico & Craig Murphy. 1988. America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third World, A Gramscian Analysis, London: Pinter. Barnet, J., and Ronald E. Muller. 1974. Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations. New York: Simon and Schuster. Beckman, B. 1992. "The Post-Colonial State: Crisis and Reconstruction." IDS Bulletin, Vol 19, No. 4, Spring, pp.40-51. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1992. An Agenda for Peace. New York: United Nations. Brierly, James L. 1963. The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace.

New York: Oxford University Press. Bull, Hedley, ed. 1984. Intervention in World Politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Clinton, William. 1993. White House Press Statement 15 September. Colclough, Christopher, and James Manor, eds. 1991. States or Markets: Neo-Liberalism and the Development Policy Debate. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Cox, Robert W. 1996.Approaches to World Order. New York: Cambridge University Press. Cox, Robert W. 1981. Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press. Deng, Lual, Markus Kostner, and Crawford Young, eds. 1991.Democratization and Structural Adjustment in Africa in the 1990s. Madison: African Studies Program, University of WisconsinMadison. Francis, Michael J. 1995/96. "A Response to Rethinking Development," Developing World, Vol. 5 pp. 38-40. Friedman, Jonathan. 1992. Cultural Identity and Global Process. London: Sage Publications. Gibbon, Peter, Yusuf Bangura, and Arve Ofstad.1992. Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Reform in Africa. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Gill, Stephen. 1995. Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations. New York: Cambridge University Press. Gill, Stephen and David Law. 1989. "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital," International Studies Quarterly, 33 (1989), No. 4, 475-499. Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections From Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers. Gurr, Ted R. 1993. Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. Harris, D.J. 1991. Cases and Materials on International Law. London: Sweet & Maxwell. Horowitz, Donald L. 1994. "Ethnic and Nationalist Conflict." In Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, eds., World Security: Challenges for a New Security. New York: St. Martin's Press. Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosberg. 1982. "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: the Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," World Politics, No. 35, pp. 1-24. Levison, David. 1993. "Ethnic Conflict and Rufugees," Refugees. Geneva: UNHCR. Lissintzyn, Oliver J. 1963. "International Law in a Divided World." International Conciliation No. 542, pp 12-34. Magyar, Karl P. & Earl Conteh-Morgan. 1998. Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia. London, Macmillan. O'Connor, James. 1973. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York: St. Martin's Press. O'Brien, Richard. 1992. Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography. London: Pinter. Olukoshi, Adebayo O. 1996. "Africa and Structural Adjustment," In Adebayo O. Olukoshi, and Liisa Laakso, eds., Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa. Upsalla: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Oppenheim, Lassa. 1955. International Law: Peace. London: Longmans, Green. Robinson, William I. 1996. Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony. New York: Cambridge University Press, Ruggie, John G. 1982. "International Regimes Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring, pp. 379416. Strange, Susan. 1996. The Retreat From the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sunkel, Osvaldo, and Edmundo R. Fuenzalida. 1979. "Transnationalization and its National Consequences." In Jose J. Villamil, ed., Transnational Capitalism and National Development: New Perspectives on Dependence. Brighton: Harvester Press. Szentes, Tamas. 1988. The Transformation of the World Economy: New Directions and New Interests. London: Zeb Books. Toulmin, Stephen. 1992. Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 770, paragraph 2, August 15, 1992. UNRISD. 1995. States of Disarray: The Social Effects of Globalization. Geneva: UNRISD.

Vilas, Carlos M. 1996. "Neoliberal Social Policy, Managing Poverty Somehow," NACLA Report on the Americas. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1970. The Modern World System. New York: Academic Press. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979.Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Weber, Cynthia. 1995. Stimulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State, and Symbolic Exchange. New York: Cambridge University Press. World Bank. 1991. World Development Indicators. Washington D.C.: World Bank Publications. January 1996 ISSN 1085-7494 Volume 1, Number 1

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Articles

Chadwick Alger Introduction: Reflection on Peace Research Traditions

John W. Burton Civilization in Crisis: From Adversarial to Problem Solving Process

Johan Galtung Peace and Conflict Research in the Age of the Cholera: Ten Pointers to the Future of Peace Studies

Birgit Brock-Utne

The Challenges for Peace Educators at the End of a Millennium

Paul Smoker and Linda Groff Spirituality, Religion, Culture, and Peace: Exploring the Foundations for Inner-Outer Peace in the Twenty-First Century

NGO Policy Perspectives

Stephanie Mills Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Karlheinz Koppe and Kevin Clements Letter to Mr. Jacques Chirac

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The Journal promotes discussion about various issues in peace research, including but not limited to, security systems, justice and basic human needs, survival for indigenous people, discourse on peace and war, human security, nonviolent social change, peace and environmental movements, sustainable development, global environmental policies, human rights, self-determination, economic equity, conflict resolution, disarmament, and peace education. This journal is dedicated to enhancing discourse on a wide range of theoretical issues in peace research and improving our knowledge in the quest for global peace. In particular, it wishes to address strategies to deal with local, regional, or global problems. For this purpose, we promote the dialogue between peace research and policy making communities. International Journal of Peace Studies is published twice a year for the International Peace Research Association.

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Interventionism (politics)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search Interventionism is a term for a policy of non-defensive (proactive) activity undertaken by a nation-state, or other geo-politicaljurisdiction of a lesser or greater nature, to manipulate an economy or society. The most common applications of the term are for economic interventionism (a state's intervention in its own economy), and foreign interventionism (a state's intervention in the affairs of another nation as part of its foreign policy).[1]

Contents

1 Overview o 1.1 Objectives o 1.2 Relations o 1.3 Methods 1.3.1 Non-aggressive 2 Foreign interventionism o 2.1 Ideologies o 2.2 Policies in practice 2.2.1 Diplomacy 2.2.2 Multilateral and international intervention 2.2.3 Unilateral intervention o 2.3 Controversies 2.3.1 Human rights 2.3.2 State terrorism 2.3.3 Occupation 2.3.4 Peacekeeping 2.3.5 Globalization 2.3.6 Media o 2.4 History 2.4.1 1800 - 1900 2.4.2 1900 - 1990 2.4.3 1990 - 2000 2.4.4 2000 - present 3 See also 4 References 5 Books

Overview
The political government of a state decide actions of foreign intervention and foreign policy. Political interventionism can include methods such as sanctions on a foreign economy or international trade with similar results to protectionism, or other international sanctions through international cooperation decisions guarding international law or global justice. Political support or political capital, such as nationalism or ethnic conflict also decide foreign intervention actions such as occupation, nation-building and national security policies.

Objectives
The objectives of a policy for foreign intervention can be philosophical, religious or scientific based on the different ideological foundations supporting the policy. Example of objectives are national security, support for world government, scientific systemic concern of systemic bias in international relations theory, policy of balancing as a goal for balance of power in international relations or balance of threat.

Relations
International relations are developed through international cooperation and international organizations giving rise to military alliance, cooperation through a trade pact or development of a trade bloc. These can set common policies of foreign intervention through bilateralism or multilateralism, and international agreement on a treaty. The development of international law is also done through international cooperation and organizations with implications for foreign intervention actions.

Methods
There are varying methods on foreign intervention from participants including government, military, international, corporate, religious and public efforts reflecting their respective objectives, interests and ideologies. Foreign intervention methods that are physically passive and do not use violence are nonaggressive. Non-aggressive Some methods that are used are various sanctions like economic sanctions, embargo, boycott, trade sanctions, political sanctions, international sanctions. Promotion of efforts for media or information methods may be used; such as information warfare, propaganda, advertising, political symbolism, media democracy, freedom of information to gain political capital and support for political reform. Publicly organized efforts also appear; like the peace movement and nonviolence organizations, sometimes by religious organizations.

United States military strategy like military operations other than war and Civil-Military Cooperation are examples of how to deal with asymmetric warfare in the War on Terrorism, as well as winning hearts and minds (Iraq)

Foreign interventionism
Ideologies
Ideologies for supporting or opposing varying degrees of foreign intervention in international relations can have philosophical, religious or scientific origins. Within political philosophy there are variations giving ideological foundation and reasoning to different degrees of foreign interventionism. Political doctrines are often the expressed views for such belief systems, such as a foreign policy doctrine (usually of philosophical origin) or like the Doctrine for Just War (of religious origin). Military science through military doctrine and military strategy also include geopolitical strategy. International relations theory is the scientific study of such policies, methods and paradigms resulting in scientific modelling through the interdisciplinary fields of systems philosophy and systems science. Some central philosophical and systemic topics on foreign intervention and war studies include:

philosophy of war deterrence theory preemptive war preventive war war of aggression global justice right of revolution international law "The ends justify the means"

The non-aggression principle holds that aggression is inherently illegitimate, but does not preclude defence against aggression. Marxist international relations theory and later World-systems approach are essentially opposing any policies of domination or hegemony such as world domination. The idea of complex interdependence argue that the decline of military force as a policy tool, the increase in economic and other forms of interdependence should increase the probability of cooperation among states. Some theories that promote less aggressive foreign intervention are:

Critical international relations theory Constructivism in international relations Neoliberalism in international relations

Institutionalism in international relations English school of international relations theory

Theories openly supporting explicitly aggressive foreign intervention are:


political realism Neorealism (international relations) Neoconservatism Objectivism - Objectivist views on Islam and the War on Terror Khomeinism

Political realism states that the overriding 'national interest' of each state is its national security and survival; as well as that to ensure this security, states must be on constant preparation for conflict through economic and military build-up. Ruhollah Khomeini believed in Muslim unity and social solidarity, as well as the export of Islamic revolution throughout the world: "Establishing the Islamic state world-wide belong to the great goals of the revolution." [2][3] Public opposition to aggressive foreign intervention along with public activism has also promoted nonviolence as an alternative to passive acceptance of oppression and armed struggle against it through actions like direct action and nonviolent intervention. An example of such internationally organized nonviolent intervention is the Peace Brigades International.

Policies in practice
Foreign policy doctrines examples are the Bush Doctrine, Monroe Doctrine, the Stimson Doctrine, the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Nixon Doctrine, the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Kirkpatrick doctrine. Nazi GermanyGeopolitik and United StatesRealpolitik are also examples of practical policies. Foreign intervention may result in a declaration of war or state of emergency. Diplomacy Efforts in foreign intervention may include diplomacy to dispute resolution. The involved parties in a conflict may negotiate a peace treaty or other treaties. A state may operate as a protecting power on behalf of other states, offering foreign intervention capabilities. This is usually done by a neutral country. International conventions may be reached by an international consensus. Ideas of equal power relationship and pacifism are sometimes used in diplomacy. Towards the end of the Cold War there was a public rationale and reasoning for a peace dividend with economic benefits of a decrease in defence spending. Multilateral and international intervention

The most frequently used multilateral alternative is a policy through the United Nations Security Council, often for peacekeeping initiatives. There is also an International Police. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also participates, for example through combating terrorist financing. This is also the case for Interpol. Other organisations are the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and NATO. Canada's International Policy Statement is an example of a multilateral policy. Unilateral intervention Throughout the last century there has been several unilateral and covert efforts by the United States like Operation Gladio, School of the Americas and other CIA activities in the Americas. The Bush Doctrine and United States realpolitik are seen as promoting unilateral foreign intervention. There are also programs like the extraordinary rendition by the United States in the asymmetric warfare nature of the War on Terrorism. During the war in North-West Pakistan there are further Effects-Based Operations in a low intensity conflict, selective assassinations and a manhunt (military) for Osama bin Laden. The United States also defines a list of State Sponsors of Terrorism and an Axis of evil which are subject to various US foreign intervention policies like sanctions. During the 2008 South Ossetia war there were privately hired military veterans from Israel giving military education and training; as well as other official military aid such as military advisors from the United States and Israel to the Georgian military.[4][5][6][7] Later Russia intervened in this conflict in order to protect the ethnicminority group in South Ossetia, and later expressed NATOexpansionism concerns.

Controversies
There are controversies to foreign interventionism policies with accusations of hegemony and world domination through expansionism or imperialism. Some social criticism is directed as anti-imperialism. Others warn that militarism and inflated military spending will result in a permanent war economy. Critics of appeasement say it can result in world war. Also, Finlandization is the process of turning into a neutral country which, although maintaining national sovereignty, in foreign politics resolves not to challenge a more powerful neighbour. Ethnic conflict can result in Balkanization. Human rights Military intervention can result in accusations of war crimes like ethnic cleansing or genocide. The International Court of Justice handles some cases of such abuse. There is also public criticism on collateral damage in conflicts such as public infrastructure and civilian casualties.

State terrorism There are allegations of state terrorism by the United States from its history of foreign interventions and policies like low intensity conflict or covert operations. Occupation The United States intervened in Iraq in the 2003 invasion of Iraq citing concerns for national security and adhering to the evolving Bush Doctrine based on neoconservatism and the democratic peace theory. Disputes from ethnic conflict and the question of self-determination and independence can lead to insurgency or military occupation. Russia intervened in the 2008 South Ossetia war, but has also voiced support for any of its citizens in places like Ukraine and elsewhere. Peacekeeping The United Nations and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are examples of international organizations which can be used to both promote or oppose foreign intervention. Scientific criticism point to multi-level governance as a better alternative for public choice theory and decision theory. Public peace movements like the anti-war groups promote non-interventionism. Globalization Neoliberalism points to the complex interdependence of foreign relations on economy, but there is criticism of the world economyglobalization from the anti-globalization movement. Promoters of global governance and democratic mundialization organize and participate in political activism. Media Critics name concerns on media manipulation and censorship like political censorship or denialism. There are accusations that embedded journalism is military manipulation of the media. There are accusations of negationism in public education and education resources. Throughout history propaganda has been used for gaining political capital and political support, like Nazi propaganda or Communist propaganda. There are also criticisms of monuments and statues supporting various ideologies through political symbolism, such as Nazi architecture. There is criticism of promotion of culture of fear and the appeal to fear like the tactic of creating "fear, uncertainty and doubt" such as the expressions "the terrorists have won" or "for the children (politics)" in an appeal to emotion.

History
1800 - 1900

Opium Wars in China was a process from 1830's to 1852 which saw the Qing Dynasty intervening to stop British opium smuggling markets in coastal parts of China. The British Empire, driven by Adam Smith's Free trade ideology and loss of profits, responded with military intervention to force the Qing Dynasty into signing the "free for us" treaties known as the Treaty of Nanking and the Treaty of Tianjin.[8][9]

1900 - 1990

Eight-Nation Alliance, made up of the United States, Japan, and various European powers, organized to quell the Boxer Rebellion in China. Russian Civil War multilateral Western Allies of World War I foreign intervention.

1990 - 2000

Gulf War multilateral NATO and Coalition of the Gulf War foreign intervention. Kosovo War multilateral UN, OSCE and NATO foreign intervention.

2000 - present

2003 invasion of Iraq unilateral foreign intervention based on the Bush Doctrine and coalition of the willing for invasion, regime change and occupation. 2011 Libyan civil war

See also

Non-interventionism Foreign interventionism by neoconservatives in United States United States embargoes Liberal internationalism List of military occupations List of ongoing conflicts Muslim Peacemaker Teams Christian Peacemaker Teams Human shield action to Iraq

References
1. ^Robert Higgs and Carl P. Close, "Opposing the Crusader State: Alternatives to Global Interventionism", 2007, ISBN 978-1-59813-015-7 2. ^ (Resalat, 25.3.1988) (quoted on p.69, The Constitution of Iran by Asghar Schirazi, Tauris, 1997 3. ^ Personal communications from Dr. Mansur Farhang, a biographer and supporter of Khomeini who was the former Iranian representative at the United Nations, with Ervand

4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9.

Abrahamian. Quoted in Abrahamian, Ervand, Khomeinism : Essays on the Islamic Republic University of California Press, (1993) ^Ha'aretz: Georgia president denies Israel halted military aid due to war., September 14, 2008 ^Asia Times: Georgia's Israeli arms point Russia to Iran. (Inter Press Service), September 14, 2008 ^Ynetnews: War in Georgia, The Israeli connection., September 14, 2008 ^DEBKAfile: Israel backs Georgia in Caspian Oil Pipeline Battle with Russia., September 14, 2008 ^ Giraldez, Arturo (2001) . "Book Review: The World That Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World Economy, 1400 to the Present" Journal of World History vol12.2, 482-485 (online) ^ Hammond, Kenneth J. (2008) "From Yao to Mao: 5000 Years of Chinese History", The Teaching Company

Books

Robert HiggsOpposing the Crusader State: Alternatives to Global Interventionism, The Independent Institute, 2007. ISBN 978-1-59813-015-7
Bringing Religion into International Relations Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler Series: Culture and Religion in International Relations Palgrave Macmillan

Bringing Religion into International Relations (Culture and Religion in International Relations) [Paperback]
Jonathan Fox (Author), Shmuel Sandler (Author)

Product Description
Review
'This book, by two highly regarded experts on international conflict, takes an excellent step forward along a neglected path, namely, the one leading to the study of the impact of religion. This ambitious book succeeds in covering an agenda that ranges from theoretical issues about legitimacy to the role religion plays in the ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. In sum, this superb book contains much that will interest students of international relations, religion and area experts on the Middle East.' - Patrick James,

Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri, USA, and Editor, International Studies Quarterly 'This broad-ranging and well documented analysis of the global impact of religion represents a felicitous combination of approaches. It deals at once with questions of ideology and legitimacy and the debate about conflicts of nationalism and ethnicity. It is a significant contribution to the study of international relations.' - William Safran, University of Colorado at Boulder, USA 'If 9/11 proved anything, it was the enormously influential role that religious extremism plays in contemporary affairs. Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler understand the essential need for International Relations experts, at long last, to integrate a sophisticated understanding of religion into their analyses of world politics. Accordingly, they have provided an engaging and well-researched guidebook for the task. Bringing Religion into International Politics will quickly become the standard introduction and overview for anyone seeking to comprehend the complex dynamics of religion and power in the Twentyfirst century.' - R. Scott Appleby, Author of The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation and Professor of History, University of Notre Dame, USA '...a contribution that will enjoy wide acceptance as one of the first texts to urge for the inclusion of religious discourse through paradigm modification in international relations. Fox and Sandler have done a great service to the social sciences with the publication of this book.' - John K. Burk, International Journal of Public Theology

Product Description
This book has several main themes and arguments. International Relations has been westerncentric, which has contributed to its ignoring religion; while religion is not the main driving force behind IR, international politics cannot be understood without taking religion into account; the role of religion is related to the fact that IR has evolved to become more than just interstate relations and now included elements of domestic politics. The book proceeds in three stages. First, it looks at why religion was ignored by IR theory and theorists. Second, it examines the multiple ways religion influences IR, including through religious legitimacy and the many ways domestic religious issues can cross borders. In this discussion a number of topics including but not limited to international intervention, international organizations, religious fundamentalism, political Islam, Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' theory, and terrorism are addressed. Third, these factors are examined empirically using both quantitative and case study methodology.

MA International Intervention
Factfile
Typical Entry Requirements A good undergraduate degree (First or Second class) in a social science or humanities discipline (or an equivalent qualification). In exceptional cases

students with relevant practical experience but no first degree may also be admitted. Programme length Show more 12 months full-time 24 months part-time

For general enquiries


T: 0800 980 3200 or +44 (0)1483 681681 E: pg-enquiries@surrey.ac.uk Contact details

For admissions enquiries


T: +44 (0)1483 686506 E: politics-pg@surrey.ac.uk This programme is subject to validation. This innovative programme will enable you to understand and evaluate contemporary debates in the study of international intervention, focusing on the factors that shape such intervention in situations of conflict, state breakdown and humanitarian/human rights emergency. You will be encouraged to explore in a detailed manner various analytical frameworks which can be used to understand international intervention, relating them to different theories of international relations and global governance. You will also gain a good understanding of the legal framework relevant to an understanding of international intervention. In addition, the programme will provide you with the skills necessary to design and complete a dissertation on a specialist topic, including: formulating research questions; selecting appropriate methods of data collection and analysis; conducting a literature review; and presenting research according to scholarly conventions. It provides a good preparation for students wishing to pursue a career in development, humanitarian assistance and conflict resolution, as well as politics more generally.

Modules Careers Teaching Prizes More

Compulsory modules

Politics of International Intervention I


The module will examine, from both a theoretical and a practical perspective, different kinds of international intervention in response to poverty, humanitarian crisis, abuses of human rights, state failure, and armed conflict. The different forms of intervention studied will include: development and humanitarian assistance; peace-making, peace-keeping, and peace-building; use of international legal institutions and processes; and coercive military intervention to secure regime change.

Politics of International Intervention II


The module builds on Politics of International Intervention I by exploring in more depth the varying analytical frameworks used to theorise international intervention and the practice of intervention. You will develop the skills to compare and contrast intervention in different crises and learn to evaluate the relative successes and failures.

Global Governance
This module introduces contemporary systems of global governance. It explores the links between national and international politics and provides an understanding of key concepts, structures and theoretical debates.

International Human Rights Law


The module takes a progressive approach to the international human rights system, primarily studying the United Nations and then moving towards the regional systems, exploring how each system co-exists and works together.

Law of Armed Conflict


This module is an advanced level course on the principles of public international law which regulate the use of force in international society. It examines both the law relating to when it is permissible to use force and the law governing the conduct of hostilities once the decision to resort to force has been taken.

Introduction to Research
This module provides an introduction to the design and conduct of social science research. Emphasis is placed on the applicability of these methods to other subject areas across the social sciences.

Optional modules
Religious Ideologies and International Conflict
This module considers religious ideologies and the significance of belief in contemporary conflicts. You will examine the relationship between belief and reason, and the politicisation of religious ideologies.

Theories of International Relations


This module explores a range of theoretical approaches to the study of international relations. It begins with the classical debates, moving on to mainstream theories, and concludes with critical approaches.

Key Issues in International Politics Today


This module investigates contemporary developments in international politics. You will cover a range of issues at regional and international levels, such as the war on terror, human rights, development, humanitarianism and the environment.

International Security and Defence


This module provides an overview of the field since 1945, in particular the shifts resulting from the end of the Cold War. It moves on to consider contemporary themes and future scenarios for the development of security and defence.

Law of International Organisations


This module focuses on the institutional legal aspects of the activities displayed by international organisations and the relationship of these activities to the methods and sources of public international law. It focuses in particular on the law of the United Nations and the function and powers of the International Court of Justice.

Law, International Trade and Development


This module explores the linkages between law, international trade and development. In particular, it considers the international framework of policies and legal measures adopted by states and international organisations to bridge the gap between developed and developing countries.

Humanitarian Intervention
A History

Edited by Brendan Simms


University of Cambridge

D. J. B. Trim
University of Reading

View list of contributors...

Hardback
(ISBN-13: 9780521190275)

Also available in Adobe eBook | Mobipocket eBook Published April 2011

Manufactured on demand: supplied direct from the printer


AUD$124.95 (inclusive of GST) Export price AUD$113.59

The dilemma of how best to protect human rights is one of the most persistent problems facing the international community today. This unique and wide-ranging history of humanitarian intervention examines responses to oppression, persecution and mass atrocities from the emergence of the international state system and international law in the late sixteenth century, to the end of the twentieth century. Leading scholars show how opposition to tyranny and to religious persecution evolved from notions of the common interests of 'Christendom' to ultimately incorporate all people under the concept of 'human rights'. As well as examining specific episodes of intervention, the authors consider how these have been perceived and justified over time, and offer important new insights into ideas of national sovereignty, international relations and law, as well as political thought and the development of current theories of 'international community'.

