Francisco vs CA, 122 SCRA 538 Facts: Petitioner Pablo C.

Francisco, upon humiliating his employees, was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five of his employees, each Information charging him with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980. On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, guilty of grave oral defamation, in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, and sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit. However, he was acquitted in for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify. Issue: (a) Whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed. Held: Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and serious consequences of the offense they might further commit. The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of the Revised Penal Code, and not necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of the disqualification of the petitioner is principally on the gravity of the offense committed and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of probation. The Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance which is analogous to passion or obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in each case to a straight penalty of eight months imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law; and to pay the costs. The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the application for probation with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow probation after an appeal has been perfected. Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an application for probation outside the period for perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED.

Quirino Mateo & Matias vs.

Dorotea Diaz, et al. G.R. No. 137305, January 17,2002 FACTS: The land involved is registered under the Torrens system in the name of petitioners father Claro Mateo. There is no question raised with respect to the validity of the title. Immediately after petitioners discovered the existence of OCT 206 in 1977 or 1978, they took steps to assert their rights thereto. They divided the land between the two of them in an extrajudicial partition. Then petitioners filed the case below to recover ownership and possession as the only surviving children of original owners, the late Claro Mateo. The RTC, Bulacan, at Malolos, ruled that prescription and laches are applicable against petitioners, that real actions over an immovable prescribe after 30 years, that ownership can be acquired thru possession in good faith and with just title for a period of 10 years, and that ownership may be acquired thru uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of just title or good faith. On appeal, CA affirmed RTCs decision. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the equitable doctrine of laches may override a provision of the Land Registration Act on imprescriptibility of title to registered land. Otherwise put, the issue raised is whether prescription and the equitable principle of laches are applicable in derogation of the title of the registered owner. HELD: A party who had filed immediately a case as soon as he discovered that the land in question was covered by a transfer certificate in the name of another person is not guilty of laches. An action to recover possession of a registered land never prescribe in view of the provision of Sec. 44 of Act 496 (now Sec. 47 of PD 1529) to the effect that no title to registered land in derogation to that of a registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. In fact, there is a host of jurisprudence that hold that prescription and laches could not apply to registered land covered by the Torrens system. With more reason are these principles applicable to laches, which is an equitable principle. Laches may not prevail against a specific provision law, since equity, which has been defined as justice outside legality is applied in the obscene of and not against statutory law or rules of procedure. Upon the other hand, the heirs of the registered owner are not stopped from claiming their fathers prope rty, since they merely stepped into the shoes of the previous owners. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner, but also against his hereditary successors because the latter merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessorin-interest. The CA erred in ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel OCT 206 of Claro Mateo and issue new titles to those who are occupying the subject land. This violates the indefeasibility of a Torrens title. The title of Claro Mateo could be cancelled only if there is competent proof that he had transferred his rights over the parcel of land to another party, otherwise title would pass to his heirs only by testate or intestate succession.

Republic of the Philippines v. Ricarte G.R No. L-46893, November 12,1985 Key Facts Francisco Ricarte filed his income tax return for the year 1958. On April 6, 1959, the Office of the Collector of Internal revenue made the assessment and fixed at 222.00. This is pursuant to the express provision of Sec 51 (a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (Commonwealth Act No. 466). The tax was paid in two installments. Then the R.A. No.2343 took effect in June 20, 1959, amending the Commonwealth Act No. 466 including Sec. 51 (a). Under the new act, the taxpayer assesses himself, files his return and pays the tax as shown in his return upon filing thereof.In 1961, Upon its subsequent assessment the BIR found that the defendant had a deficiency income tax liability of 1,136.87 for the year 1958. Then on the same year, BIR mailed an audit sheet and demand letter to the defendant. But the defendant failed to pay. On January 14, 1966, the plaintiff filed a complaint for collection of unpaid tax liability against the defendant. It asseverates that the Upon the assessment of the tax liability by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the tax deficiency should be paid by the defendant under the provisions of a new law.,R.A. 2343. On the other hand, the defendant assert that the action had already prescribed.

