NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW MASSACHUSETTS CRIMINAL DIGEST

Commonwealth v. Daley, 463 Mass. 620 (2012)

CONTRIBUTING EDITOR: SARAH J. KMIECIAK I. Procedural History

A grand jury indicted the defendant on three counts including: (1) motor vehicle homicide; (2) negligent operation of a motor vehicle; and (3) leaving the scene of an accident where death resulted and was tried in a bench trial in Superior Court.1 The judge denied both the defendants motion for required findings of not guilty at the close of the prosecutions case and his renewed motion at the conclusion of the trial.2 The trial court judge found the defendant not guilty of the indictments for motor vehicle homicide and negligent operation of a motor vehicle.3 At issue with the final indictment for leaving the scene of an accident where death resulted was whether the Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant knew he collided with a person.4 The judge initially held the defendant guilty stating that the statute only required the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant knowingly collided with an object, there was no requirement to show that the defendant knowingly collided with a person.5 Prior to sentencing the defendant filed a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 25(a) to set aside the conviction.6 At sentencing, the judge stated that after reconsideration he had misinterpreted the statute.7 He found that the statute did require that a defendant have knowledge that he had collided with a person.8 As such, the judge stated that he should have held that the Commonwealth did not

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Commonwealth v. Daley, 463 Mass. 620, 622 (2012). Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. at 622-623. Commonwealth v. Daley, supra at 623. Id.

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meet its burden.9 The judge advised the defendant to file a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b).10 The judge stated in his memorandum of decision and order on the motion that the defendant was not guilty of leaving the scene of an accident where death resulted as the Commonwealth did not meet is burden by proving that the defendant knowingly collided with a person.11 The judge found that he had erred by entering a judgment of guilty and resolved this error of law by entering a judgment of acquittal.12 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted the Commonwealths application for direct appellate review.13 II. Facts On December 23, 2009, the defendant was driving on Robertson Street in Quincy.14 On that night the street was lined with snow banks from one to two feet high.15 As the defendant was driving he struck a pedestrian with the passenger side of his Toyota truck.16 The victim was discovered the next morning on the sidewalk between the snow banks.17 The victim had died of blunt force trauma to his chest, and at the time of death had a blood alcohol level of .25 percent.18 The police held a press conference identifying the car that struck the victim as a Toyota and asking for the publics assistance in finding the driver.19 The defendant, hearing the announcement, turned himself in via his attorney.20 The defendant stated that on that night he had attended a party in Quincy and over the course of the evening he drank two glasses of wine.21 At approximately 11 P.M., the defendant was driving home and glanced away from the road to reach for a cup of coffee in his cup holder, and he felt his car strike something.22 He stopped a short distance down the road approximately 100 feetgot out of the truck, and walked a distance of

Id. Id. 11 Id. 12 Id. 13 Commonwealth v. Daley, supra at 620. 14 Id. at 621. 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 Id. 19 Commonwealth v. Daley, supra at 621. 20 Id. 21 Id. 22 Id. at 621-622.
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about ten to twenty feet down the street to determine what he hit.23 The defendant did not see anything in the street and got in the car and drove away.24 The defendant noticed damage to his side view mirror but assumed he had hit a signpost, fire hydrant, or something else solid.25 The defendant maintains that he is unaware that he hit a person until he heard the announcement of the police press conference at which point he turned himself in.26 III. Issues Presented Whether under G. L. c. 90, 24(2)(a1/2)(2) the Commonwealth has the burden to prove that a defendant knowingly collided with a person rather than an object to receive a conviction for leaving the scene of an accident where death resulted.27 IV. Holdings and Reasoning The Court relied on the ordinary language of the sentence to interpret the statute.28 The court found that the adverb knowingly modifies both verbs within the clause.29 Here, the statute states Whoever operates a motor vehicle . . . [who] goes away to avoid prosecution or evade apprehension after knowingly colliding with or otherwise causing injury to any person shall, if the injuries result in the death of a person, be punished . . . .30 The Commonwealth argued: (1) that Commonwealth v. McMenimon31 and Commonwealth v. Horsfall32 apply; and (2) that the legislative history of the statute supports their argument that the defendant does not have to have knowledge that the object he struck was, in fact, a person.33 For the first argument, the Court found that these cases could be distinguished from the case at issue on the factsneither of those cases dealt with the issue of whether a defendant had knowledge that he collided

Id. at 622. Id. 25 Commonwealth v. Daley, supra at 622. 26 Id. at 621-622. 27 Id. at 620. 28 Id. at 623, citing Foss v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 584, 586 (2002). 29 Id., citing Flores Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 647 (2000); Ten Local Citizen Group v. New England Wind, LLC, 457 Mass. 222, 229 (2010); Rowley v. Massachusetts Elec. Co., 438 Mass. 798, 802 (2003).
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G. L. c. 90, 24(2) (a ) (2). Commonwealth v. McMenimon, 295 Mass. 467 (1936). Commonwealth v. Horsfall, 213 Mass. 232 (1913). Commonwealth v. Daley, supra at 624-625.

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with a person.34 As for the second issue, the Court reiterated that when the words and meaning of a statute are clear there is no reason to resort to extrinsic aids, such as legislative history.35 Ultimately, the Court held that the plain language of the statute requires that a person must knowingly cause harm to a person to be liable for leaving the scene of an accident.36 Here, the Commonwealth failed to show that the defendant knowingly hit a person; therefore they did not meet the required burden of proof. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed.37

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Id. at 625. Id., quoting Foss v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 584, 586 (2002). Id. at 626. Id.