Contents
1. Towards a history of humanitarian intervention Brendan Simms and D. J. B. Trim; Part I. Early-Modern Precedents: 2. 'If a prince use tyrannie towards his people': interventions on behalf of foreign populations in early-modern Europe D. J. B. Trim; 3. The Protestant interest and the history of humanitarian intervention, c.1685c.1756 Andrew Thompson; 4. 'The age of chivalry is not dead': the idea of humanitarian intervention in the era of Burke Brendan Simms; Part II. The Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire: 5. 'From an umpire to a competitor': Castlereagh, Canning and the issue of international intervention in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars John

Bew; 6. Intervening in the Jewish question, 184078 Abigail Green; 7. The 'principles of humanity' and the European powers' intervention in Ottoman Lebanon and Syria in 18601 Davide Rodogno; 8. The guarantees of humanity: the Concert of Europe and the origins of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877 Matthias Schulz; 9. The European powers' intervention in Macedonia, 19038: an instance of humanitarian intervention? Davide Rodogno; Part III. Intervening in Africa: 10. The price of legitimacy in humanitarian intervention: Britain, the European powers and the abolition of the West African slave trade, 180767 Maeve Ryan; 11. British anti-slave trade and anti-slavery policy in East Africa, Arabia, and Turkey in the late nineteenth century William Mulligan; 12. The origins of humanitarian intervention in Sudan: Anglo-American missionaries after 1899 Gideon Mailer; Part IV. Non-European States: 13. Humanitarian intervention, democracy, and imperialism: the American war with Spain, 1898, and after Mike Sewell; 14. The innovation of the JacksonVanik Amendment Thomas Probert; 15.Fraternal aid, self-defence, or self-interest? Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia (197889) Sophie Quinn-Judge; Part V. Postscript: 16. Humanitarian intervention since 1990 and 'liberal interventionism' Matthew Jamison; 17.Humanitarian intervention in historical perspective D. J. B. Trim.

Review
'One of Simms and Trim's expressed objectives is to show the 'rich and varied' history of humanitarian intervention, which is definitely achieved.' Kate Nevens, International Affairs

Contributors
Brendan Simms, David Trim, Andrew Thompson, John Bew, Abigail Green, Davide Rodogno, Matthias Schulz, Maeve Ryan, William Mulligan, Gideon Mailer, Mike Sewell, Thomas Probert, Sophie Quinn-Judge, Matthew Jamison International Studies Review 2001 The International Studies Association Abstract: Religion is among the most overlooked factors in the study of international politics. Some reasons for this include a bias against the study of religion that dates to the origins of the social sciences, the influence on social scientists of classical liberal ideas that stress the separation of church and state, and the fact that religion is difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, the essay holds that religion influences international politics in three ways: 1) religion influences the worldviews of many decisionmakers and their constituents and shapes the environment in which decisionmakers act; 2) religion is a source of legitimacy for political decisions and actions; 3) religion is an issue that crosses borders in many ways, including domestic conflicts with international implications. Equally significant are international religious movements, like fundamentalist movements and political Islam, and the foreign policies of theocratic states and other governments, which are guided by religious ideologies. Attention focuses on the international movement for the support of religious rights in the context of the world's growing interdependence. This underscores the importance of religion in the study of international politics.

Religion and Internationalism Project Related Publications


by Nathaniel Berman
2011: The Sacred Conspiracy: Religion, Nationalism, and the Crisis of Internationalism Leiden Journal of International Law 25 (2011), pp. 1-46 The goal of this article is to initiate an interdisciplinary and historical reflection on one of the central preoccupations of our time: the relationship of religion to international order. This current project grows out of my long-standing work on the genealogy of modern internationalism. In my past work, I have argued that internationalists constructed their own disciplines in tandem with their construction of nationalism, to such an extent that modern internationalism and modern nationalism must be understood in relation to each other; in the present essay, I contend that internationalism and religion have an equally mutually constitutive relationship. This article seeks to retell the story of international law over the past century through the lens of its relationship to religion a lens that both overlaps with and differs from that of nationalism. Its historical narrative is rooted in the early twentieth century a period to which so many of our modern cultural conceptions may be traced. Its methodology is broadly interdisciplinary, setting changing international legal conceptions of religion in relation to contemporaneous developments in domains such as sociology, religious studies, and historiography. This is the first piece of a series of projected studies on the construction and contestation of religion, the secular, and the international over the past century. 2011: Hysteria: Reading the Palestinian Application Shma: A Journal of Jewish Responsibility 42 (November 2011), pp. 16-17 2011: "Passion and Ambivalence: Colonialism, Nationalism and International Law"(Brill 2011) Ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts and debates about international intervention have been central global preoccupations of the past hundred years. Such debates, this volume argues, were first framed in their modern form during the interwar period, when a Modernist break (akin to that in literature, philosophy, and the arts) transformed the way such conflicts were viewed. Internationalists began to cast identity-based claims -- whether those of anti-colonialists or European separatists -- not only as mortal dangers to international order but as indispensable to its revitalization. Drawing on cultural studies, postcolonial theory, and psychoanalysis with case studies ranging from 1930s Ethiopia to 1990s Jerusalem this volume looks at both the origins and legacy of these debates, offering a radical reinterpretation of modern internationalism. 2010 :"The Emerging One-State Consensus"

2010 :"Intervention in a 'Divided World': Axes of Legitimacy" 2010 :"The Ambivalence of 'Walls' in the Internationalist Imagination: Legal Scandal or the Foundation of Legal Order?"

by Nukhet Sandal
2011: Religion and International Relations theory: Towards a mutual understanding, European Journal of International Relations 17(1) (2011), pp. 3-25 (with Patrick James) Until the end of the Cold War, it is not an exaggeration to say that only a few theorists of International Relations (IR) or policy-makers engaged in either substantial investigation or articulation of the links between cultural variables like religion and ethnicity on one hand and international affairs on the other. In our article, we argue that this pattern does not do justice to the nature of mainstream IR theories. Although studies are accumulating, how (or whether) religion as a variable can be integrated into mainstream IR thinking still remains in question. We look at three main traditions in IR theory classical realism, structural realism and neoliberalism to see how religion can contribute to our understanding of international affairs within those frameworks. We claim that, without stretching the limits of theories or disturbing their intellectual coherence, possibilities for two-way interactions between the frameworks and identity-related variables like religion can be identified. 2011: Religious actors as epistemic communities in conflict transformation: the cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland, Review of International Studies 37 (2011), pp. 929-949 With the increasing influence of theocrats and other religious actors on policymakers and masses, recognising the agency of the clergy is crucial. This article uses the epistemic communities framework to place the religious agents in contemporary politics and it shows how hermeneutics can be treated as a form of episteme. Until recently, this framework has been used to explain how scientific communities affect policymaking. Using the cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland, this article claims that religious actors, especially with their shared set of normative and principled beliefs as well as shared norms of validity, also meet the requirements of the epistemic community category. The employment of this established IR framework in theorising religious politics has the potential to shed light not only on peacebuilding and mediation, but also violent movements and terrorist organisations that use religion as justification. (Online publication March 1, 2011)

by Thomas A. Lewis
Books "Religion, Modernity, and Politics in Hegel." Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

"Freedom and Tradition in Hegel: Reconsidering Anthropology, Ethics, and Religion." Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. Chapters in books On the Role of Normativity in Religious Studies.In Cambridge Companion to Religious Studies, edited by Robert A. Orsi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Finite Representation, Spontaneous Thought, and the Politics of an Open-ended Consummation.In Hegel and the Infinite: Religion, Politics and Dialectic, edited by Slavoj iek, Clayton Crockett, and Creston Davis, 199-219. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. Religion and Demythologization in Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit. In Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit: A Critical Guide, edited by Dean Moyar and Michael Quante, 192209. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Refereed journal articles Ethnography, Anthropology, and Comparative Religious Ethics, Or, Ethnography and the Comparative Religious Ethics Local.Journal of Religious Ethics 38:3 (2010): 395-403. Speaking of Habits: The Role of Language in Moving from Habit to Freedom.Owl of Minerva 39:1-2 (2007-2008): 25-54. Beyond the Totalitarian: Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion in Recent Hegel Scholarship. Religion Compass 2:4 (2008): 556-74. Non-refereed journal articles Hegelian Anthropology and Ethical Cultivation in the Modern World. In Yo y Tiempo: La antropologa filosfica de Hegel, supplement, Contrastes 15:2 (2010): 249-56.

Canadian Journal of Political Science


Canadian Journal of Political Science (2009), 42 : pp 161-186 Copyright Canadian Political Science Association 2009 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0008423909090064 (About DOI) Published online: 07 April 2009
Conflict Research Consortium ARTICLE SUMMARY

"Report of Conference Key Findings, Ideas, and Recommendations"


by

The Aspen Institute

Citation: "Report of Conference Key Findings, Ideas, and Recommendations" in Managing Conflict in the Post-Cold War World: The Role of Intervention. Report of the August 2-6, 1995, Aspen Institute Conference (Aspen, Colorado: Aspen Institute, 1996) pp. 9-26.
This article summary written by: Tanya Glaser, Conflict Research Consortium.

The 1995 Aspen Institute Conference convened to consider the question, "How can the international community establish greater stability in the world system at large, and within that system, what is the role of international intervention?"[p. 10] International intervention can take many forms, including political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, and military interventions. Conference participants discussed three main types of potentially violent large-scale conflicts. First were conflicts between the great powers over the structure of the emerging post-Cold War international system, and over the distribution of power. Currently relations between China, Russia, and the United States are potential sites of great power conflict. A second area of potential conflict is presented by regional conflicts over the local distribution of power. At the time of the conference, North Korea, and Iran and Iraq were seen as having the strongest potential to erupt into violent regional conflict. The third type of conflicts considered were communal conflicts over "competing identities, territorial claims, and political institutions." These include religious and ethnic conflicts. Communal conflicts have increased in number and intensity since the end of the Cold War, especially the former Soviet states and Africa. Such conflicts tend to Wi the least international concern, and yet have the potential to become very costly, spread, produce human rights abuses including, possibly, genocide. Communal conflicts were predicted to be the most common form of violent conflict in the future. Therefore conference participants tended to focus on the role of international intervention in communal conflict. Conference participants recounted some of the main questions raised when nations consider intervening in communal conflicts. Two questions usually arise first. Is intervention in the outside nations' interest? Is intervention a moral imperative? These two influences are often found in tension. Considerations of national interest lead to the further question: What are the costs of intervention, as compared with the costs of inaction? Conference participants agreed that more consideration should be given to the costs of inaction that tends to be given currently. Moral considerations prompt the broader question: At what point do moral concerns become imperative? The conference participants suggested that genocide should be recognized as a moral threshold. Genocide requires international intervention. The most pragmatic question is "Whose money and whose kids?"[p. 12] This is a key question, since it summarizes so many basic concerns. This is the question which most tends to frame domestic and international debates over proposed interventions. As agreement on the need for intervention is reached, the further question then arises: Who should lead or coordinate interventions? Given the United States' present status, conference participants agreed that the U.S. must take a leadership role in building an effective international system. U.S. failure to participate would undermine the power and

credibility of any other international system or undertaking. However, the U.S. will need to share power with other nations. And leadership entails taking on a share of the risks and costs of the venture. There are a wide array of interventions available to nations. To date there is no coordinated or principled system for using the various techniques. Often nations have rushed to employ military intervention. Conference participants stressed the need to develop and employ other, non-military means of intervention. Similarly there are a number of international organizations through which intervention into violent conflicts could occur. However, many of these organizations, such as NATO, were designed to deal with the interstate conflicts typical of the Cold War. Conference participants agreed that such organizations need to be updated, and that they should be given greater roles in peacekeeping. The United Nations in particular has been overburdened. The UN's successful intervention in Kuwait during the Gulf War produced unrealistic expectations in many member states. Many nations then "dumped" their problems and conflicts on the UN. UN peacekeeping has had a number of successes. Unfortunately the UN's failures tend to be better remembered. While this has revealed many shortcomings of the UN system, it has also prompted unjustified criticism, and damaged the UN's reputation and effectiveness. Conference discussions about the future of the UN produced agreement on a number of points. First and most pointedly, it was agreed that "states should not dump difficult problems on the United Nations, provide inadequate political will and resources, and then blame [the UN] for not acting strongly enough." In addition, UN capabilities should continue to be enhanced, particularly in its non-enforcement and humanitarian areas. For the present, conference participants suggested that regional organizations may be better situated to supply peace enforcement in communal conflicts. In addition to intervention in full-blown violent conflicts, conference participants discussed preemptive intervention. Preemptive intervention seeks to make an early, decisive intervention to end or reduce violent conflict. Such interventions may be military. However we do not yet fully understand how to make effective military intervention in communal conflicts. Other forms of preemptive intervention may include use of human rights observers, shows of force, diplomatic or economic sanctions, and intervention to limit or eliminate hate propaganda. The conference participants agreed that more emphasis on preemptive intervention was needed. Conference participants also stressed that conflict prevention would be preferable to intervention. One key to improved prevention of violent conflict is greater regional integration. Such multilateral regional partnerships will facilitate better early detection, more stability, and would create powerful organizations to deal with other threats to global stability. Increased economic growth, development and prosperity would also tend to prevent conflicts. Based on the conference discussions, participants developed a set of guidelines for planning and implementing international interventions into violent conflicts. When planning an intervention, the intervening nations must have a robust appreciation for, and understanding of, the broader context in which the present conflict occurs. Intervening nations should undertake a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the proposed intervention. Participants stressed the importance of having "clear, achievable objectives and a strategy to achieve those objectives."[p. 18] Planning should include an exit

strategy. Nations must then muster the political will to implement that strategy, including the will, where relevant, to use military force. Participants agreed in cautioning that "the international community must avoid issuing threats and failing to follow through. Failed intervention efforts and empty threats of action embolden aggressors."[p. 18] Effective implementation of a planned intervention requires a swift effective decisionmaking process. Leaders must have clear principles of accountability. Over the course of the intervention process, intervening nations must maintain unity and support among themselves, with the interventions forces, and with their respective publics. Conference participants caution against allowing intervention forces to be taken hostage, or directly targeted. Finally effective intervention requires effective follow-through. Provisions must be made for disarming combatants and reintegrating them into their society. Polls show that the American public is generally willing to intervene in cases involving terrorism, energy supplies and oil, proliferation and humanitarian crises. They are generally willing to employ military force if necessary, but prefer non-military intervention whenever possible. Americans support the UN. Usually, public opinion can be swayed by decisive action by the nation's leadership. International opinion tends to exaggerate the American public's reluctance to become involved in international conflicts. This tends to undermine other nation's confidence in the United State's reliability as an international leader. Such perceptions also fuel the concern that the U.S will tend to act unfairly, unilaterally pursuing it own best interests.

What extent should government intervene in the economy?


In:Economics [Edit categories] Answer: Improve An economic system is an organized approach to producing and distributing goods and services. It is an organize way to answer the three economic questions of what, how and to whom to produce. Although every country must have an economic system to answer these three economic questions, their method of producing and distributing largely depends on the country's historical experience, form of government, objectives and ideologies. To some people, government intervention in the economy are consider significant to protect against the worst elements of capitalism while others think that such regulations are unnecessary invasions of their freedoms. To what extend should the government get involve in the economy. The government should take a limited role in the economy while allowing private enterprises because such involvement would eliminate the negative aspects of capitalism while adopting the positiveness of Socialism. This would benefit the economy in variety of ways. Firstly, government regulations allow businesses to remain in the private hands while removing some of the worst abuses of pure capitalism. Secondly, a government intervention protects the consumers, producers, and the community as a whole. Finally, limited government involvement prevents crises such as inflation, unemployment and depression.

The nineteenth century period was a memorable period in the history of human kind. The Industrial Revolution transformed society from an agricultural to a mechanized society.

The output of production increased enormously thus creating a substantial amount of jobs. Although the economy was drastically affected by the increasing industrialization; many people were horrified at the evils of the Industrial Revolution. It was this period of time when new ideas and philosophies began to emerge regarding the government intervention. For example; the Liberal ideology was reform and transformed by John Stuart Mill. Initially, many supported Adam smith's Lassez-faire capitalism. However, as the abuses of Industrialization multiplied and as the Industrialists showed little concern for the plight of their workers, a new period emerge known as the enlightenment era. In this period, philosophers of the time such as Mill gradually came to believe that government should play a role in the economy. The ideas of Mill and his fellow philosophers influenced the passage of several factory acts and spread the ideas of market oriented economy. The market oriented economy allows private enterprises while removing the worst abuses of capitalism. For example, Health and safety controls ensure that safety standards are met while fairness laws prevent false advertising and discriminatory hiring practices. The implementation of progressive taxes by government agencies also created equality and eliminated the negative aspects of pure capitalism. With the global instability of the economy in recent years, the government started to take an active role in the economy. This is because it prevents the economy from going further down the spiral. The government intervenes both directly and indirectly. The government intervenes directly by setting regulations to prevent unsafe working conditions, racial discrimination, and contributes directly by fiscal or monitory policies. It is important that government set regulations in the economic activities because it would protect the consumers from wrong done of capitalism. For example; the government interventions in democratic society would bring fairness and equality in the economy while promoting competition to produce products in the cheapest way possible. Not only does this ensure the right of consumers but as well protects the producers; allowing them to take risks and to not worry about fraud in the business cycle. The government intervention plays even a larger role which is to protect the community as a whole. For example; the pollution control legislation restricts larger corporations to limit releasing harmful chemicals into the atmosphere, while provision of child-care facilities provides a place for the children. The government involvement in the economy in areas such as health, education, and welfare, provides incentives and motivates citizens to be innovative creating a hybrid of public and private enterprises thus an idealistic society. Historians claim that twentieth century was the most important period in which the government involvement increased significantly. It was a period in which many catastrophic events occurred, and government intervention was necessary to stop the spreading of these crises. For example; the increasing demands of the Second World War and the increasing unemployment and the plunging inflation during the Great Depression stimulated the government to act. During such crises the government started to act by implementing policies such as fiscal or monetary to lower inflation and unemployment. The impacts of these crises were unbearable and to some nations it led to the establishment of authoritarian state. Therefore it is significant that government set limitations to prevent such crises. The tremendous growth of government involvement during the twentieth century led to present day government programs. The programs such as the unemployment insurance, pension plan, social-insurance, and welfare capitalism are such examples of today's government intervention. The government involvement in

the economic and by providing such programs are necessary because it encourages innovation, entrepreneurship, competition and over-all prevents crises such as depression in today's unstable economy. By: Ahmad Shayan In a free market approach too economic decision-making, there are several advantages. First, there is a great deal of individual freedom in the decision making process. Secondly, the free market approach is efficient at allocating resources into various uses. This efficiency is achieved through the price system. Changes in prices act as signals to buyers and sellers and direct their behavior. Third, the competition among sellers ingrained in a free market system provides for lower prices and better quality goods. However, this is only true in a model free market. Markets are not always perfect in their operation. Buyers and sellers often don't have proper information to make informed decisions and competition may be controlled by a few large companies. Also, the free market system may not provide certain services that society considers important and there may be such huge gaps in income distribution that many of the underprivileged cannot compete and earn very little in terms of income. Free markets are not immune to fluctuations in the level of economic activity and as a result of these market imperfections, the government intervenes and tries to maintain an order of balance in the economy.

Religion and International Relations


By Ken R. Dark Google books, religion and international conflict

The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention


Author: Jayshree Bajoria Updated: March 24, 2011

Introduction Responsibility vs. Sovereignty Failure to Address Humanitarian Intervention A Positive Shift? A Worrying Future

Introduction

The crackdown by Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi on mass anti-regime protests in early 2011 resulted in strong condemnation by the international community. In a historic move, the UN Security Council invoked the principle of "responsibility to protect" and adopted Resolution 1973, endorsing a no-fly zone over Libya and authorizing member states to "take all necessary measures" to protect civilians under attack from Qaddafi's government. As a result, some Western countries, including the United States, began air strikes over Libya, which spurred a

debate on whether forced intervention was warranted. Countries like Russia, China, Brazil, and India abstained from voting on the UN resolution, spotlighting the sensitive nature of the issue. Some states in Asia and Africa, especially former colonies, have long seen intervention of any kind as a threat to their sovereignty. This was evident in the divide that followed a devastating cyclone in Myanmar in May 2008. There have been some instances in the recent past where countries have opened up to outside aid in the aftermath of natural disasters, but sovereignty remains a sticking point. Share 216 34
Responsibility vs. Sovereignty

The United Nations, formed in the aftermath of World War II to promote peace and stability, recognizes the importance of sovereignty, especially for newly independent nations or those seeking independence from colonizers. The UN Charter says: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." The principle does not rule out the application of enforcement measures in case of a threat to peace, a breach of peace, or acts of aggression on the part of the state. The Genocide Convention of 1948 also overrode the nonintervention principle to lay down the commitment of the world community to prevent and punish. Yet inaction in response to the Rwanda genocide in 1994 and failure to halt the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia highlight the complexities of international responses to crimes against humanity. "R2P is not solely about military intervention but, if it is to have any meaning at all, must include that option as a last resort." --Ramesh Thakur In 2000, the Canadian government and several other actors announced the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to address the challenge of the international community's responsibility to act in the face of the gravest of human rights violations while respecting the sovereignty of states. It sought to bridge these two concepts with the 2001 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report (PDF). A year later, the co-chairs of the commission, Gareth Evans of the International Crisis Group and Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun, wrote in Foreign Affairs: "If the international community is to respond to this challenge, the whole debate must be turned on its head. The issue must be reframed not as an argument about the 'right to intervene' but about the 'responsibility to protect.'" The commission included environmental or natural disasters as possible events after which the international community could intervene if the state failed in its responsibility to protect its population. But in 2005, when the responsibility to protect doctrine was incorporated into a UN outcome document, environmental disasters had been dropped as a reason for intervention. The document did say it was every state's responsibility to protect its citizens from "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity." If a state fails to do so, the document

says, it then becomes the responsibility of the international community to protect that state's population in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Chapter VII includes use of military force by the international community if peaceful measures prove inadequate. The UN outcome document was unanimously adopted by all member states but is not legally binding. The doctrine was hailed by international affairs specialists as a new dawn for peace and security. In a 2007 Council Special Report, former CFR Senior Fellow Lee Feinstein wrote that the adoption of R2P was a watershed, "marking the end of a 350-year period in which the inviolability of borders and the monopoly of force within one's own borders were sovereignty's formal hallmarks." He says the doctrine's adoption begins to resolve the historic tension between human rights and states' rights in favor of the individual.
Failure to Address Humanitarian Intervention

Following Myanmar's cyclone in May 2008, some experts say the spirit of the R2P doctrine, if not its letter, was tested. The country's regime was incapable of providing relief to millions of affected citizens and it refused to let in international aid and aid workers for several days. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner suggested the United Nations invoke the R2P doctrine as the basis for a resolution to allow the delivery of international aid even without the junta's permission. But the French proposal faced opposition from Security Council members Russia, China, and South Africa. China's UN ambassador, Liu Zhenmin, argued it was not an issue for the Security Council. "The current issue of Myanmar is a natural disaster," and the situation should not be politicized, he said. Experts warned that Southeast Asian nations and India might also take exception to intervention in Myanmar. In identifying one possible case for the application of military force, the 2001 R2P report had included "overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened." But Ramesh Thakur, one of the original R2P commissioners, says politically, "we cannot ignore the significance of the exclusion of natural and environmental disasters between 2001 and 2005." To attempt to reintroduce it today, he writes, "would strengthen suspicion of western motivations and reinforce cynicism of western tactics." Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright writes in a New York Times op-ed that the "notion of national sovereignty as sacred has gained ground after the U.S. invasion of Iraq."And despite recent efforts to enshrine the doctrine of a 'responsibility to protect' in international law, the concept of humanitarian intervention has lost momentum," she says. Though sovereignty concerns linger, especially in Asia, some instances in the recent past have suggested countries in the region might be warming to humanitarian aid intervention. Proponents of the doctrine say another way to raise pressure for action in Myanmar is to focus on rebuilding the country. Those who helped write the 2001 report emphasized that R2P embraced not just the "responsibility to react" but the "responsibility to prevent" and the "responsibility to rebuild" as well. Evans and Sahnoun argued in Foreign Affairs: "Both of these dimensions have been much neglected in the traditional humanitarian-intervention debate. Bringing them back to center stage should help make the concept of reaction itself more palatable." The 2005 UN document also emphasized prevention. It noted: "We also intend to commit ourselves, as

necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations . . . and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out." But David Rieff, a journalist who specializes in humanitarian issues, writes in the New York Times Magazine: "Use any euphemism you wish, but in the end these interventions have to be about regime change if they are to have any chance of accomplishing their stated goal." In the wake of the 2011 crisis in Libya following calls for regime change, Thakur also argued: "R2P is not solely about military intervention but, if it is to have any meaning at all, must include that option as a last resort (OttawaCitizen)."
A Positive Shift?