Issue of law: whether or not the appellant can still collect the alleged deficiency income tax liability thru judicial proceeding. Holdings The Court ruled that the reassessment made by the Bureau of Internal Revenue was made pursuant to the old law and not under the R.A. No. 2343/amendatory act. Thus, the 5-years prescriptive period as provided for in Section 332(c) already prescribed. Ratio Decidendi It can be gleaned from the facts that on March 2, 1959 the defendant filed his income tax return and the same was assessed b the BIR on April 6,1959. The amount due was previously computed by the BIR. Then upon finding that it made an error, the BIR reassessed the income tax liability of the defendant. Such subsequent assessment undertaken by the BIR was pursuant to the old law and not the amendatory act. With regards to the claim of the plaintiff that it filed an action within the 5 years prescriptive period; that the subsequent notice of assessment was made and appellee notified thereof on January 19, 1961; that from January 19, 1961 up to the date this case was filed in court on January 14, 1966, only four years, eleven months and twenty-five days had elapsed. It is not correct because the prescriptive period provided for in Sec.33(c) of the tax code should be counted from April 6, 1959 and not from the subsequent reassessment made by the plaintiff. Therefore, the action had already prescribed. Disposition The Supreme Court does not agree with the CFI of Cebu that the subsequent assessment made on January 19, 1961 was based on the amendatory act. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts decision that the action filed by the plaintiff had already prescribed. LAWSSec 51 (a) Sec. 51. Assessment and payment of income tax.-(a) An assessment shall be made by the Collector of Internal Revenue and all persons and corporations subject to tax shall be notified of the amount for which they are respectively liable on or before the first day of May of each successive year. As amended by R.A.2343 Sec. 51. Payment and assessment of income tax.(a) Payment of tax. (1) In general.-The total amount of tax imposed by this Title shall be paid at the time the return is filed but not later than the fifteenth day of April following the close of the calendar year, ... ... xxx xxx xxx (b) Assessment and payment of deficiency tax.After the return is filed the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall examine it and assess the correct amount of the tax. The tax or deficiency in tax so discovered shall be paid upon notice and demand from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. LEONIDES C. PENGSON, petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, REYNOLDS PHILIPPINE CORPORATION, WILLIAM W. DUNCAN, JR., PACIFIC MERCHANDISING CORPORATION and SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, respondents. ABAD SANTOS, J.: In the defunct Court of First Instance of Rizal, Leonides C. Pengson filed a suit against Reynolds Philippine Corporation and others (Civil Case No. Q-15060) for DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND INEFFICACY OF SALE OR RESCISSION OF SALE AND MORTGAGE WITH DAMAGES. The trial court decided for the plaintiff whereupon Reynolds Philippine Corporation appealed to

the Court of Appeals whose successor, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the decision. The instant petition was filed by Pengson with the following prayers: 1. that the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court be reversed and another entered affirming that of the trial court; 2. that alternatively a writ of mandamus be issued commanding the Intermediate Appellate Court to make complete findings of facts. The decision of the appellate court which is sought to be reviewed gives the following factual background: The defendant Pacific Merchandising Corporation, hereinafter known as PMC is the owner of shares in the Aluminum Products (Alpro) to the extent of 96% of its capital (share) holdings. PMC was indebted to defendant Reynolds Philippines Corporation, hereinafter referred to as Reynolds, in the sum of more than P800,000.00, because of which indebtedness its shares in the Alpro were pledged with Reynolds as a collateral of its loan. Because PMC needed some money, it decided to sell its shares with the Alpro to the herein plaintiff Leonides C. Pengson', the deed of sale being evidenced by Exhibit A. Among other things, the plaintiff assumed the obligation of PMC to Reynolds, which amount however was reduced from more than P800,000.00 to only P500,000.00. Since the certificates covering the shares were then held by Reynolds in pledge as security for PMC obligation, the former's consent to the sale with assumption had to be obtained. As a security for the payment to Reynolds of the aforesaid P500,000.00 in five (5) annual installments, the first installment being P125,000.00. Pengson mortgaged to Reynolds a parcel of land. While Pengson paid the first installment in the sum of P125,000.00 in three (3) installments and a bit late, the next in installments which fell due were not paid for in spite of demands. Consequently, Reynolds foreclosed by considering an unpaid installments due and demandable. (Rollo, pp. 25- 26.) The trial court in its decision said: In other words, it is the considered opinion of this Court that the sale having been rendered ineffective by Reynolds' refusal and failure to deriver the certificates, subject of the sale, the mortgage, Exhibit B, and the promissory note embodied therein were likewise rendered ineffective. As stated earlier, Reynolds' refusal and failure to deliver the certificates wore tantamount to its withdrawing the conformity it had previously given to the sale. Without its conformity the sale, Exhibit A, was nothing but a mere scrap of paper. (R.A. p. 235.) The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision' states: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Reynolds Philippines; 1. Declaring the sale, Exhibit A, ineffective or ineffectual for failure or refusal of Reynolds to deliver the certificates of stocks subject of the sale after having previously given its consent to the sale, tantamount to its withdrawing the formity or consent it had previously given;

2. Declaring the accessory contract of mortgage (Exh. B) similarly ineffective or ineffectual as a consequence of the ineffectivity or ineffectuality of the sale in consideration of which it was executed;

3. Declaring illegal, and null and void, the foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale at public auction of the property covered by T.C.T. No. 77093 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City; 4. Declaring null and void the certificate of sale, Exhibit G, and the transfer certificate of title which the Register of Deeds of Quezon City may have issued as a result of said certificate of sale; 5. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to reinstate in the records of the Registry of Deeds, T.C.T. No. 77093, and to cancel the mortgage encumbrance thereon as a result of the execution of the mortgage, Exhibit B; 6. Ordering and sentencing defendant Reynolds Philippines to return and pay back to plaintiff the sum of P125,300.00; 7. Ordering and sentencing defendant Reynolds Philippines to pay plaintiff the amount of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees; and 8. Ordering defendant Reynolds Philippines to pay the costs. (R.A. pp. 239-241.) In reversing the appealed decision, the Intermediate Appellate Court in part said: 3. Because of the said decision, defendant Reynolds and the Sheriff of Quezon City appealed upon errors which boil down to a resolution of the question: Was Reynolds under any obligation (on account of the deed of sale of PMC holdings in Alpro in favor of the plaintiff to surrender the said certificates of stocks to the plaintiff, failling in which plaintiff was entitled to the relief of nullification of the deed of sale, Exhibit A; a declaration of ineffectivity of the mortgage contract, Exhibit B; and the other collateral incidents adverted to in the appealed decision. Our answer is negative. To start with, Reynolds was not a party to the contract of sale between PMC and the herein plaintiff. This being so, it had no obligation whatsoever on the strength of the contract ii favor of the plain. plaintiff. By the terms of the contract, however, since plaintiff undertook to pay PMC obligation to Reynolds, plaintiff was under obligation with the PMC on account of the said undertaking. Otherwise, there is absolutely no reciprocal obligation between the herein plaintiff and the appellant Reynolds. The stock certificates which PMC owned were in the possession of Reynolds because of PMC indebtedness to Reynolds in the sum of more than P800,000.00. PMC stock certificates in Alpro which were about 96% of Alpro's share holding was in fact pledged by PMC to Reynolds as a collateral for the plaintiff's indebtedness to the latter. The indebtedness of PMC to Reynolds was

reduce to the sum of P500,000.00 on account of an arrangement it had with the herein plaintiff. Otherwise said, the new debtor of Reynolds was the plaintiff and no longer PMC To argue now, as the plaintiff contends, that Reynolds was under an obligation to return the certificates of stocks pledged to it by PMC is to put the plaintiff in a better footing than PMC was with Reynolds. There is absolutely no agreement by Reynolds to that effect in the consent it gave to the sale by PMC of the said shares in favor of the plaintiff. By resolving the said principal issue, further discussion of the other errors assigned is hereby rendered moot and academic. (Rollo, p. 28.) Accordingly, the appellate court rendered a judgment ordering Pengson's estate to pay Reynolds: a) The amount of P265,494.16, plus 8% interest thereon per annum from December 10, 1970 when Reynolds' counterclaim was filed, until its full payment; b) P951.98 representing stipulated interest on P255,494.16 from November 23, 1970 when the foreclosure sale took place up to December 10, 1970, with legal rate of interest thereon until full payment; c) P239.00 as expenses for the foreclosure proceeding, plus legal rate of interest thereon from November 23, 1970, until fun payment; d) 10% of the amount due as stipulated attorney's fees. (Rollo, pp. 28-29.) The petitioner urges reversal of the decision under review on four counts but in the alternative prays that the appellate court be ordered to make complete findings of facts such as those made by the trial court. The alternative prayer is impressed with merit. The decision of the appellate court in respect of the facts is indeed sketchy compared to the facts stated in the decision of the trial court which is found in the Record on Appeal. The deficiency of the appellate court's decision is made more manifest by the extensive factual statements made by private respondent Reynolds in its Opposition to Petition to Review on Certiorari. WHEREFORE, this case is returned to the Intermediate Appellate Court which is hereby ordered to make complete findings of fact and on the basis thereof to render another decision, The Intermediate Appellate Court is also ordered to scrutinize more closely the legal aspects of Exhibit A and its conclusion that Reynolds was not a party to the contract of sale between Pengson and the Pacific Merchandising Corporation PMC in the light of Reynold's foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Pengson to secure the payment of PMC debt to Reynolds. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-65377 May 28, 1984 MOLAVE MOTOR SALES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. CRISPIN C. LARON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XLIV and PEDRO GEMENIANO, respondents. Respondent Judge, presiding Branch XLIV of the Regional Trial Court in Dagupan City, had dismissed the case below for lack of jurisdiction and had denied reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner, PLAINTIFF in the case below, is a corporation engaged in the sale and repair of motor vehicles in Dagupan City. Private respondent, the DEFENDANT in the case below, was, or is, the sales manager of PLAINTIFF. Whether or not there was still a relationship of employer and employee between the parties when the complaint was filed is an unsettled question which need not be resolved in this instance. Alleging that DEFENDANT was a former employee, PLAINTIFF had sued him, on March 22, 1983, for payment of accounts pleaded as follows: That during his incumbency as such the defendant caused and without authority from the plaintiff incurred accounts with the remaining balances in the total sum of P33,890.38 excluding interests, arising from the purchases of vehicles and parts, repair jobs of his personal cars and cash advances, faithful reproductions of the Vehicle Invoice, Debit Memos, Deed of Absolute Sale, Repair Orders, Charge Invoices, Vouchers, Promissory Notes, Acknowledgement Letter and Statement of Account, hereto attached and marked as Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D", "E", "F", "G", "H", "I", "J", "K", "L", "M", and "N" respectively and the contents of which being herein additionally pleaded and made integral parts hereof; (Emphasis supplied) In his Answer, DEFENDANT denied ... that he incurred any unpaid unauthorized accounts with the plaintiff in the total sum of P33,890.38 excluding interests therefor, and, specifically denies under oath that the annexed Vehicle Invoice, Debits Memos Deed of Absolute Sale, Repair Orders, Charge Invoices, Vouchers, Promissory Notes, Acknowledgement Letter and Statement of Account have remained unpaid as in fact the truth of the matter is as follows, to wit: (Emphasis supplied) DEFENDANT further alleged in a counterclaim that he should still be considered an employee of PLAINTIFF inasmuch as there has been no application for clearance in regards to his separation. At the pre-trial conference, the DEFENDANT raised the question of jurisdiction of the Court stating that PLAINTIFF's complaint arose out of employer-employee relationship, and he subsequently moved for dismissal. It was then when respondent Judge dismissed the case