The doctrine was most notably applied to mediate Kenya's post-election violence in 2008, which Thakur refers to as the "only successful R2P marker to date" (TOI). Following the mass atrocity crimes as a result of a highly disputed election in Kenya, the international community rapidly responded to apply political and diplomatic pressure to stop violence and encourage a political solution which resulted in a coalition government. Before being invoked explicitly in 2011 in reference to the situation in Libya, the Security Council also invoked the R2P doctrine for first time in its 2006 Resolution on Darfur. Though sovereignty concerns linger, especially in Asia, some instances in the recent past have suggested countries in the region might be warming to humanitarian aid intervention. In the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, one of the worst-hit areas was Indonesia's Aceh Province, where the government had been fighting a secessionist movement for more than four decades. The province, under martial law, was off-limits for most international human rights groups, aid organizations, and reporters. But after initial hesitation, the Indonesian government allowed international aid in what Elizabeth Ferris and Lex Rieffel of the Brookings Institution call "one of the largest disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts in modern times, as well as the peace agreement, which led to the election of a former secessionist leader as governor of the province." Similarly, after a powerful 2005 earthquake rocked the long-disputed Kashmir region dividing India and Pakistan, the Pakistani government decided to give access to international relief agencies. Moreover, it accepted food and relief aid from neighboring India, with which it has fought three wars over Kashmir. The move was significant enough for regional experts to ask if this could lead to peace. More recently, an earthquake in China's Sichuan Province in May 2008 led Beijing to make unprecedented moves to open up. The Chinese government, which in the past has spurned foreign aid, accepted international aid publicly, opened a hotline for the U.S. military to have increased communication with its Chinese counterparts, and eased media restrictions. "Humanitarian/military intervention outside of a UN Security Council mandate remains a very highly contested area of international law." --Matthew Waxman, CFR India, by contrast, refused international aid both after the 2004 tsunami and after the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir. Experts say isolationist governments spurn assistance because they seek to retain complete control over their populations, but other countries may reject foreign aid as a matter of international prestige. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, director of the New-Delhi based Center for

Policy Research, saw India's decision to refuse aid after the 2005 earthquake as a reflection of its desire to be seen as an emerging global power (NYT).
A Worrying Future

Several experts saw the situation in Libya as a test case for the Security Council and its implementation of the R2P doctrine. "The international military intervention (SMH) in Libya is not about bombing for democracy or Muammar Qaddafi's head," says Evans, a principal author of the R2P concept. "Legally, morally, politically, and militarily, it has only one justification: protecting the country's people." R2P proponents also point to regional backing for the no-fly zone from organizations such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, stressing its international legitimacy. But others recommend caution, saying that without sufficient military commitment, the intervention would do more harm than good. "The trouble is, although we are prepared to 'do something' and pull out the most impressive kit in the U.S. toolbox--military power--we aren't actually willing to get involved at the level required to win (ForeignPolicy)," writes CFR's Micah Zenko. Beyond the operational and political, military intervention also involves legal issues, says CFR's Matthew Waxman. "Humanitarian/military intervention outside of a UN Security Council mandate remains a very highly contested area of international law," he says. And Russia and China have historically been reluctant to support any form of intervention. Besides their longstanding noninterference policy in the internal affairs of other countries, they are "particularly worried that it could create a precedent for the international community to have a say in how they treat their own, sometimes restive, minority populations," says Stewart M. Patrick, CFR senior fellow and director of the program on international institutions and global governance. The willingness to use armed force is also inevitably influenced not only by the desperation of the affected population but also by geopolitical factors, including the relevance of the country to the world community, regional stability, and the attitudes of other major players, say experts. The choice over humanitarian intervention remains equally difficult. At present the world community has limited options for responding to humanitarian crises. UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 formed guiding principles for the international community's response to humanitarian disasters and was central to the establishment of the office of the UN emergency relief coordinator and the development of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. But the General Assembly resolution reiterates that "the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations," which makes it difficult to operate in situations where the affected country denies access. In such cases, the role of regional actors and neighbors becomes critical. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations played a very active role in changing the minds of Myanmar's regime to let in international aid after the initial refusal, experts say. But "if our methods short of armed force have no impact and we are not willing to threaten to use military action, there are no good options," says Patrick.

At the same time, Patrick says, forced humanitarian intervention is a difficult choice to make. "The crime that the government is guilty of may be a crime of omission rather than commission, so that the level of culpability appears to be less than a government actively making war against its people, for instance in the case of a genocide," says Patrick

Courses
These courses at Columbia University have been designed by and for the Committee on Global Thought. Courses taught in the past may run again according to the needs and research interests of the Committee and its fellows. New courses and new instructors will be added each semester. Current/Upcoming Courses Balkan History and Historiography This graduate colloquium explores recent historiography trends in Balkan history. It focuses on the close reading of outstanding new scholarly studies which are chosen for their methodological diversity and craft and for the exemplary way in which they tackle a variety of conceptual and theoretical issues. Topics covered include the environment, mountains and borderlands; peasants, merchants and other social actors; nationalism as social movement and intellectual project; the politics of memory and religion, and the role of the state as war maker and regulator of the economy. Colloquium on Modern Japanese History Meiji and Modernity: Reading, analysis, and research on modern Japan. International Development in History This colloquium proposes to examine the emerging historical literature on development, with an eye toward drawing broad connections about developments history. Because the historical study of development is currently in its infancy, we will also read reflections about the history of development offered by practitioners of the field, theoretical treatments of the topic, and historical scholarship on related topics, such as the history of empire and human rights. And rather than producing a term paper that features original research about a single episode, students will be encouraged to develop a historical overview and to write synthetic accounts of developments history that draw on existing scholarship. International Ethics The seminar begins with a reexamination of two major traditions in international political theory - Realism and Liberalism - as seen through the eyes of classical political philosophers. We will discuss their insights into the issues of peace and war, cooperation and conflict, intervention and independence and international equality and inequality. In the next part of the seminar we will examine problems in contemporary international ethics - wars, massacres and terrorism;

international intervention; and global economic justice. We conclude with a discussion of the debate between cosmopolitans and nationalists over the conditions of world order. Law and Development This course will examine the various roles that law and legal institutions play in economic, social, and political development in both theory and practice. The first part of the course will be devoted to general theories. The second part will examine the impact on development of different approaches to law and development in areas such as property, contractual relations and finance, the status of women, labor and environmental concerns, the structure of the judiciary, and anti-corruption efforts. Comparative as well as historical analysis employing different methodologies, such as case studies and statistical analysis, will be used to explain successes and failures of law and development initiatives over time and across countries. The final part of the course will examine the role of multilateral organizations, including the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, as agents of legal and institutional change, especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Perspectives on Economic Studies This course will critically examine mainstream approaches to economic theory and practice, particularly in the areas of macroeconomic stabilization policy, poverty reduction, economic development, environmental sustainability, and racial and gender inequality. Topics will vary from year to year, but may include responses to the credit crisis and Great Recession, global warming and international negotiations, globalization, the measurement of poverty and inequality, different approaches to poverty reduction, AIDS and malaria, mass imprisonment, children's wellbeing, the IMF and the World Bank, intellectual property in an international context, racial disparities in life expectancy, public pension systems in developed countries, health care, and homelessness. The course will also examine biases in economic discourse, both among policy makers and scholars. Politics of Identity in Africa This seminar examines the politics of identity and accommodation of diversity in selected countries of contemporary Africa in a historical, anthropological and political theory perspective. It eschews a narrowly institutional or short-term conflict-solving approach to favour instead a careful analysis of interwoven political, social and cultural dynamics, emphasizing the articulation rather than the dichotomization of the above and the below, the past and the present, the global and the local. Postcolonial Theory This course will go over some philosophical and interpretative problems raised by recent works in a field described as 'postcolonial theory'. It will start with the original debates about 'Orientalism' - particularly its critical arguments about the question of representation of the Orient in art and literature, the question of the writing of history, and the logic of basic concepts in the social sciences. The course will analyse some 'Orientalist' texts in detail, assess the

criticisms offered by postcolonial writers, and take up these three problems - of representation, history and conceptualization for detailed, rigorous critical discussion. Readings in African Intellectual History Contact instructor for more details. World War II A global examination of the coming, course, and consequences of World War II from the differing viewpoints of the major belligerents and those affected by them. Emphasis is not only on critical analysis but also on the craft of history-writing. Past Courses Advanced Studies in South Asian History, Culture, and Society This course is intended to be an advanced graduate seminar on late medieval and modern South Asia (i.e., from roughly 1600 to the present). Students will be expected either to have taken a previous graduate course on South Asia or to have extensive background in South Asian studies. The content of the course will change from year to year depending on the particular interests of the students and the professor. Students will be expected to prepare a paper based on primary research, and will make a presentation on the issues involved in their research at some point during the second half of the term. Africa, Empire and the Twentieth Century World This undergraduate seminar explores African political thought and action during the first half of the twentieth century. It brings together readings from a range of disciplines, including history, colonial and post-colonial studies, women's studies, and literary studies as well as primary documents and novels to explore African intellectuals' engagement with European imperialism and international politics, and their positioning of Africa within the twentieth century world. Cities in Developing Countries: Problems, Politics and Policies This course will examine the most pressing problems facing metropolitan areas in the developing world. It will also consider the political and institutional environment in which efforts to address metropolitan problems have been developed, the financial and institutional vehicles used to provide services of different types, and the role of political parties and other forms of political organization in the development and allocation of services. Comparative Politics and Reform China In this seminar, we examine how the case of reform-era China enriches or challenges major theories in comparative politics and political economy. Our objectives are: (a) to survey existing literature in the China field on selected core themes in political science; (b) to consider how

abiding issues in the comparative literature manifest in a non-democratic and transitional context like China; and (c) assess the theoretical and methodological challenges of doing comparative research using China as a major case. The course aims to prepare graduate students to develop research projects specifically on contemporary China and more broadly on projects that seek to integrate area studies with comparative approaches. Global Economic Governance This course aims at familiarizing students with major issues surrounding global economic governance and its effects on developing countries. It will start with two general lectures that will deal with the objectives of international cooperation, the historical evolution of the current governance and typologies of the different rules, organization and governance structures that have been created at varied times. It will then deal in detail with major topics in the broad agenda of global economic governance, exploring both issues that are the subject of current debates as well as the institutional questions involved. "Global economic governance" is understood in a broad sense, to refer both to global and regional frameworks, as well as those rules of international transactions that have been left to bilateral agreements or are under the domain of national sovereignty. "Economic" is also understood in a broad sense, to include also social and environmental issues. SIPA: MIA- Interstate Relations. SIPA: EPD. SIPA: IFEP- Economic Policy. SIPA: Intl Org. Global Governance This graduate seminar reviews how various literatures identify the critical issues of governance in a highly interdependent world and formulates policy responses to them. The class will then apply these various approaches to selected case studies that raise critical global governance issues: Climate Change; Failed States; International Trade and Investment; and Democratic Accountability. Global Political Thought This course is intended to explore important themes in modern political thought from texts taken from traditions outside the modern West. It will not be devoted to textual exegesis, but use as sites of exploration central questions of modern politics. The attempt will be not merely to grasp what these thinkers thought, but to think more widely with and through their texts. The course will focus on the works of M K Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Mohammad Iqbal, and Leopold Senghor. It will involve reading assigned texts and critical and comparative analysis of their theoretical ideas. Global Urbanism Using classical texts about cities (do they still work for us?) and on the diverse new literatures on cities and larger subjects with direct urban implications, we will use a variety of data sets to get at detailed empirical information, and draw on two large ongoing research projects involving major and minor global cities around the world (a total of over 60 cities are covered in detail as of 2008).

Globalization This undergraduate course examines globalization along its diverse but inter-related dimensions, including economic, cultural, and political globalization. The course begins with a historical overview of globalization. Second, the course examines economic globalization and its governance with a focus on the major international organizations involved in the governance of international trade and financial flows, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Globalization: Empirical and Theoretical Elements Transnational processes such as economic globalization and cross-border migrations confront the social sciences with a series of theoretical and methodological challenges. This course examines these challenges through a focus on both macro level cross-border flows and micro processes which might take place at a global or at a sub-national level. Immigration, Cities, States: Deciphering the Global Transnational processes such as economic globalization and cross-border migrations confront the social sciences with a series of theoretical and methodological challenges. This course examines these challenges through a focus on both macro level cross-border flows and micro processes which might take place at a global or at a sub-national level. Particular attention will go to analyzing the challenges for theorization and empirical specification. Introduction to International Development This course is the gateway introductory course for those concentrating on Economic and Political Development. As such, it seeks to provide participants with a framework and context for historical and current debates on sustainable development, in the broad sense of the term (economic, social and environmental development), and on political and institutional development. Specifically, the course aims to provide students with: 1) A systematic overview of how development perspectives have changed over time. 2) A historically informed understanding of ongoing debates concerning not only how to promote development (means) but also what constitutes "development" (ends). 3) Help students understand and question both mainstream and critical paradigms on development issues. Issues of Secularism and Diversity in Global Thought This course focuses on issues of cultural diversity under conditions of globalization. Weekly topics include secularism in postcolonial contexts, as well as cosmopolitanism, feminism and religion in relation to secularism and tolerance. While the emphasis of the course will be on contemporary debates, we will also look at relevant historical genealogies of some of the controversies. Locating Africa

In this seminar, we will study the ways that African and people of African descent participated in this discussion. Through primary and secondary readings, we will learn how African, African American and European writers, artists and activists engaged and (re) interpreted imperial and international resources (including the insights of the new sciences of Man) to (re)imagine their political and social situations, and to participate in various political expressions , including panAfricanism, communism, feminism, black internationalism, and anti-imperialism. Political Economy The purpose of the course is to introduce doctoral students to the field of political economy while at the same time introducing students to a wide range of empirical methods. The course will consider mostly empirical work, that is applied econometrics, rather than theoretical work. This is a 2nd year PhD course. Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in the Middle East An introduction to the wide variety of processes and discourses that have emerged in the Middle East in recent years under the rubric of truth and reconciliation, in the broad sense of the narration of political violence, and the main issues arising from it. The region provides a range of potent case studies for thinking about the complexity and variety of memory politics and, in particular, for the respective roles of the state, civil society, and international idioms in suppressing, promoting, and/or co-opting collective memories of violence, which are increasingly conceived of as a key and highly problematic means of political contestation. Country studies include Lebanon, Algeria, Morocco, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, and Sudan. Postcolonial African Cities This seminar considers postcolonial African cities in historical and geographical perspective. Drawing from diverse literatures, including geography, history, anthropology, cultural studies, and development studies, it offers an interdisciplinary approach to reflect on experiences of urbanization on the continent and the socio-economic, cultural, and political aspects of contemporary African urban life. The Law of Violence Law and Violence introduces key theoretical and historical readings on the relationship between law and violence. Are they mutually exclusive forms of human action? Is it a contradiction that violence is often the means to establish or change the law? Such questions will be considered in historical contexts of the nation-state and the global legal order. The Politics of Identity in Africa This seminar examines the politics of identity and accommodation of diversity in selected countries of contemporary Africa in a historical, anthropological and political theory perspective. It eschews a narrowly institutional or short-term conflict-solving approach to favour instead a careful analysis of interwoven political, social and cultural dynamics, emphasizing the

articulation rather than the dichotomization of the above and the below, the past and the present, the global and the local. Humanitarian Protection & Intervention

Any government derives true legitimacy only from the willing consent of the governed and the first obligation of government is to provide security for its people. A government that cannot protect its people from external threats has failed in its primary responsibility, while a government that itself threatens the lives and security of its citizens forfeits any claim to legitimacy. Michael Walzer writes that, Humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response to actsthat shock the moral conscience of mankind. Since a state cannot attack and kill citizens of other states legitimately, it doesnt follow that they can do so within their own borders either. The question is not whether a state can kill with impunity, but the point at which external intervention is justified. Even so, the decision to intervene to protect human lives provokes endless debate and delays while innocent people die. A humanitarian intervention is an armed intervention in another state, without the agreement of that state, to address a threat of humanitarian disaster, particularly those caused by grave and large-scale violations of fundamental human rights. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the USSR and the end of the cold war, the world was plunged into an era of uncertainty. Instead of an expected a peace dividend, we saw a rise in low-intensity conflicts within states, incidents of genocide and ethnic cleansing, and the emergence of a new strain of international terrorism a world of small wars, weak states and new threats. As the preeminent military and economic superpower, the U.S. entered the 21st century uncertain of its role as world leader. The 1990s raised important questions about if, when and how the international community should respond to political conflict through intervention and peacemaking efforts. In places like Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti, Liberia, East Timor and more recently Iraq and Sudan, the world was been confronted with deadly situations, claiming innocent lives. Despite the apparent moral, and ethical imperatives to protect the vulnerable, the issues surrounding intervention remain conflicting and unresolved. Intervention vs. Sovereignty The Blair Reality Check Elements of Intervention Focus on Genocide in Sudan 2004 Additional Resources

FLASHPOINTS Guide to World Conflicts Flashpoints provides "Country Briefings" covering over 35 current, recent and potential political conflicts. The website is a valuable resource for high school and college students, teachers. military personnel and policy-makers. Click here>>>

SITE LINKS Site Directory New World Disorder Religious Extremism & Conflict Humanitarian Protection Weapons of Mass Destruction International Terrorism Energy & Resources Arms & Drug Trade 21st Century Warfare War Theory Asymmetric Warfare Counter-Insurgency Counter-Terrorism Unrestricted Warfare Weapons of Mass Perception SPECIAL REPORTS

AL-QAEDA DOSSIER INSIDE IRAQ CHINA SYNDROME WEAPONS OF MASS PERCEPTION

Religious Causes of International Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts


Author: Fox J. Source:International Politics, Volume 38, Number 4, December 2001 , pp. 515-532(18) Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan

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Abstract:

Ethnic conflict and international intervention have become increasingly important items on the international agenda since the end of the Cold War. Yet not all ethnic conflicts attract international intervention. While there are clearly other important motivations for international intervention, this study focuses on the influence of one of them: religion. Are religious conflicts perceived as more important to potential intervenors? Do those who intervene have religious affinities with the ethnic minorities on whose behalf they intervene? The results of this analysis find support for these relationships. Religious conflicts attract more political intervention by foreign governments and kindred groups to the minority living elsewhere. Intervening states are likely to have populations that are religiously similar to those minorities on whose behalf they intervene. Also, religious conflicts involving Christian and Moslem minorities attract military intervention by foreign governments about ten times as often as conflicts involving other religious minorities. These groups also attract more political intervention by kindred groups living elsewhere, whereas minorities that are not Christian or Moslem attract more intervention by NGOs and multi-state organizations. Document Type: Research article DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8897050 Affiliations:1: 1Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, ISRAEL Publication date: 2001-12-01 Related content

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1 Preview NATO's humanitarian intervention in Kosovo: making or breaking international law? (Sommaire: L'intervention humanitaire de l'OTAN au Kosovo: transformation ou transgression du droit international?) Currie, J. Canadian Yearbook of International Law. Annuaire Canadienne de Droit International 36 (1998): 303-333.
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2 Preview Humanitarian intervention in international law: the French intervention in Syria re-examined Pogany, Istvan. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 35. 1 (1986): 182-190.
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3 Preview Intervention in the International Court: the Libya/Malta continental shelf case

McGinley, Gerald P. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 34. 4 (1985): 671694.
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4 Preview From Kosovo to Kabul and beyond: human rights and international intervention Chandler, David. From Kosovo to Kabul and beyond: human rights and international intervention (2006): 290.
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5 Preview International intervention, justice and national reconciliation: the role of the ICTY and ICTR in Bosnia and Rwanda Humphrey, Michael. Journal of Human Rights 2. 4 (2003): 495-505. Cited by ( 4)
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6 Preview Humanitarian intervention in international and Islamic law Sinanovic, Ermin. American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 20. 1 (2003): 88-106.
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7 Preview International law, politics and the re-invention of humanitarian intervention: the lesson of Somalia Mwagiru, Makumi. Indian Journal of International Law 34 (1994): 33-44.
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8 Preview The right to return home: international intervention and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Cox, Marcus. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 47. 3 (1998): 599-631. Cited by ( 1)
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9 Preview Military intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina: will world politics prevail over the rule of international law? Roch, M P. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 24. ii-iii (1996): 461-487.
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10 Preview Lessons of international law from NATO's armed intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Ronzitti, N. International Spectator 34. 3 (1999): 45-54.
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11 Preview Potential Muslim contributions to international security: the problem of collective action and humanitarian intervention Hashmi, Sohail H. Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, East Lansing ... 1992. New directions. Ed. Mona M.Abul-Fadl (1993): 373-381.
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12 Preview L'intervention des personnes publiques et parapubliques dans l'arbitrage international commercial (point de vue du droit algrienne) Zaalani, Abdelmajid. Revue Alg rienne des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et Politiques / Al-Majalla al-Jaz ir ya li-l- Ul m al-Q n n ya al-Iqti d ya wa-'l-Siy s ya 35. 3 (1997): 907-887.
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Preview Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and Liberia - revisiting the validity of humanitarian intervention under international law - Part II Nanda, V P; Muther, T F; Eckert, A. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 26. 5 (1998): 827-869. Cited by ( 1)
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14 Preview Bosnia after Dayton: nationalist partition and international intervention Bose, Sumantra. Bosnia after Dayton: nationalist partition and international intervention (2002): 295. Cited by ( 24)
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15 Preview From Kosovo to Kabul: human rights and international intervention Chandler, David. From Kosovo to Kabul: human rights and international intervention (2002): 268.
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16 Preview Kosovo and the challenge of humanitarian intervention: selective indignation, collective action, and international citizenship. Ed. Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur Kosovo and the challenge of humanitarian intervention: selective indignation, collective action, and international citizenship. Ed. Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (2000): 536.
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17 Preview The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: ethnic conflict and international intervention

Burg, S L; Shoup, P S. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: ethnic conflict and international intervention (1999): 499. Cited by ( 44)
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18 Preview Documents on Pakistan and international conflicts. Vol. 19-20: Soviet intervention in Afghanistan Documents on Pakistan and international conflicts. Vol. 19-20: Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1993): 2 vols. 525.
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19 Preview The Bosnian War and the new world order: failure and success of international intervention Andreatta, F. The Bosnian War and the new world order: failure and success of international intervention (1997): 25. Cited by ( 1)
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20 Preview L'intervention arme en Irak et son occupation au regard du droit international Nguyen-Rouault, Florence. Revue Gnrale de Droit International Public 107. 4 (2003): 835-864.