finding that the sum of money and damages sued upon arose from employer-employee relationship and that jurisdiction belonged to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Before the enactment of BP Blg. 227 on June 1, 1982, Labor Arbiters, under paragraph 5 of Article 217 of the Labor Code had jurisdiction over "all other cases arising from employeremployee relation, unless expressly excluded by this Code." Even then, the principle followed by this Court was that, although a controversy is between an employer and an employee, the Labor Arbiters have no jurisdiction if the Labor Code is not involved. In Medina vs. CastroBartolome, 116 SCRA 597, 604, in negating jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, although the parties were an employer and two employees, Mr. Justice Abad Santos stated: The pivotal question to Our mind is whether or not the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs. For if the Labor Code has no relevance, any discussion concerning the statutes amending it and whether or not they have retroactive effect is unnecessary. It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. It results that the orders under review are based on a wrong premise. And in Singapore Airlines Limited vs. Pao, 122 SCRA 671, 677, the following was said: Stated differently, petitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and claims no benefits under the Labor Code. The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The other items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in labor disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The items claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute. In the case below, PLAINTIFF had sued for monies loaned to DEFENDANT, the cost of repair jobs made on his personal cars, and for the purchase price of vehicles and parts sold to him. Those accounts have no relevance to the Labor Code. The cause of action was one under the civil laws, and it does not breach any provision of the Labor Code or the contract of employment of DEFENDANT. Hence, the civil courts, not the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC, should have jurisdiction. BP Blg. 227 has amended Article 217 of the Labor Code to read as follows: ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural: 1. Unfair labor practice cases; 2. Those that ( involve) WORKERS MAY FILE INVOLVING wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social security, and maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and 5. CASES ARISING FROM ANY VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 265 OF THIS CODE, INCLUDING QUESTIONS INVOLVING THE LEGALITY OF STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS. 6. All other claims arising from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code]. (Italics and bracketed portions indicate the deletions, while the amendments introduced are capitalized). The dismissal of the case below on the ground that the sum of money and damages sued upon arose from employer-employee relationship was erroneous. Claims arising from employeremployee relations are now limited to those mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 217. There is no difficulty on our part in stating that those in the case below should not be faulted for not being aware of the last amendment to the frequently changing Labor Code. The claim of DEFENDANT that he should still be considered an employee of PLAINTIFF, because the latter has not sought clearance for his separation from the service, will not affect the jurisdiction of respondent Judge to resolve the complaint of PLAINTIFF. DEFENDANT could still be liable to PLAINTIFF for payment of the accounts sued for even if he remains an employee of PLAINTIFF. WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to take cognizance of the case below and to render judgment therein accordingly.No costs.SO ORDERED.