NATO's humanitarian intervention in Kosovo: making or breaking international law? (Sommaire: L'intervention humanitaire de l'OTAN au Kosovo: transformation ou transgression du droit international?)
Cited by ( 1) Currie, J.Canadian Yearbook of International Law. Annuaire Canadienne de Droit International 36 (1998): 303-333. Turn on hit highlighting for speaking browsers

Indexing (details)
Cite Subject NATO; Kosova; Albania(ns); Minorities (Muslim) - Serbia; Serbia & the Serbs; Law - international; Yugoslavia: 1992- (Serbia-Montenegro); Balkans: Albania & the Albanians; Kosova Economics, politics & current affairs Title NATO's humanitarian intervention in Kosovo: making or breaking international law? (Sommaire: L'intervention humanitaire de l'OTAN au Kosovo: transformation ou transgression du droit international?) Author Currie, J Correspondence author Currie, J Publication title Canadian Yearbook of International Law. Annuaire Canadienne de Droit International Volume 36 Pages 303-333 Number of pages 31 Publication year 1998 Year 1998 Source type Scholarly Journals Language of publication English Document type Journal Article Accession number A234675 ProQuest document ID 43868152 Document URL http://210.48.222.80/proxy.pac/docview/43868152?accountid=44024 Last updated

2012-04-02 Database Index Islamicus

Humanitarian intervention in international law: the French intervention in Syria re-examined


Pogany, Istvan . International and Comparative Law Quarterly 35. 1 (1986): 182-190. Turn on hit highlighting for speaking browsers

Indexing (details)
Cite Subject Syria; France - Syria; Law - international; Syria History Before 1918 Title Humanitarian intervention in international law: the French intervention in Syria re-examined Author Pogany, Istvan Correspondence author Pogany, Istvan Publication title International and Comparative Law Quarterly Volume 35 Issue 1 Pages 182-190 Number of pages 9 Publication year 1986 Year 1986 ISSN 0020-5893 eISSN 1471-6875 Source type Scholarly Journals Peer reviewed

Yes Language of publication English Document type Journal Article Accession number A311231 ProQuest document ID 43675129 Document URL http://210.48.222.80/proxy.pac/docview/43675129?accountid=44024 Last updated 2012-04-02 Database Index Islamicus

Potential Muslim contributions to international security: the problem of collective action and humanitarian intervention
Hashmi, Sohail H. Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, East Lansing ... 1992.New directions. Ed. Mona M.Abul-Fadl (1993): 373-381. Turn on hit highlighting for speaking browsers

Indexing (details)
Cite Subject International politics Theoretical; Islam in world politics; war & peace Title Potential Muslim contributions to international security: the problem of collective action and humanitarian intervention Monograph title Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, East Lansing ... 1992.New directions. Ed. Mona M.Abul-Fadl Author Hashmi, Sohail H Correspondence author Hashmi, Sohail H Publication title Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, East Lansing ... 1992.New directions. Ed. Mona M.Abul-Fadl Pages 373-381

Number of pages 9 Publication year 1993 Year 1993 Publisher International Institute of Islamic Thought & the Association of Muslim Social Scientists Location Herndon Source type Scholarly Journals Language of publication English Document type Journal Article Accession number A201117 ProQuest document ID 43929048 Document URL http://210.48.222.80/proxy.pac/docview/43929048?accountid=44024 Last updated 2012-04-02 Database Index Islamicus

From Kosovo to Kabul: human rights and international intervention


Chandler, David . From Kosovo to Kabul: human rights and international intervention (2002): 268. Turn on hit highlighting for speaking browsers

Indexing (details)
Cite Subject Kosova; Serbia; Minorities (Muslim) - Serbia; Yugoslavia: 1992-2006 (Serbia-Montenegro); Afghanistan; Politics: Military & strategic studies Military involvement of non-Muslim powers Title

From Kosovo to Kabul: human rights and international intervention Monograph title From Kosovo to Kabul: human rights and international intervention Author Chandler, David Correspondence author Chandler, David Pages 268 Number of pages 268 Publication year 2002 Year 2002 Publisher Pluto Location London Source type Scholarly Journals Language of publication English Document type Book Accession number M321676 ProQuest document ID 43616679 Document URL http://210.48.222.80/proxy.pac/docview/43616679?accountid=44024 Last updated 2012-04-02 Database Index Islamicus

Pillage and plunder: the vast natural resources of the Congo are once again fuelling war, exploitation and povertyand Western consumers are profiting
by Michael Renner

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FOR THE BETTER PART of the past two years, Western media attention has trained an intense spotlight on Iraq. While the media fascination with Iraq is understandable, given the high drama of regime change and an occupation unraveling in the face of insurgency and chaos, it has obscured another conflict that has caused the most suffering in the world in recent years. With only brief interruptions, fighting has engulfed large parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the former Zaire, since 1996. The deadliest phase started in 1998, when Ugandan and Rwandan troops invaded, assisting Congolese rebel groups against Laurent Kabila's government, which received assistance from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. As many as three million people have been killed and at least another two million displaced. In one of its largest peacekeeping efforts, the United Nations has deployed more than 11,000 soldiers and civilians. Resource pillage has been a key factor sustaining violence in the Congo. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is one of several developing countries in which abundant natural resources have helped fuel conflict, either by attracting predatory groups seeking to control them or by financing the continuation of wars that were initially caused by other factors. Prominent other examples include Colombia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, the Sudan and Afghanistan. Governments, rebels and warlords have made billions of dollars by selling a variety of "conflict commodities." They have used the revenues to arm themselves and to line their own pockets. But the population at large has suffered extraordinarily due to violence, economic collapse and social deprivation. Although the intervention by several of Congo's neighbours was initially triggered mostly out of security concerns, the opportunity to plunder the country's enormous resource wealth became a paramount reason for continued fighting. Congo is extremely rich in minerals and gemstones such as diamonds, gold, coltan, niobium, cassiterite, copper, cobalt, zinc and manganese. It also offers copious agricultural and forestry resources such as timber, coffee, tea and palm oil. In addition, the country's wildlife, including okapis, gorillas and elephants, has long attracted poachers.

At first, the foreign invaders and their rebel allies resorted to outright theft of stockpiled raw materials. Once the stockpiles were exhausted, they organized a variety of methods to extract additional resources. In some cases, the armies have been engaged directly in resource extraction; in other cases, local Congolese were put to work by Rwandan and Ugandan forces. Child labour was used in gold and diamond mining. Occupying forces and their rebel allies have also forced coffee growers and palm oil producers to sell their commodities at depressed prices. Finally, a series of companies of questionable reputation--most of them European--were given concessions to exploit Congo's resources. Looted resources became a major source of Rwanda's and Uganda's foreign exchange and allowed them to finance their military presence. In Uganda's case, the individual enrichment of top military commanders and business leaders also was a main driving force. The Kabila government nearly fell to Rwandan troops at the beginning of the invasion. To stave off defeat and continue the war, the cash-strapped government, too, relied on the country's resources to purchase weapons and secure allied support. It granted concessions and entered into joint ventures with foreign firms in return for up-front payments. And the Kabila government appealed to Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia for military assistance. Although the governments of these nations had strong political and strategic motivations for dispatching troops, they also demanded compensation, and the Kabila government used resource wealth as an incentive for its allies to stay involved. The government granted several concessions, including offshore oil wells to Angola and a share of a diamond mine in KasaiOccidental province to Namibia. Zimbabwe's commercial pursuits were the most extensive. Companies controlled by Zimbabwe's military and civilian leadership secured extensive timber rights and became involved in running diamond, copper and cobalt mines, among other ventures. Although most foreign troops were eventually withdrawn (as a result of growing international pressure and the rising cost of the military interventions), illegal commercial networks were being left behind; headed by military officers and unscrupulous political and business leaders, they continue to control vast areas of Congo and operate them as their personal fiefdoms. The conflict has created a humanitarian and environmental nightmare. Like other contemporary resource-related conflicts, the skirmishes and battles of the Congo war were fought in areas that are of great environmental value because they are home to a large portion of the world's remaining intact forests as well as the habitat for many rare plant and animal species. The Democratic Republic of the Congo accounts for more than half of Africa's forests. It has the largest number of bird and mammal species of any country on the continent (including okapis, rhinos, chimpanzees and lowland gorillas) and is also one of the region's most flora-rich countries. Even under the best of circumstances, mining and logging are highly destructive of the environment, both because of the methods of extraction used and because these operations often take place in ecologically fragile areas. Under conditions of armed conflict, the consequences can be far more severe. Because much resource extraction occurs illegally, and because loggers and miners are intent on extracting resources before they might lose control over an area, they

have no incentive to conduct their operations in a responsible manner. Their primary interest is in raising funds for weapons purchases or self-enrichment and they try to extract as much, and as fast, as possible. A number of factors--the overall state of anarchy in much of the country, widespread illegal logging, mining and poaching, resource battles and refugee movements--have had a devastating impact on forests and wildlife in the eastern Congo. The Rwandan civil war of 1990-94 spilled over into neighboring Zaire almost from the beginning, with both sides conducting military operations in the Virungas area. The military presence in the forest kept growing, landmines were laid and vegetation was cut down. But this was mere prelude to far greater destruction. Following the Rwandan genocide, nearly two million people left Rwanda in a sudden, massive outflow in July 1994; half went to eastern Zaire and settled mostly on the edge of Virunga Park or inside it. Desperate for firewood, the refugees cut and gathered as much as 1000 tonnes of wood a day, causing serious deforestation. During the 27 months that the refugee camps existed, a total of 113 square kilometres of forestland was affected; of that, 75 square kilometres were clear-cut. The subsequent Congolese civil wars (first, Laurent Kabila's overthrow of long-time dictator Mobutu in 1996-97, then the Rwandan/Ugandan intervention) imposed additional burdens. Congo's national parks have been severely affected by war, anarchy, refugee flows and massive illegal resource extraction. The lure of resource wealth drew not only a variety of armed factions into the Congo's natural parks, but also some 10,000 miners, with calamitous consequences. Coltan miners strip off the bark of eko trees to fashion troughs in which they flush out coltan (used in the manufacture of cellphones) from ore-bearing mud; thousands of trees have been destroyed, undermining the livelihoods of the local indigenous people, the Mbuti, who use the eko trees for gathering honey. Kahuzi-Biega National Park and the Okapi Wildlife Reserve are both UNESCO World Heritage sites, a status that extols their unique value to all of humanity. But severe environmental degradation as a result of the modern day gold rush for coltan landed them on the organization's list of sites in danger. Poaching of elephant tusks left only two out of 350 elephant families in Kahuzi-Biega in 2000. Likewise, the number of eastern lowland gorillas has been so reduced-down by 70 percent since 1994--that they are threatened with extinction.

Pillage and plunder: the vast natural resources of the Congo are once again fuelling war, exploitation and povertyand Western consumers are profiting
by Michael Renner

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Logging companies connected to Congolese rebel groups have engaged in rapacious clearcutting operations. DARA Forest Company, for example, had been denied a logging licence by the government in early 1998, but obtained a concession in Orientale Province in 2000 from a rebel group allied with Uganda. It subsequently carried out logging "without consideration of any of the minimum acceptable rules of timber harvesting for sustainable forest management," according to a UN expert panel. Satellite images show deforestation taking place at an alarming rate. Although DARA Forest failed to satisfy Forest Stewardship Council procedures and evaded international requirements for timber certification, a UN expert panel found that companies from Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland, China, Japan, Kenya and the United States nevertheless imported the company's timber via Uganda. Responsibility for the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo lies not only with regional leaders but also more distant countries and private companies that have wittingly or unwittingly facilitated the exploitation of Congolese resources by shipping and buying illegally obtained commodities. During the last few years, awareness has grown that natural resources will continue to fuel deadly conflicts as long as consumer societies import and use materials irrespective of where they originate and under what conditions they were produced. Shareholder activism and campaigns for ethical investing can generate pressure on oil, mining and logging companies to adopt more ethical ways of doing business. So far, however, Western nations have been all too ready to turn a blind eye in order to protect the interests of their own corporations. Follow up Read the detailed UN report on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo at www.un.org/News/dh/latest/drcongo.htm The Rainforest Foundation is campaigning for the protection of Congo's rainforests and their human and animal inhabitants:

www.rainforestfoundationuk.org The Canadian human rights NGO Rights & Democracy is hosting a 2004 international think tank on peace building in the Congo: www.ichrdd.ca RELATED ARTICLE: War in Congo's Protected Areas Garamba National Park During the 1996-97 civil war, battles and looting took place inside the park. There were precipitous declines in mammal populations from 1995 to 1998 (elephant population halved to less than 5500; buffalos reduced one-third to fewer than 8000), but poaching decreased after 1998. Okapi Wildlife Reserve Situated farther away from areas originally affected by civil war, the reserve began experiencing elephant poaching only in 2000 (no appreciable decline in population found). The number of illegal coltan and gold mines increased significantly the same year. Kahuzi-Biega National Park The park has suffered since the first influx of Rwandan refugees in 1994. Rwandan Interahamwe forces (which carried out the Rwandan genocide) and Congolese (MayiMayi) rebels control lowland portion of the park (encompassing 90 percent of the total territory), where they are involved in gold, castorite and coltan mining and ivory poaching. The elephant population has been nearly destroyed, down from 350 families to two. The lowland gorilla population halved (down to 130), though due more to conditions of anarchy than acts of war per se. Virungas National Park Rwandan refugees, which include heavily armed, former government soldiers, engage in poaching of antelopes, forest buffalos and elephants, which are subsequently sold through illegal commercial networks established by Zairian soldiers. In late 1996, Congolese Mayi-Mayi militias decimated hippopotamuses that remained along the Rutshuri and Rwindi rivers, and antiMobutu rebels slaughtered antelope and buffalo populations. In 1999, Rwandan-allied rebels killed at least 330 buffalo and 450 antelope, though a large portion of the mountain gorilla population apparently continued to survive. Salonga National Park The park has been a poacher's paradise for more than two decades, long preceding the current armed conflicts. It lies in territory controlled by government forces in west-central Congo.

Poachers now include heavily armed deserters from former dictator Mobutu's army. Elephant populations are severely reduced. Maiko National Park This park has been a battleground during the civil war that started in 1998; government soldiers and other armed groups are involved in poaching and illegal mining. Michael Renner is a senior researcher at the Worldwatch Institute, Washington, DC. This article is based on the research presented in The Anatomy of Resource Wars (Worldwatch Paper 162, 2002), available at <www.worldwatch.org/pubs/paper/162/>. COPYRIGHT 2004 Alternatives, Inc. COPYRIGHT 2008 Gale, Cengage Learning FindArticles / Reference / Alternatives Journal / Sept-Oct, 2004

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World insecurity Pillage and plunder: the vast natural resources of the Congo are once again fuelling war, exploitation and povertyand Western consumers are... by Michael Renner

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Dams, guns and refugees: irresponsible development and environmental conflicts displace rural people, especially when the tensions lead to violence

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All ResourceLibrary

Oil, Water, Blood and Diamonds:International Intervention in Resource Disputes Author: Jenny, R. Kehl Source:International Negotiation, Volume 15, Number 3, 2010 , pp. 391-412(22) Publisher: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, an imprint of Brill

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Abstract: Violent conflicts over natural resources disrupt energy supply, distort economic development, weaken governments, and threaten international security. With looming resource scarcity and increasing energy demands, international powers position themselves to protect their access to vital resources abroad. Fierce competition for resources will increase the urgency with which international actors intervene in resource disputes. Yet strategies for resolving resource disputes are underdeveloped. The purpose of this research is to examine the use of political and economic strategies to resolve disputes over vital resources through negotiated settlements, in comparison to strategies that result in exacerbating conflict. This study develops a valuable new dataset on resource disputes and provides a systematic cross-national analysis of international intervention strategies. It tests the success

or failure of leveraging international market access, financial aid, capacity building, transparency reforms, and levels of military mobilization for understanding the outcome of resource conflicts. The results identify specific international strategies that are effective in altering the costbenefit analysis of cooperation versus conflict, in the interest of achieving negotiated settlements for resource disputes. Articles that cite this article? Keywords:natural resource security; international conflict resolution Document Type: Research article DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157180610X529609 Affiliations:1: Department of Political Science, Rutgers University-Camden 401 Cooper Street, Camden NJ 08102 USA, Email: jrkehl@camden.rutgers.edu Publication date: 2010-10-01

Racism, Brutality and Starvation in Sudan


The government of (north) Sudan is waging terrible war in South Kordofan. Rebels there aspire to independence like their neighbors in South Sudan, the worlds newest country. Khartoum doesnt intend to make the same mistake twice. The NYTs Nicholas Kristof returned from South Kordofan this weekend. His report paints a dire and tragic picture. They said that they want to finish off the black people; they said they want to kill them all, recalled Elizabeth Kafi, a 22-year-old Nuban who said she was kidnapped in December by Sudanese uniformed soldiers. She and others say that the mostly Arab Sudanese soldiers scorn Nubans partly for their darker skin, partly because some are Christian, but mostly because many Nubans back an armed uprising against decades of Sudanese misrule. In 23 days of captivity, she said she saw the soldiers use guns to execute several Nuban men, including her grandfather and brother-in-law. She described watching soldiers gang rape and then cut the throat of a young Nuban woman, and also stab to death the womans 3 -year-old son. The occasional racism of north Africas Arabs against their dark-skinned African brethren is not confined to Sudan. Its happening in Libya, in the aftermath of the civil war, with similarly tragic results, and its happening in Mali, where veterans of the Libya war are continuing an old fight. Ahmed Haroun, wanted by the ICC for crimes against humanity in Darfur, is now governor of South Kordofan. His strategy is to starve the enemy into submission, rebels or civilians, and to prevent aid groups from reaching refugees while bombing towns with aircraft and unleashing soldiers to rape, pillage, and kill. There are very few calls for a international intervention in Sudanno movement for a Libya-style coalition to protect civilians and no UN Security Council resolutions authorizing mediation. Here in Sudan, the duty to protect once again proves its limited application.

Pillage and plunder: the vast natural resources of the Congo are once again

fuelling war, exploitation and povertyand Western consumers are profiting


by Michael Renner

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FOR THE BETTER PART of the past two years, Western media attention has trained an intense spotlight on Iraq. While the media fascination with Iraq is understandable, given the high drama of regime change and an occupation unraveling in the face of insurgency and chaos, it has obscured another conflict that has caused the most suffering in the world in recent years. With only brief interruptions, fighting has engulfed large parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the former Zaire, since 1996. The deadliest phase started in 1998, when Ugandan and Rwandan troops invaded, assisting Congolese rebel groups against Laurent Kabila's government, which received assistance from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. As many as three million people have been killed and at least another two million displaced. In one of its largest peacekeeping efforts, the United Nations has deployed more than 11,000 soldiers and civilians. Resource pillage has been a key factor sustaining violence in the Congo. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is one of several developing countries in which abundant natural resources have helped fuel conflict, either by attracting predatory groups seeking to control them or by financing the continuation of wars that were initially caused by other factors. Prominent other examples include Colombia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, the Sudan and Afghanistan. Governments, rebels and warlords have made billions of dollars by selling a variety of "conflict commodities." They have used the revenues to arm themselves and to line their own pockets. But the population at large has suffered extraordinarily due to violence, economic collapse and social deprivation. Although the intervention by several of Congo's neighbours was initially triggered mostly out of security concerns, the opportunity to plunder the country's enormous resource wealth became a

paramount reason for continued fighting. Congo is extremely rich in minerals and gemstones such as diamonds, gold, coltan, niobium, cassiterite, copper, cobalt, zinc and manganese. It also offers copious agricultural and forestry resources such as timber, coffee, tea and palm oil. In addition, the country's wildlife, including okapis, gorillas and elephants, has long attracted poachers. At first, the foreign invaders and their rebel allies resorted to outright theft of stockpiled raw materials. Once the stockpiles were exhausted, they organized a variety of methods to extract additional resources. In some cases, the armies have been engaged directly in resource extraction; in other cases, local Congolese were put to work by Rwandan and Ugandan forces. Child labour was used in gold and diamond mining. Occupying forces and their rebel allies have also forced coffee growers and palm oil producers to sell their commodities at depressed prices. Finally, a series of companies of questionable reputation--most of them European--were given concessions to exploit Congo's resources. Looted resources became a major source of Rwanda's and Uganda's foreign exchange and allowed them to finance their military presence. In Uganda's case, the individual enrichment of top military commanders and business leaders also was a main driving force. The Kabila government nearly fell to Rwandan troops at the beginning of the invasion. To stave off defeat and continue the war, the cash-strapped government, too, relied on the country's resources to purchase weapons and secure allied support. It granted concessions and entered into joint ventures with foreign firms in return for up-front payments. And the Kabila government appealed to Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia for military assistance. Although the governments of these nations had strong political and strategic motivations for dispatching troops, they also demanded compensation, and the Kabila government used resource wealth as an incentive for its allies to stay involved. The government granted several concessions, including offshore oil wells to Angola and a share of a diamond mine in KasaiOccidental province to Namibia. Zimbabwe's commercial pursuits were the most extensive. Companies controlled by Zimbabwe's military and civilian leadership secured extensive timber rights and became involved in running diamond, copper and cobalt mines, among other ventures. Although most foreign troops were eventually withdrawn (as a result of growing international pressure and the rising cost of the military interventions), illegal commercial networks were being left behind; headed by military officers and unscrupulous political and business leaders, they continue to control vast areas of Congo and operate them as their personal fiefdoms. The conflict has created a humanitarian and environmental nightmare. Like other contemporary resource-related conflicts, the skirmishes and battles of the Congo war were fought in areas that are of great environmental value because they are home to a large portion of the world's remaining intact forests as well as the habitat for many rare plant and animal species. The Democratic Republic of the Congo accounts for more than half of Africa's forests. It has the largest number of bird and mammal species of any country on the continent (including okapis, rhinos, chimpanzees and lowland gorillas) and is also one of the region's most flora-rich countries.

Even under the best of circumstances, mining and logging are highly destructive of the environment, both because of the methods of extraction used and because these operations often take place in ecologically fragile areas. Under conditions of armed conflict, the consequences can be far more severe. Because much resource extraction occurs illegally, and because loggers and miners are intent on extracting resources before they might lose control over an area, they have no incentive to conduct their operations in a responsible manner. Their primary interest is in raising funds for weapons purchases or self-enrichment and they try to extract as much, and as fast, as possible. A number of factors--the overall state of anarchy in much of the country, widespread illegal logging, mining and poaching, resource battles and refugee movements--have had a devastating impact on forests and wildlife in the eastern Congo. The Rwandan civil war of 1990-94 spilled over into neighboring Zaire almost from the beginning, with both sides conducting military operations in the Virungas area. The military presence in the forest kept growing, landmines were laid and vegetation was cut down. But this was mere prelude to far greater destruction. Following the Rwandan genocide, nearly two million people left Rwanda in a sudden, massive outflow in July 1994; half went to eastern Zaire and settled mostly on the edge of Virunga Park or inside it. Desperate for firewood, the refugees cut and gathered as much as 1000 tonnes of wood a day, causing serious deforestation. During the 27 months that the refugee camps existed, a total of 113 square kilometres of forestland was affected; of that, 75 square kilometres were clear-cut. The subsequent Congolese civil wars (first, Laurent Kabila's overthrow of long-time dictator Mobutu in 1996-97, then the Rwandan/Ugandan intervention) imposed additional burdens. Congo's national parks have been severely affected by war, anarchy, refugee flows and massive illegal resource extraction. The lure of resource wealth drew not only a variety of armed factions into the Congo's natural parks, but also some 10,000 miners, with calamitous consequences. Coltan miners strip off the bark of eko trees to fashion troughs in which they flush out coltan (used in the manufacture of cellphones) from ore-bearing mud; thousands of trees have been destroyed, undermining the livelihoods of the local indigenous people, the Mbuti, who use the eko trees for gathering honey. Kahuzi-Biega National Park and the Okapi Wildlife Reserve are both UNESCO World Heritage sites, a status that extols their unique value to all of humanity. But severe environmental degradation as a result of the modern day gold rush for coltan landed them on the organization's list of sites in danger. Poaching of elephant tusks left only two out of 350 elephant families in Kahuzi-Biega in 2000. Likewise, the number of eastern lowland gorillas has been so reduced-down by 70 percent since 1994--that they are threatened with extinction.

Pillage and plunder: the vast natural resources of the Congo are once again

fuelling war, exploitation and povertyand Western consumers are profiting


by Michael Renner

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Logging companies connected to Congolese rebel groups have engaged in rapacious clearcutting operations. DARA Forest Company, for example, had been denied a logging licence by the government in early 1998, but obtained a concession in Orientale Province in 2000 from a rebel group allied with Uganda. It subsequently carried out logging "without consideration of any of the minimum acceptable rules of timber harvesting for sustainable forest management," according to a UN expert panel. Satellite images show deforestation taking place at an alarming rate. Although DARA Forest failed to satisfy Forest Stewardship Council procedures and evaded international requirements for timber certification, a UN expert panel found that companies from Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland, China, Japan, Kenya and the United States nevertheless imported the company's timber via Uganda. Responsibility for the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo lies not only with regional leaders but also more distant countries and private companies that have wittingly or unwittingly facilitated the exploitation of Congolese resources by shipping and buying illegally obtained commodities. During the last few years, awareness has grown that natural resources will continue to fuel deadly conflicts as long as consumer societies import and use materials irrespective of where they originate and under what conditions they were produced. Shareholder activism and campaigns for ethical investing can generate pressure on oil, mining and logging companies to adopt more ethical ways of doing business. So far, however, Western nations have been all too ready to turn a blind eye in order to protect the interests of their own corporations. Follow up

Read the detailed UN report on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo at www.un.org/News/dh/latest/drcongo.htm The Rainforest Foundation is campaigning for the protection of Congo's rainforests and their human and animal inhabitants: www.rainforestfoundationuk.org The Canadian human rights NGO Rights & Democracy is hosting a 2004 international think tank on peace building in the Congo: www.ichrdd.ca RELATED ARTICLE: War in Congo's Protected Areas Garamba National Park During the 1996-97 civil war, battles and looting took place inside the park. There were precipitous declines in mammal populations from 1995 to 1998 (elephant population halved to less than 5500; buffalos reduced one-third to fewer than 8000), but poaching decreased after 1998. Okapi Wildlife Reserve Situated farther away from areas originally affected by civil war, the reserve began experiencing elephant poaching only in 2000 (no appreciable decline in population found). The number of illegal coltan and gold mines increased significantly the same year. Kahuzi-Biega National Park The park has suffered since the first influx of Rwandan refugees in 1994. Rwandan Interahamwe forces (which carried out the Rwandan genocide) and Congolese (MayiMayi) rebels control lowland portion of the park (encompassing 90 percent of the total territory), where they are involved in gold, castorite and coltan mining and ivory poaching. The elephant population has been nearly destroyed, down from 350 families to two. The lowland gorilla population halved (down to 130), though due more to conditions of anarchy than acts of war per se. Virungas National Park Rwandan refugees, which include heavily armed, former government soldiers, engage in poaching of antelopes, forest buffalos and elephants, which are subsequently sold through illegal commercial networks established by Zairian soldiers. In late 1996, Congolese Mayi-Mayi militias decimated hippopotamuses that remained along the Rutshuri and Rwindi rivers, and antiMobutu rebels slaughtered antelope and buffalo populations. In 1999, Rwandan-allied rebels

killed at least 330 buffalo and 450 antelope, though a large portion of the mountain gorilla population apparently continued to survive. Salonga National Park The park has been a poacher's paradise for more than two decades, long preceding the current armed conflicts. It lies in territory controlled by government forces in west-central Congo. Poachers now include heavily armed deserters from former dictator Mobutu's army. Elephant populations are severely reduced. Maiko National Park This park has been a battleground during the civil war that started in 1998; government soldiers and other armed groups are involved in poaching and illegal mining. Michael Renner is a senior researcher at the Worldwatch Institute, Washington, DC. This article is based on the research presented in The Anatomy of Resource Wars (Worldwatch Paper 162, 2002), available at <www.worldwatch.org/pubs/paper/162/>. COPYRIGHT 2004 Alternatives, Inc. COPYRIGHT 2008 Gale, Cengage Learning FindArticles / Reference / Alternatives Journal / Sept-Oct, 2004

Angkatan Pemuda Insaf


Daripada Wikipedia, ensiklopedia bebas.

Lompat ke: pandu arah, cari Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API) merupakan sebuah parti politik yang ditubuhkan pada 17 Februari1946 di Ipoh, Perak, oleh Ahmad Boestamam, Abdul Rahman Rahim dan Bakar Thareek. API adalah sebuah badan politik kiri dan sosialisMelayu yang pada asalnya merupakan sayap pemuda Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM). Parti ini mempunyai kaitan yang sangat rapat dengan Gabungan Pemuda Demokratik Sedunia dan Pertubuhan Lembaga Pemuda Bangsa Asia di Indonesia yang banyak mempengaruhi API dalam setiap sudut perjuangannya. Parti ini diharamkan oleh kerajaan British pada 17 Julai 1947 dalam Warta Kerajaan Malaya Union. Tindakan mengharamkan pertubuhan yang berhaluan kiri itu adalah mengikut Ordinan Persatuan, 1947 (Societies Ordinance, 1947). Tindakan mengharamkan API didakwa disebabkan kekacauan yang dilancarkan oleh AMCJAPUTERA serta kegiatan-kegiatan golongan kiri yang dipelopori oleh API. Kerajaan British juga mendakwa asas-asas perjuangan API yang membahayakan melalui buku Testament Politik API

yang ditulis oleh Ahmad Boestamam. API merupakan pertubuhan politik yang pertama diharamkan oleh British.

[sunting] Ideologi dan perjuangan API


Tujuan berdirinya API sebagaimana yang terkandung dalam buku "Testament Politik A.P.I." adalah:

Menyatukan pemuda-pemuda insaf dalam satu barisan. Mengukuhkan barisan perjuangan untuk bangsa dan tanah air. Memberi latihan sahsiah, rohani dan jasmani kepada pemuda-pemudanya supaya bersedia menjadi pemimpin bila dikehendaki. Membina semula Malaya mengikut fahaman demokrasi yang sejati berdasarkan kedaulatan rakyat. Menuntut perwakilan dalam pemerintahan Malaya.

Sementara itu tuntutan API pula adalah seperti berikut:


Tuntutan politik: Negara merdeka, demokrasi tulen, pemerintahan datang dari rakyat dan faedah kebajikan untuk rakyat (dari rakyat untuk rakyat). Tuntutan ekonomi: Gagasan ekonomi yang teratur dari rakyat untuk rakyat. Susunan ekonomi yang dipegang oleh negara. Perubahan susunan masyarakat dan keadilan sosial: Keadilan sosial adalah merupakan kayu pengukur sama ada demokrasi berjalan sepenuhnya atau pun tidak. API menyatakan bahawa selagi ada susun kelas mesyarakat selagi itulah demokrasi tidak tulen. API mahukan penentangan kelas antara rakyat dihapuskan dalam masyarakat bangsa Melayu.

[sunting] Rujukan

Testament Politik A.P.I. (1946) oleh Ahmad Boestamam Pengharaman Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (A.P.I.) diwartakan, dari Hari Ini Dalam Sejarah Online

[sunting] Lihat juga


Senarai parti politik Malaysia Politik Malaysia

Diambil daripada "http://ms.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Angkatan_Pemuda_Insaf&oldid=672295"


Perspectives on Contemporary Ethnic Conflict: Primal Violence Or the ...
By Santosh C. Saha

jonathan fox intervention religious

Islamisation of engineering education in International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM): problems and prospect
Ahmad, Zuraida and Ismail, Ahmad Faris and Shafie, Amir Akramin and Ihsan, Sany Izan and Halim, Zahurin and Albat'hi, Souad A.M. (2011) Islamisation of engineering education in International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM): problems and prospect.Revelation and Science, 1 (3). pp. 131-137. ISSN 2229-9947 PDF - Published Version Download (252Kb) | Preview Official URL: http://www.iium.edu.my/revival/index.php/revival/a...

Abstract
The surge for infusing of Islamic knowledge and values into engineering education emerge having realized the gross inadequacies of the western/secular engineering education, which aimed only at outward development of individuals. The intention of integrating the Islamic values is to develop a balanced student personality, pleasing to God and to fellow humans, who promote and encourage maruf (good) and fight munkar (evil). This paper is an attempt to examine the existing engineering education system in Kulliyyah of engineering, IIUM. It examines two fields, which are germane to the whole discussions on the subject matter. The two concepts are the existing engineering education and the Islamic knowledge that is and will be integrated in the engineering curriculum. The authors are also proposing frameworks for the Islamisation of engineering programme, highlighting some obstacles in the proposed frameworks as well as likely trying to encounter and suggest solutions for its success.

Item Type: Article (Journal)

Review of International Studies

Review of International Studies (2003), 29 : pp 321-340 Copyright 2003 British International Studies Association DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0260210503003218 (About DOI) Published online: 26 June 2003

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Table of Contents - 2003 - Volume 29, Issue 03

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Humanitarian responsibilities and interventionist claims in international society


Alex J. Bellamy

Abstract
This article calls for a widening of the debate about humanitarian intervention to incorporate insights from constructivism, Welsh School; Critical Security Studies, and critical approaches to Third World International Relations. After identifying a series of problems with the contemporary debate, which is dominated by the English School, it calls for a broadening of the concept of intervention and suggests a need to rethink the meaning of humanitarianism and terms such as the supreme humanitarian emergency.

South Sudans Post-Independence Challenges: Greed or Grievance? Elizabeth Tesfaye Haile January 04, 2012 It is now eight months since South Sudan joined the family of nations as a newly independent state. However, as the South Sudanese struggle to find their bearings in a very unpredictable world, compounding challenges seems to be wearing heavily on them. Elizabeth Tesfaye Haile takes stock of how some of these challenges are redefining South Sudans dynamics, inquiring as to whether it is greed or grievance at the heart of the simmering tensions.

Introduction South Sudan achieved its independence from the North on July 9, 2011 after a referendum in January 2011. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement bore its fruit and ended Africa's longest-running civil war, which claimed the lives of an estimated 2.2 million people (BBC News, 2011). However, the question remains whether South Sudan will be able to sustainably achieve peace and stability by overcoming its ongoing and future challenges. While this new country still maintains hostilities with Sudan even after its independence it has been also critically confronted by internal rebels. Though it is difficult to exactly trace the root causes of the NorthSouth civil war, various suggestions have been offered by scholars with regard to the causes of the war. Exclusion of South Sudan from political power and development, along with the racial and ethnic divide between the north and south since colonial times, are considered major causes for the civil war. Islamisation policies by different leaders of Sudan, especially the waging of Sharia law in Sudan by the then-Sudanese President Jaafar Mohammad al-Nimeiri, has further radicalized South Sudanese, who are animists and Christians (Batruch, 2003; ICG, 2010). In general, a historical

consistency of oppressive regime from Khartoum discriminating and exploiting the South is believed to have initiated grievances by the South (Johnson, 2003, as cited in Patey, 2007). Simmering Hostilities However, it is not only grievance by South Sudanese that has contributed to the onset of the northsouth civil wars in Sudan. Even if the first civil war broke out mainly due to grievance, the greed for resources, especially oil, has contributed its share to the onset of the second civil war. The first civil war ended in 1972 and granted autonomy to the South. Then, it is not by chance that war resumed again and the second civil war started in 1983 after the discovery of oil in South Sudan in 1979 by Chevron (U.S Department of State, 2011). Consequently, President al Nimieri disregarded South Sudans autonomy and moved to change southern state boundaries to ensure the North would have access to future oil earnings (Patey, 2007). Sudans interest in south Sudan seemed to shift from political and territorial to economic. In actuality, no conflict remains static. Structural and situational factors, especially economic ones, can transform the objective of armed struggle and shape the character of the conflict. Hence, economic objectives might overtake political objectives when the priority becomes economics (Ballentine, 2003). Further, the nature of the resource also determines the type and duration of the conflict. Un-lootable resources including oil tend to lead to separatist conflicts and increase the duration of the conflict itself (Ross, 2003). Economic interests also shape international interventions, as interventions are for the most part directed by powerful nations such as the United States, whose actions, in turn, are primarily dictated by their own economic agendas vis--vis the war-affected nations. Hence, it was only after the discovery of oil that the internationally mediated peace process began. And until that time, Sudans war had been neglected within the international arena, except from the humanitarian perspective (Batruch, 2003). In general, as Patey (2007) explains, it looks like the all of the same causes of civil war that have long plagued the African continent also attributed to Sudans North-South civil war. Even though the civil wars have ended and South Sudan is separated from Sudan, the two governments still remain hostile toward each other. The main reason for their hostility is North Sudans economic fear and insecurity resulting from South Sudans independence. Under the 2005 peace deal, the oil wealth was split 50-50 between North and South Sudan. However, this deal ended when South Sudan obtained its independence, taking 380,000 barrels per day of oil production and leaving North Sudan only 120,000 barrels of production per day ( Sudan Tribune, 2011). However, while the South possesses roughly 75 percent of Sudans oil reserves, the North has the refineries and pipelines, which could help both countries benefit fairly well from the oil (The New York Times, 2011). Nevertheless, South Sudan has already started complaining about the higher rates charged by the North for oil infrastructure. Hence, landlocked South Sudan is currently considering building its own refineries and pipelines and looking for other optional ports; this has created further frustration on the part of North Sudan (Kron, 2011). In general, high inflation, low foreign exchange reserves, huge debt, the loss of South Sudan and its huge oil income has prompted economic distress for the North, which analysts expect could

lead North Sudan to resume war with the South in order to get back the Souths oil producing areas (Reeves, 2011). Further, the dispute over the border district of Abyei remains unsettled. In accordance with the comprehensive peace agreement, the referendum of Abyei district has been planned to take place in 2011. However, due to the disagreement between the North and South Sudan, the referendum has been postponed indefinitely (IPS, 2011). The Sudanese army occupied Abyei town in May, 2011, violating the 2005 peace deal and conflict assumed between the Sudanese army and the other faction of SPLM, SPLM -North (aligned with South Sudan). A deal on demilitarization of Abyei has been reached on June 20, 2011, led by the African Union. The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) consisting mainly Ethiopian peace keepers is patrolling the Abyei area since June 27, 2011(Reuters, 2011). Even if the conflict over Abyei is usually described as economic, ethnic rivalries between the southern group Dinka Ngok and northern nomads, the Misseria has been a challenge for the referendum to occur (Copnall, 2011). The Kordofan Question Although ceasefire has been reached in Abyei, another conflict escalated in Sudans only oil producing state of South Kordofan, which borders South Sudan (Reeves, 2011). The origin of the conflict goes back to the dispute that marred the state's gubernatorial elections in May 2011. The National Congress Party (NCP)'s incumbent Ahmed Haroun won the election over the SPLM-N's candidate Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu, who alleged that the vote was rigged and refused to accept the outcome (Sudan Tribune, 2011). The conflict is between North Sudans army and SPLM-North (SPLM-N), and it spilled over into Blue Nile state (AFP, 2011). South Kordofan and Blue Nile states are home primarily to Nuban people who associate themselves with South Sudan and fought with SPLM-A against the Sudanese government during the civil wars. However, these states were not allowed to participate in the January 2011 referendum to form South Sudan, and the "popular consultation" process as promised by the 2005 peace deal was repeatedly delayed. Ethnic cleansing has been claimed against the Nubans by the Northern Arab militia, and the crisis has been mentioned as another Darfur (The Guardian, 2011). North Sudan accused South Sudan of supporting SPLM-N, although South Sudan claimed that it stopped its ties with the SPLM-N after independence (ICG, 2011). The United States proposed splitting South Kordofan in two as a mean to accommodate the rebels SPLM-N, though it was rejected by Sudan. The humanitarian crisis is growing at an alarming rate in these two states. Approximately 1.4 million people have been killed or injured by the military (The Guardian, 2011). The UN accused the Sudanese government of bombing civilians in these north-south border areas and even bombing civilians crossing South Sudans border. Around 140, 000 people fled the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states (BBC, 2011). UNHCR says that almost 33,000 people have fled to Ethiopia from Blue Nile, while South Sudan has absorbed more than 50,000 refugees since fighting began in June (IPS, 2011). The government of Sudan also embargoed foreign aid directed towards South Kordofan and Blue Nile state. The UN humanitarian chief is calling now for free access to provide humanitarian assistance to the two Sudanese states (UN News & Media, 2011).

The international community, including the UN and US, is committing effort to end the crisis in these states and also to stop the confrontation between North and South Sudan. For instance, the African Union panel led by former South African president Thabo Mbeki, attempted to mediate between SPLM-N and the Sudanese government (BBC, 2011). The AU hailed, on June 29, 2011, the preliminary deal between Sudan and SPLM-N, which was supposedly intended to lead to a ceasefire in the ethnically divided South Kordofan region; however, it failed to prevent the spread of the conflict or result in ceasefire (Terra Daily, 2011). Humanitarian organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, are also constantly reporting human rights abuses by both conflicting parties, especially that of Sudans government, for bombing civilians (Sudan Tribune, 2011). Consequently, both Sudan and the new nation of South Sudan are anticipating the possibility of a new war based on the current cross-border attacks and economic hostilities (BBC, 2011). The North-South border has not been officially designated since the South gained independence in July. Troop build-ups are being identified on both sides of the Sudan-South Sudan border (Straziuso, 2011). The Internal Rebellion: Greed or grievance? Apart from the conflict with Sudan, South Sudan itself is in civil war with different rebel groups. Meanwhile, violent cattle raiding is also igniting ethnic and tribal disputes in some communities, creating further instability. South Sudan is an ethnically diverse country. The Dinkas are the largest ethnic group, followed by the Nuer and Shilluk (BBC News, 2011). In the country, power-sharing across tribal lines is not done. The Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its armed wing, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), are the main constituents of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). SPLM is dominated by South Sudans largest ethnic group, the Dinka, and is accused of ignoring other ethnic groups, in particular the second largest - the Nuer. Military and oil interests are dictated by the Dinka, themselves driven by different objectives (The Economist, 2011). Ethnic belonging is not simply a source of identity; it is also a source of livelihood and social capital in many weak states (Ballentine, 2003). The presence of ethnic diversity usually makes a country safe from civil war, as argued by scholars (Collier, 2001). However, since the dominance of one ethnic group over the others still prevails in South Sudan, exclusion of other groups begets grievance and violence. Apart from political exclusion, several complaints have been voiced in South Sudan, including inflation, corruption, and unemployment since independence. Hence, a series of armed rebellions have appeared in 2010-2011 in South Sudan; several in the state of Unity, such as the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) and a force led by former SPLA General George Athor (BBC News, 2011; ICG, 2011). Even very recently, in September 2011, a new rebel group called the National United Front emerged. The majority leaders of the rebel groups are also former senior officials of SPLA or militia leaders who fought in the civil wars. Although it is difficult for these rebel groups to overthrow the government at present time, indeed they will cause instability in specific regions, such as Unity state, which produces a third of South Sudans total oil production (BBC News, 2011).

President Salva Kiir promised amnesty for all groups who rebelled against the government after the April 2010 election, right on Independence Day. Some successes have been achieved such that some rebel groups surrendered to the Juba government. However, a majority of rebel groups are active, especially in the oil rich Unity state. For instance, though one faction of SSLA led by Peter Gadet reached a ceasefire agreement with Juba, another faction of SSLA rejected the deal and announced that the ceasefire decision was made without the consultation with the group (Kuich, 2011). George Athor, who was killed in December 2011 during a clash with South Sudan, had been a senior member of SPLA who rebelled against GOSS once he lost the April 2010 governmental election in Jongeli state (Aljazeera, 2011). He was believed to be one of the most powerful of the post-election insurrectionists (Sudan Tribune, 2011; ReliefWeb, 2011). The Enemy From Within Various grievances, such as rising inflation, corruption, nepotism, tribalism, inequality, and high unemployment are described by rebels. For instance, the current faction leader of SSLA, Major General Bapiny Montyuil, in an interview with the BBC spoke out against the discrimination of South Sudanese by Salva Kirrs regime, and he stated that the people need freedom, education and development (BBC News, 2011). Apart from the presence of real grievance issues at hand, it should be noted that grievance discourses are highly crucial for rebels in order to shape popular perception about the violence, and also to recruit supporters. Rebels need grievance discourses to function no matter how their objectives vary (Collier, 2001). On the other hand, some of the rebels actions clearly reflect predatory behavior and their greed for power and resources. For instance, Major General Bapiny Montyuil clearly indicated that oil and overthrowing Salva Kirrs regime are major targets for his group. As Keen (1998, p.11) suggested, war is the continuation of economics by other means. George Athor also urged for the formation of a new government in which his group would get "two or three" ministerial posts until the organization of the vote (Sudan Tribune, 2011). As David Keen explained, much of the violence in contemporary conflicts has been initiated by elites seeking to defend their vested interests. Further, some economic aims, especially obtaining unlootable resources such as oil, can be furthered by controlling the state (Keen, 1998, p. 12-13). Also short term economic advantages of violence for rebels could include pillage or securing protection money from civilians (ibid). Some SPLA troops also joined rebel groups. In contrast to SPLA troops salary delay and associated frustrations, rebel groups promised decent salary and allowances for SPLA soldiers once South Sudan is liberated from Saliva Kiir. They also announced that each household in South Sudan will obtain compensation from oil after liberation of South Sudan (South Sudan News Agency, 2011; CIA Fact Book, 2011): It is our position that once Salva Kiir is removed, our government will give each household across the ten states of South Sudan a share of oil money. We will ensure that the oil money is accessible to each and every citizen of South Sudan. Under Saliva Kiir regime, the oil money is controlled by Awan clan where he originated from. As soon as the current regime is toppled, each Southern Sudanese will get monthly payment from the government as the way to redistribute oil money

As Collier (2001) argues, groups rebel when rebelling is financially viable. Rebel groups, unlike governments, cannot finance conflict through taxation or other legitimate revenues. Rebel groups might have genuine grievances, but they only rebel if they know they do well out of war. Some rebel leaders led by greed may instrumentalize ethnicity and other grievance discourses to meet their economic agenda. On the other hand, ordinary people driven by fear, grievances or need for greed may turn to violence for a solution to their economic and social problems (Keen, 1998, p.12). It is expected that grievances would arise in such a chronically underdeveloped war-torn country emerging after decades of conflict. Hence, the presence of the dissatisfactions and grievances as claimed by rebel groups in South Sudan cannot be denied; however, they could be addressed through non-violent political opposition. This is also partially due to the fact that postconflict societies are at substantial risk because of what has happened to them during conflict. Violent ways of handling matters are usually learnt during conflict and, thus, post-conflict societies may have a limited tradition of conducting their political conflict nonviolently (Collier, 2001). Insecurity among rebels and lack of trust in the government to address their dissatisfactions non-violently, along with the lack of a strong and transparent political system in South Sudan both contribute to the problem. This is also exacerbated by the abundance of weapons, particularly after the end of conflict. However, unrealistic dissatisfaction related to individual oil income distribution in South Sudan, as claimed by rebels, is far from a true grievance; rather, it indicates greediness on their part. Resources: Blessing or curse? South Sudan is characterized by a wealth of resources, in contrast with the resource-poor country of North Sudan. It has one of the richest, agriculturally fertile lands in Africa with more-thanadequate water supplies. The country has about 10-20 million head of cattle and also wildlife herds, which can help establish eco-tourism in the future. This new country produces threefourths of the former Sudans total oil output at nearly a half a million barrels per day. Though South Sudans population was based for a long time on subsistence agriculture, the country now highly depends on its oil revenue, with oil constituting 98% of South Sudans budget (BBC News, 2011; CIA Fact Book, 2011). GOSS is accused of spending on military and not in human investment. Further accusations of oil revenue misuse are widespread, and the social and environmental consequences of extraction on the local communities persist (ICG 2011; Aljazeera, 2011). The oil resource in South Sudan can be a blessing to be used positively for development, or it can be a curse, as witnessed in the Niger Delta in Nigeria, where conflict is fuelled to serve the economic interests of multinational companies and corrupt government officials. There are many factors that could make South Sudan vulnerable to future wars and make the resource more of a curse than a blessing. Its high dependency on natural resource exports, weak institutions and poor governance, unemployment, lack of diversified economic opportunities, limited education, vast geography and conflict history are some factors, among many (Pineda & Rodriguez, 2010). A high level of natural resource dependence is a risk factor for civil war, fuelling competition over resources. A high level of dependency on primary commodities also makes the countrys economy vulnerable to price instability and global financial shocks. In addition, the vast geographical area of the nation matters, as distance could pose difficulties for

the government to effectively address and manage rebels (Collier, 2011). Last but not least, the presence of diasporas abroad is also another factor, since they serve as huge contributors to rebel finance. South Sudan has a vast number of diasporas, who fled their region mainly due to the civil wars (ibid; Ballentine, 2003). The nature of the resources in South Sudan, mainly oil, is also another factor that poses a challenge. Different resources are associated with different types of conflict. Oil is an unlootable but obstructable resource, since it must travel through a long, above ground pipeline. Hence, it presents rebel groups with an unceasing flow of extortion (Ross, 2003, p.65). For instance, during the second north-south Sudan civil war, SPLM periodically attacked the workers and equipment in pipeline construction. SPLA then used the money it extorted from western oil firms that wished to protect their equipment to fund itself (ibid). Even if there are various factors that could make South Sudans resource a curse, the situation with resources is not bleak, as long as GOSS chooses the right path for development. Natural resources can be a blessing rather than a curse if GOSS could manage its wealth and invest it in human development, diversification of its economy, such as by strengthening the agriculture sector and investing in science and technology. As Pineda and Rodriguez (2010, p.10) argue, countries can benefit from natural resources and can create sustainable economic growth and development through proper export diversification, human and physical capital investment, volatility and real exchange rate control. Further, many success stories have also been witnessed from natural resource wealth including those of Norway and Dubai. Even without going the extra miles to Europe or the Middle East, lessons could be learnt from the African nation of Botswana. Botswana more importantly invested in its own people, which South Sudan can learn from. The way forward Since the South recently achieved independence, longsuppressed grievances increasingly emerged (ICG, 2011). There are high expectations of the new government by the people, which could be very challenging to be met by this undeveloped nation in th short term (Aljazeera, 2011). Some of the expectations set by rebels, such as individual distribution of oil money, are unlikely and unfeasible for South Sudan to realize. South Sudan is one of the least developed nations with very poor infrastructure and social development. According to the United Nations, approximately a third of the South Sudanese population will need food aid starting this year because of crop failures and the widespread violence that killed more than 3,000 people in 2011. Further, inflation also topped 80 percent, and trade income including oil has been reduced due to disruption by border violence (Reuters, 2011). Moreover, any revenue generated in South Sudan including oil money needs to be spent on sustainable investments, such as human development and building infrastructure for trade and development. Hence, direct distribution of wealth as stipulated by rebel groups is unsustainable and will not help South Sudan tackle its inherent poverty sustainably. Nevertheless, the construction of sustainable peace in post-conflict societies such as South Sudan must aim to address realistic grievances, such as equal representation of the peoples of South Sudan in all political, social and economic spheres, are paramount for sustainable development.

Looking Beyond Juba In line with this, GOSS need to commit itself to constructing a government where each ethnic group is fairly represented. GOSS needs to also fight corruption and build transparent and accountable governance. Effective governance serves as a bridge to avert the relationship between natural resources and the opportunity for rebellion (Ballentine, 2003). National and international actors must also look beyond Juba to the many challenges and threats throughout the regions of the emerging Republic (ICG, 2011). The international community could also play a role in negotiating power re-distribution in South Sudan. GOSS should strengthen its provision of public services, such as education and health services, and invest in employment creation for the young population (Collier, 2009). Only 27% of South Sudanese aged 15 years and above can write and read (CIA Fact Book, 2011). Education is one among other elements considered a risk for natural resources to become a curse rather than a blessing (Pineda & Rodriguez, 2010; Ballentine, 2003). There is also a positive correlation between economic decline, high levels of poverty and unemployment, and the incidence of armed conflict (Ballentine, 2003). Hence, GOSS should diversify its economy, encourage private investment, and decrease its prime dependency on natural resources, thereby also creating diversified employment. It should also encourage its diasporas to invest and contribute to South Sudans development. The nature of un-lootable resources is more of a benefit for the government than it is for rebels, especially as it tends to make non-separatist conflicts short. This is because un-lootable resources require effective rebel and group leadership, in contrast with lootable resources such as diamonds, which can be easily exploited (Ross, 2003). Hence, this could be used as a window of opportunity by GOSS if it can establish a stronger, representative and united party to hasten the end of conflict. Further, the GOSS needs to take care while handling civilians in conflict regions. Taking harsh measures against civilians purported to be associated with rebel groups can further intensify the conflict (Keen, 1998). GOSS needs to provide adequate compensation for its soldiers so that they will not be attracted to other economic benefits. For instance, the former Sudans soldiers during the North-South civil war sold arms and ammunition on the open market, which finally reached the hands of the rebels. It should also not be assumed that violence is always characterized by rivalry. Cooperation can also happen between opposing groups and members when the need exists (Keen, 1998). International Responsibilities In a nutshell, it should be noted that South Sudans stability cannot be achieved without addressing Sudans stability and the north-south hostility. Hence, there is a need for the international community, including international institutions such as the UN, IGAD and AU, to facilitate dialogue and cooperation between Sudan and South Sudan by arranging conditions for agreement, particularly on oil and border disputes. Both Sudan and South Sudan benefit from their peaceful coexistence, as they depend on each other for exploiting oil resources in South Sudan. South Sudans plan to construct its own pipeline and refineries will not be viable in the

short term; hence, it is a must for South Sudan to depend on Sudans oil infrastructure for an indefinite period of time. Moreover, a coordinated international effort including the US, EU, China, the Arab League, and other friends of Bashirs government is required in order to stop Sudans civil war. China, the oil partner of both countries, is considered to play an immense role in bringing peace between the two countries (Sudan Tribune, 2011). Achieving Sudans stability is very complicated and thus demands an all-inclusive approach. Although relying on past experiences, it is expected President Bashir will refuse international requests to stop the conflicts. However, there is a chance that his government will agree to international help, since the country is economically weakened. External interventions to cease the civil war in Sudan may also include arranging debt relief by the US, facilitating the writing of a new constitution, legalization of the north-south border, facilitating dialogue between Sudan and its rebels, popular consultation about CPA with the South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, and arranging Abeyis referendum and new election in Sudan. In the coming days, the Juba-based leadership and their external friends might have to look beyond Juba. If, after all, they do not want South Sudan to join the long list of failed states, they must diversify their economic interests and start perceiving the population as a resource rather than a burden.

References (2011). US fears Kordofan violence contagion to South Sudan. 10/08/2011. Available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hQi27URRFH5Iu7OiHTbJPoUalvA?docId=CNG.d1c504bf387227a7f8244a7ff8064da3.401 (2011).South Sudan army 'kills' rebel leader Athor. 20/12/2011. Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/12/20111220143827296197.html (2011). A blessing or a curse?Crossroads Sudan.1/24/ 2011. Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/crossroadssudan/2011/01/2011124851123594.html Ballentine K. (2003). Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflict. In: Karen Ballentine, Jake Sherman (Eds). The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), Chapter 10: pp. 259283 Batruch C. (2003). Oil and conflict: Lundin Petroleums experience in Sudan. Available atwww.lundin-petroleum.com/.../ot_sudan_oil&conflict_24-11-03.pdf BBC News. (2011). Sudan's South Kordofan: 'Huge suffering from bombs. 14/06/2011. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13767146

BBC News. (2011). Sudan 'stealing oil' from South - Pagan Amum. 12/1/2011. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15983251 BBC News. (2011). South Sudans Profile.Last updated on 22/11/2011. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14069082 BBC News. (2011). Where do South Sudan rebel SSLA weapons come from? 11/1/2011. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15546499 BBC News. (2011). South Sudan demands Sudan forces 'withdraw from Jau'. 7/12/2011. Availabe at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16077689 CIA Fact Book.(2011). South Sudan.Last updated on 11/10/2011. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/od.html Collier P. (2009). Paul Colliers new rule for broken nations. TED Talks. 24/ 1/2009. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TvW4yugCPZo Collier P. (2001). Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy. In: Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela R. Aall (Eds.), Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001. Chapter 10: pp. 143-162 Copnall J. (2011). Sudan: Why Abyei is crucial to north and south.23/05/2011. BBC News. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13502845 The Guardian. (2011). We must act to stop South Kordofan becoming the next Darfur. 08/08/ 2011. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/povertymatters/2011/aug/08/south-kordofan-preventing-next-darfur International Crisis Group (ICG). (2010). Sudan Conflict History. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/sudan.aspx International Crisis Group (ICG). (2011). South Sudan: Compounding Instability in Unity State. Africa Report N179. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of africa/sudan/179%20South%20Sudan%20%20Compounding%20Instability%20in%20Unity%20State.pdf International Crisis Group (ICG). (2011). Conflict Risk Alert: Stopping the Spread of Sudans New Civil War. 26/09/ 2011. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/mediareleases/2011/africa/stopping-the-spread-of-sudans-new-civil-war.aspx Inter Press Service (IPS). (2011). Equitable Oil Deal Needed For Peace. 07/07/2011. Available athttp://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=56398

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Elizabeth Tesfaye Haile is currently a masters student in International Peace Studies at the University for Peace. She has been working as a lecturer at the department of Gender and Development at Haramaya University, Ethiopia.

Intervention motives questioned: Resources and attempts to control domino effect in the Middle East may be among reasons for intervention in Libya
Posted on April 27, 2011 by Karina Kainth

Courtesy of The Guardian. Iranian woman protests in favor of ex-President Mir Houssein Mousavi. Some believe that NATOs intervention in Libya aims to control the revolutions in Iran and Bahrain.

Anthony Chimente Staff Writer

Western intervention in the Libyan Revolution has introduced competing hypotheses regarding the very nature of the intervention authorized under the auspices of Security Council Resolution 1973. Nations such as France, the U.K. and the U.S. affirmed that intervention by NATO was imperative to stem a humanitarian crisis and the slaughter of innocent civilians. British Prime Minister David Cameron remarked in The Guardian that the military action against Muammar Gaddafi is necessary, it is legal and it is right. Right, because I dont believe that we should stand aside while this dictator murders his own people. French President Sarkozy echoed the P.M.s sentiments in The Times, asserting, If we intervene on the side of the Arab nations it is because of a universal conscience that cannot tolerate such crimes. In his peroration regarding Libyan intervention, President Obama cited a moral imperative to justify airstrike, as it was obvious that Gaddafi was massacring innocent protestors and was intent on continuing this slaughter to retain power. However, a key contention among many throughout the international community purports western intervention to be driven by natural resources, specifically oil. Libya is a main supplier of oil, producing around 2 percent of world production, or around 1.6 million barrels per day. The U.S. imports around .5 percent of its oil from Libya, while France and the U.K. import around 10 percent of their oil from Libya. Italy imports about 20 to 25 percent of its oil from the North African state. However, President Obama stated unequivocally that Gaddafi must go, making regime change the ultimate objective of the western powers. It is clear that the way the conflict in Libya has unfolded provides an avenue for the western powers to initiate a policy calling for the ousting of Gaddafi. However, the issue of western intervention in Libya and the motivation behind such action is very complex and entails concerns over oil markets, geopolitics,

and refugees going beyond the guise of humanitarian intervention, according to an analytical piece compiled by Stratfor, which is known as the private CIA. A la carte humanitarian intervention such as in Libya is not necessarily based on feasibility or the degree of suffering or repression, but on whether the Gaddafi regime was carrying on as a reliable ally. Gaddafi provided a slew of services to the West, ranging from immigration control and aiding in the War on Terror to providing natural resources. Recent Whitehead graduate Zach Jaworksi believes the intervention stems the tides of other revolutions, especially in Shiite revolutions such as Bahrain and elsewhere, where Iran can gain momentum in gaining power in the Middle East. As an analyst with the Abu Dhabi based Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Jaworksi said, The intervention sends a message to Tehran, but not necessarily one of deterrence. He cited a recent Wall Street Journal article by Jay Solomon, which said that administration officials fear that Western inaction could further embolden Tehran, and Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia and Irans Shiite government are locked in a battle for regional influence. Further, Jaworski said that the U.S. is concerned Iran could benefit from an overthrow of the monarchy in Bahrain, home to U.S. 6th Fleet which aides in control of the Persian Gulfs oil flow. Until the west is better able to enunciate our sometimes conflicting goals into an overarching framework, moral sentiments will be just that and strain the west with accusations of hypocrisy, generating a situation that calls into question the motives of a nation. Contact Anthony Chimente at anthony.chimente@student.shu.edu.
This entry was posted in Focus, Sections and tagged Iran, Libya, Middle East Protests, natural resources. Bookmark the permalink. The Mystery Diplomat: April 2011 RtoP norm surfaces as NATO inches toward deploying ground troops

One Response to Intervention motives questioned: Resources and attempts to control domino effect in the Middle East may be among reasons for intervention in Libya
1. Nalliah Thayabharan says:

August 29, 2011 at 9:13 pm

Since the 1950s Western imperialists have been in the business of regime change, assassinations and propping up client states to pillage the wealth of nations. In 1953, England and America overthrew the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mosaddegh of Iran. The coup was orchestrated by the intelligence apparatus of both countries after Mr. Mosaddegh nationalized the oil industry that was controlled by foreign interests. They set up Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (the shah of Iran) as a puppet authoritarian ruler who relied heavily on U.S. support. In 1961, in the Congo, the CIA in collaboration with Belgium plotted the overthrow and subsequent murder of Patrice Lumumbathe countrys first post colonial prime ministerand installed Joseph Mobutu who served America for 32 years until his own demise at the hands of Clinton administration backed proxies, Rwanda and Uganda. The war caused the death of 6 million Congolese. In 1966, Ghanaian independence leader Dr. Kwame Nkrumah was deposed by the CIA using ambitious enemies from within Ghana while Dr. Nkrumah was abroad in China on a peace mission attempting to mediate the Vietnam conflict. Another gross example of U.S. meddling in the affairs of others was the September 11, 1973 ousting and assassination of the legitimate, elected government of President Salvador Allende of Chile. The coup dtat was organized by the Richard Nixon administration and Chilean military, ushering in the brutal dictator General Augusto Pinochet. These are only three examples out of many that can be named as examples of Americas pursuit of wicked foreign policy objectives. A dictator becomes a dictator abhorred by his countrymen when he has overused his authority & power. These are good lessons for such leaders overstepping their power because they have come to equate power as their right. Such have been the countries that the West have been quick to ear mark & target for overthrowing these countries has been an easy effort to enter & dislodge these leaders. It is these very citizens who end up helping the overthrow take place, thus the non-requirement for stretched military equipment or personnel & the use of their own to minimize the casualties to their own

countrymen. Collateral damage is what the West would call this. The countries where these leaders become dictators are often rich in natural resources which are one reason why they end up misusing the mandate given to them & becoming power hungry & their stooges & families end up devastating the country to which they are supposed to function as custodians. It is the lack of answering this all important question that demands the West not to use these false clichs of freedom from dictators as an excuse. No sooner these dictators are overthrown the first thing the West ends up doing is to tap the natural resources, take over the economic hubs & privatize all channels that will supply their countries a steady flow of monetary returns & economic gain. All those who played an indirect role in aiding the West by providing support end up just turning their heads away. Therefore, when we all know Iraq was a mistake it is good to now ask whether Libya is going to be another where the consequences to the future of the people of these countries were never part of the strategy or overall plan! It is not hard to deduce that all of the efforts to overthrow Governments whatever type of governance has taken place in these countries are done so purely on the basis of acquiring the wealth of these nations. The calls for removal of these despots or dictators are mere slogans helped greatly by the mass media that provides the visuals of sensationalism to justify the overthrowing by painting the perfect picture of saviors against despots. It took no time for Mubarak of Egypt, the one time darling of the West to be portrayed with so much hatred by the media with no reminder to the public that he was an agent of the West. This is what is likely to happen to all other political leaders who think they will remain the darlings of the West & continue corrupt leadership. In any democracy where people come to power on the strength of a vote it is natural that almost half the nation will not vote in favor of the overall winner. This is certainly not basis for any country to say that a leader is opposed & plans set to overthrow him. The countries that are currently earmarked for regime change will know from diplomatic statements where their countries are heading for & this alone should suffice to ensure the country is set in order & issues that are likely to be used as excuses are properly taken care of. Corruption being one excuse is a perfect area to ensure that politicians, their stooges & the corrupt public service immediately function as they should & not as they want to run for the repercussions are far more dangerous in the present context. If any country should be saved by the West it should be Palestinians suffering in Gaza for years as a result of Israeli. What does the US do instead it vetoes Resolutions

brought against Israel in the UN. - Nalliah Thayabharan

Libya: Here we go again


John Hilary questions Natos claims of humanitarian intervention in Libya

Military planners are not big on irony. The bombing of Libya by US, UK and French aircraft commenced on 19 March 2011, eight years to the day since the aerial bombardment that launched the invasion of Iraq. Such a coincidence should have set the generals alarm bells ringing. Not only were they embarking on yet another war against an oil-rich, dictator-led Arab country, but they were doing so on exactly the same date as the last one. Natos engagement in Libya ran into the desert sand faster than the invasion of Iraq ever did. Support for the bombing started to unravel within days of the UN security council vote authorising all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack. The secretary general of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, whose support had been crucial in persuading China and Russia not to veto allied action against Libya, recanted within just 24 hours of the commencement of hostilities. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa issued a statement denouncing the military action and backing the African Union proposal for a political solution.

International concern mounted still further as Nato leaders swiftly moved beyond the UN mandate of protecting civilians to openly advocating regime change. The press article by Cameron, Obama and Sarkozy carried by the Times, Washington Post and Le Figaro on 15 April stated explicitly that Gaddafi must go and go for good, and pledged that their forces would continue operations until his removal. The three leaders appeared supremely indifferent to the fact that military intervention to bring about regime change is against international law. Further contravention of the UN mandate of protecting civilians came with the decision to deploy unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) for bombing raids on areas held by pro-Gaddafi forces. The British media continue to parrot the official line that drones offer the possibility of targeting military installations more accurately minimising the risk of civilian casualties, according to the BBCs formulation. The reality could not be more different. The use of drones by the UK and US in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan has shown how wildly inaccurate they are, with an average of 10 civilians killed in collateral damage for every militant targeted. The UNs special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, Philip Alston, has warned that the use of such indiscriminate weapons may well be a violation of international humanitarian and human rights law. David Camerons sudden concern for the safety of Libyan civilians rings particularly hollow, given that he had authorised the sale of sniper rifles, assault rifles, machine guns and crowd control ammunition to Gaddafi during the second half of 2010. Singling out Libya for bombardment while supporting equally despotic regimes elsewhere is further evidence of double standards. The Arab Leagues suggestion that the UN security council should authorise a parallel no-fly zone over Gaza is a fair one, but should in no way detract attention from the serious problems of legitimacy faced by many members of the League in their own countries. Responsibility to protect The Nato assault on Libya reveals serious problems with the principle of humanitarian intervention itself. Following the Rwandan genocide of 1994, in which half a million Tutsi were massacred while the international community looked on, the call for outside intervention to protect civilian populations from such atrocities grew more and more vocal. The subsequent crises in Bosnia, Kosovo and Darfur added further impetus to the conviction that something must be done.

The principle of humanitarian intervention was given normative expression in 2001 as the responsibility to protect civilian populations from mass atrocities, or R2P for short. This responsibility was adopted by the UNs 2005 world summit, which committed the international community to take collective action to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity if and when peaceful means to prevent such crimes prove inadequate. The summit gave ultimate power to approve any such use of force to the security council, in keeping with chapter VII of the UN Charter. It should be noted that neither the invasion of Afghanistan nor the Iraq war had been cast as instances of humanitarian intervention. In the case of Afghanistan, US and UK representatives argued to the security council which had given no mandate for military action that their operations were acts of self-defence under the UN Charter in response to the attacks of 9/11. The pretext given for the Iraq war was, infamously, Saddam Husseins supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction. Tony Blairs retrospective attempts to justify the invasion on humanitarian grounds convinced nobody. In both instances, of course, the true causes of war ran deeper. The geopolitical importance of Afghanistan in relation to Iran and the resource-rich countries of central Asia had already singled it out as a potential target even before 2001; the discovery of major mineral deposits and the need for a trans-Afghan pipeline to carry natural gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India added further cause. In Iraqs case, as Greg Muttitts new book Fuel on the Fire conclusively demonstrates, the primary strategic goals of the invasion were to maintain a low and stable oil price and to secure access for western companies to the countrys giant oil fields. Self-interested intervention Libya boasts the largest proven oil reserves of any country in Africa, as well as significant reserves of natural gas. When BP returned to the country in 2007 through an exploration and production agreement worth an initial $900 million, chief executive Tony Hayward called it BPs single biggest exploration commitment. Shell had already signed its own $200 million gas exploration deal when sanctions on Libya were lifted in 2004, gaining rights to explore and develop five areas in the Sirte basin and to upgrade a liquefied natural gas plant on the Mediterranean coast. No fewer than 35 foreign oil and gas companies are active in Libya, including several national oil companies from Nato member states.

It is childish to suggest that Natos intervention in Libya was undertaken without reference to the countrys natural resources. Nato member states are not disinterested observers but key players with strategic investments in Libya and across the wider Arab world. The fact that the protagonists have been able to cloak their actions in terms of humanitarian intervention does nothing to disguise the underlying agenda of securing key supplies of oil and gas. This points to the central problem with the responsibility to protect, namely that the decision to intervene will always be taken according to the political and strategic interests of those prepared to commit their armed forces. Even those instances that are cited as the most positive military interventions of recent history such as Indias intervention in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971, or Vietnams 1978 invasion of Cambodia to oust the Khmer Rouge had clear political motivations. To pretend that the UN security council represents a safety mechanism above such considerations is disingenuous. Indeed, Nato forces now treat the security council as no more than a convenient fig leaf for their most aggressive ambitions. British public opinion is alive to the hypocrisy. Within a few weeks of the start of hostilities, polls showed even less support for British intervention in Libya than for the Iraq war at the same time in 2003. Britains two largest trade unions, Unite and Unison, both issued statements in April calling for a cessation of military action. Unites statement noted that, despite the security council mandate, Natos intervention risked escalating the violence and causing further civilian casualties while doing nothing to end hostilities on the ground. Advocates of humanitarian intervention need to address these realities head on. The responsibility to protect civilians from war crimes or other atrocities has degenerated into a convenient excuse for selected acts of aggression, while other equally pressing human rights crises go untouched. Nato is not a benign force for peace in the world but a coalition whose leaders take military action for their own political and strategic ends. We must challenge such imperialism, not legitimise it.
John Hilary is executive director of War on Want.

yawn.. typical, could have been written by anyone. Oil explains everything does it? Why didnt we invade Sudan then under the pretext of Humanitarian Intervention, or Bahrain, or Saudi Arabia? lets just leave the dictator in power and let him kill his people indiscriminately. The problem with your theory is that you cant pro ve it, when we invade a resource rich nation you say its for oil, you forget when there are no resources like Kosovo or Siera Leone. You are having your cake and eating it, the world is more nuanced than you seem to be able to understand.
Ralph Parlour says:

Just remember something else, you should try to develop your basic marxist understanding of how the world works. Not everything that is bad is caused by greedy capitalists and not everything that the west does is in support of said capitalists. Your analysis is very shallow and basic. I completely agree with your statement about the world leaders who take military action for their own political and strategic ends. There are so many interests involved in this war that they will hardly be able to bring it to a halt. And I also think the next years presidential elections in some of the most powerful countries will be a good reason to prolong the Libyan conflict. Britains brutally aggressive adventure in Libya is to be utterly condemned. Claiming falsely to protect civilians, British military jets are raining munitions from the sky on to Tripoli and other Libyan cities in a shock and awe assault, acting on behalf of one side in a civil war, trying to assassinate the head of state of a sovereign country and to teach a lesson to Libyans who dare to support their independence in the face of imperialist intentions. The British action is both shameful and cowardly. British troops are not to be risked, yet the Libyan people die in intensive bombing raids. In spite of a deliberately vague UN resolution, the action is illegal under international law. It is terrorism, inflicted by our government against a sovereign state which is no threat to us or its neighbours. Britain acts as cheerleader to EU aggression, promoting the interests of the USA, which grabs its chance to seize control in awkward Middle East states which refuse to do its bidding. It is no coincidence that Libya has the highest standard of health, education and

infrastructure in North Africa, that Gaddafis government is resistant to religious extremism, and that Libya has high-quality oil. At a time when government tells us there is no money for civilised life at home, there is unlimited funding for the bombings likely to top 1 billion by the end of the year. War is waged on us at home, and on the Libyan people in their country. Where is the outcry? Why have workers not protested against this outrage? The voice of the trade unions is absent. Not surprisingly Labour MPs remain largely silent, except to complain that they arent being fully consulted on each escalation in the war which they support, and to assert that the civil not military budget must be used to fund it. In targeting Gaddafi as head of state, and killing his son and three young grandchildren, the British government is perpetrating state terrorism. We should support the right of the Libyan people to determine themselves the affairs and government of their country, free from imperialist meddling. Whatever the future holds for Libya, it is not our business, nor that of the USA or the EU.
Nalliah Thayabharan says:

The University library system consists of five libraries at each of the University's five campuses: the Main Library at the Gombak campus, two Medical libraries in the Kuantan campus (Indera Mahkota and Jalan Hospital branches), the ISTAC Library at Damansara, the IIBF Library at Jalan Duta and the Centre for Foundation Studies (CENFOS) Library at Petaling Jaya and Nilai. With a total collection of over 550,000 volumes of monographs, 1,600 serial titles on subscription, 24,000 volumes of bound serials, 60,000 units of audio-visual media, and 29,000 microforms, the library also subscribes to a number of online databases and electronic journals and e-books, using the Library of Congress List of Subject Headings and the Library of Congress Classification Scheme to organize its collections. Library operations are computerized using an integrated library automation system. The system allows for speedy and convenient access to the library's catalogue both from within the library and remotely through the Internet. Its 'broadcast' search facility provides direct access and simultaneous searches to a selection of other libraries' online catalogues. The Main Library building in Gombak provides a spacious and conducive study environment with 40 carrel rooms, 15 research rooms, 8 discussion rooms, 4 audio-visual viewing rooms, an auditorium, and a multi-purpose room with a seating capacity for over 2,000 users. In addition, the Library also has 3 computer labs as well as computer and internet facilities for Library users.

To introduce and familiarize new users to the available resources, services and facilities, training programmes are conducted by the Library to enhance information-seeking skills to facilitate maximum use of in-house facilities and external information resources by learning efficient and effective methods in accessing information. In-line with the Library's emphasis on customer oriented services, faculty and subject liaison teams have been established to cater for the information needs of clients at the various Kulliyyahs in the University. For more information about the library, its services and facilities, visit http://www.iium.edu.my/lib

Life In IIUM

Tour in IIUM Studying in Malaysia Hostel Facilities Hostels Campuses Libraries Food and Dining ICT Facilities Sports, Recreation and Clubs Parking and Transportation Mosque Azman Hashim Complex Other Facilities

August 30, 2011 at 1:57 am

Since the 1950s Western imperialists have been in the business of regime change, assassinations and propping up client states to pillage the wealth of nations. In 1953, England and America overthrew the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mosaddegh of Iran. The coup was orchestrated by the intelligence apparatus of both countries after Mr. Mosaddegh nationalized the oil industry that was controlled by foreign interests. They set up Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (the shah of Iran) as a puppet authoritarian ruler who relied heavily on U.S. support. In 1961, in the Congo, the CIA in collaboration with Belgium plotted the overthrow and subsequent murder of Patrice Lumumbathe countrys first post colonial prime minister and installed Joseph Mobutu who served America for 32 years until his own demise at the hands of Clinton administration backed proxies, Rwanda and Uganda. The war caused the death of 6 million Congolese. In 1966, Ghanaian independence leader Dr. Kwame Nkrumah was deposed by the CIA

using ambitious enemies from within Ghana while Dr. Nkrumah was abroad in China on a peace mission attempting to mediate the Vietnam conflict. Another gross example of U.S. meddling in the affairs of others was the September 11, 1973 ousting and assassination of the legitimate, elected government of President Salvador Allende of Chile. The coup dtat was organized by the Richard Nixon administration and Chilean military, ushering in the brutal dictator General Augusto Pinochet. These are only three examples out of many that can be named as examples of Americas pursuit of wicked foreign policy objectives. A dictator becomes a dictator abhorred by his countrymen when he has overused his authority & power. These are good lessons for such leaders overstepping their power because they have come to equate power as their right. Such have been the countries that the West have been quick to ear mark & target for overthrowing these countries has been an easy effort to enter & dislodge these leaders. It is these very citizens who end up helping the overthrow take place, thus the non-requirement for stretched military equipment or personnel & the use of their own to minimize the casualties to their own countrymen. Collateral damage is what the West would call this. The countries where these leaders become dictators are often rich in natural resources which are one reason why they end up misusing the mandate given to them & becoming power hungry & their stooges & families end up devastating the country to which they are supposed to function as custodians. It is the lack of answering this all important question that demands the West not to use these false clichs of freedom from dictators as an excuse. No sooner these dictators are overthrown the first thing the West ends up doing is to tap the natural resources, take over the economic hubs & privatize all channels that will supply their countries a steady flow of monetary returns & economic gain. All those who played an indirect role in aiding the West by providing support end up just turning their heads away. Therefore, when we all know Iraq was a mistake it is good to now ask whether Libya is going to be another where the consequences to the future of the people of these countries were never part of the strategy or overall plan! It is not hard to deduce that all of the efforts to overthrow Governments whatever type of governance has taken place in these countries are done so purely on the basis of acquiring the wealth of these nations. The calls for removal of these despots or dictators are mere slogans helped greatly by the mass media that provides the visuals of sensationalism to justify the overthrowing by painting the perfect picture of saviors against despots. It took no time for Mubarak of Egypt, the one time darling of the West to be portrayed with so much hatred by the media with no reminder to the public that he was an agent of the West. This is

what is likely to happen to all other political leaders who think they will remain the darlings of the West & continue corrupt leadership. In any democracy where people come to power on the strength of a vote it is natural that almost half the nation will not vote in favor of the overall winner. This is certainly not basis for any country to say that a leader is opposed & plans set to overthrow him. The countries that are currently earmarked for regime change will know from diplomatic statements where their countries are heading for & this alone should suffice to ensure the country is set in order & issues that are likely to be used as excuses are properly taken care of. Corruption being one excuse is a perfect area to ensure that politicians, their stooges & the corrupt public service immediately function as they should & not as they want to run for the repercussions are far more dangerous in the present context. If any country should be saved by the West it should be Palestinians suffering in Gaza for years as a result of Israeli. What does the US do instead it vetoes Resolutions brought against Israel in the UN. - Nalliah Thayabharan

Reversing the Race to the Bottom


excerpts from the book

Global Village or Global Pillage


Economic Reconstruction from the Bottom Up
by Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello
South End Press, 1994

An Agenda for Upword Leveling


Democratize As long as democracy remains exclusively national it will remain largely powerless to address the economic problems of ordinary people. It will take democratization at each level from the

local to the global to implement an effective alternative economic program. And it will take continuing grassroots mobilization to see that such a program actually works. Such democratization will require a struggle-but so has every advance in democracy from the American Revolution to the abolition of apartheid in South Africa. The democratic struggles of the past provide a treasury from which to draw and perfect means to use in the struggles of the future. To cope with the New World Economy, the absolute version of national sovereignty must evolve toward a worldwide multilevel democracy. Global institutions like the World Bank, the IMF, and GATT/WTO will have to be radically democratized. Global corporations will have to be brought under democratic control The global economy will have to be reshaped to encourage rather than impede democratic government at lower levels. National and local governments will have to be recaptured from the global corporations. They will have that support and cooperate with the environmental, economic, and social regulation that is needed at a global level to serve as stewards representing global human and environmental interests in the areas under their control People will have to win the right to organize in and democratically control their workplaces, schools, neighborhoods, and other institutions in civil society. In short, we need a multilevel process of democratization leading to democratic self-government at every level from the global to the local The demands of the Zapatistas in Mexico illustrate what it means for social movements to project democratization at multiple levels. They simultaneously demanded autonomous selfgovernment for indigenous people in southern Mexico; free elections not dominated by wealth for Mexico as a whole; and an end to what they called the "neo-liberal project" in Latin America. In the New World Economy, democracy is not something we have; it is something we have to recreate. Democratization requires the redistribution of power. It currently has four principal fronts: Democratize global institutions. The past decade has concentrated enormous power in such global institutions as the IMF, World Bank, and GATT. Yet these institutions are virtually unaccountable to those who are affected by their decisions. Today, these organizations are dominated by the United States and a few other rich countries; their governance needs to be opened up to include the world's poor, represented by their governments and citizen organizations. Their operations are conducted with enormous secrecy; they need to be made open to public scrutiny. They are formally accountable only to national governments; they should be made more accountable to the United Nations and to non-governmental organizations representing citizen interests. They make decisions without the consent of local communities affected by them; their plans should be made in consultation with and require the approval of local communities they affect. End "preemption" of democratic decision-making. A principal function of global institutions and agreements has become to prevent governments from doing things their people want them to. The Uruguay Round GATT agreement, for example, restricts the freedom of countries to favor domestic suppliers, subsidize domestic businesses, impose health or environmental standards above specified levels, control prices, nationalize anything, or engage in economic planning. The

effect of these restrictions is almost always to "pre-empt" governments from doing things that would raise labor, social, and environmental conditions. Such negative "conditionalities" should be ended. Instead, international rules should encourage governments to improve the conditions of their people. Rather than punishing countries for spending on education, health, and welfare, the conditions governments and international institutions require for loans, investment, aid and trade advantages should encourage them. International standards should be "floors" not "ceilings." Recapture governments from global corporations. All over the world, national, provincial, and local governments have become the pawns of global corporations and the Corporate Agenda. This has occurred through legal domination of the political process, political corruption, erosion of democratic processes, and the power of blackmail provided by capital mobility. Coalitions of popular movements and organizations, utilizing tactics adapted to the political context at hand, need to challenge this domination, People need to reassert the right to use governments to regulate corporations and markets in the public interest Establish the right to self-organization. Such basic human rights as freedom of speech, assembly, publication, political participation' unionization, cultural expression, and concerted action are crucial supports for resistance to downward leveling. Yet they are widely denied, not only in authoritarian governments, but also in workplaces, schools, and other institutions of supposedly democratic countries. Democratic organization in and control of such institutions can be a crucial vehicle for resisting downward leveling. The self-organization and empowerment of discriminated-against groups, such as racial and ethnic minorities, women, immigrants, and migrants is particularly crucial for countering the race to the bottom. Coordinate Global Demand Ironically, as the economy has become more globalized, international cooperation to encourage adequate global economic demand has been virtually abandoned. The richer countries must share responsibility for countering the current downward spiral. In the past, minimum labor standards, welfare state programs, collective bargaining, and other means to raise the purchasing power of have-nots did much to counter recessions and depressions within national economies. So did the tools of monetary and fiscal policy. Similar instruments increasing the buying power of those at the bottom and providing economic stimulus are now required in the global economy. Ending the world economy's downward spiral requires ad hoc, and eventually institutionalized, coordination. The IMF needs either to be replaced with a new agency or radically r~ formed in its purposes, policies, and personnel. Its goal should be to regulate the flow of capital, debt, and repayment to end the present downward economic spiral, reverse the polarization of wealth and poverty, and support the efforts of lower-level polities to mobilize and coordinate their economic resources.

Economist Walter Russell Mead has spelled out a possible institutional structure for such coordination. It includes an international fund to provide global economic stimulus; an international bank and specialized international agencies able to adjust interest rates and expand and contract their operations to promote growth and counter economic cycles; and an international trade organization devoted to encouraging the growth of global demand rather than the expansion of exports for their own sake. The UN Development Program's Human Development Report 1992 similarly calls for a new global central bank "to create a common currency, to maintain price and exchange-rate stability, to channel global surpluses and deficits, to equalize international access to credit and to provide the liquidity and credits poor nations need." Expanded demand will primarily increase the consumption of the wealthiest unless it is combined with global redistribution. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions has recently proposed a "trade union strategy for world development" that links coordinated recovery in the industrialized countries with jobs and poverty reduction in the developing world. It proposes expanded currency reserves for developing countries and Central and Eastern Europe; debt relief; and redesign of structural adjustment programs to emphasize reducing poverty and creating jobs. Such an approach provides a starting point for a "grand bargain" between North and South. Establish Global Rights and Standards To prevent competition among work-forces and communities from resulting in a "race to the bottom," we need minimum global standards for human, labor, and environmental rights. The European Community's "Social Dimension" provides one possible model for minimum standards in such mattes as job security, occupational safety, unemployment compensation, union representation, and social security benefits. For North America, A Just and Sustainable Trade and Development Initiative spells out in some detail an alternative to NAFTA that would protect human and worker rights, encourage workers' income to rise in step with productivity, and establish continental environmental rights, such as the right to know about environmental threats and the right to a toxic-free workplace and living environment. Such rights and standards need to be incorporated in a wide range of international economic agreements and institutions. Enforce Codes of Conduct for Global Corporations Global corporations should be made accountable by means of codes of conduct. Such codes might require corporations to report investment intentions; disclose hazardous materials imported; ban employment of children; forbid environmental discharge of pollutants; require advance notification and severance pay when operations are terminated; and require companies not to oppose union organization. While such codes should ultimately be enforced by the United Nations and by agreement among governments, global public pressure and cross-border organizing can begin to enforce them directly. Reverse the Squeeze on the Global Poor

Globalization has been marked by the extraction of wealth from poor countries and communities. The richer countries have used international economic institutions to force a destructive flow of wealth from poor to rich This is disastrous both for the people of the poor countries, for whom it has been a sentence of poverty and often premature death, and for those of the industrialized countries, who have lost markets for their products and had to face competition from impoverished work-forces. The first step to reversing this process is to end the structural adjustment and shock therapy programs that the IMF and World Bank have been forcing on poor countries and countries emerging from state-run economies. Second, new arrangements should be made so that these countries do not have to run their economies to pay the interest

on their debt. Debts for the poorest countries should be written off. Debts for other developing countries should be reduced, with the remaining parts paid in local currencies into a fund for local development.!' Third, large-scale resource transfers should be provided so that "developing" countries can in fact develop. Reformed trade rules can play a major role. The Third World Network proposes commodity agreements to improve and stabilize poor countries' terms of trade; opening rich country markets to poor countries; and preferential treatment for underdeveloped countries. The Third World Information Network (TWIN) and other groups have developed strategies for alternative forms of trade which they are implementing on a small scale. Under such conditions, trade can become a win-win proposition for different regions- for example, the production in the North of environmentally sound capital goods for the South, with production in the South of consumer goods for the North. Resource transfer also requires some direct compensatory funding; models for such funding can be drawn from the compensatory funds of the EU and the grassroots funds of NGOs. Encourage Grassroots Development Deregulation and austerity policies have meant the drain of resources out of local communities. The forced opening of markets to global corporations has created conditions in which small local enterprises are unable to compete. We need instead to foster local, small scale businesses and farms and a growing "third sector" of grassroots, community- and employee-owned cooperative enterprises designed to mobilize poorly utilized resources to address unmet needs. Here are some techniques for doing so. Grassroots-controlled enterprises. The last few years have seen an enormous range of experiments in new forms of employee and community-controlled enterprises. Initiatives in poor communities in Brooklyn, N.Y. and Waterbury, Connecticut, for example, have established

employee-owned home health aide companies which provide a needed service to local communities and jobs to a workforce made up primarily of women of color. In Mali, a cooperative formed by a group of women in the 1970s in the small town of Markala became the nucleus for a Women and Development Program that spread to more than 30 village groups. The women conduct such income-generating activities as soap-making, small animal raising, cloth dyeing, and raising vegetables; they also receive training in how to manage the coops. Such efforts provide a way ordinary people in local communities can control and benefit from productive activity. Public development authorities. Local, regional, and national development authorities can serve as a vehicle for a proactive economic strategy. A current model is the Steel Valley Authority, established by ten towns in the Pittsburgh area with the power to float bonds, own and manage enterprises, and use the power of eminent domain to save or re-open threatened companies. Another example is the recently created Connecticut Community Economic Development Program. Created by the state government and jointly controlled by the government, representatives of poor communities, and private investors, it provides funding and technical assistance for private, public, and cooperative enterprises in poor communities. Its goals include creation of jobs and development of skills, particularly for people who are unemployed, underemployed, or receiving public assistance; community participation in decision-making; establishment of self-sustaining enterprises; improving the environment; promoting affirmative action, equal employment opportunities and minority-owned businesses; and coordination with environmental and economic planning. The Greater London Enterprise Board -abolished by Margaret Thatcher-provides an even broader vision of what such institutions can do, helping restructure industries and providing support to enterprises based on their contribution to such social objectives as equalizing opportunity, empowering workers, and strengthening communities. Development banks and credit unions. Banks can be a crucial vehicle for gathering resources and connecting them with needs across time and space. Various forms of community-based and cooperative banking have developed in the Third World and in poor communities in the United States. For example, over t-he past few decades, as most banks collected deposits in poor and middle class communities and channeled them into unproductive speculative investment, Chicago's South Shore Bank reversed this process, dedicating its resources to rebuilding a poor, majority African-American neighborhood which had been cut off from credit by other area banks. By providing residential mortgages and small business loans and organizing initiatives in commercial development and housing rehabilitation, South Shore financed and redeveloped the neighborhood's infrastructure and services, funding the renovation of nearly 30 percent of the neighborhood's apartments." Sweat equity and labor exchange. Sweat equity converts labor into a right to a share in the product. It lets people build houses and thereby acquire a share of their ownership or work in enterprises and thereby acquire a proportion of their stock. Labor exchange allows people with different needs and abilities to help each other. In the Great Depression, mutual aid organizations made it possible for unemployed carpenters to fix other people's houses h exchange for fish caught by fishers or firewood gathered by laborers. A modern equivalent, known as a "service credit" program, lets people work as volunteers in meeting community needs and receive for

each hour of service a "service credit" which entitles them to one hour of service for themselves, their family, or organization from others in the program. Such programs allow people to make use of resources which the mainstream economy leaves to languish. Community-based development organizations. Solving economic problems requires mobilization of diverse segments of the community. In many parts of the world, citizen-based organizations and coalitions are playing a crucial role in representing the needs and mobilizing the capabilities of grassroots people and organizations. Perhaps the most famous is the Mondragon network of banks, social service organizations, technical education institutions, and producer cooperatives in the Basque region of Spain. In the United States, several dozen citizen coalitions in different cities are grouped in the Federation for Industrial Retention and Renewal (FIRR). They mobilize community support to aid employee buyouts, start coops, pressure corporations and banks, and encourage government to support local economic development Rebuild the Public Sector A central aspect of the Corporate Agenda has been to defame and dismantle those sectors of the economy private companies do not control Structural adjustment programs and the desire to reduce business taxes have led to sharp cutbacks in public sector activities all over the world. The constant attack on government and the privatization of formerly public functions has led to worldwide decay of education, health care, infrastructures, environmental protection and enhancement, and services for the young, the old, and the disabled. It has also led to unemployment and aggravation of the downward spiral The "free market" has proved an inadequate vehicle for performing many such functions. Even where large numbers of people are unemployed and other resources lie idle, markets do not necessarily channel them to meeting such public needs. An expansion of education, health, infrastructure, environmental, and similar public sector activities is an essential element of economic reconstruction. Convert to Sustainable Production and Consumption The victims of downward leveling need, want, and deserve a better life. But the current industrial system is already destroying the earth's air, water, I;and, and biosphere. Global warming, desertification, pollution, and resource exhaustion will make the earth uninhabitable long before every Chinese has a private car and every American a private boat or plane. The solution to this dilemma lies in converting the system of production and consumption to an ecologically sound basis. The technology to do this exists or can be developed, from solar energy to public transportation and from reusable products to resource-minimizing production processes. However, a system in which the search for ever-expanding profits has no regulation or limits will continue to use environmentally destructive processes to produce luxuries, pollutants, and waste.

This malappropriation of resources is exacerbated by the huge share of human wealth squandered on the military. Despite the end of the Cold War, global military spending is more than $1,000 trillion per year nearly half of it by the United States. This is justified in large part by the need to control economic rivals and the revolts of poor and desperate peoples. The energies now directed to the race to the bottom need to be redirected to rebuilding the global economy on a humanly and environmentally sound basis. Such an approach requires limits to growth-in some spheres, sharp reductions-in the material demands that human society places on the environment. It requires reduced energy and resource use; less toxic production and products; shorter individual work-time; and less production for war. But it requires vast growth in education, health care, human caring, recycling, rebuilding an ecologically sound production and consumption system, and time available for self-development, community life, and democratic participation.

Asian Journal of Social Science


Edited by Vineeta Sinha (Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore) and Daniel PS Goh (Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore)
Published continuously since it was launched in 1973, the Asian Journal of Social Science provides a forum for exploring issues in Southeast Asian societies. Contributions are from anthropology, economics, geography, history, language and literature, political science, psychology and sociology. The Asian Journal of Social Science is unique in three ways: (i) It is the only Asia-wide journal of the social sciences. All other journals dealing with Asia tend to be area studies journals and focus on a particular discipline or part of Asia. The Asian Journal of Social Science, however,

Bibliography for: "Pillage and plunder: the vast natural resources of the Congo are once again fuelling war, exploitation and povertyand Western consumers are profiting"
Michael Renner "Pillage and plunder: the vast natural resources of the Congo are once again fuelling war, exploitation and povertyand Western consumers are profiting". Alternatives Journal. FindArticles.com. 10 May, 2012. COPYRIGHT 2004 Alternatives, Inc.

COPYRIGHT 2008 Gale, Cengage Learning

The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention


By Steven L. Burg, Paul S. Shoup

The U.S. has often intervened in the internal affairs of foreign states with military force, however its policies have been inconsistent and, as a result, often raise questions about US motives. Other countries face similar concerns when they intervene in the affairs of sovereign states. Resulting public dissent and criticism often discourage future efforts and make it more difficult to build the necessary public support and political consensus for future interventions. As a world military and economic superpower the United States could take a leadership role in formulating an international policy to deal with emerging humanitarian crises. To have meaning and value, policies must be clearly understood and implemented with consistency. To attract broad international support, intervention policies must be multilateral, with a defensible legal and/or ethical foundation. And finally, they must be comprehensive enough and of sufficient duration to correct the situation that caused the human catastrophe. To date, no country has taken a meaningful leadership role, instead some observers have noted a trend for countries to retreat from multilateral institutions, ensuring that similar problems and dilemmas will re-emerge, as they now have western, Sudan. Intervention vs. Sovereignty The international community accepts the need and responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance to countries whose people are threatened by natural disasters, hurricanes, floods, earthquakes and famine. Lives are at risk and assistance can help save lives. Paradoxically, its less clear when the international community, or individual states should or can intervene legitimately to prevent or stop the loss of lives due to political disasters, repression, war, ethnic cleansing or genocide. In the case of natural disasters the victim states usually welcome aid and assistance, presumably because the leaders of victim states are concerned about the safety and welfare of their citizens. In the case of political turmoil, such empathy and concern for constituent citizens cease to exist and repressive leaders often see the death and suffering as a means to further their political goals, or protect their hold on power. Thus the issue is not whether intervention is desirable, but whether repressive states can trump morality under the protective cloak of sovereignty. Commenting on the Kosovo intervention, Czech Republic President Vaclav Havel declared that:

decent people cannot sit back and watch systematic, state-directed massacres of other people. Decent people cannot fail to come to the rescue if the rescue action is within their power. He added a controversial opinion that there is a growing trend to realize that a human being is more important than a state. Alain Pellet, an international jurist has written: In the case of human rights violations, sovereignty is never a defence; in cases of gross violations of human rights it has no role to play; it does not impede the [UN] Security Council from concluding that such violations create a threat to the peace and to draw appropriate consequences in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter; and it cannot even protect heads of states from international prosecution. There is no moral or ethical argument that justifies the taking of innocent lives in these situations; nonetheless, there are legal arguments against intervention. These arguments most often emanate from such powerful states as China, Russia, the United States, and from dictators of repressive regimes, all of whom fear that the consequences could one day infringe on their own claims to sovereignty. The United Nations Charter prohibits states from interfering in the internal matters of other states unless, after a prescribed process, the U.N. Security Council authorizes intervention. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll. VII. Article 42: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. Some will argue that the UN Charter authorizes action to restore international peace and security, not intra-national peace and security. There are, however, many cases where individual states or coalitions have intervened anyway, as well as cases where the international community has been widely criticized for not acting. The crux of the debate is between sovereignty and human rights, and between states and individuals. The underlying problem is the inherent conflicts of interest of UN members. The so-called international community (IC) and the United Nations are organizations of states, not individuals; each state is motivated by powerful self-interests and few are likely to undermine their own power, control, security and impunity by diluting claims to sovereignty.

Critics of the U.N. complain that it is little more than a talking shop. They argue that it does no more good to condemn repressive or criminal states than to condemn nature; only intervention can help make a difference and fulfill the responsibility inherent in our claims to civilization and humanity. In effect, the UN is like a legislature, a government without an executive branch or Supreme Court. Its a legislature, congress or parliament where some privileged individual members hold veto power, and its a club that can accept or deny membership, but only to states. Issues surrounding humanitarian intervention raise many questions: Whose ethics and morals form the foundation for decisions to intervene? Who makes the decisions? Who has the right to veto proposed intervention? Who actually intervenes? Is an intervention unilateral or multilateral? What if the decision is in dispute? Is there a legal basis to intervene and does it matter? What are the consequences of intervention without legal justification, support and backing? Who cares and does it matter? One can argue that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) confers certain unalienable human rights (like life itself) that have precedence over a states claim to sovereignty. Leaders of many states will disagree, however governments gain legitimacy only through the willing consent of the governed. Theorists accept that governments can forfeit their claim to legitimacy and that when they do people are entitled to change their government. This easier said than done. States do not exist in a vacuum; they are also a part of the community of nations and earn legitimacy only by their adherence to accepted standards of behavior and conduct. Such legitimacy is generally conferred when other states recognize a particular state and agree to conduct diplomatic relations. When the Taliban took control of Afghanistan only three states recognized the regime and opened diplomatic relations; the international community thus refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Taliban regime. States sometimes withdraw their diplomatic missions as a form of protest or as a prelude to war. This sends a message that there is nothing further to discuss and that the regime no longer has diplomatic currency, standing or legitimacy. Such actions to suspend diplomatic relations are usually preceded by suspensions of economic and/or military aid and/or imposition of economic trade sanctions. Without multilateral cooperation, however, attempts to sway states to conform to international standards are often unsuccessful, or subject to debate and criticism. The Blair Reality Check Discussing the Kosovo intervention, British Prime Minister Tony Blair identified five essential questions to answer before intervention. [To these weve added the italicized supplements.] 1. Are we sure of our case? 2. Have we exhausted diplomacy? 3. Can we be successful? 4. Are we prepared for the long haul? [Do we need to be?] 5. Is it in our national interest? [Is it in our common interest?] 6. [What is the desired outcome?]

Recent events in Iraq have focused attention on the need for absolute certainty regarding the case for intervention or pre-emptive military action. A key question is: can we be successful? In the case of powerful states like Russia, China, or the US, the answer could well be negative. The risk-reward ratio could argue against intervention, thus relieving these states of their core concerns about risking their sovereignty. The decision would be purely pragmatic. Critics will argue that the powerful states are above the law. In the world of Realpolitik they are beyond the law. Nonetheless, all states are subject to the court of world opinion. The goal is to make a better world, not a perfect one. Blairs fourth question, are we prepared for the long haul, ignores an obvious alternative. It may be sufficient to punish or remove a regime that has forfeited its claims to legitimacy; this doesnt necessarily impose a requirement to re-establish a functioning government, economy or society. While recognizing the right of self-determination, John Stuart Mill suggested that it is a human right, but not an obligation on outsiders. In his book, Just and Unjust Wars, author Michael Walzer writes: The members of a political community must seek their own freedom, just as an individual must seek his own virtue. They cannot be set free, as he cannot be made virtuous by any external force. Self-determination is the school in which virtue is learned (or not) and liberty is won (or not). He then quotes John Stuart Mill, It is during an arduous struggle to become free by their own efforts that these virtues have the best chance of springing up. Walzer summarizes the views of Mill that: Self-determination, then, is the right of a people to become free by their own efforts if they can, and nonintervention is the principle guaranteeing that their efforts will not be impeded or their failure prevented by the intrusions of an alien power. It has to be stressed that there is no right to be protected against the consequences of domestic failure, even against a bloody repression. These arguments may appear cold-hearted, but may also help facilitate more aggressive and more timely, humanitarian intervention. One of the obstacles to intervention is the need to build political support for the cost and long-term commitment to re-establishing order. By relieving states of the nation-building burden, its more likely that support would be forthcoming. The recent US invasion of Afghanistan is a suitable example. First of all, the invasion was justified as retaliation for and protection against attacks by al-Qaeda terrorists, harbored by the Taliban regime. (The US also afforded an opportunity for the Taliban to surrender members of al-Qaeda.) Elements of Intervention Although Intervention typically suggests military operations, intervention can and should take a variety of forms, including: Diplomacy & Conflict Prevention Coercive Inducement Sanctions Military Intervention

Within each of these broad categories are a number of sub-sets, comprised of threats and promises, carrots and sticks. Diplomacy & Conflict Prevention Representatives attempt to negotiate with the culpable regime to cease offensive activities and to suspend such activities during negotiations. Diplomats endeavor to identify root causes of the problems and offer incentives for cooperation, balanced by the threat of sanctions or intervention. By the time the international community becomes aware of and engaged in a potentially catastrophic situation its likely that violence has begun and once underway, its extremely difficult to stop, as adversarial parties have usually crossed the line of no return. Coercive Inducement This approach involves early deployment of military forces in the role of peacekeepers and observers. The idea is to contain the crisis, separate adversaries, while continuing to pursue diplomatic alternatives. The peacekeeping force is placed in a difficult and precarious position with strict rules of engagement that can render the force virtually impotent and vulnerable. This form of involvement is not technically an intervention, in that the regime must consent to deployment of foreign troops, which may be possible in relatively few instances. Despite the associated problems, one benefit is that this facilitates the security forces in collecting intelligence and in upgrading force capabilities should they need to escalate the level of involvement. Sanctions Typical sanctions include suspension of military and economic assistance, trade embargoes, and cessation of diplomatic relations. However, sanctions are problematic; theyre relatively hard to enforce and easy to circumvent; they tend to impose collective punishment on the victims of repression, and they often fail to impose hardship on the subject regime. In some cases the ruling elites prosper from sanctions. In some cases there may be opportunities for targeted sanctions that more directly impinge on the regimes welfare. Sanctions can be modulated to increase or decrease their impact relative to the cooperation received. To offer any hope of success, a sanctions program must have broad international cooperation, especially from neighboring states. Military Intervention When all other measures have proved fruitless and atrocities continue there may be no alternative to military intervention. Military intervention can take many forms, depending on the goals and nature of the situation on the ground. (Discussed later) Human Rights Watch has established five basic criteria for military intervention: First, military action must be the last reasonable option to halt or prevent slaughter; military force should not be used for humanitarian purposes if effective alternatives are available. Second, the intervention must be guided primarily by a humanitarian purpose; we do not expect purity of motive, but humanitarianism should be the dominant reason for military action. Third, every effort should be made to ensure that the means used to intervene themselves respect international human rights and humanitarian law; we do not subscribe to the view that some abuses can be countenanced in the name of stopping others.

Fourth, it must be reasonably likely that military action will do more good than harm; humanitarian intervention should not be tried if it seems likely to produce a wider conflagration or significantly more suffering. Finally, we prefer endorsement of humanitarian intervention by the U.N. Security Council or other bodies with significant multilateral authority. However, in light of the imperfect nature of international governance today, we would not require multilateral approval in an emergency context. Once the threshold to military operations has been breached there are a wide range of options available, none of them particularly attractive, all of them uncertain and potentially costly in money and lives. They range from supplying weapons to a resistance force, if there is one, to naval blockades, air strikes and deployment of ground forces. Especially troublesome is the potential to ignite regional escalation if neighboring states are unsupportive, or if they harbor ulterior motives. Military intervention is fraught with stipulations and limitations. The response should be proportionate to the threat and the minimum required to stop the atrocities and prevent their reoccurrence. As a practical matter its difficult to imagine how this can be accomplished short of removing and replacing the existing regime. The degree of difficulty depends on the size, quality and commitment of the regimes military. Experience has shown that even in failed states like Somalia, lacking any government or formal military force, intervention can face extreme problems and resistance. Unfortunately, there may be ulterior motives for intervention, beyond the moral or humanitarian concerns. These motives may be political or economic and regime change alone is not generally sufficient to accomplish such goals. The regime must be replaced with one that is acceptable to the intervening state or states, or the interventionists must implement changes that have a desirable political or economic outcome and benefit. Although the intervention may be morally justified, the imposition of a new regime, or government could deny people their fundamental rights of self-determination. Although the recent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were not humanitarian interventions, the U.S. set parameters and requirements for the new governments. The new governments had to be democratically elected, the government could not be a theocracy, and the countries could not be subdivided into smaller states. Such provisions undermine the peoples rights of selfdetermination and can face intense criticism from within and without the country. Artificial government structures that fail to satisfy the needs and desires of the local people may have bleak future prospects. There is no shortage of recent cases where one or more states have intervened in another state (Panama, Grenada, Bosnia, Kosova, Iraq, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Haiti), however, the erratic pattern of intervention does not reveal much of a basis for policy formulation. Some of these cases involved humanitarian motives, others did not, but all violated the sovereignty of the subject states and in no case was the intervening state subject to international disapproval and tangible consequences.

It is a red herring to delay or deny humanitarian protection to people under imminent threat of genocide, democide, ethnic cleansing, systematic rape or physical persecution to preserve the sovereignty of failed and illegitimate states and repressive regimes. The real debate needs to focus on methods to establish coherent policies and procedures and facilitate rapid, effective responses. Recommendations Documentation & Validation: The first obstacle to intervention is documenting that there is a factual case of gross human rights violations. In the current case of Sudan, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution declaring that the Sudanese government is engaged in genocide. Meanwhile, European Union representatives declared there was no evidence of genocide. Reports by the International Crisis Group indicate that there is a humanitarian crisis that might qualify as genocide. The US has brought their case to the UN Security Council (UNSC), which is directed to investigate further. If the UNSC finds sufficient evidence, a new resolution could be brought to authorize intervention, but would be subject to veto by any permanent member of the UNSC and both Russia and China are likely to cast a veto. Any state that felt compelled to intervene in Sudan would have to act unilaterally or as a coalition, but without UNSC approval, making the whole process moot and delaying action while people are being slaughtered. The international community should create an independent International Human Rights Court, or agree to use the European Human Rights Court as a court of jurisdiction. Any state, or authorized independent entity could petition the court, provide evidence to document and validate charges of gross human rights violations or genocide. By rendering a decision any state, or coalition would then have legal justification to intervention, and no state would have veto power. There would, however, be no requirement to intervene, conceivably the legal approval could be sufficient to coerce the guilty party to cease and desist. Monitoring Interventions: In cases where a state intervenes in the sovereign affairs of another state, the action is generally taken with UN approval and outside accepted international legal channels. This leaves the intervening state subject to a wide range of charges, criticisms and potential liabilities. Although not a humanitarian intervention per se, the US invasion of Iraq is an adequate example. During the military invasion, embedded journalists accompanied US forces. In future cases, UN observers or monitors should accompany military forces to aid in legitimizing and monitoring events to help prevent additional human rights violations. If states chose to intervene without UNSC approval, independent monitoring would enhance legitimacy and help preclude political and legal complications. In retrospect such monitoring could easily have prevented the human rights abuses in Iraqi prisons and/or help mitigate Iraqi civilian casualties, or confirm that serious mitigation efforts were undertaken. Conducting

interventions properly and effectively would encourage future activities of this type and thus serve to deter violators. United Nations Peacekeeping & Peacemaking Forces: The blue U.N. helmets are a symbol of peacekeepers in hot spots throughout the world, but it is usually difficult, expensive and time consuming to gain support for peacekeeping deployments and such deployments require approval of the subject state or parties to a conflict. Peacekeepers are often deployed with extremely restrictive rules of engagement and its recognized that a poorly trained, or inadequate force, unable to defend itself is of little value and can present other problems. Others have already proposed establishing a standing UN Rapid Deployment Force for use in emergency situations. Such a force would include specially trained, volunteers provided by any number of states. The idea is not new, but to date, there has been no progress toward actually creating such a force. However, there are interim measures that could be more feasible in the near term. One alternative would be for the UN to use security forces from private military contractors, essentially subcontracting the work to private firms. Although fraught with political issues and a problematic track record in many parts of Africa, the idea is worthy of consideration if it can save lives that are at imminent risk. Finally, the first responsibility of any new state or reconstituted government is to provide security, which entails developing and army and police force. Again Iraq is a good current example. The U.S. and other states offer military training and assistance programs as part of a foreign aid package. A new government could also hire private contractors as has been done in some African countries. Either approach has strings attached, or presents other problematic issues. A new government might turn to the US, Israel, South Africa, China or Russia for military training and support, a decision that begins to shape their foreign policy and destiny. If one views the U.N. as a form of state franchiser, it seems reasonable that that the U.N. would provide a range of services associated with nation building, including military training. Done under U.N. auspices, the franchisee would be free of future obligations and entanglements. The training would be sure to include serious human rights training elements, and this service would help justify the U.N. establishing a standing military component. It would be a logical step toward developing a future rapid deployment force. Private military subcontractors could do the training as well, which would begin to address a number of growing concerns about PMCs. Focus on Genocide in Sudan 2004-2005 After the U.N. failed to respond to human rights violations and possible war crimes in Kosovo, NATO intervened and many observers predicted this would be the end of an era of humanitarian intervention. Today, a new crisis is approaching, or underway in Sudan. The international response to the Sudanese situation will be an informative case study on the current state of intervention politics by the international community. In March 2004, the International Crisis

Groups (ICG) published a report, Darfur Rising: Sudans New Crisis, describing the growing humanitarian crisis in Sudans the western province Darfur. Sudan is Africas largest country, covering 2.5 million square kilometers, almost five times the size of France, with a population estimated around 38 million. An estimated 6 people million live in Darfur. ICG estimates that as much as one fifth of that population is currently internally displaced. The report stated that, The situation in the western Sudanese region of Darfur is now acknowledged to be a humanitarian and human rights tragedy of the first order, but the international response has been slow and inadequate. The UN Security Council must take strong measures against the Khartoum government, which has acted in bad faith throughout the crisis, and encourage the African Union (AU) to follow up more decisively its efforts to improve the situation on the ground and mediate a political settlement. Since this report the situation has begun to gain traction with the international media. Sudan has endured 21 years of internal conflict, primarily in the potentially oil-rich southern provinces and in the mid 1990s became the temporary home for Usama bin Laden and an alQaeda staging area for African operations. Its alleged that the Sudanese Arab-Islamic government is supporting genocide by the Janjaweed militia against black African residents in the western province of Darfur. On 23 July 2004, the US Congress passed a resolution by unanimous vote, declaring that, the atrocities unfolding in Darfur, Sudan, are genocide. On 10 August 2004 the Beijing Times reported, The European Union (EU) said here Monday that it has found no evidence of genocide in the troubled region of Darfur, though there was widespread violence there. The EU has sent a fact-finding mission to Sudan recently, which was headed by Pieter Feith, an adviser to EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana. "We are not in the situation of genocide there. But it is clear there is widespread, silent and slow, killing going on, and village burning of a fairly large scale." US Secretary of State, Colin Powell then asserted that up to 50,000 people have been killed and a million displaced from their homes, as Janjaweed militias have burned entire villages forcing starving, impoverished people to flee to relative safety. In September 2004, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1564, calling for an investigation into reports of genocide. The resolution was prepared by the United States and cosponsored by Germany, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom and passed by an 11-0 vote, with Russia, Algeria, China, and Pakistan abstaining. UN Resolution 1564 calls for: 1) expansion of the number and mandate of the current 300 African Union troops in the country, 2) international over flights in Darfur to monitor what is happening, and an end to Sudanese military flights there, and 3) the UN is to assess whether acts of genocide have been carried out and identify the perpetrators. For additional information visit Flashpoints: Guide to World Conflicts Sudan Conflict Briefing

Additional Resources The Moral Foundation of International Intervention by Leonard Binder http://repositories.cdlib.org/igcc/PP/PP22/ What Justifies Military Intervention? by Charles Knight , Project on Defense Alternatives http://www.comw.org/pda/0109intervention.html Just War and Humanitarian Intervention Jean Bethke Elshtain. National Humanities Center Ideas, 2001 (pdf file) http://www.nhc.rtp.nc.us/ideasv82/elshtain.htm Humanitarian Intervention, NATO and International Law Clara Portela. Berlin, Germany: Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security, December, 2000 (.pdf file) http://www.bits.de/public/pdf/rr00-4.pdf Just War and Intervention: The Challenge of the International for Social and Political Thought Justin Rosenberg. Sussex University Joint Social and Political Thought Seminar, 27 May 1999. http://www.susx.ac.uk/Units/SPT/archives/jrosenberg.html Humanitarian Intervention and Just War Mona Fixal and Dan Smith. Mershon International Studies Review #42 (1998). Posted on the Mount Holyoke College International Relations Website http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/fixdal.html Kosovo and the Just War Tradition By Bjrn Mller http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/0008moeller.doc War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention By Ken Roth Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/wr2k4/3.htm Humanitarian Military Intervention Foreign Policy in Focus http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol5/v5n01hmi.html Program on International Policy Attitudes http://www.pipa.org/ Series of Public Opinion poll results

International Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States Americans and the World http://www.americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/globalization/intervention.cfm Humanitarian Intervention? Global Policy.org http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/humanint/ Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention & Sanctions by Arthur C. Helton and Robert P. DeVecchi Council on Foreign Relations http://www.foreignpolicy2000.org/library/issuebriefs/IBHumanRights.html The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention United States Institute for Peace (USIP) http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks45.pdf Humanitarian intervention: a controversial right United Nations http://www.unesco.org/courier/1999_08/uk/ethique/txt1.htm The Reasonable Public and the Polarized Policy Process I. M. (Mac) Destler http://www.americans-world.org/PDF/Destler.pdf About Sudan Genocide Emergency: Darfur, Sudan Twelve Ways to Deny a Genocide By Gregory H. Stanton Genocide Watch 13 September 2004 http://www.genocidewatch.org/SudanTwelveWaysToDenyAGenocidebyGregStanton.htm Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis International Crisis Group 25 March 2004 http://www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?id=2550&l=1 Darfur Deadline: A New International Action Plan International Crisis Group 23 August 2004 http://www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?id=2920&l=1

Globalization and the Muslim world


Mohd Abbas, Abdul Razak (2011) Globalization and the Muslim world.Journal for Islam in Asia (3). pp. 275295. PDF (Globalization and the Muslim world) - Published Version Restricted to Repository staff only Download (242Kb) | Request a copy

Abstract
History indicates that before the coming of modern globalization, the Muslims had their own version of globalization. During the Muslim era of globalization which coincides with the Golden Age of the Muslims, the West benefited immensely from the scholastic works produced by Muslim scientists and scholars. Modern globalization which started during the era of Western colonization of the East has now gone to every nook and cranny of the world. The usage of internet and other modern electronic media directly or indirectly has speeded up the process of transporting modern globalization to the world community. Modern globalization has brought about radical change in aims of education; it has marginalized local culture and language; it has caused brain drain everywhere in the world. Muslims, it seems, are perceiving globalization as identical to re-colonization. This paper intends to explore and investigate how modern globalization heralded by the west is different from Muslim globalization in the past.

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